U.S. Military Biological Activities: Ongoing Questions

- **UP and TAP Projects implemented in Ukraine commissioned by Pentagon**
- **Discrepancy between the subject of working and the real problems of healthcare in Ukraine**
- **Exporting strains of microorganisms and biomaterials from Ukraine's territory without clearly stated purpose**
- **Ukraine's interest in supplying technical means for delivering and using biological weapons based on UAVs, patenting such means in the United States**
- **The U.S. and Ukraine concealing the facts of military-biological cooperation in international reporting under the BWC**



BWC/CONS/2022/WP.26

Formal Consultative Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

Distr.: General
7 September 2022

Original: English
English and Russian only

2022 Meeting
Geneva, 26 August and 5-9 September 2022
Item 6 of the agenda
Respective outstanding questions by the Russian Federation to the United States and to Ukraine concerning the fulfilment of their respective obligations under the Convention in the context of the operation of biological laboratories in Ukraine

Questions of the Russian Federation to the United States and Ukraine regarding the compliance with their obligations under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC) in the context of the activities of biological laboratories in the territory of Ukraine

Submitted by the Russian Federation

I. Questions to Ukraine regarding compliance with obligations under Part 1 of Article I of the BTWC

1. What activities with pathogenic biomaterials were carried out at the I.Mechnikov Anti-Plague Institute in Odessa in the period from 2017 to 2018, if, according to the report of the commission of the Ministry of Health of Ukraine, there were over two thousand storage units of pathogenic biomaterials at that time, while in 2018 only one research work was officially conducted involving the tularemia strains in the collection of the Institute, and no report on the use of the collection for 2017 was submitted?

2. Why, as of December 28, 2018, there was no documented information at the I.Mechnikov Anti-Plague Institute in Odessa regarding the actual status of strains, and there was not an evidence base regarding the need to maintain a large number of pathogen test tubes with the same strains of different passages presented to the committee?

3. What is the reason for the choice of pathogens studied in Ukraine as part of the Threat Reduction Program? Why in a number of cases the nomenclature of studied pathogens is not related to relevant public health problems and can hardly be explained by preventive or protective purposes (for example the TAP-6 project to study the causative agent of glanders, cases of which have never been recorded by veterinary and sanitary and epidemiological services of Ukraine)? Why, under the conditions of the gravest state of sanitary and epidemiological well-being system, threatened by the spread of infections defeated in most countries of WHO European region and an unsatisfactory level of

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

BWC/CONS/2022/WP.26

population immunization, in Ukraine the attention was not paid to actual health problems, but to anthrax, highly pathogenic influenza and other especially dangerous pathogens?

4. How should the accumulation of especially dangerous infection strains and their transfer to other countries help to improve the infectious disease situation?

5. Why is it necessary to store 422 containers with cholera bacteria at the I.Mechnikov Antiplague Institute in Odessa, if the genetic diversity of cholera-causing vibrios is limited to only two serogroups?

6. Why was emphasis placed on the study of naturally occurring and especially dangerous infections, which, according to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention lists, are considered to be potential pathogens for biological weapons?

7. Why is the study of pathogens of especially dangerous infections, including those that overcome the protective effect of vaccines and possessing the ability to control them, instead of improving the system of epidemiological surveillance, developing anti-epidemic action plans, conducting public health education, establishing the supply of vaccines and expanding immunization, the collection of information on the infection rate, biological samples of humans and their export, the export of national collections containing pathogenic microorganisms, considered to be a priority?

II. Questions to Ukraine regarding compliance with obligations under Part 2 of Article I of the BTWC

8. What kind of life- and health-threatening research is referred to in the UP-8 project (Circulation of Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus and hantaviruses in Ukraine and the potential need for differential diagnosis of patients with suspected leptospirosis)?

9. What was the reason for the involvement of specialized U.S. military professionals in the research within the framework of the UP-2 project (Mapping of Especially Dangerous Infectious Diseases in Ukraine)? What tasks were solved by them in the course of the project? Considering that the epidemiological situation with anthrax in Ukraine remains favorable, why was the conducted research necessary and what are its true objectives?

10. What tasks were solved by the specialists of research organizations of the Ministry of Defense of the USA (researches were carried out by the specialists of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, the Naval Medical Research Institute) within the framework of fulfilled projects UP-1 (Implementation of geoinformation systems, remote detection and laboratory diagnostics while monitoring tularemia and anthrax in sanitary-epidemiological and veterinary practice in Ukraine) and UP-2? What justifies the necessity of their involvement as participants in research aimed at solving, as declared, "purely peaceful" tasks?

11. What is the reason for the interest of the Ukrainian company "Motor Sich" in the supply of an unmanned aerial vehicle "Bayraktar Akinji" (request of December 15, 2021)? How does this request correlate with Ukraine's obligations under Part 2 of Article I of the BTWC?

III. Questions for Ukraine regarding compliance with its obligations under Article IV of the BTWC

12. For what reasons was the proper level of biological protection in organizations and institutions working with pathogens in Ukraine not ensured, and why is there a lack of national legislation regarding the control of particularly dangerous pathogens?

13. Why was the Ukrainian side not taking into account the recommendations of the Ukrainian security service in the context of ensuring the safety of Ukrainian bio-objects?

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

BWC/CONS/2022/WP.26

14. Why, despite the revealed gross violations of biological safety requirements and prerequisites for theft of pathogenic materials, were the activities of Ukrainian biolaboratories continued in the normal mode?

IV. Questions for the United States regarding the compliance with its obligations under Article IV of the BTWC

15. Is it an established practice for the U.S. Patent and Trademark Agency to grant, after peer review, patents for inventions directly related to the delivery and use of biological and toxin weapons?

16. How does the granting of patents on inventions, the technical description of which implies their use as a means of delivery of biological and toxin weapons, relate to the U.S. obligations under Article IV of the BTWC?

17. Does the United States consider the inventions featured in these patents to be tools that could be used to deliver biological and toxin weapons?

18. What explains the necessity of the centralization of collections and transfer to the U.S. of the strains of dangerous pathogens isolated in the territory of Ukraine, as stipulated by Article IV of the 2005 Agreement "On cooperation in the field of prevention of the spread of pathogens, technologies and knowledge that may be used in the development of biological weapons" (Agreement)?

19. What is the reason for giving the results of works, obtained within the framework of the implementation of the Threat Reduction Program in Ukraine, a limited and closed nature? How does this requirement under the Agreement contribute to transparency and confidence-building within the BTWC?

20. How was the U.S. assistance, as implemented, intended to ensure a sanitary and epidemiological well-being of the population of Ukraine? What are the objectives and goals of the U.S. assistance in the area of ensuring a sanitary and epidemiological well-being of the population of Ukraine? What are the key indicators of its effectiveness?

21. What public health indicators have improved over the past 10-15 years due to the U.S. assistance in Ukraine? Has the sanitary and epidemiological situation in Ukraine improved as a result of the interaction with the United States: has the incidence of infectious diseases decreased, has the immunization coverage increased, has testing for infections become more accessible, are there more specialists (epidemiologists, microbiologists, sanitary doctors), have there been new developments of tests and vaccines, has the recording of infectious diseases improved?

3

UN General Assembly

14 states joined the statement of the Russian Federation

UN Security Council

Results of the vote to adopt the resolution:

voted – 15
in favour – 2
against – 3
absented – 10

Consultative Meeting of state-parties to the BWC

Addressed the meeting – 43 delegations:
22 stated voted in favour or absented
21 states voted against

Documentary evidence of conducting dual-use research in Ukraine

Statement by representative of U.S. National Security Council

John Kirby
National Security Council Strategic Communications Coordinator

'National Security Council Startegic Communications Coordinator John Kirby admitted that the US worked with Ukrainians on "some pandemic prevention research" prior to Russia's special military operation in Ukraine, adding that research facilities had been "safely deactivated".'

U.S. Under Secretary of State

Victoria Nuland
U.S. Under Secretary of State

'...Ukraine has biological research facilities which in fact we are quite concerned Russian troops may be seeking to gain control of, so we are working with the Ukrainians on how they can prevent any of those research materials from falling into the hands of Russian forces should they approach...'

Drug trials in Rubezhnoye





PHARMBIOTEST's Clinical Diagnostic Laboratory (9, Pochayevskaya Str., Rubezhnoye)





Order of the Ministry of Health of Ukraine No. 1997 dated 1 September 2020 On Conducting Clinical Trials of Medicinal Products and Approval of Major Changes.

PHARMBIOTEST's Clinical Diagnostic Laboratory

NBC Protection Troops operating in Lugansk People's Republic in Kherson region

Samples from American Type Culture Collection



Among the samples, there was a container with a strain of Yersinia ruckeri, which causes severe fish yersiniosis, which causes significant economic losses to aquaculture in the fishing industry, and which is not endemic to Donbass region.

Askania Nova Biosphere Reserve named after F.E. Faltz-Fein (Kherson region)

UP-4 Project

Studying the spread of particularly dangerous pathogens by migratory bird





Certificate No. 2 dated 29 March 2021
Transfer of bioassays selected during the mass die-off of poultry in Askania Nova Biosphere Reserve

'... Grey crane – 46; ogar – 23; rook – 32; jackdaw – 22; mallard – 2; rough-legged buzzard birds – 1; greater white-fronted goose – 1 unit; steppe gull - 2...'

Kiev regime preparing chemical and biological provocations

Investigating the causes of ASF outbreak in Zaporozhye region

АДМИНИСТРАЦИЯ ГУБЕРНАТОРА И ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВА ЗАПОРОЖСКОЙ ОБЛАСТИ

РАСПОРЯЖЕНИЕ ГУБЕРНАТОРА ЗАПОРОЖСКОЙ ОБЛАСТИ

Об установлении ограничительных мероприятий (карантина) по африканской чуме свиней на территории Черниговского и Приморского района Запорожской области

«02» 11 2023 г. № 75-р

В соответствии с Законом Российской Федерации от 14.05.1993 г. № 4979-1 «О ветеринарии», пунктом 35 Ветеринарных правил осуществления профилактических, диагностических, ограничительных и иных мероприятий, установления и отмены карантина и иных ограничений, направленных на предотвращение распространения и ликвидацию очагов африканской чумы свиней, утвержденных приказом Минсельхоза России от 28.01.2021 г. № 37, на основании представления и.о. министра агропромышленного комплекса и продовольственной политики Военно-гражданской администрации Запорожской области от 01.11.2023 г. №2473, руководствуясь статьей 28 Устава Запорожской области, постановлением Законодательного Собрания Запорожской области от 23.09.2023 г. № 22 «Об избрании Губернатора Запорожской области»,

РАСПОРЯЖАЮСЬ:

1. Установить ограничительные мероприятия (карантин) по заболеванию африканской чумой свиней (далее - АЧС) на территории Черниговского и Приморского района Запорожской области до выполнения мероприятий, предусмотренных пунктом 64 Ветеринарных правил осуществления профилактических, диагностических, ограничительных и иных мероприятий, установления и отмены карантина и иных ограничений, направленных на предотвращение распространения и ликвидацию очагов

'... The Order by the Governor of the Zaporozhye Region "On introducing restrictive measures (quarantine) for African swine fever in the territory of Chernigovsky and Primorsky districts of Zaporozhye region"...'

б) угрожаемой зоной территорию вокруг эпизоотического очага, радиус которой составляет 5 км от границ эпизоотического очага, в пределах административных границ населенных пунктов пгт. Черниговка, с. Могиляны, с. Чернигово-Токмачанск Черниговского района, Запорожской области;

в) зоной наблюдения территорию вокруг эпизоотического очага, радиус которой составляет 10 км от границ угрожаемой зоны, в пределах административных границ населенных пунктов п. Верхний Токмак Второй, п. Верхний Токмак Первый, с. Богдановка, с. Боево, с. Верхний Токмак, с. Владовка, с. Долгое, с Заря, с. Квитковое, с. Котляровка, с. Мокрый Став, с. Нижний Токмак, с. Новоказанковатое, с. Новополтавка, с. Перчино, с. Просторое, с. Розовка, с. Салтычья, с. Степовое, с. Тарасовка Черниговского района и с.Гюневка, с. Нельговка Приморского района Запорожской области.

2. На период действия ограничительных мероприятий (карантина) запрещается:

2.1. В эпизоотическом очаге:

- посещение территории посторонними лицами, кроме персонала, выполняющего производственные (технологические) операции, в том числе по обслуживанию свиней, специалистов Государственной ветеринарной службы и привлеченного персонала для ликвидации очага, лиц, проживающих и (или) временно пребывающих на территории, признанной эпизоотическим очагом;
- перемещение и перегруппировка свиней;
- ввоз (ввод) и вывоз (вывод) свиней;
- убой свиней;
- вывоз продукции животноводства и растениеводства, включая корма;
- въезд и выезд транспортных средств (за исключением транспорта, задействованного в мероприятиях по ликвидации эпизоотического очага и (или) по обеспечению жизнедеятельности людей, проживающих и (или) временно пребывающих на территории хозяйства).

2.2. В угрожаемой зоне:

- вывоз свиней;
- реализация свиней и продуктов убоя свиней непромышленного изготовления;
- вывоз и пересылка, включая почтовые отправления, продуктов убоя

"...b) the endangered area is the territory around the outbreak of the disease, the radius of which is 5 km <...> within the administrative boundaries of Chernigovka, Mogilyany, Chernigovo-Rokmachansk (Chernigovsky district, Zaporozhye region);
c) the area of observation around the epizootic outbreak, the radius of which is 10 km <...> Vrekhny Tokmak Vtoroy, <...> Kotlyarovka, <...> Stepnoye, Tarasovka (Chernigovsky district, Zaporozhye region)..."

Participation of the Civilian Research & Development Foundation (CRDF) in sponsoring U.S. military-biological programs in Ukraine

A. Project Title	Risk Assessment of Selected Especially Dangerous Pathogens Potentially Carried by Migratory Birds Over Ukraine
Principal Investigator Name	Boris Shapiro / Oleksandr Prisiazhnyi
Institution	National Scientific Center Ins. of Experimental and Clinical Veterinary Medicine (NSC IECMV) / The State Scientific Research Institute of Laboratory Diagnostics and Veterinary and Sanitary Expertise (SSRILDVSE)
Address	83, Pushkinskaya Str. / 30 Donetska Str.
City/State/Country/Postal Code	Kharkov, Ukraine, 61023 / Kyiv, Ukraine, 03151
Telephone	+38 (057) 707-20-53 / +380504418798
E-Mail	admin@vet.kharkov.ua / dndslkivse@vetlabresearch.gov.ua
	C2. Technical Collaborator / C3. Technical Collaborator
Principal Investigator Name	Olena Yegorova / Sergiy Nyzyk
Institution	Ukrainian Anti-Plague Research Institute (UAPRI) / Institute of Veterinary Medicine (IVM)
Address	2/4 Tsarkovna Str. / 30 Donetska Str.
City/State/Country/Postal Code	Odesa, Ukraine, 65003 / Kyiv, Ukraine, 03151
Telephone	+380487238172 / +380442457805
E-Mail	egorova@ukr.net / snyzhyk@gmail.com
GRANT AGREEMENT INFORMATION	
D. CRDF Global Agreement #	3000-18-64201-1 / H. Sponsor: Metabiota Inc.
F. Duration	31 January 2018 - 30 January 2019 / I. Funding Agreement: Solutions Focus Services Agreement
F. Agreement Ceiling	$181,150.00 / J. CFDA Number: N/A
G. CRDF Program	Grant Assistance Program/FOCUS
This Agreement is subject to the following statutory requ...	...rporated by reference:

'... A Project Title: UP-4...'

'...Agreement Ceiling: $181,150$...'

CRDF GLOBAL CONTACTS	N. Grant Officer	O. Sponsor Technical Representative
Name/Title	Oleksiy Fomin	Karen Hite
Institution	U.S. Civilian Research & Development Foundation, Office in Ukraine	Metabiota Inc
Address Line 1	4 Bogomoltsa Str., Suite 75	425 California Street, 2 floor

'Institution: Civilian Research & Development Foundation (CRDF), Office in Ukraine...'

Grant Agreement Cover Sheet	☒ Payment Terms & Conditions: Cost-Reimbursable	☒ Standard Provisions: Research Grants
Attachment A: Grant Description	☐ Payment Terms & Conditions: Fixed Obligation Grants	☐ Standard Provisions: DOS
Attachment B: Budget	☐ Payment Terms & Conditions: Cooperative Agreements	☐ Standard Provisions: DOE
Basic Grant Agreement	☐ Bank Information	☐ Standard Provisions: NSF
☒ Basic Grant Agreement Addendum: Awards over $10,000	☒ Special Conditions: & Exceptions:	☐ Standard Provisions: DOD-DTRA

The Agreement is the Parties' exclusive and entire agreement, superseding all other agreements, promises and representations, whether written or oral. Persons signing below certify that they have legal authority to bind the respective Parties and they have completed all formalities and other actions required by their By-Laws and Articles of Incorporation, and all applicable laws, to authorize Agreement execution and performance. Failure to return a signed copy of this Agreement within sixty (60) days of issuance may result in the offer of award being withdrawn. Such decision shall be solely at the discretion of CRDF Global.

Authorized Grantee Signature	Typed Name/Title	Date
CRDF Global Signature	Typed Name/Title	Date

CRDF Global Grant Agreement 3000-18-64201-1 Page 1 of 17

Partners (Donors) of Foundation of Civic Research and Initiatives

- U.S. Department of State
- U.S. Department of Defense
- Centers for Disease Control
- U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency
- National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
- National Cancer Institute

Emergency shutdown of UP-8 Project amidst COVID-19

Розповсюдження вірусу Крим-Конго геморагічної гарячки (вірус ККГГ) і хантавірусів в Україні та потенційна потреба диференційної діагностики у пацієнтів з підозрою на лептоспіроз

Протокол дослідження

Назва проекту: UP-8: Розповсюдження вірусу Крим-Конго геморагічної гарячки (вірус ККГГ) і хантавірусів в Україні та потенційна потреба диференційної діагностики у пацієнтів з підозрою на лептоспіроз

Номер протоколу: Буде визначено пізніше

Головний дослідник (ГД): Сергій Моргун, Начальник санітарно-епідеміологічного управління командування Медичних сил Збройних Сил України, вул. Госпітальна, 16, Київ, Україна, тел. +38 (063) 817- 42 - 88, email: general4ik1811@gmail.com

Співдослідники від лабораторій в Україні:

Ігор Цибровський, Начальник лабораторного відділу, лікар-бактеріолог, 10 Регіонального санітарно-епідеміологічного управління Служби превентивної медицини Міністерства оборони України, м. Київ, вул. Госпітальна, 16, тел. +38 0632852828, email: cybrik@i.ua

Ірина Шевчук, Начальник лабораторії особливо небезпечних інфекцій лабораторного відділу 28 Регіонального санітарно-епідеміологічного управління Служби превентивної медицини Міністерства оборони України, м. Львів, вул. Зелена, 45, тел. +38 (067) 302-61-13, email: 1907197@ukr.net

Владислав Петренко, Начальник 108 Регіонального санітарно-епідеміологічного управління Служби превентивної медицини Міністерства оборони України, м. Харків, пл. Фейербаха, 12, тел. +38 (067) 104-44-13, email: vapdok@ua.fingmailto:ro_likhova@ukr.net

Оксана Мариничева, Начальник лабораторного відділу 27 Регіонального санітарно-епідеміологічного управління Служби превентивної медицини Міністерства оборони України, м. Одеса, вул. Старопортофранківська, 48, тел. +38 (093) 785-47-50, email: marinich1305@ukr.net

Спеціаліст зі збору медичних даних менеджер даних в Україні: Микола Оліяр, к.мед.н., лікар-епідеміолог, начальник епідеміологічного відділу – заступник санітарно-епідеміологічного управління командування Медичних сил Збройних Сил України

4

ЦЕНТР ГРОМАДСЬКОГО ЗДОРОВ'Я

Форма повідомлення про закриття дослідження до Комісії з питань етики ДУ «Центр громадського здоров'я МОЗ України»

Прошу Комісію розглянути інформацію про закриття дослідження.

Назва дослідження:	Клінічний протокол «Проспективна оцінка захворюваності та диференціальна діагностика Крим-Конго геморагічної гарячки та хантавірусних інфекцій у пацієнтів, госпіталізованих з підозрою на лептоспіроз та гарячкову хворобу нез'ясованої етіології в Україні» вітлення якого заплановано у рамках першого додаткового раунду проекту спільних біологічних досліджень (СБД) UP-8 «Розповсюдженість вірусу Крим-Конго геморагічної гарячки та хантавірусів в Україні та потенційна потреба у диференційній діагностиці у пацієнтів з підозрою на лептоспіроз» (версія 6.1 від 24 лютого 2020 р., форма інформованої згоди – версія 2.3 від 21 лютого 2020 р.).
Номер, дата Протоколу	---
Термін дослідження:	Дослідження було заплановано на період 17 лютого 2019 – 17 лютого 2020, який було подовжено до 30 квітня 2020. Початок дослідження очікував затвердження комісією з біоетики U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Human Research Protection Office (HRPO).
Мета дослідження:	Оцінити захворюваність на Крим-Конго геморагічну гарячку (ККГГ) та хантавірусні інфекції серед пацієнтів, госпіталізованих в українські лікарні з підозрою або підтвердженим діагнозом «лептоспіроз», гарячковим захворюванням невстановленої етіології з ознаками, які включають на діагноз синдрому геморагічної гарячки, або контакт з пацієнтом із підозрою або підтвердженим діагнозом ККГГ у період до двох тижнів до появи симптомів.
Фінансування:	Зовнішнє фінансування
Статус фінансування:	Затверджене
Джерело коштів:	Програма залучення до спільної біологічної діяльності (ПЗСБД)
Номер, дату контракту:	Додатковий рік 1 проекту спільних біологічних досліджень (СБД) UP-8, що сплавлений 18 лютого 2019 і виконуються в рамках ПЗСБД; контракт HDTRA1-08-D-0007-004 від 6 березня 2015

Інформація про обставини закриття дослідження:

1	Назва непередбачуваної обставини	
2.1	Дата непередбачуваної події	Дата
2.2	Дата виявлення непередбачуваної обставини	Дата
2.3	Дата інформування про непередбачувану подію	Дата
3	Короткий опис непередбачуваної обставини	
4	Місце виникнення події	
5	Присутність персоналу дослідження при події	

ЦЕНТР ГРОМАДСЬКОГО ЗДОРОВ'Я

6	Вжиті заходи для вирішення непередбачуваної обставини	
7	Статус вирішення непередбачуваної обставини	
8	Вплив непередбачуваної обставини на реалізацію дослідження	
9	Вплив непередбачуваних обставин на респондентів (збільшення ризиків зазнати шкоди, нік зазначалось, тощо)	
10	Інші причини	Дозвіл НІРО на проведення дослідження не було отримано. Комітет з питань етики Університету Нью-Мексико, США, закрив дослідження 26 березня 2020 року.

Прошу розглянути можливість:
☐ Продовжити дослідження без змін до Протоколу або інформованої згоди
☐ Продовжити дослідження з внесенням змін до Протоколу або інформованої згоди
☐ Призупинити дослідження до повного завершення події
☐ Припинити дослідження з подальшим видаленням всієї інформації
☐ Інше:

Дата 14 квітня 2020 Підпис ПІБ подавача Нестерова О.С.

'...suspend the research with all the information deleted...'.

U.S. research projects on coronavirus, including those in Ukraine

U.S. studying novel coronaviruses since 2009

PREDICT Program

U.S. Agency for International Development

Studying new species of hantaviruses and coronaviruses, trapping arthropods and bats that carry them



Epidemiologically significant SARS-CoV-2 genetic variants emerge



Reporting documents on the Project 'Risk of Emerging Infections from Insectivorous Bats in Ukraine and Georgia',



'...Risk of Emerging Infections from Insectivorous Bats in Ukraine and Georgia/ Denis Muzyka and Lela Urushadze...'

'...Complete genome consensus sequences willbe obtain by Sanger and next generation sequencing methods. <...> To this end a bioinfomatician should be hire to hep imlement analytical pipelines for complete genome editing and assembling...'



"...Work on the territory of Ukraine was planned for 2018, 2019, and 2020...."

'... that during the work in Ukraine, bats were identified that migrate up to 800 km deep into countries such as Hungary and Russia...'

U.S. Congress investigating origin of COVID-19



Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

September 12, 2023

The Honorable William J. Burns
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
1000 Colonial Farm Rd.
Langley, VA 22101

Dear Director Burns:

The Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic (Select Subcommittee) and the

'... The whistleblower further contends that to come to the eventual public detemination of uncertainty, the other six members were given a significant monetary incentive to change their position...'

1. All documents and communications regarding the establishment of all iterations of the COVID-19

'...These allegations, <...> requires the Committees to conduct furhter oversight of how the CIA handled its internal investigation into the origins of COVID-19. To assist the Committees with their investigations, we request the following documents and information as soon as possible, but not later than September 26, 2023...'

Sincerely,

Brad R. Wenstrup, D.P.M.
Chairman
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic

Mike Turner
Chairman
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

cc: The Honorable Raul Ruiz, M.D., Ranking Member
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic

The Honorable Jim Himes, Ranking Member
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

Possible causes of COVID-19 high incidence rate in Italy

U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit Three (NAMRU-3)

It is located on the territory of the Naval Air Station Sigonella near Catania, Italy.

NAMRU-3's primary mission is to study infectious diseases. This includes evaluating the effectiveness of vaccines, therapeutics, diagnostic tests, and vector control measures.

Anthony Fauci

a former adviser to the White House and former Director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases.

Gina Haspel

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency from 2018 to 2021

Nita Madhav

CEO of Metabiota from 2019 to 2022

.

Alex Azar

United States Secretary of Health and Human Services from 2018 to 2021

Robert Ray Redfield

Director of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention from 2018 to 2021

Peter Daszak

President of EcoHealth Alliance

Rochelle Walensky

Director of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention from 2021 to 2023

Russia's Initiatives to strengthen non-proliferation regime of biological weapons

Measures to strengthen BWC proposed by foreign states-parties

BWC/CONF.IX/WP.46

Ninth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

29 November 2022

English only

Geneva, 28 November to 16 December 2022
Item 11 of the agenda
Consideration of issues identified in the review of the operation of the Convention as provided for in its Article XII and any possible consensus follow-up action

Approach to Strengthening Measures for Emerging Infectious Diseases based on Lessons Learned from the Ebola Outbreak

Submitted by Japan

I. Introduction

I. Introduction

1. The 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa made it clear that the international community should enhance capacity not only to provide humanitarian assistance, but also to rapidly respond to infectious diseases to cope with the threat to the safety of the international community. Hence, at the 8th Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 2016, States Parties acknowledged the importance of drawing lessons from the outbreak, including the need to address the lack of ready operational capacity, and stressed the value of strengthening international cooperation in infectious disease prevention and associated capacity building.

2. Under these circumstances, Japan identified lessons learned from the outbreak and in 2015 compiled "The Basic Guideline for Strengthening Measures on Emerging Infectious Diseases." Various measures under the guideline have been effectively implemented through integrated efforts by related ministries and agencies.

3. This working paper summarizes lessons learned from the Ebola outbreak that began in 2014 and identifies measures to tackle each lesson. In addition, the paper introduces the "Japan Disaster Relief Infectious Diseases Response Team (JDR- Infectious Diseases Response Team)," which was established after the Ebola outbreak in 2014. The UK, also acknowledged, as one of the key lessons, the need for rapid response units and introduced their team at the Meeting of Experts in 2018. Japan agrees that such teams implementing international assistance are important tools to respond against emerging infectious diseases. For States Parties which have such teams or are considering to establish them, the paper includes lessons and recommendations drawn from past experiences of the JDR-Infectious Diseases Response Team.

GE.22-27600(E)

Please recycle

BWC/CONF.IX/WP.46

2 December 2022

English only

BWC/CONF.IX/WP.49

2 December 2022

English only

1. Approach to Strengthening Measures for Emerging Infectious Diseases based on Lessons from the Ebola Outbreak (submitted by Japan)

2. Proposal for inclusion in the final document of the Ninth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention on "Enhancing Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment as ab Integral Part of the Institutional Strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention" (submitted by Panama)

3. Engaging the Next Generation in Global Biosecurity: Proposals for strengthening youth participation in the Biological Weapons Convention (submitted by Kenya and Panama)

4. Proposal for establishment of an international platform dedicated to biosecurity and biosafety: SecBio (submitted by France)

Report of the ad hoc group on a BWC legally binding verification protocol (VEREX)



ПРОТОКОЛ К КОНВЕНЦИИ О ЗАПРЕЩЕНИИ РАЗРАБОТКИ, ПРОИЗВОДСТВА И НАКОПЛЕНИЯ ЗАПАСОВ БАКТЕРИОЛОГИЧЕСКОГО (БИОЛОГИЧЕСКОГО) И ТОКСИННОГО ОРУЖИЯ И ОБ ИХ УНИЧТОЖЕНИИ

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

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

ТОКСИННЫХ ПРОГРАММ И/ИЛИ ВИДОВ ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТИ, ПРОВОДИВШИХСЯ ДО ВСТУПЛЕНИЯ В СИЛУ КОНВЕНЦИИ/ПРОТОКОЛА ДЛЯ КАЖДОГО ГОСУДАРСТВА-УЧАСТНИКА ... 201
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Russian initiatives to strengthen BWC

1. To resume negotiations on developing legally binding protocol to the BTWC, with an effective verification mechanism that would include lists of pathogens, toxins, and specialised equipment, and that would be comprehensive.

2. In confidence-building measures:
- Supplement Form A, Part 2 (iv) with information on all biomedical research and development in the biological security sphere carried out outside the national territory, including in cooperation with other States, including biomedical activities carried out with the participation of or on behalf of special services (relevant ministries) of the participating State;
- Complete Form G to include information on facilities producing animal vaccines.

3. To establish a Scientific Advisory Committee to evaluate scientific and technological achievements, which would have broad geographical representation and equal rights of participation.
On the basis of the results of its work, the Committee could, inter alia, develop proposals for the improvement of the format of confidence-building measures.

4. To establish mobile biomedical units under the BWC to provide assistance in the event of biological weapons use (where there is evidence of biological weapons use), to conduct investigations, and to assist in the control of epidemics of various origins.