DIA's 30-Year Commitment To Excellence: 1961 To 1991 CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA Intelligence EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: DIA's 30-Year Commitment to Excellence: 1961 to 1991 Author: Robin B. Boatman, Defense Intelligence Agency Thesis: This paper presents a historical overview of the Defense Intelligence Agency's service to our nation, including organizational changes within the Agency and major world events that have influenced, shaped, and consumed the Agency's attention Summary: The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) became operational In October 1961 to improve the Defense intelligence collection and production activities, and to reduce the considerable duplication which existed among the military service intelligence organizations. DIA's organization development suggests distinct themes. In the period of establishment and consolidation during the 1960s, the Agency sought to achieve internal stability and to define its role in the Department of Defense. The second period--of growth and maturity in the 1970s--was marked by the Agency's search for credibility within the national Intelligence Community. Third, the Agency looked ahead to the 1980s and became an integral participant in the U.S. intelligence establishment. The 1990s have brought Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, and significant changes in the world DIA studies to include nations dissolving, boundaries changing, and governments collapsing. Changes will be made in the Agency to adjust to the changing world, and new challenges present themselves for the years ahead. DIA'S 30-YEAR COMMITMENT TO EXCELLENCE: 1961 TO 1991 OUTLINE Thesis Statement: This paper presents a historical overview of the Defense Intelligence Agency's service to our nation, including organizational changes within the Agency and major world events that have influenced, shaped, and consumed the Agency's attention. I. The Intelligence Community Prior to DIA A Interagency Task Force Study Results 1. Streamline the Military Intelligence System 2. A Need for a Unified Military Intelligence Agency B. Planned Formation of DIA and the Services' Reactions to It II. The Agency's Beginnings, 1961-69 A. Setup of DIA B. Important Events/Functions Established During this Period Ill. DIA Matures and its Reputation Grows, 1970-79 A. Reorganization B. Agency Concerns/Analytical Efforts IV. The Agency Comes of Age, 1980-89 A. Focus Turns to Intelligence Needs of Field Commanders B. Influencing World Events V. Highlights, 1990-91 A. Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM B. Other DIA Concerns/Changes VI. Looking to the Future A. Inevitable Major Changes Due to World Events B. Reorganization within the Intelligence Community C. New Challenges to Meet DIA'S 30-YEAR COMMITMENT TO EXCELLENCE: 1961 TO 1991 The effort to coordinate military intelligence began 30 years ago with the creation of the multi-service Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). 1/ DIA was not intended to be a merger of the intelligence branches of the armed services, but primarily an attempt to achieve maximum coordination and efficiency in the intelligence processes of the three services. Thus, in contrast to the U.S. custom in the past of letting the intelligence function die when the war was over, intelligence has been allowed to grow to meet the ever-widening and more complex responsibilities of time. 2/ Recently, DIA celebrated its 30th anniversary. This paper presents a historical overview of the Defense Intelligence Agency's service to our nation, including organizational changes within the agency and major world events that have influenced, shaped, and consumed the Agency's attention. The Intelligence Community Prior to DIA During the 1950s, the existence of separate military agencies was a major barrier to producing coherent and agreed-upon military estimates. The Intelligence Advisory Committee had become an inter-service debating forum, with representatives from the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, plus the three services, all pushing distinct estimates. Overlapping collection programs and incoherence in estimates created pressures for reform. In 1960, therefore, a study was undertaken by a special inter-agency task force, operating under the Director of Central Intelligence, with the Central Intelligence Agency's Inspector General, Lyman Kirkpatrick, as chairman. The task force reported in December 1960: In line with the centralizing trend that had begun with the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, and which was to be accelerated during the Kennedy Administration, the report made many recommendations directed toward streamlining the military intelligence system in order to modernize it. Thomas Gates, Eisenhower's last Secretary of Defense, urged these recommendations be acted upon by his successor, Robert McNamara. However, the incoming Administration needed little persuasion; both Kennedy and McNamara were soon dismayed by the range of differing estimates that faced them. Therefore, acting along the lines set out in the 1960 report, McNamara formed the Defense Intelligence Agency with a startup date of October 1961. 3/ The Agency's beginnings were meager. On its first day of operation, DIA consisted of less than 25 people borrowed from the military services, and it was located in about 2,000 square feet of borrowed space in the Pentagon. 4/ The services had always opposed a unified military intelligence agency on the grounds that they each had particular needs that could not be adequately served by a centralized system. The Army was totally against the new agency, as was the Navy, although less vehemently. The Air Force, still a young service with fewer traditions to protect, saw in DIA an opportunity to push its own perspectives, and, in fact, landed many of the Agency's top management jobs. On the civilian side, at both the CIA and the State Department there was some ambivalence over the creation of DIA; however, in general, the trend its creation represented was favored. The multiplicity of military estimates, and the open competition between them, had made life difficult for non-military agencies. Yet, the institutional strength of a unified military intelligence agency posed the threat of a strong challenge to the civilian agencies. 5/ Indeed, the CIA and the DIA are considered by many, even today, to be rivals and competitors. Thus, in summary, the formation of DIA, like the earlier creation of the CIA itself, was the result of studied effort to give intelligence its proper stature in our nation's security structure. 6/ The Agency's Beginnings, 1961-69 A transfer of intelligence functions and resources from the services was completed on a time-phased basis to avoid degrading the effectiveness of defense intelligence during the transition. It took nearly three years for DIA to become fully functional in all assigned areas. Specifically, DIA was assigned the mission of collecting, processing, evaluating, analyzing, integrating, producing, and disseminating military intelligence for the Department of Defense. Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll, formerly Inspector General of the Air Force, was named Director, and as President George Bush recently wrote, "Since its earliest days under the direction of Lieutenant General Joe Carroll, DIA has quietly built a reputation for excellence by providing timely, accurate intelligence of the highest quality." 7/ But, this reputation certainly wasn't built overnight, and the following descriptions of events occurring in the fledgling Agency's early years hopefully will make that clear. Deane J. Allen, DIA's current historian, pointed out that the Agency's history falls very neatly, almost unbelievably so, into neat segments: 1961-69, DIA's Beginnings; 1970-79, The Agency Matures and its Reputation Grows; and 1980--89, DIA Comes of Age. 8/ Of course, during 1990-91, DIA efforts were concentrated on Operations Desert Shield and Storm, and future directions for the Agency will mean more change. The Defense Intelligence Agency's first major intelligence test came in October 1962 when the Soviet missiles were detected in Cuba and the prospect of nuclear war brought fear to Americans. The Agency would gain its first national recognition the following February, when analyst, John Hughes, briefed Americans on television concerning the missile crisis. Early organizational milestones in 1962 included the following events. In November 1962, the Defense Intelligence School--later to become the Defense Intelligence College--was chartered, and later formally activated in January 1963. The College continues to thrive in 1992. Additionally, the year of 1962 brought about DIA's Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy function being incorporated into a major directorate. Ten years later, this directorate was established as a separate organization, that is, the Defense Mapping Agency. 9/ On January 1, 1963, DIA's Production Center was activated, and that event, along with the merging of several service production elements meant more needed space. 10/ This need was met by occupying the "A" and "B" Building facilities at Arlington Hall Station, Virginia. The DIA Production Center integrated the military intelligence production activities of the services, which included basic intelligence production entities such as reference files, libraries, and automated data processing capabilities. Also in this year, on February 19, the Automated Data Processing Center was established. Next, and of great importance, DIA assumed the staff support functions of the J-2, Joint Staff, on 1 July, following the disestablishment of the J-2. 11/ All of the above were organizational milestones in DIA's evolutionary development process. High lights of 1964 included starting the Intelligence Career Development Program on February 1, establishing the Dissemination Center on March 31, and forming the Scientific and Intelligence Directorate on April 30. DIA analysts focused their attention on the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the Chinese detonation of an atomic bomb, increasing unrest among African nations, and fighting in Malaysia and Cyprus. Moving on to 1965, DIA assumed responsibility on July 1 for the Defense Attache System (DAS). A DOD directive assigned ". . . the DAS as part of DIA and it would consist of all military personnel accredited as attaches or assistant attaches to foreign government as well as other DOD personnel assigned to attached posts." The Defense Attache System was a logical outgrowth of the centralization of the military intelligence function in DIA. However, the services initially objected to giving up control of the attaches, primarily because protocol was a major function of the attaches and allegedly would be lost when DIA assumed this responsibility. The Agency's analytical efforts during 1965 were concentrated on the following: the start of bombing in North Vietnam by the United States, China's launching of its cultural revolution, India and Pakistan's war over Kashmir, and declarations of independence by Rhodesia and Malaysia. 12/ In 1966, DIA's first Agency-wide reorganization occurred in November. It was undertaken in order to streamline DIA and improve the reaction time of military intelligence production elements. An overwhelming amount of requirements, particularly those resulting from U.S. involvement in Vietnam, brought about this reevaluation of DIA's internal managerial relationships. The war in Vietnam also led to increased defense intelligence involvement in prisoners of war and missing in action (POW/MIA) in Southeast Asia. Prior to 1966, DIA had been assigned only limited responsibility for POW/MIA analysis, but its role expanded in mid-year when the Agency assumed chairmanship of the Interagency POW Intelligence Ad Hoc Committee. DIA would later centralize its POW/MIA activities in a special office. Analysts' attention was divided between U.S operations in Vietnam and other crises around the world. On the one hand, there were Operations CEDAR FALLS and JUNCTION CITY in Southeast Asia, plus the stand at Khe Sanh, while on the other hand, there was the Six-Day War between Egypt and Israel as well as continuing troubles in Africa, particularly Nigeria. Organizationally, the JCS delineated counterintelligence responsibilities between DIA and the Unified and Specified Commands. In 1968, intelligence requirements reached an all-time high as a result of the Tet Offensive in Vietnam, North Korea's seizure of the PUEBLO, and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Resource cutbacks threatened the Agency, and the President's Blue Ribbon Defense Panel proposed structural and managerial changes in DIA to deal with a situation in which the Agency had "too many jobs and too many masters." Therefore, in 1969, General Donald V. Bennett (USA) began to realign the organization. The rise of Ostpolitik in Germany and the Palestine Liberation Organization in the Mideast, U.S. space efforts that culminated in a moon landing, and growing arms control concerns shifted DIA attention somewhat from Vietnam.13/ DIA Matures and its Reputation Grows, 1970-79 DIA's second major reorganization took place in July 1970. The Agency's focus shifted to establishing itself as a credible producer of national intelligence. Initially, this proved difficult because sweeping manpower decrements had reduced Agency manpower by 31 percent from 1968 to 1975, causing mission reductions and organizational restructuring. 14/ In the post-Watergate controversy surrounding American intelligence activities in the mid-1970's, DIA focused nonetheless on providing quality products to national decision makers. The Agency's reputation grew as its products were increasingly perceived throughout the Government as valuable to the decisionmaking process. Contributing to this reputation, in 1970, there was a major innovation with the formation of a Directorate of Estimates within DIA. This was the brain-child of General Daniel Graham. The new Directorate for Estimates (DE) was headed by Graham who had stressed to General Bennett DE's potential worth when Bennett became DIA's director in 1970. The Directorate was set up with about 50 analysts, mainly taken from DIA but with some from the CIA, and a military:civilian ratio of about 2:1. In order to remove it from the daily pressures of Pentagon life it was located in Rossyln, Virginia. Graham encouraged independent and long-range thinking. The consensus would appear to be that DE made a definite improvement in the quality of DIA estimates. 15/ Time was also spent in 1970 on the monitoring of such issues as the riots in Gdansk, Poland, civil war in Jordan and Nigeria, and the U.S. incursion into Cambodia. In 1971, a position for an Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) was established "to supervise Defense intelligence programs. . . and to provide the principal point for management and policy coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence, CIA, and other intelligence officials outside the DOD." In addition, the year saw President Nixon reorganizing the Intelligence Community in general. During 1971, DIA analysts tracked issues such as arms control support, Idi Amin's takeover in Uganda, unrest in Pakistan, the formation of Bangladesh, and fighting in Laos and Cambodia, as well as in Vietnam. 16/ VADM Vincent P. de Poix became DIA's Director in 1972. During this year, the Agency's analysts concentrated on Lebanon, President Nixon's visit to China, the formation of Sri Lanka, Salvador Allende's regime in Chile, and the POWs held in Southeast Asia. In addition, the General Counsel function was added to the Agency. Then in 1973, peace-oriented efforts--such as detente, arms control agreements, and the Peace of Paris (Vietnam)--captured as much DIA production emphasis as Allende's overthrow in Chile, the Yom Kippur War, global energy concerns (gasoline lines), and troubles throughout Africa. Next, in October of 1974, a comprehensive overhaul of DIA's production function, organization, and management was begun. DIA's new Director, LTG Daniel O. Graham (USA), was faced with the need for intelligence on coups in Ethiopia and Portugal and independence movements in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. In 1975, intense congressional review created turbulence in the national Intelligence Community. The Murphy and Rockefeller Commissions investigated charges of intelligence abuse that ultimately led to an Executive Order modifying the overall functioning of the Intelligence Community. 17/ The Vietnam War produced many refugees and heightened concern for American POWs. The Defense Intelligence Agency coordinated the collection of information pertaining to POWs and MIAs. Between 1975 and late 1980, more than 900 reports were received--largely from Indochinese refugees--of which about 25 percent were firsthand sightings. Each one was investigated separately; none supplied conclusive evidence. 18/ In 1976, the issuing of Executive Order 11905 in February prompted the third major reorganization of the Agency in July. In the first charter change since 1964, DOD Directive 5105.21 was revised in December to recognize DIA as the primary military intelligence authority in the production of national-level products. Organizationally, DOD sought to centralize its activities to cope with pressure to reduce resources. Thus, a Defense Intelligence board was established and the President also set up a National Foreign Intelligence Board. DIA strengthened intelligence support to consumers in OSD, JCS, and the U & S Commands. Lt Gen Eugene F. Tighe, Jr. (USAF) served as acting Director until the former Defense Attache to the Soviet Union, LTG Samuel V. Wilson (USA), assumed the directorship in mid-year. Analytical efforts centered on the death of Mao Tse-Tung, aircraft hijackings, unrest in South Africa, and continuing Mideast dissension. 19/ In 1977, Lt General Tighe became DIA Director. Tighe (pronounced "tie") had a disarming, intense smile that he often held long after the laughter had passed. 20/ To this day, I have heard people in the Agency speak of him with fond and respectful remembrance. 21/ Tighe's philosophy was simple: the more you know, the less chance of war. The task was to get intelligence that made it possible for the United States to act peaceably. He believed that the DIA was the chief line of intelligence defense, and that the Agency's message had to be simple: the Arabs are going to attack or not attack; the Russians are coming or not coming; or the Chinese, or whoever. 22/ Also, in 1977, the Director of DIA was designated program manager for the General Defense Intelligence Program. The Agency concerns centered in 1977 on terrorism, technology transfer, and internal automation and technology; in 1978, intelligence production focused on Lebanon, China, South Africa, and still on terrorism. 23/ During 1979, an internal DIA reorganization established five major directorates: production, operations, resources, external affairs, and J-2 support. DIA sought to improve the flow of intelligence to the Secretary of Defense and other principal consumers. However, the loss of intelligence resources throughout the 1970's limited the Intelligence Community's ability to collect and produce timely intelligence and ultimately contributed to intelligence shortcomings in Iran, Afghanistan, and other strategic areas. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the overthrow of the Iranian monarchy, and the taking of American hostages in the American embassy in Teheran began a long period of DIA work in these areas. Furthermore, the Vietnamese takeover in Phnom Penh, the China-Vietnam border war, the overthrow of Amin in Uganda, the North-South Yemen dispute, troubles in Pakistan, Libya-Egypt border clashes, the Sandinista takeover in Nicarauga, and the Soviet movement of combat troops to Cuba during the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty II all served to increase intelligence requirements levied on DIA. 24/ The Agency Comes of Age, 1980-89 DIA came of age in the 1980s by focusing on the intelligence needs of field commanders as well as national-level decisionmakers. DIA provided intelligence support to the newly established Rapid Deployment Force during Operation BRIGHT STAR, while analysts were preoccupied with Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Iraq's attempts to seize Iranian oil fields and the resulting war, the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, and civiI war in El Salvador. In addition, several events signaled DIA's maturation as an integral part of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Publication of the first "Soviet Military Power" was greeted with wide acclaim, and the long-awaited groundbreaking for the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) in April was a tremendous morale boost for DIA employees. Budget increases were voted for DOD to support "readiness, sustainability, and modernization." LTG James A. Williams (USA) took over as Director and focused on enhancing support to tactical and theater commanders, improving capabilities to meet major wartime intelligence requirements, and improving indications and warning. 25/ In 1981, important world events included the following scenes: In Latin America, the Contras sought to wrest power from the Communist Sandinistas in Nicaragua, while leftists in El Salvador battled government forces, and Honduras and Nicaragua clashed at their border. Solidarity's birth and martial law in Poland brought Soviet warnings to the West to stay out of Poland. Events in the Middle East occupied DIA's attention including the Iranian hostage release, the U.S. downing of two Iranian jets over the Gulf of Sidra, two Iranian hijackings, and Iranian air raids on Kuwait. 26/ Counted among the DIA highlights of 1982 was the national television briefing provided by John Hughes of DIA and ADM Bobby Inman, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, on deteriorating events in Nicaragua, as DIA analysts provided extensive support to the U.S. Southern Command. Other analysis focused on the Falkland Island War. Then in 1983, 6,000 U.S. troops were deployed to Grenada during Operation URGENT FURY. DIA's task force responded to numerous formal taskings for briefings, papers, or information, and distributed a wide variety of Intelligence Summaries to assist field commanders during the operation. The planning process for URGENT FURY was also greatly enhanced by several intelligence products that had been prepared as early as 1979. The CINCLANT and others had high praise for DIA's support and services during this time. 27/ DIA's move into the DIAC on Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, DC, in 1984, consolidated major Agency functions under one roof. The building was dedicated on May 23, 1984. At the same time, the concept of intelligence as a "force multiplier in crises" became a predominant theme in planning as DIA began structuring an all-source integrated data base to support the U & S Commands in assessing the threat as it existed in the field. Analytical emphasis during 1984 was on India and Lebanon (the embassy bombing in Beirut). 28/ During 1985, a significantly larger number of hijackings--notably, of a TW airliner by radical Shiites and the ACHILLE LAURO cruise ship by the PLO. 29/ Numerous bombings, kidnappings, murders, and other acts of terrorism led to characterizing 1985 as the "Year of the Terrorist." In addition, DIA supported intelligence requirements stemming from the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Geneva and communist efforts to overthrow the Aquino Government in the Philippines. The year 1985 was also marked by a new Director, Lt Gen Leonard H. Perroots (USAF).30/ The Agency, in 1986, adopted the motto "Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation" during its 25th anniversary. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger presented DIA with the Joint Meritorious Unit Award for intelligence support during the TWA and ACHILLE LAURO hijackings and the Philippine crisis situation. DIA was also designated as a "Combat Support Agency." This was a significant result of the Goldwater- Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. Moreover, the Agency began preparing joint intelligence doctrine to enhance cooperation between DIA and the U & S Commands. In 1987, the DIA Persian Gulf working group tracked on a 24-hour basis all developments in the region and provided CENTCOM with an assortment of intelligence products. A real enhancement for DIA in this year was the development of the Operational Intelligence Crisis Center (OICC) which allows DIA to respond to crisis situations. The OICC was designed to muster production resources rapidly, "surge" on a problem, and then convert analysis to operationally relevant products. DIA also established at around this time a Command Support and Plans element to more actively involve the U.S. Commands in the defense intelligence planning, programming, and budgeting process. DIA played a major role in support of INF negotiations. To relieve overcrowding in the DIAC, in 1988, the Agency leased a building a 3100 Clarendon Avenue, Arlington, VA. 31/ Even at present, some of DIA is at the Clarendon building, Including the personnel office for the Agency. In terms of analysis, during 1988, the Agency focused on the shifting national security environment and other key issues including changes within the Soviet Union, counternarcotics, warfighting capabilities and sustainability, and low-intensity conflict (LIC). DIA took steps to improve the DOD-wide automated data bases and to apply additional resources monitoring terrorist groups, illegal arms shipments, and narcotics trafficking. Arms control monitoring also resulted in increased demand for intelligence support from DIA. Other issues of importance during 1988 included terrorist threats against the Seoul Olympics, the Palestinian intifada and unrest in Libya, Chad, Somalia, Ethiopia, Burma, Pakistan, and the Philippines. Analysts also prepared extensive support packages regarding Panama, Nicaragua, Honduras, Chile, Peru, Haiti, El Salvador, and Mexico. LTG Harry E. Soyster (USA) became the new Director of DIA. Construction was completed of a Patriot's Memorial for those DIA employees killed in the line of duty and was inscribed with ... "A Grateful Nation Recognizes Those Who Have Made the Supreme Sacrifice While Protecting Our Freedom." 32/ It is located in the middle of the lobby as you enter the DIAC. Moving to 1989, DIA played a major role in Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama, while the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan brought to a close a significant collection, analytical, production, and intelligence support effort that spanned nearly 12 years. Weapons acquisition issues became a high priority throughout the Intelligence Community. Also, analysts played a critical role in monitoring events surrounding the downing of two Libyan jets, and were also heavily involved in providing threat data on Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and other "hot spots" throughout the Middle East and Africa. A new publication, "Prospects for Change" in Eurasia, provided analysis of changes in the USSR, Eastern Europe, and to a lesser degree, Asia, and weighed the impact of these events on the rest of the world. New additions included a combined intelligence operations facility, the Crisis Management Room, designed and built adjacent to the NMIC Alert Center, and a Counternarcotics Research Center and a Joint Tactical Intelligence Center, formed to better manage DIA support to the counternarcotics and Latin American issues. 33/ DIA Highlights, 1990-91 Upon Iraq's 2 August invasion of Kuwalt, DIA immediately launched an extensive, 24-hour intelligence effort that resulted in perhaps one of the finest examples of intelligence support to operational forces in modern times. All phases of the Agency's workforce and more than 2,000 people contributed to Operation DESERT SHIELD. In conjunction with this effort, a Joint Intelligence Center was established in order to integrate intelligence produced by all sectors of the Intelligence Community. In addition, the fall of the Communist Party in East European countries, the reunification of Germany, and the ongoing economic reforms in the region continued to require intelligence support from DIA. The coup in Liberia and ensuing civil war also occupied considerable planning time. Highlighting the support given by DIA in 1991 to Operation DESERT STORM was the around-the- clock intelligence monitoring, the deployment to the theater of nearly 100 personnel, and daily tailored intelligence products dispatched to coalition forces. As a result, no combat commander in history has ever had as full and complete a view of his enemy as did U.S. and coalition field commanders during DESERT STORM. And, for DIA's achievements during the crisis and conflict, the Agency received its second Joint Meritorious Unit Award from the Secretary of Defense. The award was presented in an outdoor ceremony in front of the DIAC by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen Colin L. Powell, on June 26, 1991. In addition, during 1991, the position of Deputy Director was civilianized, and, accordingly, Mr. Dennis M. Nagy, became the first civilian Deputy Director of the Agency. In October 1991, DIA celebrated its 30th anniversary, and, in the tradition of proud service, its workers now enter a fourth decade of "excellence in defense of the Nation." 34/ Looking to the Future For the people who work at DIA, the past several months have brought the chill tidings of changes. The world that they have studied exists no longer. With nations dissolving, boundaries changing, and governments collapsing, their jobs and the Agency's mission are not what they were just two or three years ago. The question for DIA is: What next? The answer is more change, as geopolitical earthquakes are followed by reorganizations of the U.S. intelligence effort. Robert Gates, the new Director of Central Intelligence, recently said, "The old verities that guided this country's national security policy for 45 years.... have disappeared in an historical instant." Furthermore, Gates added,". . the very idea of change, the idea that for years to come, change and uncertainty will dominate the international life and the not-even-thought-about will be commonplace." 35/ Congress is exerting pressure to revamp. In February 1992, Dave McCurdy and David Boren, chairmen of the intelligence committees in the House and Senate, respectively, introduced similar bills to streamline and consolidate intelligence operations. Both bills would create an "intelligence czar" who would oversee three divisions: collections of intelligence, analysis, and clandestine operations. However, absent such sweeping legislation, Gates could himself use the current upheaval as an opportunity to assert greater control over all the intelligence agencies, including, of course, DIA. Such a move would give real meaning to the title of Director of Central Intelligence, but would be difficult to achieve given the longstanding preeminence of the Defense Department in military intelligence. Still, Gates is certainly acting as if he wants to assert authority and move rapidly to reorient intelligence activities. In this direction, he has established task forces to examine subjects including preventing proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons and improving national intelligence estimates. President Bush has said, "The intelligence community today is being asked to cope with issues ranging from traditional Soviet military forces to the environment, from economic competitiveness to AIDS." In the aggregate, intelligence agencies were devoting about half their resources to understanding the Soviet Union. And in the immediate future, they must shift their focus, Gates voiced. Furthermore, he complained, they are too obsessed with "long-standing structural arrangements, old habits and vested bureaucratic interests" in the once-mighty Soviet military threat. Already, the disappearance of the Soviet conventional military threat has led to a reduction of analytical resources focused on the Soviet Army. At DIA, the number of Soviet analysts has been cut back by a much as 30 percent, and a new Office of Global Analysis has been set up "to analyze the whole range of transnational issues that don't fit neatly into regional analysis," said the newly appointed Director of DIA, Air Force Lt Gen James Clapper, at a recent 1992 conference. 36/ It is clear then that the future for DIA undoubtedly means change. . . but reflecting over the last 30 years, change, growth, and meeting new challenges is what DIA is really all about. Therefore, a quote from Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney in a congratulatory letter to DIA on its 30th anniversary seems the perfect summary of future issues: "The years ahead will present an array of different and complex intelligence challenges, but I have complete confidence in your ability to meet all of them." 37/ FOOTNOTES 1. Richard A. Stubbing, "The Defense Game" (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1986), p 5. 2. Allen Dulles, "The Craft of Intelligence" (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1963), pp. 46-47. 3. Lawrence Freedman, "U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat" (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977), pp. 21-22. 4. Deane J. Allen, "The Defense Intelligence Agency: A 21-Year Organization Overview", Comment Edition, September 1983, p. 56. 5. Lawrence Freedman, "U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat" (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977), p. 22. 6. Allen Dulles, "The Craft of Intelligence" (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1963), pp. 46-47. 7. Deane J. Allen, "DIA . . . Committed to Excellence," "Communique" (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, October 1991), pp. 1-4. 8. Interview with Deane J. Allen, DIA Historian, conducted by Robin Boatman, on February 6, 1992. 9. Deane J. Allen, "DIA . . . Committed to Excellence," "Communique" (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, October 1991), pp. 1-4. 10. Deane J. Allen, "The Defense Intelligence Agency: A 21-Year Organization Overview" (Comment Edition), September 1983. 11. Deane J. Allen, "DIA . . . Committed to Excellence," "Communique" (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, October 1991), pp. 1-4. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. Lawrence Freedman, "U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat" (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977), p. 25. 16. Deane J Allen, "DIA . . . Committed to Excellence," "Communique" (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, October 1991), pp. 1-4. 17. Ibid. 18. Steve Emerson, "Secret Warriors" (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1988), pp. 77-78. 19. Deane J. Allen, "DIA . . . Committed to Excellence," "Communique" (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, October 1991) pp. 1-4. 20. Bob Woodward, "Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987" (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), p. 97. 21. Author's (Robin Boatman's) opinion/observation. 22. See footnote number 20, p. 98. 23. See footnote number 19. 24. Ibid. 25.Ibid. 26. Ibid. 27.Ibid. 28.Ibid. 29. See footnote number 18, pp. 212-14. 30. Deane J. Allen, "DIA . . . Committed to Excellence," "Communique" (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, October 1991), pp. 1-4. 31.Ibid. 32.Ibid. 33.Ibid. 34.Ibid. 35. Larry Grossman, "Intelligence in a World of Change," "Government Executive" (Washington, DC: National Journal, Inc., March 1992), pp. 11-15. 36. Ibid. 37. Deane J. Allen, "DIA . . . Committed to Excellence," "Communique" (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, October 1991), p. 1. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Allen, Deane J., "The Defense IntelligenceAgency: A 21-Year Organi- zational Overview" (Comment Edition), September 1983. 2. Allen, Deane J., "Communique", "DIA . . . Committed to Excellence," DIA, October 1, 1991. 3. Best, Richard A., Jr., "CRS Report for Congress: Reforming Defense Intelligence", Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, January 1992. 4. Dulles, Allen, "The Craft of Intelligence", Harper & Row Publishers, New York, NY 1963. 5. Emerson, Steve, "Secret Warriors", G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1988. 6. Freedman, Lawrence, "U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat", Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1977. 7. Grossman, Larry, "Intelligence In a World of Change," "Government Executive", March 1992. 8. "History of the Defense Intelligence Agency", Pamphlet, Defense Intelligence Agency, 1985. 9. Interview conducted with Deane J. Allen, DIA Historian, and by Robin B. Boatman, author of this paper, on February 6, 1992. 10. Jeffereys-Jones, "The CIA and American Democracy", Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1989. 11. Kennedy, Colonel William, "Intelligence Warfare", Crescent Books, New York, 1983. 12. Marchetti, Victor and Marks, John D., "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence", Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1980. 13. Nincir, Miroslav, "United States Foreign Policy: Choices and Tradeoffs", CQ Press, Washington, DC, 1988. 14. Stubbing, Richard A., "The Defense Game", Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1986. 15. Woodward, Bob, "Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987", Simon and Schuster, New York, 1987.
|Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list|