Why Israel Was Surprised In October, 1973 AUTHOR Major Kent A. Leonhardt, USMC CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Intelligence EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Why Israel was Surprised in October, 1973 On 6 October 1973, Israel was caught by surprize when Egypt and Syria simultaneously attacked on two fronts. Prime Minister Golda Meir had made the decision to call up the reserves six hours earlier, but that was an insufficient amount of time to mobilize a defense designed to receive at least 48 hours warning. Most students of the 1973 Arab- Israeli War agree that there was an intelligence failure, and this is essentially the finding of Israel's Agranat Commission. The Agranat Commission was set up immediately after the war to study what went wrong. It labeled the war an intelligence failure and pointed out some of the problems with political analysis. This is how history records the outbreak of the war. It describes Israel's heavy reliance on military intelligence and "the concept." "The concept" stated that before war could commence the Arabs must unite, and Egypt would not attack without air superiority. While Israel's military intelligence recognized most of the indicators leading to war, they did not recognize the political motives of Egypt's leader, Anwar Sadat. Political factors made the conditions pointed out in "the concept" a reality and war commenced. There is evidence that Israeli leaders were aware of the problems pointed out by the Agranat Commission as early as 1963, but failed to implement corrective procedures. The heavy reliance Israel placed on its military intelligence system proved to be costly. The reasons can be found in a breakdown of that system and a leadership failure which began ten years earlier. Why Israel was Surprised in October, 1973 OUTLINE Thesis: The heavy reliance Israel placed on it military intelligence system proved to be costly. The reasons can be found in a breakdown of that system and a leadership failure which began ten years earlier. I. The start of the war A. The decision to mobilze the reserves B. Break down of the Intelligence system and a leadership failure that began 10 years earlier II. Events leading up to the war A. Known Arab Intentions B. Israel's recognition of intentions C. Indications that were identifiable D. Other deviations from the norm E. Indications and intelligence not forwarded F. Missed indications G. "The concept" H. False signals and paradox of warning I. Conditions required to attack J. Israel's deception plan III. Israel's leaders made some serious mistakes A. There was an intelligence failure 1. Events hindered decision making 2. DMI could not give sufficient warning B. Problems with intelligence assessments C. Details of Agranat Commission 1. Culpability 2. Recommendations IV. Summary of failures and reasons for being surprised A. Intelligence failure B. Parlimentary failure Why Israel was Surprised In October, 1973 The Israeli Cabinet was still in session at 1400 on 6 October 1973 when they received word that the Egyptians and the Syrians had simultaneously attacked Israel. Prime Minister Golda Meir had just finished detailing her decision not to conduct a preemptive strike against the enemy but to mobilize the reserves. Israel was caught by surprise, and the initial casulties mounted rapidly. Earlier that morning the Prime Minister and her Defense Minister, Moshe Dayan, were awoken and told they could expect an attack at 1800. The decision to mobilize was made around 0800, leaving the Israelis less than six hours to mobilize a force to reinforce thinly stretched defensive positions which faced overwhelming numbers of Arab soldiers. The heavy reliance Israel placed on its military intelligence system proved to be costly. The reasons can be found in a breakdown of that system and a leadership failure which began ten years earlier. There is no doubt that the Arabs' intentions were known. Israel had occupied the Sinai all the way to the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights since the Israeli victory in 1967. The peace talks were stalled, and Israel was not returning any of the occupied Arab lands. Sadat needed something to reopen the peace process, and a limited objective war with some success was what the Arabs needed. In a conflict that had been raging for over 20 years, an Arab attack was only a matter of time. Egypt's president, Anwar Sadat, had discussed the need for war in 1971, 1972 and 1973. 1 1971 was announced by Sadat as the year of decision, but no attack materialized. On December 21, 1972, a Cairo newspaper reported that Sadat had instructed his new war minister to prepare for war within six months. 2 In February, 1973, Egypt renewed relations with the Soviet Union, and arms began arriving that same month. In the first half of 1973, Egypt got a fresh shipment of T-62 tanks, and at the same time Syria was being supplied with 40 MIG-21s and SAM missiles worth $185 million. The Arab intentions for war in 1973 did not go unnoticed by Israel. Moshe Dayan had warned his staff of a possible war in the second half of the summer in 1973. 3 The United States State Department had predicted that there was less than a 45% chance of war with an important caveat; the chances of war would increase if the Arabs made no progress in diplomatic circles. 4 On 25 September, the CIA reported to Israel that a war was imminent on two fronts. 5 Several indications were identifiable. Israel was aware of the forward deployment of aircraft and the military concentrations along the Suez Canal and Syrian border. Israel was aided by the use of American reconnaissance platforms, and the enemy build-up could not have gone undetected. 6 For the first time bridging material arrived on the scene of the military build-up after Egyptian bulldozers were reported to have dug gaps in sand dunes and soldiers were seen placing markers at the water's edge. Syria's build-up on the front began slowly on 21 September, and by 1 October, there were 2,000 tanks in defensive positions. The tanks were moved to offensive positions the night before the attack, but this movement went undetected. The Soviet Union displayed indications hinting at the Arabs' intentions, the most significant being its evacuation of Soviet advisors and their families from Syria on 4 October. Dayan knew of these flights and the Soviet passenger planes landing in Syria shortly after the attack. Provocative speeches by Sadat two weeks before the war revealed another indicator. He was reported as having told Palestinian guerilla leaders, "Prepare yourselves. We are going to War." 7 Sadat had also reported to the Egyptian parliament that the peace process was stalled, although he was openly continuing to show his desire for peace. Libyan leader Qadhafi had publicly announced earlier his desire to separate himself from the plans made by Egypt and Syria. 8 Towards the end of September, Egypt appeared to be exercising more frequently near the canal; they had new equipment hidden in special crates, installed landlines, and the SAM radars were not being activated. The SAMs were deployed forward to cover the limited objective area, thereby signaling Egypt's initial air superiority. These were all clear indications of impending hostilities. They were all deviations from the norm and should have opened the eyes of Israeli intelligence analysts. Dayan himself read an indicator but failed to have it inputted into the intelligence picture. Dayan recognized that Syria showed no reaction during the days following the September 13 air battle, in which Syria lost 12 MIGs to one Israeli Mirage. 9 This was not natural for Syria. There were no artillery barrages -- Syria did not react because it was preparing for war. Following the cessation of hostilities, it was learned that many of the indicators seen along the front lines, particularly the Suez Canal, were recognized and reported. However, on one particular occasion, the report was never forwarded. Lieutenant Benjamin Siman-Tov, an intelligence officer with the Southern Command, sent a report to his boss on 1 October titled, "War Preparations in the Egyptian Army." This report was in contradiction with the headquarters intelligence assessment, so it was not forwarded. In the report, he stated that the Egyptian exercise could be camouflage for a real operation. Lt. Siman-Tov had a tense relationship with his commanding officer and had had disagreements with him before. Still other indicators appear to have been missed. The Egyptians were well aware that Israel operated an espionage ring known as Mitkal in the canal area. They had to see the Egyptians spraying a chemical flame protective against napalm on their uniforms, after which they could not be worn again. This should have given Israel almost six hours warning. During the night of the 5th, the spies should have noticed the loading of tactical missiles on launch pads. History created an atmosphere within which the Intelligence Branch of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) could overlook the obvious. After the 1967 War, in which Israel was blessed with unparalleled success, the IDF began to consider a reduction in force size -- they immediately began to underestimate the enemy. The Israeli military leaders began to believe in what became known as "the concept." 10 They believed that two conditions must exist before the Arabs would try again. The first was that Syria would not attack without Egypt. Israel, at the time, had little regard for Arab unity. The second condition was that Egypt would not attack without air superiority. Nasser had stated before his death that it would be 1975 before Egypt would possess the capability to neutralize the Israeli Air Force. 11 Gen. Zeira, Director of Military Intelligence (DMI), had inherited "the concept" a year before the war but never seemed to question it. Gen. Shalev, his assistant, who had held his position since before the 1967 War, at times questioned "the concept," especially in light of Egypt's new supply of arms, but it fell on deaf ears. Zeira had a reputation for not agreeing with anyone who disagreed with his assessment. The Ten-Hour War of 9 September 1969 only helped to reinforce Israel's belief in "the concept." In one 10-hour raid across the Suez Canal, 150 Israelis were able to destroy three major radar stations, kill about 150 Egyptian soldiers, and capture two of the Soviet's newest T-62 tanks. The latter half of 1969 also saw the Israeli Air Force destroy most of the radar sites controlling 24 Egyptian SAM-2 complexes. Later in 1969, Israeli commandos captured a late-model Soviet antiaircraft gun from the Gulf of Suez. In March, 1971, Egypt was prepared to attack across the canal, but backed off when Israel mobilized. Sadat was not prepared to face a fully alerted IDF -- more reassurance for "the concept." In 1972, Gen. "Arik" Sharon expressed a common confidence, "Israel is now a military superpower. Every national force in Europe is weaker than we are. We can conquer in one week the area from Khartoum to Baghdad and Algeria." 12 Israel believed their system of fortification along the canal, called the Barlev Line, would hold up any Egyptian crossing long enough for Israel to mobilize; this symbolized Israel's feeling of strength. Zeira continued his belief in "the concept" up to the day of the attack, pointing out to Dayan on 6 October that the Americans had changed their opinion of 25 September saying that Egypt was technically unable to complete a successful crossing. 13 President Sadat summed up the Israeli biases best seven months after the war. In a speech at Alexandria University, he stated, "Rogers (U. S. Secretary of State) thought we would never fight, the Israelis thought they could not be surprised. The West thought we were poor soldiers without good generals." 14 The hesitation to mobilize in October, 1973, without a strong intelligence estimate that the Arabs were planning to attack, can be traced back to the full mobilization in May, 1973. The May mobilization was costly to a fragile Israeli economy. The "paradox of warning" here is clear. With no attack by the Arabs, it is not known whether or not the expense was justified. The question of whether or not Sadat intended to go to war remains unanswered. There are Israeli sources which state that Sadat was going to war. A former Israeli general believes that Soviet intervention prevented Sadat from carrying out his plans. 15 Deputy Israeli Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Yisrael Tal, believed Sadat failed to attack in May because Syria was not ready. The Israeli Chief of Staff was convinced war in May was inevitable based on stronger indications than were seen in October, 1973. Israel's mobilization and high state of readiness could also have deterred the Arabs. However, Sadat in his memoirs, stated that he did not plan to attack in May but that the build-up was part of his deception plan for later. 16 Israel's intelligence service throughout the whole period felt there would be no war and thus claimed a victory and gave credibility to their early warning analysis. Both May and October held the conditions Sadat needed to attack. Sadat chose his date and time to attack to correspond with a moonlit night, when the tides of the canal had their least variance and during low tide. In October, they happened to fall on the Jewish holiday, Yom Kippur. For Israel, the coincidence with Yom Kippur was a blessing; a reserve call-up was faster because everyone was at home or the synagogue, and the streets were clear. Mobilization could not have been easier. The Arabs had hoped the holiday would catch Israel totally off guard. Sadat did have a deception plan, and it helped to reinforce "the concept." The Arabs designed their deception plan to reduce Israeli warning to four or five days rather than 15 days. They believed it would take Israel five to seven days to mobilize fully, giving them one to two days' advantage. 17 In actuality, it took Israel only 18 hours to implement a system designed for 48 hours' warning. The deception plan was helped by the secrecy of their plans. Most of the high-level planning meetings were carried out in the spring and early summer of 1973, and both presidents kept the date a secrets. Only three men in Syria knew the date: the president, the defense minister, and the chief of staff; only a few more than that knew in Egypt. The Arab forces in the field thought they were on an exercise until one hour before the attack. The Soviet Union had to have a good idea of the date in order to withdraw its advisors and begin the loading of ships with arms destined for Syria and Egypt. The Soviet Union helped the deception campaign by reporting in their papers and on Radio Moscow the Syrian defensive concentrations on the Golan, and Egypt's reluctance to attack. Syria described in their news media Israel's intent to attack Syria so Meir could strengthen her government before the upcoming Israeli general election. Egypt published freely of winter maneuvers and Al Ahram, Cairo's leading newspaper, reported that officers should submit leave requests for UMRAH, their pilgrimage after Ramadan. Egypt knew Israel received its newspapers via Cyprus, and played the maneuver game to the end. Both Arab countries started spreading rumors -- Egypt saying their air defense was weak because of the Soviet expulsion; Syria saying they were dissatisfied with the MIG aircraft. The September 13 shootdown helped to reinforce that opinion. Syria also described repeated disputes with its Soviet advisors. The Arabs apparently used on-going diplomatic efforts to aid in covering up their military build-up. In August, 1973, Syria welcomed United Nations General Secretary Waldheim to discuss U. N. Resolution 242; he then went to Egypt. After his visit, Egypt "leaked" information to the press that they desired a Middle East settlement. Sadat was open about his intent to fight Israel. He frequently gave away dates and plans in speeches and to the press, but did it so often that it surprised everyone when he made good on these "promises" in October. 18 Egypt made extremely good use of exercising prior to the assault. Egypt held major exercises in July and September, 1973. Throughout 1973 the reserves were activated to various levels 22 times. At the end of September, for the first time, all of Egypt's reserves were activated, but their orders read, ". . . deactivate 8 October." 19 The September exercise, "Liberation 23," was planned before plans for the attack were finalized. It simply became a matter of changing the strategy and making it real. 20 There were other incidents that were not part of the deception plan which became "noise" and blinded Israel. On 28 September, two Arabs kidnapped five Jews and an Austrian from a train enroute to Vienna from Moscow. In exchange for the release of the hostages, the Arabs demanded that Austria close down a transit center for Jews enroute to Israel called the Schonau Castle. Austria agreed, and the kidnappers released the hostages. The Israeli Cabinet was so annoyed, it became absorbed with the incident until 5 October. Some authors have called it "misdirection," but Heikal, who was Sadat's confidant, insists that it was not. Either way, it did serve to divert Israel's attention from the growing Arab forces along its borders. Foreign press unknowingly aided the Arabs -- the British press reported on the poor maintenance of Egyptian equipment, and the Lebanese press reported on the poor Soviet equipment in the Canal Zone. These news items could have been started by Egypt. More proof and misdirection concerning Egypt's desire for peace in the Suez Canal area was the signing of an agreement with an American company to build a pipeline terminating in the Gulf of Suez. The deception plan was kept active right to the end. On October, Syria sent a complaint to the United Nations truce observer about two Israeli tank battalians being brought up to the Golan out of fear of increased tensions. The complaint was forwarded to Israel. Syria then moved tanks up to defensive positions, hull down, and its artillery was placed back covering Syrian territory only, a defensive posture. Egypt took precautions to camouflage the equipment to be used for the canal crossings and concealed its movement into the objective area over a long period of time. The large earthen works along the canal aided them in concealing their movements. The deception plans even included Egyptian soldiers being seen by the Israelis 30 minutes before the attack -- without weapons or helmets. The deception plan was brillant. By reinforcing "the concept" the Arabs were able to reduce the expected time of warning given to Israel. The secrecy of their planning reduced the risk of leaking the exact date and time of the attack. The Arab planning was aided by other events not of their doing, such as the Schonau Raid that helped to divert the attention of the Israeli leaders. The costly mobilization in May probably did more to create a hesitation in decision making on the part of the Israeli military leadership than any other single incident. There is no doubt that a mistake was made in May, 1973, but what the mistake was has yet to be determined. Israeli military intelligence claimed a victory when no attack occurred showing that the decision to mobilize was wrong. This made the Chief of Staff hesitant about questioning intelligence estimates despite his opinion to the contrary. On the other hand, there is strong evidence available indicating that the Arabs were going to attack but were deterred by any of a number of theories. Regardless of which version is accepted, the May mobilization was costly, and its memories hindered the decision making at the top level. There are no doubts in any analysts' minds that there was an intelligence failure in October, 1973. The DMI continued to insist they could give sufficient warning when, in fact, they did not; and the DMI insisted that the possibility of war was low, and the enemy was not capable of attacking and winning. In fact, the Arabs did attack and were capable of achieving only limited successes. In fairness to the DMI, he did not say there was no chance of an attack, which shows one of the problems with assessments of this nature. How does one quantify the probability of attack based on indications seen? This is not an easy undertaking, and there are no good answers. The DMI was charged with giving a military assessment, not a political one. The intelligence branch was correct, as the war eventually proved, that the Arabs could not win, and the forces on line could protect Israel proper until the reserves were mobilized. The intelligence branch did not see -- nor was it charged with seeing -- the limited objectives of the Arab leaders. Immediately after the war, Israel's cabinet appointed the Agranat Commission to determine exactly what went wrong. The Commission labeled it an intelligence failure and pointed out some of the problems with political analysis. But, the Agranat Commission in paragraph 30 titled, "Personal Responsibility at the Government Level," felt free to remark on direct responsibility only and not on official parliamentary responsibilities. The Commission decided not to become involved in political matters. 21 Defense Minister Dayan, according to the Commission, was not obliged to come to a conclusion different from those of his advisors or order any changes to their advice. However, Dayan did suspect a war was eminent; he stated so. He also correctly read the indicator concerning Syria's lack of reaction to the air battle on 13 September, but did not input the information into the intelligence picture. Dayan's observations were made from experience, and that experience was why he held the position of Defense Minister. Dayan was cleared by the Agranat Commission from any direct responsibility for Israel being caught unprepared. Prime Minister Golda Meir was also cleared of any direct responsibility by the Commission. However, if the Prime Minister had acted upon the recommendations on intelligence matters presented in 1963 to Prime Minister Eshkol and the cabinet, as a part of her duties as foreign minister, the disaster may have been avoided. The Agranat Commmission pointed out that there was no independent political, strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence evaluations. 22 They recommended the immediate implementation of those recommendations made by the 1963 committee, set up by retiring Ben Gurion, to study the subordination and evaluation function of the intelligence community. The two primary recommendations were the appointment of a special advisor to the Prime Minister for intelligence and the strengthening of the Foregin Ministry's Research Department. The special advisor would keep the Prime Minister in touch with the activities of the various intelligence services. The stronger Research Department in the Foreign Ministry would achieve a pluralism in intelligence, concentrate on security and political evaluations, and ensure a better balance in intelligence estimates. A better Research Department in the Foreign Ministry could have seen the stalled peace process and the usefulness of limited objectives. It could have sorted through the rhetoric of Arab leaders and advised accordingly. Dayan's observations could have been seen or inputed into the system through this office or through the special advisor, had one been appointed. The Commission did not put the blame on anyone in particular for not implementing any of the 1963 recommendatins. Since it was a parliamentary decision, they did not involve themselves. Prime Minister Meir has to share in the responsibility because she was the Foreign Minister in 1963 and remained so until 1965. Indeed, there was an intelligence failure in 1973 that allowed the Arabs to gain a tactical surprise over Israel. Complete strategic surprise was not achieved because the Israelis were mobilizing prior to the attack and had implemented their alert posture the day before. The Agranat Commission, while clearly laying blame on the Military Intelligence Branch of the IDF, also pointed out flaws known to exist in the intelligence community a decade earlier. The military intelligence effort was correct in saying Syria would not attack alone, and they were correct that Egypt would not attack without air superiority. If Israel's intelligence system had recognized Sadat's limited objectives, it would have realized that the forward deployment of SAMs gave Egypt air superiority. Military intelligence analysts were also correct in saying the Arabs were not capable of winning. They never said there was no chance of war. Without a good political assessment the low probability of war was not very far from the truth. The Agranat Commission does not acknowledge that the flaws within the Israeli intelligence community were known to the Prime Minister and other government officials, but just that the flaws were identified earlier and not acted upon. Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan each, in their autobiographies, remind their readers that the Commission cleared them. It did, in fact, clear them from direct responsibility but not parliamentary responsibility. The failure to implement a more effective intelligence apparatus is a parliamentary failure for which the Prime Minister and government ministers are responsible. Notes 1 Zeev Schiff, October Earthquake (Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects Ltd., 1974), p. 34. 2 Editors, "All the Inefficiencies of Any Intelligence Service," Armed Forces Journal International (October 1973), p. 47. 3 Moshe Dayan, Moshe Dayan: Story of My Life (New York: William Morrow, 1976), p. 466. 4 Insight Team of the London Sunday Times, The Yom Kippur War (New York: Doubleday, 1974), pp. 70-71. 5 Jacques Derogy and Hesi Carmel, The Untold History of Israel (New York: Grove Press, 1979), p. 280. 6 "The Middle East War," Armed Forces Journal International (January 1974), p. 34. 7 "War of the Day of Judgment," Time Magazine, October 22, 1973, p. 34. 8 Henry Schultz, Jr., ed. Facts on File Year Book 1974 (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1975), p. 431. 9 Dayan, p. 468. 10 The Agranat Commission refers to "the concept" as "the conception," but most authors use "the concept. 11 Insight Team, p. 95. 12 Ibid., p. 27. 13 Derogy and Carmel, p. 281. 14 Insight Team, p. 46. 15 Yoel Ben-Porat, Brig Gen. IDF., "The Yom Kippur War: A Mistake in May Leads to a Surprise in October," Rev. Ben- Porat, Yoel, Brig. Gen. IDF., and Dr. A. Lavita. "The Yom Kippur War," Maarachat (February 1985), np. 16 Ibid., np. 17 Mohamed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (New York: Quadrangle/New York Times Book, 1975), p. 16. 18 James A. Bill and Carl Leiden, Politics in the Middle East (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1983), p. 352. 19 K. A. MacKinney, Egypt and Israel: The Intelligence Prelude to the October War of 1973, Defense Intelligence School, March, 1978, p. 15. 20 Heikal, p. 16. 21 "Israel: Waht Went Wrong on October 6?" 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The Road to Ramadan. 1975 rpt. New York: Quadrangle/New York Times Book, 1975. Insight Team of the London Sunday Times. The Yom Kippur War. New York: Doubleday, 1974. "Israel: What Went Wrong on October 6?" Journal of Palestine Studies. Summer 1974, pp. 189-207. MacKinney, K. A. Egypt and Israel: The Intelligence Prelude to the October War of 1973. Defense Intelligence School, March 1978. Meir, Golda. My Life. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1975. "Missing the Arabs' War Signals." Time Magazine. 22 Oct. 1973, pp. 48-49. Schiff, Zeev. October Earthquake. Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects Ltd., 1974.
