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LESSONS LEARNED FROM OPERATIONS ALERT 1955-57

30 April 1958

CAPTAIN LAUTRUP: Operation Alert is a management tool that is used to evaluate the caliber of Government planning for emergency. To speak to us this morning on the lessons learned from Operations Alert 1955 through 1957, we have Mr. I.D. Harris, who is the Deputy Assistant Director for Plans and Readiness in the Office of Defense Mobilization.

His background includes experience as a lawyer, as an officer in the Air Force, some time with the State Department, and he is a graduate of the Industrial College. Since 1952 he has been with ODM. He has been closely identified with mobilization planning for nuclear war, and particularly with the formulation of policies for the mobilization base, continental defense, and test exercises. He was the Evaluation Officer for Operation Alert 1957, and the chairman of the task force to resolve some of the problems identified in that exercise. Now, this should qualify the speaker this morning as an expert.

Mr. Harris, it certainly is a pleasure to welcome you back to the school and to present you to this year's class.

MR. HARRIS: Captain Lautrup, Admiral Clark, Faculty, Students: I don't know whether you've heard the latest definition of an expert or not. There is one adapted for the sputnik era when the emphasis is on education and the training of scientists and mathematicians. It has become common knowledge that "X" stands for the unknown quantity; that a "spurt" is a drip under pressure; and that, therefore, an expert is an unknown drip under pressure. Under that definition, I qualify as an expert this morning.

Operation Alert, as I'm sure you know, is a name which has been used to identify integrated test exercises conducted by the Federal Government.

The lessons learned from these exercises are in substance the sum total of our experience in mobilization planning to cope with any emergency--limited war and general war--but principal emphasis has been placed on situations involving a nuclear attack on the continental United States.
To summarize the lessons learned in 45 minutes is really a monumental task of distillation. For example, the evaluation reports for Operation Alert 1957 fill more than a file drawer. I compared those reports with the lectures, term papers, committee reports, and other material that I accumulated while I was in the Industrial College. The reports for Operation Alert 1957 are equal in volume and weight, if not in substance, to the pounds of lectures, term papers, and other material to which one is exposed in a 10-months' course at the Industrial College.

In making this summary of lessons learned, I shall, therefore keep in mind the task that is before you, namely, that of the final problem, and endeavor to highlight those experiences which might be most helpful to you. Incidentally, it was my fortune to have served as chairman of one of the committees on the final problem when I was here; and I have a very deep sympathy for you. However, I might say that what you have before you for possibly a month's time is the kind of thing that in an Operation Alert the participants have before them in a few days' time. So you can sympathize with us as well. I will therefore eliminate lessons learned on how to plan, organize, conduct, and monitor an exercise, and will concentrate on lessons learned with respect to our preparedness, and how to improve it.

A proper appreciation of the progressive nature of these exercises and the lessons learned therefrom requires a brief explanation as to how the exercises got started. This will be followed by a brief description of the exercises themselves with a summary of the lessons learned. Finally, if time permits, we may find it of interest to delve into some of the unresolved problems identified in these exercises and which are currently under probe.

First, how these exercises got started. Historically, due to our geographical position, the speed of travel, the range and destructive power of weapons, little attention was given to mobilization planning in peacetime. We had time.

Between World War I and World War II the military had foreseen the need for mobilization planning in peacetime, to purchase the time needed in war. Extensive plans were developed, as you know, notably the Mobilization Plan of 1937. But the various agencies of Government that would be needed to put the plans into action did not participate in this planning; nor were they familiar with the plans. In the absence of this Government-wide participation, the benefit was largely lost in the
rush and confusion of the "battle against time" which came with the sudden outbreak of hostilities at Pearl Harbor. From this we learned a lesson—the need for Government-wide participation in the development of plans.

We also learned some lessons during World War II. We learned that the nature of warfare was changing rapidly, that weapons of mass destruction increasingly involve civilian populations, that the contraction of distances makes time increasingly precious, and that mobilization planning involves some degree of instant readiness. We learned that if there was to be an acceptable state of readiness, we must do in time of peace that which we would no longer have time to do after the commencement of hostilities.

Now, to capitalize on these lessons, the National Security Act was enacted in 1947. It provided for (1) a National Security Council to integrate domestic, foreign, and military policies; (2) a Central Intelligence Agency to coordinate the direction of intelligence activities; (3) a Department of Defense to provide coordinated direction for the military establishment; (4) the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the preparation of joint military war plans; and (5) a National Security Resources Board, now the Office of Defense Mobilization, for the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization plans.

Three years later, in 1950, came the Korean War. Mobilization plans took second place to activities in support of the war we were then fighting. By 1953, the Korean War became stabilized. In August 1953, the USSR detonated a thermonuclear device. In October 1953 the President stated that the Soviets now have the capability of atomic attack on us, and such capability will increase with the passage of time. Increased emphasis was now to be placed on adjusting our mobilization preparedness measures to the possibility of nuclear warfare.

A few months later, early in 1954, after some review of the continental United States defense posture, following the study that was made by the Bull committee and presented to the National Security Council, the President was presented with what was called a mobilization plan. It was a feeble plan by comparison with current concepts. In fact, there may be some question as to whether or not it was a plan in the true sense of the word. It was in the nature of a checklist of policy actions. I might say it was an abbreviated form of the British War Book.

The President's reaction to the plan was this: No plan is any better than it works. Test it. And that is how we got started on test exercises—an activity entirely new to the Federal Government.
We were faced with many novel questions: How could a mobilization plan be tested? What should be the objectives of a test? What should be its scope? Who should participate? What assumptions should be used as to the possible situations we would face? How realistic should it be?

Let us now briefly review the exercises that have taken place and the lessons learned.

In 1954, a few high-level officials, assuming several hours warning of a hypothetical attack, left Washington with a checklist of possible actions. They assembled in a cave. Water was dripping from the ceiling and oozing from the walls. This was the setting for our first exercise.

The exercise lasted only a few hours, but a great deal was learned, believe it or not. The participants needed information on the attack situation to determine what policies were actually necessary. They didn't have it. They needed assistance in the preparation of documents to reflect policy decisions. They didn't have it. They needed to communicate policy directives to the departments and agencies concerned. They couldn't do it. They needed to know that the agencies had a capability to carry out the policy directives if they could issue them. They had no way of knowing. So a new push was given to the development of physical features for carrying on government—relocation sites, an interagency communication system, and the further development of plans.

We now have some 90 relocation sites in the seat of Government arc from 30 to 300 miles of Washington, and over 300 relocation sites throughout the country for regional and field offices. The arc is connected with an interagency communication system, which is reasonably adequate and is in the process of further development. A few highly secure relocation sites for central direction and for the protection of central communications have either been constructed or are under construction. That's just a side note to show what development there has been in some of these things which seemed so dismal in 1954.

Now, in 1955 a combined Civil Defense and Government relocation test was staged, with the participation of one region, the St. Louis region. We wanted to make sure that we didn't fall flat on our faces; so 45 days prior to the exercise, alert cadres from all of the participating agencies activated their relocation sites, checked records, tested communications, and performed functions under conditions of a sustained alert as though we may have had a strategic warning. We wanted to have a few people set up shop in advance.
The exercise lasted three days and was participated in by some 6,000 Federal employees. The three actual days of the exercise, however, covered a simulated period of 30 days following the attack. This gave us some trouble.

An interim assembly, consisting of the heads of 21 departments and agencies, met with the President to advise on policies, proclamations, Executive orders, and other matters to cope with the emergency. This showed that planning had not been sufficiently developed.

Incidentally, there were some people in Government at the time who said that this was a lot of nonsense, boy scout business, school play. They said that we don't need any of this mobilization planning, that a few strong men can meet together after the attack takes place and decide the critical questions. These exercises have pretty well done away with the force of that point of view in Government.

A quick appraisal of the hypothetical attack pattern in 1955 indicated that there was a shocking number of casualties by World War II standards. We've gotten used to larger quantities since.

The President announced to the Interim Assembly that under the circumstances he was declaring martial law, that is, ordering military assistance to civil authority and martial law where necessity required it. He immediately ordered the heads of the agencies to go to their relocation sites and be with their organizations.

No one was prepared for the military assistance--martial law action. It wasn't in the plan. Why it wasn't I can't say. The decision caused no end of consternation to both civilian and military agencies. Everyone was speculating as to what it meant. Would the civilian agencies or the military make the allocations of resources, do the rationing and so forth and so on? The lawyers were running for the books to draft an appropriate proclamation, looking back to see what Abraham Lincoln did.

Work went on for the following three days--in shifts around the clock. High-level conferences continued. Communication facilities, built for day-by-day traffic, were choked with the traffic of 30 simulated days crowded into 3 actual days. At many headquarters people were asking: "Are we testing a plan? Are we testing a situation? Or are we testing human endurance?"

And I might say from my experience that if the exercise had lasted four days, human endurance would have been tested. We were all exhausted.
Meanwhile, out in the St. Louis region a simulated evacuation of a great city had taken place. On first blush it looked as though quite a good job had been done. But on examination it was found that the greater part of the people had been evacuated into the most intense fallout area.

As against this backdrop, here are some of the highlights of the lessons learned in 1955:

1. The dispersed relocation sites fared well under the attack. Operations from relocation sites is feasible if you have enough warning time. The continuous staffing of relocation sites must be looked into, just in case we don't have sufficient warning time.

2. The telescoping of 30 simulated days into 3 actual days placed unrealistic demands on the communications system, and did not provide a fair test. However, it was found that much remained to be done not only to improve communications facilities, but to train people at all levels—and let me emphasize "at all levels"—on communications discipline, because most of the offenses against such discipline were committed at high levels. They consisted of long, verbose messages, abuse of precedence ratings, overclassification requiring encrypting, paraphrasing, and so forth and so on. A communication system is an essential for dispersed operation. Communications discipline is an essential for the operational efficiency of any such system.

3. The assemblage of 21 persons to advise the President in an emergency is unwieldy. To avoid such an assemblage requires a further development of plans; greater familiarization with the plans; the predrafting, clearance, and distribution of action documents; and faster means for analyzing and distributing attack damage data on which decisions are to be made.

The idea in bringing the 21 heads of departments and agencies together in an Interim Assembly was to give them a quick feel for the initial policy direction, and to give them some conception as to what the magnitude of the damage situation might be before going to their organizations. If, however, we could develop these concepts in advance, or be assured of their prompt communication, it would not be necessary to take the heads of agencies away from their organizations.

4. Planning for military assistance to civil authority must be further developed; and substitutes for martial law, if any, must be explored.
Well, you know the result of that. There have been a great many articles written on the subject of military assistances and martial law since that exercise.

5. Preparations in the regions to deal with disaster situations must be given immediate attention, not only for one region, but to get emergency planning out to the field generally, so it will be prepared to act in accordance with national policy.

In 1956--if we can move on to that one--a more ambitious exercise was undertaken. The scope included mobilization, civil defense, and military activities--a three-way exercise--at the national, State, and local levels. The exercise lasted seven days with 10,000 Federal employees participating.

Operations included the full gamut of activities, some 21 in all, including air defense warning, civil defense actions, activation of relocation sites, performance of essential functions, military support for civil authority, damage assessment, allocation of surviving resources, implementation of wartime controls, and regional coordination.

The magnitude of the attack and the gravity of the situation with which we would try to deal was stepped up about 30 percent over that of 1955. Eighteen percent of the total estimated casualties were attributed to fallout. And here we sense the beginning of a new problem area--that of fallout--which we must now take account of in all of our emergency planning.

Prior to the exercise, agencies had conducted individual exercises. Plans had been improved. More documentation was available. Preliminary briefings had taken place, first with the heads of the agencies and thereafter with the agency staffs. Considerably improved data for damage analysis had been assembled. More clear-cut divisions of responsibility had been defined. Regional organizations had been established.

Here are the highlights of the lessons learned in 1956:

1. The administrative aspects of the operation at emergency relocation sites were carefully observed by independent inspectors at each site. They were found to be generally satisfactory. Great emphasis was placed on administrative and physical capabilities because we must have these before we can deal with substantive problems. In other words, we have to survive in order to work and fight.
The attack had wiped out one site which was too close to a critical military installation. I think that I should refrain from telling you whose site this was, because I don't want to agitate any interservice rivalry. But the headquarters of one of the military services, Gentlemen, was gone. Since then, a new site has been selected. Fallout would have caused some sickness to two sites occupied by civilian agencies.

I should mention that Providence also participated in the exercise—just to make sure that we didn't get too smug. Throughout our relocation arc there broke loose on the first day of the exercise heavy thunderstorms, with a number of small tornadoes ripping through the area. Communications, already overcrowded, were temporarily interrupted.

All of these things, of course, pointed up the need to make some adjustments in the selection of sites, to expedite the construction that was under way, and to harden sites against fallout.

2. There was need for further training and discipline in the use of communications—this has plagued us considerably—shorter messages, proper use of precedence, less classification. And there was need to have at the sites, at all times, copies of proposed plans and action documents; so that you don't have to load your communications in an emergency with material which can be communicated in advance.

3. Further clarification of organizational responsibilities was needed, particularly as between old-line agencies and the new emergency agencies that were set up.

4. More basic data on resources were needed as well as faster means for estimating damage, subtracting losses from preattack resource estimates, and then estimating the surviving resource capabilities.

5. There were a few hard policy decisions that had to be made. One, for example, was in the domestic financial policy field. It's interesting to note that some agencies with considerable pride reported that they were able to continue their pensions and other payments to aid relief operations, while others with equal pride, reported that they had cut off all payments as an anti-inflationary measure.

The question remained open as to what is the best way to reestablish the economy. Is it through war damage indemnification? Or through relief and rehabilitation assistance on the basis of priority of need?
Let's move on, then, to 1957. In 1957 a still more ambitious exercise was undertaken. As in 1956, it was a three-way exercise, that is mobilization, civil defense, and military, at all levels. But, in addition, it was divided into three phases, which covered approximately six weeks.

The first phase dealt with increasing international tensions, followed by limited war. The second phase dealt with a nuclear attack on the United States. The magnitude of the attack and the resulting problems can be deduced from an estimated number of casualties over twice that of 1956. Approximately half of the casualties were due to residual radiation. The third phase dealt with the postattack situation, in which the management of surviving resources for winning the war and restoring the Nation became the Government's chief concern.

The exercise was participated in by approximately 13,000 Federal employees, and—get this—over half a million others, including military, State, local, and industrial personnel.

Perhaps the most significant feature of the exercise was that it forced an integration of our two major mobilization plans: one for dealing with a situation short of general war, and the other for dealing with a surprise attack without the strategic warning which preliminary hostilities might give us.

During the process of this integration in the exercise, one question became paramount, namely, what can be done, or what should have been done, in periods of international tension and limited war to make the Nation better prepared to meet the requirements of general war? In other words, if we get into a limited war situation, let's formulate our policies to support the limited war, but at the same time do it in a way, if possible, that will better prepare us in the event that the limited war develops into an attack situation.

The magnitude of the attack and the growing implications of radioactive fallout required, I would say, almost a complete reappraisal of policies and the means for carrying them out.

Administrative facilities for dealing with an emergency had improved appreciably since 1956. Thirty-seven percent of the agencies rated themselves as being in a high state of readiness. Forty-five percent rated themselves as generally satisfactory, and only 18 percent indicated that there was need for considerable improvement.
You might question these self-evaluations as being overly optimistic, but there is some justification for them. The increased year-round participation in mobilization planning activities over a period of four years was beginning to pay dividends. It should be credited for the extensive followthrough on Presidential decisions at various echelons, including field organization, and the high degree of confidence displayed in coping with a grave emergency. It should also be credited with the growing capability--and this is significant--to identify remaining deficiencies and unresolved problems. It takes competence to recognize a problem and a deficiency when you see them. Therefore, at the conclusion of Operation Alert 1957, due in part to the increased competence of participants, we found an increased number of deficiencies.

The lessons learned in 1957 can be summarized best by citing some of the matters identified as needing particular attention.

1. **Local Planning and Action.** You've got to have something more than a seat of government and a headquarters to deal with an emergency situation. Many things--most things actually--have to be carried out at the local level. Greater emphasis must be placed on planning and action at the local level. To avoid placing unwarranted reliance on the regional and central machinery of the Federal Government, efforts must be made to utilize to the maximum local governmental authority, services, and resources, together with State controls, leadership, and persuasion.

   Measures must be developed to assure a continuity of State and local governments, and to assure the maintenance of law and order, even by the use of extreme means, including martial law, insofar as necessary.

   Special guidance should be provided to local, State, and Federal field officials so as to enable them to take the appropriate actions during mobilization, attack, and recovery. Methods of communicating effectively among these officials, including a system for rapid record and telephone communications, must be developed.

2. **Transportation** is a matter needing attention. Steps must be taken to establish local control centers for transportation--it can't be done from headquarters--in order to achieve the widest possible decentralization of transport control. Provision must be made for the continuity of district offices which handle railroad embargoes and priorities. Incidentally, practically every district railroad control
office in the country was wiped out in the attack. Most of them, as you know, are located in major cities.

3. Communication. Governmental communications facilities require strengthening, particularly in the field. Arrangements should be worked out for the pooled utilization of message centers outside of damaged areas.

The time lag between actions taken by the President and the distribution of the resulting documents to the agencies must be reduced. This involves standby and self-triggering orders which will reduce communication requirements.

4. Attack Warning Systems. Alternate warning systems should be developed which will become operative in the event that the main system suffers damage from an initial attack.

5. Regional Structure. A common and consistent pattern of regional boundaries for purposes of an emergency should again be considered to make for greater efficiency and better coordination at the regional and local levels. Incidentally, there are some 17 departments and agencies with field offices and activities. As you know, there are six Army areas. At the time of the exercise in 1957, ODM had 10 regions, FCDA had 7 regions and the other 15 departments and agencies had various field organizations with various boundaries.

Now we are about to see the light of day when we will have among all the civilian agencies contiguous boundaries of regions for emergency administration. It appears that there may be eight, but well adjusted to the boundaries of the six Army areas.

6. Organizational Problems. More extensive planning is needed for timing the establishment of emergency agencies—both preattack and postattack—and coordinating their activities with the regular agencies. Questions were raised about the desirability of creating these emergency agencies in an attack situation. Can we afford to go through a reorganization at a time like that? Can we afford not to where critical functions and responsibilities are scattered? Take transportation, for example. If such functions should be brought together, and if it is too difficult to do so postattack, should it not be done now?

The scattering of responsibilities for health services among the Federal Civil Defense Administration; the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare; the Office of Defense Mobilization; and the Department of Labor should be reexamined.

Organizational arrangements for handling domestic information, and for coordinating foreign information and propaganda activities need to be established now, at least on a ready basis, for wartime use.

The existing list of essential wartime functions requires complete review to bring it up to date in view of the changing possible post-attack situations, as to what is essential and what isn't.

Consideration should be given to limiting the number of delegations of requisitioning authority. There are too many agencies with authority to requisition the same property.

7. Central Programing. Further study needs to be given to the central programing function as a means of dealing with the immediate postattack problems, in addition to providing policy guidelines pre-attack for use in the event of attack.

Central programing for the postattack period must give principal attention to the management of surviving resources, taking account of losses and the possibility of long-term denial of areas due to radiation, for the primary purpose of making the best immediate and potential use of what remains.

The identification of the most limiting resource is essential to the formulation of meaningful central programs. The extreme limiting effects of the hypothetical fallout situation on manpower utilization emphasized the need to reexamine ways and means for the mobilization and utilization of trained manpower.

The development of better mechanisms for the adjudication of conflicting claims on scarce resources is needed.

8. Production statistics. We have the know-how, the statistical tools, for handling the traditional job of mobilizing military (hard goods) production--this might be pretty obsolete if we are depending on military forces in being in an attack situation--but we are not equipped with the statistical tools to mobilize critical items for human survival, under attack and postattack conditions.
9. **Damage assessment.** Further study is needed of the capabilities of bomb damage assessment to provide prompt and adequate information for policy decisions, with emphasis on what survives rather than what is destroyed, emphasis on the "vertical" effects of production losses, and the quick identification of the overall most limiting factor on the utilization of total resources.

In addition to perfecting an electronic computation system for rapid assessment, work should begin on the development of on-the-ground surveys by technically competent people. Capabilities in radiological monitoring at the local level must be substantially improved.

Incidentally, I think that we have moved very far in this field of electric computers, standby computers, here and there throughout the country. But I noticed the other day where Ted Coop, CBS, was down visiting Cape Canaveral. Maybe you read the same story. He was impressed with the computers, dials, and other gadgets, but there was one on the wall that impressed him the most. It was a Chinese abacus under glass. The sign read: "Break in case of trouble." Maybe we should also incorporate that gadget at our computing headquarters.

10. **Civilian survival stockpile and shelter programs.** Approximately 50 percent of the hypothetical casualties occurred through lack of shelter and lack of critical survival items. Dealing with stockpile and shelter programs has to be on a long-term basis, rather than on an emergency basis, during a period of mobilization, when time may not be available to complete crash programs and when other mobilization demands of the Nation's resources are rapidly increasing.

11. **Fallout.** In addition to the hardening of sites against fallout, adequate equipment must be provided for fallout detection at relocation sites, and, for that matter, over the country as well.

12. **Domestic economic policy.** We had some of the same domestic economic policy problems that we had in previous years; i.e., establishing consistent policies among the Federal agencies. It now becomes clear that Federal, State, and local economic policies must also be made consistent.

13. **Foreign economic policy.** We had problems also with respect to foreign economic policy--economic warfare and foreign assistance. We need to improve our mechanisms for administering economic warfare
measures. We need to study the means and capabilities for providing assistance to our allies and other friendly nations in relation to probable domestic needs.

We need better and more integrated planning in the mobilization field between Canada and the United States. Incidentally, joint United States-Canadian participation in these exercises would be helpful.

14. Finally, the policy problems. The exercise demonstrated once again that a brief relocation period does not afford the time necessary for an adequate consideration of policy problems. Attention to such matters must be continuous, and a part of each agency's normal work programs, to assure thorough staff consideration of documents, careful determination of requirements, and organizational responses to planned actions.

In summary, then, with respect to all exercises and all of the lessons learned, I think that the most lasting dividend is that we are developing throughout Government habits of thinking and the ability to react quickly to a new kind of emergency situation with which no government has had to deal. Our hope is, that if we are sufficiently prepared for such a situation, no one will ever have to deal with it. These exercises will not permit us to become complacent. There will never be a "plan" not subject to change, nor a document which cannot be modified. Each year, we must work against the problem of a dynamic situation. Each year, we improve plans, skills, and readiness.

Thank you very much.

CAPTAIN LAUTRUP: Mr. Harris is ready for questions.

QUESTION: I'd like to ask a question about economic warfare. We noticed that in last year's plan there were no actions for economic warfare. This year in the revision there is quite a section on it. Can you give us an idea of the difference between the part that it played in last year's Operation Alert and what is intended this year?

MR. HARRIS: I think that you have already surmised that planning for economic warfare was behind planning in some other fields. Economic warfare cuts across a great many departments and agencies. It involves the Departments of State, Treasury, and Commerce, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs, and others.
During the course of the year they have organized two working committees on this subject: one dealing with the negative aspects, shall we say, the economic warfare itself; and the other dealing with the more positive aspects, where we lend assistance to our allies as we can. These committees soon found that one couldn't work on these economic warfare aspects without taking into account what was being done with the other hand, on the assistance. So then they formed a joint committee, and as a result of that they have been trying to hammer out a consistent plan.

I think that in this year's exercise we will get a great deal more out of the economic warfare play than we ever have before; first, for the reason that I've given; and, second, because this year's exercise is planned to reach a further point of time in the postattack period than we have ever been able to reach before.

QUESTION: In an Operation Alert, what types of policy are you required to make which could not properly have been made ahead of time?

MR. HARRIS: Frankly, I am inclined to believe that there are very few among the broad or major policies. It is for this reason that I believe the time has come when we can and should provide the general public with policy guidance for use in an emergency.

QUESTION: My question is in the same area as the first one, although it looks at the other side of the coin. It seems to me that most of the ODM work is looking at the facts after we are into a war. What part does ODM play in cold war before the fact of getting into a war, realizing our weaknesses and so forth? Do you participate? And if you do, do you participate enough, do you think, in this area?

MR. HARRIS: The ODM is concerned with developing mobilization plans for an emergency--such as those assumed in our exercises. This may be what you describe as looking at the facts after we are in a war. We might call it a capabilities plan. The ODM is also concerned with preparedness programs for overcoming our weaknesses, currently or in the cold war period. There are many such programs, such as those pertaining to the continuity of Government, industrial defense, stockpiling, manpower, the mobilization base, trade agreements having an effect on the mobilization base, and others.

What we need is a midrange plan to provide a basis for budgeting and for measuring progress in these programs. If this were done, I
believe we could move ahead more orderly with our preparations during the cold war period.

Heretofore, we have always thought that "attrition" is the last stage of war, this situation is entirely reversed today if you are looking at massive nuclear warfare. What you do in the way of preparedness has to be done in advance of the attack. If the free people of the world only realized that in the cold war period, the peacetime period, we are actually engaged in a war of attrition, we would willingly make sacrifices which we are not now willing to make. We would willingly do many things which are now postponed.

QUESTION: How long will it be before your FCDA plan actually gets down to the villages and the lowest communities where people have an active organization in being? I found out personally from my own experience that down in the counties and the towns they don't have anybody in there. They've got a head of this thing maybe, but no one else. If an attack occurred during this kind of situation, it would be bad. How long do you think it's going to be before the planning will get down to where this man has the documents, and if martial law is declared, he'll know who's going to help from where? I don't know what you are planning to do about taking over in the case of martial law and having food stockpiled around, taking over all your grain elevators out in the Middle West, and things like that. These things will have to come first. Then we can get into matters like getting on our feet and manufacturing some weapons, reorganizing our economy, and continuing the war. How long will it be in view of that before we get this plan down in the grassroots? We were told by many people that we don't have such a plan today.

MR. HARRIS: You are speaking now primarily of the Civil Defense plan. I am not an authority on it, but I will try to be as responsive as I can. There are visitors here this morning from the Federal Civil Defense Administration who could probably give a better estimate than I.

I think that by and large it is accurate to state that the depth and breadth of planning from the civil defense standpoint down to the village is pretty spotty. It varies in different parts of the country and in different localities. There are many that no doubt have nothing. There are others that are probably very good. And it varies tremendously as between States.
This is one thing that makes conducting a nationwide type of exercise difficult. Some States are able to participate in a much more sophisticated way than others.

Now, how long it will take to get this planning on down to the villages? I don't know. I doubt very seriously if it will ever be uniform. There will always be some that will procrastinate and say: "Oh, it's not going to happen. Or, if it does happen, what can we do about it?" But tremendous strides are being made.

QUESTION: You said that the States and the local governments should assume greater authority and responsibility. Now, in connection with economic stabilization, should we treat these local and State governments as independent operators, depending upon the situation, or would you treat them as local administrators of a prearranged plan?

MR. HARRIS: I would treat them as local administrators of a prearranged plan. This would make the most sense. But, in order to make it effective, they've got to be given the policy in advance.

I am very much in hope that from the standpoint of policy in general to meet an attack situation, something of that sort can be gotten out this fall. We have some ideas. We want to test them thoroughly in this year's exercise and subject them to the severest criticism.

I think this: That if each individual, each community, each county, each State, realizes that this policy guidance is essential from the standpoint of the national interest, and that people in other States, other communities, are called upon to comply and make sacrifices for the national good, then they will be willing to do so.

The administrative mechanisms of all governments should be utilized in carrying out the general policy, applicable to the country as a whole, because this is to their interest.

CAPTAIN LAUTRUP: Mr. Harris, on behalf of the Commandant, I would like to thank you for a very good look at Operations Alert. I am sure that we now have many more experts in the audience.