02 February 2000
Text: Secretary of State's Speech at Russian Diplomatic Academy
(Feb. 2: Chechnya, ABM Treaty changes, nonproliferation) (2,770) Moscow -- Russia and the United States have common interests and the basis for true cooperation on three key sets of issues -- nonproliferation, arms control and regional stability, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said February 2. "That is why our disagreement over Chechnya is so troubling," she continued. "No one questions Russia's responsibility and even obligation to combat insurgency and terror within its borders. But the world increasingly has questioned doing so at such a high cost in innocent human lives and suffering, and such a high cost to Russia's international standing." Albright was speaking at the Diplomatic Academy in Moscow. Warning that "military operations encourage the extremists," she added, "The Russia that chooses to pursue the political solution is the Russia that we hope to work with well into the 21st century." Albright began her speech by discussing the forces of globalization and the trend towards a multipolar world. From the U.S. perspective, she said, this "is a positive and welcome development." "A multipolar world of diversity and creativity among cultures, nations, and economies is the world we believe we can build, one that will enrich our lives, and thrives on habits of peace and creative competition," she said. "I am convinced that America and Russia have enough major interests in common to surmount our disagreements and work together in dealing with the biggest dangers and opportunities we face in the new century." To illustrate those common interests, Albright listed examples in the area of arms control -- preventing "loose nukes" and the spread of nuclear and ballistic missile technology to the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula and elsewhere; eliminating stockpiles of chemical weapons in Russia and the United States; strengthening the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); "walking India and Pakistan back from the nuclear precipice"; and bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force. The Secretary also sought to reassure her audience that the changes the United States is contemplating in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty are "modest." "They simply would not permit us to undermine Russia's deterrent, and we do not seek to do so. And because Russia and the United States are vulnerable to the same threats -- even if we sometimes perceive them differently -- we are prepared to cooperate with your government on missile defense." Albright stressed that "it is in our mutual interest to find a way to preserve the essential deterrent structure of the ABM Treaty, while responding to the new dangers we both face." Following is the text of her speech as released by the State Department: (begin text) Moscow, Russia February 2, 2000 Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright Speech at the Diplomatic Academy (as prepared for delivery) SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Rector Fokin, faculty and students; distinguished colleagues, guests and friends. It is a humbling experience to speak at the preeminent diplomatic academy in a nation whose diplomatic history dates back twice as far as the entire history of the United States. I was surprised to learn that I am one of only a few women ever to address this venerable institution. I trust that if I earn passing marks from you this morning, I will not be the last. It has been a decade now since the Cold War ended. That no longer seems like only yesterday. To the contrary, enough time has passed for the shape of the post-Cold War world to have become clearer: new realities, new problems, new opportunities. A world ever less defined by being "post"-anything; a new era in its own right. I was particularly struck by this a few days ago in Davos, where I participated in the meetings of the World Economic Forum. Here were gathered many of the world's leading political, corporate and intellectual figures -- a globalized international society on display. (I heard lots of Russian, incidentally, being spoken in the corridors.) Foreign and economic policy discussions blended seamlessly together. Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers and I actually shared the same platform, talking about each other's issues. This kind of joint public discussion by foreign and finance ministers would have been hard to imagine in past eras. And my colleague made a mind-bending prediction -- that two centuries from now, historians will view the Cold War's end as only the second most important event of the late 20th century. The first, in his view, being the explosion of economic growth across borders and around the world. To many of the high-tech participants, it seemed that international borders hardly mattered. Their cyberspace realm is inherently global, and the Internet on which they do business is inherently democratic and decentralized. This is the kind of world that might even be called "multipolar" -- a term with which you here in Russia are, I know, familiar. On this multipolar stage, the actors are advancing not only national goals, but also corporate, individual, and organizational agendas based on economic and other interests. Now I have heard it said -- sometimes in Russia -- that the strategy of the United States is to establish and enforce a "unipolar" world. But it is hard to pay attention to the trends and forces of globalization without observing the many "poles" that affect the way the world now works. This is unprecedented. And from the American perspective, it is a positive and welcome development. Of course, if advocates of a multipolar world envision a 19th rather than 21st century way of conducting our affairs, then we do have a disagreement. The issue is whether the "poles" that give the world its structure are in conflict or work in concert. The latter -- a multipolar world of diversity and creativity among cultures, nations, and economies -- is the world we believe we can build, one that will enrich our lives, and thrives on habits of peace and creative competition. In this new world, governments may not be the sole or even the dominant forces in international relations that we once took for granted. And yet they continue to have special responsibilities. Because many of the positive trends on which globalization is based -- maintaining the peace; strengthening democratic institutions; preserving an open international economic order -- depend on how well governments meet their responsibilities. Likewise, some of today's most worrisome international trends are in part a consequence of the difficulties governments face in finding the right strategies for dealing with them. Our Attorney General, Janet Reno, who visited here in October, has noted that in dealing with international organized crime, we are still heavily reliant on national tools. Pessimists about this new world argue that many of the positive trends I mentioned will in fact break down, because states face too many conflicting interests and too many irreparable rivalries to be able to cooperate even against problems that threaten them jointly. I do not agree with that defeatist assessment. And I would like to explain why I believe we must not -- and ultimately will not -- allow it to define the relationship between Russia and the United States. I am convinced that America and Russia have enough major interests in common to surmount our disagreements and work together in dealing with the biggest dangers and opportunities we face in the new century. As we look ahead to the first years of this new century, I hope that this is the practical approach we will bring to bear on three key sets of issues: nonproliferation; arms control; and regional stability. As to the first, the convergence of interests is clear. The Cold War's end lessened one great danger, but spawned others. One is that international arms dealers and shady middlemen would seek ways to sell nuclear materials, technology or expertise to dangerous clients. This has placed enormous pressure on all governments to enact and enforce a strict, modern system of export controls. Russia's new export control regime -- on paper -- is a solid start. But far more needs to be done to address this serious problem -- a commitment at all levels to better implementation, better enforcement, better control of exports. The logic of cooperation here is powerful. For in the parlance of our mainstream media, both of our countries share an interest in preventing any nukes from becoming "loose nukes." We both have an interest in preventing the spread of nuclear and ballistic-missile capabilities in the Middle East. The same is true on the Korean Peninsula and elsewhere. We both have an interest in eliminating the deadly stockpiles of chemical weapons that remain on Russian and U.S. soil. We both have an interest in an NPT Review Conference this April that makes this bedrock treaty a stronger instrument than ever against the spread of nuclear arms. We both have an interest in walking India and Pakistan back from the nuclear precipice, and in reinforcing the global norms that were challenged by those countries' nuclear blasts. We both have an interest in bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force, and in maintaining our respective moratoria on testing until we do. The list could go on; the logic is compelling. Russia and the United States have a host of powerful reasons to work together to prevent the spread of mass weapons and the missiles that can carry them. On many issues, we have done so. If we can continue to do so, we will make a major contribution to the security of both countries. But it will be a troubling sign that we see the world in very different ways if we don't. Even the most assiduous nonproliferation efforts will not be perfect. That reality obliges us also to consider how we respond to the emergence of new weapons capabilities. Here we must begin by acknowledging that the strategic environment has changed greatly over the past quarter-century. And we know that the technology required to launch longer-range missiles is spreading despite our best efforts to stop it. The U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals provide overwhelming deterrence against direct attack by any rational adversary. The problem is how to deal with threats from sources that are neither rational nor interested in complying with global norms. That is why discussion of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and America's plans for a National Missile Defense have figured prominently in my meetings here. An American decision on deploying a limited National Missile Defense system -- let me stress the word "limited" -- could be made as early as this summer. It has not yet been made. But for deployment to occur under the ABM Treaty, certain changes would be necessary. We have been discussing these changes with Congress, our allies and with you. Not long ago, a Russian defense official declared that your nation has the ability to overwhelm the missile defense system we are planning. That is true -- and part of our point. The changes we are contemplating in the ABM Treaty are modest. They simply would not permit us to undermine Russia's deterrent, and we do not seek to do so. And because Russia and the United States are vulnerable to the same threats -- even if we sometimes perceive them differently -- we are prepared to cooperate with your government on missile defense. In response, I hope Russia will do more than just say "Nyet." It is in our mutual interest to find a way to preserve the essential deterrent structure of the ABM Treaty, while responding to the new dangers we both face. One reason is the historic opportunity we have today to make further reductions in strategic arsenals. Almost three years ago, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed on the outlines of a START III Treaty that would cut our arsenals by 80 percent from their Cold War peaks. This was one of the subjects I discussed in this visit to Moscow. I hope we succeed, for such a treaty would be in both our nations' interests. It would make us safer by maintaining parity at lower levels. Moreover, nuclear weapons are expensive to maintain and safeguard. We should find ways openly to destroy and dispose of every one we don't need. This brings me to a third set of problems and interests common to both our countries: potential instabilities in the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. In each, the sources are similar: ethnic hatred, fanaticism, economic hopelessness and too little democracy. And the tensions they spawn create fertile breeding grounds for many forms of organized thuggery -- from trafficking in drugs and guns and women, to outright terrorism. In avoiding such developments, U.S. and Russian interests clearly coincide. We both have a clear stake in stability in Kosovo; in a Middle East transformed by peace; and in a lasting settlement of the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh. In each of these areas, Russia and the United States have worked together to seek sound solutions. Once, a comprehensive peace in the Middle East seemed all but unthinkable, in part because the United States and Russia were adversaries. Almost thirty years ago, we came all too close to war in this region. Yesterday, Foreign Minister Ivanov and I co-hosted the Multilateral Steering Group Ministerial. Our cooperation was easy because our interests coincide. In Kosovo, we had very strong disagreements but our nations knew they had an interest in ending conflict and ushering in an era of stability in the Balkans. Today, our soldiers serve alongside one another to give peace the best possible chance. On the diplomatic front, our two governments have been working through the OSCE Minsk Group to find a lasting solution to the very difficult problem of Nagorno-Karabakh. With our help, the leaders have made progress. Such cooperation illustrates how the United States and Russia can also work together with the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia. These sovereign states face the quadruple challenge of protecting their independence, creating modern political institutions, building prosperity, and maintaining stability. The fact that many of them border on a region to the south that has been an exporter of extremism and terror adds to the challenges they face. Russia and the United States have much to gain, and nothing to lose, from the success of the strategies that these states have chosen. These countries believe they need access to international markets for their exports, especially energy and natural resources; they want to be part of international institutions like the WTO and OSCE; and they seek normal, mutually beneficial relations with their neighbors. In summary, in each of the vital policy areas that I have just discussed, Russia and the United States have common interests. This means that there is a basis for true cooperation in each, even if differences seem at times to occupy center stage. That is why our disagreement over Chechnya is so troubling. No one questions Russia's responsibility and even obligation to combat insurgency and terror within its borders. But the world increasingly has questioned doing so at such a high cost in innocent human lives and suffering, and such a high cost to Russia's international standing. These tactics will not set the stage for building a peaceful, prosperous Chechnya within the Russian Federation. Only a political resolution of the conflict will do that. As long as the fighting continues, it will serve as a magnet for extremism that could one day risk the stability of the entire region. The Middle East peace process that we have so successfully advanced here in Moscow carries a powerful lesson. A commitment to political solutions empowers the peacemakers. Military operations encourage the extremists. The Russia that chooses to pursue the political solution is the Russia that we hope to work with well into the 21st century. This is a secure Russia with strong political institutions; a rock of stability in Europe and Asia; an engine of prosperity in the global economy; a vibrant and varied contributor to a multilateral world; and a source of inspiration to all who admire Russia's remarkable culture and history and believe in the power of human beings to change their individual and collective destinies. These may seem like dreams; but I am speaking to you of interests. For it is this Russia which will benefit most in world markets and international institutions. And it is this Russia with which the United States can work most effectively to meet the many challenges that confront both our nations. Thank you very much. (end text) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State)
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