Tainted Decision: The Atom Bomb And America's Rush To End World War II
CSC 1986
SUBJECT AREA History
TAINTED DECISION: THE ATOM BOMB AND AMERICA's
RUSH TO END WORLD WAR II
by
Major Lee T. Wyatt, III
United States Army
Command and Staff College
Education Center
Marine Corps Development and Education Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134
25 March 1986
ABSTRACT
Author: Wyatt, Lee T., III, Major, USA
Title: Tainted Decision: The Atom Bomb and America's
Rush to End World War II
Date: 25 March 1986
The United States' decision to drop atomic bombs on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 has been the subject
of controversy for the past four decades. The vast
majority of Americans adhere to the premise that U.S.
policy makers were justified to employ atomic weapons,
given the dreaded alternative of a bloody invasion of
Japan to end the war. On the other hand, critics of the
American actions scoff at the rationale of these leaders,
arguing that other factors influenced a decision which, at
best, produced a pyrrhic victory. This paper explores the
central issues of the debate and highlights those factors
which affected the U.S. and its policy toward atomic
weapons.
This study concentrates primarily on the tumultuous
four months between the death of President Franklin D.
Roosevelt and the dropping of the atomic bombs. The paper
is divided into an introduction, seven chapters, and a
conclusion. The initial chapter describes the status of
U.S atomic energy policy upon Harry S. Truman's assumption
of the presidency. Chapters Two through Four analyze the
historical arguments which formed the framework for the
atomic bomb decision: U.S. unconditional surrender
objectives, casualty estimates related to the proposed
invasion of the Japanese homeland, and the impact of
Russia on the decision and postwar diplomacy. Chapter
Five discusses the growing voice of opposition which
appeared in scientific circles during the last months of
the war and the failure of this dissent to sway the
decision makers. The sixth chapter briefly reviews the
actual decision and employment of the bomb, emphasizing
the forces which culminated to introduce the atomic age.
The final chapter reveals the opinion of several key
participants in the atomic bomb effort from their
perspective after the war in order to understand the
impact of the bomb on America.
Abundant material is available on the subject.
Important memoranda and Joint Chiefs of Staff war planning
documents housed in the National Archives in Washington,
D.C., formed the basis of the research effort. Memoirs
and postwar statements by significant personages involved
with the atom bomb project were scrutinized for
objectivity as these individuals naturally couched their
role in the most favorable light possible. Secondary
sources, journals, periodicals, and newspaper articles
provided insight on specific issues within the scope of
the paper.
In conclusion, this paper takes exception with those
scholars who render a scathing indictment of U.S.
political and military leaders who struggled to discharge
their awesome responsibility by approving a nuclear strike
against Japan. These critics, far removed from the times,
cannot fully appreciate the pressures which mounted on
America's leaders as the war dragged through its fourth
year. However, U.S. officials did tarnish America's image
by encouraging certain myths surrounding the decision and
failing to develop a positive policy to control atomic
energy in the postwar world.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction 1
Chapter
1 Truman and the Roosevelt Legacy 4
2 The Unconditional Surrender Dilemma 16
3 The Casualty Myth 34
4 The Russian Connection 47
3 Scientific Dissent 56
6 Decision and Employment 63
7 Postwar Views 76
Conclusion 91
Appendix 1 Key People 97
Appendix 2 Important Dates 99
End Notes 1O2
Annotated Bibliography 113
INTRODUCTION
"The plane was flying so high that only a few
people saw it. And when the bombs that it
dropped struck, it was doubtful if anyone in the
city heard the explosion. For that explosion
was so tremendous and all-inclusive that in a
fraction of a second the entire community had
been wiped from the face of the earth."1
The 40th commemoration of the atomic bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki spurred anew the controversy
between supporters and critics of the United States'
actions in August 1945 to conclude hostilities with
Japan. With the Reagan-Gorbachev summit serving as an
historical backdrop, academia and the press debated the
rationale (or lack thereof) shown by American leaders who
introduced the atomic age. This flurry of activity 40
years after the first atomic weapon attempted to seize the
moment and impress upon the U.S. and the Soviet Union the
futility of the nuclear arms race. In June 1985,
Professor Anatoly Gromyko of the U.S.S.R. Academy of
Sciences, speaking to an international gathering on
nuclear issues in Geneva, Switzerland, condemned President
Truman's decision to use the bomb.2 In contrast, the
American conservative journalist, James Kilpatrick,
referring to the destruction at Hiroshima, offered a means
to end the current arms race which he labeled as " . . .
absurd, grotesque, obscene, insane." Mr. Kilpatrick
advocated a joint U.S.-Soviet agreement to eliminate all
nuclear weapons, except enough to level 20 of each
adversary's cities.3 Yet, in spite of the East-West
rhetoric in 1985, Paul Boyer, writing in the New York
Times, struck a more ominous note when recalling the
events of four decades ago: "For most Americans, however,
the news (of Hiroshima) brought not joy but profound
apprehension . . . . the fear that would come to haunt
millions of people not yet born in 1945 had already found
urgent expression."4
During the tumultuous four months between the death
of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the dropping of the
atomic bombs, complex, and at times conflicting, forces
intertwined to coax the U.S decision to employ an atomic
weapon. The personalities and perceptions of key policy
makers influenced that decision. The appearance of a new,
untested President, charged with the responsibility to end
the war, added urgency to an already tense political
situation. U.S. officials failed to cope with the
diverging opinions on American war aims as they related to
the doctrine of unconditional surrender and its impact on
the use of the bomb. Grave concern and uncertainty
existed about the human cost and depth of public support
associated with a prolonged Pacific war. Lastly, the U.S.
erred by deferring important decisions regarding the
diplomatic mark of the bomb on postwar international
relations. In toto, these factors proved greater than the
sum of their parts. A vortex was spawned, creating a
momentum of events which made the bomb inevitable.
Critics are quick to claim that American leaders did
not take advantage of available opportunities to end the
war without resorting to the bomb. These opponents
believe that U.S. and allied leaders sought to justify the
use of the bomb after the fact through the use of
emotional rationale. The evidence does not support this
conspiratorial view. Truman, Churchill, and Stimson acted
in good faith by approving an atomic attack on Japan.
However, these officials fostered later criticism by
giving birth to certain misconceptions surrounding the
decision which tarnished America's image and role in
concluding six tragic years of war.
CHAPTER 1
Truman and the Roosevelt Legacy
The swirl of forces began churning in the spring of
1945. On April 12, 1945, President Franklin D. Roosevelt
died at Warm Springs, Georgia. Seen as Wilson-like in his
approach to the war, Roosevelt, early in the conflict,
established a personal link with the allied leaders and
dominated the U.S. conduct of foreign affairs. The impact
of his sudden passing from the scene at such a critical
point in the war was immeasurable. Americans witnessed
the loss of the paternalistic spirit which sustained them
over three long years of war and who seemingly sat poised
to guide them into the postwar world. Roosevelt's
possible decision on how and when to use the bomb is lost
to history. The weapon thus became transformed into a
mystique, labeled the "badly needed equalizer" at the time
by Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, who filled the void
of knowledge and experience created by the death of
Roosevelt.1
Harry S. Truman's unexpected assumption of the
presidency offered the potential for a shift in the
American conduct of the war. In reality, Truman felt
comfortable operating within the policy constraints
established by his predecessor and rarely flexed his
authority to test these parameters during the war. Thus,
political and military planning regarding the fate of
Europe and the war in the Pacific took on no added
trappings with the new President.
The atomic bomb project offers ample proof that
Truman needed time to absorb the magnitude of his
responsibilities. Some scholars argue that the bomb was a
fait accompli by the spring of 1945. This assumption is
shallow. The truth remains that no successful test had
been conducted and no Japanese targetting sites or dates
had been set. The responsibility to continue or forestall
the project, and ultimately to use the bomb, clearly lay
with Truman. Despite the opportunity to chart new
directions, the President chose the steady course. 2
Truman's memoirs record his entry into the atomic
gameplan. Immediately following his hastily called
swearing-in ceremony and a short cabinet meeting,
Secretary Stimson dallied to conduct a private
conversation with the President about "a most urgent
matter." Stimson briefly mentioned that the U.S. was
developing a new explosive of incomprehensible power and
urged the President to learn the details soon.3
Truman, at best, had a faint inkling of the full
meaning of Stimson's words. During the early part of the
war, the then Senator Truman chaired the Committee to
Investigate the National Defense Program. The committee,
as part of its duties, prepared to inspect certain war
plants in the states of Washington and Tennessee. These
facilities belonged to the Manhattan District, the
top-level and highly classified research and development
project for the atomic bomb. Truman later wrote that
Stimson informed him that the plants in question were part
of the "greatest project in the history of the world."
The Secretary of War politely requested that the Senator
call off his investigators. Senator Truman, trusting in
Stimson's impeccable reputation as a loyal public servant,
stymied the Committee's work.4
The day following his ascendancy to the presidency,
Truman obtained more details about the project. The
President conferred with James F. Byrnes, then Director of
the Office of War Mobilization, later Secretary of State,
and often referred to as Roosevelt's "Assistant
President"; Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of
Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) and Chief
Scientist-Administrator of the Manhattan Project; and
Admiral William H. Leahy, Chief of Staff to President
Roosevelt and presider over the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the Combined Chiefs of Staff. These officials informed
Truman about the basic scientific tenets of the project,
astounding the President with the knowledge that the
explosive in question was powerful enough to destroy the
world. Thus, merely one day into office, Truman became
the arbiter of knowledge of an import never before thrust
upon a new chief executive. Greater details began to flow
to the President within the next several weeks.5
The road to the U.S. atomic bomb project began in the
late 1930's. The consolidation of fascist power in Italy
and the Nazi regime in Germany, with the resulting
persecutions, especially in the Third Reich, led to an
exodus of leading scientists from Europe to England and
the U.S. These exiles nervously reported that German
scientists, building on decades of rapid advances in
physics, produced nuclear fission in 1938. Many
scientists panicked and believed that Germany stood on the
brink of producing a nuclear bomb, although few people
understood the Nazi high leadership's disdain of
technology. In 1941, Dr. Leo Szilard, a top physicist,
with the assistance of Albert Einstein, convinced
President Roosevelt to pursue atomic research in the U.S.
Roosevelt appointed a committee consisting of Vice-
President Henry A. Wallace, Secretary Stimson, and Dr.
James B. Conant, Chairman of the National Defense Research
Committee and President of Harvard University, to study
the matter and serve as a presidential advisory body
regarding nuclear fission. In reality, little activity of
note occurred until the U.S. entered the war.6
Prior to Pearl Harbor, the Manhattan Project received
paltry funding. That approach ended in 1942 as
Congressional appropriations flowed from additional
resources within the budget. In February 1944, Secretary
Stimson, General of the Army George C. Marshall, and Dr.
Vannevar Bush appealed to Speaker of the House Rayburn and
other Congressional leaders for increased financial
assistance. These men directed monetary sums through the
House of Representatives without public debate. The
Senate followed suit in June 1944. The Manhattan Project
eventually spent $2 billion and moved the effort to
produce an atomic bomb from theory to reality.7
The issue of the bomb spilled over into U.S.-British
affairs. This relationship at times resembled a bumpy
sibling rivalry. Churchill approached his cabinet as
early as 1939 regarding the specter of German atomic
research. The Prime Minister broached the subject with
president Roosevelt at their first meeting in August 1941
in Newfoundland. Two months later, Roosevelt wrote to
Churchill recommending that the two leaders correspond on
each country's efforts in the area of atomic energy. In
addition, a lower level exchange commenced between the
British Maud Committee and the U.S. Office of scientific
Research and Development. Each agency conducted uranium
bomb studies. In 1941, an optimistic missive from the
Maud Committee convinced Dr. Bush to press Roosevelt for a
high-level policy group and more formal ties between the
two governments on the uses of atomic-energy. Roosevelt,
always leary of the British, dragged his feet on this
proposed allied collaboration for more than a year. 8
The atomic bomb, on occasion, became one of several
issues which strained the Roosevelt-Churchill
relationship. Political and diplomatic goals often
separated the two leaders more so than military plans.
Thus, although the U.S. joined the fray in Europe and gave
that theater priority early in 1942, the American and
British governments never resolved certain issues, such as
colonies, refugees, Nazi atrocities, and how to deal with
postwar Russia.9
Churchill correctly remained fearful of what an
atomic bomb in the hands of Hitler might portend for the
United Kingdom. He urged Roosevelt to hasten the
cooperative effort between the U.S. and Britain. The
weapon, in Churchill's mind, became the ultimate
bargaining chip for the British in Europe. Britain, as
sole possessor of such power, could assert her primacy
after the war over both France and the Soviet Union.
Thus, from the early days of the war, Churchill begged
Roosevelt not to divulge atomic secrets to either the
French or the Russians. At the Second Washington
Conference in June 1942, Churchill convinced Roosevelt to
provide London with an unimpeded flow of atomic
information. British interest in the matter was
emphasized by the fact that the War Cabinet permitted
Churchill to leave London during the heat of the desert
battle in North Africa. Thus, "tube alloys," the British
code name for the project, grudgingly became a joint
endeavor.10
Roosevelt initially did not honor this promise to
Churchill. The Army had tightened security around the
project and the release of atomic information. Furtner,
both Dr. Bush and Dr. Conant, despite their earlier
support for Anglo-American cooperation, opposed
presidential approval to release significant research
developments to the British. These two scientists won
Roosevelt's ear for a short time by convincing the
president that such a policy, even toward a close ally,
was fraught with danger.11
Churchill, however, possessed the knack of
persuasion. In August 1943, at the Quebec Conference,
Roosevelt finally relented and signed a formal agreement
promising an exchange of atomic energy information related
to postwar industrial use. In September 1944, the two
leaders sealed their atomic covenant at a meeting at
Roosevelt's home at Hyde Park, New York. This session has
received limited attention by some scholars in comparison
with the more widely publicized conferences that
followed. In fact, the Hyde Park meeting produced, albeit
in sketchy terms, short range and general future
Anglo-American strategy for the bomb. The leaders
recognized that the European war would likely end before
the final production of an atomic bomb. Their agreement
vowed joint efforts to designate the Japanese as a
potential military target for it if the Pacific war had
not ended. In addition, the leaders pledged full
cooperation for peaceful and military uses of atomic
energy following Japan's defeat. This latter stipulation,
rather than moving the leaders toward international
control of atomic weapons, set the tenor for an attempted
western isolation and monopoly of atomic secrets after the
war. Roosevelt and Churchill believed that atomic
knowledge guaranteed military superiority and a path to
world peace. Admiral Leahy, in attendance at the meetings
between the two leaders, later recalled that he had little
faith in the discussions at Hyde Park.12
Roosevelt maintained a consistent course after his
Hyde Park session with Churchill. Other than Admiral
Leahy, none of the President's advisors knew about the
agreements. Some observers believe that Churchill
mesmerized his American counterpart, and as a result,
Roosevelt did not consult his team on the diplomatic
aspects of atomic energy until after discussion with the
British Prime Minister. The historian, Martin Sherwin, on
the other hand, suspects that the answer is simply found
in the realization that the American President felt
comfortable with Churchill's grand concept that military
prowess was the precursor of postwar diplomacy.13
Secretary Stimson made one final appeal on the issue
of the use and control of atomic energy prior to
Roosevelt's death. On March 15, 1945, Stimson reviewed a
memorandum with the President criticizing the Chief
Executive's faith in the Manhattan Project. This
document, the author of which was purposely not identified
by Stimson because of his high position in the government,
specifically indicted the work of Bush and Conant.
Stimson reassured the President that the project was in
excellent hands, having four Nobel Prize winners on the
staff. The Secretary took the opportunity to pose options
for the future control of atomic weapons. Two schools of
thought existed. First, the U.S. should maintain a
monopoly; second, the U.S. should encourage international
control based upon scientific interest and access.
Stimson later claimed that the President agreed to settle
this question prior to using the first bomb.
Unfortunately, in less than a month, Roosevelt lay dead,
the war in Europe wound to a close, the atomic bomb
remained untested, and no final consensus existed in the
minds of American policy makers on options for the use of
the bomb or its future implications.14
Secretary Stimson wasted little time in seeking to
counsel President Truman. On April 25, 1945, Stimson and
Major General Leslie R. Groves, Commanding General of the
Manhattan District, conferred with Truman. This formal
meeting sought to impress upon the President the gravity
of the pending decision on the bomb. Stimson promised the
President that a bomb would be ready within four months,
and perhaps sooner. The Secretary conceded that the
British had shared in the effort but stressed that the
U.S. would be the atomic kingpin for some time to come.
Stimson cautioned against slipping into a lethargic state
over the bomb because other nations would learn atomic
secrets in the future. Stimson nudged the President
toward a position of unilateral control vice international
control of atomic weapons. He argued that international
control was unthinkable until key U.S. Congressional
leaders grasped the total power of the weapon. In
Stimson's mind, the U.S. had the moral responsibility to
serve as the atomic policeman to "prevent disaster to
civilization."15 Within several months, the Secretary
of War spoke a different policy.
At the April 1945 session with Truman, Stimson
presented the President with a report by General Groves
which reviewed the questions and problems posed when
secrecy surrounding the project was lifted. To address
that concern, Stimson and Groves informed Truman that a
special Committee had been created. This body, known as
the Interim Committee, also studied means to employ the
bomb and planned to forward recommendations to the
President by early June 1945. Stimson served as Chairman
of the Committee; however, the onus of day-to-day
operations fell to his lieutenant, George L. Harrison.
Other members included James F. Byrnes; Ralph A. Bard, the
Under Secretary of the Navy; William L. Clayton, Assistant
Secretary of State; Dr. Vannevar Bush; Dr. Karl Compton,
Chief of the Office of Field Service in the OSRD and
President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology;
and Dr. James B. Conant. The Committee relied on a small
panel of outstanding scientists for technical advice and
assistance. These men, collectively known as the
Scientific Advisory Committee or the Scientific Panel,
included Dr. A. H. Compton, Dr. Enrico Fermi, Dr. E. O.
Laurence, and Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer. Each individual was
a nuclear physicist of momentous reputation; each had
served in critical positions since the inception of the
Manhattan Project. The Interim Committee reported its
findings five weeks following Stimson's April meeting with
the President. The Committee's assessment of the role of
the atomic bomb formed the heart of the final American
policy decision and will be discussed in a subsequent
chapter.l6
Upon assuming office, President Truman had a dearth
of knowledge about the atomic energy potential of the
United States. His advisors, other than Admiral Leahy,
possessed little information regarding Anglo-American
agreements forged between Roosevelt and Churchill. This
situation hindered the new President's ability to grasp
the enormity of the forces working to sweep Washington
closer to a decision about the bomb. The frenetic pace of
events continued unabated. Questions concerning U.S.
policy on unconditional surrender and plans for the
invasion of Japan clashed as the issue of the bomb loomed
stealthily on the periphery. Major General Groves
captured the spirit of the moment when he observed that
Truman was like a young boy on a moving sled, set in
motion prior to being ready to make a yes or no
decision.l7
CHAPTER 2
The Unconditional Surrender Dilemma
In the spring of 1945, military planners struggled to
integrate strategic plans with the political objectives of
the war. In the Pacific, some American officials
expressed reluctance to tamper with the long-stated U.S.
policy of the unconditional surrender of Japan. The
debate among policy makers on whether or not the U.S.
should retreat even slightly from a hard-line position on
this issue distracted Truman and other leaders at a time
when long-range atomic energy policy hung in the balance.
The inability of moderates to influence a modification of
the unconditional surrender doctrine indicates that the
American political leadership considered Japan to be a
formidable opponent to be defeated at a possibly high cost.
The policy of unconditional surrender was an accepted
American position from the Casablanca Conference. The
doctrine aimed to strike awe in the enemy, demonstrate
American resolve, encourage solidarity among the allies,
and prevent a repeat of the World War I debacle wherein
Germany surrendered based upon the 14 Points, yet was
forced to sign an entirely different treaty at
Versailles. The policy consisted of four elements.
First, the enemy would receive no guarantees prior to
acceptance of unconditional surrender. Second, the
principles of the Geneva Convention would be honored.
Third, no restrictions would be placed upon the victor.
Fourth, the political philosophies of the axis powers must
be destroyed.1
By 1945, some military leaders, such as General
Marshall, viewed unconditional surrender with growing
skepticism. From its vantage point, victorious military
forces needed no justification to occupy the territory of
the vanquished. Military officials also believed that the
enemy's perception of unconditional surrender might vary
from that of the U.S. Thus, American and allied forces
might conceivably encounter desperate, last-ditch
fighting. The picture of such a scenario became
increasingly real as the final planning for the defeat of
the Japanese Empire commenced, to include the looming
possibility of an invasion of the home island. Finally,
no military leader felt comfortable with the role to
change a nation's political philosophy. General Marshall
recalled that President Roosevelt once stated that it
would take 40 years to root Nazism from Germany. A
long-term military occupation threatened to create a
weakened overall military posture if resources were
siphoned from other critical areas of the world. 2
Military planning with respect to the Pacific
produced several divergent courses of action to achieve
unconditional surrender with respect to Japan. These
means were blockade, aerial bombardment, invasion, or a
combination of the above. No planning documents mention
the use of an atomic bomb because only a few members of
the military establishment were privy to the secret. In
April 1945, the Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC) in the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) explored the proposed
options. The JWPC labeled the blockade approach as a
"gamble" and the least likely method to achieve success.
The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in the JCS
supported this assessment, stating that a blockade might
reduce Japanese capability and will but could not ensure
surrender.3
The Navy leaders did not totally agree with the
stated JCS position on a blockade. This parochialism
existed throughout the war. General Marshall expressed
frustration about parochialism when he noted in a postwar
interview that the services constantly squabbled among
themselves. Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander-in-Chief of
the Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, saw the Navy's
role as paramount. In his War Report submitted to
Congress, King stated "The defeat of Japan was directly
due to our overwhelming power at sea." King cited the
statistics of enemy aircraft and vessels destroyed by the
U.S. Navy. He wrote "This impressive record speaks for
itself and helps to explain the sudden collapse of
Japan."4 In his memoirs, King lambasts the Army for
failing to appreciate the impact of sea power, hinting
that the strangulation of supply lines and the starvation
of the Japanese people was the best approach to end the
war.5
However, Admiral King had little to do with the
atomic bomb project. In late 1943, General Marshall
informed the admiral about the bomb and swore him to
secrecy. Admiral King later expressed surprise that the
JCS principals did not discuss the bomb, because the
knowledge was present. In the spring of 1945, Admiral
King complied with a request to provide a Naval ordnance
officer, Captain W.S. Parsons, to work on the trigger
mechanism for the bomb. General Marshall provided insight
on his impression of Admiral King by stating that, in the
tough JCS decision-making process, Admiral King usually
took the opposite position from the majority.5
General H. H. Arnold, Commanding General of the U.S.
Army Air Forces, also believed that his combat arm could
end the war. In his War Report, Arnold stated "Air
power's part may be fairly called decisive . . . no
invasion was necessary."7 Arnold knew that the air
forces inflicted horrendous losses on the Japanese. By
1943, the U.S. had won air superiority from Japan in the
Pacific. The Strategic Bombing Survey conducted after the
war concluded that the air forces made substantial
contribution to the virtual elimination of the Japanese
fleet and air power.8
The U.S. air offensive against Japan consisted of two
phases. In November 1944, B-29 aircraft bombed enemy
airplane factories, arsenals, power plants, oil
refineries, etc. to weaken Japanese military strength and
will. In March 1945, the Air Force launched a spectacular
series of incendiary bombing raids on urban areas,
railroads, and transportation centers. Between November
1944 and July 1945, U.S. planes attacked 60 cities,
destroyed over two million homes, and inflicted nearly
800,000 casualties. Food supplies ran critically low.
Daily caloric intake dipped to less than half of the U.S.
war ration standard. Electric power output fell to 50% of
the 1944 peak level. An estimated one-fourth of all city
dwellers abandoned their homes. In near desperation. the
Japanese government ordered each family to have a
self-evacuation plan.9
General Arnold was the sole member of the Army Air
Force with knowledge of the atomic bomb until the last
days of the war. He learned about the weapon
surreptitiously through a scientist friend and pieced the
details together. Arnold later argued that he knew the
U.S. controlled the air war because Japan defaulted
tactical air battles over her homeland and the "Enola Gay"
managed to proceed unmolested to Hiroshima. Arnold
summarized his vision for the Air Forces in his report to
Congress: "In any future war the air force, being unique
among armed services in its ability to reach any possible
enemy without . . . long delay . . . may remove the
necessity for surface conflict."l0
Not everyone shared General Arnold's optimistic view
of air power. In the summer of 1945, General Marshall
grappled with the final invasion plans. The Chief of
Staff believed that aerial bombardment was merely an
adjunct to the final push for victory, " . . . despite
what generals with cigars in their mouths had to say about
bombing the Japanese into submission."11 Even the
Strategic Bombing Survey, which generally gave the Air
Force high marks, admitted that . . . until the end,
however, national traditions of obedience and conformity,
reinforced by the police organization, remained effective
in controlling the behavior of the population . . . . It
is probable that most Japanese would have passively faced
death . . . had the Emperor so ordered."12
Wrangling within JCS created confusion and
uncertainty about the best approach to achieve
unconditional surrender. In April 1945, the JWPC argued
that the idea of unconditional surrender was foreign to
the Japanese psyche, citing that at no time in the war had
organized Japanese units surrendered; however, the JIC did
not support this view. One JIC report stated " . . . on
occasion in the past Japan has indicated a willingness to
bow to a greater force and compromise . . . ."13 The
JIC prepared a position which gained more advocates in the
weeks that followed. The heart of the JIC proposal
stressed a clarification of allied intentions to allow
Japan to establish a constitutional monarchy backed by the
Emperor. The JIC reasoned that such a concession might
obtain a rational, acceptable version of unconditional
surrender prior to the end of 1945, avert a costly
invasion, and save lives.14
This report incorporated more than a year's worth of
intelligence gathering efforts concerning the Japanese
will to resist. As early as 1944, intelligence planners
speculated that one of three forms of government might
emerge in Japan following a successful U.S. invasion. The
first form was a constitutional monarchy under the
imperial throne. This government, according to analysts,
would permit fanatics to return to their families. This
estimate ran counter to other opinions of the Japanese
will to resist. However, intelligence planners recognized
that "In the minds of many Japanese the question of a
generation is not particularly important in their concept
of eventual progress to world domination." These planners
also believed that "many will consider their return to
Japan is necessary so that inevitably their imperial power
can rise from the ashes of their defeat."15 The second
case envisioned an emergency government without imperial
sanction. This possibility meant continued resistance by
the Kwantung Army. The third case outlined an emergency
conservative government in Japan with a "die hard"
government in Manchuria manned by the Kwantung Army. In
each of the last two cases, the JIC expressed deep concern
about the Kwantung Army's size and will to fight. Despite
these intelligence summaries, the JWPC remained convinced
that the best means to force a Japanese capitulation was
by an invasion. As support for its position, the JWPC
cited other intelligence reports which identified enemy
positions, air and naval impotence, and slow replacement
trains.16
Above the planners, military leaders feared the
potential pitfalls of the final campaign of the war.
Analysis of Japanese troop strength projected more than 40
divisions, or approximately two million men, could be
mustered to repel an invasion by December 1945.
Fortifications began appearing on beach and shore defense
sites. The Japanese air force retained thousands of
combat aircraft. The majority of these planes were
devoted to a Kamikaze defense of the homeland. Aircraft
production stood slightly below 70% of peak levels despite
the massive U.S. bombing campaign.17
The intangible within all the statistical summaries
remained the Japanese will to resist. Intelligence
officers believed that less than 10% of the Japanese
people despaired in the spring of 1945. Army planners
speculated that U.S. forces might face a "volksturm" or
"people's army" once the mainland was invaded. The
purpose of such a force would be to screen regular
military units, replace rear area troops, and assist with
war production. The intelligence estimates reported
frightening numbers. Japan had 17 million males, ages
15-59, of which 14 million (82%) were fit for military
service. Of this 14 million, approximately five million
had received at leapt rudimentary military training. This
force would be armed with 1,350,000 surplus rifles.
Planners shuddered at the thought of the damage this
people's army might inflict on advancing U.S. and allied
forces. A further consideration involved the possibility
of the mass dislocation of civilians from South Kyushu,
the Kanto Plain, Nagoya, and other areas. Officials
believed that the Japanese military would encourage a
wide-scale exodus of the old, young, and infirmed to
hamper the allied push after an invasion of the home
island. As one intelligence summary stated, "The Japanese
army may be expected to cruelly and ruthlessly disregard
the sufferings of the civilian population."l8
The uncertainty of the Japanese will was joined by
flagging British support and low U.S. troop morale as
factors which troubled American planners. It had been
long suspected that the British effort against Japan would
consist of only a token force until at least nine months
after the fall of Germany. According to this view,
Churchill was biding his time, hoping the war with Japan
would end early so America would not shift essential
resources to the Pacific. It is true that the Prime
Minister believed these resources were critical to the
European recovery. However, what the planners did not and
could not know was that Churchill based this hesitation on
his feeling that the war would have a sudden, unexpected
conclusion.19
The attitude of American soldiers worried the War
Department. In March 1945, Secretary Stimson visited
soldiers at an Air Force redistribution center in
Florida. These men, on their way to fight in the Pacific
after combat duty in Europe, made an indelible impression
on the Secretary. Stimson winced at the sight of weary
soldiers who said without emotion that they would go to
fight the Japanese. The Secretary recorded later that his
encounter with these American fighting men quickened his
resolve to end the war as soon as possible. Stimson wrote
that his failure to employ any means at hand to save these
men "deserved punishment." Additionally, the War
Department hastened to blunt a perceived "discharge itch"
among the troops after V-E Day. In May 1945, a propaganda
brochure issued to Pacific-bound soldiers attempted to
bolster the psychological attitude of American servicemen
in anticipation of long, bloody campaigns. The pamphlet
addressed Pacific duty, separated fact from fiction about
the Japanese soldier, and ordered U.S. soldiers to get
tough in order to achieve victory in the last phase of the
war.20
Thus, as spring of 1945 and the glow of V-E Day ebbed
in Washington, the policy of unconditional surrender, so
clear in the public perception, underwent a dramatic
review by America's political and military leaders. This
debate resulted in a de facto rift between the military
establishment and many officials in the State Department.
General Marshall exhibited a somber demeanor. Acting
Secretary of State Joseph Grew was the only State
Department official sympathetic with the military
position. Grew was also the only member of cabinet rank
who knew the Japanese in depth, having served a decade as
ambassador in Tokyo before the war. Despite his obvious
experience and insight, Grew faced united resistance
within the State Department to a loose interpretation of
the unconditional surrender terms. Grew championed
retention of the Emperor and assurances to the Japanese
that the U.S. did not intend national extinction.
Hard-line supporters of the Roosevelt doctrine in the
State Department resisted Grew's appeals. These
officials, particularly Assistant Secretaries of State
Dean Acheson and Archibald MacLeish, based their position
not only on public opinion, but on the belief that the
Japanese Emperor was a stooge of the military and the real
impediment to democracy in Japan. Lower level State
Department representatives sat as ex-officio members on
several JCS committees and stone-walled military
suggestions to soften the unconditional surrender policy.
Grew and Marshall saw their formal organizational chains
to the President obstructed. Both men personally lobbied
behind the scenes to encourage Truman to change the
official U.S. policy. This effort resulted in the
appointment of an informal committee to review the issue.
Stimson, Grew, and the Secretary of the Navy, James
Forrestal, met privately as individuals rather than as
representatives of their respective organizations.
Marshall, Arnold, King, and Assistant Secretary of War,
John J. McCloy, provided opinions to the committee.21
In early June 1945, Stimson solicited formal comments
from General Marshall on a memorandum written by McCloy.
Specifically, the Secretary asked the Chief of Staff if
the military could accept the wording "complete defeat and
war making power of Japan" vice "unconditional
surrender." Marshall voiced JCS support of the phrase and
recommended the addition of "at the earliest possible
date." Marshall cautioned Stimson that unconditional
surrender long had been the lexicon equivalent to U.S. war
aims and that any change might raise questions in the
public's mind. Marshall further suggested that, since the
term had become imbedded in the political and
psychological conscious of Americans, any future public
statements must avoid use of the cryptic wording and spell
out true U.S. objectives. Marshall believed that details
could be hammered out among negotiators and placed in
formal documents."22
The informal committee saw timing as the critical
problem. The B-29 raids continued to cause havoc in
Japan. At the same time, the Okinawa campaign grew in
intensity and inflicted the largest number of U.S.
casualties in the war. This situation led proponents of
unconditional surrender to argue that any softening of the
U.S. position at a time of travail such as the Okinawa
campaign might be construed by the Japanese as a sign of
American weakness and loss of resolve. Stimson and
Forrestal received the new approach with interest but
hesitated to follow through for reasons mysterious to Grew
at the time. Stimson became increasingly preoccupied with
the options for the bomb. The Secretary knew the bomb
might be the lever to pry apart the enemy's will.
Stimson, although sympathetic to Grew's and Marshall's
opinions, was in no position to respond to changes in U.S.
policy until a bomb was tested. The extreme secrecy of
the project, code-named S-1 for ease of discussion in
certain high-level circles, meant that Grew, unaware of
the bomb, sat outside a small circle of officials who
could breathe life or death into his proposals. Indeed,
Assistant Secretary of State, William J. Clayton, a member
of the Interim Committee and Grew's subordinate, was the
lone State Department officer, prior to July 1945, with
knowledge of the Manhattan Project.23
President Truman also sought advice on the
unconditional surrender policy. In early June 1945, the
President asked Stimson for his opinion on a memorandum
which outlined an approach to end the war. The source of
this memorandum is mysterious, merely identified as an
unknown economist who passed his thoughts in writing to
Truman via ex-President Herbert Hoover. This document is
important because several of its considerations and
recommendations found their way into final U.S. war aims
and postwar statements made by officials directly linked
to the atomic bomb decision.24
The author of the memorandum advocated six objectives
to define allied policy to end the war: restore Manchuria
to China, permit U.S. control of the Japanese Army and
Navy, disarm the Japanese for a generation, try all
Japanese who violated the rules of warfare, and cede
certain islands to the allies. The paper further
suggested that the Japanese be encouraged to lay down
their arms by assurances that the allies harbored no
intention to destroy the Japanese or their government.25
The memorandum displayed an insight of the Japanese
people and their nature not understood by most key policy
makers, save Under Secretary Grew. The author speculated
that the Japanese might be amenable to overtures for
several reasons. First, the appointment of Prime Minister
Suzuki in April 1945 meant that anti-militarists were
appearing in the government. Second, the substantial
middle-class, a product of rapid Japanese industrializa-
tion, had a liberal political bent. Third, the Japanese
possessed a strong national will to survive.26
The memorandum also considered the American point of
view. If the Japanese accepted the proposed terms, the
U.S. would have obtained every national objective, except
for the purposeless revenge advocated by a minority of
Americans. The author also made the dramatic claim that
his approach would save 500,000 to one million American
lives. This latter point is critical. Until this
memorandum appeared in early June 1945, NO FIXED NUMBERS
had been discussed formally regarding the human cost of
future operations against Japan. This estimate, cropping
up at this propitious moment, captured the fancy of Truman
and Stimson, and will be addressed later in the paper.27
Secretary Stimson requested Marshall's evaluation of
the memorandum. On June 14, 1945, Marshall replied that
his staff was in "substantial agreement." Marshall
perceived that the enemy knew he was licked and sought a
way out of the war. The Chief of Staff stressed that U.S.
military objectives must ensure that the Japanese were not
the focal point for a war for at least a generation. To
accomplish this end, Marshall proposed the dissolution of
the Japanese armed forces and the intellectual reeducation
of the Japanese people through the encouragement of
liberal thought, free press, democracy, human rights,
etc. The staff differed with the memorandum on the issues
of war trials, resources, cessation of islands, and
casualty figures. On this last point, Marshall informed
Stimson that the JCS strongly believed that the cited
figures were inflated.28 Secretary Stimson transmitted
the JCS comments to the President with the notation that
prolongation of the war would "cost a large number of
human lives."29
Time was running out. Despite the rhetoric, no
revision of the unconditional surrender terms occurred
prior to the allied gathering at Potsdam. Secretary
Stimson, sympathetic to Grew's idea, did not press the
issue higher. He had the President's confidence,
counseling patience and promising an atomic bomb test
prior to the conclusion of the allied meeting in Potsdam.
Truman informed Grew in June 1945 that he liked the idea
of reassuring the Japanese on the matter of the Emperor.
However, Grew was disappointed to learn that the President
had chosen the Potsdam Conference a month hence to push
for an allied proclamation. Thus, the personal crusade
trumpeted by Grew and Marshall to modify U.S. stated war
aims spent itself by early summer 1945. Few opportunities
lay ahead as the final planning commenced for the
long-awaited assault on Japan. The cost of an invasion
weighed heavily in the minds of political and military
officials. And, ever so methodically, the atomic bomb
moved closer to testing.
CHAPTER 3
The Casualty Myth
Military planning for the conquest of Japan began in
earnest in the Spring of 1945. The concept involved a
two-phased campaign. Operation Olympic, a landing on the
southern island of Kyushu, was initially scheduled for the
month of December 1945, but was later moved to November 1,
1945. The second phase, Operation Coronet, entailed an
assault on Honshu (the Tokyo Plain) about March 1, 1946.
Planning documents show that the military expected success
based upon surprise, mobility, and superior mechanized
power. The invasion also incorporated a tightening of the
naval stranglehold around Japan and stepped up aerial
bombardment. General Marshall estimated that a force of
766,700 Americans and allies would face 350,000 Japanese
during the Olympic campaign. The Chief of Staff believed
that, if the two operations proved successful, the war
would end by November 1946. Other officials, such as King
and Arnold, expressed more optimism, believing that a
smashing victory in Kyushu might coerce an earlier
Japanese surrender.1
A crucial point in the planning process took place on
June 18, 1945, at an important White House meeting.
Admiral Leahy had informed the JCS several days earlier
that the President desired to prepare for the forthcoming
Potsdam Conference. Truman sought information on such
matters as the numbers of men and ships required for an
invasion of Japan, estimated casualties, U.S. intentions
for Russia, and contributions expected from America's
allies. Leahy's memorandum to the JCS specified that the
decision on the campaign must economize the loss of
American lives. Time and money in comparison were not
important.2
The June meeting provided a ripe opportunity for a
review of the cost to conclude the Pacific war. Attendees
included President Truman, Secretary of War Stimson,
Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, Assistant Secretary of
War McCloy, and the JCS (Leahy, Marshall, Arnold, and
King). Secretary Stimson, suffering from one of his
frequent attacks of migraine headaches and intestinal
ailments, nearly missed the gathering. General Marshall
briefed the President on his best estimate of the casualty
expectations if the U.S. invaded Japan. It must be
remembered that, at a minimum, Truman, Stimson, and
Marshall were aware of the early June anonymous memorandum
estimating a million casualties. The Chief of Staff told
Truman that "the first 30 days in Kyushu should not exceed
the price we have paid for Luzon." That price included
31,000 soldiers killed, wounded, or missing-in-action.
Several days later Admiral Nimitz raised the estimate in
official planning documents to 49,000, based upon revised
statistics from the Okinawa campaign. Rufus Miles, in the
fall 1985 edition of International Security, rightly
argues that this meeting only reviewed the plans for
Operation Olympic and that no detailed consideration of
viable alternatives to invasion, such as naval blockade,
aerial bombardment, etc., were discussed, despite Truman's
original tasking. Miles' contention is that the Army had
already persuaded the other services to accept the
invasion route. Miles' charge, however, glosses over the
fact that Admiral King, in an unusual show of unity,
openly sided with Marshall during the confabulation,
showed no reservation, and stated that Kyushu was "a
natural step" following Okinawa. Admiral King previously
reported to Marshall that he did not support quoting
comparative casualty figures for the European and Pacific
theaters. Marshall also read statements submitted by
Generals Eaker (Army Air Force) and Eisenhower. These
general officers agreed that, based on the German
experience, air power alone could not defeat Japan. In
addition, General MacArthur cabled Marshall shortly before
the session and stated his opinion that Operation Olympic
posed less possibility of loss than other alternatives.3
The casualty speculations at the White House
gathering only amounted to an educated guess. Later
references by President Truman and Secretary Stimson to
the meeting provided fodder for critics of the ultimate
decision to use the atomic bomb. Recalling the
discussions, Truman stated "all of us realized the
fighting would be fierce and heavy."4 He also recorded
that "General Marshall informed me (at the meeting) that
it might cost half a million American lives to force the
enemy's surrender on his home grounds."5 This
statement, written nearly a decade later, is a blemish on
the record. No such exchange took place between the
President and Marshall unless conducted privately. The
other participants at the meeting make no mention of such
a statement. Moreover, Marshall denied telling the
President such a statistic.6 In 1947, Secretary Stimson
wrote that he remembered being told that the Kyushu and
Honshu operations "might be expected to cost over a
million casualties." Yet, even Stimson failed to identify
the source of his numbers. Is it possible that his only
sharp recollection is the early June memorandum which
provided this bloated estimate?7
Winston Churchill compounded the confusion in two
public statements issued 10 days apart following the
August 1945 atomic bombings. On August 6, 1945,
Churchill, on the eve of departing office and in response
to the news of Hiroshima, told reporters that the bomb
saved 500,000 American lives. On August 16, 1945,
Churchill's first speech as leader of the opposition in
the House of Commons raised the ante. The former Prime
Minister declared that the bomb spared one million
American and 250,000 British lives. These latter
statistics also appear in Churchill's memoirs. 8
The casualty figures cited by these officials later
became a crux of the atomic bomb decision. Authors Arjun
Makhijani and John Kelly believe the reference to the
large casualty statistics represented a desire to
rationalize the event after the fact and mask the truth
that the bomb was unnecessary. These writers argue that
the numbers were "exaggerated deliberately so in the face
of much better estimates and available evidence prior to
the atomic bombings." Rufus Miles states that American
and British leaders needed to make no such claim of
enormous loss to justify the bomb because the vast
majority of Americans approved of the bomb as a means to
shorten the conflict. Miles' analysis targets the number
of casualties spared at no more than 20,000. He observes
that it is ludicrous to believe that General Marshall
would have proposed and President Truman would have
approved a campaign that might cost 500,000 casualties or
more.9
No official at the meeting broached the subject of
the atomic bomb during the formal discussions. Prior to
adjournment, President Truman surveyed the attendees for
any additional comments. Assistant Secretary of War
McCloy spoke candidly about his belief that a policy
decision should be forthcoming on the bomb. Specifically,
he urged the President to send a conciliatory message to
the Japanese describing the bomb and threatening to use it
unless a surrender occurred. Those present seemed
uncomfortable with the subject and ignored the
conversation between McCloy and Truman. The President
brushed aside the suggestion by consoling McCloy that the
matter would be given further thought. If that occurred,
there is no indication that Truman seriously considered
McCloy's argument.10
The uneasiness expressed in June 1945 about the high
casualty estimates continued in military circles in the
month following the atomic attacks. In September 1945,
the War Department desired to negate Japanese propaganda
statements aimed at discrediting the U.S. for bombing
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Reports in Japanese diplomatic
cables and press releases gave grapnic descriptions of
large post-bomb suffering and death. On August 24, 1945,
General Groves sought an explanation from his scientists
involved in the Manhattan Project concerning the reports.
These scientists assured Groves that the information
related to thermal burns was a hoax. Only later did
officials grasp the magnitude of radiation poisoning.
Earlier U.S. press releases quoted that the bombs saved
more than 200,000 lives. A War Department cable prepared
for field commanders urged that the reference to 200,000
lives be amended to say that the bomb spared "tens of
thousands, possibly 200,000 lives."11
These arguments, however, fail to account for other
factors which troubled American military and political
leaders in the hectic months prior to the conclusion of
hostilities. Foremost was the perception of the cost of
an invasion. Despite the best estimates available, the
fact remained that no official could be certain what
suffering the allied forces would experience by invading
Japan. The pulse of military activity in the advance on
Japan only heightened this concern. In 1944, the U.S.
sustained an average of 3,200 casualties per month. This
figure represented all categories: killed-in-action
(KIA), missing-in-action (MIA), wounded-in-action (WIA),
died-of-wounds (DOW), seriously wounded-in-action (SWA),
seriously injured-in-action (SIA), lightly wounded-in-
action (LWA), and lightly injured-in-action (LIA). During
the first 7 months of 1945, the number escalated to an
average of 12,750 casualties per month. In May 1945, the
Bureau of Public Relations within the War Department
sought casualty data for a pamphlet entitled "The Military
Policy of the United States Against Japan." The casualty
statistics cited in the brochure are horrific, even
without the inclusion of the final count from the Okinawa
campaign.12
The Okinawan casualties became the most significant
for the planning of the final assault on Japan. The heavy
casualties suffered by American troops presaged the
brutality and magnitude of fighting that officials
believed allied forces would face in the autumn. In
addition, the campaign had not ended when Truman met with
his advisors on June 18, 1945. The intensity of the
fighting in Okinawa and the reports of Japanese
recalcitrance added a sense of urgency to the planning.
In Okinawa, a garrison of 110,000 Japanese, led by
LTG Misuru Ushijami, held for more than 80 days against an
American force of 183,000 troops supported by the most
extensive naval gunfire barrage in the history of
amphibious operations. On June 22, 1945, American led
forces finally secured Okinawa by sealing, digging up, or
using flame throwers against the entrenched enemy. In the
minds of American military leaders, the fanatical
resistance displayed by the Japanese at Okinawa would
stiffen further as the allies penetrated the defensive
ring around Japan. Furthermore, the spectacle of Okinawa,
where thousands of Japanese soldiers committed suicide
rather than surrender, worried U.S. and allied
officials.13
In September 1945, the War Department published the
final casualty statistics for the Okinawa campaign. This
report showed that, during the fighting conducted between
March 26 - June 2l, 1945, U.S. forces sustained a casualty
rate of 43%. One in five combat soldiers and a like
number of non-combat troops became casualties.
Twenty-five percent of all battle casualties died.
Lastly, 87 of every 100 casualties were infantrymen.
These grim statistics also revealed that the final death
count numbered more than 7,300 soldiers. The overwhelming
suffering in the campaign heightened the fears of U.S.
officials who clearly understood that Okinawa was a
delaying action. The Kyushu operation would begin the
struggle for the Japanese homeland.14
Even after the fall of Okinawa, American officials
expressed continued amazement at the ferocity of the
Japanese resistance. Suicide air attacks and banzai
charges by ground troops burned in the American image of
the Pacific struggle. These Kamikaze attacks inflicted
serious damage. In 1944 and 1945, these suicide raids
destroyed 26 naval vessels, damaged 164 others, and
inflicted 10,000 casualties on sailors. Intelligence
estimates predicted that as many as three times the
attacks might occur during Operation Olympic, as compared
to Okinawa. Japan, working at a frenzied pace, had fitted
about 5,000 aircraft with 500-pound explosives to use in
Kamikaze attacks. An additional 4,000 planes awaited
bombs. Special attack naval units and one-man torpedo
submarines readied to guard Japan and harass the U.S.
invasion force. U.S. troop morale sagged and no military
official dared to hazard a guess at the casualties for the
final fighting during Operation Coronet in the Spring of
1946.15
Planning conducted later in the summer of 1945
reflected the gravity of the situation facing the allies.
In mid-July 1945, General MacArthur estimated that he
needed four more divisions per month from the U.S.
strategic reserve to conduct additional operations during
Operation Coronet. Intelligence reports during the same
month recorded that economic measures were not sufficient
to end the war. Moreover, while some reports surmised
that the Japanese will was waning, the JCS learned in
early August 1945 that Japan was strengthening her defense
in southern Kyushu through an expansion of ground forces,
aircraft conservation, and mining operations. The JCS
requested that commanders reexamine their plans for
Operation Olympic and forward alternatives to Washington.
The bomb obviated this necessity. Secretary Stimson
recalled after the war that he was appalled at military
estimates of the serious costs that even a poorly equipped
defensive army could inflict on a landing party.16
Truman, Churchill, and Stimson quoted erroneous
casualty statistics after the war. The evidence does not
support inflated estimates that up to one million lives
were spared by not conducting an invasion of Japan. The
record clearly shows that General Marshall briefed the
president and Secretary of War on June 18, 1945, that the
initial assault on Kyushu would result in no more than
31,000 casualties (all categories). Even later revisions
placed the number at no higher than about 50,000. Rufus
Miles believes the number of dead would have totalled
about 7,000, even in the most pessimistic scenario. His
figures represent the conservative number of estimated
casualties. This paper revealed earlier that the source
of the large estimate surfaced in early June 1945 in the
anonymous memorandum given to President Truman by Herbert
Hoover. The JCS review of that memorandum rejected the
loss figures as too high, although Stimson watered down
the language in his reply to the President.17
The question lingers as to why these leaders
perpetrated what Rufus Miles describes as the "myth of
Hiroshima."18 The answer is not simple and goes beyond
the impersonal recording of statistics. Some observers,
such as Chalmers Roberts of the Manchester Guardian
Weekly, have little difficulty in excusing "the passions,
bitterness, hatred, the faulty intelligence, and sheer
stupidities of the war."l9 The truth lies in the fact
that, no matter what the intelligence reports estimated,
neither the politicians nor the military leadership knew
the ultimate cost of the victory over Japan, particularly
through the employment of an invasion of the enemy's
homeland. Previously cited intelligence reports
highlighted that the Japanese had substantial manpower and
will to summon against an attack. The level of Japanese
resistance in Okinawa was seen as a mere harbinger of what
Operation Olympic might encounter. Therefore, a full
measure of certainty never existed in the minds of those
American leaders charged with the responsibility to send
so many men to battle. Then too, all recorded estimates
only related to the first 30 days of the campaign in
Kyushu. No estimates materialized for the remainder of
Operation Olympic or for a struggle that bogged down due
to the enemy's stiff resistance. These estimates were not
produced because the bomb abruptly ended the war, but they
most assuredly would have reflected a more bloody result
than critics envisioned. Nonetheless, Truman, Churchill,
and Stimson collectively share the blame for failing to
set the record straight after the war. There is no doubt
that even the smaller losses recorded in official
documents were enough to sway a decision to use the atomic
bomb. These leaders were not insensitive to the suffering
of their soldiers. However, their failure to revoke the
symbol of extensive casualties as justification to use the
atomic bomb provided opponents of that decision an
opportunity to criticize America's true war aims.
CHAPTER 4
The Russian Connection
Some scholars contend that diplomatic relations with
the Soviet Union stirred as much concern among policy
makers as casualties. By the spring of 1945, the U.S.S.R.
replaced the Third Reich as the chief security interest of
the U.S. Some American officials saw the atomic weapon as
a means to influence postwar international relations,
particularly with respect to Russia. Unfortunately, these
same leaders failed to establish a unity of purpose or
understand the diplomatic limitations of the bomb so
evident today.1
Secretary Stimson saw little hope for postwar
U.S.-Soviet cooperation. He based this opinion on the
very nature of each nation's political system and the
long-standing mistrust between the two countries. The
Secretary of War originally bought presidential approval
to tell Stalin about the bomb. Stimson reasoned that the
secret of the bomb might obtain a quid pro quo from the
Russian leader. Further, Stimson felt that failure to
inform Stalin would aggrevate the strain of postwar
relations with the Soviets. By early 1945, Stimson
reconsidered this assumption and urged Roosevelt to issue
a statement on the future of atomic weapons concurrent
with the first use of the bomb. By this time, Roosevelt
supported Churchill's long-held position that only an
Anglo-American atomic monopoly would stifle the Russians.
This view, interestingly enough, contradicts the argument
of some historians that Roosevelt was soft on the
Russians. Roosevelt refused to pursue shared knowledge
with the Soviets. His death prior to a policy decision on
long-term atomic energy goals left Truman with an heirloom
of war and a paucity of knowledge upon which to forge
future actions.2
Some authorities believe that the U.S. sought to use
atomic blackmail on the Soviet Union to keep the Soviets
out of the war. Gar Alperovitz, author of a monograph on
this subject, quotes General Marshall to support this
view. At the June 18, 1945, White House meeting, Marshall
said, ". . . the impact of the Russian entry on the
already hopeless Japanese may well be the decisive action
levering them into capitulation at that time or shortly
thereafter if we land in Japan."3 The implication is
that the U.S. needed to end the war prior to Soviet
entry. In addition, Alperovitz paints Truman and his new
Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, as almost rabid in
their desire to use the bomb to control Stalin.
Alperovitz also cites Japanese peace initiatives to the
Russians in the summer of 1945 as proof that Japan knew
she was beaten. Therefore, the bomb's target was not
Japan, but rather the Soviet Union.4 Alperovitz's
viewpoint is supported by columnist Drew Middleton, who
recently wrote that "the explosion of atom bombs on Japan
would impress the Soviet Union and make its leaders more
cooperative with the United States."5 According to
Alperovitz and Middleton, the bomb had as its purpose to
give the U.S. the advantage over the Soviets in shaping
the postwar world.6
These writers miss the mark on several accounts.
Alperovitz took Marshall's quote out of context. A closer
scrutiny of the minutes of the White House meeting
indicates that General Marshall referred to the Russian
entry into the war as making an impact only in conjunction
with continued U.S. and allied air bombardment, naval
blockade, and the fall landing on Japanese soil. In
addition, the belief that the U.S. hastily dropped two
bombs after the Potsdam Conference to halt Soviet
intervention in the war is illogical. The U.S. did not
know the exact date that Russia would enter the Pacific
war. The estimated window of entry was August 8-22,
1945. Little margin for error existed for such an
enormous undertaking as the bomb. To forestall Soviet
participation in the war by bombing Japan, the U.S.
actually would have had to move sooner than the Hiroshima
attack. The actual date for execution of the atomic
bombings was left to the discretion of the air forces
commander in the Pacific. Thus, no political pressure
emanated from the top to rush a bomb into use as a mean
to frighten the Russians. Finally, the argument that
Truman dropped the bombs to intimidate Russia ignores the
fact that the President strongly believed that the atom
bomb was a combat weapon that could be legitimately used
against Japan. Moral problems did not exist. Great
Britain and the U.S. set the precedent for the mass allied
bombings of civilians in Germany (naturally stimulated by
the Nazi blitzkrieg) and continued the policy with Japan.
Recorded discussions leave little doubt that some policy
makers saw the bomb as a means to neutralize Russian
intentions in the Far East. To view this position as
being held by the majority of U.S. officials, however,
ignores the dictates of American wartime policy.7
The bomb had a less immediate impact on U.S. postwar
relations with the Soviet Union. As has been shown,
Secretary Stimson's view on the subject wavered throughout
the war. After Roosevelt's death, the Secretary of War
believed that no world organization, with a nation member
whose people lacked basic human freedoms, could be trusted
with the new weapon. Stimson felt that the Russians could
show good faith by honoring the admirable precepts in the
1936 Soviet constitution. 8
Secretary Stimson changed his mind once again after
the Potsdam Conference. Averell Harriman, the U.S.
Ambassador to the Soviet Union, convinced the Secretary
that the bomb could not be used to bargain for peace. In
early September 1945, Stimson urged President Truman to
open immediate and direct negotiations with the U.S.S.R.
on the subject of future control of atomic energy.
Secretary Forrestal recorded that he shared Stimson's view
that the bomb could not be used to secure peace.
Forrestal saw the bomb as an albatross to civilization, as
each new weapon produced a counter-weapon.9
On September 2l, 1945, President Truman devoted an
entire cabinet meeting to a discussion of the U.S. postwar
atomic policy. The same lack of consensus which had
characterized discussions during the war dominated this
session. Henry Wallace, Secretary of Commerce, believed
that science could not be cribbed. Therefore, the U.S.
ought to give atomic secrets to Russia. Secretary
Forrestal countered Wallace and suggested that, since the
bomb and its secrets were the property of the U.S., the
administration should withhold this information until it
was positive how the benefactor would use the knowledge.
Forrestal reminded all present that the Japanese had
been U.S. allies during World War I. The Russians might
be a declared enemy in the future. Forrestal proposed an
approach which found little support in 1945, but later
became a basic tenet of American policy. The Secretary
suggested the idea of sole trusteeship under the United
Nations. Truman did not commit his administration to a
policy at that moment but promised to study the cabinet's
views, draw conclusions, and report to the Congress.
Another blow to the advocacy of international cooperation
occurred with the resignation of Secretary Stimson after
the cabinet meeting.10
Immediate postwar atomic energy policy did not
materialize. On October 30, 1945, President Truman asked
Congress for the authority to create the Atomic Energy
Commission. At the same time, Truman informed Congress
that he planned to pursue international control of atomic
weapons, but only after consultation with the British and
Chinese. However, these U.S. allies were in no mood to
see the Soviet Union become an heir to atomic bomb
technology.11
Between 1945-1947, efforts for a U.S.-Soviet
cooperative approach on the bomb failed. Lengthy debates
within the U.S. government soured the Russians on the
sincerity of any American proposals on the issue.
Shrewdly, the Soviets saw the open division within the
American government as a means to buy time to develop
their own bomb. For example, in April 1946, General
Walter B. Smith, Ambassador to Russia and General
Eisenhower's former Chief of Staff, spoke to Soviet
leaders in a tough manner about U.S.-Soviet relations. On
the same day, Senator Claude Pepper of Florida discussed
in a public forum his disappointment that the U.S. and her
allies seemed intent on ganging up on the Soviet Union.
Pepper urged all nations to denounce atomic weapons,
destroy all bombs, and disband all production
facilities.12
This inconsistency among government representatives
bred suspicion and spilled over into discussions about
conventional weapon disarmament. In October 1947,
Forrestal, Ralph Bard (the U.S. representative to the
U.N.), General Eisenhower, and several other U.S.
representative determined that the outlook for arms
reduction was gloomy. Eisenhower opined that if the U.S.
went forward with an agreement to limit conventional
weapons without a workable, rigid inspection process, the
Russians would have a precedent to reject such provisions
on atomic weapons. This point, so obvious to even the
casual observer in 1985, struck these men hard in 1947.
By 1950, the issue of viable inspections was central to
all disarmament talks and remains so today.13
The U.S. missed the opportunity to develop a
consistent policy with regard to the bomb and its
diplomatic impact on the Soviet Union. This failure grew
from the inability of American leaders to form a workable
consensus froin which to advise the President. During the
war, the rapidly changing military situation, anti-Soviet
pressure from Churchill, and the uncertainty over the
success of the bomb contributed to a short-sighted
policy. There is no concrete evidence, contrary to the
belief of critics of U.S. actions, that President Truman
or other U.S. officials conspired to terrorize the
Russians by dropping an atomic bomb on Japan, although no
doubt the Soviets were expected to take notice. Indeed,
the U.S. possessed few bombs with which to wage such a
campaign. Moreover, the American military machine, true
to its historical form, underwent a rapid demobilization.
Thus, the U.S. in reality was not working from a position
of strength. After the war, the U.S. lost key cabinet
members, such as Stimson and Forrestal, whose long-term
experience had crystallized on the theme of international
control of nuclear weapons, perhaps under a U.N.
trusteeship. Their disappearance from the debate,
continued mistrust of Soviet intentions, and Russian
perceptions of conflicting U.S. policies doomed any hope
for immediate postwar disarmament. The Russians developed
an aatomic capability much more rapidly than American
experts predicted. Cooperation and negotiation became
increasingly difficult.14
CHAPTER 5
Scientific Dissent
Two scientific forces clashed in the summer of 1945
with respect to the atomic bomb. The Interim Committee
reported its recommendations for the employment of the
weapon against Japan. At the same time, a sincere cry of
opposition to the use of the bomb emerged in the
scientific community, but this protest by scientists came
too late. The Interim Committee'S report became the seed
for President Truman's ultimate decision.
On May 3l, 1945, the Interim Committee and the
scientific Panel met to decide on recommendations
pertaining to the use of the atomic bomb. Several members
remarked later that it appeared to be almost a foregone
conclusion that the bomb would be dropped. On June 1,
1945, with the concurrence of the scientific Panel, the
Interim Committee issued the following recommendations:
(1) The U.S. should drop the bomb on Japan at the
earliest possible date.
(2) A dual target should be bombed, consisting of
both military and civilian facilities vulnerable
to damage.
(3) Japan should be given no prior warning of the
attack.1
The Interim Committee provided rationale for its
recommendations. It believed that the Japanese should not
receive any advance warning because there was no guarantee
that such an action would induce a surrender. The
committee reasoned that even a successful test prior to
the actual attack should not deter a surprise U.S. bombing
of Japan. The committee stated that the scheduled test in
New Mexico and military deployment by air drop were not
the same. The committee also discounted a staged
demonstration for the Japanese, fearing a dud would cost
the U.S. loss of face and spur the Japanese to resist
further. Lastly, the U.S. had only several bombs to use.
Production rates promised insufficient inventory for
multiple attacks until late summer or fall of 1945.2
Despite the Interim Committee's distinguished
credentials, significant dissent against the bomb existed
in scientific circles. As early as 1944, Niels Bohr, the
famed Nobel Laureate in physics and a member of the atom
bomb project, strove to convince U.S. and British leaders
of the futility of atomic weapons. Bohr believed that the
U.S. and U.S.S.R. were destined for a postwar arms race
unless America and Britain established some form of
international control. He suggested that Roosevelt
approach the Soviets on the subject while they were still
a U.S. ally. Bohr succeeded in convincing several British
officials, such as Ambassador Halifax in Washington and
Sir John Anderson, the director of the British portion of
the atom bomb project, that international control was
necessary. In 1944, Roosevelt dispatched Bohr to London
to discuss his views with Churchill. The Prime Minister
rudely dismissed Bohr, who returned frustrated to the
U.S. Bohr eventually thought he had convinced Roosevelt
to pursue a policy of mutual trust and cooperation with
the Soviets. In reality, Roosevelt duped Bohr. In
September 1944, Roosevelt and Churchill chose to keep
atomic developments concealed from Stalin. Furthermore,
these two leaders opted to spy on Bohr to ensure that the
physicist did not pass atomic information to the
Soviets.3
Dr. Vannevar Bush and Dr. James Conant attempted to
influence the administration's policy. Like Bohr, these
scientists sensed that the Anglo-American monopoly would
last a maximum of three to five years, believing that the
Soviets had some primitive atomic research underway.
Thus, a policy of secrecy offered only a short-term value
and might hamper future relations with Russia. These
scientists also understood that the atomic bomb was merely
the first step to more dramatic developments in nuclear
weapons. Bush and Conant faiied to persuade Roosevelt and
found Truman unwilling to change his predecessor's
direction so late in the war. It is interesting to note
that, despite the sincere views held by Bush and Conant,
both scientists acquiesced in favor of tide Interim
Committee's report, which omitted any reference to
long-range U.S. atomic energy policy.4
The Interim Committee report did not halt opposition
by other scientists. On June 12, 1945, James Franck, a
Nobel Prize winner, attempted to give Secretary Stimson a
report from the Committee on Social and Political
Implications. This committee consisted of seven
scientists involved with the preparation of plutonium as a
nuclear explosive. The committee viewed the atomic weapon
as infinitely dangerous, potentially creating a Pearl
Harbor in a thousand cities. The report cited the
perceived German threat as the original impetus to develop
the weapon, but that danger no longer existed. In
addition, the report claimed that the Russians knew basic
atomic information as early as 1940. The vast resources
of the Soviet Union made containment of atomic secrets in
the future impossible. Thus, the Franck Committee saw an
arms race as inevitable unless immediate steps were taken
to prevent such a tragedy. The committee recommended that
a demonstration of the bomb be given on a desert island.
Simultaneously, and in good faith, the U.S. should
renounce use of nuclear weapons and call for international
control. The report argued that U.S. employment of the
bomb against Japan without a warning was inconsistent with
American stands for humanity, such as those made with the
anti-gas warfare policy. The Franck Committee also
believed that a first use policy for the bomb might anger
our allies and find little support among the American
people. The report concluded that the initiative to delay
the arms race stood clearly with the U.S.5
The scientific Panel reviewed the Franck Report. On
June 16, 1945, the panel stated that the only alternative
to the bomb was an invasion of Japan. J. Robert
Oppenheimer later remarked that members of the panel saw
the bomb as a means to save lives and make an impact on
the stability of the postwar world. Truman recorded that
the Scientific Panel informed him that no technical
demonstration could ensure the termination of the war.
The Japanese likely would interpret the failure of a
preannounced test as a hoax or U.S. propaganda.6
During June and July 1945, additional scientific
protest actions surfaced. On June 27, 1945, Under
Secretary of the Navy, Ralph Bard, an original member of
the Interim Committee, changed his earlier support for the
body's June 1, 1945, report. Bard recommended that Japan
be given a two or three-day warning about the pending
bomb. In Bard's opinion, failure to do so would damage
America's image as a humanitarian nation. Bard believed
that Japan was searching for a face-saving way out of the
war. Therefore, the U.S. lost nothing by informing the
Japanese leaders about the potential of the bomb. On July
12, 1945, scientists in several laboratories in Chicago
conducted a poll which favored a warning and demonstration
of the bomb prior to military use.7
In a separate action, Dr. Leo Szilard, the scientist
who originally approached President Roosevelt about atomic
research, forwarded two petitions with over 60 signatures
to Truman urging non-military use of the bomb. Szilard
worried that there was not enough contact between
scientists and Congress. Many of the young scientists
felt they were working in a vacuum, far removed from the
decision process, with little or no knowledge about
government policy or the military situation. Neither
Szilard petition reached the President. General Groves
intercepted the second document and passed it to George
Harrison for safekeeping. Groves justified his actions on
the grounds that the Interim Committee's recommendations
had already been forwarded to President Truman. If one
peers closer, an additional factor existed. The petition
simply arrived too late to make a difference. The atomic
bomb test had proven successful the previous day.
President Truman received the positive news at Potsdam and
began formulating the decision to use the bomb against
Japan. There is little reason to believe that the Szilard
petition stood any chance of changing Truman's mind.8
The efforts by a small, dedicated group of scientists
to convince the government not to employ an atomic bomb
against Japan failed in the summer of 1945. This body of
experts was intimately associated with various portions of
the Manhattan Project. The justification presented by
these scientists centered on the issues of humanity and
the fear of a rampant nuclear arms race. Rather than
becoming a weapon to stop war, the atom bomb had emerged
as a new weapon of war. Therefore, these scientists
worked diligently to abolish, or at least limit the new
and horrible technology.9 The administration did not
alter its course. Key officials prevented the scientific
appeals from reaching the highest levels of the
government. In addition, the timing of the protest
weighed against its success. In the end, the momentum for
the decision to drop the bomb found at least silent
support among the President's closest scientific advisors
on the Interim Committee.
CHAPTER 6
Decision and Employment
The initial development of atomic energy did not
commit the U.S. to use atomic weapons against an
adversary. By the spring of 1945, the situation changed
dramatically. The proposed military operations,
production status of the bomb, continued political
insistence on unconditional surrender, and the perception
of American public opinion convinced U.S. leaders that the
bomb should be used. The window of opportunity for the
decision became mid-July 1945 at the Potsdam Conference.
The meeting of allied leaders at Potsdam occurred
between July 17 - August 2, 1945. On the day prior to the
official convening of the conference, Secretary Stimson,
in attendance as part of the American delegation, received
an urgent, top secret cable from his Assistant Secretary
of War, George L. Harrison, in Washington, D.C. The
message informed Stimson that the Manhattan Project had
reached fruition on that date with the successful
detonation of an atomic bomb at the Alamogardo, New
Mexico, test site. Cable in hand, Stimson personally
delivered the information to President Truman. Stimson
recalled that the President appeared pleased but opted to
wait for a detailed report from General Groves in person
before discussing possible courses of action.1
Truman received Groves' report on July 17, 1945, and
reviewed his military strategy in light of the new
development. The chief executive faced conflicting views
and personalities. He desired to use the bomb in a manner
prescribed by the internationally accepted rules of war.
That is to say, Truman honestly believed that the U.S. had
the right to engage a military target with the bomb. The
President felt that, once an advantage was gained over a
foe, no respite should be given to the enemy. Yet,
despite the knowledge of the successful test, Truman gave
neither Stimson nor Marshall orders to stop the
preliminary planning underway for the Kyushu operation.2
American leaders faced immense pressures at Potsdam.
On July 17, 1945, the morning following his meeting with
President Truman, Stimson related the atom bomb test
results to both Secretary of State Byrnes and Prime
Minister Churchill. Stimson urged Byrnes and Churchill to
take the position that the U.S. should issue a warning to
the Japanese about the bomb and give assurances that the
Emperor could be retained. In addition, Stimson lobbied
the position to tell Stalin about the weapon. Both men
denied Stimson's request. Indeed, Byrnes' book, All in
One Lifetime, strangely omits any reference to the Stimson
suggestions. It is a well-known fact that Byrnes and
Churchill harbored deep suspicions about the Russians.
Byrnes seemed the most anxious of those delegates in the
American entourage at Potsdam to get the war finished
prior to Soviet participation. Byrnes viewed Stimson's
ideas as advocating a softening of U.S. policy toward
Japan. He considered any relaxation of the unconditional
surrender terms as anathema.3
Truman's dilemma was greater than that of his
advisors. The weight of the decision rested with him.
Conflicting ideas and opinions spun a web of confusion.
Indeed, Potsdam was Truman's initial meeting with Prime
Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Stalin. The
President dared not give the appearance of being the
weakest link in the alliance; therefore, what he lacked
experience, he more than made up in fortitude and
statesmanship.4
President Truman understood the political
considerations at stake. The solution lay in balancing a
plan to secure and control global peace without
compromising with the Japanese. The problem was in the
actual Japanese situation. Were the Japanese seeking a
path out of the war? If so, how ccould the U.S. use that
knowledge to conclude hostilities without appearing
soft?5
The evidence shows that some Japanese leaders
attempted to seek peace during the spring and summer of
1945. According to an interview conducted in 1950 with
Hiroshi Shimomura, the former Minister of State and Chief
of the Japanese Cabinet Information Bureau, the cabinet
which came to power in April 1945 signaled Japanese
intentions to terminate the fighting. In a postwar
interview, the Premier, Admiral Baron Suzuki (in marked
contrast to some U.S. intelligence reports), claimed that
the Japanese people distrusted their government. As
evidence, he cited reports by the Kempei, or secret
police, and increasing acts of sabotage by civilians
against political symbols. Suzuki stated that he publicly
advocated an increase in the war effort (to save his life
from fanatics), while privately he labored to negotiate an
end to the war.6
The situation was a gordian knot for the Japanese
government. During May and June 1945, Suzuki sent an
emissary to Russia to seek Soviet assistance in securing
peace terms. Suzuki felt that the Potsdam Conference
delayed his envoy from making any headway in convincing
the Soviets to serve as intermediaries. In reality, the
Premier knew that Soviet help was not forthcoming. Stalin
informed the Japanese that the Soviets would not renew
their neutrality pact with Japan after April 1946.7
U.S. intelligence reports stated that the Japanese
hope rested on thin ice. The militarists in the Japanese
government clung to the belief that a tough resistance
offered the best opportunity to gain a more favorable
bargaining position. These Japanese leaders also felt
that the U.S. was experiencing war weariness. U.S.
assessment of the Japanese situation saw no change in the
last-ditch, bloody conflict predicted for so many
months.8
The decision on the bomb was Truman's and his alone.
Based upon the Quebec Agreement, the President of the
U.S., with the concurrence of the British Prime Minister,
took responsibility for directing an atomic bombing of
Japan. The President knew that his entire staff and
advisors, except Admiral Leahy, favored use of the bomb in
some form or fashion. Thus, on July 23, 1945, Truman
chose to employ the bomb and informed his key civilian and
military advisors to proceed with established plans.
Truman minced no words in his memoirs as to his
intentions: "The final decision of where and when to use
the atomic bomb wad up to me. Let there be no mistake
about it. I regarded the bomb as a military weapon and
never had any doubt that it should be used."9 Churchill
supported this position by stating ". . . there never was
a moment's discussion as to whether or not the atomic bomb
should be used or not . . . the historic fact remains, and
must be judged in afterlife, that the decision whether or
not to use the atomic bomb to compel the surrender of
Japan was never even an issue."10 General Marshall
summed up his impression of the decision made at Potsdam
by President Truman: ". . . and it was decided to use
this weapon immediately in an effort to shorten the war
and save thousands of lives."11
The question remained of what to tell Stalin.
Stimson's efforts to persuade Churchill and Byrnes on the
initial day of the session to inform the Russians
concerning the atom bomb failed. Secretary Stimson,
always the obedient public servant, pressed the issue no
further. Truman, with the approval of Churchill, informed
Stalin in an indirect manner on July 24, 1945. Truman
casually mentioned to the Russian leader that the U.S. had
a new weapon of unusual power. According to Byrnes and
Truman, Stalin paid no special attention to the remark and
merely bade the American President well in the
endeavor.12
A major item resolved at Potsdam was the tripartite
proclamation. On July 26, 1945, the U.S., Great Britain,
and China issued the Potsdam Declaration. Stimson
provided President Truman preliminary thoughts on a
proposed proclamation in a detailed memorandum dated
July 2, 1945. In the document, Stimson recommended a
carefully timed warning to the Japanese to stress the
following points:
(1) The overwhelming power of the allied armies.
(2) The inevitability of Japanese destruction.
(3) The determination of the allies to change the
political authority in Japan.
(4) The goal to neutralize Japanese war-making
potential.
(5) A disavowal of allied intentions to destroy the
Japanese people or nation.
The memorandum is unique for three reasons. First,
Stimson made reference to allied acceptance of a
constitutional monarchy under the existing government, a
clear sign that he now favored relaxed surrender terms in
a manner similar to Under Secretary of State Grew.
Second, in keeping with Stimson's changing view, the
Secretary omitted any reference to the unconditional
surrender doctrine. Last, Stimson avoided mention of the
atomic bomb. However, in his transmittal memorandum to
the President, the Secretary remarked that the efficacy of
such a weapon could be incorporated into any future
document. The final Potsdam Declaration reflected most of
Stimson's early July 1945 proposals, except for the
important ones on the position of the Emperor,
unconditional surrender, and any mention of the atomic
bomb.13
The Potsdam announcement froze in place the opposing
parties in the Japanese cabinet with respect to ending the
war. For the most part, the Japanese interpreted the
Potsdam announcement as no change in the U.S. position.
The government made no statement for two days. On July 28,
1945, Premier Suzuki officially rejected the allied
statement. The Japanese people saw the government's
inaction as ignoring the situation. Militarists
interpreted the 48-hour silence as acquiescence. Field
commanders flooded the Ministry with messages begging
public officials to denounce the communique from Potsdam.
The chasm ran deep. Military officials and young public
leaders imbued with indoctrination argued that Japan
should stand and fight to the last man. Suzuki stated
after the war that, during the turmoil of the last month
of the war, ". . . we could never get a complete agreement
anywhere in the government."14
On July 24, 1945, General Groves requested approval
of target dates, sites, and other administrative details
associated with the use of the bomb. The following day
General Marshall, at the direction of Secretary Stimson,
confirmed that the time-frame for using the bomb was
August 3, 1945, or as soon thereafter as weather
permitted. The dating of the order led some critics to
argue that Truman knew the Japanese would reject the
Potsdam Declaration. In reality, such a view ignores the
timing of military planning requirements. The truth is
that the order issued on July 25, 1945, stood unless the
President reversed his decision. It is ludicrous to think
that the President would have allowed an earlier dated
order to stand had the Japanese accepted the allied peace
terms. Ample opportunity existed to cancel the order, for
Truman had the power to do so. Therefore, as the Japanese
failed to provide an amenable response, military planning
and execution continued unabated.15
Stimson previously reviewed the target list for the
bombs. Four cities were selected: Kokura, Hiroshima,
Nigata, and Nagasaki. Stimson designated those targets
considered important, such as centers of military
equipment and supplies, troop concentrations, and
headquarters. Additionally, an aim of the bomb was to sap
the will of the Japanese people. Authors Makhijani and
Kelly speculate that Stimson merely wanted a good show so
the bomb could demonstrate its strength. This
condemnation is far off the mark. Stimson was not callous
or without feeling in the matter. To illustrate this,
Stimson personally struck the city of Kyoto from the
original target list. He did so because of the city's
ancient heritage, importance as a cultural center, and
sheer beauty. In addition, he protected the city from any
incendiary bombing prior to the atomic attack. The
procedure for execution dictated that bombs be used as
they became available. General Marshall originally
thought that nine bombs would be needed to subdue the
Japanese forces during the entire campaign into 1946.16
As Truman left Potsdam, the anxious wait commenced.
The President paused in England prior to embarking to the
U.S. He paid a courtesy call on King George, VI. Admiral
Leahy remarked that the King's knowledge of the atomic
bomb project astounded him. In jest, the King and Leahy
wagered a bet on the success or failure of the pending
bomb drop. The King cast his lot in favor of the bomb;
and Admiral Leahy, to his later embarrassment, took the
opposite position. On August 6, 1945, the presidential
party aboard the cruiser USS Augusta received word that
the atomic bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima and that the
results were more spectacular than imagined. Truman
issued an announcement on the bomb which had been prepared
at Potsdam in the event of a successful detonation. The
statement promised a "rain of ruin" from the air if Japan
did not capitulate.17
The political situation in Japan, although frayed,
did not unravel after the first bomb. Following the
attack, military leaders mobilized propaganda statements
denying that an atomic bomb had ravaged the city. These
statements went so far as to say that a white shirt and
concrete buildings afforded enough protection from the
powerful bombs, even if they were atomic in nature. One
survivor at Hiroshima had a different view as he recorded
his recollection of August 6, 1945:
"Suddenly, a strong flash of light startled
me--and then another . . . . I remember vividly
how a stone lantern in the garden became
brilliantly lit . . . . To my surprise I found
I was completely naked. How odds! Where were my
drawers and undershirt?"
After the second bomb fell on Nagasaki on August, 9, 1945,
the Japanese cabinet remained deadlocked on the question
of continuing the war. In a dramatic overnight session on
August 9-10, 1945, the Emperor was forced to cast the
deciding vote on the issue. He ended the stormy meeting
and the war by choosing peace. Premier Suzuki, saddened
by this imperial invocation, stated that this
participation marked only the second time in the war that
the Emperor personally interfered in the governmental
process of the conflict. The first instance occurred in
1941 with the decision to go to war. Suzuki also stated
that the Emperor's decision to terminate hostilities with
the U.S. rested on his sincere wish to stop the suffering
on both sides.18
The level of human suffering from the two atomic
bombs shocked the world. At Hiroshima, 70,000 people died
and a like number suffered injuries. At Nagasaki, nearly
37,000 Japanese were killed and slightly under 30,000
became casualties. By late 1945, the post-bomb total
deaths doubled in both cities. By 1950, the after-effects
of the explosions claimed 200,000 lives in Hiroshima and
140,000 in Nagasaki. These numbers do not include the
tens of thousands of people who suffered physical and
phychological wounds from disfigurement, sterility,
infertility, and other problems which surfaced as the
years passed.19
A number of factors merged as President Truman made
the fateful decision to use the atomic bomb. Stimson and
Marshall failed in their efforts to convince Secretary of
State Byrnes to lighten the unconditional surrender
demands on Japan. Byrnes remained fixed in his belief
that any approach other than unconditional surrender
smacked of appeasement and ensured further entrenchment of
the Japanese feudal caste. Confusion and uncertainty
reigned in the Japanese government as hawks and doves
sought a resolution to a political stalemate. Truman and
Churchill, gambling that the limited bombs available would
turn the tide of the war, chose not to inform Stalin about
the details of the bomb. Thus, the seeds of East-West
distrust were sown at Potsdam. Stalin, in a propaganda
campaign, later charged that the allied leaders broke
faith with the Soviets on this very point. The Soviet
Leader labeled the bomb as merely a new phase in the
external threat posed to Russian security by the West.
Lastly, no long-term approach on the issue of atomic
energy emerged. The bombs fell from the sky and the world
soon questioned the reasoning behind the U.S. action.20
CHAPTER 7
Postwar Views
The mushroom clouds which billowed majestically in
dark plumes over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945
cast their shadow over an unsuspecting world. The
immediate reaction to the atom bomb announcement ran the
gamut of the human emotional expression. As time passed,
the decision to drop the atomic bombs succumbed to
detailed examination and retrospect, even by many of those
persons intimately involved in the U.S. project.
Popular periodicals recorded the impressions of a
wide variety of people in the days following the
bombings. One journalist penned, "All thoughts and things
were split. The sudden achievement of victory was a
mercy, to the Japanese no less than to the United States;
but a mercy born of a ruthless force beyond anything in
human chronicle."1 Hanson W. Baldwin, a military
analyst who wrote for Life magazine, predicted that,
despite the new technology, the bomb could not hold ground
militarily; according to Baldwin, men remained essential
to war, perhaps as an "army of moles . . . . for men may
well burrow into the earth as the Japs have done in this
war . . . ." Baldwin predicted many items intrinsic to
today's military thinking: mass armies, big bombers,
giant warships, wide dispersion tactics, mobility, and
transportation by air.2 Time lamented that the U.S., a
Christian nation, produced the seeds of man's demise.
Even Herman Goring provided one last quote for posterity.
In reference to the bomb, Goring said, "A mighty
accomplishment. I don't want anything to do with it. I
am leaving this world."3 Finally, a British newspaper
managed to find a measure of comparison for the bomb when
it stated that the general electorate defeated
conservatism in England, the bomb did so worldwide.4
The question of the correctness of the decision to
bomb Japan with atomic weapons grew after the war as some
participants in the U.S. effort began to doubt the wisdom
of that decision. In military circles, various
interpretations abounded. Admiral King conceded after the
war that the atomic bomb saved American lives but not
Japanese lives. He clung firmly to the belief that a
naval blockade could have accomplished the same end as the
bomb and thus saved may lives and much misery on both
sides.5
General Arnold agreed with his Navy counterpart that
the bombs were unnecessary. Arnold believed that the
Japanese situation was hopeless in the summer of 1945. To
support his view, Arnold's War Report to Congress quoted a
Japanese official, Nauhiko Hagashi-Kuni. According to
Hagashi-Kuni, an advisor to Premier Suzuki, the incendiary
bombings had eliminated Japan's ability to wage war by
June 1945. Arnold surmised that the bomb was the worst
choice to force a conclusion of the war. In his book,
Global Mission, Arnold writes, ". . .atomic bomb, or no
atomic bomb, the Japanese were already on the verge of
collapse.
In 1963, published recollections of former President
Eisenhower about the bomb indicated that military
opposition to the events at Hiroshima and Nagasaki ran
deep. Eisenhower was dining with Secretary Stimson at
Potsdam when the coded message arrived confirming the
successful test in New Mexico. Eisenhower recalled that
Stimson asked for his opinion of America's new military
capability. Eisenhower informed Stimson that the bomb
"was a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer
mandatory to save American lives." Eisenhower viewed the
whole question as an "awful problem," although he fully
understood the Secretary of War's position. Eisenhower
felt, as did many others, that it was an unfortunate
legacy for America to have been the first nation to use
such a weapon.7
General Douglas MacArthur believed that the bomb was
not a military necessity. He became indignant when
reminded that the allied leaders failed to consult him
prior to Potsdam and that the JCS did not inform him about
the bomb until late July 1945. MacArthur also felt
insulted that Eisenhower knew aabout the existense of the
bomb before he did.8 General Marshall, recalling
MacArthur's ruffled feathers, said "We didn't want the
theater of commanders to get too optimistic about the new
weapon, so we didn't tell them about it until the last
minute."9 MacArthur insisted that he would have
promised the retention of the Emperor as a means to
extract peace terms from the Japanese.10
The scientific community voiced its opposition to the
birth of the atomic age. In a series of interviews
conducted after the war and in light of more than a
decade's experience with the failure of arms reduction,
several key scientists presented their forum on the atomic
bomb project. Dr. Leo Szilard, winner of the Einstein
Medal for outstanding achievement in natural sciences,
referred to the bomb in 1960 and said "I opposed it with
all my power." Szilard claimed that his misgivings about
the bomb which he helped to create increased as the
incendiary bombings intensified and gave him a picture of
the destruction that awaited Japan from an atomic attack.
Szilard attempted to counter the pro-bomb rationale
parlayed by supporters of the U.S. decision. With respect
to the dud argument, Szilard stated that enough bombs were
scheduled for production to overcome this possibility.
The scientist gave Truman low marks for not weighing all
available options more carefully. Szilard believed that
Truman's later reference to a $2 billion gamble that won
proves that the President did not understand the
ramifications of what he had done. In the end, Szilard
saw the U.S. postwar position weaken because of the use of
the bomb. America won. Therefore, the act of dropping
the bomb was not seen as a war crime like the Nazi
atrocities. Szilard's question remained: If the U.S. had
ultimately lost the war, how would the world then have
viewed Hiroshima and Nagasaki?11
Dr. Edward Teller, a colleague of Dr. Szilard on the
project and Director of the University of California's
radiation laboratory, also expressed grave doubts about
the bomb. Teller labeled the actions of America's leaders
in the closing days of the war as unfortunate. Teller
preferred the demonstration alternative. However, the
physicist also believed the experience gained at
Hiroshima, though regrettable, would lead the U.S. (and
perhaps other nations) to use nuclear devices in the right
way in the future. Taller determined that the hydrogen
bomb was a certainty with or without the bombings in
1945.12
Lewis L. Strauss, a Navy officer during the war and
later Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, did not
support the manner in which the bomb was used. Strauss
advanced the argument that the U.S. knew the Japanese
desired to keep the royal family. In addition, the
experience of World War I showed the world that the
destruction of a central government bred chaos. He
described America's approach as "a mistake." Strauss
stated that the U.S. should have issued a warning to the
Japanese and detonated a device in an uninhabited or
sparsely populated area for effect.13
Former members of the Truman administration opposed
to the U. S. actions spoke out publicly after the war.
Ralph A. Bard, former Under Secretary of the Navy and
member of the Interim Committee, supported warning the
Japanese because the U.S., by the very nature of its
political philosophy and historic goodwill, was a
humanitarian nation. Bard did not express disagreement
with the development of the bomb per se, but felt that a
warning would have brought the Japanese to the peace
table. In Bard's opinion, the positive effect of the
bomb, or the sudden conclusion of the war, was negated by
the fear the action generated in the Soviets and their
subsequent rush to develop an atomic bomb device.14
Admiral Leahy's negative views about the bomb changed
little following World War II. Truman's former advisor
confessed that the President sincerely thought the bombs
saved innumerable American lives. Leahy, however, held
firm to the view that the Japanese were beaten prior to
August 1945. Leahy supported King and Arnold in their
assumptions that the dual impact of sea blockade and
conventional bombing won the day. Leahy stated, "It is my
opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima
and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war
against Japan." Leahy classified the atomic bomb in the
same category as chemical and biological weapons.
According to Leahy, the U.S. stood on soft ground in this
regard. Not even the fanatical followers of Hitler or
Hirohito dared to use such weapons for fear of allied
retaliation. Thus, the U.S. took a more radical step
which had far-reaching consequences for generations to
come. Leahy cringed at the word "bomb." The former
presidential advisor did not even feel comfortable calling
the weapon an explosive. To Leahy, the device equated to
a poisonous thing. The weapon killed indiscriminately,
giving no quarter to women and children. America found
itself equated to a barbarian nation of the dark ages.
U.S. cruelty toward noncombatants reminded Leahy of
Genghis Khan, merely another form of rape and pillage
conducted impersonally by one state against another.15
In the end, Leahy witnessed a rising tide of atomic
weaponry development. The Admiral reluctantly accepted
what he could not change and worked as an advocate of U.S.
security through strength. According to Leahy, "Until the
United Nations, or some other world organization, can
guarantee--and have the power to enforce that guarantee--
that the world will be spared the terrors of atomic
warfare, the United States must have more and better
atomic bombs than any potential enemy."16
Several U.S. officials prominent in the decision
displayed somber feelings as the full impact of the
results at Hiroshima and Nagasaki became known. The day
after Hiroshima, General Marshall found little
gratification because, undoubtedly, a large number of the
Japanese people suffered horrible injuries. Stimson
remarked that, while the bomb ended a war which the
Japanese began, any satisfaction paled in comparison with
deeper emotions. President Truman, speaking to a radio
audience of 42 million people two weeks after Hiroshima,
said "I realize the tragic significance of the atomic
bomb."l7
The concern expressed by most American political,
scientific, and military leaders about what they had
unleashed on the world was balanced by their conviction
that the right decision had been made. General Marshall,
interviewed 15 years after Hiroshima, discounted the
theory that a demonstration or warning might have
convinced the Japanese to surrender. Marshall stated
that, although more bombs existed in the production
pipeline, only two completed devices were ready in August
1945. Therefore, the possibility of a dud loomed large in
the minds of those associated with the project. Marshall
explained that ". . . we had to use them in the best
possible way to save American lives."18 In his War
Report to Congress, Marshall provided additional
justification. The Chief of Staff stressed that, although
the atomic bomb offered danger to man, the weapon was not
alone among other terrible developments in the war, such
as aircraft, rockets, and electronics. Marshall
emphasized America's long heritage as a peace-loving
country, a tradition that he felt would continue in future
years.19
James F. Byrnes, J. Robert Oppenheimer, and Leslie R.
Groves also saw no reason to denigrate the U.S. decision.
Byrnes, who served as Governor of South Carolina following
the war, felt no regret for his role in the effort.
Byrnes admitted that he feared growing Russian influence
in the Far East, but that this factor did not drive his
position on the bomb. Byrnes knew that American
technology far outstripped that of the Soviets; therefore,
the U.S. faced no immediate danger from the Soviet Union
in the field of atomic energy. Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer
remained steadfast until his death that he had nothing to
rue about his role in the Manhattan Project. In his mind,
abstinence from progress was a medieval approach to
science. Leslie R. Groves, the military officer who sat
at the heartbeat of the project, believed that an untold
number of lives were saved by the bomb. The following is
Groves' recorded perception of President Truman's decision:
"An act of unsurpassed courage and
wisdom--courage because for the first time in
the history of the United States, the President
personally determined the course of a major
military strategical and tactical operation for
which he could be considered directly
responsible; and wisdom because history, if any
thought is given to the value of American lives,
has conclusively proven that his decision was
correct."20
In the February 1947 edition of Harper's, former
Secretary of War Stimson published his account of the
atomic bomb decision. This article, more than any other
single version, captured the attention of both the
supporters and opponents of the decision. Stimson
attempted to still the emerging din of questions about the
reasoning of U.S. leaders in employing the bomb. Critics
charged that American leaders failed to appreciate the
Japanese will to surrender as early as the spring of l945.
In addition, these same opponents remarked that a
diplomatic course could have achieved an acceptable
surrender at an earlier date. Stimson countered his
detractors by explaining that they misunderstood two key
points. First, the U.S. did not start the war. The
American goal in the spring and summer of 1945 was the
complete and immediate surrender of the Japanese Empire.
Despite intelligence reports which showed gains by
moderates in the Japanese cabinet and peace feelers by the
government, not all Japanese leaders favored the peace
route. The information available to the U.S. government
showed a Japan which wanted to maintain certain territo-
ries captured during the war even if she surrendered.
Nonetheless, no official peace offer emerged and the U.S.
perfected the bomb to end the war. Second, critics
misjudged the purpose of the American government during
the conflict. American policy aimed to avoid use of the
bomb, but events cancelled that option. By the late
summer of 1945, Stimson saw the bomb as a means to secure
a swift victory. Thus, he treated the weapon, not as a
separate entity in the war, but rather as part of the
overall U.S. strategy. Stimson's one regret was that the
U.S. did not clarify its position on the Emperor as he
suggested in his early July 1945 memorandum to the
president. However, Stimson reconciled that shortcoming
by reminding Americans that the bomb brought the Emperor
into the Japanese decision-making process and ended the
war. In this view, the first two bombs did not
necessarily turn the tide. The sight of the carnage at
Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the threat of additional bombs
convinced the Japanese to sue for peace. Stimson believed
that the "deliberate, premeditated destruction was our
least abhorrent choice." Stimson held that his cabinet
position and responsibilities dictated using a weapon with
the possibility for saving lives and concluding
hostilities. As he stated in 1947, "My chief purpose was
to end the war and with the least possible cost in the
lives of men in the armies which I helped to raise . . . I
believe that no man . . . could have failed to use it (the
bomb) and afterwards looked his countrymen in the
face."21
Recently, more radical views regarding the first
employment of the atomic bomb appeared from persons who
did not participate in the events of 1945. Dr. Arjun
Makhijani and John Kelly, in a manuscript scheduled for
publication in Japan, cited several blights on the U.S.
record. The authors claimed that the secrecy of the
Manhattan Project and the failure of the U.S. to integrate
the bomb into overall military strategy, even as a
contingency, proves that American officials lacked sound
judgment. In addition to criticisms such as exaggerated
casualties, the Russian scare, and the unconditional
surrender issue, Makhijani and Kelly advance the
interesting arguments that the targets themselves were not
appropriate and that American officials overlooked reports
that American prisoners of war and imported Korean workers
were located near the blast sites. 22
The Makhijani and Kelly thesis, although
incorporating novel ideas, is weakly constructed. There
is no evidence that the targetting criteria stipulated
anything other than military and industrial sites for the
bomb drops. These designations aimed to damage and
disrupt military production, communications, and enemy
resolve. General Groves wrote after the war that the U.S.
had no evidence of American prisoners of war in the
Hiroshima area. Near Nagasaki, U.S. officials suspected a
camp with about 100 American prisoners. However, air
force officials stated that, even if Americans were
prisoners in Nagasaki, the camp was not anywhere near the
aiming point or expected danger zone of the bomb and no
prisoners were expected to be in the camp at the time of
the blast. 23
Robert Wilcox, in his work, Japan's Secret War,
advances perhaps the most far-fetched theory of American
intentions with regard to the bomb. Wilcox contends that
the U.S. government covered up evidence of Japanese
efforts to construct an atomic bomb for defense of the
homeland. Wilcox states that on August 12, 1945, six days
after Hiroshima and three days prior to surrender, Japan
exploded its own weapon or "genzai bakudan" in the Sea of
Japan. The author speculates that Japanese scientists
relocated an atomic bomb project to Konan, Korea, after
the November 1944, B-29 raids commenced. Wilcox supports
his claim with intelligence reports which recorded that
American agents found l0 uranium ore mining sites in Korea
after the war. Korea was the only place left in the
Japanese Empire with enough electric power to continue a
project of this magnitude. Wilcox believes the U.S. kept
this information secret in order to lure the Japanese into
an alliance against the Soviets after the war. Wilcox's
whole argument is based upon conjecture. While the book
makes interesting reading, the author provides little in
the way of hard proof for his thesis. No eyewitness
accounts are presented. Wilcox believes that the Russian
captured all the scientists involved in the Japanese
effort. As with the Makhijani and Kelly manuscript,
Wilcox's work falls on the periphery of legitimate postwar
historical criticism surrounding the atomic bomb.24
Proponents and critics of America's actions in August
1945 have sparred for 40 years. The immediate reactions
of a shocked world soon gave way to an analysis of the
rationale of American leaders in their approach to end the
war. Many participants in the events of the tense weeks
and months leading to the atomic bombings opened the book
on their perceptions of the decision and its impact on the
postwar world. Without a doubt, these perceptions, when
interpreted as being in conflict with official claims by
American leaders, lent support to these opponents who
believed the U.S. acted unwisely by dropping the atomic
bombs. As time passed, other critics, interpreting the
events from the perspective of hindsight, claimed the
actions of U.S. officials regarding the atomic bomb
decision were suspicious.
Conclusion
The atomic bomb seared an indelible mark in the
American conscious with the dramatic revelation of its
power 40 years ago. Americans received continual images
of the destruction at Hiroshima and Nagasaki as reminders
of the horrors inflicted upon the Japanese people. Since
1945, criticism mounted against the U.S. decision to
employ the bomb as opponents attacked erroneous casualty
estimates, U.S. insistence on the unconditional surrender
doctrine, and American paranoia about Russian influence in
the Far East. Supporters attempted to refute these
claims, arguing that U.S. leaders were faced with the most
momentous decision in history. The ensuing debate marred
U.S. credibility on an issue which, to this day, holds the
fate of the world in the balance.
By 1960, initial panic waned concerning increased
atomic bomb related casualties in Japan. In 1957, the
U.S. established the A-Bomb Casualty Commission. This
agency registered a quarter of a million survivors in
Hiroshima. By l960, nearly 90,000 had been examined.
Surprisingly, only 3,700 required treatment. Of this
number about 700 subsequently died, but merely a small
number of these deaths were directly attributed to the
bomb or its after effects. The commission also reported
that no genetic defects appeared in 70,000 Japanese
children born in 1956. The fears subsided but the
questions remained.1
Skeptics of U.S. policy in 1945 argue that ". . .
myths have been perpetuated . . . a recount is long
overdue" and charge that Americans must know their
history, "warts and all."2 These critics, writing after
the event, stated that the U.S. operated from a series of
false pretenses. First, both the U.S. and Japan knew she
was a defeated power prior to the bomb. However, the U.S.
stubbornly maintained adherence to the antiquated policy
of unconditional surrender. Second, U.S. officials
allowed a casualty myth to permeate American lore by
stating that the bomb prevented a massive human wave
assault, perhaps saving up to one million American
soldiers from oozing their blood on Japanese soil. Third,
the U.S. sought to badger the Russians, but the plot
backfired as the Soviets invested money and spies into
atomic research to keep abreast of western technological
advancements.
In reality, in 1945, American and allied leaders
concentrated on the short-term goal to destroy the
Japanese designs in the Pacific. Prior to the summer of
1945, the atomic bomb remained an undefinable factor in
American political and military planning. Further,
sincere scientific opposition came too late to affect the
employment of the bomb. The necessary secrecy of the
Manhattan Project permitted little military comment on the
bomb until a successful test proved the awesome potential
of the new weapon. Thus, planning continued for the
expected invasion of Japan in the fall of 1945.
The unconditional surrender doctrine posed problems
for U.S. decision-makers. The American public viewed the
policy as one of righteous vindication against the
instigators of the war. Any revision of the doctrine at a
time when the Japanese still seemed capable of resistance
made the U.S. appear to be operating from a position of
weakness. The image of the desperate fighting in Okinawa
led many officials to discount any peace signals from
Japan, including the initiatives with the Russians in the
summer of 1945.
There is little doubt that the official casualty
estimates for Operation Olympic were much lower than the
figures recorded by Truman, Churchill, and Stimson after
the war. However, it must be remembered that, in the
frenetic pace of events, particularly in June and July
1945, American leaders perceived a large loss of life and
much suffering if the war continued on a conventional
basis. Truman publicly stated later that he considered
the bomb as a legitimate weapon of war against an
adversary. In addition, these officials saw the bomb as
the first stage in an explosion of technology which would
complicate the postwar world. The fault lies in the
failure of these leaders to clarify the estimates in their
published memoirs and accounts of the decision which
appeared in the postwar years. The estimate that up to
one million American casualties might occur in an assault
on Japan is simply wrong. No planning documents or
official estimates supported such a view. The large
number which appeared by happenstance in June 1945 became
a symbol of the unknown that awaited U.S. forces which sat
poised to conclude the war in a bloody struggle. American
leaders valued the lives of their soldiers; Japanese
officials were willing to sacrifice their fighting men in
a hopeless cause. The sin of omission hurt the reputation
of these leaders and America's stature in the postwar era.
The Russian question is the least convincing
criticism. The U.S. knew that the Soviets planned to
enter the war in the Pacific by mid-August 1945. However,
to believe that U.S. leaders orchestrated the decision,
order, deployment, and execution of the atomic bomb to
prevent Russian participation in the war ignores the
complicated planning required in a military operation,
particularly of this political magnitude. The time was
too compressed between the final decision to use the bomb
and the subsequent first drop to alter the Russian designs
to join the conflict. The more valid criticism of U.S.
actions with respect to the Soviets lies in the
short-sighted view of the impact of the atomic weapon.
The pressures of the war and the sheer momentum of events
distracted U.S. leaders from developing a policy to
control, or at a minimum lessen, the dangers from atomic
energy in the postwar years. Allied mistrust of the
Soviet Union and Russian suspicions of the West proved the
Grand Alliance was always shaky.
Between April-August 1945, a maelstrom of forces
gained speed and exploded over the skies of Japan. At
first, few dared to question the soundness of the decision
to use atomic weapons to defeat Japan. The new American
President, Harry S. Truman, and his closest advisors
willingly accepted the responsibility for unleashing the
greatest destructive force known to man No other
decision was possible given the tenor of events and the
personalities involved. However, the barbs leveled at
Truman, Stimson, and others since 1945 prick their wartime
argument regarding the bomb. As a result, America's
standing in the eyes of the world suffered after the
initial euphoria about the bomb subsided. The world had
changed forever.
Wars end, and men come back from them
Into another world not of their knowing,
And strangers they to their own blood and bone
Who remember them before their going.
That time they knew the place, the world;
As children tricked by a conjurer's illusion,
Children with puzzled eyes, and oddly old,
Confused at their own sad confusion.3
APPENDIX 1
Key People
General H. H. Arnold, Commanding General, U.S. Army Air
Forces -- Advocate of aerial bombardment. Viewed
atom bomb as unnecessary.
Ralph A. Bard, Under Secretary of the Navy -- Member of
Interim Committee. Reversed original support for
bomb prior to its employment.
Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director, Office of Scientific Research
and Development and chief scientist-administrator of
the Manhattan District -- Long-time advocate of
atomic energy research. Realized the awesome power
of the bomb but failed to persuade Truman to
cooperate with the Russians in atomic energy.
James F. Byrnes, Director of the Office of War
Mobilization and Secretary of State -- Pro
unconditional surrender policy. His efforts
prevented consideration of relaxed war aims against
Japan.
Winston S. Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain --
Believed the bomb had the potential to check Soviet
and French influence in Europe.
Dr. James B. Conant, Chairman of the National Defense
Research Committee -- Colleague of Dr. Vannevar
Bush. Expressed similar views.
James V. Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy -- Sympathetic
to lessened unconditional surrender terms but failed
to press the President for consideration of a new
approach to the Japanese. Believed bomb should be
placed under a united Nations trusteeship.
Joseph Grew, under Secretary of State -- Most vocal
proponent of providing the Japanese a face-saving way
out of the war. Aired his views to the President but
could not overcome Byrnes' influence.
Major General Leslie R. Groves, Commanding General,
Manhattan District -- As the man in charge of the
Manhattan Project, he saw the bomb as a justifiable
means to conclude the war.
Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations --
Skeptical of the bomb. Sought a naval blockade to
conclude hostilities with Japan.
Admiral William H. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President
and presider over the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
Combined Chiefs of Staff -- Man closest to the
President who abhorred the direction the U.S. took
with the bomb. After Hiroshima, Leahy felt U.S. was
in a no-win predicament.
General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army --
Counseled political leaders that the initial cost of
an invasion was about 40,000 casualties. After the
war, he inexplicably cited the highly inflated
statistic of 500,000 to one million casualties.
John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War -- Advanced a
sensible approach to concluding the war in summer of
1945, but failed to win superiors' support. Politely
rebuffed by Truman at critical 18 June 1945 meeting
when he advocated use of bomb only after all other
courses of action explored.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States --
Seemed destined to use bomb. Policies until death
indicated nothing otherwise.
Joseph Stalin, Dictator of the Soviet Union -- Probably
knew little about weapon. Used issue of bomb to
launch anti-West propaganda campaign.
Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War -- Most vocal member of
administration after the war regarding decision to
use bomb. Compelling argument supporting decision
except for exaggerated casualty citation.
Dr. Leo Szilard, leading physicist with the Manhattan
District -- Leading physicist who tried
unsuccessfully to stop employment of bomb. Postwar
views criticized decision.
Harry S. Truman, President of the United States -- Took
full responsibility for decision. Saw bomb as a
legitimate weapon of war. Rationale blemished with
high casualty statistics.
Click here to view image
END NOTES
Introduction
1"Can the Nazis 'Blow up Half the Globe'?" unnamed
author, Newsweek, Vol. 22, No. 24, December 13, 1943, p.
32. This article, although concerned with German
technical boasts, tolled an ironic note for the demise of
the Axis powers.
2Richard N. Perle, "Setting the Record Straight,"
Defense 85, November 1985, p. 8.
3James Kilpatrick, "Nuclear War Will Never Be
Waged," Potomac News, October 24, 1985.
4Paul Boyer, "The Day You First Heard the News,"
New York Times, August 4, 1985.
Chapter l
1John C. Campbell, The United States in World
Affairs, 1945-47. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947),
pp. 16-17; John L. Harper, "Henry Stimson and the Origin
of America's Attachment to Atomic Weapons," SAIS Review,
No. 1330, Summer-Fall 1985, p. 12.
2Barton J. Bernstein, "The Quest for Security:
American Foreign Policy and International Control of
Atomic Energy, 1942-1946," The Journal of American
History, Vol. 50, No. 4, March 1974, pp. 1003-1004.
Hereafter cited as Bernstein, "Quest," JAH.
3Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, 2 Vols., Vol I, Years of
Decision. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc.,
1955), p. 10. Hereafter cited as Truman, Memoirs.
4Ibid., pp. 10-11.
5Truman, Memoirs, I, p. 11; Fleet Admiral William
H. Leahy, I Was There. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
Inc., 1950), pp. 2-3, 483. Hereafter cited as Leahy, I
Was There. James F. Byrnes, All in One Lifetime. (New
York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), p. 186. Hereafter cited
as Byrnes, Lifetime.
6J.G. Crowther and R. Whiddington, Science at War.
(New York: Philosophical Library, 1948), pp. 121, 127,
130. Hereafter cited as Crowther and Whiddington, Science
at War. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active
Service in Peace and War. (New York: Harper & Brothers,
1948), p. 619. Hereafter cited as Stimson, On Active
Service. Henry L. Stimson, "The Decision to Use the
Atomic Bomb," Harpers, February 1947. Reprinted in SAIS
Review, No. 1330, Summer-Fall 1985, pp. 1, 2. Hereafter
cited as Stimson, "Decision."
7Stimson, "Decision," p. 2; Crowther and
Whiddington, Science at War, p. 130.
8Winston S. Churchill, Memoirs of the Second World
War. (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1959), p. 71.
Hereafter cited as Churchill, Memoirs. Francis L.
Lowenheim, Harold D. Langley, and Manfred Jonas, editors,
Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime
Correspondence. (New York: Saturday Review Press/E.P.
Dutton & Co., Inc., 1975), pp. 85, 161. Hereafter cited
as Lowenheim, Langley, and Jonas, Secret Correspondence.
For a discussion of the British atomic energy research,
see C.P. Snow, The New Men in Strangers and Brothers, Vol.
II, (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, reprinted 1972).
9Lowenheim, Langley, and Jonas, Secret
Correspondence, p. 71.
10Arjun Makhijani and John Kelly, "Target Japan:
The Decision to Bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki," unpublished
manuscript, National Archives Record Service (hereafter
cited as NARS), Washington, D.C., pp. 3, 100. Hereafter
cited as Makhijani and Kelly, "Target Japan"; Churchill,
Memoirs, p. 580; Lowenheim, Langley, and Jonas, Secret
Correspondence, p. 221.
11Lowenheim, Langley, and Jonas, Secret
Correspondence, pp. 32-33; Bernstein, "Quest," JAH, pp.
1004-1006.
12Martin Sherwin, "The Atomic Bomb and the Origins
of the Cold War: U.S. Atomic Energy Policy and Diplomacy,
1941-1945." American Historical Review, Vol. 78, No. 4,
October 1973, p. 960. Hereafter cited Sherwin, "Atomic
Bomb," AHR; Lowenheim, Langley, and Jonas, Secret
Correspondence, p. 573; Leahy, I Was There, pp. 265-266.
13Stimson, "Decision," p. 3; Sherwin, "The Atomic
Bomb," AHR, p. 953.
14Stimson, "Decision," p. 3.
15Ibid., p. 5.
16Ibid., pp. 6-7.
17Barton J. Bernstein and Allen J. Matusow,
editors, The Truman Administration: A Documentary
History. (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 2.
Hereafter cited as Bernstein and Matusow, Truman
Administration.
Chapter 2
1Brian L. Villa, "The U.S. Army, Unconditional
Surrender and the Potsdam Declaration," The Journal of
American History, Vol. 63, No. 1, June 1976, pp. 69-70.
Hereafter cited as Villa, "The U.S. Army," JAH.
2Ibid., pp. 70-71.
3NARS, Record Group (RG) 218, ABC File 384 (Japan)
Memorandum, "Pacific Strategy," Joint War Plans Committee
(JWPC) 332/2, 23 April 1945; RG 218, Memorandum, "Defeat
of Japan by Blockade and Bombardment," Joint Intelligence
Committee (JIC) 266/1, 18 April 1945.
4Ernest J. King, Fleet Admiral King, A Naval
Record. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1952), pp.
620-623. Hereafter cited as King, Fleet Admiral King.
5The War Reports of General of the Army George C.
Marshall, General H.H. Arnold, and Fleet Admiral Ernest J.
King. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1947), pp.
243, 265. Hereafter cited as War Reports.
6King, Fleet Admiral King, pp. 620-623.
7War Reports, p. 437.
8Summary Report (Pacific War), The United States
Strategic Bombing Survey. (Washington: Chairman's
Office, 1 July 1946), p. 11. Hereafter cited as Strategic
Bombing Survey.
9Ibid., pp. 15-21.
10War Reports, p. 440; H.H. Arnold, Global
Mission. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), p 598.
11John P. Sutherland, "The Story General Marshall
Told Me," United States News and World Report, Vol. 47,
No. 18, pp. 52-53, November 2, 1959. Hereafter cited as
Sutherland, "Marshall," USNWR.
12Strategic Bombing Survey, pp. 20-21.
13RG 218, JWPC 332/2.
14RG 218, JIC 266/1.
15RG 218, Report, "Japanese Surrender-Post War
Resistance," JIC 181, 29 March 1944.
16RG 218, JIC 181; RG 218, JWPC 332/2.
17RG 319, ABC File 384, Operations Division,
Memorandum for the Strategy Section, 30 April 1945; RG
319, ABC File 384, "Brief G-2 Report," 25 May 1945.
18Ibid.
19RG 319, ABC File 384, Joint Planning Staff,
Memorandum, "Joint Chiefs of Staff Combined Planning of
the War Against Japan," 7 May 1944.
20Stimson, On Active Service, p. 632; RG 165, ABC
File 384, "Army Orientation Fact Sheet," War Department,
No. 71, 12 May 1945.
21Rufus E. Miles, Jr., "Hiroshima, The Strange Myth
of Half a Million American Lives Saved," International
Security, Vol. 10, No. 2, Fall 1985, pp. 124-126.
Hereafter cited as Miles, "Myth," International Security;
Villa, "The U.S. Army," JAH , pp. 81-88.
22RG 107, Stimson Safe File, Memorandum, "Basic
Objectives of the Pacific War," 25 May 1945; RG 107,
Stimson Safe File, Memorandum, "Basic Objectives of the
Pacific War," 9 June 1945.
23Miles, "Myth," International Security, p. 126.
24RG 107, Stimson Safe File, Memorandum, "On Ending
the Japanese War," undated. The date of the document is
late May or early June 1945, based upon the priority
placed on the War Department for a response. This
memorandum is the source for the myth of half a million
U.S. casualties predicted for the invasion of Japan.
25Ibid.
26Ibid.
27Ibid.
28RG 107, Stimson Safe File, Memorandum, "On Ending
the Japanese War," undated.
29RG 107, Stimson Safe File, Memorandum, "On Ending
the Japanese War," 16 June 1945.
Chapter 3
1Dr. Marlene J. Mayo, "An Accounting," Diamondhead,
The University of Maryland Student Newspaper, August 8,
1985. Hereafter cited as Mayo, "Accounting;" RG 319,
Memorandum, "Details of the Campaign Against Japan," JWPC
369/1, 15 June 1945; Miles, "Myth," International
Security, p. 133. See Campaign Analysis, Olympic-Coronet:
The Planned Invasion of Japan," Conference Group 9, Marine
Corps Command and Staff College, 29 March 1983.
2RG 319, ABC File 384, "Memorandum for the JCS," 14
June 1945.
3RG 319, ABC File 384, "Extracts of Minutes of
Meeting Held at the White House, 18 June 1945 at 1530;" RG
218, Memorandum, "Details of the Plan Against Japan," JCS
924/16, 16 June 1945; RG 218, Memorandum, "Proposed
Changes to the Details of the Campaign Against Japan," JCS
1388/1, 20 June 1945; Peter Weyden, "Sudden Dawn,"
Washingtonian, Vol. 20, No. 10, July 1985, p. 90.
Hereafter cited as Weyden, "Sudden Dawn."
4Truman, Memoirs, II, pp. 416-417.
5Ibid.
6Mayo, "Accounting."
7Stimson, "Decision," p. 8.
8Charles Mead, editor, The War Speeches of RT Hon
Winston S. Churchill, 3 Vols. (Cambridge: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1953), Vol. III, pp. 508-514.
9Makhijani and Kelly, "Target Japan," pp. 1-2, 48;
Miles, "Myth," International Security, pp. 121, 138.
10Mayo, "Accounting;" Weyden, "Sudden Dawn," p. 183.
11RG 165; OPD 704. Draft Cable, "Propaganda Release
Regarding Casualties in the Pacific," 14 September 1945;
Weyden, "Sudden Dawn," p. 89.
12RG 165, OPD 704, Memorandum, "Bureau of Public
Relations to OPD," 8 May 1945; Roy E. Applebaum, James M.
Burns, Russell A. Gugelas, and John Stevens, "Okinawa, The
Last Battle," The United States Army in World War II: The
War in the Pacific. (Washington: Historical Division,
Department of the Army, 1948), p. 490.
13Frank Davis, "Operation Olympic, The Invasion of
Japan, 1 November 1945," Strategy and Tactics, No. 45,
July/August 1974, pp. 9, 14-15. Hereafter cited as Davis,
"Olympic."
14RG 165, OPD 704, Casualty Report Number III,
Including Okinawa Campaign, 17 September 1945.
15Davis, "Olympic," p. 9.
16Stimson, "Decision," p. 9; RG 218, Report, Joint
Intelligence Staff (JIS) 193, 30 July 1945; RG 218, JCS
1388/4, 11 July 1945; RG 218, JWPC 397, 4 August 1945;
Mayo, "Accounting."
17RG 319, Extracts of Minutes of Meeting Held at
the White House, 18 June 1945 at 1530; RG 218, JCS 1388/1.
18Miles, "Myth," International Security, p. 121.
19Chalmers Reports, "The Right Choice to Shorten
World War II," Manchester Guardian Weekly, August 11, 1985.
Chapter 4
1Sherwin, "Atomic Bomb," pp. 946-947; Mayo,
"Accounting."
2Stimson, On Active Service, pp. 637-638;
Bernstein, "Quest," JAH, pp. 1008-1013; Sherwin, "Atomic
Bomb," AHR, p. 948.
3RG 319, Extracts of Minutes of Meeting Held at the
White House, 18 June 1945, at 1530; Gar Alperovitz, "The
U.S. Was Wrong," New York Times, August 4, 1985.
4Alperovitz, "The U.S. Was Wrong," New York Times,
August 4, 1985.
5Drew Middleton, "Was it Necessary to Drop Atom
Bomb?" Navy Times, August 19, 1985.
6Alperovitz, "The U.S. Was Wrong," New York Times,
August 4, 1985; Middleton, "Was it Necessary to Drop Atom
Bomb?" Navy Times, August 19, 1985.
7RG 319, Extracts of Minutes of Meeting Held at the
White House, 18 June 1945 at 1530; Louis Morton, "The
Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, in Command Decisions.
Kent Roberts Greenfield, General Editor. (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959), pp. 407-408.
Hereafter cited as Morton, "The Decision to Use the Atomic
Bomb," Command Decisions; Bernstein, "Quest," JAH, pp.
1014-1015.
8Stimson, On Active Service, pp. 640-641.
9Walter Millis, editor, The Forrestal Diaries with
the collaboration of E. S. Duffield. (New York, Viking
Press, 1951), pp. 94-95. Hereafter cited as Millis,
Forrestal Diaries.
10Ibid, pp. 95-96.
11Bernstein, "Quest," JAH, p. 1014.
12Millis, Forrestal Diaries, pp. 95-96; Bernstein,
"Quest," JAH, pp. 1014-1044.
13Ibid.
14Milis, Forrestal Diaries, pp. 95-96.
Chapter 5
1Bernstein and Matusow, Truman Administration, pp.
9-10.
2Bernstein and Matusow, Truman Administration, pp.
9-10; Stimson, On Active Service, p. 617.
3Sherwin, "Atomic Bomb," AHR, pp. 961-962;
Bernstein, "Quest," JAH, p. 1006; James MacGregor Burns,
Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom. (New York: Harcourt,
Brace, Javanovich, Inc., 1970) pp. 457-459.
4Sherwin, "Atomic Bomb," AHR, pp. 961-962;
Bernstein, "Quest," JAH, pp. 1008-1009.
5Bernstein and Matusow, Truman Administration, pp.
10-13.
6Bernstein and Matusow, Truman Administration, pp.
13-15; Truman, Memoirs, I, p. 419; John J. Weltman,
"Trinity: The Weapons Scientists and the Nuclear Age,"
SAIS Review, No. 1330, Summer-Fall 1985, p. 30. Hereafter
cited as Weltman, "Trinity," SAIS Review.
7Truman, Memoirs, I, p. 419.
8Bernstein and Matusow, Truman Administration, pp.
16-20; Byrnes, Lifetime, p. 284.
9Weltman, "Trinity," SAIS Review, p. 30.
Chapter 6
1Charles L. Mee, Jr., Meeting at Potsdam. (New
York: M. Evans & Company, Inc., 1975), pp. 86-87, 107.
Hereafter cited as Mee, Meeting at Potsdam. Truman,
Memoirs, II, p. 415.
2Truman, Memoirs, II, p. 420; Leslie R. Groves, Now
It Can Be Told, The Story of the Manhattan Project. (New
York: Harper & Brothers, 1962), pp. 264-265. Hereafter
cited as Groves, Now It Can Be Told.
3Mee, Meeting at Potsdam, pp. 88-89; Morton, "The
Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," Command Decisions, pp.
398-399; Truman, Memoirs, II, p. 415; Byrnes, Lifetime, p.
305.
4Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 265.
5Mayo, "Accounting."
6Office of the Center for Military History (OCMH)
File, "Interrogation of Japanese Officials on World War
II," Interview with Hiroshi Shimomura, 3 March 1950; OCMH
File, Interview with Premier Admiral Baron Suzuki, 26
December 1945.
7Ibid.
8Morton, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb,"
Command Decisions, p. 343.
9Groves, Now It Can Be Told. p. 265; Truman,
Memoirs, II, p. 419.
10Churchill, Memoirs, p. 918.
11Sutherland, "Marshall, USNWR, p. 53.
12Truman, Memoirs, II, p. 416.
13RG 107, Stimson Safe File, Memorandum for the
President, "Proposed Program for Japan," 2 July 1945.
l4OCMH File, Interview with Premier Admiral Baron
Suzuki, 26 December 1945.
15Morton, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb,"
Command Decisions, pp. 405-406; Stimson, On Active
Service, p. 13.
16Makhijani and Kelly, "Target Japan," p. 95;
Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 267-268, 272, 309;
Sutherland, "Marshall," USNWR, p. 53.
17Leahy, I Was There, pp. 430-432.
18Michihiko Hachija, Hiroshima Diary, The Journal
of a Japanese Physician, August 6 - September 30, 1945,
translated and edited by Warner Wells. (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1955), p. 1; OCMH
File, Interview with Premier Admiral Baron Suzuki, 26
December 1945.
19Mayo, "Accounting."
20Villa, "The U.S. Army," JAH, pp. 89-91; Byrnes,
Lifetime, p. 285.
Chapter 7
1Time, Vol. 46, No. l8, August 20, 1945, p. 19.
2Hanson W. Baldwin, "The Atomic Bomb and Future
War," Life, Vol. No. 46, No. 18, pp. 17-20.
3Time, August 20, 1945, p. 20.
4Ibid, p. 42.
5War Reports, pp. 243, 655.
6War Reports, p. 440; Arnold, Global Mission, pp.
491-493.
7"Ike on Ike," Newsweek, November 11, 1963, p. 108.
8D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, 3 Vols.
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985), II, p. 775.
Hereafter cited as James, MacArthur.
9Sutherland, "Marshall," USNWR, p. 52.
10James, MacArthur, II, pp. 775-776.
11"Was the A-Bomb on Japan a Mistake?" United
States News and World Report, Vol. 49, No. 7, August 15,
1960, pp. 68-71. Hereafter cited as "Mistake," USNWR.
Almost 15 years to the day following the first atomic
bomb, U.S. News and World Report interviewed five men who
participated in the historic project (James F. Byrnes,
Lewis L. Strauss, Dr. Leo Szilard, Dr. Edward Teller, and
Ralph A. Bard). During the course of the interviews, it
is apparent that each one of these men agreed on several
key points in retrospect. First, the Japanese were most
likely beaten before the bomb. Second, the bomb could not
be kept a secret due to espionage by the Soviets. Third,
an arms race was inevitable. Despite this agreement,
however, the interviews reveal a division of opinion on
whether or not the bomb should have been used against
Japan.
12Ibid., p. 75.
13Ibid., p. 71.
14Ibid., pp. 73-75.
15Leahy, I Was There, pp. 440-442.
16Ibid., p. 442.
17Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 324; Stimson, On
Active Service, p. 634; Time, August 20, 1945, p. 42.
18Sutherland, "Marshall," USNWR, p. 52.
19War Reports, p. 149; "Mistake," USNWR, p. 65.
20Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 264, 266; Weyden,
"Sudden Dawn," p. 189.
21Stimson, On Active Service, pp. 628-629; Stimson,
"Decision." p. 15.
22Makhijani and Kelly, "Target Japan," pp. 1-2,
8-13, 97.
23Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 312-313.
24Robert K. Wilcox, Japan's Secret War. (New
York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1985). p. 15.
Conclusion
1"Life in Hiroshima Today," United States News and
World Report, Vol. 44, No. 7, August 15, 1960. p. 78.
2Mayo, "Accounting."
3George Herbert Clarke, editor, The New Treasury of
War Poetry, Poems of the Second World War. (Freeport, New
York: Book for Libraries Press, 1943), p. 224.
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