04 April 2003
Snyder Sees Signs of Peace in Democratic Republic of Congo Conflict
(Deputy Assistant Secretary testifies before Congress) (5580)
Testifying on U.S. policies in Africa's "troubled" Great Lakes region,
Charles Snyder, deputy assistant secretary of state for African
affairs, said that the conflict involving the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) "has shown signs of movement toward peace" recently, and
that the United States' primary foreign policy objective in that
country "remains a peaceful resolution of the nearly five-year civil
war."
Speaking to the House of Representatives International Relations
Committee's subcommittee on African Affairs April 3, Snyder said the
U.S. also "strongly supports democratization of Congolese governmental
institutions and an improvement in the humanitarian situation in the
DRC."
The Lusaka Agreement, signed in 1999, along with other bilateral and
multilateral agreements, governs the DRC peace process.
Under this accord, the U.N. peacekeeping operation is assisting the
Lusaka signatories with the peace process in the DRC with an expanded
mandate. The United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC)
has recently been authorized to deploy more personnel, with the
assistance of a task force from South Africa, which will continue to
carry out MONUC's responsibilities under the Lusaka Agreement and also
oversee the disarmament, demobilization and repatriation (DDR) of as
many as 40,000 mainly Rwandan Hutu rebels in the DRC.
Snyder acknowledged that the DDR process "will be a difficult one,"
encountering "continuing violence" among various Congolese rebel
groups, and "acute humanitarian need."
The U.S. has called on Uganda to begin withdrawing its troops
immediately and has urged other elements operating in the Ituri region
of northeastern DRC to withdraw its troops immediately also. The U.S.
also urged the DRC government to do the same from Beni in northeastern
Congo, and for Rwanda to cease any support for Congolese militias.
A ray of hope for the beleaguered Congolese people are the Pretoria
Agreement between the DRC and Rwanda, and the December 17 Transitional
Agreement in which the three principal armed belligerents all signed
the agreement which was also signed by representatives of Congolese
political parties and civil society.
"The transitional formula outlined in the Pretoria agreement . . .is a
true compromise," Snyder said. "We believe the framework is a good one
and can work, so long as the parties remain committed."
Calling attention to the "continued exploitation of the DRC's natural
resources" which include coltan, gold and diamonds in eastern Congo,
diamonds, copper, cobalt and timber in central Congo, Snyder said the
U.S. and U.N. are exploring a number of measures to "ensure the
resources of the DRC are used legally and on a fair commercial basis
to the benefit of the Congolese people."
Citing clashes between Ugandan troops and groups allied with Rwanda,
Snyder said "The challenge for the United States is to stimulate
positive developments in the region that will enable Rwanda to
conclude that its security and economic interests are better served
through fostering stability at home and improving relations with its
neighbors than by allowing its neighbors' turmoil to deflect Rwanda
from its chosen path of peace, reconciliation, democracy, and economic
development."
He said the U.S. "applauded Rwanda's decision last year to withdraw
its combat forces from the DRC and continue(s) to believe that Rwanda
made a wise and appropriate choice in so doing. The decision, in
accordance with an agreement signed July 30, 2002 between Presidents
Kagame and Kabila, was an important step forward in the peace
process."
Snyder said the U.S. "continues to support, both financially and
politically, the Rwandan judicial system, 'gacaca,' (a traditional
sytem of justice) and the ICTR (the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda)." He said the Government of Rwanda (GOR) "has made efforts
to promote justice and reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda."
Snyder also spoke of the humanitarian crisis in Burundi caused by
postwar conflict and the transition of the presidency from Pierre
Buyoya, a Tutsi, to current Vice President Domitien Ndayizeye, a Hutu.
He said the U.S. seeks to ameliorate the situation, and to end the
conflict there, while helping to develop democratic systems and
principles in Burundi.
Pointing to factors leading to continued deterioration of quality of
life in Burundi, Snyder said the United States provided more than
$22.5 million dollars in assistance to Burundi in 2002, "the vast bulk
in the form of humanitarian assistance (nutrition and health care)."
Following is the text of Snyder's testimony as prepared for delivery:
(begin text)
TESTIMONY OF CHARLES SNYDER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
AFRICAN AFFAIRS, BEFORE THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
April 3, 2003
Chairman Royce, members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to
testify today on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and its
neighbors in the Great Lakes region of Africa.
This region, recently one of the most unstable and tumultuous of the
continent, has shown signs of movement toward peace in recent months.
In my testimony today, I intend to describe those developments in some
detail and to indicate how the United States intends to support the
region in its current efforts.
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
Our primary foreign policy objective in the DRC remains a peaceful
resolution of the nearly five-year civil war in the Congo. At the same
time, we strongly support democratization of Congolese governmental
institutions, and an improvement in the humanitarian situation in the
DRC. With respect to the war, at various times up to nine countries
were involved in this conflict, including foreign armed forces
introduced by Uganda, Rwanda, Angola, and Zimbabwe.
Lusaka Cease-Fire Agreement: Backbone of the Process
The Lusaka Agreement, signed in 1999, governs the DRC peace process,
along with a number of other bilateral and multilateral agreements
intended to stabilize the DRC. The Lusaka Agreement establishes a
number of actions among the signatories:
-- A cease-fire, which has been in place since December 2000,
supported by the United Nations;
-- Withdrawal of foreign forces, which occurred between July and
December of 2002, with the exception of the Ugandan contingent in
northeastern Congo;
-- The Inter-Congolese Dialogue, intended to create and to oversee a
transitional framework, which is still in progress among the parties;
and
-- Disarmament, demobilization, and repatriation of primarily Rwandan
Hutu rebels. Some rebels have been demobilized, but there is still
much work to be done in this area.
Ugandan Presence in Ituri
Currently, the most significant foreign force in the DRC are the
approximately 6,000 Ugandan troops in the Ituri region of northeastern
DRC. Under a September 6 agreement signed in Luanda September 6,
Uganda and the DRC agreed to form a group called the Ituri
Pacification Committee to work out local administrative arrangements
in preparation for the departure of the Ugandan forces. However, after
serious fighting with an armed Congolese group know as the Union of
Patriotic Congolese (UPC), in early March Uganda increased its
military presence in Ituri from around 1,500 to 6,000 troops. Uganda
and the DRC have recently agreed that Ugandan troops will withdraw
from the DRC by April 24, so long as a security mechanism for the
Ituri region is agreed to by that time through the work of the Ituri
Pacification Committee.
The Ituri Pacification Committee has just begun its work, and that
group as well as the UN and other parties are considering possible
options for establishing the necessary security conditions urgently.
We have called on Uganda to begin withdrawing its troops immediately.
We have also urged the DRC government to withdraw its approximately
600 troops from Beni in northeastern Congo until a transitional
government is formed and a mechanism for an integrated Congolese
military is agreed to by all parties. At the same time, we have
stressed to Rwanda the need to cease any and all support for Congolese
groups such as the UPC. We have also strongly urged Rwanda not to
carry out its recent threat to re-insert its military in Congolese
territory, a threat based at least in part on the continuing presence
of Ugandan troops in Ituri.
The UN Peacekeeping Effort in the DRC - United Nations Organization
Mission in the DRC (MONUC)
A UN peacekeeping operation, MONUC, was created in 1999 to assist the
Lusaka signatories with the peace process. Between 2001 and the
present, MONUC has largely focused on monitoring the cease-fire lines
and the disengagement of forces.
In mid-2002, significant progress occurred towards a peaceful
resolution of the Congo conflict, including the withdrawal of most
foreign forces and progress in the ongoing transitional political
discussions -- that led us, late in 2002, to consult with Congress and
ultimately to support a revision of MONUC's mandate and an increase in
MONUC's troop ceiling. MONUC is now authorized, under certain
conditions, to deploy up to a total of 8,700 personnel. These
personnel will continue to carry out MONUC's responsibilities under
the Lusaka Agreement and will also oversee the disarmament,
demobilization, and repatriation (DDR) of as many as 40,000 mainly
Rwandan Hutu rebels in the DRC. One or two robust task forces will
undertake this process. South Africa has agreed to provide around
1,200 troops for the first task force. The deployment date of the
South African task force is expected to occur in May or early June.
The DDR process will be a difficult one. In order for MONUC to reach
those rebels desiring repatriation, secure conditions must exist in
eastern Congo. The present continuing violence is both an obstacle to
DDR and a source of continuing acute humanitarian need. Presently,
there are reports of continuing violence among various Congolese rebel
groups including the Congolese Rally for Democracy - Goma faction
(RCD-G), the Movement for Congolese Liberation (MLC), the Congolese
Rally for Democracy - Nationale (RCD-N), the Congolese Rally for
Democracy - Liberation Movement (RCD-ML), the Mai Mai, and other
ethnic Congolese militias. We continue to impress upon all parties,
particularly the Kabila government, the RCD-G, and Rwanda, the need to
stop supporting militias and to avoid further military aggression in
eastern Congo.
Implications of July 30 Pretoria Agreement
The past nine months have witnessed progress in moving the DRC peace
process forward. With the July 30 Pretoria Agreement between the DRC
and Rwanda, which led directly to the Rwandan withdrawal from the
Congo, the Congolese population, for the first time in modern history,
now has the opportunity to try to create its own governmental system,
free from the influences of larger or stronger states.
December 17 Transitional Agreement
On December 17, 2002, the Congolese parties, with the support of South
Africa in Pretoria, agreed to a transitional framework. For the first
time since the signing of the 1999 Lusaka Accord, the three principal
armed belligerents -- the DRC government, the Movement for the
Liberation of the Congo (MLC), and the Rally for Congolese Democracy -
Goma faction (RCD-G) -- all signed the same agreement, which, in turn,
was also signed by representatives of Congolese political parties and
civil society. This agreement was followed by a March agreement
relating to the transitional constitution and security in Kinshasa by
the same parties. Talks took place the last week in March on
outstanding military integration issues. The Inter-Congolese Dialogue
formally ratified the agreement on April 1-2 in Sun City, South
Africa, as called for under the Lusaka Accord.
The transitional formula outlined in the Pretoria agreement which
includes one president (current President Joseph Kabila) and four
vice-presidents -- is a true compromise. We believe the framework is a
good one and can work, so long as the parties remain committed to its
implementation.
For this reason, we have strongly encouraged President Kabila to take
steps to begin implementing the agreement, including discussions to
resolve outstanding military issues. We have also encouraged, in the
strongest terms, MLC leader Jean-Pierre Bemba and RCD-G head Adolphe
Onusumba, to cease military confrontation in northeastern and eastern
DRC. Continued fighting among parties that have signed a peace accord
is completely unacceptable.
U.S. Strategy for Moving the Process Forward
In step with the 1999 Lusaka Cease Fire Agreement, our strategy in the
DRC has been to urge the withdrawal of foreign forces, to support the
formation of an inclusive transitional government and reunification of
the country, and to encourage the DDR of armed rebel groups in the
DRC. We have also strongly supported access for humanitarian
assistance throughout the country, cessation of human rights abuses,
and the cessation of illegal exploitation of the DRC's resources. Our
engagement on all these issues has remained constant and active. Our
primary focus currently is to ensure the achievement of an inclusive
transitional government, along with a cessation of all hostilities in
eastern Congo, the implementation of a successful DDR program, and an
improvement of the dire humanitarian situation, particularly in
eastern Congo.
Withdrawal of Foreign Forces
Our interventions with the Rwandan and Ugandan governments were
instrumental in realizing the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan forces
from the Congo in late 2002. The withdrawal of these troops (less the
Ugandan troops still in the DRC) was a factor in the Zimbabwe and
Angolan decisions to withdraw their troops from the DRC also in late
2002.
Support for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue
From early on in the DRC peace process, we have been strong proponents
of the formation of an inclusive transitional government in the DRC.
We contributed $1.5 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to
Inter-Congolese Dialogue Facilitator Masire's efforts prior to the Sun
City session in South Africa in early 2002. Our encouragement during
the Sun City session was instrumental in the achievement of a partial
agreement there. We have continued to work with all parties to the
dialogue and our encouragement helped the Congolese achieve an
inclusive transitional agreement on December 17.
We are now focused on ensuring that the December 17 agreement be
implemented as quickly as possible. The Congolese have not yet begun
to move this process forward. We are currently working with other
interested parties (French, Belgian, South African, British) to
formulate a strategy for international engagement with this process,
including the formation of the international committee called for in
the December agreement. We also encouraged Facilitator Masire to
arrange for the formal ratification of this agreement as quickly as
possible. We remain ready to commit up to $1 million in ESF funds to
support the transitional process, including support to the various
committees called for in the agreement.
Support for DDR process
We continue to work closely with the UN Department of Peace Keeping
Operations (DPKO) as it moves forward with its Phase III (DDR) program
for MONUC. We supported the expansion of MONUC's mandate to include
DDR activities, as well as the accompanying necessary increase in
MONUC's troop ceiling. We have provided $800,000 in FY2002 PKO funds
to the South African/UN Third Party Verification Mission (TPVM)
process in support of the July 30 DRC/Rwanda agreement which includes
a program for the DDR of Rwandan
Hutu forces in the DRC. We have encouraged the TPVM to work closely
with MONUC in order to ensure a comprehensive and targeted DDR program
in the DRC. We have maintained a constant pressure on the DRC
government to cease military support for Rwandan Hutu rebels in
eastern Congo, as well as to Congolese militias including the Mai Mai
and the RCDML. We remain ready to commit up to an additional $1.2
million in PKO funds and $1 million in ESF funds to support the DDR
process.
We strongly support active, effective, and forceful UN leadership in
the DRC, both for MONUC and for peace negotiations, to match the UN's
increase in peacekeeping resources for resolution of the DRC conflict.
Support for Humanitarian Operations
The on-going armed conflict in eastern Congo - among the Mai Mai, the
RCD-G, the Rwandan Hutu rebels, and other groups in North and South
Kivu, and among the MLC, the RCDN, the RCD-ML, and ethnic extremist
groups in the northeastern Ituri region continues to cause a dire
humanitarian situation throughout eastern Congo. This fighting has
displaced thousands of civilians and has exposed thousands of
Congolese men, women, and children to horrific human rights abuses,
including allegations of rape, murder, and atrocities such as
cannibalism. Unfortunately, the on-going conflict and the lack of
security guarantees has made it extremely difficult, if not impossible
in many instances, for humanitarian aid organizations to reach the
suffering population. We have maintained a constant pressure on all
groups in the DRC to allow humanitarian organizations the ability to
dispense their assistance.
Since the March 6 re-taking of Bunia by the Ugandan military, the
UPDF's stabilizing effect in Bunia and other major towns in Ituri has
created new opportunities for humanitarians to expand their activities
to previously inaccessible populations. Elsewhere in Ituri, however,
insecurity and lack of humanitarian access remain problems. The UN is
working with local authorities to establish a new humanitarian
protocol for activities in Ituri. USAID/OFDA-funded non-food item kits
delivered by UNICEF are in Bunia and EFTA plans to assist German
Agro-Action (GAA) to bring in additional kits. USAID/OFDA is also
supporting NGO Premiere Urgence in southern Ituri in a food security
project. As of January 2003, OFDA has provided nearly $1 million in
humanitarian assistance to the Ituri region.
However, in order to ensure any real improvement in the situation of
the local population in eastern Congo, a cessation of hostilities
there must take place. To this end, we are exploring ways to work with
groups in the Kivus in order to reach a mediated solution. In Ituri,
we continue to pressure the parties to the September 6 Luanda
Agreement to establish the Ituri Pacification Commission called for in
the agreement. This commission is charged with mediating a solution to
the on-going crisis in that area. We remain ready to provided
technical or financial assistance to this commission, and we have
encouraged the Angolan government, which was the broker of the
September 6 agreement, to take steps to constitute this commission.
Overall FY 2002 humanitarian assistance to the DRC is nearly $42
million, in addition to nearly $26 million in development assistance.
During FY 2002, USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
(USAID/OFDA) provided more than $26.0 million in emergency assistance
to the DRC, in the food security and nutrition sectors, emergency
market infrastructure rehabilitation, and agricultural programs for
war-affected, vulnerable, and internally displaced persons. USAID's
Office of Food for Peace (USAID/FPP) and the US Department of
Agriculture (USDA) provided nearly $11.6 million in P.L. 480 Title II
emergency food assistance in FY2002. The Bureau of Population,
Refugees, and Migrations (State/PRM) provided more than $5.5 million
in FY2002 to the UNHCR and the International Rescue Committee (IRC)
for support to refugees in the DRC.
Whither the Exploitation Panel
One of the most perplexing issues in the DRC conflict remains that of
the continued exploitation of the DRC's natural resources. It has long
been established that the exploitation of these resources, including
coltan, gold, and diamonds in eastern Congo, and diamonds, copper,
cobalt, and timber in central DRC, contributed to and exacerbated the
conflict in the DRC. Concerned with reports of pillaging of resources
by the foreign forces, the UN Security Council mandated an independent
panel to investigate these allegations. The panel has produced a
series of reports, detailing the circumstances of this exploitation.
In January 2003, in the UN Security Council, we supported a resolution
(1457) calling for a six-month extension of the panel's mandate to
explore ways to address this continued exploitation. The Panel's
mandate includes formulating recommendations on measures the
transitional government and other regionalgovernments could take to
develop and enhance their policies, legal framework and administrative
capacity to ensure the resources of the DRC are used legally and on a
fair commercial basis to the benefit of the Congolese people.
Parties named in the Panel's last report have been asked to send, by
May 31, reactions to the UN Secretariat. The UN Security Council
resolution also urged all countries, particularly those in the region,
to conduct their own investigations into this issue, and encouraged
the transitional government to establish a special commission to
examine the validity of economic and financial agreements regarding
natural resources in the DRC. However, it should be noted that the
Panel's findings are not necessarily established facts and do not
constitute a finding of "guilt' or 'innocence' of entities involved in
the exploitation, legal or otherwise, of the DRC's natural resources.
Next Steps
We hope to see the implementation of a transitional government within
the next few months. Although the parties involved in the government
will surely encounter many difficulties in keeping the new government
on course, the establishment of such a government would help to
increase the likelihood of a successful DDR process, would signal the
completion of the Lusaka peace process, and would mark a new beginning
for self-governance in the Congo.
RWANDA
Our greatest foreign policy challenge with Rwanda is to promote
policies that support Rwanda's transition and that will bring long
term internal stability, economic development, and justice and
reconciliation to Rwanda and its neighbors.
Regional Stability
We applauded Rwanda's decision last year to withdraw its combat forces
from the DRC and continue to believe that Rwanda made a wise and
appropriate choice in so doing. The decision, in accordance with an
agreement signed July 30, 2002 between Presidents Kagame and Kabila,
was an important step forward in the peace process.
However, Rwanda believes that its interests are threatened by events
in eastern Congo. As a result of this perception, Rwanda continues to
exercise influence in eastern Congo through Congolese allies, whom it
supports financially and with military supplies and advisory
personnel. Rwanda has raised the possibility that it might be forced
to intervene again in eastern Congo.
Though the threat to Rwanda from Rwandan Hutu rebels, some of whom
were involved in the 1994 genocide, has been greatly reduced since
1996 and 1998, these forces do continue to operate in eastern Congo.
Attempts to demobilize and repatriate these fighters have had only
limited success. This is partially due to a lack of cooperation by the
various belligerents, including at times the Congolese Government and
Congolese Rwandan allies, but mostly because of the strong resistance
of the Hutu rebel leadership to allow the rank and file - many of whom
appear to want to return to Rwanda - to reach demobilization centers.
The July 30 Pretoria Agreement and the subsequent withdrawal of
Rwandan troops led to a break in the relationship between the
Congolese government and the Rwandan rebel groups. However, it is
unclear if these Rwandan groups continue to receive some supplies from
the Congolese Government or through local Congolese allies.
We support efforts by the regional parties to reduce tensions between
Rwanda and Uganda. The relationship between President Kagame and
Ugandan President Museveni has steadily worsened over recent years and
each President accuses the other of supporting rebel elements against
him. The recent warming of relations between Kampala and Kinshasa is
also of concern to Rwanda. The international community - most notably
the British - has made several efforts to lower tensions between the
two Presidents, and we strongly support our British allies in this
effort.
Clashes between Ugandan troops and groups allied with Rwanda have
already occurred in northeastern DRC. A direct clash between their
armies is possible. Various Congolese factions have taken advantage of
the Rwanda-Uganda divide, in an effort to improve their own standing
militarily or politically, making northeastern DRC particularly
volatile.
The challenge for the United States is to stimulate positive
developments in the region that will enable Rwanda to conclude that
its security and economic interests are better served through
fostering stability at home and improving relations with its neighbors
than by allowing its neighbors' turmoil to deflect Rwanda from its
chosen path of peace, reconciliation, democracy, and economic
development.
Internal Stability
The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) has made good strides in bringing
stability and normality to Rwanda since 1994. Rwanda is at a
crossroads this year, with the prospect of a constitutional referendum
at mid-year and elections late in 2003.
Thus, in addition to promoting regional stability, the United States
encourages and assists the GOR to pursue policies that will lead to a
more open, democratic political system. We are strongly urging the GOR
to take steps to ensure that the national elections slated for later
this year are free and fair. This must include freeing political
prisoners, allowing political parties to operate and campaign, and
easing restrictions on the press.
The GOR has expressed concerns about the need to control speech and
assembly due to Rwanda's experience during the genocide. These
concerns are understandable, though we do not agree fully with them.
We believe that Rwanda should minimize such controls in order to
empower its citizens to conduct legitimate political activity and to
express dissent.
Justice and Reconciliation
The GOR has made efforts to promote justice and reconciliation in
post-genocide Rwanda. The National Unity and Reconciliation Commission
has done excellent work in Rwandan villages. The Government has set up
the "gacaca" system, a traditional system of justice, which is now
operating in pilot districts, to bring to justice the overwhelming
number of genocide suspects in its jails, most of whom were not
organizers and planners of the 1994 tragedy. The leaders will still be
dealt with in the regular Rwandan judicial system or the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).
The GOR's relations with the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, located in Arusha, Tanzania; which operates independently of
the Rwandan judicial system, have been rocky, at best. U.S. policy is
to encourage improved communications between the GOR, survivors'
groups, and the ICTR.
The United States continues to support, both financially and
politically, the Rwandan judicial system, "gacaca," and the ICTR.
BURUNDI
The Republic of Burundi is nearing the mid-point of a transitional
government that was inaugurated in November 2001 following the signing
of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in Tanzania in August
2000. This agreement did not include the two main Hutu rebel groups as
signatories, and the conflict that began with the 1993 assassination
of Burundi's first democratically elected president, Melchior Ndadaye,
has continued to rage. Those two rebel groups later splintered into
four separate factions.
The country is at a critical point in its transition. Cease-fire
agreements have been signed with three of the four rebel groups,
including the largest, the National Council for the Defense of
Democracy/Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD/FDD) led by Pierre
Nkurunziza, on December 3, 2002. The cease-fire agreements have,
however, been frequently violated by both Government and rebel forces,
and implementation of the provisions of the agreement has been slow.
Further, the transition of the presidency from President Pierre
Buyoya, a Tutsi and member of the Tutsi-dominated National Unity and
Progress Party (UPRONA), to current Vice President Domitien Ndayizeye,
a Hutu and member of the Hutu-dominated Front for Democracy in.
Burundi (FRODEBU) party is scheduled for May 1. Tensions surrounding
this transition, mandated by the Arusha and related accords as well as
by the Transitional Constitution, were reduced when President Buyoya
stated in a national radio address that he would relinquish the
presidency on schedule. Tension caused by speculation that President
Buyoya would seek to stay on beyond May 1 was substantially reduced as
a result of this announcement.
The humanitarian crisis that has developed as a result of this
conflict is tremendous. Of a population of just over six million,
approximately one million Burundians are either refugees in
neighboring countries, most notably the United Republic of Tanzania,
or chronically internally displaced both in United Nations camps or on
their own. Public services have been devastated in Burundi, and basic
needs are not being met in the areas of health, sanitation and
nutrition. Human rights abuses against non-combatants are far too
common, from both the Burundian Armed Forces and the armed rebel
groups.
U.S. Interests
U.S. interests are to:
(1) End the conflict;
(2) Ameliorate the humanitarian crisis;
(3) Assist in the development and strengthening of democratic systems
and principles.
The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement
The U.S. strongly supported the process, led initially by the late
Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere and then by former South African
President Nelson Mandela, that brought about the conclusion of the
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (APRA) in August 2000. The
Transitional Government of Burundi was inaugurated in November 2001.
Post-Arusha Cease-Fire Negotiations
While the Arusha Accords were a major step toward peace in Burundi,
the two armed rebel groups were not signatories leading to continued
fighting in Burundi. Those two rebel groups subsequently splintered.
Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni led a regional effort to broker a
cease-fire, along with Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa, South
African President Thabo Mbeki, and Gabonese President Omar Bongo.
These negotiations began to bear fruit in the fall of 2002. South
African Deputy President Jacob Zuma facilitated talks that resulted in
cease-fire agreements between the Transitional Government of Burundi
and three of the four rebel groups, including the largest, the
National Council for the Defense of Democracy - Forces for the Defense
of Democracy ADD) led by Pierre Nkurunziza.
African Mission Peacekeeping Force
While agreements with the two smaller groups were relatively
straightforward, that with Nkurunziza's CNDD-FDD left many key issues
to further negotiation, and relied on the deployment of an "African
Mission" peacekeeping force under the auspices of the African Union.
At its February meeting in Addis Ababa, the African Union's Central
'Organ endorsed the mission, recognized that the force would be
comprised of troops from Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa, and
charged South Africa with taking the lead on planning and operations.
Support from international donors, including the United States, was
requested.
We view deployment of the AU force to be critical to the success of
the cease-fire, and important to a successful transition of the
Burundian presidency on May 1 as well as full implementation of the
Arusha Accords. We are in touch with the AU, troop contributing
countries, and other possible donors seeking detailed information to
determine what type of support the United States can best provide.
Since FY2002, we have provided $5 million in Africa Peacekeeping
Operations funds to support the deployment of South African troops to
Bujumbura who are taking part in a Special Protection Unit to provide
protection to Hutu leaders returning to Bujumbura to take part in the
transitional government. In addition, approximately $4.5 million in
FY2001 and FY2002 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) was provided to
support the operation of South Africa's C-130 fleet, a portion of
which was used to support the South African detachment in Bujumbura.
Democracy and Human Rights Concerns
The human rights situation in Burundi continues to be poor. A
necessary measure for adequately protecting human rights in Burundi is
a just and enduring peace based on democratic principles.
We view the three most important human rights issues in Burundi to be:
-- the killing and abuse of civilians by both the Burundian army and
Burundian rebels;
-- the lack of a fair and independent justice system that would
provide for accountability;
-- the absence of basic rights such as freedom of the press and
freedom of assembly.
Details of the continued abuse of human rights in Burundi can be found
in the Country Human Rights Report just released by the Secretary of
State this past Monday.
Security forces and rebels that commit extrajudicial killings and
torture are rarely held accountable by the government or rebel
organizations. This impunity to prosecution for such crimes is one
central element of the Arusha Accords.
The Humanitarian Crisis and Development
Continued fighting, massive population movements, general insecurity
and a poor socio-economic environment are all factors that complicate
Burundi's development. Quality of life continues to deteriorate as the
conflict destroys infrastructure, prevents access to basic services,
and reduces agricultural output. School attendance has dropped to 48%,
life expectancy is 43 years, infant mortality has risen to 136 per
1,000 births, and maternal mortality averages 1,000 per 100,000. The
HIV/AIDS prevalence rate is approximately 19% in urban areas and 7% in
rural areas, and there are an estimated 230,000 AIDS orphans.
Of a population of just over six million, more than one million
Burundians are either refugees in neighboring countries, most notably
the United Republic of Tanzania, or chronically internally displaced
both in United-Nations camps or on their own. Public services have
been devastated in Burundi, and basic needs are not being met in the
areas of health, sanitation and nutrition.
Due to massive instability and insecurity, work on repairing and, in
many cases, creating an infrastructure in Burundi has been limited.
The United States, along with most donors, has focused efforts on
humanitarian assistance, and relatively limited activities aimed at
supporting the Arushabased transition to a democratically elected,
representative government.
In FY2002, the United States provided over $22.5 million dollars in
assistance to Burundi, the vast bulk in the form of humanitarian
assistance (nutrition, healthcare).
Mr. Chairman, let me express again my appreciation for the opportunity
to describe the policies we are following toward this troubled region:
I would be happy to respond to any questions you or members of the
Committee might have.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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