Enhancing The Surveillance, Reconnaissance, And Intelligence Group (SRIG) CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Enhancing the Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group (SRIG) Author: Major John E. McKnight, United States Marine Corps Thesis: The Marine Corps needs to create doctrine for the Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group. Background: Headquarters, Marine Corps, instituted the SRIG concept to assist the Marine Expeditionary Force Commander in his decision making process. This concept led to assimilating military occupational specialties of surveillance, intelligence, reconnaissance and communications into a common unit that would support the MEF. The SRIG concept was not well understood or well received in the Fleet Marine Forces. Headquarters, Marine Corps, seemed incapable of and unwilling to provide any practical employment doctrine to institutionalize the SRIG concept. MEF commanders decided "who is going to manage the store and how." Without any guidance from Headquarters, Marine Corps, the three respective MEF commanders determined the purpose and organizational structure of their SRIG. This led to three separate employment philosophies. Recommendation: The Marine Corps needs to institutionalize employment doctrine for the SRIG. OUTLINE Thesis: The Marine Corps redesigned the organizational structure and procedures for gathering, processing, and transmitting information by establishing the Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group (SRIG). Its purpose was to optimize the information available to the commander for use in decision making, but little or no doctrinal guidance was provided. This created an enormous amount of uncertainty on "who is going to manage the store and how." I. Evolution of the SRIG A. Reorganization of C4I2 B. The philosophy behind reorganization C. Prior to the establishment of SRIG II. The Dilemma A. General Gray's "vision" B. SRIG's role in Desert Shield/Storm III. Issues to be resolved A. Doctrinal relationships and procedures B. Command and staff relationships C. Purpose of having a Communication Battalion in SRIG D. Rename the SRIG VI. Solutions A. Alternative B. FMFM 3-22 ENHANCING THE SRIG by Major John E. McKnight, United States Marine Corps The Fleet Marine Force Manual-1 (FMFM-1) contains the Marine Corps' philosophy on warfighting. An important point in that philosophy is that war is chaotic; it is conducted in a cloud of uncertainty. The concept of maneuver warfare is to create as much uncertainty as possible for the enemy and to take advantage of the opportunities uncertainty creates. The commander who penetrates the cloud of uncertainty holds an advantage in controlling the outcome of the battle. The timely, accurate, and secure flow of processed information and reports is the key to removing the uncertainty from the battlefield. The Marine Corps redesigned the organizational structure and procedures for gathering, processing, and transmitting information by establishing the Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group (SRIG). Its purpose was to optimize the information available to the commander for use in decision making, but little or no doctinal guidance was provided. This created an enormous amount of uncertainty on "ho is going to manage the store and how." Evolution of the SRIG In January 1988, the Marine Corps Force Restructure Study Group met to discuss and develop the future Marine Corps organization. The Group recommended that a Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group (SRIG) be formed in each Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). General Alfred M. Gray, then Commandant accepted this recommendation. He reorganized the Intelligence and Command, Control, Communications and Computers (C4) divisions into the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence and Interoperability (C4I2) department. The next step was to direct Fleet Marine Forces (FMF) to establish SRIGs within their respective MEFs. As a result, the 2nd SRIG was activated in 1988, 1st SRIG in 1989, and 3rd SRIG in 1990. The philosophy behind combining C4I2 is "to enable the commander to view interoperability as a total force systems requirement to enhance the commander's access to accurate information about the battlefield" in order to assist in the commander's decision making process. (7:81) Prior to the establishment of SRIG, the commander of a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) had multiple resources for gathering information and processing and disseminating intelligence. These assets were found scattered under different organizations within a MEF--Wing, Division, and/or Force Service Support Group (FSSG). During exercises, units reported directly to the MEF Command Element (MEF CE), General Staff sections from their respective parent unit for duty. These attachments were inadequately trained to support the requirements of the MEF. This in effect made the General Staff sections responsible for their operational training to support the MEF. The respective General Staff sections had neither the time nor manpower to adequately train these attachments. As a result, their state of readiness (equipment, personnel, and training) varied widely, depending on the abilities of the commanding officer. To enhance operational readiness, the Marine Corps initiated a move to combine these units' assets into one organization. The establishment of SRIG organized different military occupational fields in surveillance, reconnaissance, intelligence, counterintelligence, electronic warfare, direct action, air/naval gunfire liaison, communications, and automated data processing into one unit. Combining these military occupational specialities within one organization, freed the General Staff from the administrative, logistic, and direct tasking burdens associated with attachments, which allowed the staff to conduct coordination and planning. The Dilemma General Gray provided the Marine Corps with his vision of the SRIG i.e., that we should look at "tactical fusion as a subset of command, control, communications and intelligence and to develop the means to establish a family of standards for the full range of data and information used in C4I2 systems...to ensure that standards are developed, coordinated, deconflicted, maintained and enforced." (7:83) This vision has created much fiction within the three SRIGs. From the start, many personnel believed the concept could not work. Some regard the SRIG as General Gray's, pet project forced on the Marine Corps. Others see it as an attempt by the intelligence community to build an empire in order to create command billets for intelligence officers. Whatever one's reasons were for opposing General Gray's vision, friction was self-induced. The SRIG concept was not well understood or well received at its inception because the Marine Corps seemed incapable of and unwilling to provide a practical employment doctrine. When 1st SRIG, I MEF, deployed to Southwest Asia for Desert Shield, the then-Commanding Officer, Colonel Brock, had no Marine Corps-approved mission statement, table of organization, table of equipment, concept of employment, or concept of operations. Desert Shield/Storm was the first real operational test of the SRIG concept and philosophy. Both 1st SRIG and I MEF staffs had mixed feelings about the SRIG concept. Some Marines tried to make it work, but other Marines actively worked against the concept. After-action reports from 1st SRIG personnel indicate that they were unable to work out an agreeable doctrinal relationship with the I MEF staff. When it became clear that the 1st SRIG's view of its role and mission was inconsistent with that of the MEF's staff, the decision was made to return to business as usual. For all intents and purposes, 1st SRIG ceased to exist for I MEF. The Commanding Officer of 1st SRIG became a glorified headquarters commandant for I MEF. Issues to be resolved There are several issues that need to be resolved to enhance the SRIG concept. We need to discuss these issues in an open forum and decide "who is going to manage the store and how." Issue. #1. Without doctrine on "who is going to the manage the store and how" from Headquarters, Marine Corps, the various MEFs and SRIGs were left to develop their own doctrinal unique relationships and procedures. Discussion. This issue suggests that we have three different concepts pertaining to each SRIG within its respective MEF. Operational and administrative relationships between the MEF staff, SRIG commander, and component commanders of the SRIG are strained. The three MEFs view each SRIG differently creating an "us vs them" atmosphere. III MEF issued a Commanding General Policy Memorandum stating, "3rd SRIG is a separate command within the III MEF Command Element...neither part of the III MEF staff nor a major subordinate command...it is a command within the III MEF whose commanding officer reports operationally and administratively to the Commanding General...." (4 & 5) II MEF developed its own way of doing business without diluting the operational integrity of the warfighting MEF. (3) The relationship between the SRIGs and their respective MEFs are based on who had the stronger personality and the ear of the MEF commander. Furthermore, it is my view that we have three different concepts on how the MEF acts as a warfighter, which impacts directly on the SRIG. Without an equivalent to FM 100-15-which provides the warfighting doctrine for a Army Corps--we continue to philosophize on how to employ the SRIG to support a warfighting MEF that does not have a warfighting doctrine. Perhaps, this is why there is so much uncertainty with the SRIG concept: the MEF has not established doctrine or standardized its operating procedures. The Marine Corps tried to standardize the MEFs with a Tri-MEF Standing Operating Procedures, but it went by the wayside. We have already experienced the negative results of having three unique warfighting philosphies. As Marines transfer from one SRIG to another, they bring along the philosophy that worked at their last unit. What comes with this philosophy is a preconceived idea on how the SRIG ought to work within a particular MEF. It does not make any sense to have three different concepts on "managing the store." Recommendation. What is needed is a clear and concise doctrine on how the SRIG supports the warfighting MEF. The Marine Corps needs to establish doctrine on how a warfighting MEF operates in order for the SRIG to support it. Issue. #2. Command and staff relationships between the SRIG and MEF have been strained. The SRIG has no clear tasking on what command and staff responsibilities they have with the MEF General Staff. These responsibilites are scattered haphazardly between the staffs. Discussion. The Achilles heel of a unit is command and staff relationships. Staff officers have their way of doing staff work while commanding officers have their way of making decisions. Command and staff functions differ in perspective and approach to task accomplishment. Commanders orginally utilized their staffs to relieve them of administrative duties and the day-to-day burden of running a military unit. Today, staffs are functionally specialized in their area of expertise and provide advice--operational or administrative- -to the commander. "The commanding officer, SRIG exercises command of the SRIG through an executive staff." (10) However, it is uncertain whether the SRIG is an operational command and or adminstrative command given operational and/or administrative control: "The commander of the SRIG is responsible for providing trained and equipped task-organized detachments to MAGTFs or other designated commands to execute integrated...operations." The SRIG commander will assist the MEF General Staff in establishing, operating, maintaining, planning, and coordinating. "The SRIG commander is the principal advisor to the MEF commander in the employment of SRIG assets.... in conjunction with the principal staff officers in their areas of expertise." (2 & 8) The role of "advisor" is left open to interpretation. One interpretation of the SRIG commander is, "a manager of various assets which does not make him qualified to be an advisor on organic elements and their employment." (5) To help clarify what is meant by operational command (OPCOM), administrative command (ADCON), and operational control (OPCON) the following definitions are pertinent: "OPCOM is the authority to perform those functions of command involving the composition of subordinates forces, assignment of tasks, designation of objectives, and authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCOM includes directive authority for logistics and joint training....and it should be exercised through the commanders of assigned normal organizational units or through the commanders of subordinate forces established by the commander exercising OPCOM....OPCOM does not, of itself, include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organizational, and unit training." (9:3-9) OPCOM is a function of a Unified or Specified Commander in Chief (CINC). Therefore, the SRIG commander does not have OPCOM. ADCON includes matters of administration, discipline, internal organizational, and unit training. An administrative commander organizes, trains, equips, and provides a task-organized unit to support a commander. This type of commander retains ADCON by being responsible for the Marine's administration-unit diary, pay, allotments, etc.,. The SRIG commander is given ADCON of his unit. "OPCON is the authority to perform the functions of command over subordinate forces that involve organizing and tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations..." (1 & 9) The SRIG commander is not given any authority in handling operations. This authority is retained by the MEF commander who exercises his control through the General Staff during operations. The SRIG commander is given the authority (ADCON) and decision-making latitude required to make the SRIG function as a unit. Headquarters, Marine Corps, decided to provide the MEF with operational command over the SRIG. One alternative is to give operational control to the SRIG commander allowing him to function independently from the MEF General Staff. What was the SRIG concept behind General Gray's vision? Only General Gray really knows. General Gray stated that, "the SRI group/detachment is not a tactical maneuver unit to be fought as a regiment or a battalion but rather a source of specialized capabilities specifically structured to provide improved intelligence support to MAGTFs." (7:84) The SRIG commander was never designed to be given OPCON. The SRIG was designed to give the warfighting MEF an organization to coordinate the planning, training, and equipping as well as the employment of all MEF assets that conduct intelligence functions and ground electronic warfare across the full spectrum of the conflict. One may compare the SRIG concept to the functions of the Commandant of the Marine Corps--an administrative command--to organize, train, equip and provide forces to a CINC of a unified or specified command. If the SRIG commander is given operational control, would the SRIG work effectively in a functional organizational structure? Currently, SRIG operates in a functional organizational MEF structure. The SRIG is subordinate to the MEF. Normally, a functional organization structure tends to be more effective in smaller units that are specialized. The SRIG's table of organization includes 214 officers and 2389 enlisted, far from a small unit. Consolidating SRIG military occupational specialities--which formerly were scattered around the MEF--should enhance functioning of the MEF, but not operational control between the staffs. Recommendation. The SRIG commander should retain ADCON of his unit. What is needed is a clear, concise, and distinct command and staff relationship. Each staff needs to know when the other staff is in control of the various components of the SRIG. This is more difficult than it sounds. A General Staff officer with operational control of a unit does not have an appreciation for the commanding officer's roles and problems or the unit's overall mission. The staff officer is too narrowly focused on his own functional area, despite his best efforts to give cooperation and to do "what's best for the unit." A staff officer's inevitable tunnel vision imposes a burden on the SRIG in terms of resolving differences, enforcing joint cooperation, and opening lines of communication. To resolve this on-going command and staff problem, the SRIG commander should be given operational control of his unit to enhance SRIG's full potential to provide direct support to the MEF. A MEF commander is too busy fighting the war to control the SRIG through his General Staff. The General Staff's concerns should be providing the MEF commander with pertinent advice to assist the MEF commander in his decision-making. Issue. #3 What is the purpose of having a Communication Battalion in a SRIG? Discussion. There are many views on this subject, ranging from taking the Communications Battalion out of the SRIG and making a Communication Brigade to retaining the Communication Battalion in the SRIG. To understand why General Gray decided to incorporate the Communication Battalion in the SRIG, we must go back to the Joint Tactical Fusion Interoperability Steering Group (JTFI). The Marine Corps coordinates the JTFI which is chaired by the Joint Chiefs of Staff J-6 Directorate. "The Joint Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC) established the JTFI Steering Group (general officer level) based on the recommendation of a special study group commissioned to examine the problem of non-interoperable tactical fusion system." (7:83) This steering group looked at tactical fusion as a subset of command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) in order to develop a family of standards. The Marine Corps Steering Group and Force Restructure Study Group took the JTFI advice when they decided to establish the SRIG. Their intent was to ensure that our future C4I2 systems would focus on the collection, processing, and transmission that would foster sound tactical decisions which would enable the MEF commander to focus his combat power on the enemy's center of gravity. Recommendation. General Gray was correct to incorporate the Communication Battalion in the SRIG during 1988. However, with major cutbacks taking place, the Communication Battalion may eventually grow in the next few years. Serious discussions need to take place on the future of the Communication Battalion. Will we combine communication assets and personnel and task-organize them to support the MEF, to include its components (Division, Wing, and Force Service Support Group)? If so, why should a newly created Communication Brigade remain in the SRIG? Issue. #4 The name "Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence" is not valid. Discussion. This name is misleading in all aspects. Approximately 40% of the SRIG comprises of intelligence units. Communications Battalion accounts for approximately 33% of the entire organization. Normally, an intelligence officer will command the SRIG. However, nowhere is it authoritively stated that an intelligence officer will command the SRIG. The commander can have any military occupational speciality that is retained in the SRIG. Recommendation. The SRIG should be renamed so as to show the type of unit that it truly is--"C4I2 Group." Thinking out of the Box According to FMFM 3-22 (coordinating draft), the SRIG is here to stay. This FMFM attempts to describe SRIG's mission statement, tasks, purpose, command relationships and organization structure, and it specifies the duties of principal staff officers and the commanding officer. The manual is adequate covering the aforementioned topics and it elicited lots of input from the Fleet Marine Forces. New doctrine is coming that dissolves to a considerable extent the cloud of uncertainty that has plaqued the SRIG. It addresses the "who is going to manage the store and how" and should resolve the more contentious issues that I have covered in this paper. But, I would resolve the problem (lack of cooperation, understanding, and trust between the MEF's General Staff and the SRIG) by taking the SRIG out of its current command structure and making it the fifth element of a MEF, commanded by a General Officer. The Deputy Commander of the MEF would be the Commanding General, SRIG-one star. Creation of a fifth element would simplify the chain of command over SRIG. This approach offers a logical and workable means of centralizing responsibility while decentralizing authority in a large organization. This structure not only fits the mission but also makes the Deputy Commander responsible for both operational and administrative control of the SRIG. The biggest advantage is that it allows the SRIG to organize its command and control around its mission to better support the MEF. The MEF General Staff would be required to support the SRIG staff in its mission accomplishment. By creating a new command structure the fundamental problems can be resolved. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Armed Forces Staff College. Armed Forces Staff College Publication 1. 2. Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force letter, "Review of FMFM 3-22 Coordinating Draft," dated 1 Feb 91. 3. Commanding General, II Marine Expeditionary Force letter, "FMFM 3-22 Coordinating Draft Recommendations," dated 4 Jan 91. 4. Commanding General, III Marine Expeditionary Force letter, "Review of FMFM 3-22 Coordinating Draft," dated 22 Apr 91. 5. Commanding General, III Marine Expeditionary Force Commanding General Policy Memorandum, "III MEF policy letter on the 3D SRIG," dated 22 Feb 91. 6. Commanding General, 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade letter, "Coordinating Draft for FMFM 3-22," dated 17 Oct 91. 7. Gray, A. M. General, USMC, "Marines Streamline C3I, Merge Interoperability," Signal, Nov 1989: 81-84. 8. Headquarters, Marine Corps, "Table of Organization Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence Group Fleet Marine Force," dated 4 Nov 92. 9. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Unified Action Armed Forces JCS Publication 2. 10. United States Marine Corps. FMFM 3-22 Coordinating Draft Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence Group.
