President Johnson's Effect On U.S. Intelligence AUTHOR Major Kevin G. Donaleski, USMC CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - History EXECUTIVE SUMMARY PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S EFFECT ON U.S. INTELLIGENCE Lyndon B. Johnson became President after the tragic death of John F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963. His five years as President will be seen as some of the most troubling days in modern history. President Johnson was confronted with an overwhelming desire to create a Great Society. His hopes of this major domestic initiative were consumed by the complexities of the Vietnam War and the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Even though President Johnson did inherit Vietnam and the Soviet containment policy from Kennedy, it was President Johnson's lack of interest in foreign affairs coupled with his policy of giving broad grants of authority to others which caused serious problems in the intelligence community. During his administration, President Johnson misused the intelligence community. He continually used the community as his private staff instead of a support staff. The lack of oversight by the NSC, PFIAB and Congress added to the misuse of the intelligence community, especially in the area of collection. President Johnson's suspicious nature and the fact that he relied on a small inner circle of key advisors contributed to the lack of critical questions being asked with regard to foreign policy and the conduct of United States Intelligence Agencies. The results of President Johnson's impact on the intelligence community can be best illustrated by the sweeping changes made as a result of the Church and Pike Commission, that investigated the improper use of the system, much of which occurred during President Johnson's administration. PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S EFFECT ON U.S. INTELLIGENCE by KEVIN G. DONALESKI Major/United States Marine Corps TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1-2 CHAPTER I The Nation and President Johnson 3-7 CHAPTER II Containing Commumism 8-10 CHAPTER III Intelligence During the Johnson Era 11-19 CHAPTER IV Conclusion 20-21 ENDNOTES 22-23 BIBLIOGRAPHY 24-26 INTRODUCTION Lyndon B. Johnson will be remembered for more than being the thirty-sixth president of the United States. His five year tenure as President will be associated with some of the most troubling days of modern American history. On November 22, 1963, Lyndon B. Johnson was thrust into the main political spotlight - the Presidency of the United States. When he assumed that office, after that tragic day in Dallas, Texas when John F. Kennedy was assassinated, he envisioned his dream of the "Great Society" becoming a reality for all Americans. However, President Johnson's one great dream was consumed by an overwhelming theme - the Vietnam War. During the years of his Presidency, Lyndon B. Johnson was confronted by a great deal of turbulence affecting domestic issues, as well as foreign affairs. The Great Society, Vietnam, in fact the entire presidency of Johnson was a major turning point in American history. This turmoil brought about, for the first time, a close examination of the inner workings of senior level policy and decision making. This included questioning the credibility of the President, Congress and the intelligence community. Prior to President Johnson's Administration, many of the functions and methods of decision making and intelligence operations were silent and invisible - not to be held up for public scrunity. It was his administration that initially caused the American people, that included the press, to publicly question the decisions of the President, his advisor and the intelligence community. This paper will examine the relationship between President Johnson's preference for domestic affairs over foreign affairs and how the effects of the Vietnamese War affected this relationship. An historical perspective will first be presented, illustrating the mood of the nation and the circumstances which initially confronted President Johnson. This will be followed by a discussion of the effects that the preoccupation with Vietnam had on President Johnson and its influence on the intelligence community, both foreign and domestic. This paper will focus on the effects of President Johnson's perspectives on the intelligence community. It should be noted that this paper will deal with locally available, open-source material. Specific works dealing with President Johnson and his direct relationship with the U.S. Intelligence Community were virtually non-existent in the metropolitan D.C. area. In my search for information, I discovered that a valuable research center exists. This is the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, located in Austin, Texas. Although this library was not utilized for this paper, due to geographic location and lack of research time, it should be mentioned. To begin our discussion, we must look at the mood of the country when President Johnson became the thirty-sixth President. CHAPTER I. The Nation and President Johnson In a dramatic event that shocked the world, President John F. Kennedy was assassinated and Vice President Lyndon Johnson was catapulated into the Presidency. Johnson follwed an enormously popular and controversial president, who was in the process of campaigning for a second term. The Kennedy administration was a spark which ignited many deep feelings within the American people. At the onset of his administration, the country stood up and noticed their ambitious and charismatic leader. Even though there was a concern about his religion, family influence and liberal politics, the American people found him to be the leader who could excite the nation. He challenged the imagination of America with images of space travel to the moon. He raised the conscience of America with civil rights issues and he instilled strength and pride in America by dealing firmly with the Soviets during the Cuban Missile Crisis and while negotiating with the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. With Kennedy as President, a new vigor and excitement took hold, especially after the seemingly gray days of the recent Eisenhower administration. Technological advances in space, medicine and communications brought new horizons. Coupled with this excitement was the reality of the Cold War and the threat of nuclear was with the Soviets. The American public was very mindful of the cost of a global war, especially since World War II and the Korean War were still fresh in their minds. It was because of these memories and the associated fears that the American people believed war should be averted and America should, by virture of her morale and military strength, act as a global policeman. America became this force which attempted to contain rising Soviet expansionism and ebb the tide of communism.1 Even though the nation was concerned about the future, there was a feeling of better days ahead. This new sense of the future revitalized the nation. The Kennedy Administration was in part responsible for this new era and John F. Kennedy personified it. However, prior to his assassination, the brief thirty-five months of the Kennedy Presidency was not considered to be overly successful. In the foreign affairs arena, the fiasco with the Bay of Pigs and the limited progress made in Vietnam did nothing to heighten the credibility of his administration. In domestic affairs, four important legislative proposals - civil rights, tax reduction, Medicare, and federal aid to education - were all without Congressional approval at the end of the Kennedy administration. 2 In fact, prior to his assassination, there was widespread criticism of his administration. In the month before that fateful day in Dallas, the Kennedy approval rating in the polls was down to 59%, from a one time high of 83%3 The mood across the nation was restless and impatient. The nation as a whole was experiencing many changes, facing new issues and frontiers. With his death, an uncertainty about the future was pervasive among the American people. President Johnson was faced with a myriad of complex issues, both foreign and domestic, during his initial days as president. Some of these issues he handled with success, others would eventually overwhelm him. In retrospect, President Johnson was an able and astute leader, whose reputation of being a tough, competitive politician earned him a great deal of respect as a Congressman and Senator. He was so energetic and ingenious as a Congressman that observers called him "the best Congressman for a district that ever was." He ran numerous times for political office totally unopposed.4 In fact, it was Johnson who fought Kennedy for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1960 and, in an effort to ensure a Democratic victory, Johnson was brought on as the Vice Presidential cnadidate. As Vice President, he was very active; he was sent to twenty-six foreign countries on good will or fact finding missions and was appointed Chairman of the President's Committee on Equal Opportunity and the National Aeronautics and Space Council.5 Johnson was quite comfortable in this active Vice Presidential role, although he longed to be president. "He never doubted that if given the opportunity, he would be a great one."6 While Vice President, his exposure to foreign affairs was limited, and he was able to focus much of his attention on domestic issues. Domestic issues were always a keen concern of his. Johnson perceived himself in the same vein as Franklin D. Roosevelt, who greatly influenced Johnson in his early political life. This influence coupled with his rural upbringing in the difficult years of the 1920's and 1930's gave Johnson his focus on domestic issues and a desire to create a better society for all of America. In his book, My Hope for America, written in 1964, President Johnson expressed a deep concern and hope for the American people and society in general and explained how his "Great Society" was to evolve.7 He also remembered, while growing up, that his neighbors in Texas lived at a level so low that Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal could not reach far enough down to benefit them.8 Johnson shared the dreams of Roosevelt and Kennedy in creating a Great Society and was determined to achieve it.9 However, his first priority upon assuming office was to assure the American people, as well as the world, that the United States' policy would continue and the country would remain politically stable. One of the primary ways of maintaining this confidence was to retain Kennedy's senior national security advisors. This arrangement not only let Kennedy's principal advisors stay involved in foreign affairs, but also let Johnson devote his time to his primary interest of domestic politics and policy. Over the course of his administration, President Johnson replaced some of Kennedy's advisors with his own advisors. In the mid-1960's, when McGeorge Bundy left the White House, Walt Rostow moved in as the new National Security Advisor. William Bundy also moved to Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East. Both men exerted a great deal of influence in the foreign affairs arena and both were convinced that a military solution in Vietnam was possible.10 President Johnson was quite comfortable with this arrangement, which eventually removed him more from the decision making process and gave his advisors a broad grant of authority. CHAPTER II. Containing Communism American interest in Vietnam did not begin with President Johnson. The appreciation of Asia's vulnerability can be seen in President Truman's Administration. It was President Truman who added a new thrust to American policy: the containment of Communism in Asia. In late 1949, Dean Rusk, Deputy Under Secretary of State, announced that the resources of the United States would be deployed to preserve Indochina and Southeast Asia from further Communist encroachment.11 It was the success of the United States foreign policy in Europe that blocked the Soviets there and brought about a Soviet shift toward Asia. The Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were extremely effective, but there were no such doctrines, plans, or organizations to prevent communist expansion in Asia. With the Communist Chinese and Soviets increasing their influence, and the western powers losing influence in the Far East, a vacuum was created by this lack of western presence which was filled by the Communists.12 At this time, the United States was beginning to discuss the "Domino Theory". It stated that if Indochina fell to communism, so too would the other countries of Southeast Asia. Since the Soviet Union and China both recognized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, United States' first priorty in dealing with Vietnam was to thwart the Soviet Union and China there. On September 8, 1954, the first concrete response to providing security to Asia against communist agression was established the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Thus, the conditions for military response has been established and with its increased tensions, Vietnam would soon become the country where the United States would test its resolve. In 1959, President Eisenhower, in a speech delivered at Gettysburg College in Pennsylvania, heightened Vietnam priorty when he stated: "Strategically, South Vietnam's capture by the Communist would bring their power several hundred miles into a hitherto free region. The remaining countries in Southeast Asia would be menaced by a great flanking movement....We reach the inescapable conclusion that our national interest demands some help from us in sustaining in Vietnam the morale, economic progress, and the military strength necessary to its continued existence in freedom."13 This thinking continued into the Kennedy Administration. At the outset, President Kennedy expressed his feelings about Communist expansion when he said at his inauguration "Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty." 14 It is not surprising that President Johnson also perceived the same dangers surrounding Southeast Asia and communist expansion. Not only was he committed to a strong response to communism, but his commitment was even more strengthened by his loyalty to Kennedy's policies. President Johnson inherited a large American commitment to Vietnam, which was not working. From its beginning, his Administration was in a never-ending attempt to decide what to do about it.15 During the Johnson Administration , Vietnam was the main focus of the United States foreign policy, but there were other events around the world which also played a significant role in his administration. The crises in Panama, Guantanano Bay, the Dominican Republic and the Six Day War in the Middle East brought about a great deal of concern. The foreign affairs problems increasingly took time, energy, and attention away from President Johnson's main agenda - that of domestic issues.16 He became increasingly perplexed by the Vietnam War and the time it was taking to find a solution. The frustrations with the war, threats of communist expansion, and the changing mood in America, with regard to domestic issues, brought about changes throughout the Johnson Administration which directly affected the intelligence community CHAPTER III. Intelligence During The Johnson Era In researching President Johnson's impact on the intelligence community, there are few detailed facts that could illustrate any specific changes or new directions given to the intelligence community during his administration. In fact there were a lack of Presidential mandates governing the community. Rather than long-range planning, requirements were levied with little advance notice. This chapter will briefly deal with the highlights concerning the direction, operations, and the limited oversight of the intelligence community during the Johnson era. DIRECTION For the most part, President Johnson let the intelligence community have a free reign in collecting and processing intelligence information that could be used by senior policy makers. He was appreciative and impressed with the capabilities of the intelligence community.17 He was also aware of its limitations, as he witnessed President Kennedy's fiasco with the Bay of Pigs, an incident for which the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) drew most of the blame. During the 1960's the United States intelligence community was dominated by two significant events. These were the increase in the volume of technical intelligence and the increasing involvement of the United States in Vietnam.18 As noted in Chapter I, President Johnson's first priorty was to give an image of continuity and political stability. This was achieved by continuing President Kennedy's policies and retaining his advisers. A key adviser who remained was John McCone. A rich and conservative Republican, McCone was the first outsider to head the CIA. McCone was well-acquainted with private industry and Washington Politics. He served as Under Secretary of the Air Force and later as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. He was the only Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) who ever took his role of providing substantive intelligence analysis and estimates to the President as his first priorty. During his tenure as DCI. McCone focused on improving the CIA's intelligence product, developing new technical collection systems, and attempting to coordinate the total United States foreign intelligence effort.19 Even though he was quite effective in reorganizing the CIA and providing sound intelligence, McCone continually became an irritant to President Johnson. President Johnson had two major difficulties with McCone. First, he continually stated that the gradually escalating air strikes against North Vietnam and the mission of our ground troops would be an active role, was too little, and too late. Second, he had close ties with Robert F. Kennedy, with whom President Johnson did not get along. 20 Upon McClone's resignation, due to falling from the President's favor, a major search for replacement was undertaken. President Johnson wanted Richard Helms, who headed the CIA's Directorate for Plans, the clandestine service side of the CIA. Johnson knew he would have a difficult time in getting a career intelligence officer confirmed by the Congress, so he selected Admiral William Rayborn. President Johnson wanted to give Richard Helms at least a year to prepare himself and to build a solid reputation with the elected officials on Capitol Hill. After approximately 13 months, Rayborn resigned and Helms became the new DCI. Due to his acceptance by President Johnson, Helms became a part of the White House inner circle. He was one of a dozen top officials on whom the President depended. Helms quickly won the confidence of the President which had eluded his predecessor, McCone. 21 His acceptance at the Tuesday luncheons was especially important, since these lunches effectively substituted for the formal National Security Council (NSC) meetings. Even though the NSC met frequently, President Johnson preferred to discuss issues of national security outside the NSC system. These informal meetings increased as President Johnson faced increased political pressure. Although Helms was considered to be an outsider, President Johnson viewed him and the CIA primarily as an instrument for the execution of White House wishes by secret methods. The President really did not comprehend or care to learn the structure of the intelligence community, and as a result, CIA's influence in policymaking deteriorated. 22 It became apparent to Helms that President Johnson selectively intelligence estimates, usually leaning toward reports furnished by the military which tended to be more optimistic than the reports by the CIA. On one occasion, Helms seemed to bend to White House influence concerning intelligence reporting. Helms signed a report entitled "Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communist for Fighting In South Vietnam," thus approving its content. The estimate of enemy order of battle that was quoted by the military was deflated in order to present a more favorable impression to the senior policy makers. Helms was fully aware that the military figures were extremely low and were contrary to the figures his agency estimated. Nonetheless, Helms signed the document and stated he do so because he did not want to confront the military, supported by Walt Rostow and the White House.23 It seemed as though Helms was right in not confronting Rostow and the other advisors. By keeping on the good side of President Johnson he still was able to direct some influence, however limited it was. Overall, Vietnam presented serious problems in the analysis and production of intelligence. The CIA continually battled with the proponents of bombing North Vietnam, mainly Defense, which had a serious effect on the nature of intelligence estimates, especially toward the late 196O's.24 It is important to note that the CIA was consistent throughout the war in presenting a less optimistic view than the Defense Department, particularly those of McNamara, who was always predicting victory. Due to his preoccupation with the Vietnam War, President Johnson ultimately mismanaged the proper use of his NSC staff and the intelligence community, using it as his private staff instead of a supporting staff, thus eliminating the procedure to formulate a consensus on foreign policy.25 OPERATIONS The overall direction given to the intelligence community was dictated by the President's policy of containing the communist threat, especially the Soviets. President Johnson and his close advisors saw Soviet involvement confronting the United States on both the foreign and domestic fronts. Since President Johnson used the intelligence community as his provate staff, there was some confusion in dealing with the Soviet threat in a comprehensive manner. This was especially true in dealing in the domestic area. At first a number of questions were raised of bureaucratic jurisdiction between the CIA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In 1966, there was a formal agreement between the FBI and the CIA dealing with jurisdiction overlap. The FBI retained jurisdiction over domestic counterintelligence. The CIA was required to coordinate with the FBI, as did the military services, when special situations inside the United States presented problems.26 This agreement was more of proper management of assets than it was of control of the intelligence community's operations. Throughout the Johnson era, the White House directed numerous actions to be undertaken, mostly involving counterintelligence operations in the United States. At this time, there was an impression given to the intelligence community of "get the job done" regardless of the methods.27 The CIA's CHAOS, which began in 1967, was a foreign intelligence operation requested by the President. He was very concerned about the protest over Vietnam being linked to other dissident groups who were under Soviet influence. While CHAOS was concerned with foreign influences on internal political activities, its basic direction was overseas. In another domestic operation, the CIA infiltrated the activities of demonstrators protesting in Washington, D.C. in 1967 and 1968. The CIA employed about a dozen private citizens to join activist organizations and report on their plans, organization and financial backing.28 In 1967, President Johnson requested a detailed study be done on the "Restless Youth". This was due to President Johnson's suspicions that a conspiracy of some sort lie behind the unrest in Newark, New Jersey and Detroit, Michigan. He was convinced, by his own feelings and by J. Edgar Hoover, Dean Rusk and Walt Rostow, that North Vietnam, Cuba and the Soviet Union were not only supporting, but somehow directing, these types of movements.28 The FBI during this time had also initiated a specialized Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO). Their objective was simply the destruction, exposure and neutralization of the Subversive groups' activities. These subversive groups included the Communist Party, U.S.A., Socialist Workers Party, White Hate Groups, Black Extremists, and the New Left.30 It should be noted that even though a good deal of effort was put forth toward domestic targets, both the CIA and FBI continued to target foreign communist organizations and the individuals connected with them. Additionally, the CIA was very active overseas during this period. The Agency, through various means, attempted to influence foreign government to be in line with a more pro- western way of thinking. These operations took place in Eucador, Chile, the Congo, Cuba, Greece, Laos, Peru and Vietnam. They were in part successful and benefited the United States in balance of power with the Soviets. However effective the intelligence community was during this time, a seriou problem seemed to develop when the White House began to utilize the community as its support staff, especially in the domestic arena. Abuses began to occur at the direction of senior officials or by their unwillingness to control the intelligence community. They included: President Johnson using the FBI for purely political intelligence on critics and political opponents; FBI warrantless wiretaps on civic and social leaders; the National Security Agency's Watch List Activity which targeted certain U.S. citizens; Internal Revenue Service conducting tax investigations based on political criteria; FBI infiltration of the Women's Liberation Movement. and the CIA's funding of nearly 80 percent of the National Student Association from 1952 until 1966, in order to gain influence over activities of student organizations.31 It seemed as though the intelligence community and the senior White House officials took full advantage of all their opportunities. OVERSIGHT Intelligence oversight during the Johnson Era and before, was, for the most part, left to the Executive Branch and the intelligence agencies themselves. There were, however, organizations such as the NSC and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) in place, but they had limited effect under President Johnson. The PFIAB, which was established in 1956, was comprised of distinguished citizens from outside the government to make recommendations for actions to enhance the intelligence of the United States. It also had an independent watchdog role, a role which it was not allowed to fulfill because it lacked authority. In fact, President Johnson had little use for the PFIAB. When President Johnson left his first meeting of the PFIAB, he confided to Marvin Watson, then Special Assistant to the President, "The grass grows too tall in there." That was almost the last meeting President Johnson had with the PFIAB.32 The NSC was another possible oversight organization, but it is an instrument of the President and not an entity with authority of its own. Additionally, since President Johnson used his "Tuesday Lunch" group in lieu of the NSC to formulate his foreign policy decisions, the NSC lost its limited oversight role. There was limited Congressional oversight of the CIA conducted by separate subcommittees of the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. However, Congress generally had a supportive attitude toward the Cold War policies of the President and to the intelligence community.33 To illustrate this fact, in July 1966, a roll call vote rejected a proposal to permit members of the Foreign Relations Committee to participate directly in Senate Oversight of U.S. Intelligence operations.34 This pervasive attitude continued throughout the entire term of President Johnson, effectively nullifying any critical oversight by Legislative and Executive branches of the government. CHAPTER IV. Conclusion Based on the discussions throughout this paper, it is evident that President Johnson did have a major impact on the intelligence community. Due to his suspicious nature and his management style, he misused the intelligence community to suit his personal needs, not in the way it was intended to function. At times the overwhelming preoccupation with the Cold War, Vietnam and his failures on domestic issues, found President Johnson using McCarthy Era tactics in dealing with these problems. President Johnson ignored the oversight mechanisms, the NSC and the PFIAB, by relying heavily on his inner circle of advisors who shared his same suspicious feelings about those outside their "Tuesday Lunch" group. As seen in Chapter III, this eyen affected the intelligence provided by the DCI, Richard Helms, who avoided confrontation with McNamara and Rostow by giving in on occasion on his agency's position. It is true, President Johnson did inherit Vietnam and the Cold War theme from President Kennedy and others; however, it was President Johnson's lack of interest in foreign affairs and his propensity to delegate and give broad grants of authority to others which caused serious problems in the intelligence community. There was no restrictive legislation passed nor was there any concern expressed by the Johnson administration about occurring abuses. It can be stated that a president mirrors the American society, to an extent. The American people were preoccupied with Vietnam and suspicious of the Soviet intentions, but not to the extent that President Johnson was affected. Additionally, the lack of concern, oversight and strict control exhibited by the other two branches of government contributed to the intelligence community's problems. These problems which occurred prior to President Johnson grew throughout his presidency and were eventually addressed during the Church and Pike Committee Hearings in 1975, resulting in sweeping changes within the intelligence community. ENDNOTES 1. Spanier, John W., American Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1985). pp. 17-51. 2. Goldman, Eric F., The Tragedy of Lyndon B. Johnson (New York: Alfred A. Knof, 1969). p. 13. 3. Ibid., p. 14. 4. Caro, Robert A., The Path to Power (New York: Alfred A. Knof, 19830, p. 532. 5. Johnson, Lyndon B., Vantage Point (New York: Alfred A. Knof, 1983) p. 4. 6. Goldman, op. cit., p. 20. 7. Johnson, Lyndon B., My Hope For America (New York: Random House, 1964), pp. 49-60. 8. Caro, op. cit., p. 498. 9. Johnson, Lyndon B., My Hope For America (New York: Random House, 1964), pp. 49-60. 10. Kayfman, Daniel J., U.S. National Security (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1985), pp. 557-8. 11. Karnow, Stanley, Vietnam: A History (New York: Viking, 1983), p. 169. 12. Spanier, op. cit., pp. 50-51 13. Johnson, Lyndon B., Vantage Point(New York: Alfred A. Knof, 1983), p. 51. 14. Ibid., p. 52. 15. Powers, Thomas, The Man Who Kept Secrets (New York: Alfred A. Knof, 1979), p. 165. 16. Johnson, Lyndon B., Vantage Point (New York: Alfred A. Knof, 1983), p. 324. 17. Ibid., p. 324. 18. Fain, Tyrus G., The Intelligence Community (New York: R.R. Bowher, 1977), p. 20. 19. Cline, Ray S., Secrets, Spies and Scholars (Washington. D.C., Acropolis Books, 1976), pp. 192-214. 192-214. 20. Power, op. cit., pp. 166-7. 21. Johnson, Lyndon B. , Vantage Point (New York: Alfred A. Knof, 1983), pp. 329-330. 22. Cline, op. cit., p. 216. 23. Powers, op. cit., pp. 186-9. 24. Fain, op. cit., p. 21. 25. Cline, op. cit., pp. 199-202. 26. Senate. Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Senate Report 94-755 (94th Congress, Second Session, 1976) p. 97. 27. Johnson, Lyndon B., Vantage Point (New York: Alfred A. Knof, 1983), p. 341. 28. Breckinridge, Scott D., The CIA and the U.S. Intelligence System (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 193-202. 29. Powers, op. cit., pp. 245-6. 30. Fain, op. cit., pp. 390-410. 31. Ibid., pp. 392-398 32. Godson, Roy., Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Intelligence Policy (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1986), p. 33. 33. Breckinridge, op. cit., pp. 70-71. 34. "CIA Oversight." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, July 22, 1966, pp. 1578-80. BIBLIOGRAPHY BOOKS Breckinridge, Scott D. The CIA and the U.S. Intelligence System. Boulder: Westview Press, 1986. Caro, Robert A. The Path to Power. New York: Alfred A. Knof, 1983. Christian, George. The President Steps Down. New York: Macmillan, 1970. Cline, Ray S. Secrets, Spies and Scholars. Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1976. Destler, I.M. Our Own Worst Enemy. New York: Simon and Shuster, 1984. Dixon, James H. National Security Policy Formulation: Institutions, Processes and Issues. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1984. Fain, Tyrus G. The Intelligence Community. New York: R. R. Bowher, 1977. George, Alexander L. Presidential Decision Making In Foreign Policy. Boulder: Westview Press, 1980. Godson, Roy. Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Intelligence Policy. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1986 Goldman, ERic F. The Tragedy of Lyndon B. Johnson. New York: Alfred A. Knof, 1969. Johnson, Lyndon B. My Hope for America. New York: Random House, 1984. Johnson, Lyndon B. Vantage Point. New York: Alfred A. Knof, 1979 Karnow, Stanley, Vietnam: A History. New York: Viking, 1983 Kaufman, Daniel J. U.S. National Security. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1983. Oseth, John M. Regulating U.S. Intelligence Operations. Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky, 1985. Powers, Thomas. The Man Who Kept Secrets. New York: Alfred A. Knof, 1979. Snepp, Frank W. Decent Interval. New York: Random Housed 1977. Spanier, John W. American Foreign Policy Since World War II. New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1985. MAGAZINES/JOURNALS "CIA" Oversight." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. July 22, 1966, pp. 1578-80. Handleman, Howard. "Another U.S. Problem That Just Will Not Go Away." U.S. News and World Report, February 28, 1966, p. 52. "Intelligence Community Remains a Problem for Congress." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, November 15, 1963, pp. 1985-90. "LBJ and Congress." U.S. News and World Report, August 23, 1965, pp. 30-31. Pinkerton, Roy H. "The Role of Intelligence in Policymaking." Military Review, July 1966, pp. 40-51. Stern, Sol. "NSA and the CIA: U.S. National Student Association." Ramparts, March, 1967, pp. 29-38. "U.S. Intelligence - Is It Good Enough?" U.S. News and World Report, September 9, 1963, p. 66. "Watching the CIA at Work Around the World." U.S. News and World Report, March 6, 1967, pp. 28-30. "What Next In Vietnam?" U.S. News and World Report, August 9, 1965, pp. 33-40. NEWSPAPERS Beecher, William. "Johnson and Vietnam." Wall Street Journal, December 30, 1965, p. 1. Large, Arlen J. "Shadowboxing." Wall Street Journal, January 10, 1967, p. 1. Karmin, Monroe W. "Getting in Deeper." Wall Street Journal, August 6, 1964, p. 1. Otten, Alan L. "The Men Around LBJ." Wall Street Journal, August 18, 1965, p. 12. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS House of Representatives. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Compilation of Intelligence Laws and Related Laws and Executive Orders of Interest to the National Intelligence Community. Committee Print. 99th Congress, First Session, 1985. Senate. Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Senate Report 94-755. 94th Congress, Second Session, 1976.
