Reconnaissance,
Surveillance, And Target Acquisition Collection
Planning--Embedded
Within The MEF Intelligence And Operations Cycles
CSC
1995
SUBJECT
AREA - Intelligence
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title:
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition
Collection Planning--Embedded Witliin
the MEF
Intelligence and Operations Cycles
Authors:
Intelligence Doctrine Working Group
Chairman: Major J.C. Dereschuk, United
States Marine Corps
Members: Major R. H. Chase Major
J. A. Day
(USMC) Major D. D. Cline
Major J.G. O'Hagan
Thesis: Judicious employment of finite, high value
RSTA resources to support myriad
battlespace
activities demands top-down planning, unity of effort, and Commander's
synchronization
of the intelligence and operations cycles.
Background: The emerging body of Reconnaissance,
Surveillance, and Targeting
Acquisition
(RSTA) resources brings a powerfiil contribution to battlespace domination.
Diverse
RSTA operations occur simultaneously within the battlespace--keyed to support
a
range of users from decision makers to "shooters." In addition to collecting
information
that develops situational awareness, RSTA assets contribute to many battle
space
activities: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, Indications and
Warning,
situation
development, force protection, Battle Damage Assessment, targeting and
collection
queuing. Given this multi-dimensional capability, it is no longer desirable to
relegate
RSTA assets solely to the realm of intelligence collection management. The
command
and control of finite, high value RSTA resources is the Commander's
responsibility,
one demanding top-down planning and unity of effort throughout the
MAGTF
to achieve a synchronized intelligence-operations approach to RSTA
employment.
Recommendation: To oversee the coordination and tasking
of RSTA missions
supporting
battlespace domination, the Marine Corps must institutionalize a MEF-level
coordination
board--the Reconnaissance,
Surveillance, Target Acquisition Board
(RSTAB). Under the Commander's direction, the Board's
concerted efforts to plan,
coordinate,
and task RSTA resources will embed RSTA collection planning within the
intelligence-operations
cycles.
CONTENTS
LIST
OF FIGURES iii
Chapter Page
I. SITUATIONAL OVERVIEW: RECONNAISSANCE,
SURVEILLANCE, TARGET ACQUISITION (RSTA)
PLANNING WITHIN ThE MAGTF TODAY 1-8
II. THE EXPANDED CHARTER FOR RSTA
OPERATIONS 9-18
III.
A NEW DIRECTION FOR MEF RSTA COORDINATION 19-33
IV. RSTAB PROCEDURES 34-38
V. EMBEDDING RSTA COLLECTION PLANNING WITHIN
THE INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS
CYCLES 39-52
VI. CONCLUSIONS 53-56
Notes 57-59
Appendices
A.
DIVERT SCENARIO FOR A PRE-PLANNED
UAV MISSION
60-64
B.
THE INTELLIGENCE BATTALION WITHIN THE
NEW MEF SUPPORT GROUP 65-73
Bibliography 74-75
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure
1.
Intelligence Flow Within the MEF
(page 2)
2.
G2 Combat Intelligence Center (CIC)
(Page 5)
3.
Divert Scenario: UAV Detects Targets of
Opportunity Beyond the FSCL
(page 7)
4.
RSTA Collection Planning Cycle--Embedded
Within MAGTF Planning Cycles
(page 34)
ABSTRACT
The emerging body of Reconnaissance,
Surveillance, and Targeting Acquisition
(RSTA)
assets serves as a significant combat multiplier to a commander. In addition
to
collecting information that helps develop situational awareness, RSTA assets
contribute
to many battle space activities:
--Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlespace (IPB)
--Indications and Warning (I&W)
--Situation Development
--Force Protection
--Battle Damage Assessment (BDA)
--Targeting, Target Acquisition, and
Target Development
--Collection Queuing
--Battle Management
Given this multi-dimensional capability,
it is no longer desirable to relegate RSTA
assets
solely to the realm of intelligence collection management. The command and
control
of finite, high value RSTA resources is the Commander's responsibility, one
demanding
top-down planning and unity of effort throughout the MAGTF to achieve a
synchronized
intelligence-operations approach to RSTA employment.
Not surprisingly, synchronizing diverse
RSTA capabilities to support operations
involves
complex coordination and planning considerations. During this process, the
Commander
and his staff must ask themselves: Are these assets best employed in
general
support of the MAGTF, direct support of subordinate units, or both? Will
these
assets fall under G2 or G3 purview, or should a Commander-designated board
conduct
oversight and management? What relationship must be established, what
coordination
effected between organic and nonorganic RSTA assets and the
Surveillance
and Reconnaissance Center (SARC), the Combat Intelligence Center
(CIC),
and the Combat Operations Center (COC)? Who orchestrates the coordination
for
RSTA planning, and who provides the sanity check on how well the collection
strategy
supports operations? Given that diverse RSTA operations occur
simultaneously
within the battlespace--keyed to support a range of users from decision
makers
to "shooters"--what parameters must define the information flow, and
who
should
oversee the dissemination process to ensure usable intelligence reaches the
Major
Subordinate Commands?
RSTA assets provide a powerful
contribution to battlespace domination. The
finite
nature of RSTA platforms and the complexities inherent in planning and
executing
their operations flag the RSTA collection process for commander's
responsibility.
The management demands unity of effort, top-down planning, and
synchronization
of the RSTA cycle. This paper proposes the formation of a MEF CE
coordination
board--the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Target Acquisition Board
(RSTAB)--to
oversee the prioritization, validation, coordination, and tasking of RSTA
missions.
Key principal staff officers whose guidance is pivotal to synchronizing
intelligence
and operations are dual-hatted to form the RSTAB. Under the
commander's
direction, the Board's planning, coordination, and execution efforts
would
embed RSTA collection planning within the intelligence-operations cycles.
RECONNAISSANCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND TARGET
ACQUISITION
COLLECTION PLANNING--EMBEDDED WITHIN THE MEF
INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS CYCLES
CHAPTER 1
SITUATIONAL OVERVIEW: RECONNAISSANCE,
SURVEILLANCE,
TARGET
ACQUISITION (RSTA) PLANNING WITHIN THE MAGTF TODAY
The Dilemma
As the spectrum of battlefield systems
becomes more sophisticated and diverse,
intelligence
requirements to support battlefield operations grow astronomically--from
collecting
on and correlating battlefield activities to developing target packages; from
analyzing
Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) to relaying information in near-real-time
(NRT)
to a tactical commander.(1) General Clapper, Director of DIA, recently
commented
on these demands placed on intelligence:
As a result, intelligence simply must
situate itself within the operational cycle
rather than outside it...the intelligence
collection, production and dissemination
cycle must be compressed so that it fits
within the operational cycle for targeting
to support strike and restrike
operations.(2)
The MAGTF intelligence collection cycle
must be tailored to support the
operational
cycle, and the entire spectrum of MAGTF operations and fires. The
diverse
array of reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting acquisition (RSTA) sensors
and
systems either organic, attached, or available to support a MAGTF challenges
the
current
way we do business. The G2 and G3 must expand their partnership to
Maximize
the multidiscipline capability inherent in finite RSTA assets. Importantly,
synchronizing
intelligence and operations planning to optimize RSTA advantages must
stand
as one of the commander's priority concerns. The commander provides the
top-down
direction ensuring unity of effort in intelligence and operations cycles.
To understand the intricacies of RSTA
planning and collection management, and
how
crucial coordinated staff planning is to successful RSTA operations, consider
what
generally occurs at the MEF during a collection planning cycle. Historically,
the
intelligence collection management process has often failed to integrate fully
target
acquisition.
It must be noted that each MEF currently employs different procedures
for
collection planning and management, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center
(SARC)
employment, and development of a dissemination architecture. The
following
concept is based primarily on I MEF Command Element (CE) and
Surveillance
and Reconnaissance Intelligence Group (SRIG) operations. See
Figure
1.
MAGTF Intelligence Collection Management
Cycle
The commander has the ultimate
responsibility to determine, direct, and
coordinate
all intelligence collection through centralized, apportioned collection
management.
The commander determines his Critical Information Requirements
(CCIR)
for the operation, requirements that subsequently focus the collection process.
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Traditionally,
the MEF G2 Collection Management Officer (CMO) and/or, Collection
Requirements
Management Officer (CRMO) if assigned, work with the Commanding
Officer
of the SRIG and his collection units to develop the MEF collection plan. The
plan
is based on the MEF commander's intent and planning guidance, CCIRs, staff
Priority
Intelligence Requirements (PIR), and Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlespace
(IPB). Through IPB--the underpinning
for collection and RSTA
operations--the
G2 forms a basis for determining possible enemy courses of action,
intent,
capabilities, and critical vulnerabilities. Once the IPB process has begun, the
CMO
(and usually the SRIG S3) participate in the MEF staff planning sessions that
produce
the Event and Decision Support Templates--replete with Named Areas of
Interest
(NAI), Target Areas of Interest (TAI), and Decision Points (DP).
Armed with this collection focus, the CMO
meets with the G2's Human
Intelligence
(HUMINT) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) planners, the SRIG S3 and
representatives
from his collection units, and CMOs of major subordinate commands
(MSC)
to develop a comprehensive plan to cover NAIs, TAIs, CCIR, PIR, and
collection
capability gaps. Before deciding on the need for new collection efforts, or
prior
to validating requirements for fulfillment at higher echelons, the G2 CMO
confers
with the MEF All Source Fusion Center (MAFC), Imagery Interpretation Unit
(IIU),and
the Topographic Platoon to determine if off-the-shelf products are available
within
the MEF to satisfy commander, staff, and MSC requirements. The CMO also
must
be aware of the capabilities, limitations, and leadtime for tasking
intelligence
collection
assets and production agencies.
Once the gaps in organic intelligence
products and collection capability are
determined,
the CMO/CRMO registers, validates, and prioritizes collection,
exploitation,
and dissemination requirements to satisfy the intelligence concerns of the
MEF
and MSC commanders. Requisite theater and national assets and agencies will
be
tasked through operational channels to support the MAGTF with collection
emphasis,
coverage, and/or production.
As collection/production results flow into
the MEF, the CMO/CRMO monitors
the
overall satisfaction of command requirements and assesses the effectiveness of
the
collection
strategy. Different types of collection capabilities are employed so
information
from one source can be validated by other sources or assets. The
collection
strategy ensures redundancy so the loss or failure of one asset can be
compensated
for by another of similar capability. The CMO strives for near
continuous
surveillance on a target through synchronization of different and
complementary
national, theater, and organic collection assets. This coordinated
planning
also allows cross-cueing and tipoff among collectors, and provides a sensor-
to-shooter
capability for exploitation of targets of opportunity. (3) Generally, data
collected
are integrated within the MAFC for dissemination as all-source, finished
intelligence.
However, when mission-essential, information is transmitted NRT to the
tactical
level for immediate operational exploitation.
The MEF G3, or sometimes the Chief of
Staff, reviews the final G2 collection
strategy.
Once the plan has been approved, the SRIG S3 and representatives of
individual
SRIG units commence detailed mission planning with appropriate MEF
staff
sections (e.g., Force Reconnaissance Company confers with G3 Air for
insertions/extraction
as required, and Force Fires for establisliment of RAO and NFA;
Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Company consults with MEF and Air Combat
Element
(ACE) air space management and control authorities; Human Intelligence
Company
(HUMINT) teams work with the MEF HUMINT Branch (HIB) and the unit
they
are directly supporting). These planners keep the CMO apprised of major
developments,
but the CMO does not involve himself in the details unless there is
"finessing"
required with MEF staff elements. When coordination is complete, the
SRIG
units prepare their respective tabs for inclusion in Appendix 11 (the
Reconnaissance
and Surveillance Plan) of Annex B (Intelligence) to the OPLAN, and
present
them to the CMO for final approval.
SARC and G2 Operations. Once deployed, the
SRIG establishes and mans the
Surveillance
and Reconnaissance Center (SARC), located in close proximity to the
MEF
Combat Intelligence Center (CIC). See Figure (2), "The Combat Intelligence
Center."
Note, with the exception of the MEF G2 Administration section, the entire
CIC,
less the SARC, is situated within a field Special Compartmented Intelligence
Facility
(SCIF) during most I MEF operations. In general, most SARC personnel do
not
have the requisite Special Intelligence clearance for access within a SCIF.
Unfortunately,
this precludes the SARC and CIC elements from conducting
uninterrupted
fusion of genser (secret) and higher levels of classified material.
However,
the SARC is located either immediately outside the SCIF wire, within easy
G2
access, or located in the area between the Combat Operations Center (COC) and
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CIC
entry point (Figure 2). Both layouts have merit, although certainly the optimum
solution
would be a SARC manned with SCI-cleared individuals, fully integrated
within
the CIC, or alternatively, a CIC that in some manner allowed for co-existence
of
both SCI and genser-only cleared individuals.(4)
The SRIG S3 normally is the OIC of the
SARC. The SARC is under the staff
cognizance
of the G2/CMO, who directs collection planning and operations through
the
SARC OIC. While this situation generally provides for smooth operations, on
occasion,
deconflicting multi-mission capable assets becomes a mild tug-of-war
between
the G2, G3, and the Ground Combat Element (GCE). Final adjudication for
the
prioritization of missions for these scarce resource rests with the Commanding
General.
Information Flow
Information from the deployed collection
assets--Sensor Control and Management
Platoon
(SCAMP), Force Reconnaissance, UAVs--flows into the SARC via doctrinal
nets.
As an example, consider the UAV information flow. UAV voice reporting can
be
available to the ACE, GCE, and Force Service Support Group (FSSG) over
various
doctrinal nets, or a Remote Video Terminal (RVT) can be provided to the
unit
being directly supported by the UAV. Perishable targeting data collected by the
UAV
can be fed NRT to an MSC. Pre-planned UAV missions can be diverted to
support
unfolding battlespace events. If time does not permit consulting the SARC
OIC
and/or the G2 CMO for a divert mission, then divert authority can come
immediately
from the MEF COC Watch Officer--the direct representative of the
Commander--through
concurrence with G2 and G3 Watch Officers. Figure 3,
"Divert
of a Pre-planned UAV Mission," depicts a UAV executing three collateral
missions
while flying one preplanned orbit. Starting on a preplanned collection
mission,
the UAV detects targets of opportunity and reports back to the SARC. This
activates
a rapid targeting process involving the G2, G3, and Force Fires
Coordination
Center (FFCC). The UAV stays on station to provide immediate post
strike
BDA. This is an excellent example of intelligence and targeting synchronizing
operations
to maximize a RSTA asset. Appendix A elaborates on the events involved
in
a divert mission.
Ground sensor reports also feed into the
SARC, are "analyzed" by the SCAMP
platoon
element, and passed to the CIC/MAFC. Generally, since the SARC and CIC
are
only a door apart, a hard copy report is hand-carried to the CIC. The CMO, G2
operations
officer, the MEF All Source Fusion Center (MAFC) analysts, and/or the
target
intelligence officer quickly review the report in the context of the current
battlespace.
Based on its perishability and contents, a determination may be made to
pass
the information immediately to the COC and FFCC/Targeting section for target
consideration.
In some instances, the information may be further analyzed, integrated
with
other sources, and folded into the next published MEF Intelligence Summary
(INTSUM).
If the information is perishable and of vital concern to an MSC, the G2
Operations
Officer directs immediate dissemination of the "information" to the
subordinate
G2 via the most expeditious means: phone, radio net, Local Area
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Network
(LAN), Intelligence Analysis Station (IAS), Joint Deployable Intelligence
Support
System (JDISS), or courier.
Force Reconnaissance team reports either
enter the SARC directly through the
doctrinal
net or flow first (or simultaneously) to the adjacent Reconnaissance
Operations
Center (ROC). The Force Reconnaissance Element manning the SARC
collates
the data and passes it through the SARC to the CIC/MAFC. The same
process
detailed above for SCAMP reports occurs: the report can receive immediate
action/forwarding
to the G3/COC, be further analyzed with other sources, and/or can