Reconnaissance, Surveillance, And Target Acquisition Collection Planning--Embedded Within The MEF Intelligence And

Reconnaissance, Surveillance, And Target Acquisition Collection

Planning--Embedded Within The MEF Intelligence And Operations Cycles

CSC 1995

SUBJECT AREA - Intelligence

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition

Collection Planning--Embedded Witliin the MEF

Intelligence and Operations Cycles

Authors: Intelligence Doctrine Working Group

Chairman: Major J.C. Dereschuk, United States Marine Corps

Members: Major R. H. Chase Major J. A. Day

(USMC) Major D. D. Cline Major J.G. O'Hagan

Thesis: Judicious employment of finite, high value RSTA resources to support myriad

battlespace activities demands top-down planning, unity of effort, and Commander's

synchronization of the intelligence and operations cycles.

Background: The emerging body of Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Targeting

Acquisition (RSTA) resources brings a powerfiil contribution to battlespace domination.

Diverse RSTA operations occur simultaneously within the battlespace--keyed to support

a range of users from decision makers to "shooters." In addition to collecting

information that develops situational awareness, RSTA assets contribute to many battle

space activities: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, Indications and Warning,

situation development, force protection, Battle Damage Assessment, targeting and

collection queuing. Given this multi-dimensional capability, it is no longer desirable to

relegate RSTA assets solely to the realm of intelligence collection management. The

command and control of finite, high value RSTA resources is the Commander's

responsibility, one demanding top-down planning and unity of effort throughout the

MAGTF to achieve a synchronized intelligence-operations approach to RSTA

employment.

Recommendation: To oversee the coordination and tasking of RSTA missions

supporting battlespace domination, the Marine Corps must institutionalize a MEF-level

coordination board--the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Target Acquisition Board

(RSTAB). Under the Commander's direction, the Board's concerted efforts to plan,

coordinate, and task RSTA resources will embed RSTA collection planning within the

intelligence-operations cycles.

CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES iii

Chapter Page

I. SITUATIONAL OVERVIEW: RECONNAISSANCE,

SURVEILLANCE, TARGET ACQUISITION (RSTA)

PLANNING WITHIN ThE MAGTF TODAY 1-8

II. THE EXPANDED CHARTER FOR RSTA OPERATIONS 9-18

III. A NEW DIRECTION FOR MEF RSTA COORDINATION 19-33

IV. RSTAB PROCEDURES 34-38

V. EMBEDDING RSTA COLLECTION PLANNING WITHIN

THE INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS CYCLES 39-52

VI. CONCLUSIONS 53-56

Notes 57-59

Appendices

A. DIVERT SCENARIO FOR A PRE-PLANNED

UAV MISSION 60-64

B. THE INTELLIGENCE BATTALION WITHIN THE

NEW MEF SUPPORT GROUP 65-73

Bibliography 74-75

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure

1. Intelligence Flow Within the MEF

(page 2)

2. G2 Combat Intelligence Center (CIC)

(Page 5)

3. Divert Scenario: UAV Detects Targets of

Opportunity Beyond the FSCL

(page 7)

4. RSTA Collection Planning Cycle--Embedded

Within MAGTF Planning Cycles

(page 34)

ABSTRACT

The emerging body of Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Targeting Acquisition

(RSTA) assets serves as a significant combat multiplier to a commander. In addition

to collecting information that helps develop situational awareness, RSTA assets

contribute to many battle space activities:

--Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB)

--Indications and Warning (I&W)

--Situation Development

--Force Protection

--Battle Damage Assessment (BDA)

--Targeting, Target Acquisition, and Target Development

--Collection Queuing

--Battle Management

Given this multi-dimensional capability, it is no longer desirable to relegate RSTA

assets solely to the realm of intelligence collection management. The command and

control of finite, high value RSTA resources is the Commander's responsibility, one

demanding top-down planning and unity of effort throughout the MAGTF to achieve a

synchronized intelligence-operations approach to RSTA employment.

Not surprisingly, synchronizing diverse RSTA capabilities to support operations

involves complex coordination and planning considerations. During this process, the

Commander and his staff must ask themselves: Are these assets best employed in

general support of the MAGTF, direct support of subordinate units, or both? Will

these assets fall under G2 or G3 purview, or should a Commander-designated board

conduct oversight and management? What relationship must be established, what

coordination effected between organic and nonorganic RSTA assets and the

Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center (SARC), the Combat Intelligence Center

(CIC), and the Combat Operations Center (COC)? Who orchestrates the coordination

for RSTA planning, and who provides the sanity check on how well the collection

strategy supports operations? Given that diverse RSTA operations occur

simultaneously within the battlespace--keyed to support a range of users from decision

makers to "shooters"--what parameters must define the information flow, and who

should oversee the dissemination process to ensure usable intelligence reaches the

Major Subordinate Commands?

RSTA assets provide a powerful contribution to battlespace domination. The

finite nature of RSTA platforms and the complexities inherent in planning and

executing their operations flag the RSTA collection process for commander's

responsibility. The management demands unity of effort, top-down planning, and

synchronization of the RSTA cycle. This paper proposes the formation of a MEF CE

coordination board--the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Target Acquisition Board

(RSTAB)--to oversee the prioritization, validation, coordination, and tasking of RSTA

missions. Key principal staff officers whose guidance is pivotal to synchronizing

intelligence and operations are dual-hatted to form the RSTAB. Under the

commander's direction, the Board's planning, coordination, and execution efforts

would embed RSTA collection planning within the intelligence-operations cycles.

RECONNAISSANCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND TARGET ACQUISITION

COLLECTION PLANNING--EMBEDDED WITHIN THE MEF

INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS CYCLES

CHAPTER 1

SITUATIONAL OVERVIEW: RECONNAISSANCE, SURVEILLANCE,

TARGET ACQUISITION (RSTA) PLANNING WITHIN THE MAGTF TODAY

The Dilemma

As the spectrum of battlefield systems becomes more sophisticated and diverse,

intelligence requirements to support battlefield operations grow astronomically--from

collecting on and correlating battlefield activities to developing target packages; from

analyzing Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) to relaying information in near-real-time

(NRT) to a tactical commander.(1) General Clapper, Director of DIA, recently

commented on these demands placed on intelligence:

As a result, intelligence simply must situate itself within the operational cycle

rather than outside it...the intelligence collection, production and dissemination

cycle must be compressed so that it fits within the operational cycle for targeting

to support strike and restrike operations.(2)

The MAGTF intelligence collection cycle must be tailored to support the

operational cycle, and the entire spectrum of MAGTF operations and fires. The

diverse array of reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting acquisition (RSTA) sensors

and systems either organic, attached, or available to support a MAGTF challenges the

current way we do business. The G2 and G3 must expand their partnership to

Maximize the multidiscipline capability inherent in finite RSTA assets. Importantly,

synchronizing intelligence and operations planning to optimize RSTA advantages must

stand as one of the commander's priority concerns. The commander provides the

top-down direction ensuring unity of effort in intelligence and operations cycles.

To understand the intricacies of RSTA planning and collection management, and

how crucial coordinated staff planning is to successful RSTA operations, consider

what generally occurs at the MEF during a collection planning cycle. Historically,

the intelligence collection management process has often failed to integrate fully target

acquisition. It must be noted that each MEF currently employs different procedures

for collection planning and management, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center

(SARC) employment, and development of a dissemination architecture. The

following concept is based primarily on I MEF Command Element (CE) and

Surveillance and Reconnaissance Intelligence Group (SRIG) operations. See

Figure 1.

MAGTF Intelligence Collection Management Cycle

The commander has the ultimate responsibility to determine, direct, and

coordinate all intelligence collection through centralized, apportioned collection

management. The commander determines his Critical Information Requirements

(CCIR) for the operation, requirements that subsequently focus the collection process.

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Traditionally, the MEF G2 Collection Management Officer (CMO) and/or, Collection

Requirements Management Officer (CRMO) if assigned, work with the Commanding

Officer of the SRIG and his collection units to develop the MEF collection plan. The

plan is based on the MEF commander's intent and planning guidance, CCIRs, staff

Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR), and Intelligence Preparation of the

Battlespace (IPB). Through IPB--the underpinning for collection and RSTA

operations--the G2 forms a basis for determining possible enemy courses of action,

intent, capabilities, and critical vulnerabilities. Once the IPB process has begun, the

CMO (and usually the SRIG S3) participate in the MEF staff planning sessions that

produce the Event and Decision Support Templates--replete with Named Areas of

Interest (NAI), Target Areas of Interest (TAI), and Decision Points (DP).

Armed with this collection focus, the CMO meets with the G2's Human

Intelligence (HUMINT) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) planners, the SRIG S3 and

representatives from his collection units, and CMOs of major subordinate commands

(MSC) to develop a comprehensive plan to cover NAIs, TAIs, CCIR, PIR, and

collection capability gaps. Before deciding on the need for new collection efforts, or

prior to validating requirements for fulfillment at higher echelons, the G2 CMO

confers with the MEF All Source Fusion Center (MAFC), Imagery Interpretation Unit

(IIU),and the Topographic Platoon to determine if off-the-shelf products are available

within the MEF to satisfy commander, staff, and MSC requirements. The CMO also

must be aware of the capabilities, limitations, and leadtime for tasking intelligence

collection assets and production agencies.

Once the gaps in organic intelligence products and collection capability are

determined, the CMO/CRMO registers, validates, and prioritizes collection,

exploitation, and dissemination requirements to satisfy the intelligence concerns of the

MEF and MSC commanders. Requisite theater and national assets and agencies will

be tasked through operational channels to support the MAGTF with collection

emphasis, coverage, and/or production.

As collection/production results flow into the MEF, the CMO/CRMO monitors

the overall satisfaction of command requirements and assesses the effectiveness of the

collection strategy. Different types of collection capabilities are employed so

information from one source can be validated by other sources or assets. The

collection strategy ensures redundancy so the loss or failure of one asset can be

compensated for by another of similar capability. The CMO strives for near

continuous surveillance on a target through synchronization of different and

complementary national, theater, and organic collection assets. This coordinated

planning also allows cross-cueing and tipoff among collectors, and provides a sensor-

to-shooter capability for exploitation of targets of opportunity. (3) Generally, data

collected are integrated within the MAFC for dissemination as all-source, finished

intelligence. However, when mission-essential, information is transmitted NRT to the

tactical level for immediate operational exploitation.

The MEF G3, or sometimes the Chief of Staff, reviews the final G2 collection

strategy. Once the plan has been approved, the SRIG S3 and representatives of

individual SRIG units commence detailed mission planning with appropriate MEF

staff sections (e.g., Force Reconnaissance Company confers with G3 Air for

insertions/extraction as required, and Force Fires for establisliment of RAO and NFA;

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Company consults with MEF and Air Combat

Element (ACE) air space management and control authorities; Human Intelligence

Company (HUMINT) teams work with the MEF HUMINT Branch (HIB) and the unit

they are directly supporting). These planners keep the CMO apprised of major

developments, but the CMO does not involve himself in the details unless there is

"finessing" required with MEF staff elements. When coordination is complete, the

SRIG units prepare their respective tabs for inclusion in Appendix 11 (the

Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan) of Annex B (Intelligence) to the OPLAN, and

present them to the CMO for final approval.

SARC and G2 Operations. Once deployed, the SRIG establishes and mans the

Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center (SARC), located in close proximity to the

MEF Combat Intelligence Center (CIC). See Figure (2), "The Combat Intelligence

Center." Note, with the exception of the MEF G2 Administration section, the entire

CIC, less the SARC, is situated within a field Special Compartmented Intelligence

Facility (SCIF) during most I MEF operations. In general, most SARC personnel do

not have the requisite Special Intelligence clearance for access within a SCIF.

Unfortunately, this precludes the SARC and CIC elements from conducting

uninterrupted fusion of genser (secret) and higher levels of classified material.

However, the SARC is located either immediately outside the SCIF wire, within easy

G2 access, or located in the area between the Combat Operations Center (COC) and

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CIC entry point (Figure 2). Both layouts have merit, although certainly the optimum

solution would be a SARC manned with SCI-cleared individuals, fully integrated

within the CIC, or alternatively, a CIC that in some manner allowed for co-existence

of both SCI and genser-only cleared individuals.(4)

The SRIG S3 normally is the OIC of the SARC. The SARC is under the staff

cognizance of the G2/CMO, who directs collection planning and operations through

the SARC OIC. While this situation generally provides for smooth operations, on

occasion, deconflicting multi-mission capable assets becomes a mild tug-of-war

between the G2, G3, and the Ground Combat Element (GCE). Final adjudication for

the prioritization of missions for these scarce resource rests with the Commanding

General.

Information Flow

Information from the deployed collection assets--Sensor Control and Management

Platoon (SCAMP), Force Reconnaissance, UAVs--flows into the SARC via doctrinal

nets. As an example, consider the UAV information flow. UAV voice reporting can

be available to the ACE, GCE, and Force Service Support Group (FSSG) over

various doctrinal nets, or a Remote Video Terminal (RVT) can be provided to the

unit being directly supported by the UAV. Perishable targeting data collected by the

UAV can be fed NRT to an MSC. Pre-planned UAV missions can be diverted to

support unfolding battlespace events. If time does not permit consulting the SARC

OIC and/or the G2 CMO for a divert mission, then divert authority can come

immediately from the MEF COC Watch Officer--the direct representative of the

Commander--through concurrence with G2 and G3 Watch Officers. Figure 3,

"Divert of a Pre-planned UAV Mission," depicts a UAV executing three collateral

missions while flying one preplanned orbit. Starting on a preplanned collection

mission, the UAV detects targets of opportunity and reports back to the SARC. This

activates a rapid targeting process involving the G2, G3, and Force Fires

Coordination Center (FFCC). The UAV stays on station to provide immediate post

strike BDA. This is an excellent example of intelligence and targeting synchronizing

operations to maximize a RSTA asset. Appendix A elaborates on the events involved

in a divert mission.

Ground sensor reports also feed into the SARC, are "analyzed" by the SCAMP

platoon element, and passed to the CIC/MAFC. Generally, since the SARC and CIC

are only a door apart, a hard copy report is hand-carried to the CIC. The CMO, G2

operations officer, the MEF All Source Fusion Center (MAFC) analysts, and/or the

target intelligence officer quickly review the report in the context of the current

battlespace. Based on its perishability and contents, a determination may be made to

pass the information immediately to the COC and FFCC/Targeting section for target

consideration. In some instances, the information may be further analyzed, integrated

with other sources, and folded into the next published MEF Intelligence Summary

(INTSUM). If the information is perishable and of vital concern to an MSC, the G2

Operations Officer directs immediate dissemination of the "information" to the

subordinate G2 via the most expeditious means: phone, radio net, Local Area

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Network (LAN), Intelligence Analysis Station (IAS), Joint Deployable Intelligence

Support System (JDISS), or courier.

Force Reconnaissance team reports either enter the SARC directly through the

doctrinal net or flow first (or simultaneously) to the adjacent Reconnaissance

Operations Center (ROC). The Force Reconnaissance Element manning the SARC

collates the data and passes it through the SARC to the CIC/MAFC. The same

process detailed above for SCAMP reports occurs: the report can receive immediate

action/forwarding to the G3/COC, be further analyzed with other sources, and/or can

be passed immediately to an MSC as perishable information.

During operations, the CMO and SARC OIC continuously update the collection

strategy based on the enemy situation, collections input, commander's guidance, focus

of main effort, scheme of maneuver, subordinate units' collection requirements, and

future operations. In conjunction with current doctrinal operations planning, the MEF

collection plan works on a 72 hour cycle, and is updated every 24 hours via record

message traffic as the MEF Collections Operations Message.

CHAPTER II

THE EXPANDED CHARTER FOR RSTA OPERATIONS

Impact of Service-Related and National-Level Developments

MEF Collection Management (CM) procedures described in Chapter I work fairly

well when the MEF G2 CMO deals solely with organic SRIG assets. However, over

the past few years numerous developments at the national level, and a major change

in the role assumed by the MEF Command Element during operations have expanded

significantly the charter for RSTA asset employment, and prompted a review of

RSTA management within the MEF:

--The MAGTF now operates frequently with joint and combined forces, gaming

valuable exposure to RSTA sensors and assets at Service, theater and national levels.

--I MEF functioned as a Unified Task Force (UTF) in Somalia, experiencing

unique RSTA planning during a combined, joint Humanitarian Operation.

--MAGTFs continue to exercise as JTFs or Component headquarters (MEF as the

Warfighter) during CINC and MEF-level exercises, capturing lessons learned in the

RSTA realm.

--The ongoing battle over roles and missions created an unexpected RSTA

windfall: many national collection platforms uniquely configured for reconnaissance

and surveillance during the heyday of the USSR are scrambling to redefine their role

in the current threat environment. Several collection platforms have broadened their

charter, increased accessibility to their assets, and have been more responsive to

Service interoperability concerns.(5)

--Post Operation DESERT STORM, theater and national assets and agencies

refocussed development of support measures from the strategic to the operational and

tactical level. National agencies endeavored to inculcate collection management

awareness at the Service and Component levels, assist Service collection planning and

operations with a pool of experts, and educate the Services regarding the capability of

the national community to support a combat commander. The desired end state being

Service/Components with the knowledge and expertise to tap into the theater and

national pipelines, subsequently enhancing the ability of the national intelligence

community to successfully support future operations.

--The latest national top-down strategy for RSTA acquisition and upgrades

stresses joint interoperability and streamlining the response time and accessibility of

RSTA sensors and assets. There is a major emphasis on sensor-to-shooter capability

in collection platforms, with NRT downlink to a common user ground station--one

that is fielded with each Service and is interoperable with a variety of RSTA

platforms.

--The Marine Corps Mid Range Threat Estimate 1995-2005 states there will be a

steady advance to UAV technology, with integration of multispectral sensor

technologies to increase target detection, identification, and acquisition.(6) This

means Marine Corps intelligence and operations planners must exercise greater

coordination to better utilize the enhanced potential. Moreover, as Near Real Time

(NRT), sensor-to-shooter capability increases, the demand and necessity to deliver

information directly to the tactical commander grows. The Marine Corps must build-

in, up front, the requirement for the requisite downlink modules, communications

equipment, and band width.

--Manning, training, and budgetary restraints compel Marine Corps leadership to

make hard choices regarding billets filled, training conducted, and dollars allocated

for special projects or capabilities. Unfortunately, the Marine Corps already is years

behind the other Services regarding organic collection capability, funding for

additional RSTA sensors, and trained collection management personnel. The Marine

Corps must relook priorities in this arena, making a firm commitment to plus-up

organic RSTA capability, and increase connectivity to and interoperability with other

Service and theater/national sensors. At a minimum, this should include developing a

core of Collection Managers within the Marine Corps, and participation in formal CM

training programs such as the excellent Army courses conducted at Ft. Huachuca,

Arizona.(7)

Noting these shortcomings, standard MAGTF collection management operating

procedures have reached overload and are inadequate to rapidly, judiciously, and

safely synchronize the employment of finite, high-value RSTA assets within the

operational sequence. New doctrinal procedures for the control, management, and

integration of RSTA assets within the MAGTF intelligence and operational cycles are

required. Vital to any implementation of doctrinal changes is commander and

operator awareness that the proposal is sound, corrects a defined problem and

contributes to more efficient mission accomplishment.

No matter how superb the informal working relationship is among the MEF

Command Element staff, the burgeoning complexities in RSTA and collection

synchronization mandate adoption of a new doctrinal approach. The significant

developments outlined in the preceding section highlight changes in the way the

national community approaches RSTA challenges, and the glaring requirement for the

Marine Corps to get in step with changes in collection asset acquisition, management,

and employment. There are specific areas within the MAGTF intelligence and

operations cycles that are impacted directly by the "RSTA revolution." These are the

areas that must receive optimum attention and focus.

MAGTF Target Areas

Communications and Intelligence Systems Architecture. The communications

architecture required to support intelligence operations (collection, reporting,

processing, and dissemination) has expanded greatly. New intelligence work

stations/systems and communications capabilities have increased access to varied

RSTA assets; but these advances also have increased requirements for interoperability

and connectivity. Often, doctrinal nets are overloaded as multiple users share finite

circuits. Hasty work-arounds are implemented to achieve connectivity during

peacetime operations that may not be feasible under combat operations. More than

ever, the G6 and G2 must combine efforts during development of the Intelligence

Systems Architecture to ensure high value, perishable information is received in the

appropriate form, by the appropriate user, in a timely fashion. Knowing the unique

communications requirements of attached and supporting RSTA platforms is critical to

ensuring compatibility and interoperability. Timely, multiparty dissemination of

various forms of information and intelligence over redundant communications paths

requires updating our intelligence systems architecture. Hard choices regarding finite

satellite channel access, band width, and communications assets (radios, receivers,

mobile ground stations, remote receive terminals) are a commander's responsibility

and will reflect his concept of operations, focus of main effort, and vision for

success.

Asset Allocation and Management. Top down planning must determine the

allocation of high-value, finite RSTA assets. A unity of effort at the MEF level is

required for responsible, judicious asset management. This must not be solely a G2

responsibility; rather, Commander's intent/guidance, coupled with future operations

planning, must frame the process, and the intelligence and operations planners must

share responsibility for synchronization. The complexities and simultaneity of RSTA

operations demand coordinated management to ensure successful, productive results

for the command.

Sound management covers both planning and execution phases. Rapidly unfolding

events in the battlespace requires decision maldng to keep pace if a commander hopes

to stay ahead of the enemy's observation, orientation, decision and action cycles. For

example, a responsive, flexible decision making capability is vital when weighing the

consequences of diverting a RSTA asset from a pre-assigned mission for support of

immediate target exploitation. This should not be an issue of operations over

intelligence; rather, a case of maximizing assets to accomplish the end state. Given

the scarcity and high value of RSTA assets, it is the commander's responsibility to

determine risk vs gain for their employment, based on his vision for success.

Asset Integration in Operational Cycles. Attached and/or supporting RSTA

platforms must be integrated completely into the intelligence and operations cycles,

with cognizant staff sections conducting requisite planning for each asset. For

example, it is virtually impossible for the G2 CMO to involve himself intimately in

the intricacies of air space management inherent in operational planning for an aerial

RSTA asset while still trying to orchestrate a redundant, multisource MEF collection

plan. Consider what is required to integrate an attached P3-C detachment into the

intelligence-operations cycles. The MEF commander, his staff, and the MSCs receive

an operational briefing from the P3 squadron to learn the capabilities and limitations

of the platform, and brainstorm ways to best integrate the RSTA asset into the

intelligence and operations cycles. Once a feasible concept is conceived, coordinating

planned P3-C operations with the MEF's battle space activities begins. Integration of

the P3-C demands full participation of the G3 Air Officer from the moment a request

through channels for asset support is formulated. The G3 Air Officer must ensure

that P3 pilots and crews are integrated into the operations planning and attend

requisite briefings. Optimumly, a liaison officer is exchanged or identified early on.

The G3 Air Officer conducts requisite planning/training ensuring P3-C crew

familiarization with: the MAGTF air command, control, and tasking system;

frequencies, call signs, air space restrictions, and control measures. All aviation

matters--fuel, refueling, bed down sites, supply and maintenance--are planned and

managed by the G3 Air Officer and the P3 LNO. The G6 and G2 Systems Officers

work closely with the P3 intelligence and communications representative to determine

unique communication requirements and plan for required nets, satellite channel, and

encryption requirements; establish connectivity at appropriate sites and ensure system

compatibility; and identify any additional MEF support required for successful P3-C

integrated operations. The G2 Operations Officer, the CMO, Systems Officer, and

G6 determine time sensitive dissemination requirements for the P3-C's NRT

information, as well as dissemination paths for fused intelligence derived from P3

collection efforts. The G2 apprises the P3 crew of unique USMC intelligence

collection and reporting requirements and procedures, provides intelligence briefs on

the Area of Responsibility and Interest (AOR), (AOI), and tasks the ACE G2 with the

conduct of P3-C pilot debriefs.(8)

The G2 CMO and SRIG coordinate requirements for imagery interpretation

support, and determine any requirement for photographic lab or tape dubbing

facilities/equipment. Physical security for the air platform and or crew may be an

issue. Depending where the platform stages from (a benign, low or high threat site),

the G2 may need to coordinate with other MAGTF agencies to establish a security

plan for the platform/crew.(9)

Obviously, planning for just this one resource involved every MEF staff section,

the SRIG, and MSCs to be supported. Only MEF level coordination of all the cycles

ensured successful synchronization of the RSTA resource within MAGTF operations.

OPSEC, OPDEC, and Targeting Synchronization. Once a RSTA collection

plan is drated, the G2 CMO must ensure it supports the commander's planning

guidance, answers critical information requirements, and supports current and future

operational requirements. This balancing act requires constant coordination,

prioritization, and deconfliction of collection, targeting, security, and other operations

plans. Assets pivotal for collection on one area of interest may be equally critical for

target acquisition or I&W in another area. Alternatively, use of a RSTA asset directed

against a specific collection area could adversely affect MEF operational security

(OPSEC) or operational deception (OPDEC) plans. Players must have situational

awareness, and coordinate daily RSTA scheduling to ensure maximum targeting value

is derived from assets; and that assets are considered to support a deception operation

or assist in OPSEC.

The Dangers of Staying Our Present Course

The "new wave" RSTA assets offer a tantalizing potential to the MAGTF

commander. However, their effective employment demands comprehensive MEF

staff coordination. Mission planning and execution considerations must be

coordinated, lest any one pivotal criteria is overlooked. In the past, the G2 CMO, the

SARC OIC, the SRIG S3, individual SRIG units, and/or the MEF G3 attempted to

coordinate the complexities and intricacies of RSTA operations in an ADHOC, "good

faith" manner. For various reasons, planning sometimes is conducted in a vacuum or

haphazardly. Key players may be left uninformed or only have pieces of the RSTA

strategy. This ultimately degrades mission execution. For example, improper

coordination could result in:

--No helo support arranged for extraction of a force reconnaissance team;

--No satellite communication channel allocated/available for a Special Operations

Force (SOF) team;

--No Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) plan developed, no

extraction plan coordinated;

--Air space deconfliction not conducted;

--Restricted Fire Areas (RFA) or Reconnaissance Operating Areas (ROA) not

disseminated to appropriate command and control activities;

--Unclear mission assignment or collection direction provided to RSTA assets;

--Insufficient band width or connectivity planned for delivery of information to an

MSC.

If current MEF collection planning and procedures do not adjust to meet the

challenge, the Marine Corps risks falling further behind other Services in developing

doctrine, systems, and capabilities to exploit new wave RSTA potential. Intelligence,

operations, and communications officers must be conditioned to synchronize

comprehensive RSTA collection planning. This ensures maximizing the commander's

resources for unity of effort in mission accomplishment; provides timely dissemination

of finished intelligence to the MAGTF, and allows perishable information to reach the

MSCs in NRT.

CHAPTER III

A NEW DIRECTION FOR MEF RSTA COORDINATION

Doctrinal Change

After consideration of RSTA developments from the national to the tactical level,

and having reviewed standing MEF collection management procedures, it is evident a

doctrinal change is required for the MEF's approach to RSTA collection planning. A

new doctrine must embed RSTA collection management within intelligence and

operations cycles. The proposed venue for accomplishing this is through

institutionalizing a MEF-level oversight, planning, and management board--the

Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Target Acquisition Board or RSTAB. This standing

board should be comprised primarily of key staff members from the MEF Command

Element. This dual-hatting alleviates any requirement for additional staffing, and

imposes no extra layer of command and control.

Before considering the formation of a steering committee within a staff, are there

any existing structures on which to build? Two frameworks, used predominantly in

joint operations, exist: the Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC) and the Daily Aerial

Reconnaissance and Surveillance (DARS) Meeting. The RSTAB would combine the

purpose and activities of both--joining the operations of the JRC with the collection

management of the DARS--within a MEF level board. In both the short and long

term, this better prepares MAGTFs for joint, combined RSTA coordination and

management. Of overarching importance, the formation of a MEF level board that

mirror-images joint board fosters a working comprehension by Marine commanders

and staff with the intricacies of joint, combined RSTA collection process. In turn,

they are better prepared to articulate and secure Marine targeting and collection

requirements when faced with highly competitive brokering in a joint arena.

A brief overview of the JRC and DARS appears below. The RSTAB is presented

as an attractive alternative at little cost but much gain to the command.

The Joint Reconnaissance Center. In a joint environment, the function of the

Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC) is to monitor the operational status of assigned or

supporting RSTA assets, establish priorities to support current or new collection

requirements, assign tasks to available RSTA systems, coordinate and deconflict

RSTA missions with other operations within the AOR, assess the mission risk versus

intelligence gain, and monitor ongoing operations.(10) In essence, the JRC is the

brain center for theater RSTA management. A JRC concept has not been

implemented at a MEF level; rather, the G3, SARC, and G2/CMO have fulfilled its

functions adhoc. However, the typical JRC activities are precisely those requiring

Commander's direction to achieve unity of effort in the intelligence and operations

cycles.

Another coordinating body for RSTA operations in the joint environment is the

Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), appointed by the Joint Force

Commander (JFC). The JFACC'S responsibilities normally include:

... planning, coordinating, allocating and tasking of apportioned airborne RSTA

assets made available, based on the JFC's apportionment decision. Following

the JFC's guidance, and in coordination with other Service Component

Commanders, the JFACC recommends to the JFC apportionment of air sorties....

For short-term arrangements, RSTA forces may also be attached to a

subordinate command to which tactical control (TACON) authority is

delegated.(11)

Marine commanders need to be sensitized to the JFACC role in RSTA management:

one of the three types of sorties that a MAGTF commander is directed to make

available to the JFC, for tasking through the JFACC, is long-range reconnaissance.

(12) When the Advanced Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance System (ATARS) for the F-

18, and the medium and long range UAVs enter the Marine Corps inventory,

commanders must be cognizant of the organic RSTA capability they are providing to

the JFC. So that a JFC's tasking for these high value sorties support-to some

degree--MAGTF RSTA interests, Marine commanders and planners must understand

the RSTA platforms' capabilities and limitations, be eloquent and persistent in their

articulation of MAGTF RSTA requirements, and be prepared to demand additional

JFC RSTA capability if organic support is depleted.

The Daily Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance Meeting (DARS). As

implemented during DESERT STORM, this collection management group was the

venue for prioritizing and coordinating joint collection and targeting requirements.

The DARS meeting brought together collectors (platform experts) and collection

management personnel on a daily basis to review the theater collection plan, assign

Components' access to theater collection platforms, and prioritize collection for

national collection systems. The meeting was scheduled after the daily Joint Target

Board (JTB) so that RSTA prioritization would include the JTB's imagery

nominations for prestrike validation, post strike BDA, and target development. The

DARS's end state was to maximize RSTA assets to support operational requirements

of the JFC and Components.

There were two drawbacks to the DARS. First, it generally concerned itself with

theater and national-level RSTA assets. The fact that all Components had organic

collection capability that could support the JTF was not fully exploited. To the credit

of joint collection managers participating in such subsequent peacetime training

exercises as the Air Force's Blue Flag series (a major air tasking and targeting

evolution), the concept of the DARS has expanded since Operation DESERT

STORM. Not only does an evolving DARS CONOPS validate and prioritize theater

air breather collection and national overhead reconnaissance requirements, but the

assembled CM group considers the collection operations and emphasis of each

Component, to include SOF. In this manner, units operating in close proximity,

knowing they have similar collection emphasis, can coordinate collection to maximize

assets and benefit from each other's RSTA missions.

The second shortfall of the DESERT STORM era DARS meeting was that its

major players were primarily intelligence personnel, with little participation from the

operations side of the house. Most RSTA planning developed at the DARS's

subsequently had to be coordinated and deconflicted with the J3 side. Better time

management would have been achieved if the key J2 and J3 planners attended the

same meeting and synchronized operations at that time.

Many intelligence personnel came away from the DESERT STORM DARS

experience with a healthy respect for the value of embedding RSTA planning within

the intelligence and operations cycles. However, as Marines who held this

operational experience rotated to other billets or retired, many of the valuable lessons

learned departed also. Thus it is MAGTFs now confront a brewing crisis regarding

RSTA coordination and planning. To preserve and build on the best principles of

RSTA oversight inherent within a JRC and DARS, the Marine Corps must

institutionalize synchronized intelligence-operations management of RSTA assets.

In both garrison training and operational deployments, MEF G2s continue to

expand on the DARS concept. However, Navy, Air Force, and Army operators often

are better versed and attune to RSTA planning rigors than Marine commanders and

operators. Whereas both collection managers and operators from other services

acquiesce to RSTA planning, all too often Marine operators want to leave it in the

G2's realm.(13)

The MEF RSTAB

The proposed MEF RSTAB would join and institutionalize the intelligence

collection and targeting oversight embodied by the DARS and the operational mission

planning inherent in the JRC. To replicate the planning cycles a MEF is likely to

experience in a joint arena, a daily RSTAB meeting will be scheduled after the MEF

Target Board (MTB) meets (Chapter IV details the process). The RSTAB (assuming

DARS and JRC responsibilities) fulfills the purpose of a MAGTF-styled DARS

meeting, and alleviates the need for a separate JRC-type structure at the MEF level.

The RSTAB will reap immediate command and control benefits for the MAGTF

commander. Through the Board, the Commander allocates judiciously limited

resources to maximize RSTA support for mission success. Solely from a staffing

view, institutionalizing the RSTAB will not be burdensome since the majority of all

players (with the exception of LNOs and SRIG personnel) are resident on the MEF

staff. Finally, by implementing a doctral approach to RSTA oversight within the

MAGTF, Marine commanders prepare themselves for the complexities of RSTA

mission management--via a JRC, DARS, and/or JFACC--in a joint or combined

environment.

To ensure that the RSTAB has the right people, in one place, at the correct time

for coordinating RSTA collection planning, the following board membership is

essential (In the interest of personal time management, attendance guidelines are

offered as notes below):

RECONNAISSANCE, SURVEILLANCE, TARGET ACQUISITION BOARD

**DEPUTY G3, RSTAB CHAIRMAN **

SRIG CO (or INTELLIGENCE BATTALLION COMMANDER)

G3 AIR OFFICER

G3 FUTURE OPERATIONS OFFICER

G3/DEPUTY FORCE FIRES OFFICER, FORCE FIRES COORDINATION

CENTER

G3 TARGET INFORMATION OFFICER (Note 1)

DEPUTY G2 OR G2 OPERATIONS OFFICER (Note 2)

G2 PLANS OFFICER (Note 3)

G2 COLLECTION MANAGEMENT OFFICER

G2 TARGET INTELLIGENCE OFFICER (Note 1)

G2 INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS/ARCHITECTURE OFFICER (Note 4)

G6 OPERATIONS OFFICER (Note 4)

RSTA RESOURCE LIAISON OFFICERS (Note 5)

LNOS OR COLLECTION MANAGERS FROM MSC OR ATTACHED UNITS

(Note 6)

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TEAM (NIST) REPRESENTATIVE

NOTE 1: Attendance of either the Target Information or Target Intelligence Officer is

acceptable to field targeting issues.

NOTE 2: Either the Deputy G2 or G2 Operations Officer may attend, depending on

which has the best situational awareness.

NOTE 3: The G2 Plans Officer augments G3 Future Operations during operational

planning, and does most of his coordination prior to the board meeting with the

CMO. Thus, his interests can be represented by the Deputy G3, Future Operations

and/or the G2 CMO.

NOTE 4: The G2 Systems Officer and G6 Operations Officer conduct joint

architecture planning; the one with the best grasp of intelligence-communications

planning for RSTA operations should attend.

Note 5: Each supporting or attached RSTA asset must provide an LNO.

Note 6: CMOs and/or LNOs from each MSC and/or attached units are encouraged to

attend.

RSTAB Membership

Deputy G3. The board will be chaired by the Deputy G3 to optimize integration

of intelligence and operations. The Deputy G3 provides the punch behind RSTAB

planning, coordination, and tasking. Importantly, key members of the RSTAB come

from within the G3 (Air, Force Fires, Target Information, and Future Operations

Officers). Specific direction and guidance from the Deputy G3 to the G3 staff will

reduce significantly the time and effort other Board members spend coordinating

intricate RSTA mission planning with various G3 sections. The Deputy G3

supervises MEF efforts to embed RSTA collection planning within the operations

cycle.

SRIG Commander or the Intelligence Battalion Commander. Pending

implementation of the Marine Corps' plan to reorganize the SRIG into the MEF

Support Group, either the SRIG commander and/or his S3 (under the old SRIG

concept), or the Intelligence Battalion Commander (under the new reorganization) will

be a standing RSTAB member. Note, the Intelligence Battalion concept has merit;

see Appendix B for a proposed mission statement and concept of command and

control for the new Intelligence Battalion.

The majority of the MEF's organic RSTA collection assets reside within the

SRIG. Moreover, either the SRIG S3 (old concept) or Intelligence Battalion CO (new

concept) function as the OIC of the Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center (SARC).

As such, he will be intimately involved with the capabilities, limitations, and

operational status of organic collections assets. Additionally, LNOs for attached

RSTA assets may also be located within the SARC. The Commander determines

where attached RSTA platforms best support the MAGTF: in general support to the

MAGTF--and located in either the Combat Operations Center, Combat Intelligence

Center, or the SARC--or in direct support of an MSC. The SARC OIC represents his

units {Force Reconnaissance Company, Imagery Interpretation Unit (IIU),

Topographic Platoon, Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Company, and Sensor Control

and Management Platoon (SCAMP)} at the RSTAB. Note, recent force structure

changes have placed the UAV Company within the Aviation structure. However,

Operational Control continues to reside with the MEF Commmander, exercised

through the staff cognizance of the MEF G2. UAV Company personnel will still

participate as part of the MEF-SRIG team. A UAV element will be fully

integrated into MEF RSTA planning and operations, and continue to man the

UAV downlink at the MEF SARC.(14)

G3 Air Officer. Many RSTA assets are either aerial platforms, or rely on air for

insertion, extraction, and targeting operations. The G3 Air Officer must be actively.

intimately involved in RSTA planning and implementation. As an example, he must

coordinate MAGTF aviation planning efforts to ensure: RSTA flights are scheduled

in a timely, coordinated fashion and appear on the ATO; air space restrictions are

deconflicted; requisite CEOI documentation--frequencies, communications shifts,

encryption guidance--is provided to RSTA crews/LNOs; air procedures are briefed to

RSTA pilots and crews; and aviation-peculiar support measures (such as fueling,

basing, and resupply issues) are coordinated fully. The G3 Air Officer's

participation on the Board embeds RSTA planning within the Air Tasking and

Operations cycles.

G3, Future Operations Officer. As a pivotal board player, the Future

Operations Officer forces RSTA planners to balance collection requirements for both

future and current operations. Future operations focus on possible course of

friendly/enemy action/reaction, thereby driving future RSTA collection planning. The

Future Operations Officer, working with the G2 Plans Officer, also coordinates

and/or deconflicts Operational Security (OPSEC) and Operational Deception

(OPDEC) operations with RSTA missions. His participation on the Board embeds

RSTA planning within the Future Operations cycle.

Deputy Force Fires Coordination Officer, G3. The Deputy Force Fires

Coordination Officer brings additional operational and targeting depth to the RSTAB.

During the meeting, the Force Fires Officer focuses on the scheduled RSTA

collection effort for close and deep operations. He acquaints himself with RSTA

assets that are on station throughout the day that could assist force fires planning and

reactive targeting. The establishment and deconfliction of Restricted Fire Areas,

Reconnaissance Operating Areas, and Protected Target Lists are other critical matters

that require Force Fires coordination and that will be briefed to the Board. The

participation of the FFC Officer on the RSTAB focuses members on the commander's

priority of targets, and provides RSTA situational awareness to MAGTF target

acquisition planning.

G3 Target Information Officer. This individual, in concert with the G2 Target

Intelligence Officer, brings depth to the targeting acquisition facets of RSTA, and

helps prioritize collection on target development, validation (pre-strike), and BDA.

His continuous coordination with the G2 TIO guarantees timely, accurate intelligence

will identity and satisfy fire support planning requirements. His participation on the

Board embeds the targeting cycle within RSTA planning.

Deputy G2 or G2 Operations Officer. Either the Deputy G2 or G2 Operations

Officer participates as the senior intelligence officer on the board, bringing situational

awareness of all G2 operations to each meeting.

G2 Plans Officer. The G2 Plans Officer coordinates with G3 Future Operations,

defining intelligence and collection requirements in support of future plans. This

officer also works closely with the G2 CMO, ensuring operations past 72 hours are

supported by RSTA collection operations.

G2 Collection Manager. The RSTAB is, after all, the proving ground for the

CMO's collection strategy. To streamline RSTAB coordination, and limit the length

of the daily RSTAB meeting, the CMO staff conducts continuous planning and

coordination with the staff (as well as the G2 branch). The centerpiece of the

RSTAB's daily agenda is review and coordination of the draft 72 hour RSTA

Collection Operations Message. Based on the Commander's daily guidance and

information requirements, this message assigns collection priorities and tasks for all

organic and attached RSTA assets; identifies specific collectibles per mission; assigns

exploitation/production responsibility; and details dissemination paths for collected

information and finished intelligence.(15) From this message, Board members derive

individual tasks, essential to mission accomplishment, they will coordinate. To

ensure this draft collections nrarching order reflects synchronized intelligence and

operations planning, the CMO must have continual situational awareness, and

thoroughly understand the Commander's intent and CIRs. The CMO ensures the

requirements of the MSCs and/or adjacent, attached units are tabled at the RSTAB,

and that the MEF collection plan considers MSC Priority Intelligence Requirements

(PIR) and collection gaps. The CMO identifies all gaps in the MEF RSTA collection

capability and forwards requirements up the chain of command. Additional RSTA

platforms, or the intelligence collected from a national asset that satisfies a MEF

requirement, may be requested. The CMO works with the G2 Operations and

Systems Officers to determine intelligence architecture requirements in support of

RSTA strategy; ensure interoperability between RSTA platforms and MEF systems;

and develop a dissemination plan to feed information RT or NRT to MSCs as

required, and finished intelligence to the MAGTF. In conjunction with the SARC

OIC and RSTA LNOs, the CMO maintains situational awareness of collection

platform availability and capability. The CMO embeds coflection planning within

the operations cycle.

G2 Target Intelligence Officer. With the G3 Target Information Officer, the G2

Target Intelligence Officer performs target analysis and maintains a fusion cell for all-

source BDA that includes integration of national-level collection/reporting. The G2

TIO helps determine what targeting products are required to support RSTA

operations. His participation on the RSTAB provides an emphasis on target

information collection planning.

The G2 Systems Officer. Without the coordination of the G2 Systems and G6

Operations Officers, RSTA planning can be squandered. These individuals examine

connectivity, interoperability, and compatibility issues associated with employment of

averse RSTA assets. They coordinate on such matters as the feasibility of providing

NRT feeds to an MSC or subordinate unit. They examine what communications path,

data link, or system the MAGTF requires to receive certain data, collection products,

and/or reports. Their participation on the RSTAB fosters continued awareness of

RSTA communications-intelligence requirements, and embeds C4I within the

operations cycles.

G6 Operations Officer. The G6 works closely with the G2 Systems Officer to

Ensure a robust, integrated, redundant Command, Control, Communications and

Computers Plan supports the RSTA collection cycle. The G6 and G2 ensure

appropriate coordination conducted during and after the meeting is reflected in the

Communications-Electronics Operating Instructions (CEOI) and other communications

planning; requisite band width, satellite channels, data links, secure LANs, etc. have

been identified in support of RSTA employment; and any potential show stoppers

have been flagged, with recommended alternatives or work-arounds tendered.

RSTA LNOs. The MEF CE requires a Liaison Officer for each attached or

supporting RSTA asset. The LNO identifies his platform's operational requirements

to MEF planners, and coordinates specific planning considerations (beddown sites,

refueling requirements, maintenance issues, mission planning criteria,

communications/intelligence architecture and processing requirements) with relavent

MEF staff. As a RSTAB member, the LNO briefs planners on the capabilities and

limitations of his platform to support a task.

MSC CMOs or LNOs. The MSCs submit their command requirements to the

G2 daily via their Collection Emphasis Message.(16) However, their presence at the

daily RSTAB meeting may clarify or refine their collection requirements and is to be

encouraged. Obviously, there will be times when the distance between headquarters

precludes their daily participation. Their participation on the Board embeds RSTA

planning with the intelligence and operations cycles of the MSCs.

National Intelligence Support Team (NIST). When a NIST augments a

MAGTF operation, a representative sits on the RSTAB. The NIST representative

observes the MAGTF RSTA collection planning process, understands the

Commander's focus of effort, and notes organic/attached collection potential. As the

G2 CMO identifies collection gaps, the NIST representative briefs the Board on the

availability and capability of national assets or collection/production efforts to support

MAGTF RSTA planning. He also acquaints the Board with the national collection

focus regarding the MAGTF operation, and indicates if other Service and theater

collection priorities compete with or could support MAGTF requirements. His

participation on the Board embeds situational awareness of the national collection

focus withing the MAGTF's RSTA planning process.

RSTAB: A Command and Control View

Organizing resources based on the task at hand is one of the functions of

command and control. The RSTAB is ideally suited to support organizational theory

(as defined in FMFRP 15-3) within the context of command and control. Likewise,

although not always considered as such, organization is an important tool of

command and control.(17) The RSTAB, as an "organization," becomes the

commander's tool for managing RSTA resources. The Board brings together the

specialized expertise of the MEF staff and LNOs to provide oversight and

coordination of RSTA missions while fulfilling Commander's guidance. Through the

RSTAB, the Commander establishes unity of command and unity of effort for RSTA

planning and operations. The Board has no authority in its own right; any delegated

authority to the Deputy G3 for day-to-day supervision and management comes from

the Commander. The Commander retains responsibility for RSTA management,

and is final arbitrator on the daily 72 hour RSTA Collection Operations Message.

CHAPTER IV

RSTAB PROCEDURES

A comprehensive schematic of RSTAG coordination and planning appears as

Figure 4 (foldout). This section elaborates on that planning cycle.

During operations, the RSTAB must meet daily to support RSTA coordination

and synchronization with all intelligence and operations cycles. The meeting should

be scheduled sometime after the MEF Targeting Board (MTB) completes its daily

planning, yet before the ATO cycle for the next 24-72 hours has progressed too far.

Generally, the MTB meets sometime in the morning. An hour or so thereafter

(allowing time for a break, coordination, and staff planning) would be the optimum

scheduled time for the daily RSTAB meeting. Note, in a joint environment, the

DARS meeting is scheduled soon after the JTB completes its meeting so that decisions

reached therein can be passed to the DARS for collection planning. Similarly, MTB

nominations for the next 24-72 hours must be incorporated in the RSTA collection

cycle--along with nominations for such activities as intelligence collection, I&W,

and/or deception operations.

The daily RSTAB meeting opens with an overview of RSTA results during the

past 24 hours. A G2 analyst provides a brief overview of the current enemy

situation; the G3 provides an overview of current and future operations. Updated

CCIR and PIR are briefed to focus planners on Commander's intent and to focus the

main collection effort. The G2 CMO briefs three RSTA planning cycles captured

within the draft 72 hour RSTA Collections Operations Message: RSTA operations

underway, those approved for 48 hours out, and those proposed for 72 hours out.

The CMO drafts the message prior to the meeting: this message serves as the stepping

off point for the daily agenda.

As the CMO briefs ongoing RSTA operations for the 24 hour period underway,

he notes any changes to the published message plan. Under the 72 hour planning

cycle, these RSTA operations were briefed to the board two days earlier and now,

fully coordinated and tasked, are in the execution phase. Next, the 48 hour RSTA

collection plan his briefed--a plan approved as the 72 hour plan by the RSTAB one day

earlier. Finally, the CMO presents the proposed RSTA plan for 72 hours out. This

one incorporates the latest Commander's intent, information requirements, future

operations, mission analysis, assumptions regarding potential enemy activity,

operational requirements-- such as OPDEC--MSC collection focus, and results from

previous collection.

RSTA Operations Under Way (24 hr). As the RSTA plan under execution is

briefed for the day, any RSTAB member who has reason to request a change may do

so. For example, the FFCC and MSC representatives request UAV's in direct

support of the GCE based on indications of heavy vehicular movement into the AOR

within 12 hours and the potential for enemy engagement. Or the G6 reports that

satellite access is unavailable for the next six-10 hours and that alternative

communications paths are being pursued for particular RSTA assets.

Two Day Plan (48 hr). After any adjustments to the 24 hour plan, the 48 hour

plan is discussed (the 72 hour plan approved the day prior). Each member working

to coordinate planning can indicate accomplishments, highlight problem areas

regarding his part in mission planning. For example, a supporting P3-C is scheduled

to fly a last-look, stand-off collection mission in support of a force reconnaissance

team insertion at twilight. A review of operations for the 48 hour plan ensures that

the P3-Cs are on the ATO, the weather is good, the insertion area/plan is the same;

and dissemination to the Reconnaissance Operations Center (ROC) has been obtained.

Additional RSTA requirements for the P3-C mission may be tabled.

Three Day Plan. Finally, the CMO presents the 72 hour collection strategy,

with a brief explanation of what factors drove the planning. At this stage, all RSTAB

players have input, any changes can be discussed, routes redirected, targets

reconsidered, insertion/extraction plans revisited, and risk vs gains considered for

each collection operation.

One of the key selling point of the RSTAB is that all the right planners and

operators are in one room at the same time, and coordinate such changes as ATO

schedules, and revised ROA and RFA. Cognizant staff members get their marching

orders directly, unequivocally, from the Commander, as passed by the RSTAB

Chairman, the Deputy G3. Once the meeting adjourns, Board members disperse for

further coordination: Force Fires and G3 Air make necessary adjustments to their

plans and notify requisite personnel/units of any changes; the G6 can adjust the

communications plan as required; and the SARC/Intelligence Battalion Commanding

Officer briefs collection units/issues orders based on the final decisions of the

RSTAB. The CMO makes necessary changes to the RSTA collections operations

messages before it goes to the Commander for final approval. Once approved, the

MAGTF knows that unity of Command and unity of effort are tied to the RSTA

planning and that coordination focused on sound resource management.

The purpose of the RSTAB meeting is not to conduct detailed, exhaustive mission

planning. Rather, members coordinate the broader issues such as examining the

validity and necessity of missions; or coordinating and/or deconflicting RSTA

operations with regard to OPSEC and OPDEC. Perhaps most importantly, the Board

provides the unity of effort for intelligence and operations cycles supported by RSTA

missions. As RSTA LNOs, SRIG representatives, and other Board members

coordinate finite mission planning, the focus of effort from the RSTAB meeting

permeates all layers of the MAGTF, and synchronization of operations and

intelligence is more readily realized.(18)

RSTAB in Non-Deployed Environment

The RSTAB's role is equally important during garrison planning. In a pre-

hostilities environment, Commander's guidance on OPLANS and CONPLANS

generates intelligence requirements and operational planning within the MAGTF.

The RSTAB's planning, and its analysis of operational and intelligence requirements,

Click here to view image

help define gaps in intelligence, and prioritize requirements to the CINC and

national level for satisfaction. Thus, the requisite agencies and collection resources

can be tasked to monitor, collect, and produce against validated MAGTF

requirements.

A Commander must ensure that prioritized intelligence requirements are validated

and tasked for collection/production in a timely fashion to the appropriate agency.

By tasking the RSTAB to develop Contingency Collection Problem Sets (CPS), the

Commander generates an off-the-shelf collection package, validated at the national

level, that can be "turned on" as required. These imagery target sets are keyed to

operational planning and deployment (The set also can be collected on in peacetime to

satisty more limited planning needs). As a crisis erupts, the CPS can be activated,

and full-fledged collection starts to run, based on prestated requirements. Thus,

before organic collection capability can be deployed, the national level resources

already are reacting to pre-registered requirements. The RSTAB, augmented with G4

and G5 planners, is the best conduit to develop standing MEF requirements that

reflect coordinated operational needs.

CHAPTER V

EMBEDDING RSTA COLLECTION PLANNING WITHIN

INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS CYCLES

The Commander must require that an RSTA and intelligence activities and

assets are applied in time, space, and purpose to support the operations plan.

This synchronization process occurs across the range of military operations to provide

timely, accurate intelligence keyed to achieve operational objectives. This

integration of intelligence and operations ensures the totality of effort against the

enemy's center of gravity and critical vulnerabilities.(19)

Chapter II reviewed how MEF's historically have conducted collection planning

and the pitfalls encountered. Now, availed of the RSTAB structure, the Marine

Corps has the opportunity to revisit the process. Under the new philosophy, RSTA

management is the Commander's responsibility; he provides the top-down planning

guidance and focus of effort for judicious management of the resources. He exercises

his authority through the framework of the RSTAB that in turn sets in action the

synchronization of intelligence and operations. This chapter focusses on the

Commander's responsibility and the process required to embed RSTA planning within

intelligence and operations cycles.

Command and Control

Technological improvements in mobility, range, lethality and information-

gathering continue to compress time and space, necessitating higher operating

tempos and creating a greater demand for information. Military forces move

more quickly over greater distances...engaging the enemy at greater ranges... The

consequence...is a fluid, rapidly changing military situation... The more quickly

the situation changes, the greater the need for continuously updated information

and the greater the strain on command and control.(20)

One of the three basic elements of command and control is information.(21) One

form of information is intelligence about the enemy: getting it, judging the accuracy

of it, processing it, and disseminating it to the MAGTF. Without information to

provide the basis for his knowledge of the situation, the Commander cannot make

sound decisions. Acquiring information and intelligence for his command is the

Commander's responsibility.(22)

There is no better example of the criticality of RSTA to command and control

that its role within the "OODA" Loop: the Commander's Observe, Orient, Decide,

Action Loop.

OODA LOOP In the observation phase, a multi-discipline, multisoucce RSTA

plan--based on IPB and coordinated to support all phases of an operation--ensures

the Commander's observations will be timely and comprehensive. This also reduces

the possibility of successful enemy deception operations.

After observing the situation, the Commander orients on it. In response, the

Board fuses RSTA collection planning with all intelligence and operations efforts to

provide the Commander analysis on the meaning and impact of observed enemy

activity.

Once he has oriented on the situation, the Commander decides on a course of

action based on his perception of collection efforts and intelligence analysis, and an

assessment of the friendly situation and operation plan. The RSTAB coordinates

missions that both support the friendly course of action and develop the enemy

situation. Their RSTA plan ensures survivable, reliable, suitable, interoperable assets

are synchronized to provide continuous, overlapping coverage on enemy activity of

vital interest to the Commander.

Having decided on a plan, the Commander's executes his course of action,

while RSTA operations monitor enemy reaction, and provide RT targeting acquisition

and I&W. As the Commander observes RSTA collection efforts, the OODA loop

cycle begins again.

The essence of the OODA Loop is the overarching importance of generating

tempo in command and control.(23) Embedding multisource, multidiscipline RSTA

collection planning within intelligence and operations cycles helps generate the tempo

a Commander needs.

How can the Commander use the RSTAB as a command and control facilitator?

One goal of effective command and control is recognizing enemy intent, capability,

and critical vulnerabilities. The Commander has the best chance of achieving this

goal through judicious management and tasking of all available RSTA resources.

Effective RSTA employment serves as a combat multiplier, optimizing friendly

strengths, exploiting enemy weaknesses, and countering enemy strengths.

Commander's direction of the RSTA collection process provides requisite vision "to

create vigorous and harmonious action among the various elements of the force."(24)

Focus of Effort. The Commander's responsibility for RSTA management

provides focus of effort to the MAGTF. Viewing his array of resources, the

Commander concentrates RSTA assets where they best support the mission at a given

time. Within Commander's guidance lies his image of the battlespace, his vision for

success. This direction guides the RSTAB's efforts to concentrate, prioritize, and

coordinate RSTA missions.

The RSTA Objective

Intelligence is the basis of operations. It underpins effective planning.

Assembling an accurate picture of the battlespace requires centralized direction,

simultaneous action at all levels of command, and timely distribution of information

throughout the command.

The primary objective of RSTA operations is to support military operations across

the operational continuum. RSTA operations are performed not only by forces with

primary RSTA missions, but other resources with either collateral missions or the

capability to perform such.(25) RSTA resources include units in contact with the

adversary, patrols, air defense elements, intelligence units, reconnaissance units, and

attached liaison officers. Whether planning for aerial reconnaissance, sea

surveillance, or ground reconnaissance, the availability and capabilities of RSTA

resources are critical to the success of military operations. Commanders must be

aware of each asset's characteristics and thoroughly weigh risk to platform against

value of information obtained.(26)

The RSTAB Contribution

Carefully coordinated RSTA missions provide the necessary information to

develop plans and operations. As the Commander's RSTA resources manager, the

Board ensures:

--Commander's guidance and intent are reflected in the RSTA plan;

--Unity of effort throughout the MAGTF in planning/executing RSTA missions;

--Maximum, responsible use of supporting, attached, and organic RSTA

capability;

--Risk vs gain factored into asset employment;

--Coordination with OPSEC/OPDEC/Electronic Attack (EA) planning;

--Synchronization with air, targeting, intelligence, and future operations cycles.

Planning and Employment. RSTA operations provide Commanders with the

current information necessary for planning operations, including contingencies.

When planning RSTA missions, the Board seeks the necessary information to assess

enemy strengths and activity, defensive and offensive capabilities, and other factors

affecting plans and operations. The same missions that provide this information can

deliver I&W of a threat or impending attack in sufficient time for an appropriate

response. Board members are involved in adaptive real-time planning for current

operations as well as initial planning.

Operational Support. RSTA operational-level support includes:

--Monitoring centers of gravity and enemy OOB against which the Commander

must concentrate his operations.

--Collecting information on enemy offensive and defensive system capabilities,

locations, and other data bases.

--Collecting information on the conduct of combat or support operations.(27)

Tactical Support. RSTA tactical support provides the detailed information

(terrain, enemy disposition, OOB, movement, offensive and defensive capabilities) a

maneuver commander needs to plan for employment of forces. This support includes

providing tactical forces with target detection and acquisition, and RT/NRT

intelligence on enemy activity and intent.(28)

RSTA--Embedded within Intelligence and Operations Planning

Modern intelligence collection systems can accumulate vast amounts of

information. To be useful, the information must be relevant, accurate, analyzed,

properly formatted, and disseminated in a timely manner to the appropriate user.(29)

This is only achieved through synchronizing the RSTA collection cycle with

intelligence and operations cycles.

The RSTA Collection Process. The RSTA collection process

comprises:

--Direction: Commander's Intent and Guidance

--RSTA Collection Planning

--Execution of Collection Operations

--Processing, Evaluating Information; Analysis, Production

--Dissemination

--Review and Revalidation of Results and Requirements

Direction. The RSTA collection cycle supports the Commander as he formulates

his estimate of the situation, a concept of operations, and the operation plan. During

the staff planning process, the Commander conveys his intent and information

requirements to the Board. Through IPB--the underpinning for collection and RSTA

operations--the G2 forms a basis for determining possible enemy courses of action,

intent, capabilities, and critical vulnerabilities. Working with the Board, the CMO

validates and prioritizes collection and intelligence requirements, and focuses

the RSTA collection effort in support of the Commander's objectives. Here, it is

absolutely crucial that the RSTAB understand the Commander's combat intelligence

requirements and his vision for success. For example, the G3 Board members

focus on how RSTA missions can best support friendly operations as well as develop

information on the enemy situation; the G2 CMO identifies organic RSTA

capabilities and gaps, accesses theater andIor national systems to cover shortfalls,

and to provide redundancy and verification; and the G6 insures a robust intelligence-

systems architecture can support receipt and delivery of RSTA information.(30)

Once hostilities begin, the commander continues to provide the direction and guidance

that drive requirements, focus prioritization, and determine allocation of scarce assets.

A key to successful direction and execution of RSTA operations is unity of effort.

The Commander establishes command relationships for all assigned forces, including

RSTA resources. SRIG intelligence assets normally are in general support of the

MAGTF. The commander may determine a particular asset is better used in direct

support of an MSC for a given mission, and instruct the RSTAB to effect the requisite

planning.

Subordinate commanders employ organic intelligence capabilities to support their

assigned missions. However, should the MEF Commander decide an MSC's organic

intelligence assets could also support another unit, he may elect to task one MSC to

provide intelligence support to another.(31)

Planning. RSTAB planning never stops, extending throughout the 72 hour

planning cycle. Synthesizing Commander's objectives and guidance, enemy threat,

friendly force capabilities, and system availability challenges the Board. Only

thorough analysis and effective coordination among all members ensures RSTA

mission support will achieve the Commander's end state. As intelligence

requirements are pitted against collection capabilities, factors such as risk to RSTA

assets, timeliness of response, availability and suitability of assets, impacts of terrain,

and sensor capabilities affect the Board's selection and employment of resources.

While everyone preaches about timely and accurate information, the Board must

consider a broader range of factors. Before ever planning a RSTA mission, the

RSTAB first coordinates the assets' deployment, and determines all requisite

operational support requirements. Survivability must be assessed for the entire RSTA

system--the platforms, sensors, communications and data links, ground stations,

processing facilities, personnel, operators, etc. Not only are many RSTA assets

vulnerable, they are also scarce; careful mission planning, and intelligent tasking are

the primary ways of ensuring their survivability.(32) The RSTAB also considers

other operational parameters of available RSTA assets--range, endurance, and their

collection, processing and dissemination capabilities.

When developing the RSTA collection plan, the Board will combine multisource,

multisensor assets to provide accurate, reliable data, and ensure overlapping coverage

and verification of information. System tasking must be based on an asset's capability

and suitability within the context of the overall plan. For example, several assets may

be able to collect against one target, but only one RSTA asset has the unique

capability to collect against a second target. Good planning ensures the unique

platform is allocated against the second target. Suitability also applies to the format

of processed intelligence. The format and content must be what the MSC

needs/requested for mission accomplishment. Of overarching importance is how the

information will be received, processed, integrated, and disseminated.(33)

The RSTAB's G6 and G2 planners consider the interoperability, reliability, and

robustness of sensors, data links, ADP, and C4I systems. Proper planning is crucial

to the responsiveness, survivability, and overall combat effectiveness of RSTA

systems.

Throughout the planning phase, RSTA strategy must be closely coordinated with

Future Operations. For example, RSTA activities and communications must be so

structured as to not reveal indications of the primary mission to the enemy (OPSEC).

Along with OPSEC considerations are Operational Deception (OPDEC) concerns; and

RSTA missions have great potential to support OPDEC planning. For example,

RSTA resources may identify and locate enemy targets ripe for OPDEC. RSTA

operations may monitor enemy activity or reaction to friendly deception. Finally,

RSTA missions may be part of the Commander's deception plan: RSTA activity in

the deception area may deceive the enemy as to actual friendly intent.(34)

If theater and national RSTA systems are required, the Commander must

remember these assets are controlled by the national intelligence community. The

results from a tasked national level collection effort is received at the MAGTF via

organic Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program (TENCAP) systems.

In the Marine Corps, IMINT and SIGINT TENCAP allow receipt of imagery, raw

data, and processed reports. Timeliness varies, depending on the intelligence

discipline and competing national priorities. Also, the security of these systems and