Find a Security Clearance Job!

Intelligence

REPORT ON THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ

TABLE OF CONTENTS

COVER PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION1
A. Understanding Intelligence Analysis4
1. Developing Professional Intelligence Analysts4
2. An Analyst's Daily Taskings7
3. The Finished Product7
B. Weapons of Mass Destruction Capabilities8
1. What is an NIE?9
2. The 2002 NIE on Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction12
3. Overall Conclusions - Weapons of Mass Destruction14
C. Iraq's Ties to Terrorism29
1. Overall Conclusions - Terrorism32

II. NIGER36
A. The Original Niger Reporting36
B. Former Ambassador39
C. Continuing Analysis47
D. The British White Paper49
E. The National Intelligence Estimate51
F. The Cincinnati Speech55
G. The Niger Documents57
H. The Fact Sheet60
I. The State of the Union64
J. Secretary Powell's UN Speech66
K. Niger Conclusions72

III. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSIS OF IRAQ'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM84
A. Background84
B. Nuclear Reconstitution85
1. Aluminum Tubes87
a. The National Intelligence Estimate95
b. Other Assessments of the Tubes115
2. Procurement Attempts for Magnets, High-Speed Balancing Machines and Machine Tools119
3. Iraq's Efforts to Re-Establish and Enhance Its Cadre of Weapons
Personnel as well as Activities at Several Suspect Nuclear Sites
120
a. The Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission is Expanding the Infrastructure - Research Laboratories, Production Facilities, and Procurement Networks - to Produce Nuclear Weapons121
b. Many of Iraq's Nuclear Scientists Recently Have Been Reassigned to the IAEC121
c. Renewed Regular Contact Between Saddam and the IAEC, as Well as Enhanced Security, Suggests the IAEC is Again the Focal Point of Saddam's Nuclear Program122
d. Activity at Several Suspect Nuclear Sites124
C. Niger125
D. Explaining Uncertainties126
E. Intelligence Agencies' Analysis on Reconstitution Prior to Publication of the NIE126
F. Analysis of Iraq's Currently Accurate, Full and Complete Disclosure128
G. Nuclear Conclusions129

IV. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSIS OF IRAQ'S BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM143
A. Background143
B. Baghdad Has Transportable Facilities for Producing Bacterial and Toxin BW Agents148
1. Other Sources150
2. CURVE BALL152
(  )3.                    157
4. INC Source160
(  )5.                    161
6. Intelligence Community Mind Set Concerning Mobile BW Programs161
C. Baghdad Has Been Able to Renovate and Expand its Fixed Dual-Use B W Agent Production Facilities162
1. Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute163
2. Habbaniyah I Castor Oil Plant164
3. Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Production Plant165
D. We Assess That Iraq Has Some BW Agent and Maintains the Capability to Produce a Variety of BW Agents166
1. Smallpox166
2. Other Agents170
E. In the Absence of UN Inspectors, Iraq Probably Has Intensified and Expanded Research and Development in Support of Iraq's BW Program. Baghdad Probably Has Developed Genetically Engineered BW Agents175
(  )1. Research Activity                     176
2. Reported BW Testing Near Qadisiyah Reservoir177
F. We Assess That Baghdad Also Has Increased the Effectiveness of its BW Arsenal by Mastering the Ability to Produce Dried Agent178
G. Iraq's Capability to Manufacture Equipment and Materials and to Procure Other Necessary, Dual-use Materials... Makes Large-scale BW Agent Production Easily Attainable179
1. Foreign Procurement179
2. Indigenous Iraqi Efforts 181
H. The Nature and Amounts of Iraq's Stored BW Material Remain Unresolved by UNSCOM Accounting182
I. We Judge That We Are Seeing Only a Portion of Iraq's WMD Efforts, Owing to Baghdad's Vigorous Denial and Deception Efforts183
J. Explaining Uncertainties184
K. Intelligence Agencies' Analysis of Iraq's Biological Weapons Program Prior to Publication of the NIE185
L. Biological Conclusions187

V. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSIS OF IRAQ'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) PROGRAM195
A. Background195
B. Baghdad Has Chemical Weapons199
C. We Judge That Iraq Is Expanding its Chemical Industry Primarily to Support Chemical Weapons (CW) Production202
D. We Assess That Baghdad Has Begun Renewed Production of Mustard, Sarin, GF (Cyclosarin), and VX204
E. Although We Have Little Specific Information on Iraq's CWStockpile, Saddam Probably Has Stocked at Least 100 Metric Tons and Possibly as Much as 500 Metric Tons of CW Agents - Much of it Added in the Last Year205
F. Iraq Had Experience in Manufacturing CW Bombs, Artillery Rockets, and Projectiles206
G. Baghdad Probably Is Hiding Small-Scale Agent Production Within Legitimate Research Laboratories206
H. Baghdad Has Procured Covertly the Types and Quantities of Chemicals and Equipment Sufficient to Allow Limited CW Production Hidden Within Iraq's Legitimate Chemical Industry207
I. Chemical Weapons Defensive Posture and Procurements208
J. Explaining Uncertainties208
K. Intelligence Agencies' Analysis of Iraq's Chemical Weapons (CW) Prior to Publication of the NIE208
L. Chemical Conclusions211

VI. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSIS OF IRAQ'S DELIVERY SYSTEMS215
A. Background215
B. Scud-Type Missiles217
C. Iraq Was in the Final Stages of Development of the Al Samoud Missile (2000), May Be Preparing to Deploy the Al Samoud (2001), and Was Deploying the Al Samoud and Ababil-100 Short Range Ballistic Missiles, Both Which Exceed the 150-km UN Range Limit (2002)218
D. Development of Medium-Range Missile Capabilities220
E. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)221
F. Other Possible Missions for the UAVs225
G. Using UAVs to Target the U.S.227
(  )H.                                         231
I. Explaining Uncertainties231
J. Intelligence Agencies' Analysis of Delivery Systems Prior to Publication of the NIE232
K. Delivery Conclusions234

VII. IRAQ WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTELLIGENCE IN SECRETARY POWELL'S UNITED NATIONS SPEECH239
A. Nuclear Program242
B. Biological Weapons243
C. Chemical Weapons251
D. Delivery Systems253
E. WMD Powell Conclusions253

VIII. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COLLECTION ACTIVITIES AGAINST IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION258
A. Human Intelligence (HUMINT)260
B. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)264
C. Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)265
D. Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT)266
E. Impact of Increased Collection on Analysis267
F. Collection Directives268
G. CIA HUMINT Compartmentation268
H. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Collection Conclusions269

IX. PRESSURE ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSTS REGARDING IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) CAPABILITIES272
A. Allegations of Influence277
B. INR Analyst277
C Former INR Office Director279
D. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Senior Intelligence Analyst280
E. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Senior Intelligence Officer282
F. Former Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Desk Officer282
G. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Pressure Conclusions284

X. WHITE PAPER ON IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAMS286
A. Differences Between the Classified NIE and Unclassified White Paper290
1. Nuclear Weapons290
2. Biological Weapons291
3. Chemical Weapons292
4. Delivery Systems293
B. Primary Differences in the Key Judgments of the Classified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and Unclassified White Paper294
C. White Paper Conclusions295

XI THE RAPID PRODUCTION OF THE OCTOBER 2002 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON IRAQ'S CONTINUING PROGRAMS FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION298
A. Rapid Production of the National Intelligence Estimate Conclusions302

XII. IRAQ'S LINKS TO TERRORISM304
A. Intelligence Products Concerning Iraq's Links to Terrorism304
B. September and October 2001 Papers304
C. Iraq and al-Qaida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship, June 2002305
D. Alternate Analysis in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy307
E. Iraqi Support for Terrorism, September 2002313
F. Iraqi Support for Terrorism, January 2003314
G. CIA Assessments on Iraq's Links to Terrorism314
H. Terrorist Activities Conducted by the IIS315
I. Support for Regional Terrorist Groups317
J . Iraq's Relationship with al-Qaida321
K. Leadership Reporting323
L. Detainee Debriefings - Comments on the Relationship324
1. Abu Zubaydah324
(  ) 2.                     325
3. Khalid Shaikh Muhammad325
M. Contacts Between the Iraqi Regime and al-Qaida326
N. Training of al-Qaida by Iraq329
(  ) 1.                     330
2. Additional Reports from Varying Sources331
(  ) 3.                      Reporting about Activity at Salman Pak332
O. The Use of Iraq as a Safehaven334
1. Discussions of Safehaven335
2. Iraqi Regime Knowledge of al-Qaida Presence in Northeastern Iraq336
3. Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi in Baghdad337
P. Operational Cooperation Between Iraq and al-Qaida338
1. 1993 World Trade Center Bombing339
2. The September 11th Attacks340
3. The Foley Assassination341
Q. Iraq's Use of Terrorist Strikes in the Event of War with the United States342
1. Saddam Hussein's Past Use of Terrorism343
2. The Decision-Making Environment in Iraq344
3. Iraq's Weapons Capabilities344
R. Iraqi Links to Terrorism Conclusions345

XIII. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COLLECTION ACTIVITIES AGAINST IRAQ'S LINKS TO TERRORISM350
A. Human Intelligence (HUMINT)351
B. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)353
C. Terrorism Collection Conclusions355

XIV. PRESSURE ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSTS REGARDING IRAQ'S LINKS TO TERRORISM357
A. Allegations of Influence359
1. CIA Ombudsman for Politicization359
2. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and "Alternative Analysis"361
B. Terrorism Pressure Conclusion363

XV. POWELL SPEECH - TERRORISM PORTION366
A. Powell Speech Conclusions - Terrorism Portion369

XVI. IRAQ'S THREAT TO REGIONAL STABILITY AND SECURITY371
A Background371
B. IC Analysis on the Iraqi Threat374
C. Agency Level Papers and Current Intelligence Products375
D. Key Analysis Topics in Agency Level Documents376
E. Review of IC Level Assessments377
1. Summary of Assessments 1991-1994378
2. Summary of Assessments 1995-1998381
3. Summary of Assessments 1999- 2003386
F. Iraq's Threat to Regional Stability and Security Conclusions391

XVII. SADDAM HUSSEIN'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD394
A. Background394
B. Highlights of The Intelligence Record395
C. Collection and Analytical Approaches400
1. Information Sources400
2. Collection Issues401
3. Analysis Processes401
D. Saddam Hussein's Human Rights Record Conclusions402

XVIII. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE ON IRAQI SUSPECT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION SITES WITH UNITED NATIONS INSPECTORS404
A. Background404
B. The Lead-up to Renewed Inspections405
C. The Sharing of Information - the "Pull" Side of the Exchange406
D. The Sharing of Information - the "Push " Side of the Exchange407
E. Information Shared Compared to the Intelligence Community's Master Inspection List410
F. Multiple Intelligence Community Lists413
G. Statements Made by Administration Officials about the Sharing of Information415
H. The Intelligence Community's Sharing of Intelligence on Iraqi Suspect Weapons of Mass Destruction Sites with United Nations Inspectors
Conclusions
417

APPENDIX A423

APPENDIX B429

GLOSSARY431

ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS437

ADDITIONAL VIEWS441
Chairman Pat Roberts joined by Senator Christopher S. Bond, Senator Orrin G. Hatch441
Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV, Senator Carl Levin and Senator Richard Durbin449
Senator Saxby Chambliss with Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Senator Trent Lott, Senator Chuck Hagel and Senator Christopher S. Bond465
Senator Olympia Snowe470
Senator John Warner476
Senator Dianne Feinstein479
Senator Ron Wyden489
Senator Richard Durbin498
Senator Barbara A. Mikulski508



NEWSLETTER
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list