The Intelligence Link--Unmanned Aerial Vehicles And The Battlefield Commander AUTHOR Major Kenneth S. Smith Jr, USAF CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Logistics -TEXT- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: The Intelligence Link--Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and the Battlefield Commander THESIS: There is a genuine need for the development and acquisition of a family of unmanned aerial vehicles to augment and enhance the intelligence network, especially as it applies to the battlefield commander. BACKGROUND: The future of land warfare is anyone's guess, but it is safe to assume that technological advancements in arms and equipment will exert an increasing influence on planning and conducting war. One advancement that is receiving the attention of battlefield tacticians is the Remotely-piloted Vehicle (RPV). There are many examples throughout the history of armed conflict which indicate, as far back as 7th century China, the use of unmanned weapons. However, the true impact of these weapons has yet to be felt. Today's war strategists, armed with a Congressional mandate, are seeking the design and implementation of several inexpensive, survivable unmanned aerial vehicles. There are many reasons for this, but, the chief motivating factor seems to be that war has become too lethal for men and too expensive for manned machines. No longer regarded as a novelty, RPV employment on future battlefields is inevitable. RECOMMENDATIONS: The RPV, when correctly employed, can fill several gaps in the intelligence network. Among the many missions planned for these unmanned aircraft are reconnaissance, target acquisition and spotting, search and rescue, communication enhancement, and battle damage assessment. Most importantly, though, is the potential benefit to the front-line battlefield commander in providing valuable intellignece information not available from other means. It is a complicated process to introduce a new weapon system into the `tried and true' tactics of warfighting. Therefore, it is extremely important for each commander to learn, understand, and utilize this new and valuable system. The doctrine and tactics practiced today must be both flexible and adaptable to meet the needs of the future as well as the weapons of the future. CONCLUSIONS: The age of the unmanned, remotely-operated weapon is upon us. In spite of the hurdles ahead, such as the decreasing defense dollar and inflation, we have the opportunity to give our battlefield commanders a low-cost, far-reaching warfighting tool which will greatly influence the battle--in our favor. THE INTELLIGENCE LINK-- UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND THE BATTLEFIELD COMMANDER OUTLINE THESIS STATEMENT: To help ensure our success in future military conflicts, we must fund, develop, and acquire a family of unmanned aerial vehicles to augment and enhance our intelligence network. I. History of RPV use on the battlefield A. Myth or reality B. Historical influence on today's RPV designs II. Why remotely-piloted vehicles? A. Advantages and disadvantages III. RPV employment on the battlefield A. Potential RPV missions B. Lessons learned C. Limitations D. Smart employment INTRODUCTION "Intelligence is a luxury, sometimes useless, sometimes fatal. It is a torch or firebrand according to the use one makes of it."--CABALLERO Throughout the history of armed conflict, battlefield commanders have attempted to learn as much about their enemy as possible. Indeed, the need for current and accurate intelligence information is paramount to achieving success. Today's battlefield commander, through intricate and sometimes complex command, control, and communication systems, constantly seeks information on the enemy hoping to gain the advantage. However, gaining the advantage is only half of the battle. The commander must also maintain the advantage if he is going to be truly successful. The sophistication of weapon systems available today have done much to help the commander maintain the advantage. The shear lethality of these weapons has made every battlefield decision one of extreme import and implication requiring each decision to be both timely and informed. This is why accurate and timely battlefield intelligence is so important. While today's intelligence gathering procedures and equipment are good, the capabilities are, in many areas, inadequate and could be improved. One improvement that is receiving the attention of battlefield tacticians is the Remotely-piloted Vehicle (RPV). Department of Defense planners are currently studying how gaps in the intelligence network can be filled by using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). These planners believe that UAVs can, not only, collect high-resolution imagery and data-link this information to the battlefield commander in real-time, but also, help direct weapons fire on enemy targets with extreme accuracy. Unmanned weapons and reconnaissance platforms are on the verge of proliferating our military. No longer regarded as a novelty, RPV employment on future battlefields is inevitable. Tasks that have become simply too lethal for men and too expensive for manned machines, such as, mine clearance, battlefield reconnaissance, and artillery spotting, are soon to be the responsibility of highly efficient, technologically advanced unmanned aerial vehicles. Their use in tomorrows' wars will be limited only by the imagination of the user But if historical accounts are an indicator, then the use of RPVs could very well be the key to battlefield success. THE HISTORY OF RPV USE ON THE BATTLEFIELD "The ancient Greeks wrote that their god of fire, Hephaestus, brought to life a giant bronze statue to guard the island of Crete for King Minos. A similar Greek legend told of the statue of Talos being animated by Daedalus to protect the island of Thera from Jason and his Argonauts."1 Chinese writings of a thousand years ago discuss the use of large kites to bomb defenders of a walled city. Whether fact or fantasy, it emphasized for the first time that unmanned systems were capable of attacking an enemy without placing ones' own soldiers at risk. The use of RPVs on the battlefield is not a new concept. The first historically documented unmanned weapon system was Frenchman Charles Rogier's aerial balloon system in 1818. This lighter-than- air unmanned vehicle utilized a delayed-action fusing device which, while hovering over an enemy position, would launch a barrage of rockets. The accuracy and lethality of this weapon was questionable at best, but as a psychological weapon it definately played upon the enemys' fears. There are literally hundreds of examples in history of unmanned, remotely-positioned weapons being developed and used in wartime. While some may have been shrouded in myth, others became viable, capable weapon systems. Many made it past the drawing board. By the 1890's, U.S. Army researchers were experimenting with a kite-mounted aerial photography system. At about the same time British scientists were testing remotely controlled torpedoes to be used in harbor defenses. Robotic weaponry took a dramatic leap forward at the onset of World War I. In an effort to reduce the increasingly heavy casualties of their pilots and to provide a means to intercept German Zeppelin airships, the British initiated a program to design a pilotless aircraft capable of maneuvering to a target and exploding on impact. Several test flights proved promising, however, it was never proven in battle due to the war's end. By World War II, the unmanned aerial vehicle had reached a new state of lethality and notoriety. The V-1 buzz bomb, developed by the Germans, proved both deadly and accurate in spite of many mechanical difficulties. "Only one-fourth of all V-1 buzz bombs launched against England (appoximately 2500) survived mechanical failure or British air defenses. The 25 percent that did get through, however, inflicted some 14,665 casualties."2 The development of the V-1 was a technological wonder and a psychological terror, but its greatest influence was on Soviet and U.S. cruise missile research following the war. By the 1960's, RPV's had developed into sophisticated and survivable aerial delivery systems. Unknown to many casual military historians, unmanned reconnaissance drones were used extensively in the Vietnam War between 1964 and 1975 with great success. They were invaluable in identifying enemy strongpoints, troop assembly areas, air defense locations and battlefield damage. They provided the front-line commander with near-real-time intelligence information which quite probably saved hundreds, if not thousands, of American lives. In spite of the success of unmanned reconnaissance drones in Vietnam, five years after the war the U.S. had not one single RPV in its inventory. Proponents of RPV use could not convince the military that unmanned aerial vehicles had proven their worth, both monetarily and militarily. Other countries, to include Great Britain, Belgium, Israel, and the USSR, continued to develop and improve these systems. In several remarkable instances, to be discussed later, Israel successfully applied RPV technology in a battlefield environment. The major U.S. emphasis on unmanned aircraft in the 1970's continued to be in the area of cruise missiles, which could be launched from ground, air, and sea platforms. The Army was finally able to fund the Aquila RPV program in the late 1970's. With a small budget and little high level support, the program did not gain momentum until the Israelis demonstrated phenomenal success with the RPV. Since then RPV research and development proliferated in the United States. It appears that as we enter a new decade, RPV programs will continue to grow in the U.S. Proponents believe that they are the weapon system of the future. The economics and ferocity of warfighting, today and tomorrow, make the unmanned aerial platform look very attractive. The question to be answered is why? Why RPVs? What potential benefits can today's battlefield commander gain from their use? The answers are easy. WHY REMOTELY PILOTED VEHICLES? "It is DoD intent to provide needed non-lethal UAV operational capabilities to commanders."3 On the face of it, remotely-piloted aircraft have many sound arguments in their favor. They can be developed, produced, and operated at a fraction of the cost of manned aircraft. The relative savings in engines, airframes, fuel consumption, pilot training, logistics, and maintenance would save the Defense Department millions if not billions of dollars--a prospect that is very attractive given today's fiscal constaints. But, perhaps, the most visible advantage with RPVs is the human risk factor is virtually eliminated. Over 5000 Americans lost their lives in the Vietnam War because their aircraft were shot down. Among the most dangerous missions were reconnaissance flights. Of all our prisoners of war, 90 per cent were downed pilots or crewmen. In 1982, the US Navy risked the lives of two crewmen in a 40 million dollar F-14 to obtain non-real time photographic intelligence of targets in Lebanon. This was followed by an air strike, in which the Navy lost two aircraft out of 28, a third damaged, one pilot killed, and one crewman taken prisoner.4 Could these missions have been carried out by remotely guided aerial vehicles? Many of today's military planners believe so. There is little doubt that using unmanned reconnaissance aircraft would have been cheaper and would have produced real-time intelligence, and, most importantly, it would not have exposed our pilots to the inherant dangers of the air war. Another important advantage of RPVs is their survivability. Consider these two quotations: "This...target was...flown against the concentrated gunfire of the (British) Home Fleet during an exercise in the Mediterranean. For two hours, every gun in the fleet tried in vain to destroy the lone, slow and fragile target, but it was recovered safely."5 "Thousands of rounds of radar-directed fire from a sophisticated air defense gun, as well as hundreds of rounds of fifty caliber, were expended on an unmanned vehicle flying well within range. The unmanned vehicle flew on without a scratch."6 These quotes are noteworthy not only as an indicator of survivability but because between the two incidents there is a span of 47 years. (The first was logged in 1933 by an ancient Fairey Queen biplane, the second was quoted during a US government hearing in 1980.) Further proof of RPV survivability can be found in the Vietnam War. Between 1964 and 1975, the Air Force flew a total of 3,435 operational reconnaissance drone sorties in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Of these, 2,873 drones, or 84 per cent, came back from their missions successfully. From 1972, as more sophisticated models were introduced, survival rates were well in excess of 90 per cent.7 Perhaps the Israelis have best demonstrated the use of RPVs on the battlefield. The Israeli Air Force first recognised the value of RPVs in the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. They were able to reduce their manned aircraft losses by saturating heavy Egyptian air defenses with unmanned drones along the Suez canal. Using the inexpensive Chukar drone the SAM batteries were deceived into activating their radars while Israeli fighters remained just out of range. Once exposed, the Egyptian SAM batteries were easy targets for the Israeli aircraft. Shortly after the war, the Israeli Defense Forces began the development of small, versatile, low- signature RPVs, able to send back real-time intelligence by direct video link. These UAVs would be capable of being operated in the field by ordinary soldiers after only three to six months training. By 1982, when the Israelis launched its "Peace for Galilee" offensive against Syrian troops in Lebanon, the RPV would play a significant role in Israels' military tactics. Using unmanned drones equipped with radar reflectors designed to simulate full size aircraft, these small RPVs would draw fire from the Syrian anti-air missile batteries. Other drones carrying explosives remained undetected by Syrian radar enabling them to home in on the radars' emissions and destroy them on impact. The Syrian air defense batteries, now stripped of their capability to see, were virtually wiped out by manned strike aircraft. An excellent use of combined manned and unmanned aircraft, not one single Israeli pilot was lost. On the technological side, the most promising military mission for RPVs still seems to be reconnaissance and data gathering. While state-of-the-art technology is now available and can be applied to RPV requirements, more research and development is needed to improve the effectiveness and reliability of data links, especially over long distances, and to facilitate payload integration. Unmanned aerial platforms equipped with television cameras or forward looking infrared (FLIR) sensors have already been developed and tested, both in the U.S. and abroad. In one test conducted by the Navy in 1986, a television equipped Pioneer RPV accurately controlled sixteen-inch naval gunfire for over two hours using the on-board camera and data link.8 Improvements in such areas as camera resolution, compact navigation equipment, increased range, and communication down-link with ground controllers have greatly increased the attactiveness and marketability of the RPV system. Another distinct advantage of UAVs is their cost effectiveness. Remotely-piloted or unmanned aerial vehicles are definately cheaper to procure, operate, and maintain than manned aircraft. Compare the average cost of an RPV at $40,000 per unit (mission payload capabilities can add from $500,000 to $2 million to the value of the aerial package) to the $14-30 million per manned, fighter-type aircraft and the savings is evident.9 However, real dollar savings is hard to precisely gauge when one of the chief advantages of RPVs is that they save lives. It is safe to assume that the higher the probability that a reconnaissance platform, be it manned or unmanned, will be lost to enemy fire, or the greater the cost difference between UAVs and manned aircraft, the more attractive the UAV appears. The many advantages of unmanned aircraft have caught the attention of Congress and the Department of Defense. In 1987, Congress mandated the military services to work toward the joint development and acquisition of a family of survivable, non-lethal UAVs. To this end, the Pentagon established the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Joint Program Office (JPO) tasked with consolidating the needs of the services with the technology offered by the contractors. The JPO master plan for the acquisition of UAVs calls for a vehicle with the radius of action approximately 300 km from the forward line of troops with a loiter time of three to six hours desired. "Payloads in order of priority include SIGINT (signals intelligence), communications relay, imaging sensors, meteorological sensors, nuclear/biological/nuclear monitors, and MASINT (measurement/ signals intelligence)."10 At this point in time it is not a question of "will we buy" but "when will we buy". As each component service grapples with its peculiar requirements, it is inevitable that a wide array of RPV weapon systems will be tested. For example the Air Force is currently exploring designs for an unmanned hypersonic drone that could fly to any continent in less than an hour to perform surveillance or military strikes. The drone would be capable of flying as fast as Mach 20 to outrun even the most advanced Soviet defenses.11 The U.S. Navy has been actively testing ship-launched, medium range RPVs, deployable from battleships, to aid in fire control and reconnaissance. The Army and Marine Corps have been working closely to develop an RPV system which can be operated at the front lines by ground troops that is capable of providing real-time imagery of enemy target locations, reconnaissance, battle damage assessment, and search and rescue assistance. It is this last area of application--use on the battlefield--which will be explored next. RPV EMPLOYMENT ON THE BATTLEFIELD "In battle after battle since antiquity the victor was the commander who could most quickly recognize his enemys' key vulnerabilities and exploit those miscues in a timely manner."12 The unmanned aerial vehicle offers a uniquely flexible means of gathering information on the enemy and relaying this information in real-time. This capability can fill a critical gap in the intelligence network. That is, providing the front-line commander an instantaneous source of intelligence allowing him to better envision the battlefield, make informed decisions and exploit the full range of supporting weapons against the enemy. DoD planners, as part of the Pentagon's master plan, have identified seven mission categories for UAV deployment and utilization. They are: 1) reconnaissance and surveillance, 2) target acquisition, 3) target spotting, 4) command and control, 5) meteorological data collection, 6) nuclear, biological, and chemical detection, and 7) disruption and deception. The first three missions are, perhaps, the most adaptable to the RPV using off-the-shelf technology available today , while the remaining four missions will require more research and development to fully integrate the RPV into the battlefield commanders' resources. How can the front-line commander deploy and utilize this technology? Even more important, how can this new technology help the battlefield commander in his prosecution of battle plans? Of the four DoD classes of UAVs, medium range, short range, endurance, and close range, it is the close range (CR) and medium range (MR) classes of UAVs that are relatively unsophisticated, inexpensive, operationally controlled at the lowest level, and used in support of small forces. CR and MR RPVs are relatively simple systems that would be operated by company or battalion size units and would require minimum coordination with higher command echelons. The most obvious mission for these RPVs, as has already been alluded to, is reconnaissance and surveillance which broadly translates into the visual observation of the enemy. More specifically, a commander would, among other things, be able to survey approaches to friendly lines, patrol routes of movement, discover potential choke points, and study hydrographic and geographic data not available from maps. Both the Army and Marine Corps have had the opportunity to test these and other RPV capabilities during exercises. In one after action report (AAR), the commander, 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), stated, "RPVs proved to be a superior intelligence collection agency, providing key Essential Elements of Information that aided in beach selection during this major amphibious exercise (Kernel Blitz 88-1)."13 RPVs were also used during the USCINCLANT exercise Solid Shield 89. The commander, 4th MEB, in his AAR stated, "The RPV is an excellent collections asset, especially when used in pre-assault or advance force operations...targeting and fire support adjustments."14 These are but a few of the many positive reports on the use of RPVs in a battlefield environment. Another important application of RPV systems on the battlefield has been in the area of target acquisition and target spotting. Using the same RPVs that earlier located the enemy position during reconnaissance flights, an artillery fire control center could now direct fire at a target with precision. Advanced imagery technology is available today to spot and identify enemy targets in day or night, and with targets obscured by smoke, fog, haze, or light precipitation. These RPVs can be data-linked to fire support observers who, located safe from enemy fire, would provide accurate adjustment and analysis of artillery or naval gunfire. Small infantry units, perhaps as small as the company level, equipped with RPVs could immediately spot and adjust their own mortar fires throughout their tactical area of responsibility without direct ground observation or without relying on manned aircraft. There are many other proposed missions for unmanned aerial systems. Among the most popular are providing support for rear area security, assist in search and rescue operations, helicopter landing zone reconnaissance, and battle damage assessment. A future mission may see the RPV providing airborne communication-relay to distant units on the battlefield. Additionally, RPVs could be equipped with expendable electronic counter-measure devices to augment existing electronic warfare capabilities. While it may seem at first glance that we have found the perfect weapon system for the battlefield it should be pointed out that there are several critical limitations to unmanned aerial vehicles. First and foremost are the environmental factors that must be considered. RPVs cannot be operated in icing conditions, certain meteorological conditions and battlefield obscurants can seriously degrade video quality, and wind limitations for launch and recovery are 16 knots steady/25 knots gusting. Another limitation is that line-of-sight transmission must be maintained between the RPV and ground control/receiving station if real-time intelligence information is to be received. RPV's can be operated beyond line-of-sight transmissions if equipped with internal navigation units, then, fly pre-programmed waypoints, record the video information and return to an area within radio contact for recovery. RPVs require a large (aprox. 30 X 130 meters), relatively flat area for launch and recovery, although vertical takeoff and landing RPVs are being tested which would reduce this area. Other limitations may include special non-military fuel requirements, transportation peculiarities, and unique maintenance considerations. At present, video signals sent by the RPV are nonencrypted and, as such, are capable of being interrupted or exploited by any force with compatible equipment. Additionally the RPV is not a hardened target making it susceptible to enemy fire, although, as has already been pointed out, RPVs are extremely difficult to see and shoot down. Finally, since normal RPV operations require that a ground control station be in contact with the aerial vehicle, at least some of the time, radio emissions make the system susceptible to enemy electronic warfare actions. In spite of these limitations, the RPV system is a viable, economical, and resilient tool for the battlefield. Most importantly, though, is its potential benefit to the battlefield commander in providing valuable intelligence information not available from other means. It therefore becomes extremely important for the commander to fully understand both the limitations and benefits of the RPV if he is going to get the best use out of the system. An example may help to emphasize this point. During the Marine Corps exercise Solid Shield-89, the 2nd RPV Company was tasked to support the Ground Combat Elements (GCE) of the 6th and 8th Marines. While supporting the GCE, the only assigned RPV mission was as an intelligence collection asset. Because of this narrow mission the RPV company was not able to perform any of the other tasks as outlined in the Marine Corps Operational Handbook (OH) 2-2. There were many lost opportunities to conduct supporting arms fire and rear area security missions. This was due partially to the lack of coordination between the intelligence and fire support agencies but mainly due to the restrictive mission given the RPV unit. In OH 2-2 it is stated that the, "commander will assign the RPV unit a tactical mission of either direct or general support."15 It behooves the commander tasked with writing a mission statement to utilize his resources to the fullest; the RPV system is no different. The RPV mission statement must allow for the full integration of its capabilities in order to support the force as a whole. Intelligent employment of the RPV system on the battlefield, once a viable mission has been assigned, becomes the most important step toward successful application. The command, control, and communications complexities of today's battlefield make the introduction of yet another weapon system all the more difficult to integrate. In that light, it is extremely important to include an RPV representative at all mission planning conferences to ensure the system is used to its fullest. The RPV commander can be assigned as a special staff officer advising the commander on the best employment of the RPV. Additionally, it will be necessary to locate an RPV liaison team, having positive communications to all supported units, to the fire support coordination center or tactical operations center. Also, RPV operations must either be closely coordinated with manned aircraft missions or the airspace over the battle area must be used very judiciously to avoid conflicts with each system. An adequate number of ground control stations must be strategically located to provide the best coverage of the area of operations. Down-link receiver stations must be located at all command centers tasked with the prosecution of the battle plan--from the task force commander down to the battalion commander, and perhaps lower. All must have access to the real-time intelligence information and all must be able to utilize the fire support capabilities provided by the RPV. There must be enough RPV units available to provide decentralized control and the authority to change or divert missions must be kept at the lowest possible level to give flexibility to the system. On paper it sounds simple enough but in reality it will take years of training and practice to fully introduce and integrate the RPV into our war fighting arsenal. CONCLUSION "The age of robotic weaponry has been lifted off the pages of science fiction and is being placed in real world research facilities as well as on the battlefield."16 It is the opinion of many Defense Department officials that unmanned aerial vehicles are here to stay. RPVs are quickly proliferating the arsenal of the U.S. military for no better reason than the tasks of war have become simply too lethal for men and too expensive for manned machines. Missions such as mine clearing, battlefield reconnaissance, artillery spotting, and short-range attack missions are being taken over by these technologically advanced, highly specialized unmanned aircraft. On the face of it, RPVs have many sound arguments in their favor. Most notably, they can be developed, produced, and operated at a fraction of the cost of other systems. "They can be made smaller, more maneuverable, more available, and above all more survivable, all without putting a single human operator at risk."17 Commanders at all levels, but especially at the first echelon of committed units, need timely and effective reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition to execute their responsibilities on the battlefield. The speed with which today's battles are fought and the time sensitivity of the front-line commanders' decisions dictate immediate and accurate responsiveness. The technology available today for the non-lethal UAV allows for the satisfaction of many long standing battlefield deficiencies for each echelon of command. In its development of suitable RPV systems, the UAV Joint Program Office has its work cut out for them, especially in light of decreasing defense budgets. More research and development is needed to improve the effectiveness, range, and reliability of data-links. Design engineers must continue to improve and enhance the capabilities of unmanned platforms with emphasis on multi- mission payloads. If these efforts are to be successful, however, military planners must also be good historians. The trends of the past and the lessons learned from the history of RPV use will provide the foundation for projecting into the future. In spite of the hurdles ahead, we have the opportunity to give our battlefield commanders a low-cost, far-reaching warfighting tool which will greatly influence the battle--in our favor. Therefore we need to continue the research, development, and acquisition of a family of multi-purpose remotely-piloted vehicles. FOOTNOTES 1 Steven M. Shaker, "Robots in Warfare: From Ancient Myth to Modern Weapon," Army, April 1989, p.68. 2 Ibid., p.71. 3 DoD Joint Program Master Plan, UAV Joint Program Office, (Pentagon, Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1988), p.1. 4 James Bryan Miller, "Unmanned Air Vehicles--Real Time Intelligence Without the Risk," (Masters Thesis, Defense Technical Information Center, March 1988), p.36. 5 Kenneth Munson, World Unmanned Aircraft, (United Kingdom: Jane's Publishing Company Limited, 1988), p.7. 6 Ibid. 7 William Wagner, Lightning Bugs and Other Reconnaissance Drones, (Armed Forces Journal International, 1982), p.105. 8 Miller, "Unmanned Air Vehicles," p.60. 9 Ibid., p. 57. 10 Joseph A. Lovece, "Joint UAV Program Office Pushes to Meet Its Charter," Armed Forces Journal International, April 1989, p.53. 11 "Air Force Seeks Designs For Mach 20 Strike, Spy Drone," Defense News, 8 January 1990, p.1. 12 Gary W. Anderson, "When Maneuver Fails," Marine Corps Gazette, April 1989, p.49. 13 US Marine Corps, After Action Report, "Remotely Piloted Vehicle Employment," 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, Kernal Blitz 88-1, 15 February 1988, p.26. 14 US Atlantic Command, After Action Report, "Remotely Piloted Vehicle Employment Considerations," USCINCLANT, 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, Solid Shield-89, 19 May 1989, p.6. 15 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 2-2, "Remotely Piloted Vehicle Employment," (Marine Corps Development and Education Command, Quantico, Virginia, April 1987), p.3-14. 16 Shaker, "Robots in Warfare," p.68. 17 Munson, World Unmanned Aircraft, p.7. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Anderson, Gary W. "When Maneuver Fails." Marine Corps Gazette (April 1989): 47-49. Amouyal, Barbara. "Scrutiny Expected to Fall on the Need for Manned Craft." Air Force Times (22 January 1990) p.32. Bornick, Bruce K. "Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Support." Military Review (August 1989): 44-49. Department of Defense UAV Joint Program Office. "DoD Joint Program Master Plan." Pentagon, Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988. Fahlstrom, Paul. "Seeing Over the Next Hill." Amphibious Warfare Review, Vol.6, No.2 (Spring 1988): 25-47. Finnegan, Philip. "Air Force Seeks Designs for Mach 20 Strike Spy Drone." Defense News (8 January 1990) p.1. Karch, Lawrence G. and McGrath, James R. "Remotely Piloted Vehicles for Company and Battalion Size Units." Marine Corps Gazette (January 1989): 22-24. Karch, Lawrence G. "CAS, SEAD, and UAVs." Marine Corps Gazette (February 1990): 44-52. Lockett, Gregory P. "Remotely Piloted Decoys: Expendable Assets." Proceedings (November 1989): 111-112. Lovece, Joseph A. "Joint UAV Program Office Pushes to Make Its Charter." Armed Forces Journal International (April 1989): 49-53. Miller, James Bryan. "Unmanned Air Vehicles--Real Time Intelligence Without the Risk." Masters Thesis, Defense Technical Information Center, March 1988. Munson, Kenneth. World Unmanned Aircraft. United Kingdom: Jane's Publishing Company Limited, 1988. Shaker, Steven M. "Robots in Warfare: From Ancient Myth to Modern Weapon." Army (April 1989): 68-76. Sweetman, Bill. "Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Part 2: Developments in the US." International Defense Review (May 1989): 599-604. US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 2-2. "Remotely Piloted Vehicle Employment." Marine Corps Development and Education Command, Quantico, Virginia (April 1987). Wagner, William. Lightning Bugs and Other Reconnaissance Drones. Armed Forces Journal International, 1982. Note: Valuable additional information on RPVs and their employment on the battlefield was found in the Marine Corps' Lesson Learned System (MCLLS) in the form of after action reports from various exercises.
