Low Intensity Conflict Intelligence: Lessons From Vietnam AUTHOR Major Robert W. Livingston, USMC CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Leadership EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT INTELLIGENCE: LESSONS FROM VIETNAM I. Purpose - To examine Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) intelligence issues at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war using the U.S. involvement in Vietnam as a model. II. Thesis - Based on the intelligence lessons learned in Vietnam, U.S. civilian/military leadership must refocus its future intelligence efforts in order to operate successfully in the LIC environment. III. Data - Vietnam was our first joint military experience in the LIC environment and one of the largest intelligence efforts ever conducted. Our failure in Vietnam continues to cast a shadow of doubt over U.S. ability to deal with conflicts in the Third World - our most likely form of conflict today. Vietnam provides numerous examples of intelligence related issues at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The strategic level deals with the national intelligence structure and its ability to recognize the threat and influence the policymaker. The national policymaker never did understand North Vietnam. The operational/theater level was virtually ignored during Vietnam. There was no unity of command in the intelligence structure. The U.S. discovered how unprepared it was in establishing an organizational structure in an area where it had no U.S. commands or forces. At the tactical level, counter-insurgency operations failed overall and the U.S. gave up an emphasis on tactical HUMINT to fight an insurgency in the LIC environment with a reliance on technical intelligence. These issues and more are discussed in this paper. IV. Conclusion - LIC threats are hard to define. National intelligence collection must be increased in the Third World. Proper intelligence is essential to LIC operations in the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Intelligence structure must be strong and cohesive from the strategic down to the tactical level. HUMINT has to be stressed at all levels in the LIC environment. The operational level is important. The command structure needs to be simplified to ensure proper flow of intelligence up and down the chain of command. Intelligence training and cooperation with the Third World can make a significant difference. A universal strategy is needed for LIC providing goals and objectives in order to determine intelligence requirements. Counterintelligence training should be conducted by U.S. military forces. An increase in the number of HUMINT type specialists are necessary to cover U.S. interests around the world. LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT INTELLIGENCE: LESSONS FROM VIETNAM OUTLINE Thesis Statement: Based on intelligence lessons learned in Vietnam, U.S. civilian/military leadership must refocus its future intelligence efforts in order to operate successfully in the LIC environment. I. Strategic LIC issues A. LIC defined B. Defining the problem/threat (1) Strategic threat-Vietnam C. National intelligence structure (1) Intelligence performance/coordination for Vietnam D. Intelligence requirements for LIC (1) History and cultural aspects (2) Intelligence resources II. Operational LIC issues A. Structure and command relationships-Vietnam (1) Intelligence organization shortfalls B. Unity of Command C. Theater level Intelligence (1) Responsibilities (2) Collection resources (3) Psychological operations (4) Civil affairs (5) Deception III. Tactical LIC issues A. Insurgency-Vietnam (1) Intelligence focus (2) Intelligence resources B. Intelligence training (1) Joint intelligence organization (2) Combined intelligence C. Collection resources (1) Tactical human source intelligence (HUMINT) (2) Signals intelligence (SIGINT) (3) Imagery intelligence (IMINT) (4) Interrogator/translator (ITT) D. Counterintelligence (CI) (1) CI operations (2) Operations security (OPSEC) (3) Communications security (COMSEC) INTRODUCTION It has been fifteen years since the U.S. withdrew from South Vietnam after twenty-five years of varying degrees of involvement in the low to mid intensity spectrum of conflict. Although many political and military leaders would like to forget about Vietnam, it was our first major joint military force experience in the Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) environment and one of the largest intelligence efforts ever conducted. As such, it must not be forgotten. Our failure in Vietnam continues to cast a shadow of doubt over U.S. ability to deal with conflicts in the Third World, and LIC remains our most likely form of involvement in the Third World today. The U.S. has found that without proper intelligence there is little chance of winning in any LIC. This paper will focus on the identification and analysis of the major LIC intelligence issues at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of conflict. Vietnam provides many good examples of neglect at all levels which can be applied to future LIC operations. Based on the intelligence lessons learned in Vietnam, U.S. civilian and military leadership must refocus its future intelligence efforts in order to operate successfully in the LIC environment. STRATEGIC LIC ISSUES Vietnam turned out to be a protracted struggle against a complex enemy. The Department of Defense definition of LIC depicts most aspects of the Vietnam war when it describes LIC as: A limited political-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, or psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic, and psychological pressures through terrorism and insurgency. Low intensity conflict is generally confined to a geographic area and is characterized by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and level of violence. (4:214-215) The primary U.S. strategic interest is deterrence of high intensity conflict although it takes into account that LIC's pose a variety of threats to achievement of U.S. objectives. According to the national security strategy of the U.S., LIC is recognized as a "political-military confrontation below the level of conventioinal war, frequently involving protracted struggles of competing ideologies, and ranging from subversion to direct use of military force." (17:34) At the strategic level, the U.S. has to correctly define the problem or type of conflict occuring in the Third World. This has been a major problem among U.S. policymakers who tend to think that an American political/military solution will work in any situation. Col James Motley summed this thought up in Military Review (Jan 90), "The failure to think in strategic terms is a chronic American problem. The U.S. political system has had great difficulty defining objectives and, when appropriate, using military power efficiently to achieve them." (14:11) Inherent to the intelligence community is the requirement to correctly defining the strategic threat. In Vietnam, the U.S. was fighting a conventional and unconventional war without giving much thought to how our military action would change policy in Hanoi; meanwhile North Vietnam fought a political and psychological war that was effective against the U.S. population and political system. (14:11) National goals and missions will be improperly pursued if the threat is not correctly identified. Goals and missions directed toward the target country may be either political, economic, sociological, psychological, military or a combination. Proper intelligence is important to the policymaker in deciding to use any U.S. tools of national power. In most LIC's, the military option should be the least attractive. The national intelligence community must properly identify the strategic threat in order to guide the policymaker toward the proper focus of U.S. response. The U.S. misperception of the strategic threat in Vietnam led to unsuccessful actions in the conduct of the war. Lt Col Francis Casey summed up some of these U.S. misunderstandings in his Marine Corps Gazette (Sept 89) article as: ...the lack of understanding of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, organization, and functions of the Communist insurgent infrastructure. Also misunderstood was the vital leadership role the infrastructure played in directing and orchestrating all aspects of the conflict. This misconception, central to higher direction of the war, resulted in political indecision and in the selection of an American strategy of gradual response. (2:46) The national intelligence effort must also be focused toward the LIC environment. For years strategic intelligence has focused on two major threats (Soviet/China) and this concern drove the utilization of U.S. national intelligence assets. National intelligence agencies such as Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and Defense Intelligence Agency have a lot of resources and analysts to support U.S. civilian-military policymakers. Intelligence organizations are located at every echelon of national leadership. They do not make national security decisions, but must provide the best possible information and judgments about foreign developments to those who are responsible for making such decisions. Failure to discover the enemy center of gravity (source of strength) at the strategic level will lead to problems at the operational and tactical levels of conflict especially when the U.S. military is involved. The President, members of the National Security Council, and secretaries of the Federal Departments are called upon to make important decisions regarding the interests of the U.S., as such interests are affected by developments elsewhere in the world. The decisions must be made, whether or not adequate information is at hand. This is where national intelligence organizations fit into the picture. Their job is to ensure that there is at hand not only the raw facts needed, but the interpretative analyses and judgments as to what is happening or can be expected to happen in the Third World, and how they impact either political, economic or military policy. As U.S. world foreign interests and responsibilities grow, so must the national intelligence structure to meet these demands specifically in regard to supporting the full spectrum of low intensity conflict. The current intelligence structure is being worn thin in terms of its resources, because more and more government officials are requesting information in great detail. Intelligence is expensive and the future budget is not expected to grow. Meanwhile, the U.S. intelligence community is expected to be able to answer questions or provide information and analyses on just about anything that can happen anywhere in the world. In order to keep up with all of these demands, the national intelligence structure must constantly maintain awareness of the issues facing the policymakers. Additionally, priorities must be attached to all these issues. The better these issues are anticipated, the more likely intelligence will move toward being timely, responsive, and accurate. During Vietnam, the structure did not really work as advertised. The U.S. lacked a cohesive, coordinated intelligence effort throughout the war. There never was a free exchange of information between U.S. intelligence assets, and U.S. policymakers never demanded it. Most Washington level wartime studies and estimates were produced by one or two agencies working together, but very few were produced by the entire intelligence community. In Vietnam, the CIA and DIA often did not coordinate with or include intelligence received from Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) (the agency closest to the action) in their products for the policymaker. This caused duplication of effort and competition vice cooperation. From the Vietnam experience, the U.S. discovered how unprepared it was in establishing an organizational structure in an area where it had no U.S. commands or forces. It took several years before the structure actually supported U.S. presence and interest in Vietnam. One of the unique intelligence requirements that makes LIC different from mid and high intensity conflict is the predominance of the political dimension over the military component and the requirement for a sharp appreciation of history, cultural, and population characteristics that comprise the Third World LIC environment. (8:19) The Marine Corps learned this lesson long ago when it published the Small Wars Manual which stresses the psychological aspect: The great importance of psychology in small wars must be appreciated...that implies a serious study of the people, their racial, political, religious and mental development... the individual characteristic as well as the national psychology are subject for intensive study...a knowledge of the characteristics of the people and command of their language are great assets. (24:17-26) In Vietnam, the national intelligence structure was evidently not sufficiently cognizant of Vietnam's history, traditions, and national character; our national policymakers never did understand North Vietnam. There was also a lack of familiarity with the enemy's doctrine, organization, strategy, and tactics. Ho Chi Minh said, "The Americans are much stronger than the French, though they know us less well." (14:12) The strategy used by Ho Chi Minh and North Vietnam Army (NVA) Commander, Vo Nguyen Giap was no more than Mao Tse-Tung's three stage concept of protracted war applied by the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) from 1937 to 1949. Information concerning the strengths and longevity of the Vietnamese resistance to foreign rule was available in history books as well as the writings of Mao, Ho, and Giap. (14:12) At the strategic level, decisions have to be made in identifying the intelligence resources necessary to conduct operations in the LIC environment. The U.S. intelligence collection effort has a tendency to rely on its fancy, state of the art, multi-discipline collection assets which prove adequate for collection against conventional military forces. This is especially true for Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) systems. However, the weak link has become the Human Source Intelligence (HUMINT). During the Carter administration, hundreds of operatives were fired who previously worked overseas collecting information on foreign governments. The U.S. misses a lot of critical information and "feel" for what is happening when it does not have agents in certain countries. The U.S. now depends on overt attache and State Department diplomatic reporting, plus the debriefing of refugees and defectors. HUMINT can be one of the best sources to forwarn and determine intentions and must be strengthened if the U.S. expects to be successful in future LIC's. If properly directed and executed, the strategic intelligence effort helps the policymaker understand what U.S. international interests are, how they can be affected by events abroad, and what tools of policy may or may not be appropriate to deal with those challenges. (1:15, 70-73) Lt Col John Oseth summed up the strategic focus of LIC in his 1984 Naval War College Review article by stating: The strategic effort must look beyond the needs of Washington and take cognizance of the special interest of the operators, and there must be institutions and mechanisms which facilitate communication of resources, requirements and information between strategic, operational and tactical levels of command and of intelligence. (15:23) OPERATIONAL LIC ISSUES The operational level of war is the important key link between the strategic level and the tactical level where LIC operations are actually conducted. The operational level structure was significantly neglected and undefined during the years the U.S. was involved in Vietnam. This hindered the U.S. effort to find the enemy and determine his operational intent during one of the most comprehensive and sophisticated wartime intelligence operations in U.S. history. Today, the operational level has enjoyed a renewed focus as evidenced in the recent successful LIC operation in Panama. The focus at the operational level is the theater CINC who is responsible for military operations in a specific region of the world. The CINC looks to the strategic level for operational guidance from the National Command Authority (NCA) and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The CINC must consider the strategic military objectives and determine if they are reasonable. Concerning intelligence, the CINC has a broad intelligence focus and must look at the allocation of intelligence resources at both strategic and tactical levels. The strategic policy objective must be consistent with the military objective that the CINC is trying to achieve at the operational level. Once the CINC has all the guidance needed from the strategic level he develops a campaign plan to achieve those national military objectives. In the LIC environment, intelligence is a key part of that campaign. Enemy strategic and operational centers of gravity must be identified, located, and analyzed while protecting friendly sources of strength. LIC operations are normally conducted in conjunction with the U.S. Ambassador of the target country whose primary concern would be carrying out national objectives of a political and economic nature. It is important to look at the structure and command relationships at the LIC operational level which affect the intelligence effort. Upon determination that some form of aid will be provided to a target country, the focus of support turns to the U.S. task force leader. The leader would normally be the U.S. Ambassador who heads the "country team". The country team and the CINC are supposed to cooperate, coordinate, and share intelligence information. The CINC has a foreign service officer to coordinate with the country team. The country team has a military defense attache and sometimes a military advisory group. Tactical military operations by U.S. forces remain under strict control of the CINC. The country team has several intelligence shortfalls. Organic intelligence support to the State Department is the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) which primarily produces strategic foreign relations type intelligence that is of limited use in a LIC. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) primarily supports the National Security Council (NSC). As an independent agency, the country team can only request, but not demand intelligence support. Military support is a problem since country team military detachments do not rate access to theater military intelligence while detached from the CINC. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is tasked to provide foreign and military related intelligence to the Secretary of Defense, JCS, and Department of Defense components. The DIA has no mission to support the State Department with the intelligence it produces. (18:151-152) At the operational level of war, the theater CINC is the focus of the military effort. The CINC is primarily geared toward mid to high intensity warfare, but must also be prepared to conduct unconventional warfare in the LIC environment. However, peacetime overt unconventional warfare operations are not the CINC's responsibility so contingency plans are not prepared. The lack of plans provide no basis to task theater intelligence resources. This creates a problem in the unity of command and the ability of the CINC to control all the resources to accomplish the assigned task in a LIC. (18:153-154) LIC requires careful orchestration of both civilian and military players. The Ambassador and State Department need to be in overall command unless the U.S. is in a declared or general war. In 1962, President Kennedy signed National Security Action Memorandum's which addressed these issues. In Vietnam, unity of command only occurred in the President's inner circle. Ambassador's Maxwell Taylor and Ellsworth Bunker never exercised their authority. General Westmoreland was the Commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) who controlled only U.S. forces inside Vietnam and answered to U.S. CINCPAC in Hawaii (the theater commander), not the Secretary of Defense or JCS. (26:75-76) Westmoreland was not a supreme allied commander and had to deal with the Vietnamese command as an equal. He did not control all special operations in his theater which included the CIA. With no single point of authority, he could only attempt to direct the efforts of the various U.S./Vietnamese intelligence agencies, over which he had no control, but which formed important elements of his strategy. (18:156) In the 1960's there was a general lack of coordination of the U.S. intelligence activities. Each agency had a different picture of the enemy, a result of differing agency charters, collection efforts, and interests. Everyone appeared to have their own pet project with little concern for, and often no coordination with, others operating in the same area. The U.S. country team remained in the dark about events during this period since the efforts of civilian and military organizations could not be successfully linked. This resulted in an organizational structure that was deficient in its ability to collect, produce, and utilize intelligence. This resulted in an intelligence effort that was of little use in directing military, political, and economic actions by the country team. (18:156) Due to the protracted nature of the Vietnam War, the theater commander should have been located in Vietnam and exercising unity of command in matters of military intelligence. Former MACV J-2, MGEN Joseph McChristian noted unity of command as a major lesson learned in Vietnam stating "Unity of command was violated in Vietnam because of the nature of insurgency. In this conflict, all U.S. intelligence organizations were not centralized under the MACV commander." (11: 157) A logical choice would have been General Westmoreland who would have had the ability to look at the conflict in a broader scope of operations. He could have concentrated on the regional perspective and developed a campaign utilizing all intelligence resources that focused on enemy intentions, capabilities, and opportunities over an extended period of time. At the operational level, the theater commander must not only key on attaining the strategic aim, but also provide the proper resources for the tactical level commander to attain their objectives as part of that aim. Therefore, it is important that the theater commander have access to all intelligence assets the nation has to offer including the host nation. JCS Pub 2 states that "The commander of a joint force is responsible for defining intelligence support needs, identifying intelligence resources, and establishing intelligence support procedures." (5:3-51/52) In the LIC environment, serious consideration will be placed on the mission, nature, and composition of the forces being utilized. JCS Pub 2 further states that they must "ensure that the intelligence support structure enchances the secure, timely flow of tailored, all source intelligence to higher or lower echelons and across component lines as required." (5:3-52) Intelligence capabilities at the operational level are essentially those that permit continuous and effective support to the operations of the command. The theater intelligence structure must monitor and ensure intelligence processing and dissemination. Intelligence processing in the LIC environment involves a tremenduous amount of detailed and varied data over a long period of time. In Vietnam, intelligence processing was conducted without much of the ADP support that is now available in all intelligence agencies and echelons of command today. The CINC has to monitor intelligence processing at all levels. Dissemination of intelligence is the most important function as the collection and analytical effort is useless unless the intelligence reaches the user in time. The theater commander must make certain that intelligence derived from strategic and theater level intelligence assets reach the proper commanders at the tactical level. In most LIC's, human sources are the primary providers of the intelligence through interviewing and interrogation of prisoners, defectors, informers, and civilians. This requires extensive interaction with the host government. It also requires availability of qualified specialists who understand the cultural aspects of the country and the time required to train them. According to Col Motley, "Human intelligence plays a major role in LIC operations and must be planned well in advance of the deployment of U.S. forces." (13:52) In Vietnam, intelligence resources were not ready for the introduction of troops in 1965. It took at least two years to recruit, train, and dispatch the intelligence specialists needed. U.S. forces had few personnel that could speak Vietnamese and had to rely on locals for interpreters. The South Vietnamese intelligence structure was weak, fragmented, and heavily infiltrated with enemy informants which hindered U.S. collection and dissemination efforts. The U.S. must understand that the intelligence organization required to support counterinsurgency operations is much larger than a conventional intelligence effort. This requires a sufficient body of trained intelligence personnel in all specialties of the intelligence field. With this in mind, the U.S. must be able to cooperate with friendly Third World governments in conducting intelligence training and developing their intelligence infrastructure in order to identify capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions of insurgency and subversive activities. In LIC operations the CINC must also rely on intelligence to assist in the development of the psychological operations (PSYOP's), civil affairs, and deception portion of the campaign plan. FMFM 8-2 states that "Intelligence is vital to a sound PSYOP program since population attitude and behavior ranges from passiveness to hostility and must be reshaped into genuine acceptance of the host country's effort." (21:60) All available intelligence should be evaluated in terms of PSYOP application. FMFM 8-2 further states that the "PSYOP objective is to convince the entire population that providing intelligence information to the government forces was to their benefit."(21:60) PSYOP plans should exploit the will of the insurgent while aggressively continuing intelligence and exploitation operations. In Vietnam, U.S. and South Vietnamese forces never implemented operations that consistently and increasingly threatened insurgent psychological and organizational survival. The CINC should look toward designing a campaign that will achieve decisive results through a series of operations that can apply extreme pressure on the will of the enemy. In a counterinsurgency, civil affairs takes on a greater role due to the necessity to separate the people from the dissidents or guerilla forces. An effective civil affairs campaign requires intelligence concerning the civilian population in order to identify hostile, uncommitted and friendly elements, motivation and loyalties of population segments, and the size of the civil population engaged in guerilla support activities. Guerilla forces employ intelligence and counterintelligence and are often difficult to locate, identify, and fix. (21:57-58) Even in the LIC environment the theater commander must think about effective use of deception. The North Vietnamese used deception very effectively from the strategic through the tactical levels since they understood the nature and psychological aspects of the conflict they were engaged. They understood deception as a force multiplier that can achieve victory through surprise. Tactical and strategic deception operations have to be integrated by the operational commander and he must identify the enemies deception operations so friendly forces can conduct their own deception plans. This is normally done through successful PSYOP's and counterintelligence. (22:30) With a properly focused and attainable strategic objective, the operational level intelligence effort with a unified chain of command will be the key foundation for providing information concerning the threat to both the policymaker and the tactical level organization conducting LIC operations in a target country. The primary players at the operational level -the country team and the theater CINC must focus on the mission, the enemy, and provide the appropriate resources to be successful in the LIC environment. TACTICAL LIC ISSUES LIC intelligence at the tactical level is significantly different than intelligence operations against highly structured and identifiable armed forces during conventional warfare. Although the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) (conventional forces) finally prevailed over South Vietnam in 1975, a primary focus of the U.S. involvement was the insurgency problem with the Viet Cong (VC) organization in the South. Insurgency will be the main example used in this discussion at the tactical level. A large part of the current frustration with counter-insurgency, including the inability to develop adequate doctrine, comes from our failure to grasp some of the essential lessons learned in Vietnam. At the tactical level, introduction of U.S. military forces or advisors should not necessarily be the first choice. The political system of the country is normally the primary target and the battlefield on which the conflict must be fought using political, economic, and psychological elements. The role of the military, para-military, and police forces are normally limited to supporting the government's efforts while hindering those of the insurgents. (18:148) A common problem is trying to implement a military solution when a political solution is best suited. The introduction of civllian and military intelligence personnel can play a key role in an impending insurgency situation. Intelligence has been identified as a priority by most civilian and military personnel familiar with insurgency operations. A key to gaining the intelligence picture is to focus on "internal intelligence" defined by Lt Col Casey (MCG Sept 89) as: ...pinpointing the roots of insurgency and to gain a full and intimate knowledge of an insurgent infrastructure and its doctrine, leadership, organization, strategy, and intentions. Such intelligence must be assessed in relation to the economic, political, and military situation current within the targeted country/society. (2:49) Most Third World countries have a weakly organized intelligence structure, and a weak or non existent military intelligence capability. This problem became quite evident to senior U.S. officers serving in Vietnam. For example, General Palmer reported that: Many American and South Vietnamese officials did not understand the nature of insurgency and need for close civilian coordination between Vietnamese special police and military intelligence at every level from district on up to Saigon if a complete picture of the enemy was to be obtained. (16:79) Properly trained U.S. military intelligence personnel can make a difference by providing tactical intelligence training to Third World countries with potential insurgency problems. Military intelligence can help develop host nation appreciation of tactical intelligence and their capability to collect, analyze, produce, and disseminate intelligence information. (19:23) According to BGEN Stewert in (Jan 88) Military Review, "Military intelligence support provides a solid demonstration of U.S. commitment and supports overall U.S. policy and strategy in LIC - to help friendly nations develop democratically without commiting U.S. combat forces."(19:19) If properly trained, the host country could defeat the insurgency by itself with the U.S. providing only material and assistance training. In Vietnam, U.S. and ARVN intelligence had several joint intelligence organizations. In 1965, the U.S. and South Vietnam pooled their resources forming the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CIC-V) to produce tactical intelligence as quickly as possible in order to satisfy the tactical commanders requests. Initially, ARVN intelligence provided the bulk of the personnel and information. The U.S. forces had few trained linguists, intelligence specialists, and technicians to adequately train the Vietnamese. U.S. intelligence personnel displayed a weakness in overall proficiency. They were not familiar enough with the area, culture, and nature of the internal intelligence problem to be effective during their one year tour. With this lack of experience, intelligence personnel could not adequately train the Vietnamese to effectively conduct intelligence operations in the LIC environment. MACV J-2 and JGS J-2 did conduct some coordinated intelligence operations, but never had an effective combined intelligence program. MGEN McChristian cited combined intelligence as a primary intelligence lesson of the Vietnam War stating that: Contingency plans should include draft agreements; standing operating procedures; organizational, functional, and manning concepts; and logistical support plans to establish a combined intelligence system, preferably including all military and civilian agencies. (11:157) The overall results for U.S. military intelligence personnel working at the Division level in Vietnam were an inability to do the type of collection, fusion, and analysis required to provide the detailed and specific objectives needed for sustained counter-insurgency operations. (6:18) Tactical Human Source Intelligence (HUMINT) plays one of the largest roles in LIC since the local population is the most abundant source of information. It is possible for insurgencies to be defeated by a nation willing to invest in an appropriate low level HUMINT capability which can penetrate the insurgent's security and take away his initiative. (6:23) Until late in the war, few people realized the effectiveness of an intelligence oriented strategy primarily geared toward HUMINT. Advisory organizations in Vietnam, such as Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (COORDS) had potential, but could never take away the initiative from the VC insurgents. According to BGEN Stewert, "Interrogation, troop reports, and documents provide parts of a clear tactical intelligence picture. Tactical informant operations generally match host nation capabilities more readily than technological intelligence means." (19:22) In Vietnam, fusion of technical and HUMINT sources seldom occurred in support of tactical operations. Taking prisoners was not appropriately emphasized and when prisoners were captured they were quickly evacuated beyond brigade and division levels without being interrogated adequately. Although good informant networks existed, the information was not effectively analyzed, fused, and used at the tactical level. (6:33) HUMINT can provide the critical warning on any enemy that operates in small numbers, normally avoids direct confrontation, and selects targets based on careful understanding of vulnerabilities. After 1965, the trend in Vietnam became a decrease in the use of HUMINT and an increase in the use of technical intelligence collection methods. The North Vietnamese, in conjunction with the VC, focused on HUMINT. They depended on "peoples intelligence" as the key to their success or defeat in LIC operations. (10:12) Thousands of Vietnamese supplied bits of information on U.S./ARVN operations. The enemy often knew of U.S./ARVN operations by the time they were executed. They conducted a massive counterintelligence effort into every echelon of South Vietnamese political and military structure with heavy emphasis on security. Unlike the South Vietnamese, North Vietnam collected everywhere, including Cambodia and Laos. Their top leadership demanded accurate, highly synthesized political and military intelligence. The South Vietnamese had numerous intelligence organizations in different command channels. There was a lot of redundancy, rivalry, and dilution of effort within the intelligence structure. There was little emphasis on counterintelligence and they limited themselves to collection only in South Vietnamese territory. Intelligence was often misused and even contrived to suit the commanders preconceived impression. The South Vietnamese operated with strict separation of political and military intelligence and depended on technical intelligence collection methods. Technical intelligence sources can be useful in LIC operations when fused with HUMINT sources. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) is considered the most timely of the intelligence disciplines. In LIC, SIGINT's greatest contribution is Direction Finding against insurgent radio transmissions. (23:3) This can provide information on concentration of transmissions in a given area as an indication of impending insurgent operations. In Vietnam, radio silence was used by the North Vietnamese as well as Imitative Communications Deception (ICD) as effective countermeasures. Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) can be a good source of data on enemy camps and evaluating an area of operations. Although it is not timely for an insurgent operation, it can be effective for terrain familiarization and corroborating information from other sources. The North Vietnamese attempted to counter IMINT with camouflage, deception, night movement, and air defense. Interrogator-Translator Teams (ITT) are a principle LIC intelligence asset at the tactical level. Lack of sufficient trained ITT personnel in all branches of the service remains a problem which will initially plague U.S. efforts upon introduction into many Third World countries. Shortages have always existed in Asian and Arabic languages. Upon introduction of U.S. forces into Vietam, few U.S. personnel were fluent in Vietnamese thus forcing a reliance on local interpreters to interrogate prisoners and detainees, and to translate documents. The major keys to successful counterintelligence (CI) operations are secrecy and surprise. Surprise by insurgent forces will greatly depend on the effectiveness of their intelligence organization. An intensive effort must be made to expose, destroy, and neutralize his intelligence organization. Effective CI will increase security of friendly forces and increase the probability of surprising the insurgent forces. (21:61) In Vietnam, poor operations security (OPSEC) and communications security (COMSEC) by U.S. and ARVN forces caused frequent compromises of operations. There was not a disciplined effort to deny the enemy information on our operational plans. Military personnel often talked in the clear without secure codes. Some units failed to change radio call signs for a year. The ARVN paid dearly for their lack of attention to CI. The ARVN were thoroughly penetrated by thousands of enemy force intelligence agents. U.S./ARVN forces ended up reacting to events rather than seeking out indications of future enemy operations which further protracted the war in Vietnam. The LIC tactical level is where the ability of success or failure all comes together. However, it all starts at the strategic level. The entire chain of command must understand what must be done, the expected time period involved, and the specific objective to be accomplished. For LIC tactical operations, it is important to recognize the problem in the early stages of development. The proper resources must be allocated and the U.S. must have the will and support of the people behind the involvement. Intelligence that is properly integrated within the host nation provides the best chance for a country to deal with their particular problem without introduction of U.S. combat forces. CONCLUSION Since the departure of American forces from Vietnam, the U.S. government has continued to prepare for a conventional war, but continues to fight in the LIC environment - without declaration of war and massive conventional armies. The purpose of this paper was to highlight some of the major intelligence issues that evolved in Vietnam which continue to surface today. Volumes have been written on Vietnam which provide a good source of examples when applying LIC intelligence at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The following paragraphs summarize and suggest attention to intelligence related concepts that U.S. civilian and military leaders should consider focusing on in future LIC operations. LIC involves all levels of civilian and military leadership with a greater emphasis toward the non military (political/economic) dimensions of warfare. The national intelligence structure has to correctly define the problem and understand the threat in order to provide the national policymaker with information that supports decisions to use the tools of national power (political, economic, sociological, psychological, and military). LIC threats are hard to forecast and the U.S. needs more assets analysing Third World interests and providing awareness to the policymakers. Analysts have to become experts in the history, cultural aspects, and military doctrine of U.S. Third World interests. This involves an emphasis on HUMINT, the major source of intentions at the national level, rather than primary dependence on technical collection means. The national intelligence structure must also take special interest in supporting the operators by providing the resources, requirements, and information to all levels. To support this, U.S. policymakers need to have a universal strategy for LIC which provides goals and objectives in order to determine intelligence requirements. The command structure at the operational level has to be simplified. Unity of command has to be geared toward providing the proper flow of intelligence to satisfy the CINC, U.S. Ambassador, country team, and tactical commander. Intelligence needs to be coordinated between the national level and the theater CINC conducting a LIC. The theater CINC must push for resources, train his personnel, and anticipate areas in his region that may have a problem. The U.S. must have the capacity at the national, operational, and tactical levels to collect, fuse, and analyze all-source intelligence in a LIC. This may involve expanding inter-agency cooperation at the national and operational levels between military and civilian specialists to coordinate LIC intelligence goals. Intelligence capabilities of governments threatened by insurgency remain inadequate. The U.S. can support Third World countries by providing intelligence training and cooperating with friendly security forces. Intelligence force structures and support agreements can be worked out in advance. We have learned that the lack of an in-country intelligence infra-structure hinders U.S. collection and dissemination efforts. The CINC must examine and select, in conjunction with the Ambassador and country team, strategies that are designed to win. Psychological operations, civil affairs, and deception can be integral parts of a campaign plan that intelligence can support. If the U.S. forces expect to be involved in future LIC operations, counterintelligence (CI) doctrine must play a key role in how forces are organized. Conventional forces are not suited toward CI operations. HUMINT, ITT, and CI specialists have to be revitalized in the military services. 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