

Appendix G  
Echelons Above Corps  
Chemical/Biological Threat  
Analysis and Planning  
Procedures

This appendix provides a method for chemical staffs at echelons above corps (EAC) to address theater-level chemical and biological (CB) threats and the requisite planning and execution procedures. Through its questioning-style format, it ensures the staff addresses relevant information and intelligence requirements throughout all phases of conflict. While intended for EAC chemical staffs, lower level staffs will find the information useful in developing plans to mitigate the CB threat.

#### A. IDENTIFY AND DISEMINATE THE CB THREAT

##### 1. How well do we understand the CB threat?

- What is the threat?
  - Which adversaries have verified CB threats?
  - Which adversaries are thought to have a CB threat?
  - By adversary, what chemical agents are known to be on-hand?
  - By adversary, what chemical agents are thought to be available?
  - By adversary, what biological agents are known to be on-hand?
  - By adversary, what biological agents are thought to be available?
  - What and how many delivery systems are available to the enemy?
  - Are CB preventive measures by adversaries (such as inoculation and training) being noted?
  - Is there a release other than attack (ROTA) threat?
  - How have we considered the “collateral damage” threat posed by industrial compounds?
  - Will coalition forces be subjected to environmental hazards that have aspects similar to deliberate chemical agent attacks and if so, what?
  - What specific environmental hazards have been identified that might affect coalition proposed routes of advance or withdrawal?
  - Where are WMD production facilities and stockpiles?
- How will it be employed?
  - When do we anticipate attack in terms of deployment?
  - What is the most likely type of strike that might occur early in the deployment process?
  - What is the anticipated priority of attack against ports, airfields, and similar locations?
  - Is the enemy conducting noticeable recon of these ports, airfields, and similar locations?
  - What is the enemy agent of choice for specific scenarios?

- What is the stated national resolve and capability of the enemy regarding WMD employment in the region as well as in CONUS to prevent or disrupt deployment?
  - What WMD terrorist threat exists?
  - What is the enemy's anticipated concept of operations with regard to employment of WMD? For example, is the enemy expected to use CB to disrupt OPTEMPO, cause mass casualties, or both?
  - Will adversarial use of CB increase their regional "prestige" and/or alter psychological balance?
  - Will adversaries be able to threaten US forces throughout the depth of their deployment?
  - What is the prioritization of gathering CB threat information?
  - Have friendly or neutral population centers been identified as potential targets?
  - What friendly commercial chemical or radiological facilities are potential targets?
- What effect will its employment have on our operations?
    - Which pre-positioned storage areas are critical to the allied effort?
    - What is the vulnerability of storage areas for pre-positioned assets?
    - What is the enemy's resolve and threat toward noncombatant US citizens in theater?
    - What level of deployment degradation will the enemy seek to achieve using CB?
    - What are the impacts of threat usage in respect to psychological, medical, logistical, and so forth implications?
    - Will the use of WMD impact the cohesiveness of coalitions? How?
    - Which ports and airfields will be prime targets for enemy use of chemical and biological agents under current operational plans?
    - Will CB use produce a strategic, political, and/or psychological effect that overshadows their actual military utility?
2. Have appropriate intelligence activities been tasked to develop the threat?
    - Which agencies are developing the threat?
    - What resources does the commander-in-chief (CINC) have for obtaining threat data when deployed?
    - What is the timeliness of CB threat data?
    - How are the above resources informed of specific information to be watched for?
    - What system is in place to prioritize intelligence requests?
  3. Have we pieced together the various intelligence reports to identify and deconflict contradictory information?
    - How is contradictory information deconflicted?
    - Which staff sections or personnel contribute to deconflicting CB intelligence?
    - What criteria are in place to determine when a piece of information should be incorporated into planning?
  4. Have we disseminated this information to the whole team (services; planners; Office, Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) units)?

- When is data considered ready to be sent out to other team members?
- How is CB threat data routed?
- How and when do we share information and conclusions with actual or potential allies (coalition partners)?
- What is the threat to Host Nation (HN) population/forces and how might this impact coalition operations?
- What HN emergency response and reporting agencies are included in the dissemination of CB data? When? What types of data?

5. Do we have the capability to monitor for changes to the threat and rapidly disseminate major changes?

## B. INCORPORATE THE CB THREAT INTO PLANS AND OPERATIONS

1. Do CINC OPLANs accurately identify the current CB threat?
  - What is the US doctrinal operational response to a confirmed CB use on US forces?
    - What is the doctrine?
    - What should be the US response?
  - What other operational responses are authorized to be made by the CINC?
  - When is he authorized to make these operational responses?
  - How do friendly targeting plans consider the environmental aspects of industry and potential enemy weapon storage areas?
  - What are the plans and priorities for distribution of force protection assets?
    - Decon units and material
    - CB recon units and equipment
    - Bio defense (detection, protection, and decon)
    - Smoke and obscurants (units and munitions)
    - Medical (prophylaxes and support)
    - Engineer (equipment)
    - Individual protection material
    - Collective protection material
  - What are the plans for distribution of force protection assets to--
    - Combatants?
    - Noncombatants (US, HN, and others)?
    - EPW?
  - What plans are in place regarding handling and evacuation of contaminated corpses?
    - How has the CINC ensured that units are aware of this policy?
    - How and when has knowledge of this policy been evaluated?
  - What if any passive avoidance measures are required by the theater commander?
  - In consideration of joint doctrine, how are HN support needs determined?

- How do the plans provide NBC protection guidance for the entire spectrum of operations, from operations other than war to general war?
2. Are we addressing the CB threat, in peacetime, to forward deployed forces?
- How are changes in threat status in the unit's AO/AI sent quickly with a proper priority?
  - What priority is used to ensure timely receipt of information?
3. Is there a structured plan to reduce/mitigate the CB threat?
- Do we understand which "smart" sensors are available and how to use this information?
  - Once "smart" sensor detects agent, how (what comms system) is this information transmitted, especially across service and coalition lines?
  - What is the (our) standard to confirm enemy use of CB? For example, is a Gold Seal biological laboratory required for BW confirmation?
  - Which staging areas are most critical to our success?
  - What alternate staging areas been identified?
  - What priority are enemy CB delivery and storage units being given in the targeting sequence?
  - What nonmilitary steps are planned to negate or deter the use of WMD?
  - What steps are planned to eliminate enemy capability to target ports, airfields, and so forth?
  - What protective and defensive measures are being used throughout the coalition depth of deployment?
  - Are we prepared to portray enemy use of CB in such a negative way as to rally world opinion against our enemy?
  - What active and passive measures have been instituted to protect the key points of entry?
  - What CB units will be deployed early to provide the deterrence to enemy use of CB at points of entry?
  - Which, if any, warning systems have digitization connectivity?
  - What "risk analysis" methods are in place to determine decontamination requirements?
  - How does the command know what units are trained and equipped to perform decontamination in the absence of chemical units?
    - What can the command do about it if it is not?
  - What steps have been taken to ascertain the CB readiness of potential coalition partners?
  - What means are available to alleviate shortcomings in coalition partners' CB defense postures and capabilities?
  - If deployment is planned to be continuously over a relatively long period of time, what protective measures are planned for later deploying units?
  - How frequently are field artillery and air defense artillery (ADA) units required to move?

- What is the theater guidance with regard to dispersion?
  - What steps have been taken to mitigate the effect of WMD employment on OPTEMPO?
  - What awareness training have component forces received to negate the threat of covert positioned NBC weapons?
4. Is the entire staff involved in the CB defense process (checklists for medical, logistics, and civil-military operations (CMO) Public Affairs Office (PAO), legal)?
- Medical
    - What medical protection assets in the form of vaccines, pretreatment, and/or skin protectants are in place?
    - What plans are in effect for using them?
    - What is the immunization protocol?
    - What plans have been made to address the significant implications concerning provision of medical assistance in the event of enemy use of WMD?
    - What levels of medical protection have been provided to the subordinate units to increase an individual's resistance to CB attack, indigenous medical threat, and environmental hazards and do they understand how to use them?
    - What provision of providing military supplied medical assistance to nonmilitary personnel are included in campaign plans?
    - What plans are in place to alleviate shortfalls caused by providing medical support to nonmilitary personnel?
    - What steps have been taken to ensure proper medical assistance is available for combat units, US and HN civilian workers, dependents, and EPWs?
    - Are hospitals (component, HN, coalition) equipped to care for CB casualties?
    - What vaccines are available with the theater?
    - If sufficient vaccines are not available to inoculate all personnel, what is the protocol for determining who receives vaccinations?
    - What is the policy towards decontaminating and evacuating the wounded?
    - What steps have been taken to ensure that the decontamination and evacuation policy is known and understood?
    - What steps have been taken to ensure that an adequate number of medical personnel have received specialized training in CB casualty treatment and management?
    - Have plans been made for combating the indigenous medical threat within the theater?
    - What medical force structure, by Department of the Army master priority list (DAMPL) sequence, is available to the theater?
    - What is the policy to determine the priority of medical attention to nonmilitary personnel: US allies, EPWs, and HN?

- Logistics
  - What CB defensive procedures have logistical commanders initiated to limit exposure of their units and facilities to CB attacks and to protect personnel and supplies from CB contamination?
  - What command and control procedures are established to ensure the effective NBC defense of multiservice, HN, coalition, and major logistics bases, including ports and airfields?
  - What plans are in effect for ensuring that sufficient protective equipment is available for issue to US civilians, HN personnel, and allies?
  - How much equipment for protecting EPWs has been ordered?
    - What is a reasonable amount to plan for?
    - Where is it stored?
  - How do you determine if the required amount of individual protective gear and unit CB defensive equipment is on hand in each subordinate unit?
  - What procedures are in place to ensure that sufficient water and other supplies are on hand in the proper location to permit effective and efficient decon operations?
  - What plans have been made to ensure that necessary medical supplies are kept at the level required to execute the mission?
  - What steps have been taken to ensure that sufficient alternate supply routes exist for logistical operations?
  - What plans are in place to address CB equipment resupply?
  - What training has been conducted with HN police, fire, and other emergency organizations regarding NBC defense?
- Civil-Military Operations
  - What action plans are in place to depict a CB trained force as was done in Operation Desert Shield/Storm?
  - What provisions have been made to protect or replace the noncombatant work force if evacuation is ordered?
  - What cross training of military to perform civilian technician work has been conducted?
  - What evacuation routes for noncombatants have been designated?
  - How has this information been communicated to those affected?
    - How has it been practiced, if at all?
  - What plans have been made for controlling civilian evacuations?
    - How has this been practiced?
  - How has information concerning potential environmental hazards been communicated to the noncombatant population?
  - What steps have been taken to protect the nonmilitary personnel from environmental hazards?
  - When was the last noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) exercise? What was the percentage of participation?

- How do you ensure personnel with wartime missions are not simultaneously slotted for NEO?
  - What steps have been taken to ensure that the guards have been trained in how to teach EPWs the proper use of protective equipment?
  - What units have been designated to protect civilians, medical facilities, and so forth?
    - What steps have been taken to ensure that these units are not called for elsewhere in operations plans?
  - What are the CB-related duties and responsibilities of the various civil affairs units deployed in support of the OPLAN?
  - Who is responsible for coordinating CB matters with the various other US and HN government agencies in the theater? Is he/she prepared to do so?
  - Public Affairs Office
    - What PAO plans are in place to deter CB use?
    - What PAO plans are in place to rally world opinion before and after CB use?
    - What PAO plans are in place to deter further CB use?
  - Legal
    - What are CB rules of engagement?
    - What are rules of engagement for employing riot control agents?
    - What is the US policy for use of NBC weapons?
5. Do we provide enough guidance to synchronize the component CB defense plans?
- What decision support tools are available to assist the unit commander in determining proper protective posture?
  - What decision support tools are available to assist the unit commander in determining when to decontaminate?
6. Is the CB threat adequately considered in the OPLAN?
- What are the alternate ports and airfields available?
  - What protective and defensive measures are in effect at ports and airfields?
  - What is our policy on sending out CB warning reports--affected units only? All units? If all units, do we differentiate on urgency?
  - How do we transmit this information across service and coalition lines?
  - What is time phased arrival of medical units in theater?
  - What flexibility for changing arrival sequence exists? If CB assets are needed more quickly, what is the mechanism for making it happen?
  - What provisions are in place to ensure adequate CB force protection units are sequenced for early entry operations?
  - What is the deployment sequence for components as applicable to--
    - Reconnaissance units?
    - Biological detection (BIDS and Gold Seal Lab) units?
    - Decontamination units?
    - Medical units and personnel?

- Smoke generation units?
  - What CB defense measures are integrated into the overall force protection plan?
  - What measures are taken to protect deep strike capabilities?
  - What methods of CB warning and reporting have been established to ensure dissemination of information to subordinate components and coalition forces?
  - What is the current method of determining the need for decontamination?
  - What priorities of decontamination have been established in the theater?
  - What provisions have been made to ensure knowledge of all joint force unit locations?
  - What steps are being taken to ensure that subordinate commanders know where contaminated areas are during operations?
  - What priority is placed on avoiding contamination?
  - What is the plan for deploying CB sensor units in the theater of operations?
7. Do supporting component OPLANS adequately address CB defense?
- How are supporting component assets organized to dedicate efforts to CB functions?
  - How do supporting component commanders determine CB readiness?
  - What is the status of supporting component commanders'--
    - Plans?
    - Equipment?
    - Training?
    - Personnel?
  - What CB functions have the other components planned for conducting internally?
  - For which CB functions will the CINC need to provide the LCC support to the other components?
  - What methods are in place to monitor CB readiness of component forces in the areas of training, equipment, and personnel?
  - How are component CB defense assets coordinated into a comprehensive theater CB defense plan?
8. Do the plans maximize joint service synergy, effectively utilize resources, and produce a seamless CB defense posture across the operation?
- How has CB warning and reporting been integrated into the joint force C<sup>2</sup>S systems?
  - When was it last practiced?
  - How have the services' requests for CB defense forces been incorporated into OPLANS?
  - Where are the recon assets located?
  - Where do plans call for CB recon units to be located during offensive and defensive operations?
9. Have CB defense shortfalls been addressed?



- What actions are taken to alleviate shortfalls in the CB readiness of supporting service commanders' units?

#### ENSURE ADEQUACY OF GUIDANCE AND DOCTRINE

1. What enemy WMD employment concepts are being considered?
2. How is specific standardized CB defense guidance to all CINCs worded in the defense planning guidance (DPG), and later in campaign plans?
3. What JCS guidance is in place to synchronize the component CB defense plans?
4. What improvements are required in joint doctrine, as espoused in Joint Pub 3-11, Joint Doctrine for CB Defense?
5. What deficiencies exist in written, service-developed doctrine to provide US forces instructions on how to survive and operate in a CB defensive environment?
6. What are the procedures for decontaminating the wounded? What are the shortcomings?
7. What procedures have been written regarding handling and evacuation of contaminated corpses?
  - How has the CINC ensured that units are aware of this policy?
  - How and when has knowledge of this policy been evaluated?
  - What steps have been taken to ensure that this policy is known and understood?
8. What is the stated national policy of massive response to enemy use of WMD?
9. When do we publicly state the policy?
10. What plan exists to obscure high priority/high signature targets and obscurants from enemy acquisition assets (including smoke plan)?
11. What is the policy of coalition partners response to enemy use of WMD?
12. Does the policy of coalition partners include acting independently if WMD used on their troops or homeland?
13. Has the issue of a coordinated response concerning coalition partners been coordinated in advance?

#### D. TRAIN AND EXERCISE THE JOINT FORCE IN CB DEFENSE

1. Do CINC staff and service senior leaders understand the CB threat and how they support the theater CB defense strategy? (Suggestion: "Wargame" the

plan with senior leaders and talk them through CB attacks. Have them briefback how their units will respond. Discuss what key decisions have to be made, when and what the available options are).

- What steps have been taken to negate the operational difficulties likely to be encountered if attacked by CB weaponry?
- What steps have been taken to prevent the occurrence of needless casualties if attacked by CB weaponry?
- What steps are being taken to improve leader awareness of the CB threat and how to counter it?
- What steps are being taken for CB defense of pop~~pro~~jection operations?

2. Do necessary models and simulations support the CINC's training and exercise needs?

- What computer models/simulations are currently used to train the CINC's staff and subordinate services?
- How often are models/simulations used to exercise the staff and services?
- How thoroughly is CB integrated into these models?
- What model(s) would the CINC or his staff like to see CB thoroughly integrated into?

3. Has the CB threat been adequately addressed in joint exercises and training?

- What is the CINC's stated goal for CB defense in joint exercises?
- What universal joint task list (UJTL) tasks have been incorporated into joint exercises? Does this accommodate the GAO findings?
- How are the modern computer based tools being used to exercise CB tasks?
- How many times during the past year were each of the CB tasks of the UJTL exercised?
- How were they evaluated?
- How is the staff being trained to ensure their understanding of their responsibilities with regard to the CB tasks tested?
- What is the requirement to perform realistic missions for extended periods of time while fully encapsulated? What is the CINC's expectation?
- What training objectives are mandatory for major joint task force and CINC-level exercises?
- What training has been provided for leaders to mitigate the demonstrated extra toll that encapsulation takes on leaders?
- What is the minimum "required" CB defense training specified by command directives?
- How have unit leaders been trained in hazards and protective measures associated with depleted uranium on the battlefield?
- How have unit leaders been trained to distinguish between an environmental hazard and a chemical agent attack?
- What training has been given to both soldiers and leaders with regard to protecting themselves from an environmental hazard?

- What training has been given to both soldiers and leaders with regard to avoiding an environmental hazard?
- What training has been given to both soldiers and leaders with regard to decontaminating an environmental hazard?
- What practice have personnel had in communicating while encapsulated?
- How has medical unit ability to perform their mission with contaminated casualties been assessed?
- What plans are in place for movement of contaminated patients within theater?
  - What units are responsible for this mission?
  - When did they last practice this mission?
  - What evacuation routes have been designated?

4. Have plans and responses been adequately exercised against the CB threat?

- What action plans are in place to ensure quality CB play is included in exercises?
- How does the command envision (written in specific planning documents) maintaining OPTEMPO following enemy use of biological or chemical weapons?
- Do multinational coalition force exercises include sufficient CB plans to determine coalition readiness?
- What are the coalition force political policies that discourage the inclusion of CB defense events in major exercises?
- What is the CINC's standard regarding practice of self-sustaining decontamination operations (without a chemical unit available)?
- How are exercises designed to ensure that CB warnings are received across both service and coalition lines?
- How do exercises incorporate both active and passive measures to protect key ports of entry from CB hazards?
- How do joint exercises measure the proper use of dispersion and movement as preventive measures against CB attacks?
- How is targeting of enemy WMD capabilities played in exercises?
- How are the CB effects on the civilian population played in exercises?
- How is the need for additional medical support in a CB war exercised?
- How do exercises test a unit's ability to decontaminate wounded personnel?
- How have military personnel slated to take the place of key civilian personnel exercised to ensure that they can perform their wartime mission?
- How has exercising around massive evacuations been accomplished?
- When was the last NEO exercise? What percentage of noncombatants participated?
- How do exercises give leaders opportunities to make realistic CB defense decisions? Do exercise scenarios anticipate the use of decision support tools?
- How often is using EPW guards to train EPWs in the use of US CB defense equipment incorporated into exercises?

- How do exercises adequately account for the time-phased arrival of CB and medical support?
- How often are using decontamination priorities included in exercises?

#### E. ASSESS READINESS AND IDENTIFY NEEDS

1. Have CINC issues identified in wargames and exercises (for example, how to handle civilian/coalition requirements, logistics shortfalls, gaps in command and control, CB warning and reporting in developing theaters) been identified for resolution? What process is being used for resolution?
2. What is the process to ensure plans have been updated to reflect exercise lessons learned?
3. What mechanism(s) do the CINC and staff use to determine unit CB readiness?
4. How is the CB readiness incorporated into unit readiness reporting? Are ratings based on objective criteria or subjective criteria? Can the commander call his status anything he wants regardless of what the data indicates?
5. How has the staff ensured that the process for resolving CB readiness issues is known to all subordinate commands?
6. What are the CB defense standards that the CINC expects all deploying units to meet? What steps are being taken to ensure that this is true?
7. What is the CINC's criteria for determining CB readiness?
8. How do the CINC and staff consider and encourage technological developments related to NBC defense individual protection?
9. To what degree has the combatant command elevated the requirement for uniform and meaningful NBC readiness standards and reporting to OJCS?
10. What are the measurement standards that the CINC and staff use to ensure uniform and meaningful standards and assessment of NBC readiness among the assigned forces?
11. What CINC NBC guidance has been published?
12. What is the system to ensure issues that cannot be resolved at service component or CINC staff level have been identified to appropriate organizations for resolution?
13. What mechanisms exist for providing theater CB defense readiness needs to service chiefs for their information/action?
14. What is the process to ensure CB defense needs have been incorporated into the CINC integrated priority list (IPL) process?