UNITED24 - Make a charitable donation in support of Ukraine!

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Iraq Survey Group Final Report

30 September 2004

Please see the correction regarding Niro Atomizer Inc.

In March 2005, the Special Advisor added addenda to his original report:

Note for the Comprehensive Report with Addenda

Addendums to the Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD [PDF]

Volume I

Cover Page
Transmittal Message
Cover Page 2
Scope Note

Regime Strategic Intent
Key Findings 1
Who Made Iraq's Strategic Decisions and Determined WMD Policy5
Saddam's Place in the Regime5
The Apex of Power5
Personalized Rule5
Saddam's Unsettled Lieutenants5
A Few Key Players in an Insular Environment7
Saddam Calls the Shots8
Saddam Shows the Way9
Harvesting Ideas and Advice in a Byzantine Setting10
Weaving a Culture of Lies11
Saddam Became Increasingly Inaccessible11
Saddam's Command By Violence12
Saddam's Effect on the Workings of the Iraqi Government13
Suspicion of Structures13
Powerless Structures13
The Higher Committee14
The Foreign Policy Committees15
Saddam's Grip on National Security and WMD Development16
Saddam Holding Court18
Saddam and Fiscal Policy18
How Saddam Saw His Subordinates19
Mining Respect and Expertise19
Mutuality of Fear19
Dazzled by Science19
How Saddam Saw Himself21
Saddam's Psychology21
Saddam's Personal Security21
Saddam the Dynasty Founder21
Saddam and His Sense of Legacy22
Desire . . . Dominance and Deterrence Through WMD23
Saddam's Role in WMD Policy23
What Saddam Thought: The Perceived Successes of WMD24
What Saddam Thought: External Concerns28
The United States31
WMD Possession-Real or Imagined-Acts as a Deterrent34
Saddam's Prioritization of Getting Out From Under Sanctions34
Efforts To Lift Sanctions35
Realizing Saddam's Veiled WMD Intent41
Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline41
Ambition (1980-1991)41
Decline (1991-1996)42
Scientific Research and Intention to Reconstitute WMD44
Reaction to Sanctions44
Husayn Kamil's Departure46
Cooperating With UNSCOM While Preserving WMD47
Recovery (1996-1998)48
Impact of the "Chicken Farm" Documents49
Looking Ahead to Resume WMD Programs49
Guarding WMD Capabilities51
Iraq's Internal Monitoring Apparatus: The NMD and MIC Programs53
Suspending Cooperation With UNSCOM55
Transition (1998-2001)56
Nullifying All Obligations To UNSC Resolutions57
Preserving and Restoring WMD Infrastructure and Expertise59
Pumping Up Key Revenue Streams60
Miscalculation (2002-2003)61
Renewing UN Inspections63
Iraq's Other Security Concerns64
Sorting Out Whether Iraq Had WMD Before Operation Iraqi Freedom64
Alternative Hypotheses on Iraq's Nonuse of WMD During Operation Iraqi Freedom66
A. The Quartet-Influence and Disharmony Among Saddam's Lieutenants69
B. Iraq's Intelligence Services73
C. Iraq's Security Services85
D. Saddam's Personal Involvement in WMD Planning97

Regime Finance and Procurement
A Word on the Scope of This Chapter1
Key Findings3
Chapter Summary7
The Regime Timeline9
Ambition (1980-919
Decline (1991-96)9
Recovery (1996-98)9
Transition and Miscalculation (1999-2003)10
Directing and Budgeting Iraq's Illicit Procurement11
President and Presidential Secretary's Role in Illicit Procurement11
Presidential Diwan's Role in Illicit Procurement12
Diwan's Role in Supplemental Funding of Government Ministries12
Extent of Knowledge of the Former President of the Diwan13
Budgeting Iraqi Procurement14
General Government Budget14
Sources of Government Revenue14
Supplemental Budgetary Process14
Supplemental Budget Submission Procedure14
Approval and Authorization of Supplemental Funding16
Disbursal of Supplemental Funds18
Financing Iraq's Illicit Procurement19
Iraqi Economy's Role in Illicit Procurement19
Economic Ambition (1980-91)19
Economic Decline (1991-96)21
Economic Recovery (1997-99)22
Economic Transition and Miscalculation (1999-2003)22
Iraq's Revenue Sources22
Bilateral Trade Protocols24
Phases of the UN OFF Program28
Disposition of UN OFF Funds28
Oil Voucher Process29
Secret Voucher Recipients30
Iraqi Oil Vouchers Provided to International Leaders31
American and British Oil Voucher Recipients33
Benon Sevan's Use of Iraqi Oil Vouchers33
Iraqi Intelligence Service Nominations for Oil Vouchers33
Oil Export Surcharges33
How Surcharges Were Collected35
Kickbacks on Commercial Goods Import Contracts35
Private-Sector Oil Sales37
Role of the SOMO38
SOMO's Relationship to the MoO40
Official Oil Accounts40
Banking and the Transfer of Financial Assets for Procurement45
CBI's Role in Licensing Money Exchangers45
CBI's Role in Tracking Foreign Accounts for Iraq46
Iraqi Bank Holdings47
Funding of the Ministries47
The Use of Foreign Banks48
Use of Banks in Lebanon49
Use of Banks in Jordan49
Use of Banks in Syria50
Use of Banks in Turkey50
Use of Banks in Egypt50
Use of Banks in Belarus50
Regime Attempts To Recover Funds Prior to OIF51
The Role of Cash Transactions51
Iraq's Gold Reserves51
Executing Illicit Procurement in Iraq: Ministries, Commissions, and Front Companies53
Ministry of Foreign Affairs53
MFA-IIS Connections54
MFA's UN Sanctions Counter-Strategy55
MFA and Iraq's Bilateral Protocols56
Ministry of Trade56
MoT's Role in Procurement57
Facilitating Illicit Procurement With Cover Contracts58
Facilitating Illicit Trade Through Commercial Attaches58
Ministry of Defense61
MoD Procurement Leadership61
MoD Procurement Directorates61
Budgeting and Financing Military Procurement62
MoD Procurement Process63
Procurement for the Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard64
Military Industrialization Commission65
Procurement Leadership in the MIC65
MIC: Benefi ciary of Illicit Funds66
MIC Banking and Financing66
Items Procured via the MIC's Link to Iraqi Intelligence69
MIC Front Companies72
Iraqi Intelligence Service77
IIS Procurement Leadership and Mission77
IIS Procurement Cooperation with Foreign Intelligence Services79
Items Procured by the IIS79
IIS Front Companies80
Special Security Organization82
SSO Procurement Leadership and Mission82
Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission82
Ministry of Transport and Communication83
Mission and Key Procurement Companies under the MoTC83
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research84
University Collaboration With MIC84
Exploitation of Academic Exchanges for Procurement85
Ministry of Agriculture85
Ministry of Interior86
Front Company Conglomerates: Al-Eman and Al-Handal86
The Al-Eman Network88
Al-Handal General Trading Company90
Supplying Iraq With Prohibited Commodities93
Overview 93
Procurement Suppliers During the Decline Phase, 1991 to 199693
Jordan 100
Procurement Suppliers During the Recovery Phase, 1996 to 1998102
South Korea107
People's Republic of China108
Former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia112
Procurement Suppliers in the Transition and Miscalculation Phases, 1998 to 2003116
North Korea119
Transportation Routes From North Korea to Iraq121
Payment Methods for North Korean Contracts121
Methods Used To Hide Transshipment to Iraq121
Polish-Iraqi Procurement Financial Flows122
Key Belarusian Individuals Linked to Illicit Trade With Iraq126
Materials, Equipment and Services Provided by Belarus127
Payments From Iraq to Belarus129
Opening Conventional Trade With Yemen for Oil and Cash131
Yemen Emerges as an Intermediary for Iraqi Illicit Imports132
Importing Prohibited Commodities133
Deceptive Trade Practices Supporting Illicit Procurement133
Use of Trade Intermediaries133
Disguising the Nature of Prohibited Goods134
Consealing the Identity of Commodities135
Discussing the Commodity's Destination137
Use of Illicit Smuggling and Transportation Networks137
Smuggling by Air138
Smuggling by Land138
Smuggling by Sea139
Smuggling via Jordanian Ports139
Smuggling via Syrian Ports142
Smuggling via the Arabian Gulf142
A. Translations of Iraq's Bilateral Trade Protocols145
B. Known Oil Voucher Recipients167
C. Iraq's Budgetary Process201
D. Iraq Economic Data207
E. Illicit Earnings Sources and Estimation Methodology217
F. Iraqi Oil Smuggling221
G. Iraq's Banking System251
H. UN Security Council Resolutions Applicable to Iraq257
I. Suspected WMD-Related Dual-Use Goods and Procurement Teransactions261
J. The Procurement of Conventional Military Goods in Breach of UN Sanctions267
K. Suspected Intermediary and Front Companies Associated With Iraq291
L. Procurement Acronyms295

Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline Events

Volume II

Cover Page

Delivery Systems
Key Findings1
Evolution of Iraq's Delivery Systems3
The Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline3
Ambition (1980-91)3
Decline (1991-96)4
Recovery (1996-98)5
Miscalculation (2002-2003)7
Resolving the Retained Scud-Variant Missile Question9
Liquid-Propellant Missile Developments9
Al Samud II10
Al Samud Warhead14
Al Samud II Warhead16
Solid-Propellant Missile Developments17
Al Fat'h Missile Program17
General Characteristics18
Guidance and Control19
Material Balance25
Al 'Ubur Missile Program28
Guidance and Control29
Other Composite Solid-Propellant Systems30
Long-Range Ballistic Missile Projects31
Clustering SA-2/Volga Engines Designs31
SA-2 Conversions to Surface-to-Surface Missiles35
Large-Diameter Solid-Propellant Missile Project35
Program Development35
New Cruise Missile Projects37
HY-2 Range Extension37
Propulsion System39
Guidance and Control39
The Jinin [Jenin] Project39
Propulsion System40
Guidance and Control41
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs)41
Brief History42
MiG-21 RPV42
Roles and Missions44
L-29 RPV (Al Bay'ah)44
Roles and Missions44
Huwaysh's Accounting of the L-29 RPV Program45
Al Yamamah Project46
Ibn-Firnas UAVs47
Foreign Assistance48
Al Quds UAV Program52
Procurement Supporting Iraq's Delivery Systems56
Infrastructure Improvements and Technology Developments67
Static Test-Firing Facilities67
Solid-Propellant Rocket Motor Case Manufacture67
Propellant Production67
Solid-Propellant Motor Casting Chambers68
Production of Solid-Propellant Ingredients68
Propellant Research68
Graphite Technology69
Carbon Fiber Filament Winding69
Ceramic Warhead Effort?70
Proscribed Activities70
Violations of United Nations Sanctions and Resolutions71
Equipment Restoration.71
Undeclared Activities72
Role of the MTCR74
A. Resolving the Retained Scud-Variant Missile Question77
B. Liquid-Propellant Missile Developments95
C. Solid-Propellant Missile Developments115
D. People123
Key Findings1
Evolution of the Nuclear Weapons Program3
The Regime and WMD Timeline3
The Early Years: Ambition3
Decline (1991-96)4
Recovery and Transition (1996-2002)5
Miscalculation (2002-2003)6
Results of ISG's Investigation on Nuclear Issues7
Investigation Into Uranium Pursuits and Indigenous Production Capabilities9
Foreign Pursuits9
Indigenous Production Capabilities11
Iraq's Known Uranium Holdings13
Iraqi Uranium Conversion Program15
Aluminum Tube Investigation21
Elements of ISG Investigation21
Purported High-Level Interest in Aluminum Tubes22
Possible Association of Iraqi Nuclear Entities With the Tubes22
Tube Characteristics and Shipping Requirements23
Indigenous Tube Manufacture-A Possible Sign Baghdad Did Not Need High-Specification Tubes27
Iraqi Interest in 84-mm Tubes30
Carbon Fiber30
Carbon Fiber and Iraq's Pre-1991 Gas Centrifuge Program30
Iraqi Concealment of Carbon Fiber-Related Activity, Materials, and Documents After Operation Desert Storm31
The MIC Carbon Fiber Project in 2001/200232
Flow-Forming Machinery33
Planned Magnet Production Lines at Al Tahadi34
Procurement Details36
Rotating Machinery Department36
Investigation of Potential Centrifuge-Related Facilities38
Support Facilities38
Ash Shaykhili Storage Facility39
Al Karama State Company39
Al-Wazeriya Site39
Khadimiyah Site (Ibn Al-Haytham Missile R&D Center)39
Al Samud Factory (Abu Ghurayb Missile Facility)39
Badr and Umm Al-Marik State Companies (Khan Azad Military Production Plant)39
Al-Tahadi State Company40
Salah Al Din State Company (Samarra Electronics Plant)40
Al-Nida State Company40
Rashid State Company's Tho Al-Fiqar Factory (formerly the Nassr State Establishment Mechanical Plant)40
Ur State Company (An-Nasiriyah Aluminum Fabrication Plant)40
Uranium Enrichment-EMIS42
Electromagnetic Isotope Separation (EMIS)42
Al Safa'a EMIS Plant at Tarmiya42
Al Fajr EMIS Plant at Ash Sharqat45
Al-Jazira (Mosul Feed Materials Production Facility)45
Al-Zawra State Company45
Al-Nida State Company (Zaafaraniya Mechanical Workshop Al-Rabiyah)45
Al-Radwan (Batra Military Production Facility)47
Al-Nassr Al-Adhim State Company47
Disposition of EMIS-Related Equipment47
Laser Research in Iraq50
Laser Related Work After Operation Desert Storm50
Current Status and Future Potential51
Iraq's Pre-1991 LIS Efforts51
Rail Gun Summary52
Rail Gun Efforts52
Issues Related to NuclearWeapons Design and Development59
Casting Technology59
Explosive and Lens Fabrication Capabilities59
High-Speed Switches60
Fireset Development and Testing60
Neutron Generators60
Migration of the Capabilities From the PC-3 Nuclear Weapons Project61
IAEC Modernization66
Interest in the IAEC and Intervention by Saddam Husayn66
Increased Funding and Publicity of IAEC Activities67
Infrastructure Improvements at the IAEC: The Modernization Project67
Perceptions the Regime Was Preparing for Reconstitution of the Nuclear Program69
IAEC Work on Neutron Generators69
University Programs70
Hidden Enrichment Technology73
Survey of Structures at Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center75
A. Definitions Used by Teams During Survey81
B. Team Results83
C. Analysis of the Videotapes Compiled From Video Recce Mission 5/6 November 200391
D. Results of Mission Survey of Tuwaitha Nuclear ComplexOver the Period 20-22 November107
E. Summary of Known UN-Tagged Equipment113
F. Photography Highlights: Tuwaitha Mission, 20-22 November 2003117
G. Tuwaitha Maps, Buildings, and Numbers127

Volume III

Cover Page

Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program
Key Findings1
Evolution of the Chemical Warfare Program5
Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline5
The Early Years, 1960-1980: A Slow Start5
The Chemical Corps and Al-Hasan Ibn-al-Haytham Research Foundation5
Full Capability, 1981-1991: Ambition6
Foundation of the Al Muthanna State Establishment6
Agent Production Begins and Al Muthanna State Establishment Takes Shape6
Early Weaponization: Simple Solutions8
CW-A Permanent and Pivotal Strategic Weapon9
The Decline, 1991-19969
Destroying Iraqi Weapons9
Recovery and Transition, 1996-200312
Miscalculation, 2002-200313
Command and Control14
Preamble: Muddling Through After the Gulf War14
Iraq Could Maintain CW Competence With Relative Ease15
Infrastructure-Research and Development16
Creation of the Iraqi Industrial Committee17
The Power of the IIC17
The IIC's Master Plan for Self-Reliance: The List of 1,000 Chemicals18
Dual-Use Chemicals on the List of 1,000 Chemicals18
Thionyl Chloride19
Chemicals From the List Move Toward Production22
Infrastructure-Production Capability23
State of Chemical Industry at OIF-Limited Break-Out Capability24
Suspect Munitions Activities29
Disposition of CW Munitions Post-199129
The 1991 Decision To Destroy Undeclared Weapons31
Iraq Unilateral Weapons Destruction in 199131
Destruction of Chemical Munitions, Bulk Agent, and Precursors31
Chemical Munitions-Searching Military Depots and Caches33
Investigating Ammunition Supply Points33
Investigating Captured Enemy Ammunition Points (CEA Consolidation Points)35
A. IIS Undeclared Research on Poisons and Toxins for Assassination43
B. Al Muthanna Chemical Weapons Complex61
C. The Iraqi Industrial Committee85
D. Tariq Company's Activities89
E. Al-Abud Network93
F. Detailed Preliminary Assessment of Chemical Weapons Findings97
G. Chemical Warfare and the Defense of Baghdad107
H. Summary of Key Findings at Captured Enemy Ammunition Consolidation Points113
I. Review of 24 Iraqi Ammunition Supply Points123
Biological Warfare
Key Findings1
Evolution of the Biological Warfare Program5
The Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline5
Evolution of the Biological Warfare Program5
Ambition: The Early Years, 1960-19855
Renewed Ambition and Near-Realization: 1985-19918
The Beginning of the Decline: Opportunity Through Ambiguity and the End of the Game (1991-1996)11
Recovery and Transition 1996-200315
Research and Development18
Building Human Capital19
Research Facilities20
Iraqi BW Agent Research20
Bacillus anthracis ('Agent B')20
Clostridium botulinum (Botulinum toxin, 'Agent A')21
Clostridium perfringens ('Agent G')22
Afl atoxin ('Agent C')22
Wheat Cover Smut ('Agent D')25
Camel Pox27
Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Fever32
Acute Hemorrhagic Conjunctivitis (Enterovirus 70)32
Other R&D Related to BW Development32
Single Cell Protein R&D34
Growth Media R&D34
Drying Process/Carrier/Particle size37
Production Capability38
Break-Out Production Capability Pre-OIF42
Mobile Assets42
Attempts at BW Weaponization47
The Gulf War48
Concealment And Destruction of Biological Weapons49
Iraq's Initial WMD Concealment Effort49
The Destruction of Iraq's BW50
What Remained Hidden and Undeclared 1995-1998?53
Weaponization Related Activities in the Years Following Desert Storm53
Unresolved Issues56
Program Direction56
Research and Development56
IIS Laboratories57
Disposition of Iraq's BW Program Culture Collection57
Agent Production57
Drying of BW Agents58
Bacterial BW Agent Production and Storage58
A. Bulk BW Agents61
B. BW Research and Development Facilities63
C. ISG Investigation of Iraq's Reported Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production Capability73
D. Trailers Suspected of Being Mobil BW Agent Production Units79

Glossary and Acronyms

Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list