Violence In The Congo: A Perspective Of United Nation's Peacekeeping CSC 1984 SUBJECT AREA Foreign Policy ABSTRACT Title: Violence in the Congo; A Perspective of United Nation's Peacekeeping Author: Bloomer, David R. Major, U.S. Marine Corps Duty as part of a multinational peacekeeping force is certainly not a routine assignment for U.S. Marines. However, as evidenced by the Marines' participation as the core of the multinational force in Beirut, Lebanon, such an assignment is possible. Unfortunately, until the Marines in Beirut began to suffer casualties, there seemed to be little appreci- ation in the Marine Corps for some of the unique problems which are in- herent to all peacekeeping missions. This paper proposes to study the problems which are associated with peacekeeping through an analysis of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Congo. The U.N. pioneered international peacekeeping in the 1950's. The Congo mission, which lasted from July, 1960, through June, 1964, was the largest, the costliest, the most complex, and the most controversial of the numerous peacekeeping missions which the U.N. has sponsored. Although the U.N. Peacekeeping Force (UNF) accomplished a lot in the Congo, it also made a lot of mistakes. An understanding of what happened in the Congo and an appreciation for the problems that confronted the UNF will enable any Marine to function more effectively should he ever be assigned to a peacekeeeping mission. The United Nations played a unique role in the Congo's struggle to achieve stability after her emancipation from Belgium. The United Nations Peacekeeping Force entered the Congo as a neutral party for the purpose of restoring law and order in a riot torn country. Two years later it was actively supporting the Congolese Government's attempt to end the secession of the province of Katanga. The events that caused the metamor- phosis in the UNF from a neutral peacekeeper to an apparent belligerent form the basis of this study. This study begins by tracing the roots of the Congo's political prob- lems and with an analysis of the events that led to the establishment of the UNF. This is followed by an analysis of the Security Council mandate which authorized the Congo peacekeeping force. This mandate, which pro- vided the legal basis for the peacekeeping force to operate and which delineated the limits of its authority, changed several times during the course of the Congo crisis. These changes and their affects on the UNF are examined in detail. This is followed by a description of some of the problems which confronted the UNF and by an account of the major military operations in which the UNF participated. The concluding chapter analyzes the UNF's mission in the Congo in light of eight principles which have been established for peacekeeping. The conclusion is reached that, al- though the UNF accomplished its basic mission in the Congo, by the end of the crisis it could no longer be characterized as a true peacekeeping force. Rather, the UNF seemed to be a psuedo-belligerent in the struggle over Katanga's secession. The study concludes with a brief comment on the Beirut multinational force with regards to the principles of peace- keeping. The conclusion is reached that when the Beirut force was estab- lished, many of the fundamentals of peacekeeping were violated. Conse- quently, given the military and political situation in Lebanon at the time, the violence that consumed the Marines in Beirut was inevitable. The author relied heavily on numerous books which have been written on U.N. peacekeeping in general and on the Condo mission in particular. Numerous professional journals offered insight into the nature of peace- keeping. Of particular value were transcripts of two speeches which were delivered at the Royal United Service Institution by several prominent authorities on peacekeeping. As a note on sources, the Congo was a con- troversial issue which polarized world opinion. Consequently, unbiased opinions were frequently difficult to find. WAR SINCE 1945 SEMINAR Violence in the Congo: A Perspective of United Nations Peacekeeping Major David R. Bloomer, USMC 2 April 1984 Marine Corps Command and Staff College Marine Corps Development and Education Command Quantico, Virginia 22134 Table of Contents Map: The Congo in 1960 i Chapters One Seeds of Conflict 3 Endnotes 13 Two Independence and Chaos 14 Endnotes 21 Three Mission Overview 22 Endnotes 29 Four Mandate for Action 30 Endnotes 42 Five Problems of a Peacekeeper 44 Endnotes 66 Six Struggle in Katanga 68 Endnotes 87 Seven Conclusions and Analysis 89 Endnotes 114 Bibliography 116 Click here to view image INTRODUCTION Until the Marines who were a part of the multinational peace- keeping force in Beirut, Lebanon, began taking casualties, few Marines, outside of those who were serving in Beirut, appreciated the unique prob- lems associated with peacekeeping duty. For those who were still unaware, that unawareness was shattered when a terrorist detonated a truck loaded with TNT that he had driven through the front of the Marine barracks. Two hundred thirty-nine Marines and sailors died as a result. In a con- ventional war, it is safe to assume that such an attack would never have succeeded. Yet it succeeded in Beirut - partly because of the nature of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is different. It is not a conventional mili- tary mission and consequently, it entails unique problems and associated dangers. The United Nations pioneered the concept of international peace- keeping during the 1950's. Since then, the U.N. has sponsored numerous peacekeeping missions throughout the world. The largest, the most expen- sive, the most complex, and the most controversial of these missions was the United Nations' attempt to maintain peace in the Congo from July, 1960 until June, 1964. This paper proposes to examine the unique nature of peacekeeping through a detailed study of the military, political, and legal aspects of the U.N. peacekeeping mission in the Congo. Numerous principles have been developed which govern peacekeeping operations. These are discussed in the concluding chapter. Three of these principles, however, are particularly germane to the issues in the Congo and should be kept in mind. First, a peacekeeping force, if it is to be successful, requires the consent of all major parties to the dis- pute. Second, a peacekeeping force should remain neutral troughout the conflict towards all parties to the dispute. Third, a peacekeeping force should implement military force only in cases of extreme self-defense. The Congo mission was controversial for the United Nations. Most of the controversy centered around the manner in which the peacekeeping force observed the aforementioned principles. Not insignificantly, these three principles and the manner in which they were observed by the Marines in Lebanon were a prime cause of the difficulties which the Marines experi- enced. CHAPTER ONE SEEDS OF CONFLICT "Does independence come wrapped in paper or do we get it at the bank?" Anonymous Congolese The former Belgian colony of the Congo erupted in violent fury shortly after its emancipation in 1960. The country was swept into virtual anarchy as its government lost control of all forces of law and order. For three years, events in the fledgling country dominated the world's headlines as a United Nations peacekeeping force struggled to arrest violent tribal conflicts, to restore law and order, and to prevent a bloody civil war. Most of the Congo's difficulties were rooted in paternalistic policies which were pursued by Belgium prior to the Congo's independence, and in the nature of the Congolese people and their politics. Thees problems proved hard to eradicated and presented difficulties for the peacekeeping force throughout its involvement. A brief study of events which led to the Congo's independence will in- crease appreciation for the complexities that faced the peacekeeping force. Belgian involvement in the Congo began in 1885 when the Belgian Parliament authorized King Leopold to take possession of the Central African territory known as the Congo Free State. King Leopold rules the land as his personal possession until 1923 when the Free State was transferred to Belgium as an official colony. The Congo remained a colony until 30 June 1960, when it was granted independence. Located astride the Congo River basin in tropical Africa, the colony covered an area the size of Western Europe. The Congo prospered under the Belgians, largely because of its vast mineral wealth. The province of Katanga, located in the Southeastern corner of the colony, proved to be rich in copper, gold, diamonds, tin, manganese, uranium and cobalt. Bel- gian mining companies flourished in Katanga and the provincial natives grew accustomed to a close association with Belgian money. The Congo's climate and topography ranged from the steaming rain forests of the Congo basin to the temperate mountain plateaus and bush country of the Eastern provinces. By 1960, its six provinces boasted a population of 13 million which was divided into some 200 tribes and seventy ethnic groups who, between them, spoke over 400 dialects. In- terspersed among them were approximately 100,000 Belgian nationals. Although the Belgians were not especially enlightened rulers, they certainly could not be characterized as repressive. They ruled their colony with a kind of benevolent paternalism which ensured cordial rela- tions with their subjects, but did little to prepare the Congolese for the rigors of self-rule. The Belgians envisioned a gradual broadening of Congolese economic and educational horizons but made little attempt to engender what could be called a truly elite academic, social or eco- nomic class of Congolese. Content with the status quo, the Belgians could see no time in the forseeable future when the Congolese would be required to govern themselves. Consequently, when the Congo was swept up in the nationalistic ferver that engulfed Africa after the Second World War and cries for self determination surfaced during the mid- 1950's, the Belgians found themselves with a colony that was pitifully unprepared to rule itself. For example: the Belgians had made no at- tempt to integrate the Congolese into the administration of the colonial government and all positions of importance were held by Belgians. There were no qualified Congolese doctors, nor were there any native professional societies, for few natives had progressed beyond primary school and there were less than fifteen Congolese college graduates. Significantly, all officers in the 25,000 man Congolese army were Belgians.1 As late as 1955, the Congolese had exhibited little interest in independence. However, in December of that year, a paper published by Professor A. A. J. VanBilsen of the University Institute for Overseas Territories in Antwerp stirred interest in independence among the more educated and more politically astute Congolese. VanBilsen's paper, entitled "A Thirty Year Plan for the Political Emancipation of Belgian Africa," argued persuasively that Belgium was following no plan leading toward Congolese self-determination and that Belgium was entirely at fault for the total lack of a Congolese professional society. He further implicated Belgian policy for "giving too little attention not only to the formation of competent indigenous elites, but above all to the awakening among them ( the Congolese) of the sense of their responsibili- ties toward the general good."2 Because of these mistakes, he argued that it would take at least thirty years to prepare the Congo for independence. He proposed a future "grand Congolese federation" based on the already created Belgian administrative system. Although Belgian reaction to VanBilsen's proposals was mixed, re- action among the few Congolese who were aware of the "Thirty Year Plan" was generally enthusiastic. The proposal generated political awareness and led to the publication, in 1956, of the first formal Congolese document rejecting Belgian rule. The doculment, entitled simply "The Manifesto", was published by Joseph Ileo who was later to become the Congo's prime minister. It politely but firmly rejected any concept of the Congo's becoming an African copy of Belgium. Ileo state that: "The present mainfesto is only a point of departure. We will sharpen and complete it together with those who come later to join us...The next thirty years will be decisive for our fu- ture. It would be vain to base our national sentiment on at- tachment to the past. It is toward the future that we must turn our attention...We will only find this new equilibrium in the synthesis of our African character and temperamant with the fundamental riches of Western civilization...we wish to be civilized Congolese, not dark-skinned Europeans"3 The response to this call for Congolese to take more initiative and more responsibility for their country was electric. Word of "The Mani- festo" swept African sections of the Congo's cities and filtered into the bush country where it aroused the passions of even illiterate natives. Although Ileo was content to work slowly for independence, other groups were not so patient. Several weeks after the appearance of "The Mani- festo", Joseph Kasavubu published a counter manifesto which demanded more rapid action. Kasavubu was a dynamic leader who was to become the Congo's first president. Whereas Ileo invisioned a nation united under a single party, Kasavubu thought that political struggle among several parties was vital to the Congo. His reaction to the "Thirty Year Plan" was directly opposite to Ileo's, he wrote: "For us, we do not wish to collaborate in the elaboration of this plan, but purely and simply to annul it because its application would serve only to further retard the Congo. In reality, it is only the same old lullaby. Our patience is already exhausted. Since the hour has come, emancipation should be granted us this day rather than delayed another thirty years."4 The Congolese were slowly becoming aware of the awakening nationalism within their country. As an anti-colonial ferver swept Africa, three events occurred in 1958 which fanned nationalistic fires within the Congo. The first event was the Brussels' World's Fair where seven Congo pavilions were among Belgium's contribution. The Fair was attended by a number of prominent Congolese and the pavilions were staffed by several hundred natives. Due to poor communications and the extreme difficulty of travel within the Congo, the Fair was the first opportunity for many of the Congo's tribal leaders to meet. It provided an opportunity for them to exchange political and cultural ideas, to view Belgian and Eu- ropean lifestyles, and to search among themselves for common political ground. The second events was Congolese reaction to a spech delivered by French president Charles DeGaulle in August 1958 to citizens of Braz- zaville in French Equitorial Africa. In his speech, DeGaulle declared that it should be French policy to grant independence as soon as possi- ble to any of their colonies that wished it. This elicited a reaction from the Congo's more forceful nationalists who were led by Patrice Lumumba. He and most of the Congo's future political leaders signed a motion which was delivered to the Belgian minister of the Congo. This motion demanded a date for the end of colonization, called for Congolese representation on a study group that was examining the ques- tion of indenpendence, and rejected regional federalism in favor of a United Congo. By this time, Lumumba had emerged as the dominant figure in Con- golese politics. As leader of the Congo's largest political party, he attended a Pan-African conference in Ghana and was made a perma- nent member of the organization established there. No longer isolated in the Congo, he had a chance to meet with other African leaders and to learn first hand about nationalist movements in other parts of Africa. Though the Congolese were demonstrating increased political aware- ness, their political system was fragmented and most political parties originated in individual tribal groups. Parties were frequently short lived as they, often, merged or simply disappeared. By mid 1959, there were thirty-one formal parties in the Congo and by the spring of 1960, the number had grown to one hundred twenty. Most of these parties orginated in urban areas; however, many were dedicated to the preser- vation of the country's rural interests. However, due to poor com- munications, urban parties frequently had difficulty identifying and maintaining the allegience of their rural constituents. Consequently, large portions of the rural population had no strong political convic- tions and were easily influenced by the most recent politician to speak with them. By 1960, these parties had coalesced into four political factions. The first was best exemplified by Joseph Kasavubu and his ABAKO party which espoused a policy of separation from Belgium. Once independence was gained from Belgium, the ABAKO wanted to divide the existing Congo into several autonomous states. Closely aligned witht he separatist movement was the CONAKAT party which was led by Moise Tshombe. As political leader of wealthy Kantanga province, Tshombe was a nationalist who foresaw a loose Congo confederation in which considerable power would be vested in the individual provinces. Significantly, he favored the continuation of strong economic ties with Belgium. Lumumba, as head of the Movement National Congolese (MNC), was the leader of the Congo's only true national party. He envisioned a Congo unified under a single strong central governement. The fourth, and weakest, tendency was espoused by moderates who called for maintenance of close ties with Belgium and who stressed no timetable for independence. Both the ABAKO and CONAKAT parties were regional factions. Kasavubu drew his strength from the tribes of the lower Congo region near the capital of Leopoldville. Although he professed to desire a multi- stated Congo, Kasavubu subjugated his personal beliefs after the Congo gained independence, and he strived to maintain the power and unity of the Central Government. Tshombe, on the other hand, derived his support from the wealth and mining interests in lower Katanga. Rather than sub- jugate Katanga and its wealth to the Central Government, once indepen- dence for the Congo was gained, Tshombe chose to establish Katanga as a separate state. The stormy relationships between leaders of the Congo's strongest political parties was to cause nothing but political turmoil in the months following independence. As co-leaders of the Central Govern- ment, Kasavubu and Lumumha's inability to trust each other was to vir- tually paralyze the Central Government, while Moise Tshombe's determina- tion to create an independent state of Katanga was to bring the Congo to the brink of civil war. Until January 1959, there had been little of the violence that had chracterized many African struggles to overthrow European colonia- lism. However, on 4 January, the Belgian government banned an ABAKO rally in Leopoldville and Belgian paternalism died ingloriously in the resulting violence. By the time the rioting ceased two days later, an estimated fifty people were dead and over 300 had been injured. The Belgians were stunned. They had underestimated the intensity of Congo- lese nationalism and the depth of the hatred towards Europeans that had been carefully nurtured by some Congolese leaders. The Belgians capi- tulated to Congolese demands. Within two weeks, they offered to grant the Congo independence, but offered no timetable. The Congo was in an uproar, but most Belgian citizens cared little about what happened in the colony; and, in particular, they did not want to fight a war to preserve it as a colony. Only those who had business interests in the Congo cared much about what happened. Among, those, the general consensus was that, since the Congolese natives were so undereducated, they would have to rely almost entirely on the Belgians. Consequently, life within the Condo would proceed pretty much as before. The prevailing attitude was summed up by an article in "La Releve" by M. Staelens. He wrote: "In fact our (Belgian) policy reflected both a background of sheer funk (obession with the Algerian war) and a rather Machiavellian calculation....He (deSchrijver, the responsi- ble Belgian Minister) granted independence immediately, but without carrying out any of the reforms urged by M. VanBilsen. The reason for this is that he never intended conferring on the Congolese anything more than a purely fictitious and nominal independence. The financial circles concerned firmly believed -as for our political circles, they were more naive than any- thing else-- that it would be enough to give a few Congolese leaders title of "Minister" or "Deputy", with decorations, luxury motor-cars, big salaries, and splendid houses in the European quarter, in order to put a definite stop to the eman- cipation movement which threatened the financial interests."5 Despite Belgium's guarantee of independence, Lumumba continued to keep the pressure on the Belgian governement. During April 1959, he convened a coalition of eight political parties which drafted what be- came the MNC party platform. The platform demanded the appointment of a commission to oversee elections, called for universal suffrage, and pressed for a detailed timetable for independence. Widespread rioting continued throughout the Congo, and in January 1960, the Belgians acquiesced to Congolese demands for a date for their independence. A conference in Brussels established 30 June 1960 as independence day. The new state was to be established on the basis of the six provinces originally set up by the Belgians. The first govern- ment was to be established by elections which were to be conducted in May. This governement would subsequently draft a constitution and elect the head of state. The May elections resulted in a narrow victory for Lumumba's national party over Kasavubu's ABAKO party. The electorate voted along regional lines, and Lumumba's party could control the government in only three of the Congo's six provinces. Significantly, his party had no representation in Katanga. Immediately after the election results were announced, the Congo divided into pro and anti-Lumumba camps. Lumumba could get no support from Kasavubu and had difficulty forming a government. In Katanga, Tshombe flatly refused to have anything to do with the Central Govern- ment. However, one week prior to independence, a compromise was reached. Kasavubu was elected to the largely ceremonial office of President, and Lumumba was named Prime Minister and Defense Minister. In five short years, the Congo had evolved from a colony that had not even contemplated self-rule to the verge of independence. Al- though emancipation was at hand, the Congolese people enjoyed neither political nor social stability. The country had no common language, no common culture, and little sense of national identity. More impor- tantly, the largely uneducated population, 78% of which lived in the rural bush areas, was frightfully ignorant of ramifications of emancipation from Belgium. They had been led to believe, often by unscrupulous politicians, that independence would bring instant wealth. Other Congolese believed that they would inherit all Belgian property. Many had no comprehension of the meaning of independence and viewed it as an animate object that would arrive by train or be delivered in a box on independence day. Worst of all was the hate. Two races that had lived peacefully for three quarters of a century watched each other cautiously. Anti-European diatribes screamed at the Congolese natives had whipped many of them to a blood - thirsty frenzy. The Congolese government was led by two men who neither liked nor trusted each other. Across provincial borders, Moise Tshombe stood ready to make good his dream of an independent Katanga. In between, was the Congolese army which was soon to be stripped of its entire of- ficer corps. The bloody violence that ensued precipitated a crisis that lasted nearly three years and that split factions of the Western Alliance. The United Nations deployed a peacekeeping force to the Congo in an attempt to restore law and order. The military activities of this force created a storm of controversy and tested the credibility of the U. N. . ENDNOTES CHAPTER ONE 1David W. Wainhouse, International Peacekeeping at the Cross- roads (Baltimore:Johns. Hopkins University Press, 1973) pp. 267-68. 2Alan P. Merriam, Congo: Background of Conflict (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1961), pp.69 3Ibid., pp.71-2. 4Ibid., p.76. 5Conor Cruise O'Brien, To Katanga and Back (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962), facing page. CHAPTER TWO INDEPENDENCE AND CHAOS "The huge bonfires of joy died down the cities of the Congo. The drums and tom toms grew guiet. The last writhing dancers fell exhausted in the dust. The wild intoxication of newly won independence was over and the monstrous hangover began. With a primeval howl a nation of 14 million people reverted to near savagery, plunged backward into the long night of chaos." Time Independence day - 30 June 1960. Poorly prepared for independence and beset by political and social problem, the Congo struggled to cope with its newly won status. Lumumba's government was a fragile coalition- weak and composed of leaders who had little training to handle the tasks that confronted them. Racial tensions continued to escalate when Lumumba made an impassioned anti-Belgian speech at ceremonies commemorating the Congo's independence. A litany of anti-European rhetoric had driven many previously indifferent Congolese to a frenzy of hate aginst the Belgians. Many bold assurances had been made and impatient natives eagerly antici- pated the arrival of promised wealth. In the bush country, the drums beat and tribal unrest went unchecked as the Belgian authorities prepared to withdraw. In Elisabethville, across 800 miles of jungle from the Congo's capital, Moise Tshombe plotted independence for his mineral rich province. Caught in the midst of the turmoil, confusion, and hate, was the Con- go's poorly trained 25,000 man army, the Force Publique. The army had a reputation for ruthless effectiveness; but it was composed largely of mal contents and trouble makers who were held in check by brutal discipline that was imposed by their 1100 man, Belgian officer corps. (An agreement between Belgium and the new Congolese government provided for the Belgian officers of the Force Publique to remain until natives could be trained to replace them.) The hysteria which surrounded independence had permea- ted the army and it had raised their expectations of wealth and power. Despite impending independence and African cries for reform, the force commander, Lieutenant General Emil Janssens, felt that the army was above politics. Consequently, he had made no plans to promote any Congolese to officer ranks or to change army policies.1 Despite the tension, the Congo was quiet for five days after indepen- dence. On 4 July, however, in a barracks near Leopoldville, a small group of Congolese soldiers mutinied against their Belgian officers. This largely isolated incident went unchecked by Belgian officers who were un- sure of their authority in an independent Congo. The next day the revolt spread to Camp Hardy near the city of Thysville. The mutineers demanded higher pay, the replacement of Lieutenant General Janssens, and "Africani- zation" of the army through replacement of the remaining Belgian officers and NCO's by Congolese. They were not mollified when Janssens emphatically rejected their demands and declared that he had no intention of changing army policy in light of independence. 2 The Congo erupted in a crescendo of savage madness as large elements of the army totally rejected Belgian authority, and the revolt spread across the country. Unruly bands of leaderless, drunken soldiers roamed the streets looting and terrorizing the white population. Native civilians, caught up in the frenzy of violence and destruction, joined the marauding soldiers. Panic stricken Belgian civilians began an exodus out of the Congo as they became the target of a wave of terror. Chaos ensued as tribe turned upon tribe and blacks turned upon whites. Women were raped, businesses were burned and looted, and wholesale murder was committed. Gunfire resounded in city streets while, in the bush country, drums beat and delirious war cries resounded through the African night. The Congolese government was powerless to stop the proliferation of violence. By 7 July, thousands of Belgians had fled the Congo, which further reduced the stabilizing forces. The ferry across the Congo River to Braz- zaville in French Africa ran twenty-four hours a day to handle the flood of refugees. When the word of the madness which had engulfed the Congo reached Brussels, the Belgian government sought Lumumba's permission to use Belgian troops, who were still stationed at the Belgian controlled bases at Kitona and Kamina, to protect Belgian nationals and their pro- perty. Thinking that he could induce the rebellious army to cease its rampage, and perhaps believing much of his vitriolic anti-Belgian rhetoric, Lumumba flatly refused the Belgian request. Meanwhile, the Belgian govern- ment quietly sent 600 additional troopes to reinforce the bases at Kitona and Kamina. The next day, the Congolese Special Council of Ministers voted to "Africanize" the army. All personnel were promoted one rank and the Con- golese army became the only army in the world without a private. A former Sergeant Major, Victor Lundula, was promoted to general an made commander- in-chief of the army. His chief of staff was a former Sergeant turned journalist, Joseph Mobutu. Neither of these men possessed the requisite ex- perience to command a large force. By vote of the Congolese Senate, the army's name was changed from the Force Publique to the Armee Nationale Congolaise (ANC). More significantly, with these developmemts, the last vestiges of Belgian stabilization were removed from the Congo. Despite the pandemonium that was sweeping the reminder of the Congo, Katanga had remained relatively quiet. The province and its people had enjoyed a close economic relationship with its Belgian community. The Katangans had reaped the benefits of the wealth that was derived from the Belgian owned mines. By Congolese standards, the province and many of its people were fabulously well off. The provincial capital of Elisabeth- ville was far removed from the passions of Congolese politics, and Moise Tshombe recognized the stability and prosperity that close ties with Belgium offered. The serenity in Katanga was shattered on 9 July when ANC troops stationed at Camp Massart in Elisabethville revolted. Acting quickly and in defiance of the Central Government, Tshombe took what proved to be a fateful step by asking for Belgian assistance. Two Belgian companies under Major Guy Weber quickly restored order on 10 July when they stormed the camp barracks and then routed and killed an estimated one hundred Con- golese troops. By 11 July, however, it had become obvious to the Belgian government that the situation outside Katanga had deteriorated beyond Lumumba's con- trol and that since Lumumba could not restore order, Belgian troops would have to. With its nationals still streaming out of the country and those that remained still under threat of violence, the Belgians moved to stabi- lize the situation. In violation of existing treaties with the Congo government, Belgian troops deployed to key military bases and into Leo- poldville and quickly restored a resemblance of order in these areas. At the same time, at Tshombe's request, Belgian troops occupied the mining town of Jadotville in Katanga. Aside from Katanga and those areas which were controlled by the Bel- gian army, anarchy prevailed within the Congo. The only vestige of autho- rity was provided by the Belgians who had occupied the country in violation of existing treaties. Lumumba's authority extened no farther than the sound of his voice and his only authoritarian force, the ANC, was completely out of control. Consequently, on the evening of 10 July, the United States Ambassador to the Congo designate, Clare H. Timberlake, quietly suggested to Lumumba and Kasavubu that they request assistance from the United Na- tions.3 This proved to be a fateful step. However, if Lumumba had any reser- vations about asking for U. N. assistance, they were perished by the events of 11 July when three, unrelated incidents touched off a new and more severe wave of violence. The first incident occurred in the port city of Matadi which was shelled by a Belgian warship. The shelling caused considerable damage and some loss of life. Meanwhile, Belgian paratroops quietly rein- forced Belgian positions throughout the Congo. The Congolese army radio network carried exaggerated, hysterical versions of the paratroops' ac- tion. These broadcasts precipitated increased attacks on Europeans. On the same day, Tshombe made his move and declared Katanga to be a free and independent state. Lumumba and Kasavubu promptly flew to Elisabethville in an attempt to reconcile their differences with Tshombe; but when they arrived, Bel- gian troops, under orders from Tshombe, had occupied the airport and re- fused to let the plane land. When the plane returned to Leopoldville, it was met by Belgian troops who were occupying the airport. An angry exchange of words occurred between Lumumba and some Belgian soldiers, and Lumumba was struck in the face. The break between Belgium and the new Congo government was now complete. Lumumba made two specific requests to the United Nations for assis- tance. These were sandwiched around a thinly veiled threat to appeal to Communist China for assistance if help was not forthcoming from the U.N.. The first request was delivered orally on the evening of 11 July to Dr. Ralph Bunche who was the United Nations representative in Leopoldville. The request cited the unreliability of the Congolese army and the inability of the Central Government to maintain order. The next afternoon Lumumba and Kasavubu made another request. They submitted a formal, written docu- ment which solicited military assistance to combat both alleged Belgian aggression and Belgian support for Katanga's sucession.4 They wrote: "The Government of the Republic of the Congo requests urgent dispatch by the United Nations of military assistance. This request is justified by the dispatch to the Congo of metro- politian Belgian troops in violation of the Treaty of Friendship signed between Belgium and the Republic of the Congo 22 June 1960. Under the terms of the treaty, Belgian troops may only intervene on the express request of the Congolese government. No such re- quest was ever made....we therefore regard the unsolicited Belgian action as an act of aggression against our country."5 The differences in tone between these requests represent two funda- mentally different ways to view the Condo problem. The first request em- phasized internal weaknesses within the Congo; whereas, the second request alleged external interference in the Congo's internal affairs. These di- vergent viewpoints became the focus of United Nations' debate on the Congo issue and influenced the resolutions passed by the Security Council.6 These resolutions, in turn, had a direct influence on the capabilities and on the limitations which were imposed on the U.N. military force which was deployed to the Congo. The Congolese Central Government tried to force the issue by request- ing aid again on 13 July with the stipulation, this time, that assistance be provided primarily by African states and not by the United States. The Security Council responded the following day with an 8-0 vote to commit U.N. technical and military assistance to the Congo. This response com- mitted the United Nations to what columnist Walter Lippman described as "the most advanced and sophisticated experiment in international coopera- tion ever attempted."7 The United Nations was committed to the Congo, and as troops rushed in from all directions, they brought the tensions of cold war politics with them. ENDNOTES CHAPTER TWO 1Ernest W. Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Operation (Baltimore:Johns Hopkins Press, 1967). p. 7. 2Wynfred Joshua, A Congo Chronology, 1960-1964 (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1966), p. 2. 3David W. Wainhouse, International Peacekeeping at the Cross- roads (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1973), p. 268. 4Ernest W. Lefever, Crisis in the Congo (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1965), pp. 13-14). 5Ernest W. Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Operation, pp. 224-25. 6Ernest W. Lefever, Crisis in the Congo, p. 14. 7Washington Post and Times Herald, 21 July 1960, p. 1. CHAPTER THREE MISSION OVERVIEW "The U.N. is supposed to keep the peace - yet thousands are dying here - violently. But without the U.N. force, nobody would be safe. You wouldn't want to be here if the U.N. were not present." U.S. News & World Report As modern warfare goes, the fighting in the Congo was not particu- larly violent in terms of battle casualties. Most of the engagements were little more than skirmishes fought by company size or smaller units. Yet the danger, the fear, and the tension of combat were very real for those who served there. The Congo was a war of nerves as much as a war of action; yet, those that died there often met a brutal, inhumane death. The United Nations Peacekeeping Force (UNF) arrived in the Congo in July 1960. During the course of the following three years, the Force be- came involved in two separate conflicts, and it clashed with three distinct foes - none of which was supposed to be an enemy. The first conflict was with the mutinous ANC. On numerous occasions, UNF contingents were attacked for no apparent reason by ANC soldiers. At other times, peackeeping contingents clashed with ANC units which had been encouraged by the Congolese government to interfere with United Nations activities. This conflict expanded after the Congolese Central Govern- ment fragmented into several warring factions in September 1960. The UNF's original mission was to restore law and order. This mission was then ex- panded to include efforts to prevent civil war. The Force clashed with tribal bands and with ANC units who were loyal to the various, poli- tical leaders who were seeking power. The main act, however, was played out in Katanga where the UNF attemp- ted to prevent civil war between Katangan forces and the Congolese Central Governement. The Force gradually became more involved in the dispute over Katangan independence and eventually intervened on behalf of the Central Government. This intervention ended Katanga's secession. What follows is a brief overview of the United Nations military in- volvement in the Congo. Specific problems dealing with the political and legal maneuvering in the United Nations that established the peacekeeping force, and the specific military difficulties that the UNF faced as a result of its unique role in the Congo will be discussed in subsequent chapters. When Belgian troops occupied portions of the Congo in July 1960, Lumumba immediately accused the Belgians of aggression and of attempting to reinstate their colonial power. He also accused the Belgian government of conspiring to establish Tshombe's regime in Katanga. Consequently, the international community polarized on the issue, and what began as a local conflict, immediately acquired dimensions of a struggle between nationalism and colonialism.1 After their arrival in mid-July, U.N. troops quickly deployed to con- trol key points within Leopoldville. Other UNF units occupied key cities in the interior of the Congo. The Belgian troops, who had originally moved to restore order, cooperated with the UNF in efforts to stop the violence. By mid-September, most of the violence had ceased; and with the exception of 231 officers and non-commissioned officers, who had been seconded to Tshombe's gendarmerie by the Belgian government, all Belgian troops had left the Congo.2 Much to Lumumba's consternation, however, the UNF made no efforts to expel the Belgian troops from Katanga. By August, U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold was under pressure from the Soviet Union and militant African states to commit U.N. troops to Katanga. Hammarskjold concurred that the UNF should enter the province, but he backed down when Tshombe an- nounced that his army would oppose, with force, any United Nations attempt to enter Katanga. Lumumba's dissatisfaction with U.N. efforts grew over what he consi- dered to be half-hearted U.N. attempts to solve the problem of Katanga's secession. He insisted that the United Nations was obligated to assist the Congolese Central Government in an attempt to reintegrate Katanga. However, one of the fundamentals of peacekeeping states that peacekeening forces should remain impartial and that they should not take sides in the conflict. Hammarskjold was familiar with this principle. This, plus a racing debate in the Security Council over the precise role that the UNF should play in Katanga, prevented the Secretary-General from committing troops to action against Tshombe's forces. The Central Government's difficulties extended beyond Katanga. In the province of Kasai, tribal violence erupted between Baluba and Lulua tribesmen. After numerous savage attacks in which several Baluba villages were looted and burned, the Baluba leader, Albert Kolonji, declared Kasai to be an independent state. Subsequently, he signed a mutual defense pact with Tshombe. The province was subsequently invaded by ANC troops who murdered hundreds of fleeing Balubas. Tunisian troops of the UNF who were occupying Kasai looked on helplessly because their rules of engage- ment did not permit them to interfere or to use force except in self de- fense. 3 However, there was more involved to the action in Kasai than the UNF's inability to stop the murder of Baluba tribesmen. The Soviet Union had unilaterally intervened and had tranported the invading ANC troops in Soviet aircraft. This internationalized the incident and caused Hammar- skjold to denounce the Soviet action as "contrary to the spirit of the Security Council resolutions . . . tending to re-introduce elements of the very kind the Council wished to avoid when it requested the withdrawal of Belgian troops."4 He insisted that all nations refrain from unilateral assistance to the Congo and that all aid be channeled through the United Nations. By early September 1960, much of Lumumba's support had eroded. Baluba tribesmen and their supporters resented the invasion of Kasai. Other natives were angered by Lumumba's frequent outbursts against U.N. efforts, while others feared his leftist tendencies. Kasavubu attempted to dis- solve Lumumba's government on 5 September, but Lumumba managed a close vote of confidence. He was still attempting to continue his Soviet supported invasion of Kasai when U.N. forces closed all airports in the Congo to everything but United Nations traffic. This action prompted Soviet accusations that the U.N. was sponsoring Belgian aggression and it increased Soviet demands for active U.N. military intervention in Ka- tagna. The political situation in Leopoldville assumed proportions of a comic opera during mid-September. Kasavubu, again, declared Lumumba's government to be no-existant. Two day later, on 12 September, Lumumba was placed under arrest by army Chief of Staff Mobutu but was released shortly thereafter by loyal Congo soldiers. On 14 September, Kasavubu suspended the Congolese Parliament, and Mobutu led a militay coup. Sub- sequently, Mobutu established a Council of Ministers to run the country. Kasavubu remained President.5 Lumumbu was, once again, placed under arrest; but he escaped to Stanleyville, in Orientale provice with some of his supporters. The United Nations had steadfastly refused to interfere with the po- litical infighting in Leopoldville. The Soviet Union, alleging Belgian support for Katanga, continued to press for direct U.N. intervention to end Katanga's secession.6 The Soviets sponsored a series of verbal attacks on the Secretary-General when he refused to respond to the Soviet pressure. The fragile political coalition that had authorized U.N. entry into the Congo continued to crumble. Several African states, which were loyal to Lumumba's cause, were dismayed over a lack of U.N. action to restore Lumumba to power and threatened to withdraw their contingents from the UNF. Fortunately, the perserverence and dedication of Secretary-General Hammarskjold kept the UNF in tact. However, after the dissolution of Lumumba's government, the U.N. had no strong authority within the Central Government with whom it could deal. The political situation deteriorated further on 1 December when Lumumba was, again, arrested, and a Lumumba supporter, Antoine Gizenga, established a pro-Lumumba govern- ment in Stanleyville. He immediately declared independence and actively sought Soviet support. Lumumba, meanwhile, was shuffled between several prisons and finally wound up in Elisabethville where he died under suspicious circumstances. It was not until 2 August 1961, when the Council of Ministers voted to install Cyrille Adoula as Prime Minister, that the Congo gained a head of state. The Congoless Central Government had been without effective leadership for nearly one year. It was a frustrating year for the peacekeeping force. It was a year that was marked by sporadic outbursts of violence when United Nations forces clashed with ANC units or with bands of native tribes- men. With the establishment of Adoula's government, most of the vio- lence stopped and most of the excitement was over. However, there was still the problem of Katanga. By August 1961, Tshombe possessed a well established, well armed, and well trained gendarmerie. It was effectively led by Belgian officers and non-commissioned officers, who had been seconded to the Katanga government by Belgium, and by foreign mercenaries who had been personally hired by Tshombe. Tshombe had succeeded in resisting all political at- tempts to reintegrate Katanga with the Central Government, and his gen- darmerie had demonstrated, several times, that it was more than a match for the ANC. During its early involvement in Katanga, the UNF acted strictly as a peacekeeping force and it took no action against Tshombe's government. However, by November 1961, the political climate at the United Nations had changed considerably. The UNF was enpowered to take action against Katangan mercenaries, and, through a series of military operations, it terminated Katanga's sucession. This resolved the Katanga issue and effectively ended U.N. military operations in the Congo. It did not, however, restore political sta- bility. Gizenga remained in control in Stanleyville, and Parliament was suspended again in September 1963. Gizenga's regime continued to strengthen, and in 1964, rebellion spread through several other provinces. By June of that year, a financially strapped United Nations had conclud- ded that, although the prospects for political stability in the Congo were still not good, there was little to be gained by continued U.N. involvement. The UNF was withdrawn from the Congo on 30 June 1964. Ironically, it was the former secessionist, Moise Tshombe, who was elected Prime Minister in July 1964. With the help of some of the mercen- aires who had run his gendarmerie in Katanga, Tshombe defeated insurgent rebels in the outlying provinces. He was subsequently deposed by Joseph Mobutu. Mobutu changed the country's name to Zaire and the country re- mained relatively tranquil through the remainder of the 1960's. ENDNOTES CHAPTER THREE 1John G. Stoessinger, The United Nations and the Superpowers (New York: Random House, 1967). p. 78. 2Ernest W. Lefever, Crisis in the Congo (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1965) p. 33. 3King Gordon, The United Nations in the Congo (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962), p. 52. 4Ibid. 5Evan Luard (ed.), The International Regulation of Civil Wars (New York University Press, 1972), p. 112. 6Linda B. Miller, World Order and Local Disorder (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 75. 7Howard M. Epstein (ed.), Revolt in the Congo (New York: Facts on File Inc., 1965), p. 65. CHAPTER FOUR MANDATE FOR ACTION The United Nations Force that served in the Congo was a multi- national force, a legal creature that was carved out of a fragile poli- tical consensus at United Nations Headquarters - eight thousand miles from the conflict. Unlike a unilateral force that draws its authority from a single government, a United Nations peacekeeping force, such as the UNF, is constrained by the authority granted it by the Security Council of the United Nations. The Council, through its agents, has the authority and obligation to determine the precise mission of the peacekeeping force and to define the means that the force can use to accomplish that mission. Due to the multinational nature of the Secu- rity Council and the ever present threat of a veto by one of the perman- ent members, mandates for U.N. military action are usually, out of ne- cesity, general in nature, and frequently ambiguous. This was certainly true of the mandate that authorized the UNF. Military commanders were handicapped by a complex, changing, yet general, mission and by restric- tive rules of engagement. This caused very real problems in the field. Before addressing these problems, however, an understanding of the nature of the United Nations mandate for intervention in the Congo and the specific limitations that it placed on the UNF is necessary. This chapter will discuss the nature of the mandate that authorized U.N. intervention in the Congo. It will examine the origins of the man- date and trace the modifications which were made to the original mandate by the Security Council. These modifications took the form of resolutions which were passed by the Council in response to changes in the political and military situation within the Congo. Each of these resolutions, in turn, modified the military capabilities of the peacekeeping force. This chapter will also examine the role of the Secretary-General of the U.N. who, as the executive agent of the Security Council, directly influenced the operations of the UNF. Ostensibly, the United Nations acquiesced to Lumumba's appeal for assistance because the appeal consisted of a specific request for aid from the legitimate government of a sovereign state.1 In reality, the question of whether to acede to Lumumba's request was not nearly so simple. The committment of United Nations troops is the prerogative of the Security Council. Consequently, any response to Lumumba's request, which would commit troops to the Congo, was subject to veto by one of the permanent members of the Council. However, when the resolution to autho- rize intervention in the Congo was introduced in the Council, neither superpower, in a rare show of unanimity if not agreement on the Condo question, felt compelled to veto the resolution. In 1960, the United Nations was very conscious of emerging African nationalism and of the problems that this was causing for the colonial European powers. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was willing to interfere unilat- erally in the Congo if the price for hegemony in Central Africa was to be labeled a colonialist.2 The Cold War was at its peak, and the United States, fearing Soviet opportunism in Central Africa, saw the deployment of a United Nations force as a means of interspersing the U.N. between the super powers while, simultaneously, forestalling unilateral Soviet intervention. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, supported U.N. inter- vention because this support gave the Soviets the appearance of cham- pioning the cause of anti-colonialism while decreasing American influence in the region.3 Although the super powers had reached a rare consensus, the United Kingdom and France were lukewarm, at best, toward the proposal. Both countries had serious reservations about United Nations interference in what they both felt was essentially an internal problem for the Congolese people to solve on their own. Both opposed the creation of the UNF in principle, but neither country felt strongly enough to veto the resolu- tion. The only common ground among the permanent members of the Council was a general consensus that something should be done about the Congo; however, there was little agreement among them regarding the proper course of action. On his fragile understanding, the initial resolution to assist the Congo passed the Security Council by an 8-0 vote on 14 July 1960. (France and the United Kingdom abstained). The resolution, however, was vague for a number of reasons. First, although the U.N. had previously sponsored a number of peace- keeping missions, the U.N. had always stepped in to separate two warring belligerents. In the Congo, there were no definite warring factions and with the exception of Katanga's secession, there was no clear cut dispute. Thus, there was no established precedent for peacekeeping in such a situ- ation. Secondly, the chaotic and unclear situation in the Congo coupled with the divergent views of the Security Council members precluded the passage of a resolution authorizing definite action.4 The resolution simply called for the withdrawal of all Belgian troops from the Congo, and it authorized the Secretary-General to consult with the Government of the Congo. The resolution also stated that the United Nations should: "provide the Government (of the Congo) with such military assistance as may be necessary, until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks."5 The resolution was specific in its call for the removal of Belgian troops. However, it failed to define the nature of the military assist- ance which was to be offered to the Congolese government. Subsequent ex- pansions of this resolution (mandate) never fully clarified the specific goals of the UNF. More importantly, the means that the UNF could use to accomplish its mission were never fully delineated. The Secretary-General determined the precise interpetation of the mandate. Although the members of the Security Council were divided over how to handle the Congo problem, Dag Hammarskjold had no reservations. To him, the case for United Nations involvement was clearly defined, and he had specific ideas regarding the role that the U.N. force should play. From a United Nations point of view, Hanmarskjold saw both internal and external aspects to the Congo problem. The external aspects were more readily identifiable. Belgium had introduced troops into another sovereign state without that state's permission. Whether this was an act of aggres- sion, as charged by the Congolese government and the Soviet Union, or whether it was an act of humanitarianism to protect the lives and property of its nationals, as claimed by Belgium, the international consequences and the threat to world peace were likely to be serious. States friendly to the Congo were already threatening intervention and the potential for East-West confrontation over hegemony in Central Africa was present. Under terms of the United Nations charter, there appeared to be a clear cut case for intervention. Hammarskjold envisioned a simplistic operation for the UNF. In his opinion, the presence of Belgian troops had caused most of the ten- sion in the Congo. Therefore, he felt that the removal of these troops should be the main purpose behind U.N. intervention. The introduction of an international force, under a well-defined, United Nations mandate, would enable Belgium to voluntarily remove her forces, while simultaneously forestalling unilateral military intervention by other states.6 It fol- lowed that after the withdrawal of Belgian troops, the UNF would main- tain law and order until security forces of the Central Government could assume this function.7 Unfortunately, Hammarskjold's view of the United Nations role in the Congo clashed with Lumumba's who preceived the UNF as an instrument with which to crush Katanga's sucession. The internal portion of the conflict concerned the secession of Katanga. Hammarskjold viewed this as largely a constitutional matter which was to be resolved between Tshombe and the Central Government. However, the Katanga problem was not that simple, and it subsequently proved to be more complicated than any other aspect of the Congo crisis. Lumumba insured that the difficulties which were caused by Katanga's secession would not remain internal when, in his request for U.N. assis- tance, he alleged Belgian support for Tshombe's regime. Katanga was a thorny issue for Hammarskjold. Although he would not permit the use of U.N. troops to force a settlement on Katanga, neither could he accept Katanga's secession as an established fact. Since the Congo had applied for United Nations membership and Katanga had been an integral part of that country, Hammarskjold felt that any U.N. deter- mination regarding the Congo would have to apply to Katanga as well. He insisted that the constitutional relationship between Katanga and the Central Government would have to be resolved between the two of them, without reliance on outside forces. In addition, he would not per- mit the United Nations to employ its military forces to the advantage of either side, nor would he permit unilateral assistance by other nations to either antagonist.8 Hammarskjold steadfastly maintained his resolve to keep the UNF out of Congolese politics. However, as the crisis escalated and a political and military impasse was reached in Katanga, U.N. troops were engulfed by the tug of war over the province and, eventually,drifted towards active support of the Central Government. The Secretary-General's original concept called for a limited U.N. involvement. However, he and the Security Council made four initial assumptions regarding the Congo, all of which proved to be wrong. First, they assumed that Belgium would soon withdraw all of her troops; and second,that the UNF would be able to easily restore order.9 Belgium did remove her troops from most of the Congo shortly after the 14 July resolution was passed. However, one year later, Belgian officers and non-commissioned officers still served in the Katangan gendarmerie and their presence precipitated several clashes with the UNF. The Security Council and the Secretary-General also assumed that the Congolese government would regain control of the ANC and turn it into a disciplined force. This was never accomplished. Consequently, UNF troops periodically clashed with Congolese units. Although widespread violence against European nationals was eliminated early in the conflict, the UNF was never entirely successful at eliminating random atrocities which were frequently perpetrated by bands of native tribesmen or by dissident ANC units. The final false assumption was that the problem between Katanga and the Central Government would be easily resolved.10 The realities of Security Council politics and the Secretary-General's personal interpretation of the mandate that he received from the Security Council were to severely limit the military options which were available to the UNF. The cornerstone of Hammarskjold's policy was the principle of non-interference in the Congo's internal affairs. This principle stated that under no circumstances was the UNF to be used as an instrument by either Tshombe or the Central Government to impose a solution to Katanga's secession on the other side. Instead, the UNF was to provide a proper environment so that, through negotiation, a peaceful solution to the Con- go's problems could be found. Hammarskjold was also sensitive to the complexities of super power relationships within the Security Council. He understood that the initial consensus between the United States and the Soviet Union was not based on a mutual understanding or on common goals. In order to keep his fragile coalition in tact and to avoid the inevitable veto that would accompany an East-West confrontation over the Congo, Hammarskjold insisted not only on the principle of non-interference in Congolese affairs, but on its corallary, which prohibited the use of force by United Nations forces except in cases of extreme self-defense.11 This restriction on the use of force was to present UNF commanders with a serious moral dilemma, as well as restrict their ability to accomplish portions of the UNF's mission. Based on his interpretation of the mandate and the situation in the Congo, Hammarskjold developed a set of ground rules which defined the re- lationship between the UNF and the Congolese Central Government. Using these rules as a basis, he established the following operating principles for the UNF: First: The UNF would be under the "exclusive command" of the Secretary-General who was accountable only to the Se- curity Council. No UNF national contingents would take orders from their own or the Congolese government. All U.N. operations would be distinct and separate from any activities sponsored by individual states. Second: The United Nations would not interfere in internal con- flicts, nor would it be used to enforce any specific political solution. Third: The Force must have freedom of movement throughout the Congo, including Katanga. Fouth: The UNF would use force only in self-defense and, under no circumstance, would it initiate the use of force. Fifth: The Secretary-General, in consultation with the Congolese government, would determine the composition of the Force.12 The mission of the UNF as initially established was, on the surface, relatively simple. It consisted of five parts: 1. To restore and maintain law and order throughout the Congo. 2. To prevent civil war and curb tribal conflicts. 3. To transform the ANC into a reliable security force. 4. To restore and maintain the territirial and polical integrity of the Congo. 5. To eliminate the influences of foreign military and para-military personnel in the internal affairs of the Congo.13 The UNF's mission did not change significantly during the course of its involvement in the Congo. However, the methods which the Force was permitted to employ to accomplish its mission changed several times. These changes resulted from modifications to the peacekeeping force's mandate. The Security Council modified the mandate in response to changes in the military and political situation in the Congo. AN EXPANDING MANDATE During the course of the United Nations military involvement within the Congo, the Security Council passed four resolutions that directly in- fluenced the U.N. peacekeeping force. Due to the need for political ex- pediency and the divergent views of the permanent members of the Security Council, each of these resolutions authorized broad action, yet each limited the methods that the UNF could employ. An understanding of these resolutions and the events which led to their passage will increase appre- ciation for the problems which confronted UNF military commanders in the Congo. The initial Security-Council resolution of 14 July simply authorized U.N. intervention and called for the withdrawal of Belgian troops. It also permitted the Secretary-General to offer such military and technical assistance as would be necessary to allow the Central Government to restore and maintain law and order. A subsequent agreement with the Central Government authorized the UNF freedom of movement throughout the Congo. However, Tshombe's steadfast refusal to allow U.N. troops to enter what he considered to be the sovereign state of Katanga and his avowed determination to resist U.N. intervention with force, if necessary, forced Hammarskjold to seek clarification of his mandate from the Security-Council. The original resolution had not authorized the UNF to use force and it appeared that the peacekeeping force would have to fight to enter Katanga. On 9 August, the Council expanded the 14 July resolution by noting Tshombe's belligerent stance regarding the entry of U.N. troops into Katanga and by reaffirming the Secretary-General's authority to deal with the crisis. They expanded the mandate by calling for the removal of Belgian troops from Katanga and by declaring that United Nations forces had the authority to enter the province in order to implement the 14 July resolution. To allay Tshombe's fears of a forced end to Katanga's secession, the resolu- tion reiterated that U.N. forces would not intervene in the Congo's inter- nal problems.14 Although the resolution did not expand the UNF's capability to use force, it did mollify Tsbombe and it allowed the UNF to enter Katanga. It did not, however, alleviate the difficulties faced by indi- vidual soldiers who were trying to maintain order in the midst of the chaos that engulfed the remainder of the Congo. By February 1961, the Central Government had suffered a series of coups and had effectively ceased to function. The UNF had been able to function under its limited mandate. However, though relative stability had been restored to the remainder of the Congo by the UNF, there had been no progress toward a resolution to Katanga's secession. Tshombe had established an efficient, well-armed gendarmerie officered by Belgian of- ficers seconded to him by their government and by mercenaries who were working solely for the money. Lumumba's death in Katanga prompted Soviet demands for the immediate ouster of Tshombe and pushed the country closer to all out civil war. Clashes between ANC units and Tshombe's gendarmerie. increased. Baluba tribes from Northern Katanga sought Tshombe's ouster and they suffered several bloodly encounters with Katangan troops. The UNF was caught in the middle of these conflicts. Because they were un- able to initiate the use of force, the UNF was unable to stop these con- flicts. The Security Council took steps to remedy this situation on 21 February,when it passed Security Council resolution S4741 which autho- rized the UNF to take all appropriate measures necessary to prevent the outbreak of civil war including, as a last resort, the use of force. Resolution S4741 also called for the explusion from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military and para-military personnel who were. not under U.N. command.15 These measures, had Tshombe permitted their im- plementation, would have eliminated the backbone of his military forces. The resolution also permitted ground commanders the use of force, but it still required commanders to determine when the else of force was appropri- ate. Any determination to use force was subject to interpetation as to whether the implementation was to prevent civil war or whether it was to force a solution on Katanga. The resolution was not, under any circum- stances, authorization for the UNF to conduct offensive operations as was pointed out by Oscar Schacter in an article for the "Proceedings of the American Society of International Law". Schacter stated: "What it did was to authorize the Force, for the first time, to take up positions for the purpose of preventing civil war clashes (as in support of cease-fire arrangements and neutralized zones); if the troops were attacked while holding such positions, they could use force in defense, but this did not mean they were entitled to "take the initiative" in an armed attack on an organized army group in the Congo."16 With the establishment of Adoula's government in August 1961, the situation outside Katanga stabilized. However, within Katanga, tensions ran high. UNF and Katangese troops watched each other warily as both the United Nations and the Central Government manuevered with Tshombe in an attempt to resolve the issues which divided the two governments. It had become increasingly obvious that the Central Government lacked the finan- cial and military strength to end Katanga's secession. With UNF military commanders barred from offensive action and permitted to else force only under limited circumstances, a protracted stalemate,punctuated with spora- dic fighting, appeared inevitable in Katanga. By September, the UNF faced a new problem in Katanga. U.N. troops had clashed directly with Katangan forces in a brief, but bloody, battle near Elisabethville in early September. There was evidence that the fighting had been initiated by the UNF. Both the United Nations and the Peacekeeping Force were severely criticized by the press and several Western governments, including the United Kingdom and France, for initiating mili- tary action. Until the September incident, the United Nations had carefully avoided supporting either side in the Katanga conflict. Subsequently, however, the Security Council passed a resolution on 24 November 1961 that clearly brought the United Nations down on the side of the Congoleso Central Government. The November resolution deplored the armed action and the secession of Katanga, and it rejected Tshombe's claims of Katangan sovereignty. It demanded the cessation of all secessionist activities in the Congo and it declared that the Central Government had the full support of the United Nations. More importantly, this resolution authorized vigorous action by the UNF, in- cluding the use of requisite force, to ensure the apprehension, detention, and deportation of all foreign military personnel in the Congo who were not under United Nations command.17 Britain and France abstained from the vote declaring that it went "dangerously far in encouraging" the U.N. command in Katanga to use addi- tional force. Great Britain further advised the Secretary-General that its continued support for the Congo operation was contingent on the "skill and wisdom with which the United Nations carries out its mandate."18 The November 24th resolution was backed by a weak political consensus, but it provided military commanders with the requisite authority to force a military solution to the stalemate in Katanga. Although the UNF never initiated offensive action after the passage of this resolution to elimi- nate the foreign elements from Tshombe's forces, the fact that it was au- thorized to do so substantially changed Tshombe's perception of the peace- keeping force's role in Katanga. With the passage of this resolution, it became evident that the United Nations was determined to end Katanga's secession, even if that meant active intervention by the UNF on behalf of the Central Government. ENDNOTES CHAPTER FOUR 1Ernest W. Lefever, Crisis in the Congo, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1965), p. 16. 2Lincoln P. Bloomfield (ed.), International Military Forces: The Question of Peacekeeping in an Armed and Disarming World (Bos- ton: Little Brown and Co., 1964), p. 16. 3John G. Stoessinger, The United Nations and the Superpowers, (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 78. 4Ernest W. Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Operation, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 19. 5Lefever, Crisis in the Congo, p. 190. 6King Gordon, The United Nations in the Congo: A Quest for Peace, (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962), p. 17. 7Ibid., p. 18. 8Ibid., p. 20. 9Linda B. Miller, World Order and Local Disorder, (Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 72. 10Ibid. 11Bloomfield, p. 116. 12Lefever, Crisis in the Congo, p. 23. 13Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Operation, p. 21. 14David W. Wainhouse, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 33. 15Lefever, Crisis in the Congo, p. 194. 16Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Operation, p. 22. 17Lefever, Crisis in the Congo, p. 196. 18Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Operation, p. 127. CHAPTER FIVE PROBLEMS OF A PEACEKEEPER "Few peacetime military tasks can be less enviable than the one to which Members of the United Nations committed the officers and men of the U.N. force in the Congo. The necessity for calm under provocation, insult and violence; the need to comply with political directives which must inevitably ofter be incompre- hensible to the soldier on the spot...." Brian E. Urguhart The establishment of a large, multinational peacekeeping force in the Congo created multiple problems for the United Nations. There were numerous causes of these difficulties. Some were caused by the very nature and structure of the United Nations while other problems were unique to peacekeeping missions in general. Other troubles were rooted in the physical nature of the Congo and in its turbulent, volatile, poli- tical situation. This chapter will discuss some of the problems encoun- tered by the United Nations in its efforts to first establish and then to maintain a large, peacekeeping force in the Congo. This will be followed by an examination of the restrictive rules of engagement that encumbered the UNF for most of its existence and of the problems that these rules created. The unique problems associated with peacekeeping in the Congo affected every level of the Peacekeeping Force from top level commanders to the individual soldier. These difficulties ran an entire gamut from such mundane problems as providing a diet that would satisfy the diversi- fied religious beliefs of the various national contingents to moral ques- tions faced by commanders who were unable to use force, even to protect themselves, except as a last resort. The United Nations never anticipated the scope of the mission in the Congo. The mission seemed simple in the summer of 1960, but it turned out to be much more expensive in terms of money, manpower, and contro- versy than even the most pessimistic estimates. During the four years that the UNF existed, thirty-five nations contributed 93,000 men to the peacekeeping force of whom 126 died in combat. The Force entered the Congo as peacekeepers, but was forced to endure four years of sporadic, often savage, fighting against forces that its restrictive rules of en- gagement frequently would not allow it to fight. Peacekeeping missions were not new to the United Nations. On numerous previous occasions, the U.N. had supplied troops to maintain peace. However, with the exception of the Korean War, which the United States fought under the auspices of the U.N., the Congo was the first time that United Nations troops had functioned as combatants. On pre- vious occasions, U.N. forces had served in limited roles as military police or as peace observors. The Congo, however, was different. As the UNF became ever more deeply entangled in the Congo's problems, it was forced to fight - first to accomplish its mission and finally for survival. However, despite the limitations which were imposed on it and the difficulties that it faced, the UNF functioned for four years with a degree of authority and some measures of success. Let's examine the problems that the UNF faced. ESTABLISHING THE FORCE Member states of the United Nations responded quickly to Secretary- General Hammarskjold's call for troops. One day after the 14 July reso- lution authorized the U.N. to provide assistance to the Congo, Ghanian and Tunisian troops were ready to enter Leopoldville. In Jerusalem, Major General Carlvon Horn of Sweden, who was the commanding general of the U.N. mission in the Middle East, was notified that he was to pro- ceed immediately to the Congo in order to assume command of the peace- keeping force. Not insignificantly, it took von Horn five days to find transportation to Leopoldville. (The U.N. did not have the aircraft assets and von Horn eventually found transportation on a U.S. Air Force plane). By the time von Horn arrived in Leopoldville, several national con- tingents, totaling several thousand troops, had already arrived. These units were temporarily commanded by British Major General H.T. Alexander who was head of the Ghanian contingent. The UNF was off to a fast start, but their problems were only begin- ning. The Congo was not ready, either politically or socially, for the peacekeeping force. An obscure, underdeveloped country, neither the Congo's people nor its government understood the UNF, nor did they have time to make preparations for its arrival. In response to early criti- cisms of the U.N.'s operations in the Congo, Dr. Ralph Bunche, who was the Secretary-General's personal representative to the Congo and the first Officer-in-Charge of U.N. operations there, summarized some of the problems which were faced by the UNF. He wrote: "It (the United Nations Force) had to be quickly improvised from nothing; its military personnel had been recruited from twenty-six countries; it encountered internal conflicts, in- cluding serious inter-tribal warfare; and it had been dropped into the midst of a country and people who were totally unpre- pared by experience and psychology to understand it and to appreciate its functions and its real worth."1 From the commencement of military operations by the UNF, the very nature of the United Nations caused problems. In 1960 there was no per- manent military branch in the U.N., consequently, it had no standidng military force, nor did it have contingency units from which it could draw troops. Consequently, although troops were pouring into the Congo, the military situation was chaotic. There was no cohesiveness between units. Since the U.N. possessed no contingency plans for operations in the Congo, donating states had been given little guidance regarding the types of units which were needed. Consequently, many states sent whatever was available. These units frequently failed to fill the needs of the Force commander. In addition, the United Nations possessed no stockpiles of weapons or supplies.2 Perhaps more significantly, the U.N. had no assured source of revenue to finance its military operations. Member states were billed, individually, for the costs of maintaining the UNF. The Congo mission proved to be a severe financial hardship for the U.N.. This was particu- larly true in 1961 when France and the Soviet Union refused to pay their assessments.3 Aside from the difficulties caused by the lack of a standing U.N. military force, other problems were caused by political and social turmoil within the Congo. The abrupt withdrawal of Belgian authority had destroyed the country's social administrative system. Consequently, the UNF received virtually no host nation support from the Congo. An even larger problem was caused by poor relationships between the UNF and the Katangan and Congolese governments. If any peacekeeping force is to be successful, it requires the consent and cooperation of the host government and of all major parties to the dispute. The UNF lost the sup- port of the Central Government early in the crisis when the Secretary- General refused to let the Peacekeeping Force become Lumumba's tool in his efforts to force the reintegration of Katanga. Lumumba responded by making impassioned anti-U.N. speeches which prejudiced the Congolese people against the UNF. The relationship improved little after Lumumba's ouster and it did not improve substantially until September 1961 when the U.N. began to intervene in Katanga on behalf of the Central Government. The UNF fared little better in Katanga. Originally, Tshombe was re- markably indifferent to the UNF's presence in Katanga. However, U.N. mili- tary actions in support of the Central Government, understandably, turned Tshombe and the Katangan people against the UNF. Ernest W. Lefever, writing for the Brookings Institute, described Congolese feelings about the Peacekeeping Force. He wrote: "Many Congolese regarded the United Nations Force as an army of occupation, a resented foreign presence. This was particularly true in Katanga. To any observor the enternal appearance, be- havior, and mood of the UNF resembled an occupation army in a strange land."4 The consequence of the poor relationship between the UNF and the various Congolese governments was that the UNF failed to gain the support of the Congolese people. The Force was compelled to function under the eyes of a generally non-supportive population. Ultimately, this did not force the UNF to alter its operations, but this poor relationship did inhibit the UNF's ability to accomplish its mission peacefully. MILITARY VS. CIVILIAN CONTROL Since the United Nations is a civilian organization which is dedi- cated to the preservation of world peace, the U.N. charter does not pro- vide for any indigenous military force. Consequently, the U.N. has little corporate military knowledge. Prior to the Congo Crisis, since previous U.N. peacekeeping missions had been limited in scope, this had caused only minor problems. However, the size of the Congo mission and the fact that the UNF was forced into a combatant role, forced the. U.N.'s civilian leadership to work closely with UNF commanders in the formulation of military policy. This created numerous problems, some of which were not easily overcome. Some of these problems originated in a long and diversified chain of command while others were rooted in the personali- ties of the military and civilian leadership of the Congo mission. The Security Council was responsible for political control of the UNF; and in this capacity, it established the Force's mission and objec- tives while providing general guidance for the conduct of military opera- tions. As executive agent for the Security Council, the Secretary-General was Commander-in-Chief of all U.N. forces in the Congo. In this capacity, he was responsible for the composition, logistic support and employment of the UNF.5 Dag Hammarskjold was a career civil servant who had dedicated his life to the pursuit of international peace. As Commander-in-Chief of the Peacekeeping Force, Hammarskjold delegated all field authority to his deputy in the Congo. Since the United Nations was a civilian organization whose mission in the Congo included much more than just military operations, it was only natural that Hammarskjold would choose a civilian, whose views were similar to his own, to be officer-in-charge of the Congo operation.6 ONUC (Organisation des Nations Unies Au Congo) was the Collective designation for the U.N. operation in the Congo. UNF referred solely to the military peacekeeping force. Regulations clearly stated that the ap- pointed officer in charge commanded all U.N. activity within the Congo, both civil and military. In turn, the military force commander was opera- tionally responsible to the Secretary-General, through the officer-in- charge, for all missions assigned to the UNF.7 This placed the UNF commander in the rather awkward position of having to take direct mili- tary orders from a civilian civil servant. The following diagram illustrates the chain of command for military operations. Click here to view image Although there was a civilian U.N. representative in charge of each of the Congo's six provinces,with the exception of Katanga, provincial UNF commanders did not have to deal directly with their civilian counterparts. Rather, each provincial commander took his orders from the UNF Commander in Leopoldville. In Katanga, the provincial military commander worked directly for the civilian officer-in-charge; however, the military comman- der received his military orders from UNF headquarters in Leopoldville. General von Horn faced two immediate problems when he arrived in Leo- poldville. First, he had to organize his staff; and second, he had to de- fine his relationship with the civilian officer-in-charge, Dr. Ralph Bunche. This was a vexing problem for von Horn, His relationship with Bunche, if professional, was certainly less than cordial. The two had fundamentally different views regarding how the UNF should be controlled and administered, and on how the mission should be accomplished. Bunche viewed the entire situation in the Condo as essentially a political problem that, once solved, would alleviate the necessity for military action. Von Horn agreed that there were severe political prob- lems in the Congo, but he saw no way to accomplish his mission of restoring law and order other than by straight forward military means. The General felt that Bunche's abiding faith in the United Nations and his generally pacifistic outlook obscured his view of the realities of the situation.8 However, despite his substantial conceptual differences with Bunche, what worried von Horn most was his own inability to reconcile his position of working directly for a civilian who had little feel for military matters. In his autobiography General von Horn wrote: "What worried me most of all, however,...was my own job, its nature, scope and definition. I found it difficult to vis- ulize my exact role. In one breath, he (Bunche) told me that I had been awarded the euphemistic title of Supreme Commander of all United Nations Forces in the Congo. In the next, that over-all military command was vested in the Secretary-General, and through him in his Special Representative or Officer-in- Charge - who turned out to be Ralph."9 Due to the multi-national nature of the Peacekeeping Force and its wide dispersion across the Congo, General von Horn wanted to create a strong, unified central command. However, he was undermined in his efforts by Dr. Bunche's proclivity to issue orders directly to field commanders while leaving the central staff totally in the dark. General von Horn appreciated the seriousness of this situation, and he realized that he would be totally ineffective until the problem was rectified. However, von Horn was at a loss as to how to resolve this issue. ONUC's hastily drawn regulations made it abundantly clear that the military commander was subordinate to the civilian officer-in-charge. The General was pain- fully aware that Bunche had the authority to tell him how, when and where to deploy his troops.10 Perhaps, fortunately for the UNF, Bunche was re- called to New York in September 1960. With the change in personalities, most of the misunderstandings were alleviated. ONUC's civilian and military staffs worked in close proximity at ONUC headquarters in Leopoldville. Considering the direct control that civilians exercised over the UNF, there were remarkably few incidents when ONUC's civilian leadership interfered with military operations. ONUC's civilian officers were generally supportive of the UNF's efforts and they tried to cooperate in any way possible. However, one potentially dis- asterous incident did occur which merits a brief discussion. The Port of Matadi, near the mouth of the Congo River, was the only major sea port available to the UNF. Most of ONUC's supplies arrived through this port. During March 1961, the port was guarded by a Sudanese detachment of the UNF. During the first week of March, a detachment was attacked by elements of the ANC. The Sudanese were faced with over- whelming numerical odds and after a short fight, they began running short of ammunition. When this information reached ONUC headquarters in Leopold- ville, a civilian member of the staff attempted to order a counterattack which involved the use of the Matadi landing strip. At the time, the strip was under Congolese control and it was partially obstructed by trucks, barrels and other materials. Fortunately, the Force Commander was briefed on the plan prior to its implementation and cancelled the mis- sion. Had he not, the UNF could have sustained heavy losses.11 PERSONNEL AND STAFF DIFFICULTIES Due to the multi-national nature of the UNF, it suffered from person- nel problems. The nature of the United Nations and its lack of a standing, military force made the UNF an ad hoc mixture at best. The speed with which the Peacekeeping Force was deployed, Lumumba's preference for African troops, and the need for a politically acceptable mix did not allow the Secretary-General many options when he chose his contingents. Consequently, he was generally forced to accept whatever units donating states had to offer, even though some contingents were of inferior quality. Some of these inferior units were the best that member states could offer. Other states refused to send their better units on a U.N. mission, while some states were forbidden by law to send regular troops out of their country.12 The personnel situation was further hampered by numerous contingents whose members spoke little or no English. Six month tours of duty led to excessive turnover rates and an accompanying lack of stability. Fortunately, most of the officers assigned to the UNF were of superior quality, and they were able to overcome the shortcomings of some of the en- listed personnel. Given the language barriers, the differences in military customs and the disparities in training levels of the various contingents, it would have been easy for commanders to misconstrue the often vague and general orders which were sometimes issued. At other times, the policies or attitudes of the donating states differed from that of the United Nations. That there were few instances where related difficulties arose speaks well for the professionalism and the political astuteness of the officers involved.13 General von Horn expressed his satisfaction with his field commanders by describing them as excellent and resourceful.14 Command of all of ONUC's military and civilian operations was centra- lized at Leopoldville. Control was decentralized and delegated to UNF com- manders in each of the provinces. As such, it was vital that the Force commander have an efficient staff. This proved difficult to establish. Prior to General von Horn's arrival, operations were conducted in an ad hoc manner by Dr. Bunche who issued his orders orally. General von Horn's staff initially consisted of twenty officers on temporary loan from the United Nations force in Palestine. Although these officers had spent considerable time working together, they lacked the training and experience to direct an operation as large and as diversified as the one in the Congo. These officers were replaced by a permanent staff of 162 officers and civi- lians during August 1960. Unfortunately, the establishment of a permanent staff failed to solve the UNF's planning problems. One of the prime difficulties was caused by the Secretary-General who insisted that all significant national contingents be represented on the headquarters staff. The problems associated with procurring qualified staff officers of appropriate rank who were politically acceptable to both the Congolese Central Government and to the Security Coun- cil had to be reconciled with this requirement. Also, different national contingents were familiar with different staff systems. The system that eventually evolved was a compromise between the American and British staff systems. Most of the resulting confusion was solved by assigning most key billets to officers from countries that followed British military traditons.15 The UNF was deployed generally along provincial lines throughout the Congo's six provinces. Unlike the central staff in Leopoldville, each provincial staff had, as its core, officers of the major national contin- gent within that province. However, due to the complexity and the high visibility of the situation in Katanga and the large numbers of troops involved, the staff in Elisabethville eventually evolved into a miniature counterpart of the central staff in Leopoldville.16 This system generally worked well. However, policies and orders were subject to interpretation by the various national contingents who tended to view orders in terms of their own military tradition and experi- ence.17 This was especially true early in the conflict before the cen- tral headquarters was well established. For example, in July 1960, the commander of the Ethiopian brigade in Orientale province was given a mission to maintain law and order. The Ethiopian commander later reported that his biggest problem was the ambi- guity of his mission. He determined that, under the circumstances, he could best accomplish his mission by enacting the equivalent of martial law.18 This worked effectively, but was clearly not the intent of the order as such actions exceeded the UNF's mandate at that time. OPERATING DIFFICULTIES The initial force level in the Congo was approximately 20,000 troops which were deployed throughout a primitive country the size of Western Europe. Most of these troops came from small countries with relatively poorly equipped military establishments. The logistics problems asso- ciated with feeding, arming and transporting such a large multinational force were enormous and, without the assistance of the United States, would, most likely, have been insurmountable for the U.N. . When the UNF arrived, there was virtually no transportation avail- able to the inner portions of the Congo. Modern highways were non-existant and it was a torturous, eighteen hundred mile journey by river and rail from the port city of Matadi to Elisabethville. Most of the rail trans- portation that was available had been rendered unusable by the time U.N. troops arrived. Consequently, the only means to effectively move and supply troops in the Congo's interior was by air. However, the United Nations had no standing air force which forced it to charter some aircraft and to borrow others from member states.19 The bulk of the airlift during the entire operation, however, was provided by the United States Air Force. Handling and controlling the aircraft turned out to be nearly as big a problem as procuring them. Initially, there were few aerial maps of the Congo. The most sophisticated maps available were road maps supplied by a Belgian mining company. Few Congolese airfields in the interior of the country were capable of handling large transport air- craft. There was also a decided lack of ground crews and air traffic control personnel because, prior to independence, most of these posi- tions had been held by Belgians who later fled the country during the initial uprisings. The UNF also experienced serious ground transportation problems. The Force possessed, at one time, three thousand vehicles of nearly ninety different makes and types. Unfortunately, these vehicles lacked spare parts, maintenance manuals and facilities. Most important, the UNF lacked qualified mechanics.20 Most of those vehicles belonging to the Force were general purpose and not tactical vehicles. Field communications proved to be another problem. Initially, UNF headquarters and field commanders faced potentially crippling communica- tions difficulties. The Force possessed virtually no signal equipment aside from short range radios, and for the first four weeks of the oper- ation, the UNF was forced to communicate via ham radio, plantation nets and Air Congo teletype circuits.21 United Nations headquarters in New York possessed elaborate communications capabilities but seemed impervi- ous of the difficulties faced by the UNF in the Congo. General von Horn expressed his frustration when he stated that "New York seemed totally oblivious of the serious implications of their failure to provide us in time with field signals."22 Good intelligence is obviously essential to any succcessful military operation. In the Congo, the United Nations was sensitive to the political conotations of intelligence gathering by a peacekeeping force. The collec- tion of information for intelligence purposes was viewed as espionage and it was not something that the United Nations should overtly practice. Realizing the necessity of a good intelligence network the UNF avoided some of the unpleasant political repercussions of intelligence gathering by euphemistically referring to the G-2 section as the military informa- tion branch.23 Regardless of the name that the G-2 section went by, the UNF suffered severe problems with intelligence gathering. This was especially true in Katanga. The Secretary-General's special representative in Elisa- bethville, Conor Cruise O'brien, complained that the UNF lacked a sophis- ticated intelligence network and that it was forced to rely on one Greek ex-policeman and a native houseboy for information.24 This was, perhaps, an over simplification, but it was indicative of the problem. The military information branch was the largest staff section at UNF headquarters. All operating units at brigade and battalion level had military information sections. Information was gathered primarily via radio interception, through limited aerial reconaissance, or by patrolling and through a network of field liason officers. However, the system was hampered by too few qualified intelligence specialists and too little equipment, especially for interpeting aerial photography and for recording radio broadcast from Katanga. Not insignificantly, there was a lack of money to buy information.25 Fortunately, by the time the UNF became seriously engaged with Katangan forces, intelligence efforts had improved, especially in aerial photography. Prior to the final round of fighting, information gathered from photo reconnaisance enabled UNF aircraft to locate and destroy the Katangan air force while it was still on the ground. As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, duty in a multinational peacekeeping force creates unique problems for individual soldiers. Peacekeeping duty in the Congo was certainly no different, and the uni- que nature of the Congo caused some difficulties on its own. Unlike soldiers of a single nation military force who fight, often with un- restrained fury, to defend a national homeland or an ideal, most of the UNF troops had no strong committment to the Congo or to the United Na- tions. This proved to be especially disconcerting to UNF troops when, as the conflict escalated and they became involved in the fighting, they were attacked by the Congolese people whom they had come to protect. Coupled closely with a soldiers frequent lack of total committment to the United Nations was the problem of dual loyalty. Each soldier serving with the UNF, regardless of his nationality, was enjoined to act always "with only the best interests of the United Nations in view.26 Yet, for each soldier, duty in the Congo was only temporary. He still had loyalties to his own country whose goals or solutions to the Congo problem did not always coincide with those of the United Nations. This problem surfaced during the early stages of the crisis when the Secretary-General refused to allow Lumumba to use the UNF to end Katanga's secession. Con- sequently, some of the more militant African states which supported Lumum- ba, threatened to withdrawal their contingents if policies were not changed. Other states directed their contingents not to fire on Congolese factions who were sympathetic to the donating state's goals in the Congo. This put pressure on career officers who were concerned as much about their own careers and professional advancement as they were about events in the Congo.27 Discipline proved to be a minor problem. Though individual soldiers were often commanded by an officer of another nationality, soldiers could be disciplined only by the commander of his own national contingent. Dif- ferences in national customs and military tradition often led to widely dis- parate punishments for similar offensives. This was coupled with often striking differences in pay scales for men taking the same risks and per- forming identical tasks. For example, a private in the Indian contingent was paid $33 per month while a Swedish private earned nearly $400 per month. These inequities accented the different lifestyles and different standards of living in the various coutries that contributed troops to the UNF. De- spite these difficulties, however, it was a tribute to the leadership of the Force's officers and NCO's that, almost to a man, the members of the UNF performed to the best of their abilities and that there were few in- cidents of ill will between contingents. Logistic support for a large force, such as the UNF, in a primitive country the size of the Congo would have been a challenge for almost any individual country. It was nearly beyond the United Nations capabilities. Prior to its involvement in the Congo, the United Nations had never ex- perienced, nor had it planned to support, an operation of the magnitude of the one in the Congo. The size of the Congo and its poor transporta- tion system; the different cultures, equipment, and military traditions of the various contingents; coupled with the lack of an established U.N. military logistics branch created a set of novel and unique circumstances. The UNF was supported and maintained by the United Nations Field Operations Service which was established in 1949 to provide technical support for U.N. activities overseas. Although it did a creditable job under the circumstances, the Field Operations Service lacked the exper- tise and facilities to handle an operation as large and complex as the Congo. As a result, the UNF's logistic support was probably not as ef- ficient as it would have been had it been furnished by a single military establishment.28 The relationship between the Field Operations Service and UNF military commanders was occasionally strained. The UNF Command blamed Field Opera- tions for duplication, delays, and inefficiency in the supply effort, while Field Operations blamed the military for failing to estimate material and manpower requirements in a timely manner. Both the UNF and Field Operations were handicapped by administrative and planning deficiencies on their indi- vidual staffs. ONUC regulations gave all responsibility for logistic support of the UNF to the civilian officer in charge and not to the military commander. Such traditional military responsibilites as the feeding and billeting of troops, the procurement of supplies, and the maintenance of equipment were placed in civilian hands.29 General von Horn expressed some of his dissat- isfaction with logistic arrangements when he wrote: "During my entire six months in the Congo, the Force never enjoyed a satisfactory supply system because both its direction and application remained exclusively in civi- lian hands."30 Despite all of the logistic difficulties, however, there were few indications that the UNF's capabilities were ever seriously de- graded due to supply problems. RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF FORCE Most of the difficulties encountered by the UNF were concrete, physi- cal problems that could be overcome by dedicated, professional men. How- ever, the self-imposed limitation on the use of force except in self- defense caused moral and tactical dilemmas at all levels of the United Na- tions Command. In his first report to the Security Council regarding his plan to resolve the Congo crisis, the Secretary-General established his principle of the non-use of force. He stated that "..men engaged in the operation may never take the initiative in the use of armed force, but are entitled to respond with force to an attack with arms,... The basic ele- ment involved is clearly the prohibition against any initiative in the use of armed forces."31 Given the chaos that was prevalent in the Congo, the impotent Central Government, the mutinous army, and the brutal inter tribal warfare that flared sporadically during the course of the crisis, clashes between the peacekeeping force and the Congolese were inevitable. The UNF's initial mission was to restore and maintain law and order. However, under the principle of non-interference, the UNF was prohibited from arresting or even disarming marauding ANC units without the explicit consent of the Congolese Central Government. Critics of the UNF's efforts in the Congo have suggested that the failure to grant such authority and the restric- tions on the use of force were the single biggest mistakes during the entire operation; and that, had these limitations not been imposed, the crisis would have been considerably shorter. A counter arguement can be made that early authorization to implement military force would have shattered the fragile political coalition on which the mandate for action was based.32 The moral and tactical dilemmas which the restrictions on the use of force imposed on UNF commanders became obvious soon after the first con- tingents arrived. The Force was supposed to protect lives and property, yet it had no authority to take forceful action against ANC units, many of which took unprovoked action against the UNF. Fortunately, the mere presence of an outside force had a stabilizing influence on most ANC units. The question of when the use of force was permissable in self-defense was an issue throughout the conflict. Since the use of force by the UNF was permissable only in extreme self-defense, commanders were allowed no latitude regarding the implementation of force. Consequently, they were forced to interpret a fine line between what was offensive action and what was self-defense. The question became how far should a commander let a situation deteriorate before using force? Initiating the use of force too soon risked violation of the UNF's mandate, however waiting too long frequently risked death or injury for UNF personnel. General von Horn expressed the dilemma that this posed for military commanders. He wrote that the problem was: "whether to risk his men's lives by involving them in a situation where some of them are bound to get short before having a chance to defend themselves - or whether to risk the failure of a mis- sion (on whose success the lives of many civilians may depend) through a reluctance to expose his soldiers to what he considers an intolerable degree of risk."33 At the same time, Ralph Bunche took a more parochial, and less sympa- thetic, view of the problem. He stated that the "way of force offers no possibility for an international body operating in a soverign country at the invitation of that country."34 Several incidents which occurred are illustrative of some of the dif- ficulties created by the prohibition on the use of force. None of the in- cidents were related and they concerned personnel at vastly different levels of the Force command structure. All of the incidents, however, probably could have been avoided by less restrictive rules of engagement. The confusion and frustration created by the restrictive rules of en- gagement reached to the most senior officers in the UNF as was illustrated by an incident that occurred on 18 August 1960 at the Leopoldville airport. On that day, a group of Congolese soldiers surrounded a United Nations C-119 that was being unloaded by four Canadian crew members. The Congolese accused the Canadians of being Belgian soldiers and then roughed them up while a Ghanian unit that was guarding the airport did nothing. After con- sulting with some senior officers, the Ghanians took action and secured the the release of the Canadian crew. The Secretary-General protested to the Congolese government about the attack. However, he also criticized the Ghanian contingent for not taking stronger action before violence ensued. This precipitated a sharp exchange between the leader of the Ghanian contingent, Major General H. T. Alexander, the Secretary-General and Ralph Bunche. In a letter to Hammarskjold, Alexander noted that the incident was only one of several which involved clashes between United Nations forces and Congolese troops. Alexander deplored Congolese lack of dis- cipline and he suggested that the only way to solve the mess in the Congo was to disarm the ANC, by force if necessary, and then to retrain them. He also criticized Major General von Horn for failing to issue specific orders regarding the use of force and for an unwillingness "to exercise any military authority at all, thus putting Ghanian and other U.N. troops in an impossible position.".35 In light of von Horn's acknowledged con- fusion over his role, there was probably an element of truth in Alexander's claim. Alexander continued to push Bunche for further clarification of the rules of engagement. He insisted that orders, were "neither clear nor did they give United Nations troops any liberty of action even to the use of minimum force."36 Bu che still failed to appreciate the problem. He in- dicated that Alexander failed to realize that the UNF was a peacekeeping force, not a fighting force, and that it could use arms only in self- defense. Bunche also stated that it was essential that U.N. troops avoid getting in the "extreme position of having to shoot Congolese." 37 The confusion and misgivings felt by the UNF's most senior officers extended to the leaders of smaller units with, occasionally, tragic results. Two examples serve to illustrate this point. The first incident occurred on 8 November 1960. An Irish unit under the command of Lieutenant Kevin Gleason was attempting to maintain order among warring native tribesmen in Northern Katanga. Gleason had been warned by an experienced Swedish officer to be careful in his dealings with the natives, especially the unpredictable Baluba tribe. While leading a patrol, Gleason permitted a group of Balubas to surround his unit and then approach his position. The Balubas attacked unexpectably and killed ten members of the patrol.38 Since Lieutenant Gleason was among the casualties, he was unable to explain why he had permitted the Balubas to approach his position and then attack without taking precau- tions to defend his unit. Survivors indicated that the Balubas acted irrationally and that they appeared to be under the influence of drugs. The reasons for Lieutenant Gleason's inaction can only be conjectured. However, at the time of this incident, the UNF was still operating under extremely strict rules of engagement; and the implementation of force, as a very last resort, had been stressed to all commanders. It would be a fair assumption that this limitation weighed on Lieutenant Gleason's mind when he let his squad become surrounded. A second, equally tragic, incident occurred in November 1961. Thir- teen Italian airmen of the UNF had flown to the Congolese base at Kindu where they delivered two scout cars to the Malayan contingent. The Malayans took the airmen to lunch in the dining hall where the Italians were attacked by what appeared to be drug-crazed Congolese soldiers. The Congolese, who claimed that they were looking for Belgian paratroopers, beat the Italians and dragged them off to jail. The fully armed Malayans, who were under orders not to shoot unless fired upon, watched in silence. All thirteen airmen were subsequently murdered.39 There were other incidents and problems caused by the restrictive rules of engagement. Fortunately, only a few resulted in casualties. The question of when the use of force was permissable was never satisfac- torily resolved in the eyes of the military commanders. However, subse- quent expansions of the Force's mandate during the prolonged confron- tation in Katanga permitted the use of enough force to end Katanga's se- cession. ENDNOTES CHAPTER FIVE 1Ernest W. Lefever, Crisis in the Congo (Washington. D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1965), p. 33. 2Ibid., p. 32. 3Ernest W. Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Operation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 203. 4Lefever, Crisis in the Congo p. 140. 5Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Opera- tion p. 27. 6Michael Harbottle, The Blue Berets (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stack- pole Books, 1972), p. 39. 7Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Opera- tion, p. 38. 8Major General Carl Von Horn, Soldiering for Peace (New York: McKay Co., 1967), p. 173. 9Ibid., p. 154. 10Ibid., p. 170. 11Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Opera- tion, p. 177. 12Lefever, Crisis in the Congo, p. 145. 13Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Opera- tion, p. 196. 14Von Horn, p. 174. 15Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Opera- tion, pp. 178-79. 16Ibid., p. 184. 17Ibid., p. 183. 18Ibid., p. 184. 19Lincoln P. Bloomfield (ed.), International Military Forces: The Question of Peacekeeping in an Armed and Disarming World (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1964), p. 154. 20Lefever, Crisis in the Congo, p. 151. 21Bloomfield, pp. 153-54. 22Von Horn, p. 189. 23Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Operation, p. 189. 24D. W. Bowett, United Nations Forces: A Legal Study (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 217. 25Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Operation, p. 189. 26Ibid., p. 185. 27Ibid. 28Ibid., p. 37. 29Bowett, p. 219. 30Ibid., p. 177. 31Lefever, Crisis in the Congo, p. 194. 32Bowett, pp. 116-17. 33Von Horn, pp.162-63. 34Lefever, Crisis in the Congo, pp. 36-7. 35Ibid., p. 86. 36Ibid., p. 194. 37Ibid., p. 88. 38Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Operation, p. 325. 39Carl Mydans and Shelley Mydans, The Violent Peace (New York: 1968), p. 314. CHAPTER SIX STRUGGLE IN KATANGA "The tom-tom must beat this night to call our warriors to the fight. Everywhere in the bush the army warriors must answer this ancestral call." Moise Tshombe on the eve of the U.N. offensive Notwithstanding the UNF's occasional clashes with the Congolese army and with various tribal groups, most of the drama during the Congo crisis was played out in Katanga. It revolved around Moise Tshombe's attempts to establish the province as a free and independent state. By mid 1961, Tshombe had built a well equipped, well armed and well trained gendarmerie. The backbone of this force was a cadre of Belgian officers and NCO's who had been seconded to Tshombe by the Belgian government. For two and one half years, Tshombe's army frustrated efforts by the Congolese Central Government and by the United Nations to end Katanga's secession. Caught in the middle of what historian Mugar Vuluhu called "the Katanga Circus", was the United Nations Peace- keeping Force. Both the U.N. and the Peacekeeping Force played a controversial role in Katanga. The UNF's role expanded from simple efforts, in the beginning of the conflict, at preventing Tshombe's forces and those who opposed him from committing wholesale murder, to active intervention, at the end of the crisis, in support of the Central Government. Whereas some authorities applauded the U.N. efforts in Katanga, others viewed them as the U.N.'s "bloody war to suppress the establishment of Katanga as a separate state".1 The Peacekeeping Force entered Katanga in August 1960. Katanga's secession ended in January 1963. During this time, as its role expanded, the UNF participated in four military operations against the Katangese. By contemporary standards, these were not major military actions. How- ever, all military activity was directly influenced by the political cli- mate at United Nations Headquarters in New York and by the restrictions imposed on the Peacekeeping Force by the Security Council's mandate. Once the UNF commenced military operations, all military activity was closely scrutinized by both the press and by various national governments to ensure that the UNF had not exceeded its mandate. With this is mind, the UNF's operations in Katanga will be examined in detail. Katanga was vital to the survival of the Congo. Tucked away in the Southeastern corner of the country, Moise Tshombe's fabulously wealthy little kingdom was the key to the Congo's economic viability. Profits generated by Katanga's Belgian owned mines accounted for over half of the Congo's revenues. The province supplied 10% of the World's copper 60% of the cobalt, and half of the Western Bloc's material for lining jet engines. Consequently, more was at stake in Katanga for the super powers than the survival of a new African republic. Moise Tshombe was a wealthy man who both understood and appreciated the benefits that Katanga had reaped from Belgian business interests with- in the province. His political position had always called for close eco- nomic ties with Belgium. Consequently, it was not surprising when, after proclaiming Katanga's independence, Tshombe asked Belgium for recognition and assistance. Nor was anyone surprised when Tshombe flatly refused to let U.N. troops enter Katanga. He delared that his forces would fight rather than permit U.N. occupation of the province. Ralph Bunche recognized Tshombe's intransigence, and he reported to the Secretary-General that he had found "unyielding opposition" in Katanga to the entry of U.N. troops.2 This posed a problem for Hammarskjold. The UNF was still operating under a limited mandate which restricted U.N. military activities to the restoration of law and order. If the UNF was going to be forced to fight in Katanga, the mandate needed clarification. Bunche suggested that the Security Council establish further guidelines for U.N. operations in the Congo. These guidelines would separate the constitutional issue of Katanga's secession from questions relating to the scope of the U.N. mission.3 This resulted in the 9 August 1960 resolution which 1) authorized the UNF to enter Katanga and 2) reiterated the U.N.'s intent not to inter- vene in or influence the outcome of the Congo's internal political problems. Faced with the fact that the UNF was determined to enter Katanga, Tshombe backed down on his threat to fight and indicated that he was willing to compromise. On 12 August 1960, 240 Swedish soldiers entered Elisabeth- ville. The UNF's first year in Katanga was relatively uneventful. The UNF was still operating under a strict mandate prohibiting the use of force. Meanwhile, the Congolese Central Government floundered without leadership. During this time, UNF activity was confined to policing minor skirmishes between Tshombe's gendarmerie and Baluba tribesmen. RUMPUNCH Operation "Rumpunch" was the first significant U.N. military action in Katanga. "Rumpunch" was significant because of the motives behind the UNF's action and because the operation was the direct cause of a subse- quent, larger clash between the UNF and Katangan troops. With its activ- ities in "Rumpunch", the UNF abandoned its peacekeeping role and became an active participant in the conflict. "Rumpunch" was an effort by the UNF to capture and to expel the foreign military personnel who formed the nucleus of Tshombe's gendarmerie. Despite the passage of the Security Council's 21 February resolution calling for the repatriation of all foreign military and para-military personnel in the Congo who were not under U.N. command, by August 1961, Tshombe's forces were still firmly led by a core of foreign officers. It was esti- mated that this core consisted of 230 Belgian officers and NCO's and 200 soldiers of fortune of various other nationalities. Although most of the Belgians were due to leave the Congo during September, Hammarskjold was anxious to end Katanga's secession.4 He felt that elimination of the foreign personnel from the Katangan army would eradicate its leadership and that it would, thus, expedite Katanga's reintegration. However, despite Hammarskjold's personal desires, the UNF, at this time, had no explicit legal authority to forcibly expel anyone from the Congo. The 21 February resolution called for the removal of foreign mili- tary personnel, but it did not authorize the UNF to implement the use of force to ensure their removal. In order to circumvent this and to pro- vide the strongest legal basis for "Rumpunch", Hammarskjold persuaded the Congolese Central Government to pass an ordinance which would declare that all foreign military personnel within the Congo were undesirable. The Central Government, at Hammarskjold's request, then asked for United Na- tions assistance in expelling the foreign personnel from the country.5 Armed with a legal request from the host state, the Secretary-General felt justified in acting. In his eyes, the use of the UNF to expel the mercen- aries from Katanga had become part of the mandate.6 The actual operation was relatively simple. At 0400 on 28 August 1961, UNF forces, under the command of Indian Brigadier K. A. S. Raja, began rounding up foreign military personnel in Elisabethville and at bases in Northern Katanga. To prevent Katangan leaders from using it to incite opposition to the operation, U.N. forces quickly seized the radio station in Elisabethville. Later that morning, the United Nations Special Representative in Elisabethville, Conor Cruise O'brien, met with Tshombe and explained the purpose of the operation. Surprisingly, Tshombe agreed to cooperate and offered to announce his cooperation over the radio. At 1300, Tshombe broadcast a statement over radio Katanga indicating that he had agreed to U.N. demands and that all foreign military personnel must leave Katanga. At 1700, O'brien, who was under intense pressure from the Belgian counsel in Katanga to end the roundup, terminated the operation. In return, the Belgian counsel promised to repatriate all prohibited personnel. "Rumpunch" had netted 338 foreign military personnel who were in U.N. custody. Slight- ly over 100 mercenaries were still at large. Unfortunately, the Belgian counsel's promise proved to be empty. He had control over only those personnel seconded to Tshombe by the Bel- gian government. He had no control over Belgian nationals who had been recruited directly by Tshombe. Other country's counsels faced similar difficulties. There were a number of reasons why O'Brien stopped "Rumpunch" before all foreign personnel had been seized. He had not considered the problems that the Belgian counsel would face in fulfilling his promise, and, for once, Tshombe had agreed to cooperate with the United Nations. Mili- tarily, the UNF was concentrated in Elisabethville and it lacked the man- power to operate extensively in other parts of the province. The Force also suffered from an acknowledged lack of intelligence regarding the specific number of mercenaries in Katanga and more importantly, they lacked the mercenaries' identifies.Military considerations aside, however, O'brien's greatest concern was continued avoidance of bloodshed. The U.N. had achi- eved surprise and "Rumpunch" had been executed without conflict. To con- tinue the operation risked a confrontation with the remainder of Tshombe's forces.7 Brigadier Raja, who was commander of UNF units in Katanga, took a different view. He claimed that Tshombe's agreement to help was only a ruse and that the only way to get rid of the mercenaries was to promptly arrest and forcibly evict them.8 Subsequent events proved that Raja may have been correct. ROUND I By early September, although 273 mercenaries had been deported from Katanga, a considerable number remained, consequently, the leadership of Tshombe's gendarmerie was still functional. The U.N. Command regarded the early termination of "Rumpunch" as a mistake and they were determinded to finish the job. To accomplish this, they planned and executed operation "Morthor" (Hindu for smash and subsequently referred to as Round I) in September 1961. This proved to be the most controversial and the most militarily costly operation of the entire Congo crisis. "Rumpunch" had accomplished little aside from alienating most of the Europeans who lived in Katanga and providing Tshombe with fuel for vitri- olic, anti-U.N. speeches. Most of Tshombe's Belgian officers had left Ka- tanga. However, they had been replaced by less savory European and African soldiers of fortune who lacked the Belgian's professional ethic. Inside Elisabethville, 35,000 Baluba tribesmen sought refuge from bloody purges by Tshombe's forces in a squalid U.N. camp. The man res- ponsible for the Baluba persecution appeared to be Tshombe's Interior Minister, Geofroid Munongo. On 5 September, O'brien accused Tshombo of inciting tribal warfare, and he warned that continued persecution of the Balubas would result in United Nations intervention. 9 Often fueled by Tshombe, rumors abounded in Elisabethville that the Central Government, with U.N. backing, was planning to invade Katanga to arrest its leaders and to disband the government. At the same time, the U.N. Command claimed to have evidence that the Katangan leadership was plotting to negate the effects of "Rumpunch" by recruiting additional mer- cenaries. The Congolese Parliament held a session on 8 September and agreed on a four point plan which was to be implemented by U.N. forces. The plan called for 1) the arrest and deportation of all remaining mercenaries in Katanga, 2) the arrest of Tshombe and his key cabinet ministers, 3) the disarming of the Katangan gendarmerie, and 4) the dispatch of officers from the Congolese Central Government to take charge of Katanga.10 The operation was to conclude just prior to the arrival of the Secretary-Gen- eral who was planning a visit to Leopoldville. From the United Nations' point of view, the plan was relatively simple. Its purpose was to secure Tshombe's cooperation and to forestall Katangan resistance through a U.N. show of strength. Armed with warrants issued by the Central Government, U.N. forces were to arrest Tshombe and his cabinet. The post office and radio transmitter in Elisabethville were to be seized and all key Katangan military personnel were to be apprehended. Once this was accomplished, the Katangan colors were to be struck and re- placed by the flag of the Central Government.11 Shortly after the operation commenced, it became obvious that O'brien and the U.N. Command had greatly miscalculated Tshombe's support. O'brien had estimated that the operation could be accomplished in a few hours with- out bloodshed. However, Tshombe had been forwarned of the plan and was determined to resist. Round I commenced at 0400 on 13 September when U.N. forces quickly moved to occupy the post office and the radio station. The UNF encountered aggressive and determined opposition by Katangan forces at the post office. The Katangans fought fiercely, but they were driven out of their positions in fierce hand to hand combat by Indian soldiers of the UNF. The Indian contingent siezed the post office and held it against a subsequent counter- attack.12 Tshombe and his key assistants had been forewarned, however, and had fled the city. Elisabethville was a city filled with terror and hate, much of which was directed against the United Nations.13 A crowd soon gathered around the Indian position at the post office, where it taunted the Indians with shouts of "killers, assassins, macaques" (monkeys).14 Eyewitness accounts from some British nationals allege that as the taunts and insults continued, the Indians became nervous and shot some Congolese citizens in cold blood. Other accounts accused U.N. forces of firing on a Red Cross ambulance. Brigadier Raja denied U.N. culpability in any atrocities. He claimed that the Red Cross vehicle had a bazooka mounted on it and that he and his men had a clear conscience.15 Passions and tension ran high on both sides as each blamed the other for the violence. As members of the opposing armies watched each other warily, the danger of violent confrontation between U.N. forces and Katan- gan citizens increased. On one crude grave for some soldiers who had been killed in the fighting, a black Katangan had hanged a sign that read, "Died for Katanga". This had been crossed out by an angry Belgian national who had scrawled in its place "Murdered by the United Nations". Corres- pondent Lee Griggs described the undeclared war as "...war of the worst kind...fought by two reluctant armies, both jittery in the extreme".16 Incredibly, although U.N. forces had accomplished none of their goals, O'brien held a news conference in Elisabethville on the night of 13 September and declared that the operation was a success and that Ka- tanga's secession was ended. In reality, nothing could have been farther from the truth. The following day, Tshombe called for resistance by all Katangans to any U.N. military operations. His call was answered by tribal bands who attacked and subsequently captured an Irish army garrison at the mining town of Jadotville. In Elisabethville, despite a declaration by Brigadier Raja that all civilians caught carrying arms would be shot and that all Katangan units that refused to throw down thier arms would be executed for treason, Katangan forces kept pressure on the UNF and soon controlled most key positions. The controversy over Round I began when the Secretary-General, ar- riving in Leopoldville on 13 September, was appraised of the action, ap- parently, for the first time. The operation had been planned and executed by U.N. authorities in the Congo with no explicit authorization from United Nations Headquarters. Although the military situation was deteri- orating, now that Hammarskjold was aware of the operation, he still refused to countenance the use of force or offensive tactics, even to disengage from danger.17 By 20 September, Hammarskjold had been killed in a plane crash and the U.N. had suffered a military humiliation. Perhaps worse, the U.N. was being assailed by much of the world press and by several powerful Western governments for alleged aggression in Katanga. When a cease fire was signed on 21 September, the United Nations was at a decisive military disadvantage. The Irish unit at Jadotville was being held hostage; and, with the exception of the captured post office, Katangan forces held all key positions in Elisabethville. Under the circumstances, the best the United Nations could hope for was a return to the status quo. The ceasefire agreement guaranteed Tshombe that the UNF would relinquish all captured positions in Elisabethville and it established a joint com- mission to arrange for the exchange of prisoners. In addition, the cease- fire granted both sides free access to the Elisabethville airport, and it guaranteed that all units outside Elisabethville could return to posi- tions that they occupied on 12 September. Perhaps more significantly, the cease fire recognized the right of Tshombe's forces to protect themselves from attack by Central Government troops. Tshombe's only concession was an agreement to refrain from broadcasting anti-U.N. statements.18 In retrospect, Round I was a political and military disaster for the United Nations. Tshombe had not softened his position on Katanga's seces- sion, and his army was still run by foreign mercenaries. Worse still, the military weakness of the UNF had been exposed, the terms of the cease fire had eliminated what few gains the UNF had made, and the U.N. Command was left to defend its actions against world reaction. With its credibility at stake, the United Nations leadership was forced to explain why a peace- keeping force had seemingly initiated armed action in Katanga. The military debacle was relatively easier to explain than the poli- tical one. A prime cause of the U.N. defeat was the restrictive rules of engagement. Round I had been launched as an extension of "Rumpunch" and it was planned to proceed without bloodshed. However, when Tshombe's forces resisted, the UNF found itself at a decided disadvantage for a num- ber of reasons. First, there had been no additional clarification regar- ding the permissable use of force since the passage of the 21 February re- solution. Consequently, UNF troops carried only defensive weapons and they were still forbidden to use force except in cases of extreme self-defense. These restrictions were of little consequence during "Rumpunch". However, Katangan resistance threatened to turn Round I into an all out war and the UNF was fighting with one hand behind its back. UNF commanders appreciated the need for additional firepower. How- ever, a previous request by the Force commander for jet aircraft and tanks had been denied because these were viewed as offensive weapons. As a re- sult of this weapons deficiency, the UNF could not match the firepower of Tshombe's units. Whereas most Katangan units were well-equipped with modern weapons including machine guns, mortars, armored cars, and Belgian Standard NATO rifles, the UNF suffered from a critical lack of tactical transportation and they were armed with a potpourri of small arms.19 Many critics claim that the UNF committed a tactical blunder shortly after the commencement of Round I when the Force failed to block the main avenues of approach into Elisabethville. Consequently, the Katangans were able to easily reinforce key positions. The failure by the UNF to block the avenues of approach may have been a tactical error, however, this was not an oversight. The UNF simply lacked the manpower to control the area around Elisabethville and, in most places, the Katangan forces enjoyed a decisive superiority in firepower.20 The execution of Round I is still veiled by controversy, most of which centers around the UNF's mandate and the amount of force that the mandate authorized. Evidence does exist that Hammarskjold was not aware of the plans for Round I, and that his Special Representative in Elisa- bethville, Conor Cruise O'brien, was probably responsible for most of the planning for the operation. O'brien claims, however, that he received his instructions from ONUC headquarters in Leopoldville. Regardless of which version is correct, the operation was an embarassment to the Secre- tary-General, not so much because the operation failed, but because O'brien had announced the deliberate use of force to end Katanga's seces- sion. Both France and the United Kingdom questioned the legality of Round I. Both countries felt that the Peacekeeping Force had exceeded its man- date. Hammaskjold attempted to justify the use of force by explaining that Round I was merely a continuation of "Rumpunch" and that U.N. troops were simply trying to arrest Tshombe's mercenaries. When they were fired upon, U.N. troops were forced to defend themselves. This explanation, however, does not stand up to a critical examination. The UNF's dispatch of well armed troops to arrest Katangan officials at 0400 hardly constitutes the use of force in self-defense. The Secre- tary-Generals' explanation avoided any discussion of the arrest warrants which had been prepared for Tshombe and his ministers. It also failed to explain why the UNF was going to fly officials of the Central Government to Elisabethville once Tshombe was arrested.21 Brigadier General Indar Jit Rikhye, who was Hammarskjold's special military advisor and subse- quent founder of the International Peace Academy, stated that the United Nations collaboration with the Central Government and its subsequent use of force in an attempt to end Katanga's secession was clearly a violation of the Security Council's mandate, and that the subsequent negative re- action should have come as no surprise.22 O'brien continued to claim that the operation was not only justified but that it was also legal under the mandate. He endicated that he had received instructions from the director of ONUC's civilian operation, Mahmound Khiary to take over key positions in Elisabethville, to arrest Tshombe and his ministers, and to expel the remainder of the mercenaries. He further argued that those actions were justified to prevent civil war between Katangan and Central Government forces.23 In light of O'brien's expressed opinion that "the great political objective ot the U.N. was - and necessarily remains - to end the secession of Katanga," chances are. that he did not seriously question Khiari's instructions.24 Regardless of whether O'brein acted unilaterally or whether he merely misinterpreted instructions, the command structure between New York, Leopoldville and Elisabethville must bear some of the blame. By executing "Rumpunch", the U.N. moved to actively support the Congolese Central Government. Considering that there was a lack of strict gui- dance from New York, it would appear that ample opportunity existed for U.N. personnel to interpret "Rumpunch" as authority to intervene in behalf of the Central Government. ROUND II By late autumn, the political storm that surrounded Round I had pas- sed; however, the situation in Katanga had not improved. Most of the Bel- gian officers in Tshombe's gendarmerie had been replaced by mercenaries who had less respect for law and order than their Belgian predecessors. Most prominent among these were some French officers who had fled the French army in Algeria after an aborted coup against the DeGaulle govern- ment.25 As a result of the controversy over Round I and the continued pre- sence of mercenaries in the Katangan gendarmerie, the Security Council moved to strengthen the UNF's mandate. The 24 November 1961 resolution specifically authorized the use of force by the UNF for the purpose of ex- pelling foreign military personnel from Katanga. This action by the Security Council set the stage for Round II. The U.N. Command had learned some lessons in Round I and,as a result, had con- siderably increased its manpower level in Katanga. By the beginning of Round II in December 1961, the UNF in Katanga was organized into two Bri- gades which now totalled 6,000 men. The Force had been equipped with jet aircraft and it was able to make use of airpower, which had been non-exis- tant during Round I. More importantly, the UNF now had authority to im- plement the use of force, and it was no longer under strict orders to shoot only in self-defense. Unlike Round I, the UNF commenced operations in Round II fully intending to win a military victory.26 After Round I, the relationship between the UNF and Katangan forces had deteriorated. Katangan forces, which were initially only mildly op- posed to the UNF's presence, had become openly hostile towards the U.N. Force. By the first week in December, Tshombe had also become openly belligerant. A series of strident anti-U.N. speeches by the Katangan leader had further inflamed his troops. While Katangan forces wandered through the streets of Elisabethville with guns ready, they were closely watched by nervous Indian forces who were still concerned by restraints on their right to protect themselves. The Indian contingent should not have worried. Acting Secretary- General U Thant had made his aversion to Tshombe and his mercenaries ob- vious. In addition, there had been some concern by donating states over limitations on the use of force. The UNF had suffered casualties at the hands of Katangan troops, and states were concerned about the Forces' ability to protect itself. In response, Thant had developed a broader interpretation of the mandate which permitted the use of more force.27 Neither Tshombe nor anyone else seemed capable of fully controlling the Katangan soldiers. On 2 December, an unarmed Italian medical assis- tant was severly beaten by Katangan gendarmes. On the same day, UNF personnel were fired upon at the Elisabethville airport and Katangan forces established roadblocks between the airport and U.N. headquarters. That eve- ning ten UNF soldiers were kidnapped and another was killed by sniper fire. Three days later, UNF forces gained possession of a Katangan plan to strangle the UNF in and around Elisabethville. The plan had been drawn up by the mercenaries' leader, Colonel Faulques. The plan was supposed to create panic and confusion through selective murders. United Nations personnel were to be kidnapped and then used for negotiations, while the Katangan gendarmerie was to isolate various UNF units and disrupt communications by establishing a series of roadblocks.28 By 5 December, Thant felt compelled to authorize action. The estab- lishment of road blocks was in direct violation of the cease fire signed at the end of Round I. Katangan aircraft were flying reconaissance flights over UNF positions and Katangan army units had moved into positions around the U.N. force at the Elisabethville airport. Tshombe subsequently reneged on a promise to remove the road blocks which forced UNF units into untenable positions. Since Tshombe appeared to be stalling for time, Thant autho- rized the UNF to conduct whatever air and ground actions as were necessary to restore freedom of movement.29 The U.N. force under Brigadier Raja moved immediately to clear the roadblocks near the airport. By the time a cease fire was declared two weeks later, 206 Katangan troops, an estimated 50 civilians, and 25 UNF soldiers had been killed. Despite some blood-curdling newspaper accounts of the fighting in Elisabethville, Round II was largely a battle of position. Unlike in Round I, the UNF was able to quickly clear the roadblocks in Elisabethville. By using air support, they were able to prevent the reinforcement of Katan- gan units,while steadily reinforcing their own positions with UNF units from other provinces. Katangan units tried to take advantage of the UNF's expressed in- tention to avoid damage to civilians and their property by establishing troop concentrations in the vicinity of schools, churches and hospitals.30 Non-uniformed Katangans were often seen directing fire, and informal squads were wandering the streets setting up mortars and taking pot shots at U.N. positions. This remarkably accurate fire was directed from the roof of Elisabethville's tallest building - a hospital. Round II was a striking military success compared Round I. By co- ordinating air and ground power, the UNF was able to sieze and maintain the the initiative and to quickly reopen lines of communication. More signi- ficantly, for the first time since entering the Congo, UNF troops were largely unencumbered by restrictive rules of engagement. Once again, reaction to the use of force was predictable. In the Bri- tish House of Commons, Edward Heath decried the use of force when he stated that the "U.N. forces are of course fully entitled to protect themselves when they are attacked, but they have not got a permit from the resolutions to try to impose a political solution by force".32 Foriegn Secretary Lord Hume reinforced this position when he declared that Britain opposed the use of force "being carried to a point of leading the United Nations into an endless war and chaos".33 Belgian and French government officials echoed similar sentiments. Acting Secretary-General Thant vigorously defended the U.N. action and denied that the United Nations goal was to force a political or mili- tary solution on Katanga. He declared that "the purpose of the present military operations is to regain and assure our freedom of movement, to restore law and order, and to ensure that for the future the United Nations forces and officals in Katanga are not subject to attacks; and meanwhile to react vigorously in self-de fense to every assault on our present positions...military operations Will be persued up to such time, andonly up to such time, that these objectives are achieved.34 ROUND III As was the case after Round I, the controversy over U.N. methodology soon subsided. For the next year, both sides watched each other in an un- easy stalemate as Tshombe and the Central Government negotiated in an at- tempt to find some common ground. Negotiations proved fruitless however, and by autumn of 1962, it was obvious that Tshombe had no intention of ending Katanga's secession. Meanwhile mutual hostility between the UNF and Katangan troops continued to grow. The year was marked by sporadic but increasing violence as the U.N. force gradually increased in strength. By December 1962, there were 13,500 U.N. troops in Katanga. At the United Nations, the political climate had changed. Neutral African states were growing impatient over the Katanga impasses and India was having border difficulties with China. The U.N. Command feared that the large Indian contingent would be recalled to India. In Elisabethville, many Indian officers wanted to finish what had been started in Round II. They wanted to rout Tshombe's army and end Katanga's secession.35 The political climate and U.N. headquarters had changed by late 1962. There had been a change of government in Belgium; and in an abrupt change of Belgian policy, the new Foreign Minister declared that Tshombe was a rebel and that Belgium saw no way to end the conflict short of using force. A U.S. State Department survey had come to the same conclusion. The cost of the operation in the Congo was severely straining the U.N. budget and there appeared to be only two alternatives for the U.N. - force an end to the conflict or withdraw from the Congo.36 In response to the State Department survey, President Kennedy dis- patched a commission, headed by LtGen Louis Truman to the Congo to con- duct a survey of UNF requirements. Truman prepared a long list of reco- mmended equipment. Though the equipment failed to arrive in the Congo prior to the cessation of hostilities, Truman's list was interpreted by the U.N. Command as a committment from the U.S. to force an end to the crisis. Encouraged by the change in political climate, the UNF had been planning an operation, under the legal guise of ensuring freedom of move- ment, that, if successful, would end Katanga's secession. Although it had been planned by U.N. officials, Round III was started on Christmas Eve 1962 by Katangan soldiers who fired on a U.N. observation post in Elisabethville. For three days, UNF officials warned Tshombe that, unless he controlled his troops, military action would be taken. However, Tshombe appeared to have lost control of his gendarmerie and the sniping continued. At 0415 on 28 December, the UNF commenced offensive action and, with- in three days, controlled a fifteen mile perimeter around Elisabethville. UNF aircraft destroyed the small Katangan airforce while it was still on the ground, and UNF troops occupied strategic positions throughout the pro- vince. Despite accusations of agression by Tshombe, the UNF kept the pressure on the Katangan forces. The new U.N. operations chief, Robert A. K. Gardiner, grimly declared that he was "not going to make the mistake of stopping short this time".37 Tshombe's forces were in disarray and they seemed to have lost their will to fight. Tshombe's forces were not as well organized as in the previous engagements and by mid-January, most of his mercenaries had fled the country. On 21 January, Tshombe agreed to sur- render his gendarmerie and all of their weapons. Katanga's secession was over. UNF forces did not leave the Congo until the summer of 1964. However, there was no additional fighting in Katanga and no controversy surrounded U.N. activities. What began as a simple peacekeeping mission had lasted four years and had cost 126 UNF lives. These are light casualty figures by most standards. But in the words of U Thant, "For a peace force, even a little fighting is too mucn, and even a few casualties are too many.".38 ENDNOTES CHAPTER SIX 1New York Times, 4 Dec. 1964, sec. 1, p. 1. 2A. J.Mezerik, (ed.), Congo and the United Nations (New York: International Review Service), p. 28. 3Ibid. 4Ernest W. Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Operation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 52. 5Ibid. 6Arthur Lee Burns and Nina Heathcote, Peace-Keeping by U.N. Forces from Suez to the Congo (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 98. 7Conor Cruise O'brien, To Katanga and Back (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962), pp. 221-22. 8Ibid., p. 222. 9Ibid., p. 243. 10Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Operation, p. 54. 11Ernest W. Lefever, Crisis in the Congo (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1965), p. 80. 12Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Operation, p. 56. 13"The Congo", Time, 22 September 1961, p. 31. 14Mugar Valuhu, The Katanga Circus (New York: Speller and Sons, 1964), p. 203. 15Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Operation, p. 56. 16Carl Mydans and Shelley Mydans, The Violent Peace (New York: Atha- neum, 1968), pp.315-16. 17Rajeshwar Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjold (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 271. 18Wynfred Joshua, A Congo Chronology, 1960-1964 (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1966), p. 40. 19Lefever, Crisis in the Congo, p. 143. 20Burns and Heathcote, p. 108. 21Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Operation, p. 58. 22Indar Jit Rikhye, Michael Harbottle, and Bjorn Egge, The Thin Blue Line (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974), p. 80. 23Burns and Heathcote, p. 102. 24George Martelli, Experiment in World Government (London: Johnson Publications, 1966), p. 112. 25King Gordon, The United Nations in the Congo: A Quest for Peace (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962), p. 138. 26Burns and Heathcote, p. 134. 27Ibid., pp. 132-33. 28Ibid., p. 132, 29Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Operation, p. 60. 30Gordon, p. 142. 31"Congo: The Heart of Darkness", Time 22 December 1961, pp. 18-19. 32Howard M. Epstein (ed.), Revolt in the Congo (New York: Facts on File Inc., 1965), p. 119. 33Ibid. 34Gordon, p. 143. 35Lefever, Crisis in the Congo, p. 104. 36Joshua, p. 73. 37Lefever, Crisis in the Congo, p. 108. 38Ibid., p. 112. CHAPTER SEVEN CONCLUSIONS AND ANALYSIS "The thousands of soldiers from some twenty countries who accepted this challenge in the Congo began to learn to apply the arts of war to the infinitely subtle and difficult problems of maintaining the peace - this may be a development of more lasting importance than what eventually happened in the Congo itself." Brian Urquhart The author of the above quotation was present in the Congo and helped to invent the United Nations concept of peacekeeping. Recognized as one of peacekeepings foremost practitioners, Mr. Urquhart has risen to the rank of Undersecretary of the United Nations. The quotation, which was written shortly after the termination of U.N. activities in the Congo, has proven to be prophetic. Not only has the United Nations deployed numerous peacekeeping forces since the end of the Congo crisis, but other nations have frequently taken multinational action in attempts to maintain peace in an increasingly hostile world. The multinational force which recently served in Lebanon is a prime example. As a result of these actions, a number of working princi- ples for peacekeeping forces have been established. This chapter will define the essence of peacekeeping and then it will analyze the United Nations peacekeeping effort in the Congo in light of the established principles. It will also evaluate the success of the UNF, and it will discuss the nature of its involvement in the Congo to determine whether the Peacekeeping Force remained true to its mandate and whether it remained a true peacekeeping force throughout its deployment. Finally, every Marine is acutely aware of the problems which confronted the Marines of the multinatinal force in Beirut. The establishment of a multinational peacekeeping force with the Marines as its core directly or indirectly af- fected the entire Marine Corps. The Marines in Lebanon faced many of the same problems which were faced by the UNF in the Congo. These problems will be briefly examined in light of the principles of peacekeeping. This will be followed by a brief discussion of some of the steps that commanders can take to prepare their units for peacekeeping duty. THE PRINCIPLES OF PEACEKEEPING Brigadier Rikhye, in his book on international peacekeeping en- titled The Thin Blue Line, defines United Nations peacekeeping as "the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of sol- diers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace."1 Peacekeeping is based on "the theoretical approach that certain types of conflicts can be controlled or dampened by a neutral third-party presence."2 Once a peacekeeping force has been established, its task is to provide the proper atmosphere for negotiation and arbitration. When commenting on the essence of peacekeeping, Brian Urquhart stressed that the real purpose of a peacekeeping force " is not to win wars. It is to give other people an excuse not to have wars with each other, and thereby give negotiations a chance." Continuing, he stated that peacekeepers must "stay above the conflict, have no enemies, take a great deal of abuse, be rigidly impartial, and not confuse self-defense with reprisals."3 Clearly, enforcement plays no part in a peacekeeping role. A peacekeepers weapons must be negotiation, mediation, tact, diplomacy, patience and the moral force of his presence. His concept of action must always encompass peaceful means and not persuasion by force or threat. His operations must be guided by strict objectivity and non-alignment with the parties to the dispute. Finally, and perhaps most important, the peace- keeper must have the confidence, trust, and respect of all parties to the dispute. If the peacekeepers actions are not characterized by the afore- mentioned traits, it is unlikely that he will enjoy this trust and respect, without which the chances of his intervention remaining peaceful are not good.4 The preceding paragraphs described the essence of peacekeeping and defined it in a pragmatic manner. However, peacekeeping operations are seldom simple and the problems which confront peacekeeping forces are usually not easily solved. If a simple solution to a dispute were possible, chances are that a peacekeeping force would not be established in the first place. Although peacekeeping assignments are hardly routine in the Marine Corps, any Marine may, at some time, be called to serve in a peacekeeping force. If he is to be successful in dealing with the unique and often com- plex problems associated with peacekeeping, Marine officers need to be familiar with peacekeeping's fundamental precepts. The following principles have been developed for United Nations peacekeeping missions. They are, however, basic to the success of any multi- national peace force. Each of the following principles will be discussed in turn and then the Congo mission will be analyzed in light of each prin- ciple. The principles of peacekeeping are as follows: 1. The peacekeeping force should have the consent of the principle parties to the dispute. 2. The peacekeeping force should be balanced in its geo- graphic and political makeup. 3. All elements of a peacekeeping force must be loyal to the mission and be responsive to the force commander. 4. The peacekeeping force must enjoy freedom of movement throughout its area of responsibility. 5. The peacekeeping force must have the approval of the major powers. 6. All peacekeeping activities must be conducted simul- taneously with efforts to resolve the basic conflict. 7. The peacekeeping force must always be neutral with regards to the conflict and it must be uniformly impartial in its actions. 8. The peacekeeping force should use military force only in self-defense.5 CONSENT OF THE PRINCIPLE PARTIES Brigadier General Michael Harbottle served as the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Forces in Cyprus and, for two years, commanded the British contingent of the Cyprus Force. He stated that if peacekeeping forces are to be successful, they " must have the full cooperation and the whole-hearted and genuine intent of the two sides in the dispute to resolve their differences and to reach an equitable settlement. If this intent and purpose are missing in the hearts and minds of the two or more contes- tants most directly concerned, then the task of the peacemaker is well-nigh impossible."6 Brigadier General A.J. Wilson, who was commander of the United Nations Forces in Cyprus for six months, observed a related problem. Although peacekeeping forces usually have consent when they enter a conflict, that consent is frequently difficult to keep. Brigadier Wilson noted that once a U.N. peace force arrives, parties to the dispute invariably seek to interpret the peace force's mandate in very different ways. It is essen- tial, therefore, that the peace force clearly understand its mandate and that the force be invariably consistent in interpreting that mandate for the parties to the dispute. Few things can be more detrimental or more likely to cause a loss of confidence in the U.N. than for the peace force's terms of reference to be misunderstood. To prevent this, the peace force must make its capabilities and limitations clear from the very start.7 The most important point to this first fundamental is that any peace- keeping force needs the consent of all major parties to the dispute. Bri- gadiers Harbottle and Wilson brought up three additional points, each of which was germane to the UNF's mission in the Congo. These points were 1) consent, once gained, is often difficult to keep, 2) peacekeeping forces must accurately interpret their mandate for the parties to the dispute and they must ensure that the parties understand the peacekeeping force's limi- tations, 3) all parties to the dispute must genuinely want to find a solu- tion to their differences. Let's address each of these points in turn. The United Nations made no attempt to intervene in the Congo until it was asked to do so by the Congolese government. Therefore, the UNF entered the Congo with the consent of one of the major parties to the dis- pute - the Congolese Central Government. The other major party to the dispute, Katangan leader Moise Tshombe, was not enthusiastic about U.N. intervention in the Congo's problems. He was adamantly opposed to the en- try of U.N. troops into Katanga. However, Tshombe subsequently acquiesced to a U.N. occupation of the province and he passively accepted the presence of U.N. troops. Consequently, while the UNF did not enjoy the whole-hearted support of both parties to the Congo dispute, neither side was adamantly opposed to the Peacekeeping Force. As long as this situation existed, the Force was involved in only isolated hostilities. Unfortunately, the UNF was unable to maintain the consent of both the Congolese and the Katangan governments. When this consent was lost, the Force was no longer able to accomplish its mission peacefully. This loss of consent was closely related to the way that both Lumumba and Tshombe perceived the UNF's mandate. Since in the case of the Congo they are closely related, the principles of maintaining consent and of accurately interpreting the mandate will be discussed together. The UNF was initially successful in restoring law and order and in providing an atmosphere for the peaceful withdrawal of Belgian troops. These missions were accomplished,for the most part, without violence. By September 1961, however, the Congolese Central government had attached its own interpretation to the UNF's mandate. Although the Secretary-Gen- eral had thoroughly explained the mandate to the Congolese and he had made it perfectly clear that the UNF would not be used as an instrument by either side to force a solution on the other, the Central Government de- manded that the UNF promptly intervene to put an end to Katanga's secession. When Hammarskjold quite properly refused to permit this, the UNF promptly lost the consent of the Central Government. Consequently, for the next year the Force was involved in a series of incidents with Congolese troops who had been turned against the UNF by a series of violent anti-U.N. speeches delivered by Congolese leaders. The U.N. did not regain the sup- port of the Central Government until August 1961, when the Peacekeeping Force became actively involved in support of the Central Government during "Rumpunch" and Round I. A similar situation prevailed in Katanga. Tshombe's passive accep- tance of the U.N. presence in Katanga permitted the UNF to serve its first year in the province with no direct clashes with Katangan troops. After "Rumpunch" the situation in Katanga changed. Whether or not the UNF remained neutral in the conflict will be discussed later in this chapter. However, regardless of the U.N.'s position regarding Katanga's secession, Tshombe's perception and that of the residents of Elisabethville was that the UNF was no longer neutral. They perceived that the Peacekeeping Force had become an instrument of the Central Government. The UNF's actions during Round I only reinforced this feeling. When Tshombe's attempts to rally his people against the UNF's actions were roundly criticized by the U.N. Command, he expressed his frustration with the U.N. presence when he stated: "When I put my people on guard, against the danger which the U.N. represents for Katanga, I am said to be conducting a campaign of excitement. If I understand the situation rightly, Katanga is not only supposed to let it- self be strangled, but also to permit this to happen in silence."8 The consequence of these perceptions was an openly hostile attitude of the Katangan people toward the UNF. The fighting in Rounds II and III resulted,in part, because the Katangans viewed the UNF as an army of occu- pation and not as a neutral presence. Brigadier Harbottle's final point was that all parties to the dis- pute must genuinely want to resolve their differences. A case can be made for the thesis that a peaceful peacekeeping mission to the Congo was doomed from the start. The Cogolese Central Government genuinely wanted to resolve the conflict with Katanga. However, the Central Government wanted the conflict resolved on its own terms and, as a result, it offered few concessions to Tshombe. Tshombe, on the other hand, negotiated a lot and made numerous promises to reintegrate Katanga. In reality, Tshombe had no intention of ending Katanga's secession until he was forced to throught military action. Since both sides did not genuinely desire to resolve their differences, the violence that ultimately ensued in Katanga was not sur- prising. GEOGRAPHIC AND POLITICAL BALANCE Ideally, a peacekeeping force includes contingents from all parts of the world which are contributed by nations with widely differing idealo- gical beliefs. Generally, contingents from the super powers are not ac- ceptable for peacekeeping missions because the super powers are seldom viewed as neutral by all parties to a dispute. The principle of geogra- phic and political balance often conflicts with the principle of consent when the parties to the dispute object to representation from specific countries. This was certainly true in the Congo. Lumumba made it clear from the very beginning that he wanted no troops from the United States in the peacekeeping force. He later insisted that a majority of the contingents come from Africa. The Secretary-General com- plied with this insistence as much as possible. However, this restriction hindered his ability to get highly qualified troops, and it caused some logistics problems because some of the African contingents were poorly equip- ped. However, despite the problems which were created by a lack of super power support, the Congo operation was conducted with minimal support from the super powers. Although a preponderance of the contingents were from Africa, the UNF's composition crossed a wide spectrum of political beliefs. Although several states, in particular the militant African nations, had specific interests in the outcome of the Congo conflict, they took few actions that influenced the UNF's capabilities. It can be concluded that the makeup of the UNF had no significant detrimental effects on the Force's ability to accomplish its mission. LOYALTY AND RESPONSIVENESS TO THE FORCE COMMANDER In any multinational force, regardless of its mission, commanders are often faced with divided loyalties and with a lack of cohesiveness. This is particularly true in peacekeeping forces where missions are frequently vague and there is often a lack of immediate urgency to motivate individual soldiers. Brigadier Wilson noted the problems of divided loyalty when he said: "The first and most immediate problem facing a senior officer in a U.N. force is that he will, as generally never before, find himself faced with an acute double loyalty. As a serving officer in his own country's armed forces, he will of course retain his normal loyalty towards his country of origin; at the same time, however, as a member of a U.N. force, he will have an equal, if not overiding loyalty, to the United Nations Organization."9 Cordial relationships and mutual understanding can be difficult to establish between national contingents. Similar relationships between senior officers are vital and go a long ways towards fostering cooperation in a multinational force. For this reason, senior officers selected for multinational peacekeeping duties should possess a "disposition to compromise and a disinclination to rock the boat."10 Senior offi- cers who possess these attributes help insure that peacekeeping forces work together towards a common goal and that the force remains res- ponsive to the orders of the force commander. There were minor problems of divided loyalty during the UNF's in- volvement in the Congo. However, none was so severe that it influenced the Force's ability to function. Similarly, despite some minor mis- understandings, the Force's senior commanders worked well together. A notable exception was the relationship between Major General von Horn and the commander of the Ghanian contingent, Major General Alexander. On several occasions, Alexander disagreed vehemently with von Horn's orders and with UNF policies. General Alexander was particularly voci- ferous about the policy of not disarming the ANC. The most notable result of the poor relationship between the two officers was a reluctance on von Horn's part to make best use of the Ghanian contingent. Shortly after Alexander returned to Ghana in the autumn of 1960, he and General von Horn reached an understanding. Von Horn felt that perhaps "the most relieved and delighted unit in the command was undoubtedly the Ghana Brigade."11 FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT Once a peacekeeping force is in position, it must maintain its free- dom of movement while remaining non-coercive and impartial in the conflict. A peacekeeping unit cannot let itself be forced into a narrow zone of ac- tion by one or more of the parties to the dispute. There are difficulties inherent in maintaining freedom of movement because maintenance of free- dom of movement by the peacekeeping force frequently requires restricting the freedom of movement of one or more of the belligerents.12 Consequently, during attempts to maintain freedom of movement, peacekeeping forces fre- quently have difficulty adhering to the principle of non-use of force. Outside of Katanga, the UNF had few problems with the Central Govern- ment restricting its freedom of movement. Within Katanga, however, the problem was acute prior to Rounds II and III. Both actions were precipi- tated by Katangan attempts to restrict the movement of U.N. forces. Prior to Round III, Katangan roadblocks and troop movements had severely re- stricted UNF movement in Elisabethville. To prevent being placed in un- tenable, military positions, the UNF had little choice other than to resort to the use of force. APPROVAL OF THE MAJOR POWERS Peacekeeping forces which originate in the United Nations require super power consent to avoid a Security Council veto of the resolution which is required to create the peacekeeping force. In smaller, regional confrontations where there is little super power interest, support for a peacekeeping force is needed from the strongest single nation or group of nations in the region.13 As has been previously discussed, the permanent members of the Security Council pursued different goals in the Congo and they differed in their views as to how the crisis should be resolved. By not vetoing the various peacekeeping resolutions which were passed to control the UNF, the Council members gave their tacit approval, if not their enthusiastic support to the peacekeeping mission. PEACEKEEPING ACTIVIES MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY SERIOUS ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICT Obviously, peacekeeping is not an end in itself, but is rather a means to an end. The peacekeeping force cannot, by itself, resolve the conditions that caused the original conflict. The very real danger is that if peacekeeping efforts are not accompanied by serious attempts to resolve the underlying issues of the dispute, the peacekeeping mission may only serve to prolong the conflict by removing the urgency to find a solution to the underlying problems.14 During the course of the entire Congo conflict, negotiations between United Nations representatives, the Congolese Central Government, and Katangan authorities were on going in an attempt to find a solution to the impasse of Katanga's secession. The difficulty was that there was little common ground for agreement between the two sides. Tshombe proved to be a mercurial leader who was capable of changing his demands at any time. He agreed on several occasions to compromises that could have led to the end of Katanga's secession. Invariably, however, Tshombe reneged on his promises for one reason or another. In essence, he had little desire to reintegrate Katanga with the Central Government. To- shombe's intransigence made it increasingly difficult for the UNF to forsee a peaceful resolution to the conflict; and it led, in part, to active U.N. intervention on behalf of the Central Government and the subsequent fighting in Rounds II and III. A PEACEKEEPING FORCE MUST BE NEUTRAL AND IMPARTIAL Brigadier Harbottle has noted that a peacekeeping force, if it is to be successful in its purpose, "must be scrupulously impartial to both sides (of the conflict). Were it to act with force, then that force must also be used impartially, if necessary even against the 'host' state or government that accepted it on its territory in the first place."15 This principle is closely related to the principle of poli- tical and geographic balance. It is desirable that nations contributing contingents to a peacekeeping force have no vested interest in the out- come of the conflict. This makes it much easier for the force to remain neutral. However, the problem of neutrality goes deeper than this. Not only must the peacekeeping force be neutral in fact, but it must also be per- ceived as being neutral by the major parties to the conflict. Sometimes, despite religious attempts to remain neutral, a peacekeeping force is perceived by one of the belligerents to be partial to the other side. This inevitably leads to offensive action against the peacekeeping force. In turn, this may result in reprisals by the peacekeeping unit. Once a peacekeeping force takes such action, it loses its moral authority and it can become part of the dispute rather than the referee.16 The principle of neutrality caused numerous difficulties for the UNF in the Congo. Although the Central Government did not always agree with the limitations imposed on the UNF by its mandate, there were no instances when the Central Government perceived the UNF as being partial to Tshombe. The Katangan perception, however, was quite different. As was discussed under the principle of consent, Tshombe and the Katangan people perceived that the UNF was determined to back the Central Government to the detri- ment of Katanga. This caused active military action against the peace- keeping force which precluded the possibility of a peaceful solution to the dispute. NON-USE OF FORCE EXCEPT IN SELF-DEFENSE Brigadier Wilson described peacekeeping duty as "rather like being a member of a fire brigade which is allowed to use hoses only in certain circumstances but which is in permanent attendance on a smouldering conflagraion which might break out at any moment."17 This challenge is precipitated by necessary, but often unconfortable, restrictions on a peacekeeper's authority to implement the use of force. The primary objective of a peacekeeping force should be to keep the adversaries in the conflict apart. This should not be accomplished by armed force, but rather by mediation or through interposition of the peacekeeping force between the adversaries should they be inclined to fight. The mere presence of the peacekeeping force acts as a stabilizing factor and as a deterrant to more extreme action. The danger is that the peacekeeping force should not appear as a "third force" which is determined to impose peace at any cost.18 To avoid this appearance, the use of force for offensive or for retaliatory purposes by peacekeeping forces must be avoided at all costs. However, this is not to imply that peacekeeping forces do not have the right to defend themselves. The amount of power authorized any peace force is naturally dependent on conditions prevailing at the time. Re- gardless of the situation, however, the force commander must always be given the authority to use whatever force is necessary to protect his troops.19 However, regardless of efforts to protect itself, no peace- keeping force that strives for maximum effect in its peacekeeping respon- sibilites can reasonably expect not to suffer some casualties.20 The most obvious problem created by the use of force by peacekeeping units is that the peace force may become actively engaged in the conflict. Once this happens, the perception of neutrality is lost and the peace force may become part of the dispute rather than part of the solution. Excessive use of force may, however, cause an additional, more subtle problem. A peacekeeping unit which possesses the authority to use force will frequently find itself pressed by each disputing party to use force against the other. This makes it relatively easier for the perception of neutrality to be lost.21 The use of force by the UNF in the Congo was a continual source of controversy. Attacks on the UNF by ANC soldiers early in the conflict made it necessary for the Secretary-General to define the Force's right to defend itself. Later in the conflict, he found it necessary to broaden this right to enable U.N. troops to protect the property and lives of local civilians and of U.N. property. This right was carefully researched by U.N. lawyers and was explicitely defined for UNF commanders.22 There was little controversey, outside Katanga, over UNF military actions. However, U.N. activities inside Katanga were a source of contin- ual contention. This was particularly true during Rounds I, II and III. There is strong evidence that the UNF initiated the fighting in Round I. Even if they did not, UNF activities forced the Katangans to take action which resulted in hostilities. The effect of this was that the Katangan people no longer perceived the peacekeeping force as being neutral in the conflict. This severely undermined the UNF's ability to maintain peace. Round II was an extension of Round I. Though the fighting was not specifically started by the UNF, Katangan military activities prior to Round II were a logical result of the methods employed by the UNF in Round I. By the close of Round II, the UNF had lost all perceptions of neutrality and was openly viewed as an enemy by the Kantangan authorities. Two other questions, aside from the principles of peacekeeping, bear brief discussion in regards to the Congo. The first question concerns the proper size for a peacekeeping force. In an article for "Military Review", Major James C. Wise, USA, cites some authoratative writers about this subject. Wise states that a peacekeeping force must; 1) be large enough to defend itself and project a visible presence but not so large as to attempt to impose its will on any of the belligerents, 2)"be large enough to have the flexibility to concentrate forces in res- ponse to a local threat," 3) have no national contingent so large that it appears to dominate the rest.23 Although 90,000 U.N. troops eventually served in the Congo, the UNF, at its largest , numbered only 20,000. Frequently this number was not large enough. It must be remembered that the Congo was the size of Western Europe and Katanga, which during Round I was occupied by less than 6,000 UNF troops, was approximately the size of France. On notable occasions, the UNF was unable to properly concentrate its forces in response to a local threat. The first instance occurred at Matadi in March 1961. When the Sudanese garrison was overrun by ANC troops, the UNF did not have the assets nor the firepower to adequately reinforce or to relieve the Sudanese garrison. This prompted a Western military expert to state that "the U.N. has committed the cardinal military sin of spreading forces thin all over the Congo, leaving themselves with no troops to put in motion in an emergency."24 Colonel R. Ernest Dupuy echoed similar sentiments when he wrote that U.N. forces in the Congo were "so scattered that concentration or mutual support was impossible."25 The second occasion was during Round I in Katanga. Once the planned peaceful roundup of Tshombe's mercenaries degenerated into open hostilities, the UNF did not have enough manpower stationed within Katanga to exploit the limited successes that they achieved, nor did they have troops avail- able to deter Katangan activities outside of Elisabethville. The second point that bears discussing is the type of weapons that were carried by the UNF. Many peacekeeping experts feel that peacekeeping forces should have a full complement of weapons and equipment. However, Brigadier Harbottle would draw the line at tanks and artillery because these are generally classified as offensive weapons.26 Brian Urquhart agrees with this philosophy. He stated that "the moment you get beyond infantry weapons and armoured personnel carriers to protect the troops, it is a hazard. You look as if you are part of the conflict."27 During the first portion of its involvement in the Congo, the UNF possessed no offensive weapons. The Force was limited to light mortars and to the personal side arms which were carried by individual troops. The lack of offensive weapons posed no problems for the Force during its first year in the Condo because it was involved in only minor skirmishes. However, when the UNF became an active participant in the conflict subse- quent to "Rumpunch", the Force suffered from its lack of firepower. Con- sequently, more weapons were procured, including jet aircraft. This enabled the Force to better defend itself. However, as will be discussed in the next section, the addition of extra firepower substantially changed the Force's nature. DID THE FORCE REMAIN TRUE TO ITS MANDATE AND DID IT REMAIN A TRUE PEACEKEEPING MISSION? It must be remembered that there were three significant modifications to the original Security Council resolution of 14 July 1960. The original resolution created the UNF and authorized the Peacekeeping Force to restore law and order in the Congo. The 9 August 1960 resolution specifically authorized the UNF to enter Katanga. The 21 February 1961 resolution authorized the use of force to prevent civil war, and the 24 November 1961 resolution authorized the use of force to expel foreign military personnel from Katanga. With the exception of Round I, it can be argued that the UNF never intentionally exceeded its mandate. Even in Round I, the violence that ensued was not planned. Round I was supposed to be a peaceful roundup of Tshombe's mercenaries and fighting did not begin until Katangan forces re- sisted the UNF's action. By the time Round II took place, the UNF had been authorized to use force in order to remove the foreign military per- sonnel from Katanga. Although the UNF was ready and willing to fight in Rounds II and III, both of these operations were precipitated by Katangan agression against the UNF. In Round II, the UNF was protecting itself against a series of assaults by Katangan forces and it was ensuring its freedom of movement. During Round III, the Force took military action to, once again, ensure its freedom of movement. Coincidentally, with both of these actions, many of the Katangan mercenaries were eliminated. However, although the Peacekeeping Force remained true to its mandate, by September 1961, it had ceased to function as a true peacekeeping force. The U.N. had broken a cardinal rule of peacekeeping - it had not remained neutral in the conflict. When the United Nations planned and then executed "Rumpunch", it established the UNF as an instrument of the Central Govern- ment. Although U.N. officials rightfully claimed after each round of fighting that the UNF was only exercising its mandate, the fact remains that the mandate had expanded to permit the Peacekeeping Force to intervene on behalf of the Congolese Central Government. U.N. officials had made it clear that they opposed Tshombe's actions and that they wished to see Katanga reintegrated with the remainder of the Congo. It was no wonder that the Katangans opposed the Peacekeeping Force and that they viewed the UNF as an opposing army of occupation. The result of this view was that the Force could not accomplish its mission peacefully and it was forced to become a belligerent in the conflict. DID THE UNF ACCOMPLISH ITS MISSION In a discussion about peacekeeping operations, Brigadier Harbottle wrote: "To expect a politico-military operation of the Congo type, mounted in the ad-hoc fashion that has been the keystone of such operations, to be anything but a qualified success would be wholly unrealistic."28 The Congo mission was an exceedingly complex undertaking for the U.N. and, as a result, there are a number of questions that need to be answered in a determination of whether the UNF successfully accomplished its mission. Some of these questions are philosophical. For example, if one subscribes to the view that all peacekeeping forces should accomplish their tasks non- violently, then the U.N.'s mission in the Congo was a miserable failure. The UNF fought on numerous occasions and, as was pointed out previously, the fighting was a predictable consequence of some of the U.N.'s policies. One could also ask whether the Congo was better off as a result of the UNF's efforts. That is difficult to answer. U.N. officials acknow- ledged when the UNF left the Congo in 1964, that the Congo was no stronger politically then than it was when the crisis began. Civil war continued to plague the Congo after the UNF's departure; and Moise Tshombe, after he became Prime Minister in 1964, was forced to employ some of his old mercenaries in order to defeat a Communist inspired insurgency. As to how the question of Katanga's secession would have been resolved had the U.N. not entered the Congo, that can only be the subject of conjecture. All this is not to say, however, that the U.N. mission accomplished little or that its efforts were not appreciated. Mr. Mongi Slim, who be- came Tunisian Foreign Secretary and who was his country's representative to the Security Council during the Congo crisis, spoke eloquently of the U.N.'s efforts. He said: "...much controversy arose on the merits of such an operations, with many pros and cons. But what can be asserted beyond any doubt is that the U.N. presence prevented the cold war from settling in the Congo, that the unity of the Congo was re- established thanks in large measure to the U.N. effort, and that the U.N. helped to avoid an impending chaos that threat- ened peace and security not only in the Congo, but in the whole African continent."29 The Secretary-General, however, defined the UNF's specific mis- sions, as far as the U.N. was concerned, when he established the Peace- keeping Force. Hammarskjold delineated five missions, each of which can be analyzed. (1) The UNF was to restore law and order in the Congo. This mission presented a paradox. How was the UNF supposed to restore law and order in a country that was divided against itself without using force and without taking sides in the conflict?30 This portion of the mission proved to be difficult, but it was accomplished. The Force endured sporadic attacks by Congolese civilians and ANC units throughout its involvement in the Congo. Fortunately, however, most of the violence which was directed at Belgian nationals ceased shortly after the UNF's arrival. (2) The UNF was to establish conditions that would permit Bel- gium to withdraw her troops from the Congo. This mission was successfully accomplished, outside of Katanga, early in the conflict. With the excep- tion of those troops who were seconded to Katanga, Belgian troops were out of the Congo by mid-September 1960. The Belgian troops who were a part of Tshombe's gendarmerie proved to be more of a problem, but they, too, were eventually repatriated. (3) The UNF was to maintain the territorial and political in- tegrity of the Congo. This mission can be interpreted to mean that the UNF was to ensure that Katanga was reintegrated with the Central Government or it can be interpreted to mean that the UNF was to ensure that the Congo was not invaded by another state. In either case, the UNF accomplished this mission. (4) The UNF was to eliminate the influence of foreign military personnel within the Congo. This mission was successfully accomplished in much the same manner as the mission to eliminate the Belgian troops was accomplished. (5) The UNF was to retrain the ANC and turn it into a reliable security force. Although the UNF made several belated attempts to re- train the Congolese army, this mission was never successfully accom- plished. The primary cause of this failure was a lack of cooperation by the Congolese Central Government. The key to retraining the ANC was to train qualified Congolese officers. To accomplish this, the UNF established several training courses. However, because the Congolese Government preferred direct assistance by governments of their own choosing, it failed to cooperate with the UNF and the courses were sel- dom used.31 Closely related to this problem was the failure of the UNF to disarm the marauding ANC units early in the conflict. Most U.N. per- sonnel and many reputable observors agree that a disarmament of the ANC would have facilitated peace. In retrospect it appears that a peaceful disarmament would have been possible had it been vigorously pursued early in the conflict.32 However, the UNF was required to consult with the Central Government on security matters, and it had no authority to disarm the ANC without Central Government approval. The Central Govern- ment was so divided and the ANC was so split in its loyalties, that none of the Congolese leaders was ever willing to give the UNF permission to disarm the Congolese army. DILEMA IN BEIRUT It is well beyond the scope of this paper to examine America's vital interests in the Middle East or to comment on the propriety of the Marine Peacekeeping Mission to Beirut. Nonetheless, Marines were thrust into a peacekeeping role as part of a multinational peacekeeping force. That the Marines role was anything but peaceful is an all too well es- tablished fact. Consequently, the Marines' mission in Beirut warrants comment. The Marines and the other contingents of the multinational force did not enter Beirut originally as peacekeepers. They entered to ensure the safe and orderly evacuation of civilians out of Beirut. The peace- keeping mission evolved out of this. The result was a peacekeeping mis- sion that, through no fault of its own, violated many of the fundamental rules of peacekeeping. In a book that was written long before the Lebanon crisis began, Brigadier Rikhye discussed some problems which frequently result from peacekeeping efforts that originate outside the U.N.. His writings pro- phesied the events in Lebanon. (This is not to say that a U.N. force would have been the solution to the Lebanese crisis. The establishment of a U.N. peacekeeping force would not have been possible in 1981-82 for a number of reasons). Rikhye noted that peacekeeping efforts outside the cognizance of the U.N. frequently result in the use of force. As the peacekeeping force escalates the use of force, the amount of resistance to the peacekeepers escalates. In turn, the peacekeeper uses more force, etc.. Consequently, violence proliferates. He continued by noting that some peacekeeping operations are brutal and bloody. However, they are completed quickly. Other operations (like the one in Lebanon) adhere closely to the principle of minimum force. This method prolongs the operation. However, although both of these policies often halt vio- lence, under the surface, the structural conflict remains unchanged, and its reemergence is simply delayed to a later date.33 With Rikhye's comments and the principles of peacekeeping in mind, lets examine the peacekeeping mission in Beirut. The Beirut multinational force and, in particular, the American contingent, had many things going against it. First, and foremost, the multinational force did not have the consent of all of the major parties to the dispute. The Marine contingent, in particular, was viewed, rightly or wrongly, by numerous Moslem factions as a pillar of support for the Gemayel Government - risky business in Lebanon during the 1982-83 time frame. In an interview with a "Washington Post" correspondent, a Druze spokesman amplified this point. He indicated that the multinational force should get away from the Lebanese army instead of trying to help it. He said that the Americans had become protagonists in the civil war and that "the Americans should help all Lebanese, and not just the Phalangist government and it army."34 This is undoubtedly a very parochial view of the American involvement in Beirut. But, it must be remembered that the manner in which a peacekeeping force is perceived by the various belli- gerents is as important as the actual political position of a peacekeeping contingent. It is because of this perception that the super powers make poor peacekeepers. Peacekeeping forces should be politically neutral regarding the outcome of the conflict in which they are involved. No one could pos- sibly perceive the United States as being neutral toward the final dis- position of Lebanon. Brian Urquhart commented on the Beirut force. He said that the peace- keeping force had no unified command, it had no clearly defined mandate, and it was too heavily armed. He indicated that "the moment you get beyond infantry weapons and armored personnel carriers to protect the troops, it is a hazard, you look as if you are part of the conflict."35 This was certainly true of the Marine contingent. Granted, the Marines never intended to use their weapons for offensive action. However, in the manner discussed by Rikhye, they became involved in reprisals. As the Marines responded to force with like force, the attacks against them accel- erated. Urquhart pointed out, " the moment you (a peacekeeping force) get into the reprisal game you are lost - it is the beginning of the end."36 When the U.S.S. New Jersey became involved and rounds, other than purely defensive fires, were shot, it can be argued that the American contingent became a part of the problem in Lebanon and not the solution. All of this is not to imply that Marine commanders in Beirut should have responded differcntly to attacks on their positions. The point is that the Marine contingent was in a precarious position from the very start. The violence that ensued was predictable from the beginning of their in- volvement. TRAINING FOR PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS Successful peacekeeping requires a special state of mind in the peace- keeper. Brigadier Rikhye describes peacekeeping as "just another category of special operations for which all professional armies are trained..... requiring an attitudinal rather than a physical adjustment. In the main it is simply a question of placing greater emphasis on certain fundamental characteristics required of a trained soldier - alertness, vigilance, patience and acuteness."37 Major Wise, in an article for "Military Review" stressed the mental aspects of peacekeeping. He wrote: "In preparing his unit, no leader can overlook the frustrating aspects of a task where acheiving nothing is the goal, or living with the paradox of using a fighting force not to fight. The reqards of peacekeeping are not very visible since the operation takes place in an atmosphere of continuing international bicker- ing."38 It is essential that junior personnel understand the elements of their mission, and the reasons for prohibitions on the use of force. Above all, they must understand the inherent frustrations of peacekeeping. They must be prepared to, quite possibly, absorb a lot of abuse and they must realize that there may well be little immediate, tangible reward for their efforts. On the tactical side, peacekeeping forces should be proficient in all small units manuevers. They should pay particular attention to accurate, controlled, fire discipline; to patrolling techniques; and to riot and crowd control operations.39 More senior officers and potential field commanders should receive training in diplomatic, political and international civil service roles. A senior officer should be especially conscious of the customs and the culture of the country in which he is going to serve.40 Brigadier Rikhye summed up the attributes of a successful peacekeeping. He said that a peacekeeper must acquire a sense of objective justice and he must be able to quickly discern complex, changing situations. He must understand the parties to the conflict and their diffirent motivations. Above all, there is no place for a double standard. Both sides should expect and receive equal treatment. Rikhye concluded by stating that it was "probably true to say that is a peacekeeping force is unpopular with both sides at the same time, then it is carrying out its duties objec- tively and with impartiality."41 ENDNOTES CHAPTER SEVEN 1Mugar Valuhu, The Katanga Circus (New York: Speller and Sons, 1964), p. 11. 2LTCOL John Child, USA,"Peacekeeping and the Inter-American System", military Review, October 1980, p. 41. 3Washington Post, 12 December 1963, p. A1. 4Valuhu, p. 11. 5Child, pp. 42-43. 6Michael Harbottle, "Peacekeeping," Military Review, September 1969, pp. 44-45. 7Brigadier A. J. Wilson, "Peacekeeping - A U.N. Commander's View," Royal United Service Institute Journal, May 1968, p. 115. 8George Martelli, Experiment in World Government (London: Johnson Publications, 1966), p. 155. 9Wilson, p. 113. 10Ibid., p. 114. 11Major General Carl Von Horn, Soldiering for Peace (New York: McKay Co., 1967), p. 234. 12Major James C. Wise USA, "Putting Together a U.S. Army Force for a U.N. Peacekeeping Operation," Military Review, December 1977, p. 24. 13Child, p. 43. 14Ibid., p. 42. 15Harbottle, p. 46. 16Washington Post, 12 December 1983, p. A1. 17Wilson, p. 121. 18Harbottle, p. 46. 19Wilson, p. 116. 20Harbottle, p. 47. 21Wilson, p. 116. 22Indar Jit Rikhye, "The Problems of International Peacekeeping", Royal United Service Institute Journal, March 1977, p. 6. 23Wise, p. 25. 24U.S. News and World Report, 20 April 1961, p. 45. 25Colonel R. Ernest Dupuy USA, "A Soldier's Nightmare: That's the Congo Picture Today," Army, Navy, Air Force Register, 17 September 1960, p. 13. 26Harbottle, p. 47. 27Washington Post, 12 December 1983, p. A26. 28Michael Harbottle, The Blue Berets (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1972), p. 32. 29Ibid., p. 34. 30Dupuy, p. 13, 31Ernest W. Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Operation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 155. 32Ibid., p. 67. 33Indar Jit Rikhye, Michael Harbottle and Bjorn Egge, The Thin Blue Line (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974), p. 10. 34Washington Post, 16 December 1983, p. A1. 35Ibid., p. A26. 36Washington Post, 12 December 1983, p. A1. 37Rikhye, Harbottle, and Egge, p. 274. 38Wise, p. 29. 39Ibid. 40Rikhye, Harbottle and Egge, p. 273. 41Ibid., p. 274. BIBLIOGRAPHY A. Books and Special Reports Bloomfield, Lincoln P. (ed.). International Military Forces: The Question of Peacekeeping in an Armed and Disarming World. Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1964. This sym- posium includes several essays on the Congo operation by noted peacekeeping experts. Bowett, D.W. United Nations Forces: A Legal Study. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. An analysis of the ramifications of the U.N. intervention in the Congo. Boyd, James M. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: A Military and Political Appraisal. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971 Bunnell, Charles F. Jr. Command and Control of U.N. Peace- Keeping Operations. Air War College, 1968. Burns, Arthur Lee and Heathcote, Nina Peacekeeping by U.N. Forces From Suez to the Congo. New York: Frederick A. Praefer, 1963. A reasonable, impartial and detailed analysis of the scope of the U.N. mandate and its effect on operations in the Congo. Carter, Gwendolyn M. (ed.) Five African States; Responses to Adversity. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1963. An analysis of the Congos struggle to deal with emerging nationalism. Dayal, Rajeshwar. Mission for Hammaskjold. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. A definitive bio- graphy of Hammarskjold's term as Secretary-General written by his personal representative to the Congo. Esptein, Howard M., (Ed.). Revolt in the Congo. New York: Facts on File Inc., 1965. A narrative documentation of significant events from the Congo's independence through the withdrawal of U.N. troops. Falk, Richard A. Legal Order in a Violent World. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. Fierimsky, Steve. Communist Chinese Influence in the Congo (Brazzaville) and the Congo (Leopoldville) from Indepen- dence Through 1965. Air War College, 1967. Gordon, King. The United Nations in the Congo: A Quest for Peace. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962. The former U.N. Chief information officer for the Congo offers an uncritical view of events through July, 1962. Harbottle, Michael, The Blue Berets. Harrisburg, Pa.: Stock- pile Books, 1972. The former chief of staff of the U.N. Cypress Peacekeeping Force offers a brief history of U.N. peacekeeping efforts. Hempstone, Smith. Rebels, Mercenaries and Dividends. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. A pro-Katangan viewpoint of Katanga's secession and the ensuing U.N. involvement. The text is highly biased, but it does raise substantial ques- tions from an anti-U.N. viewpoint. Joshua, Wynfred. A Congo Chronology, 1960-1964. Washington,D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1966. A chronology of U.N. efforts in the Congo. Lefever, Ernest W. Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Operation. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967. Lefever, Ernest W. Crisis in the Congo. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1965. An in depth analysis of the political, mili- tary and legal problems that confronted the Congo Peacekeeping Force. Luard, Evan (ed.), The International Regulation of Civil Wars. New York: New York University Press, 1972 Martelli, George. Experiment in World Government. London: Johnson Publications, 1966. An opposition viewpoint by an author who favored U.N. laissez-faire in the Congo. Merriam, Alan P. Congo: Background of Conflict. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1961. A detailed analysis of the roots of the Congo crisis. Particular emphasis on pre- independence social and political problems. Mezerik, A.J., (ed.) Congo and the United Nations. New York: International Review Service. A chronology of U.N. actions in the Congo supplemented by copies of relevant documents. Miller, Linda B. World Order and Local Disorder. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967. Mydans, Carl and Mydans, Shelley (eds.). The Violent Peace. New York: Athaneum, 1968. O'brien, Conor Cruise. To Katanga and Back. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962. Autobiography and interpretation of events in Katanga during "Rumpunch" and Round I by the for- mer Special Representative to Elisabethville. Raymond, Charles W. III. A Military Perspective of International Peacekeeping. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1975. Rikhye, Indar Jit, Harbottle, Michael, and Egge, Bjorn. The Thin Blue Line. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974 Three acknowledged peacekeeping experts detail past and en- vision future problems for peacekeeping operations. Sohn, Louis B. The United Nations in Action. Brooklyn: The Foundation Press Inc., 1968. A chronology of significant legal and U.N. documents on the Congo. Stoessinger, John G. The United Nations and the Superpowers. New York: Random House, 1967. A discussion on super power inter- action at the U.N. and its subsequent influence on the decision making process. Thompson, Sir Robert, (ed.). War in Peace. New York: Harmony Books, 1982. Tondel, Lyman M. Jr. (ed.). The Legal Aspects of the United Nations Action in the Congo. New York: Oceana Publications, 1963. Valuhu, Mugur, The Katanga Circus. New York: Speller and Sons, 1964 An intensely pro-Katanga view of the Congo conflict. Von Horn, Carl. Soldiering for Peace. New York: McKay Co., 1967. An autobiography by the former commander of the Congo Peace- keeping Force. Wainhouse, David W. International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1973. Wainhouse, David W. International Peace Observation. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1966. B. Magazines and Professional Journals Child, Lt. Col. John "Peacekeeping and the Inter-American System". Military Review, October 1980, pp. 40-54 Dupuy, Colonel Ernest R. "A Soldier's Nightmare: That's the U.N. Congo Picture Today". Army, Navy, Air Force Register 17 September 1960, pp. 13. Harbottle, Michael "Peacekeeping" Military Review. September 1969. pp. 43-59. Rikhye, Indar Jit. "The Problems of International Peacekeeping" Royal United Service Institute journal, March 1977, pp.3-9. Wilson, Brigadier A.J. "Peacekeeping - A U.N. Commander's View" Royal United Service Institute Journal, May, 1968. pp. 113- 122. Wise, Major James C. "Putting Together a U.S. Army Force for a U.N. Peacekeeping Operation". Military Review, December 1977, pp. 20-31. "Congo: The Monstrous Hangover." Time, 18 July 1960, pp. 17-24. "The Congo." Time, 22 September 1961, pp. 30-31. "Congo: Dinner for the Senator." Time, 8 December 1961, pp. 29.. "Congo: Battle for Katanga." Time, 15 December 1961, pp. 21-23. "Congo: The Heart of Darkness." Time, 22 December 1961, pp. 16-21. "The Congo: The U.N. Drives Implacably Ahead." Time, 11 January 1963, pp. 28-29. "The Congo: Going, Going -." U.S. News and World Report, 13 March 1961, pp. 46-47. "How the U.N. Runs a War." U.S. News and World Report,20 March 1961, pp. 44-46. No Title, U.S. News and World Report, 20 April 1961, p. 45. C. Newspaper Articles New York Times. 4 December 1964, Sec. 1, p. 1. Washington Post and Times Herald. 21 July 1960, p. 1. Washington Post. 12 December 1983, p. A1 and p. A26. Washington Post. 16 December 1983, p. A1 and p. A26.
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