CSC 1984 SUBJECT AREA Warfighting RPV's: New Eyes for the Corps Submitted to Dr. Rudolph Wiggins In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements for Written Communications The Marine Corps Command and Staff Collegd Quantico, Virginia Major D. L. Abblitt United States Marine Corps April 16, 1984 RPV's: New Eyes for the Corps Outline Thesis sentence: To take advantage of the technolgical advances of today's high threat battlefield, the Marine Corps needs to determine what functions RPV's will perform, and when RPV's will be part of the Marine Corps' combat arsenal. I. Introduction A. RPV's over Lebanon in 1982 B. The Marine Corps at a decision point with RPV's II. What mission areas would RPV's perform for the Marine Corps A. RPV's integration into the six functions of Marine aviation 1. Offensive Air Support 2. Antiair Warfare 3. Assault Support 4. Aerial Reconnaissance 5. Electronic Warfare 6. Command and Control B. RPV's suitability within those functional areas 1. RPV characteristics 2. RPV capabilibties III. How should the Marine Corps proceed in their acquisition of an RPV A. Delay on the decision B. Continue research and development with the U.S. Army C. Purchase an operational system already available IV. Conclusion A. RPV's would best perform Aerial Reconnaissance, Electronic Warfare, and Command and Control B. The Marine Corps would be best served by a simple, proven system RPV's: New Eyes for the Corps The modern battlefield requires the commander to be fully prepared to handle the dynamics of rapid maneuver warfare brought upon him by his enemy. He must account for enemy ground movement as well as the enemy's threat from air mobile forces and air-to-ground attack aircraft. If a commander is incapable of accomplishing these tasks, his ability to wage war will be significantly jeopardized and readily available for destruction by the opposing force. What could serve as a better example of this than the Israeli invasion of Lebanon during June 1982. To control their destiny, the Israelis made a calculated decision to develop a means of acquiring real-time tactical information of the battlefield; their decision was to utilize Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV's). As defined in JCS Pub 1, an RPV is an "unmanned air vehicle capable of real-time control by a person from a distant location through a communications link." RPV's also fit into the broader definition of "drone" which refers to a land, sea or air vehicle controlled either remotely or automatically. For the Israelis, the RPV's produced a tremendous tactical advantage which enhanced their position on the battlefield: "The Israelis used RPV's last year [1982] to help deal the Soviet-equipped Syrians a humiliating defeat in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. Radar-reflecting decoy drones lured SAM antiaircraft batteries into wasting deadly missiles. Then, RPV's, locating targets electronically, helped Israeli jets to destroy 19 Surface to Air Missile (SAM) launchers while suffering only a single loss. Meanwhile, video-equipped drones hovered above Syrian airfieids signaling each time a MiG [aircraft] took off. This [information] allowed Israeli fighters, armed with air-to-air missiles, to score 81 "kills" with no losses of their own."1 During the Vietnam war, the United States armed forces made rather extensive use of drones and RPV's (more than 3,400 operational sorties were flown sustaining an attrition rate of less than 10%). However, due to post-war budgetary constraints, many of the previous RPV programs were accorded a low priority in terms of money available for research and development. It wasn't until the Israelis had enjoyed their significant successes in Lebanon that the Department of Defense renewed its full interest in continued development of Remotely Piloted Vehicles. Advances in electronic miniaturization, structural design, and composite material, combined with the Israelis innovative tactical application of RPV's, has revitalized the RPV program. As stated by Colonel Robert D. Evans, Aquila program manager for the United States Army, the manner in which the Israelis "used the RPV's over Lebanon provided them with a combat force multiplier at a relatively inexpensive cost."2 The United States Marine Corps is now at a decision point: Whether or not to take full advantage of this combat-proven system by integrating RPV's into the Marine Corps' combat arms. In order to evaluate the effects of the RPV's integration into the Marine Corps, two areas have been selected for analysis: 1. What mission areas would remotely piloted vehicles best perform in support of the United States Marine Corps; and 2. What the Marine Corps' best course of action would be in selecting a remotely piloted vehicle. Remotely piloted vehicles are capable of being programmed to handle a wide variety of missions. James P. Wade Jr., principal Deputy under Secretary of Defense of Research and Engineering offered the following viewpoint: "Recent advances in composite materials, low-cost engine technology, microelectronics, sensors, navigation systems, command and control concepts, data storage and data links have made application of a variety of subsystem capabilities possible in packages small and inexpensive enough to create promising unmanned sensor platform opportunities."3 With today's technological advances, the Marine Corps has a full range of remotely piloted vehicle options available. However, if the RPV program is to be kept manageable, the Marine Corps needs to develop a list of critical mission requirements. To facilitate this task, since the RPV's are classified as air vehicles, it would be prudent to orient the RPV capabilities around established aviation functions the Marine Aircraft Wing already performs with manned aircraft. As deliniated in FMFM 5-1, in order for Marine aviation to accomplish its mission as the supporting air component of the Fleet Marine Force, the multitude of tasks required of aviation have been organized into six functional areas; they are as follows: 1. Offensive Air Support (OAS)--Air action against enemy targets which can either be in close proximity to friendly units and requires close coordination with the friendly maneuver units (Close Air Support), or air action beyond the Fire Support Coordination Line which does not require detailed integration with the fire and maneuver of friendly ground forces (Deep Air Support). 2. Antiair Warfare (AAW)-Operations conducted against enemy aircraft and /or missiles, their supporting forces, and operating bases. AAW comprises all measures, both offensive and defensive, employed to gain and maintain air superiority. 3. Assault Support--Vertical assault airlift for the landing force, air delivery of critical materials to combat elements of the landing force, air evacuation for elements of the landing force, and in-flight refueling service for both fixed wing aircraft and helicopters. 4. Aerial Reconnaissance--Visual reconnaissance as well as multisensor imagery (photograghy, side looking radar, and infrared) and electronic reconnaissance. 5. Electric Warfare--Military action involving the use of electromagnetic energy to determine, exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum and action which retains friendly use of this spectrum (Electronic Warfare Support Measures, Electronic Countermeasures, and Electronic Counter-Countermeasurres). 6. Command and Control--The capability of Marine aviation to exercise authority over, and maintain direction of, air support elements during the conduct of operations. It is to facilitate the execution of this function that the Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS) is established. When developing this integrated support system, maintaining a balanced force is critical; there should not be a total commitment to one means of aviation over the other. After reviewing all the functional areas, it is clear that RPV's were not designed to provide the services associated with Assault Support. When considering the tasks required for Offensive Air Support and Antiair Warfare, although these are feasible mission assignments, it is questionable whether these functions would be the most efficient and effective use of the RPV's for the United States Marine Corps. There are several RPV's, currently on the market, capable of carrying a limited variety of ordnance (rockets, bombs, spray tanks, etc); however, the development of those RPV's was not without certain sacrifices. To be able to handle the larger or heavier payloads, the RPV's required several design feature modifications: 1. A larger airframe with stronger wing spars to support the added weight; 2. A higher aspect ratio (the wings length compared to its width) to provide for better stability during weapons delivery; and, 3. A larger power plant to sustain the same relative airspeed. Today's "typical" RPV could be characterized by the following parameters: Wing Span--10 to 12 feet; Length--12 to 14 feet; Gross Weight--200 to 400 pounds; Payload--40 to 70 pounds; and, Powered by--20 to 30 horsepower engine. To provide a comparison of size and capability differences between an RPV and a manned aircraft, the following information is provided on the A-4 Sky Hawk, a light-attack jet aircraft for the Marine Corps: Wing Span--27 feet 6 inches; Length--40 feet 4 inches; BasicWeight--approximately 12,000 pounds (varies based on modifications; neither fuel nor ordnance are included); Payload--9,000 pounds (varies with aircraft configuration and mission assigned); and, Powered by--Pratt and Whitney J-52-P-408 Turbo Jet Engine with 11,500 pounds of thrust. Table 1 provides a comparison of several RPV's; air vehicles that are either currently operational and available for purchase or ones that are in their final stages of development or production. "Aquila," developed by Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, is the United States Army's 70 month Full Scale Development program designed to provide the commander with a remotely piloted vehicle.4 "Scout" and "Mastiff" are Israeli RPV's; they are manufactured by Israel Aircraft Corporation and Tadiran/Israel Electronics Industries respectively (both of these systems were used during the 1982 Lebanon invasion). And, "Skyeye," manufactured independently by Developmental Sciences, Incorporated, is currently on the market and represents one of the RPV's capable of carrying a limited ordnance load (note the increased size and weight). In reviewing the table, it is significant to note the differences in Range, Endurance, and Payload. Click here to view image In terms of size, and maneuverability, the perponderance of RPV's on the market today are not structurally designed to handle a heavy ordnance load. Therefore, unless they are programmed to attack soft, point targets, the RPV's would not be able to deliver a lethal blow. In that regard, RPV's cannot compete with the capabilities of manned, fixed wing aircraft on missions specifically designated as Offensive Air Support or Antiair Warfare. Marvin Klemow, director of Israeli Aircraft Industries' Washington office stated: "It is not the airframe that counts, it is the payload, the magic The mission that Aquila was designed to do [Aquila was originally designed for target acquisition and designation, aerial reconnaissance, and artillery adjustment missions.5] is only one of the minor functions of Scout. It [Scout] also does airfield searches, intelligence gathering, electronic countermeasures, Naval target acquisition, and many, many classified missions."6 There are a significant number of factors that go into selecting appropriate items of equipment in order to accomplish required missions. And, a well balanced mix of RPV's and tactical manned aircraft would produce a very effective force structure. Of the six functions discussed, three areas stand out as providing the most effective utilization of RPV's: Aerial Reconnaissance, Electronic Warfare, and Command and Control. Dr. Azriel Lorber, an Israeli RPV expert, has indicated that the real value of the RPV is in its ability "to collect and disseminate information in real-time."7 In justifying his comments, Dr. Lorber suggested two separate levels that could gain the most from this real-time information source: The first is the intelligence officer of the brigade or division, who can use it to fill out accurately those egg-shapped forms on his map put there by other intelligence gathering means. Processing and collating this information takes time; its transfer and assimilation takes time. . .in the midst of action, this chain of events is by far too long. . .So now we come to the second user of such information, the battalion or brigade commander himself. If in the middle of the engagement he could look at every terrain feature. . .this would help him enormously.8 It is not my intention to indicate that there are only three functions RPV's are capable of performing; on the contrary, remotely piloted vehicles are only limited by their size and their capacity to launch with the wide variety of electronic sensors, camera pods, laser designators, ordnance (bombs, rockets, missiles, spray tanks, etc.; as deemed appropriate), and a variety of other miscellaneous equipment. However, with every additional mission assigned to the RPV's, the field commander's logistics load will continue to increase. The judgement then is whether or not the benefit gained from the missions assigned to the RPV's and the probability of their successful completion exceed the logistics burden that will be placed on a highly mobile force. The key determinant is the probability of successful completion of an assigned mission; and, the RPV's have proven in combat to be most effective in each of the functional areas selected: Reconnaissance, Electronic Warfare and Command and Control. For the United States and its allies, it is essential to recognize that many nations have very strong interests in the development and utilization of remotely piloted vehicles. As pointed out by William A. Burhans, the "continued coverage of RPV's in open Soviet literature and analysis of the Falklands conflict, show that the Soviet military places great importance on remotely piloted vehicles."9 There have been over 20 nations, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and India, taking the initial steps towards RPV purchases following its successful record in Bekaa Valley. "Developmental Sciences, Incorporated [DSI], a City of Industry, California-based manufacturer, has already sold RPV's to two Third World countries. Sighs DSI President Gerald Seemann: 'One of those systems will have been in place for five years before the Army gets any [RPV's]."'10 The reference being made is to the Army's commitment to the Aquila program and an apparently constant set of delays and setbacks plaguing the program. The concern expressed by many representatives from industry, as well as the defense establishment, is that delayed acquisition of an RPV system will only extend the time it takes the United States armed forces to develop the tactics and doctrine required for integrating RPV's into the force structure; in the mean time, potential adversaries will have had fully operational RPV programs. The Marine Corps has its normal complement of intelligence nets, sensors, ground and aerial observers, and airborne and ground electornic warfare systems; however, most of these sources require varying amounts of time for processing, analyzing, or disseminating before that information can be utilized by the commander responsible for making prompt, critical decisions. Such a "time-sensitive" situation establishes the basic drive for integrating RPV's into the Corps; none of our current programs provide the commander with the real-time intelligence so vital to success on today's highly technical battlefield. In determining what course of action to take regarding the acquistion of a remotely piloted vehicle system, the Marine Corps has several options available: 1. Postpone any decision waiting for additional information from research on existing systems and systems currently being developed; 2. Join efforts with the United States Army in the development of the Aquila RPV system; or, 3. Strike out on the open market to take advantage of existing systems. A delayed decision has some inherently good qualities: It will allow time to more adequately define the desired mission of the RPV for the Marine Corps; And, it will provide more products to choose from when the decision is made. However, if the needs and wishes of the Marine Corps are to be recognized and taken into account during the developmental stages, then it is necessary to initiate movement toward a desired program. Additionally, to delay the decision only increases the opportunity of going to war without the RPV's, delays the development of tactics and doctrine for RPV employment, and does nothing to stave off the rising cost of purchasing the systems. Historically, the Marine Corps has always had to contend with a limited-budget. Accordingly, it has been common practice for the Marines to line up with one of the sister services for research and development of new products--the Aquila RPV program is just such a case. The United States Army has been the driving force behind the program; and, as stated by Lt. Gen. James H. Merryman, Army deputy chief of staff for research, development and acquisition: "I can tell you in no uncertain terms, the Army is fully commited to fielding an RPV [Aquila] and we are going to start fielding that RPV in 1985. . . .The challange, however, is to develop a subsequent RPV system that is easier to transport and easier to maintain."11 General Merryman's statement does not provide a very favorable outlook for the immediate needs of the Marine Corps. Even though the fielding date is programmed for 1985, the actual date offered for operational deployment of the Aquila system is 1987. Furthermore, as pointed out by Colonel John Carlton, Marine Corps representative to the Pacific Missile Test Center at Point Magu, California, the straight forward goal of the Marine Corps "is to make it [the RPV] as simple as possible."12 It--simplicity-- is precisely the point that makes the Aquila such a disquieting selection. The Army, continuing to add more and more requirements to the system, is creating an increasingly more complex RPV. In so doing, the goals of the Marine Corps may have been overshadowed by the Army in their search for a system that will do it all (provisions for of up to 60 different tasks). The option for a joint Army/Marine Corps RPV acquisition would be more feasible if the system design had remained simpler; however, "Aquila's delicate aerodynamics, chiefly its elegant tailless design, restrict it to small payloads with precisous little flexibility and margin for error."13 Certainly, the Aquila will be an impressive system; but, there may be more practical paths available. There are many remotely piloted vehicles on the market today, most of them capable of performing a wide variety of functions. In fact, the number of manufacturers and developers is so extensive that it is well beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say, there are many RPV systems available and each could be tested to meet the immediate needs of the Marine Corps. However, two operational systems (Scout and Mastiff) are veterans of many combat missions; their individual value has been tested and proven on the battlefield. In establishing their impressive record, both the Scout and the Mastiff have displayed a fine degree of flexibility in mission capabilities. The scope of investigation should not necessarily be limited to just these two systems, but the capabilities of Scout and Mastiff and their concept of employment have a great deal to offer the United States Marine Corps. Remotely piloted vehicles have demonstrated a tremendous capability of providing the battlefield commander the real-time intelligence so vital with today's highly mobile, combat environment. For the Marine Corps, the most effective way to utilize this tool would be to integrate the RPV's into Marine aviation--create a blend of RPV's and manned aircraft. Programming the RPV's for Aerial Reconnaissance, Electronic Warfare, and Command and Control would allow the manned aircraft to concentrate on higher priority targets and targets requiring heavier ordnance loads. Through combat operations, the Israelis have been able to validate the importance of RPV's. The significance is clear, and it is now time for the Marine Corps to take full advantage of this cost-effective, force multiplier. FOOTNOTES 1Michael Cieply, "Paper planes." Forbes, 26 September 1983,p.34. 2David M. Russell, "Israeli RPVs: The Proven Weapon System DOD will Not Buy." Defense Electonics, Vol.15 No 3. (March 1983),88. 3Bruce A. Smith, "RPV Growth Depends on Technical Gains." Aviation Week and Space Technology, 119 (8 August 1983),42. 4Col. Robert D. Evans,USA, "Aquila, the force multiplier." Signal, Vol.37 No.8 (April 1983),22. 5Ibid,p.23. 6Russell,p.94. 7Azriel Lorber, "The Mini-RPV Comes of Age." Military Technology, No 6/83 (June 1983),p50. 8Ibid,p.50. 9William A. Burhans, "Soviet's Keeping a Close Eye on RPV's." Journal of Electonic Defense, Vol.6 No.6 (June 1983),22. 10Cieply,p.35. 11Bruce A Smith, "Israeli Use Bolsters Inteest in Mini-RPV." Aviation Week and Space Technology, 119 (18 July 1983), 67-68. 12Cieply,p.35. 13Ibid,p.34. BIBLIOGRAPHY Blickensderfer, Tom L., Maj, USMC. "RPVs: An Inexpensive Alternative." Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 67 No.12 (December 1983), 51-55. Burhans, William A. "Soviets's Keeping a Close Eye on RPV's" Journal of Electronic Defense, VoL 6 No.6(June 1983), 21-22. Cieply, Michael. "Paper planes" Forbes, 132 (26 September 1983), 34-35. "Eagle Eyed Scouts." The Economist, 22 October 1983, pp.94-96. Evans, Robert D.,Col, USA. "Aquila, the force multiplier." Signal, VoL37 No.8 (April 1983), 21-26. Klass, Philip J. "SkyEye RPV Squadron Due for Export Delivery." Aviation Week and Space Technology, 117 (13 December 1983), 102-104. Lorber, Azriel. "The Mini-RPV Comes of Age." Military Technology, No. 6/83 (June 1983),46-50. Millis, Philip J. "RPVs over the Bekaa Valley." Army Vol. 33 No. 6 (June 1983), 49-51. Pretty, Ronald T.,ed. Jane's Weapons System 1981-1982. 12th ed. London: Jane's Publishing Company, Limited, 1983. "RPVs: A Great Help if Properly Used." Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 67 No. 9 (September 1983), 29. Russell, David M. "Israeli RPVs: The Proven Weapon System DOD Will Not Buy." Defense Electronics, Vol. 15 No.3 (March 1983), 86-94. Schemmer, Benjamin F. "US RPVs Back in Production as USAF Buys 1,000 Boeing Pave Tigers" Armed Forces Journal International, July 1983, p. 10. Smith, Bruce A. "Israeli Use Bolsters Interest in Mini-RPVs."Aviation Week and Space Technology, 119 (18 July 1983), 67-71. Smith, Bruce A. "RPV Growth Depends on Technical Gains." Aviation Week and Space Technology, 119 (8 August 1983), 42-44. Taylor, John W. P. ed. Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1972-73. London: Jane's Yearbook, Paulton House, 1974. U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Development and Education Commad. Marine Aviation, FMFM 5-1. Quantico, 1979. Wanstall, Brian. "Battlefield surveillance RPVs bring it 'live'." Interavia, April 1983, pp. 343-346. Wilson, G.I., Maj, USMCR "RPVs for the Frontline Commander." Marine Corps Gazette, VoL 67 No 12 (December 1983), 53. Yoffee, Wade. "Send a Scout for Information." Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 67 No. 9 (September 1983), 28-30.
