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Committee on International Relations
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0128

Statement by Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Chair

Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia

Committee on International Relations

U.S. House of Representatives

For Hearing: "Syria: Implications for U.S. Security and Regional Stability-Part I"

September 16, 2003


Recently, the Subcommittee held an oversight hearing to assess the impact that foreign investment in Iran's energy infrastructure has had on the Iranian regime's ability to finance its nuclear program, its development of long- range ballistic missiles, and its continued sponsoring of terrorist organizations.

Unfortunately, we see a similar pattern emerging with respect to Syria.

Foreign investors have readily answered Damascus' call for assistance, pumping billions of dollars into the regime's coffers through investments in the oil and gas sector, in turn, enabling Syria to expend its budgetary resources on its chemical and biological weapons projects, as well as its support for terrorist groups.

Even more disturbing is how Western European companies have directly contributed to Syria's weapons programs.

In 1989, former CIA Director, William Webster, told a Congressional panel that the CIA had determined foreign assistance was:

"of critical importance in allowing Syria to develop its chemical warfare capability. Western European firms were instrumental in supplying the required precursor chemicals and equipment. Without the provision of these key elements, Damascus would not have been able to produce chemical weapons."

Since then, Syria has increased and diversified its weapons of mass destruction programs to present a serious threat to our allies and interests in the region.

An unclassified CIA report to Congress covering the period from January to June 2001, stated that "Syria sought chemical weapons related precursors and expertise from foreign sources, maintains a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin and appears to be trying to develop more toxic and persistent nerve agents."

Syria has reportedly manufactured varieties of aerial bombs containing chemical agents such as sarin gas. According to Russian intelligence, Syria has a stock of thousands of chemical aerial bombs that are carried by various types of planes. Syria also has several thousand tactical munitions, including rockets and artillery shells containing sarin gas.

Syria reportedly has three production facilities for chemical weapons but, more disturbing, are reports that Syria is amassing chemical warheads for Scud missiles.

In January 2002, the CIA estimated that: "Syria has developed chemical weapons warheads for its Scuds" and that the intelligence community remains concerned about Syria's intentions regarding nuclear weapons.

Syria reportedly produces 30 Scud C missiles per year at an underground facility, and many Western analysts agree that these Syrian Scud C's, originally purchased from North Korea, are being armed for  long-range chemical weapons delivery.

Syrian sources have publicly confirmed the test firing of Scud-B and Scud-C missiles with weaponized chemical agents.

Further, recent public reports indicate that Syria has purchased and already possesses ballistic/ cruise missiles that can carry warheads with clusters of chemical and biological agents.

In addition to mobile brigades, Syria has reportedly constructed hardened silos and a network of tunnels to hide its longer-range missiles.

With respect to Syria's biological weapons program, the Center for Scientific Studies and Research in Damascus has been reported to be the primary site for both Syria's biological and chemical programs--not to mention the procurement of dual-use chemical and biological technology and equipment from various European and South Asia countries.

The Center's published studies point to work with germs and proteins, and report that the Center's scientists have trained in France in the fields of toxicology and virology.

Various sources have reported that Syria possesses, and can weaponize, anthrax and cholera.

It has also been reported that the smallpox virus was delivered to Syria from Russia for bioweapons development and that the Syrian regime is investigating the use of another pathogen related to the bubonic plague.

Scholarly and media sources state that production facilities for chemical weapons in the Aleppo area, and at other sites, also include biological weapons facilities.

While some assessments do not place Syria's biological weapons programs beyond the research and development stage, the intentions of the Syrian regime with respect to its work with biological agents was made abundantly clear in April 2000, in a lengthy article published by the Syrian Defense Minister.

In this article entitled: "Biological Germ Warfare: A New and Effective Method in Modem Warfare", the Syrian Defense Minister spoke about the military's plan to integrate biological weapons in its tactical and strategic arsenals.

However, the current and potential threats posed by the regime in Damascus do not end with chemical and biological weapons.

Both Syria's current research reactor, provided by China, and one light water reactor that Russia has reportedly agreed to provide Syria, are under the supervision and scrutiny of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

However, there are reports that Damascus has attempted to obtain assistance on further developing its nuclear infrastructure from Argentina and China. 

There are persistent rumors of a covert nuclear weapons program, along with reports of planes returning from Syria to Iraq in 2002, with foam-producing systems, which could be used for uranium-enrichment.

These, combined with Syria's recent agreement with Russia concerning close cooperation on nuclear power, raise grave questions regarding the Syrian regime's true objectives on the nuclear front.

The same linkage former CIA Director Webster warned us about in 1989 regarding the role of foreign assistance in developing Syria's chemical weapons, applies to Syria's nuclear intentions today.

Thus, it is imperative to keep in mind President Bush's statement in his January 29, 2002 State of the Union address.  The President declared that the United States would work "to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the materials, technology, and expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction."

In themselves, Syria's nefarious activities pose grave concerns for the U.S. and its allies.  However, the magnitude of the threat increases dramatically when placed in the context of Syria's continued support for global terrorism and its relationship with other pariah states.

Public U.S. and foreign sources assess that there has been a qualitative increase in Syria's role in arms supply to terrorist groups such as Hizballah.   There are reports that Syria has recently begun supplying extended range rockets from its own production to Hizballah.

We have also received information from public sources indicating that Syria is using Lebanon to hide WMD and to serve as a trans-shipment point for weapons to terrorist groups, given that the coalition victory in Iraq closed many of their usual transport routes.

There is also increased cooperation between Syria and other rogue regimes such as Iran.

Throughout the 1990s, delivery of missiles and related cargo was done in coordination with the Iranian regime.

On May 29,2003, Syrian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister described the bilateral relations between Syria and Iran as being in the best shape ever. He noted that coordination between Syria and Iran is based on long experience and joint interests.

Unfortunately, just as ties between Iran and Syria appear to be strengthening, governments focused on appeasing these two terrorist regimes are also expanding their ties with Iran and Syria.

As I noted at the beginning of my statement, the scope and nature of foreign investments in Syria, almost directly mirror the pattern established with Iran.

Perhaps even more troubling, however, are the investments of U.S. companies in Syria.   I am deeply concerned that American companies continue to sign multi-billion dollar deals to invest in Syria’s oil and gas sector.  Worse yet, they are reportedly joining hundreds of other types of U.S. companies doing business in Syria.

We must work to deny Syria all resources and abilities to expand its WMD capabilities. The U.S. must use every tool at its disposal to confront this threat.

I believer the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, which has accumulated over 250 co-sponsors, is such a response.  This Act represents a long overdue effort to hold Syria accountable for its sponsorship of terrorism, its development of weapons of mass destruction, and its ongoing occupation of Lebanon, by toughening economic and other sanctions against Syria.

On May 11, 2002, Secretary of State Powell warned the Syrian leader that he "will find that he is on the wrong side of history" if he does not, among other priorities, move against terrorism and discourage the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

It appears to me that, for over two decades and, particularly since the September 11th attacks, Syria's overall actions have not been those of a state that shares our commitment to non-proliferation and combating terrorism.



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