



**DEFENCE MINISTRY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

**ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE  
MILITARY-BIOLOGICAL ACTIVITY OF THE USA**





# Structure of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research and the US Naval Medical Research Center

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## Organising the monitoring of the biological situation by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research

### WRAIR

#### Declared objectives

1. Prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of infectious diseases
2. Clinical trials of vaccines against dangerous infectious diseases
3. Participating in the development and testing of chemotherapy drugs
4. Studying the epidemiology and control of vector-borne infections
5. Protecting, optimising and supporting the behavioural health of armed forces personnel



Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) and medical research units  
сухопутных войск США



U.S. Army Medical Research Directorate – West, USAMRD-W (U.S. Washington)



Armed Forces Research Institute for Medical Sciences, AFRIMS (Armed Forces Research Institute for Medical Sciences, AFRIMS), Bangkok, Thailand



U.S. Army Medical Research Directorate – Africa, USAMRD-A (U.S. Nairobi, Kenya)



A research unit in Kamphaeng Phet, Thailand



Army Medical Research Directorate – Georgia, USAMRD-G (U.S. Tbilisi, Georgia)



A research unit in the Philippines



A research unit in Nepal

## Organising the monitoring of the biological situation by the US Naval Medical Research Center

### NMRC

#### Declared objectives

1. Biomedical research for the health and survival of military personnel
2. Studying the impact of various factors on the health of submariners.
3. Exploring issues in the field of toxicology
4. Monitoring tropical infections and zoonoses
5. Analysing emerging infectious disease threats



US Naval Medical Research Center (Naval Medical Research Center)



Naval Health Research Center, NHRC, California



Naval Medical Research Unit 2, NAMRU-2 Phnom Penh, Cambodia



Naval Health Research Center, NHRC, California



Naval Medical Research Unit 3, NAMRU-3 Sigonella, Italy



Naval Health Research Center, NHRC, California



Naval Medical Research Unit 6, NAMRU-6 Lima, Peru



Naval Health Research Center, NHRC, California



## The U.S. Army's Walter Reed Institute's connection to the DTRA and Metabiota

**'Study on the incidence of selected arthropod-borne diseases in western Ukraine'**

**'...Statistical collection specialist: Daniella Clark, MSc, Department of Preventive Medicine, U.S. Army Walter Reed Army Institute of Research...'**

**'...Partner is Gavin Brownstein (Dr.), U.S. Army Walter Reed Army Institute of Research...'**

**'...Project Supervisor - Mr Troy Baker, US MOD / Defense Threat Reduction Agency'**

**Address: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR)...**

## The Ebola epidemic in West Africa in 2014



**28,000 cases**

**more than 11,000 dead**

Metabiota

**The government of Sierra Leone and the World Health Organization appeal for Metabiota's help in the wake of the Ebola outbreak in West Africa in late March 2014**

(<https://www.kqed.org/futureofyou/124506/san-francisco-based-metabiota-bungled-ebola-response-ap-finds>)

## Report of the international expert group

**Ebola Virus Disease Outbreak, Sierra Leone – Laboratory Response**

**Viral Hemorrhagic Fever Consortium**

**1.0 Abstract**

**2.0 Background**

**3.0 Laboratory Preparedness**

**4.0 Sample Processing**

**5.0 Risk Evaluation**

**6.0 PCR-based Diagnosis**

**7.0 Results of data testing**

**8.0 VHFV traditional PCR assay**

**9.0 PCR inhibition**

**10.0 Controls**

**11.0 PCR panel refinement**

**12.0 Results**

**13.0 Conclusions**

'...If Metabiota does cultivate blood cells from patients with confirmed Ebola virus disease in the laboratory, we suggest that such activities be stopped immediately, particularly given the high biosafety concerns associated with culturing live Ebola virus cells and the existing problems with false positives that potential laboratory airborne contacts can generate...'

## Operation of Metabiota in Kenya, Uganda

**Metabiota's Response to Sources Sought**

**FOR POTENTIAL SOURCES CAPABLE OF PROVIDING INFECTIOUS DISEASE TRAINING FOR PHYSICIANS ON SITE IN UGANDA AND KENYA**

**Solicitation Number: W11WWE15R0010**  
**CAGE Code: 565P4**  
**DUNS number: 828131156**

**Small US Business**  
**Metabiota, Inc.**

**One Sutter Street, Suite 600 San Francisco, CA 94104**

**Metabiota personnel delivering training certificates in Uganda**

**Metabiota's Adaptive Organization Structure**

From examining USAMRIID's sources sought, it is clear that one of the key program milestones required for sustainable disease training in East Africa would be the challenging political instability and cultural sensitivities, as well as the country's Human Resources capabilities ranging from sufficient to nearly nonexistent. However, Metabiota has experience overcoming geographic and disciplinary constraints to public health protection by developing multidisciplinary collaborations and establishing systems for procurement and data sharing and integration across institutions through various programs.

For example, under PREDICT, to gain as much country buy-in and acceptance as possible, as well as ensure sustainability, we studied locally and developed partnerships with national ministries of health and other stakeholders. We performed an early gap analysis to determine the required deployment of personnel, training, equipment, and supplies. As a result, we successfully executed program activities for PREDICT with our partners, where few US government-funded entities have been successful. We were able to function in an integrating entry on the selected foreign ground and supported national surveillance systems, making results into action, as is evidenced by how we demonstrated our ability to build trusting relationships with the host country's in-country staff who were required to serve on national disease task forces. We provided technical and expert assistance for several high-profile disease

'For potential sources capable of providing infectious disease training for physicians on site in Uganda and Kenya'

'Metabiota personnel delivering training certificates in Uganda'

## Transfer of African Metabiota projects to the HEADA non-profit company

**PRESS RELEASE**

**FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE**

**CONTACT: MR UBALD TAMOUFE, PRESIDENT AND FOUNDER, HEADA: UTAMOUFE.HEADA@GMAIL.COM OR +237 222229175**

**CAMEROON-BASED NON-PROFIT HEADA ACQUIRES METABIOTA**

*After more than a decade operating in Africa, US-based Metabiota Inc. transfers ownership and control of public health projects to national organizations.*

**YAOUNDE, OCTOBER 14, 2022** – The Cameroonian non-profit organization Health and Development in Action (HEADA) today announced its acquisition of Metabiota, Inc., a leading US-based organization dedicated to global health and to mitigating the risk of pandemics.

**HEADA will immediately take over projects in HIV prevention, avian and human influenza surveillance, and pandemic preparedness in Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sierra Leone. Funders of this work include the US Department of Defense, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and USAID...**

The transfer of Metabiota to HEADA aligns with the US government's vision of "localization," strengthening local capacities and ownership in low- and middle-income countries out of a recognition that local actors are best positioned to drive their country's development.

Ubaldo Tamoufe, President of HEADA and a trained bioengineer, has worked in the region on public health projects for more than three decades, including as Metabiota's Director in Africa and most recently as Metabiota, Inc. CEO.

"This transfer demonstrates the willingness of Metabiota leadership to recognize the importance of local ownership and sustainability," said Tamoufe. "Building on almost twenty-five years of exceptional impact by the Metabiota team, we look forward to developing new opportunities here in the region and elsewhere to strengthen local health systems to improve overall public health."





# Possible operational risks of US laboratories with BSL-4, BSL-3+ biosafety levels

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## Information on biological laboratories (BSL-4 and BSL-3+). Royal College of London report (Global Biolabs, 2023)



Global Biobanks

Figure 3: Grouping metrics by country

Category	Sub-Category	Specific	USA	Canada	UK	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	Sweden	Denmark	Netherlands	Belgium	Austria	Switzerland	Poland	Czech	Slovak	Hungary	Slovenia	Croatia	Serbia	Bulgaria	Romania	Greece	Turkey	Israel	India	China	Japan	South Korea	Singapore	Malaysia	Thailand	Philippines	Indonesia	Vietnam	Myanmar	Burma	Laos	Cambodia	Timor-Leste	Moldova	Ukraine	Belarus	Poland	Czech	Slovak	Hungary	Slovenia	Croatia	Serbia	Bulgaria	Romania	Greece	Turkey	Israel	India	China	Japan	South Korea	Singapore	Malaysia	Thailand	Philippines	Indonesia	Vietnam	Myanmar	Burma	Laos	Cambodia	Timor-Leste	Moldova	Ukraine	Belarus																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																			
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### Chapter 1: New and Updated Trends in Global BSL4 Lab Data

Key Message:  
BSL4 labs are rapidly  
increasing in number

BSL4 labs that were in operation, under construction or planned in 23 countries. By the beginning of 2023, that number had increased by ten to 69 labs. There are 51 BSL4 labs in operation, three under construction, and 15 planned all spread over 27 countries. The number of BSL4 labs around the world has grown since the last report.

Philippines, and Singapore. India alone has announced plans to build four more BSL4 labs in addition to the two it currently has. For five of these countries, this will be their first BSL4 lab. The largest concentration of BSL4 labs remains in Europe, with 26 BSL4 labs, one of which is under construction in the United Kingdom and one of which is planned in Spain. Asia has 20 BSL4 labs, 11 of which are planned in China, India, Kazakhstan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and Japan. North America has 15, one of which is under construction in the United States and two of which are planned in Canada and the United States. China has four BSL4 labs, all operational.

'Key message: BSL4 labs are rapidly increasing in number. In 2021, we identified 59 BSL4 labs that were in operation, under construction, or planned in 23 countries. By the beginning of 2023, that number had increased by ten to 69 labs. There are 51 BSL4 labs in operation, three under construction, and 15 planned all spread over 27 countries.'

## BSL-3+ biolaboratories are not reported in the annual BWC reports

Comparison of BWC reports for the United States of America, showing the absence of BSL-3+ biolaboratory data.

Each report includes a table with the following columns: Measure, Building in Active, Building in Active, Year of last information on active, and Year of last information on active.

The reports show that BSL-3+ biolaboratories are not reported in the annual BWC reports.






# Deterioration of the epizootic situation for avian influenza

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## UP-4 Project

### UP-4 PROJECT

Study of the spreading highly dangerous pathogens through migratory birds







## P444 Project

### P444 PROJECT

Monitoring of Avian influenza, Newcastle disease, Paramyxoviruses along wild birds from Azova-Black Sea region



## Epizootic situation of highly pathogenic avian influenza in Russia



**РОССЕЛЬХОЗНАДЗОР**  
Федеральная служба по ветеринарному и фитосанитарному надзору

**Сводные картографические данные хронологии неблагополучия в РФ по особо опасным и экономически значимым болезням животных**

– Высокопатогентный грипп птиц – по данным ВОЗЖ на 18 мая, в 2023-м году зарегистрировано 32 вспышки ВГП в РФ, в т.ч. 5 – среди домашней, 27 – среди дикой и декоративной птицы. На отчетную дату неоздоровленными остаются 29 очагов. Кроме этого, в ВОЗЖ не подана вспышка ВГП в Херсонской области, заболевание выявлено в Биосферном заповеднике Аскания Нова среди страусов.

**МЭР МОСКВЫ**  
**РАСПОРЯЖЕНИЕ**

17 мая 2023 г. N 283-РМ

Об установлении ограничительных мероприятий (карантин) на территории города Москвы

В связи с возникновением 16 мая 2023 г. случая заболевания азиатского высокопатогентного гриппа птиц на территории района Братское города Москвы, руководствуясь Законом Российской Федерации от 14 мая 1993 г. № 4979-1 «О ветеринарии»:

- Определить:
  - 1.1. **Эпизоотическим очагом** – территорию земельного участка, ограниченного Бесединским шоссе и земельными участками с кадастровыми номерами 77:05:0012007.2, 77:05:0012007.2493, 77:05:0012007.2493, 77:05:0012007.47.
  - 1.2. **Угрожаемой зоной** – территорию следующих районов города Москвы: Братское, Капотня, Марьино, Люблино, Печатники, Москворечье-Сабурово, Царицыно, Бирюлево Восточное, Орехово-Борисово Северное, Орехово-Борисово Южное, Таганское.
  - 1.3. **Зоны наблюдения** – территорию города Москвы, примыкающую к угрожаемой зоне.
- Установить ограничительные мероприятия (карантин) в пределах эпизоотического очага, угрожаемой зоны и зоны наблюдения, указанных в пункте 1 настоящего распоряжения, на срок до выполнения мероприятий, направленных на недопущение распространения и ликвидацию очага высокопатогентного гриппа птиц, предусмотренных Ветеринарными правилами осуществления профилактических, диагностических, ограничительных и иных мероприятий, установленных в отношении карантинных и иных ограничений, направленных на предотвращение распространения и ликвидацию очагов высокопатогентного гриппа птиц, утвержденными приказом Министерства сельского хозяйства Российской Федерации от 24 марта 2021 г. № 158 «Об утверждении Ветеринарных правил





# Confirmed cases of biosecurity breaches in the US

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## Publications on the website of the Intercept US non-profit news organisation about biosecurity breaches

The Intercept

- In 2013, a researcher at Kansas State University in Manhattan, Kansas, pricked their finger while drawing blood from a chicken infected with H5N1 avian influenza. The scientist had handed a used syringe to an assistant while trying to get a better grasp of the

**'In 2013, a researcher at Kansas State University in Manhattan, Kansas, pricked their finger while drawing blood from a chicken infected with H5N1 avian influenza.'**

that had been infected with SARS four days earlier. In a letter to NIH, a biosafety specialist argued that the frequency of escapes was due to the "complex research taking place at our institute" rather than a failure of training, noting that several teams at the university use a breed of transgenic mouse known for its unpredictable behavior. After the SARS-infected mouse darted under lab equipment, researchers cornered it with a broom and returned it to its cage. The University of North Carolina did not respond to a request to comment.

- In 2018, a researcher at the Food and Drug Administration's Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research in Silver Spring, Maryland, contracted a MRSA infection, a condition that can become severe if left untreated, after working with the antibiotic-resistant bacteria MRSA in the lab. The researcher

**'In 2018, a researcher at the Food and Drug Administration's Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research in Silver Spring, Maryland, contracted a MRSA infection...'**

experiments with the H3N2 flu virus without proper equipment. A student spilled a test tube containing a small amount of virus, potentially exposing five people. None were initially wearing masks. (Two later put them on to clean up the spill.) H3N2 is a seasonal flu virus and not considered a dangerous pathogen, but in an email to Tufts, an administrator at NIH highlighted a series of omission and errors. These included the lab's failure to provide personal protective equipment, a lack of proper safety signage, and the failure of researchers to seek appropriate medical care after being exposed to the virus. The NIH administrator also recommended that the principal investigator be retrained. Tufts declined to comment.

## Publications on the website of the ProPublica American non-profit news organisation about biosecurity breaches

Here Are Six Accidents UNC Resea

Here Are Six Accidents UNC Researchers Had With Lab-Cre

Here Are Six Accidents UNC Researchers Had With Lab-Created Cor

ProPublica Local Initiatives Data Store

PROPUBLICA Graphi

Racial Justice Education Health Care



CORONAVIRUS

## Here Are Six A Researchers H Coronaviruse

There have been mouse bites and spill genetically altered coronaviruses at a Chapel Hill.

by Alison Young and Jessica Blake for ProPublica



Six accidents with lab-created coronaviruses at biosafety level 3 labs between Jan. 1, 2015 and J

PROPUBLICA

Here Are Six Accidents UNC Researchers Had With Lab-Created Coronaviruses

**August 2015:** Two researchers required medical monitoring after a mouse escaped inside one of UNC's biosafety level 3 labs. The mouse, which had been infected with an undisclosed type of "mouse adapted" virus, squirmed free from a researcher's gloved hand and onto the lab floor. It was caught inside the lab

**'...Three workers were placed on medical surveillance for 10 days...'**

temperatures and any symptoms twice a day. Neither was sickened.

**October 2015:** Three UNC researchers were potentially exposed to an undisclosed type of "mouse adapted" virus when a shallow container fell to the floor of a biosafety level 3 lab, spilled and potentially created aerosolized droplets. NIH officials told ProPublica the incident involved a type of SARS-associated coronavirus. Even though the three researchers in the lab at the time were wearing safety gear and powered air-purifying respirators, university safety officials deemed it a "potential exposure." The workers were placed on medical surveillance for 10 days. No one was sickened.

**November 2015:** Two UNC lab workers were potentially exposed to a lab-created type of MERS coronavirus when an empty cage with contaminated animal bedding spilled on the floor of a biosafety level 3 lab. A researcher was in the process of transferring MERS-infected mice to a clean cage when the dirty cage was knocked over. The two workers in the UNC lab at the time of the incident left and all aerosolized particles from the incident to settle to the ground before returning to decontaminate the area. Even though the two workers were wearing head-to-toe protective gear and powered respirators, the incident was deemed a potential exposure.

**'...Two workers were placed on medical surveillance for 10 days after working with laboratory animals in the vivarium...'**

gloves and allowed the wound to bleed for a minute before washing her hands with soap and water for five minutes. She was evaluated at UNC's employee occupational health clinic where the medical director discussed options for isolating the researcher. Instead, "the researcher was required to wear a surgical mask while in public and at work" and to report her temperature and any symptoms twice a day. The reports note the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention was also alerted because the virus involved in the incident is on a list of dangerous pathogens that are federally regulated. The report says "updates were provided to the CDC throughout the medical monitoring period." The researcher was not sickened.

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Here Are Six Accidents UNC Researchers Had With Lab-Created Coronaviruses

**April 2017:** A plate containing virus from lung samples from a mouse infected with an undisclosed type of virus was dropped by a researcher in a biosafety level 3 lab, spilling a small amount of virus material onto an incubator door and the floor. While UNC wouldn't disclose the virus's name, NIH told ProPublica that it was a type of

**'...A UNC scientist underwent 14 days of self-quarantine at home after a mouse bite...'**

Further information about the workers' health was included in the incident reports.

**April 2020:** A UNC scientist underwent 14 days of self-quarantine at home after a mouse bite caused potential exposure to a strain of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, that had been adapted for growth in mice. The incident in a biosafety level 3 lab happened when a researcher attempted to read the ID number on a tag on a mouse's ear. The mouse flipped over in the researcher's hand and bit an index finger through two layers of gloves. It did not appear to break the researcher's skin, but UNC told NIH in its reports that "given the uncertainty surrounding the exposure, we are treating this as a medium/high risk exposure." The researcher was instructed to self-quarantine and do twice-daily temperature checks. UNC also notified the local Health Department. No further information about the worker's health was included in the incident reports.

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# Research on vectors of dangerous infectious diseases in US DOD research organisations

7

## Official statement of the World Health Organisation

World Health Organisation

Yellow fever


21 May 2022

Key facts

- Yellow fever is a viral haemorrhagic fever caused by the yellow fever virus (YFV).
- YFV is transmitted by infected mosquitoes.
- YFV is found in 34 countries in Africa and 12 countries in Central and South America.
- YFV is a major public health problem in many parts of Africa and South America.
- YFV is a leading cause of death in many parts of Africa and South America.
- YFV is a major cause of death in many parts of Africa and South America.

'...A modelling study based on African data sources estimated the burden of yellow fever during 2013 was 84,000–170,000 severe cases and 29,000–60,000 deaths...'

## Number of publications over the period of 1992–2022



## Obtaining populations of new vectors

Ebola

Severe acute respiratory syndrome

Human Immunodeficiency Virus

Microfilaria Brugia malayi

Hepatitis B

Hepatitis B

Microfilaria Brugia malayi

## US DOD scientific organisations studying vectors



## Applied research with vector-borne pathogens of dangerous infectious diseases





