The
views expressed are those of the
Author
and not necessarily those of the
UK
Ministry of Defence
Henry
Plater-Zyberk January 2000
Yel'tsin's
Last Call
Boris
Nikolayevich Yel'tsin resigned on 31 January 1999, after nine years in
the Kremlin, as Russia's first ever elected leader.His
departure, described by many politicians and commentators as timely and
with style, was probably his, and his close family's, last chance to escape
a legal onslaught by his political opponents in the years ahead. The charges
he would have had to face include:
-His
assault on the parliament in 1993, including an investigation into whether
he ignoredhis opponents' preparations
for armed resistance tobe able to
destroy them usingmilitary force,
- The
legality of the assault on Chechnya in 1994 and his responsibility, as
the commander in chief for the chaos and the losses incurred by Russian
troops,
-Funding
of his political and electoral campaign in the 1996 elections.The
case of the two Yel'tsin campaign workers detained carrying a large sum
of money would also be reopened,
-His
links with various members of the Russian kleptocracy and resulting financial
benefits for him and his family.Thischarge
could emerge indirectly as a result ofan
investigation of some of Yel'tsin's benefactors, who would not hesitate
to cooperate with the new authorities to save their own skin,
-Another
legal challenge to the Belovez agreement which spelled the end of the USSR
in 1991.
Irrespective
of the legal merits of such accusations, the investigations would shorten
Yel'tsin's life and could have unpredictable consequences for the members
of his family. Only the next president could save him, after his retirement,
from the ignominy of court appearances, lengthy investigations and possible
legal sanctions to some of his family. And the only potential viable candidate
willing to protect the Yel'tsins is Vladimir Putin.
Putin
is, as a result of a decisive intervention in Chechnya, currently the most
popular Russian politician.His
hastily organised "presidential" party "Unity" came second in the December
parliamentary election largely due to his, not Yel'tsin's, popularity.Vladimir
Putin was also lucky that in contrast with his predecessors, Yel'tsin did
not meddle in his prime ministerial "business" or, envious of his popularity,
fire him unexpectedly at a time when the Russian victory in Chechnya was
almost assured. In addition the prices of oil and gas have been going up
for the last few months slightly, if only temporarily, slowing down Russia's
economic slide.
Yel'tsin's
self-preservation instinct, and probably his close entourage, told him
that Putin's is his only ticket to a peaceful retirement but that his present
popularity would by no means guarantee his victory in full-term presidential
elections in June. Unity is still a political Potemkin village headed by
the efficient, non-controversial Minister of Emergency Situations Sergey
Kuzhugetovich Shoygu, who has, until recently, stayed out of politics,
and a heavy-weight wrestling champion and political light-weight Aleksander
Petrovich Karelin. Yel'tsin's increasingly erratic behaviour, rapidly deteriorating
health, his family involvement in the decisionmaking process at the highest
level and Russia's uncertain economic future could all have reduced Putin's
electoral chances. It therefore made sense for Yel'tsin to retire before
June, automatically making Putin Acting President, in control of the well
funded, large presidential apparatus, with "his" party and also able to
count on support from his former party Our Home Is Russia. This puts Putin
in a practically unbeatable position in the election, now scheduled for
26 March.His position could be strengthened
even further if one of the presidential hopefuls Yevgeniy Primakov, not
known for supporting likely losers, in this case himself, pulls out of
the race.There are already signs
that various politicians who would have been happy to work against Yel'tsin
are looking with expectation at Putin's camp.
Vladimir
The Secretive
Vladimir
Vladimirovich Putin was born on 7 October 1952 in Leningrad.He
graduated in 1975 from the University of Leningrad with a Law Degree.His
unwillingness to provide any information about his parents may come from
wanting to protect them from the world's media but it may also mean that
one or both of them may have been linked with the predecessor of the organisation
a 23 year old Vladimir Putin joined in 1975, the KGB.He
joined the most prestigious First Chief Directorate (FCD) which was responsible
for intelligence gathering.Putin's
degree was from one of the top Soviet universities and yet by 1975 various
Soviet establishments of higher education were producing young men far
better prepared for intelligence work than he.What
made the KGB recruiters look at young Vladimir Putin in addition to his
academic record and extracurricular activities?By
1975 the organisation recruited mainly graduates with various international
studies degrees, especially from the Moscow State Institute of International
Relations and Eastern Studies Institute, graduates from technical universities
such as the Bauman Institute and linguists. Putin most probably spoke German,
either because he took the subject seriously during his secondary and university
education, or had lived in Germany for a while and was recommended by someone
from within the organisation.
After
completing courses at the KGB intelligence school he was allocated to the
4th Department in the FCD responsible for both Germanies and
Austria.His first and the only known
foreign assignment was to the GDR, where he worked on recruiting West German
businessmen visiting the GDR and GDR citizens who wanted to leave the country.
For his endeavours in 1988 Putin received the East German Order of Merit[1].
In total he must have spent 6-8 years in the GDR and the rest of his time
in the HQ in Yasenevo.
At
the end of the 80s the large contingent of KGB officers stationed in the
Warsaw Pact countries was gradually being recalled to the USSR and it was
not always easy to find them jobs.This
was when Vladimir Putin returned to Leningrad, where he worked as assistant
to the rector of Leningrad University responsible for foreign relations.
The university job was a KGB position.We
will probably never know whether his next step into the position of adviser
to the Chairman of the Leningrad City Council was a KGB attempt to plant
one of their own men near increasingly unruly politicians in the City Hall
or, disillusioned with the chaos in the Soviet political leadership, Putin
partially opted out when it was possible (KGB officers were not retired
prematurely but were allowed to transfer into the reserve).
When
in May 1990 Anatoliy Sobchak, lawyer and a new-democrat with good links
to the law enforcement agencies, became the Chairman of the City Council
Vladimir Putin quickly became Leningrad's foreign affairs man. The city
and region, in which 75% of industry worked for the military industrial
complex and only a few enterprises would survive the political and economic
changes, needed foreign investment. Putin was responsible for, among other
things, attracting investment and issuing export licences for local companies.
At the time all this was a new experience for everyone in Russia and there
were few legal guidelines on which the Soviet enterprises,Soviet/Russian
citizensand the foreigners dealing
with the USSR could rely.In the
new game of supply and demand, inexperienced Soviet partners, contractors,
clients and suppliers were frequently coming off worst.In
1990 a group of Leningrad City Councillors led by Marina Salye and Yuriy
Gladkov conducted an investigation of export licences issued by Putin.
The licences permitted their holders to export raw materials and non ferrous
metals. The councillors accused Putin of "ineffective use of his powers".They
demanded that Sobchak dismiss Putin. Sobchak refused because the accusers
were not able to provide any proof of illegalities committed by Putin,
and the accusation was eventually dropped.
In
the meantime Putin became the Chairman of the Foreign Liaison Committee
of the, by then renamed, St Petersburg Town Hall. In 1993 he also became
the head of the mayor's operational commission, which made him Sobchak's
chief of staff.Without relinquishing
his position as the head of the Foreign Liaison Committee Vladimir Putin
became in 1994 the First Deputy Chairman of St Petersburg City Council.
Until June 1997 he was also the Chairman of the St Petersburg Regional
Council of"Our Home Is Russia".
In
the June 1996 local election Anatoliy Sobchak lost his seat and Vladimir
Putin was "head hunted" to Moscow, where he was given a job as deputy to
the head of the president's private office Pavel Borodin. Putin's performance
in the Kremlin must have been highly regarded because on March 26 1997
he was appointed Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration and Chief
of the Control Commission of the Presidential Administration.At
the beginning of March 1997 Yel'tsin's most trusted supporter, another
member of the Leningrad group, Anatoliy Chubays, who until then held the
position of Head of the Presidential Administration, had been given the
job of First Deputy Prime Minister responsible for Russia's economy. His
deputy, another Leningradian, Aleksey Kudrin, had become the first deputy
Minister of Finance. Putin was brought in to take Kudrin's position and
de facto to run the administration because its new head was a former journalist
Valentin Yumashev, whom Yel'tsin treated a like surrogate son, but who
had neither qualifications nor experience to do the job.Putin's
legal qualifications and hard work were recognised quickly and three months
later he also became a member of the economic security commission of the
Security Council of the Russian Federation.
In
November 1997 Yel'tsin rewarded Viktoria Mitina, one of his staunchest
Moscow electoral campaigners, with a position as the First Deputy Head
of the Presidential Administration.The
new arrangement did not function effectively and she was replaced at the
end of May 1998 by Vladimir Putin. At the same time Putin's position as
the Chief of the Control Commission of the Presidential Administration
was given to Nikolay Platonovich Patrushev, a professional counterintelligence
officer who joined the KGB in Leningrad in 1974.Putin
was also nominated as a member of the Presidential Temporary Commission
for Reinforcing Fiscal and Budgetary Discipline.At
that stage the president more than ever needed well organised, qualified
and obedient disciplinarians.Anatoliy
Chubays had failed to save Russia's economy. Although in February 1998
he sounded upbeat about Russia's financial situation Yel'tsin publicly
demanded a tough tax policy, an investors protection plan and a realistic
1998 budget. By the time Putin became First Deputy Head of the Presidential
Administration in May 1998 the financial crash was only three months away.
Yet even when on 15 July 1998 he was given yet another function, the head
of the presidential commission preparing agreements on separation of jurisdiction
and plenipotentiary powers between federal and local authorities, he was
still relatively little known.
He
hit the headlines on 26 July, the day after Yel'tsin nominated him Director
of the Federal Security Service (FSS), the largest restructured component
of the old KGB. The Russian and foreign media knew very little about the
new boss of the FSS and latched on to his past in the KGB and his less
than cuddly media image, relying largely on comments by Moscow's and St
Petersburg's chattering classes and the reputation of the organisation
for which Putin officially worked for 14 years.The
KGB was regarded as one of the principal villains of the communist period
and those working for it were usually tarred with the same brush, irrespective
of the directorate they worked for.Vladimir
Putin kept his FSS job until 9 August 1999 when Boris Yel'tsin made him
Acting Prime Minister. (His FSS position was given to N P Patrushev.)In
the meantime he became a permanent member of the Security Council at the
beginning of October 1998, and at the end of March 1999 the Secretary of
the Council. His position as the head as the FSS gave him also a seat on
the Interdepartmental State Defence Orders Commission.In
December 1998 he also joined the Board of trustees of the International
Antidiscrimination Fund.
From
Acting Prime Minister to Acting President
In
contrast with some of his predecessors, Putin showed no signs of eager
enthusiasm or servility during his first televised meeting with Boris Yel'tsin.[2]
He leaned slightly back in his armchair with both his feet and the palms
of his hands turned inwards, which looked like a modified version of judo
post-training relaxation technique[3].With
Yel'tsin's track record of hiring and firing his prime ministers at will
this looked almost like insolence.
No-nonsense,
quietly spoken, with the certainty of a man who could carry a big stick
if he wanted to, Putin was almost immediately popular in Russia and much
less so abroad.His predecessor,
Sergey Stepashin, trained in the Military Political Academy and was an
impressive public speaker. Putin is not an inspiring public speaker but
he is very impressive at smaller meetings where he shows attention to detail,
a good memory and gets straight to the point. He is also a polite host
and an attentive listener[4].The
PR-obsessed"Western" media commented
frequently about the new Russian prime minister's lack of charisma.And
yet Russian and other TV (often voiceless) broadcasts showed Putin's immediate
underlings listening to him very attentively, visibly concerned and sometimes
worried.He did nothing to upset
Yel'tsin's sensitive political nature, paying his boss occasional lip service
and even during official visits around Russia and abroad keeping a low
profile. Had he not been supported publicly by Yel'tsin he would probably
have been given less friendly treatment by world politicians and the media.The
industrial democracies felt apprehensive about his past and lack of electoral
grin but on the other hand they were prepared to support him, for the time
being at least, for the same reason they supported Yel'tsin: because all
his opponents look less attractive and with the exception of Yevgeniy Primakov
far less efficient.
What
can we expect from Vladimir Putin?
As
far as the Russian voters are concerned, Putin's past is an advantage and
not an impediment in his political career.Yuriy
Andropov, the former head of the KGB and briefly the General Secretary
of the CPSU, is probably still the most popular leader of the communist
period[5].
The democratic credentials of Russia's greatest national hero Peter the
Great are very modest and those who in the last decade briefly threatened
Boris Yel'tsin's rule, Zhirinovskiy, Zyuganov and Lebed', became popular
thanks to their radical if somewhat imprecisely stated programmes.
Those
wishing to accuse Putin of collaboration with communism will face a difficult
task. There are no indications that Vladimir Putin worked for any other
KGB branch than the 1st Chief Directorate responsible for intelligence.He
did not take part in suppression of dissent, he was responsible for getting
other nations' secrets: that is OK by the average Russian voter.He
spent his career in the most efficient and the most prosperous Warsaw Pact
member, the GDR.For many Russians
the GDR was what communism should have been like.Putin
also had to cooperate with the East German intelligence and security services,
among the world's most effective.
All
this must have left a psychological imprint on the new Acting President.He
witnessed not only the disappearance of the whole partner security service
and his working environment, but the fragmentation and decimation of his
own service and the whole USSR.Then
he saw Anatoliy Sobchak trying to build his own mini-empire in St Petersburg
and Yel'tsin desperately hanging to the imperial chaos of his own creation.
He witnessed from close quarters how a country should not be run[6]
and probably has his own idea how it should be done.
One
of the issues which will complicate relations between Western leaders and
Putin is a generally held, naïve belief, among democratic nations,
that Russia's problems can be solved democratically.That
is not a view shared by most Russians. Putin will have to use drastic measures
to deal with some of these problems quickly and official criticism from
foreign capitals could provoke strong reactions in Moscow.The
period in which Russia listens to foreigners telling it how to behave is
probably over.
Before
and after the March election
Having
control of the vote counting machinery through the Federal Agency of Government
Communication (FAPSI) Vladimir Putin has no reason to fear any irregularities
in the vote counting in the March election.However,
he does depend on the average Russian voter. He can afford to lose Moscow,
although St Petersburg will probably vote for him.His
pre-electoral task is to convince all the other voters that he means business.
And the average voter will care very little whether he is popular abroad
(near or far) or whether he has unblemished democratic credentials. What
the average voter expects him to do is:
-To
win decisively the Chechen conflict,
-To
establish law and order around the country,
-To
deal with the most glaring cases of corruption,
-To
control the kleptocrats and limit their political influence,
-To
pay, on time, salaries with realistic purchasing powers,
-To
make Russia a power which other countries would respect, and if they are
not willing to respect it they must fear it.
Putin
will not be judged by the methods used to achieve these goals as long as
he is seen going reasonably quickly in the right direction.
He
could lose the election only in the unlikely event that the losses at the
end of the conflict in Chechnya, which he must win decisively before the
end of March, grow dramatically; if at the same time the rich media owners
who are bound to be the target of his unwelcome attention after the election
unite against him, projecting an unfavourable image of him throughout the
electoral campaign; if they temporarily undermine the economy of Russia
only to blame Putin for it; and finally were Putin to lose control over
the power structures.All these
factors would have to work simultaneously.Sniping
at the Acting President is already taking place and will continue, as it
does in every country with a political opposition and free media.The
attacks on Putin will be amplified abroad by foreign media looking for
catchy stories in a country riddled with controversies.At
the moment, however, Putin is politically bullet-proof and even large calibre
controversies should not dent his political armour.
Fortunately
for the Acting President the modern Russian boyars are preoccupied with
backstabbing and undermining each other. With the considerable powers at
his disposal Putin should have no difficulty in keeping them at it until
March.All he has to do until then
is to punish swiftly those of his direct and indirect subordinates who
make mistakes implementing his orders or commit any transgressions. The
transfers of Generals Troshev and Shamanov suggest that he intends to do
just that. He will also have to show a convincing plan to deal with low
and medium level crime, especially its violent version.He
can be expected to bring more discipline and more effective control at
every administrative level in the country. This would be similar to measures
introduced by Yuriy Andropov during his brief tenure as General Secretary
of the CPSU.
Coming
out from the shadow
If
Putin wins, the industrialised democracies and especially the USA and Europe
will have to accept that after 15 years of Gorbachev and Yel'tsin's generally
friendly pro-Western foreign policy, things may become much colder on the
international arena.Changes among
Putin's foreign policy advisers, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
the Ministry of Defence may indicate which direction Putin is going to
choose.
Moscow
will also want to keep the momentum of developing its armed forces. If
oil and gas prices continue to rise Russia might even be able to afford
some modest reforms. This may be done partly by resubordination of some
of the MVD units to the Ministry of Defence. Pampered and well financed
by Yel'tsin, the Ministry of Interior had its own alternative army which
could find itself reformed and reduced at various levels after the Chechen
conflict is over.Putin may also
attempt to merge some of the special services such as the FSS and FAPSI
and his own Security Directorate. It is doubtful whether he wants to bring
back the old system, but some of the measures he is likely to take might
look like it.
Directorate
General Development and Doctrine
Royal
Military Academy SandhurstCamberleyTelephone
: (44) 1276 412346
SurreyOr
412375
GU15
4PQFax
: (44) 1276 686880
EnglandE-mail: csrc.dgd&d@gtnet.gov.uk
http://www.ppc.pims.org/csrc
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