

(2-5)

1. Submitted by: HQ AFSPA/SPSS, Kirtland AFB NM, DSN 246-2874 or commercial (505) 846-2874.
2. (FOUO) Operation/event name: Unauthorized Entry to a Restricted Area/Alleged Attempted Hijacking of a USAF Aircraft, Mt Home AFB, ID, March 1986.
3. Keywords: Security/Unauthorized Entry to Restricted Area/Attempted Hijacking
4. Title: Unauthorized Entry to a Restricted Area/Alleged Attempted Hijacking of a USAF Aircraft, Mt Home AFB, ID
5. (FOUO) Observation: In the early afternoon on or about 15 March 1986, a male individual attempted to enter Mountain Home AFB, Idaho, through the main gate. He advised he needed a pass to see a buddy on base. He was told to park at the visitor center just inside the gate. About two minutes later, the gate guard noted that the individual had proceeded onto the installation without a pass, so he radioed the LE desk of the situation. At approximately the same time, the control tower was advised that an individual in civilian attire has just jumped the red rope at the boundary to the restricted area in Alpha sector (helicopter and transient aircraft parking) on the south side of the parking ramp. SPs were contacted, a HELPING HAND was initiated, and the SRT was dispatched. The individual was observed approaching a UH-1N helicopter which had just started its engines in preparation for takeoff on an M60 machine gun training flight. Upon seeing the individual jump the rope and approach carrying a satchel, the crew "gunned" the engines creating a great amount of propwash, pushing the individual back towards the restricted area boundary. The armed flight engineer was also poised with his weapon to stop the intruder if he was to go any further. At this time, the SRT arrived and placed the individual at a disadvantage. The search of the individual revealed a 9mm pistol (unloaded, but with the clip in the weapon), a number of .45 caliber pistol rounds, a toothbrush, and approximately 1/2 ounce of what later was tested positively for marijuana. A COVERED WAGON was initiated, along with the appropriate security response option. Once the individual was detained, a bomb dog team was sent to check out his vehicle which was parked next to the rescue hangar. The bomb dog alerted on the vehicle and the area was evacuated and cordoned off. All aircraft were also evacuated from the vicinity. EOD responded and thoroughly examined the vehicle. The dog alerted in the area of the trunk, so EOD remotely opened it. Inside was found a small cache of rifles and ammunition, along with a small amount of drugs and paraphernalia. The weapons were checked through NCIC and found to have been stolen from a residence in Twin Falls, Idaho, a year earlier. The FBI responded and arrested the subject on the criminal trespass and weapons charges. Other charges were later added. The individual stated that he was coming to the base to see a buddy and that he was going to "go for a ride on an airplane." The individual appeared to be under the influence of narcotics at the time of his arrest. He also smelled of liquor. No accomplices were discovered.
6. (FOUO) Discussion: The subject was convicted in Federal Court and sentenced to 90 days in jail, received over a year of probation, and was prohibited from entering any military reservation for a period of five years. He was then remanded to the custody of Twin Falls police to face a number of charges related to the stolen weapons.
7. (FOUO) Lessons Learned: The after-action report revealed that the individual was able to gain entry to the installation due to the configuration of the main gate parking/visitor control center. Visitors would be asked to proceed past the sentry and park at the Visitor Center out of his or her view. Flight line security procedures worked as intended. As a result of this incident, HQ TAC/CC personally visited the site of the incident and implemented a program to examine the installation entry point gates command wide. The Mountain Home AFB gate/visitor control facility was demolished and a new one erected. A new parking/vehicle flow plan ensured that visitors would not be able to proceed onto the installation without having their pass checked by the sentry.
8. Recommended Action: The new facility was completed just over a year from the incident, funded by HQ TAC/CC. Under HQ TAC/CC direction, all other TAC bases initiated projects to evaluate their gates for like deficiencies.

9. OPR Comments: None