Compendium

The Organizational Structure of Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programmes
CHAPTER II

THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF IRAQ'S PROSCRIBED WEAPONS PROGRAMMES

Early days of military industrialization

Iraq’s proscribed weapons programmes were integral parts of its military industries. During the period from 1968 to 1991, Iraq built a command-style economy suitable for waging a war. A major part of the economy both directly and indirectly supported military activity and weapons production. A very brief overview of the history of Iraq’s military industries is provided to illustrate their role, functioning and chain of command.

Iraq’s attempts to establish basic defence industries for the production of small arms and ammunition date back to before World War II. In the 1930’s, with British cooperation, Iraq established a few facilities to produce British designed rifles, machine guns and small arms ammunition. Following the overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq in 1958, Iraq decided to switch to producing Soviet rather than British designed military equipment. Until the Ba’ath Party take-over of power in 1968, little progress was made in developing the defence industries, which remained rudimentary and basic. In the four years following 1968, Iraq completed the industrial complexes at Musayyab for the production of Soviet designed SKS rifles, and the conversion of the Yarmuk State Establishment in Abu Ghraib for Soviet calibre small arms ammunition.

In 1972, after the Ba’athist government nationalized the oil sector of the economy and major industries in Iraq owned by foreign companies, oil revenues and assets required for modernization became available. According to Ba’ath Party ideology, Iraq’s economy needed modernisation, diversification and strengthening to more effectively support an expanded military. Underpinning such changes to the economic base was the requirement to improve the technology of Iraq’s main industries. This ambitious plan included the construction of new modern enterprises using foreign contractors and know-how, and was financed by the sale of Iraq’s oil. The technical modernization of Iraq’s armed forces was an integral part of this plan. A newly established state planning committee, chaired by then Vice President of Iraq, Saddam Hussein coordinated and supervised all industrial developments, including the establishment of military industries.

According to General Amer Al Sa’adi, Presidential adviser and a former senior deputy director of MIC: “it was during the 1970’s that the Iraqi government provided extra resources to the military, in an attempt to upgrade its weapons systems to counter these ever present threats (traditional threats from Iran and Israel). There was a 5-year plan directed at establishing the necessary structure to produce conventional weapons and conventional ammunitions (through licenses from other countries, commercial joint ventures and government-to-government agreements). The second objective was defined in a second 5-year plan later, to establish R&D in all disciplines in order to enhance the
productive capability – both horizontally and vertically – using already existing resources or defining new ones”.

To organize the construction of military industries, the Ministry of Industry of Iraq created the Military Industry Follow-Up and Executive Committee, FOLEX, which functioned as a co-ordination and advisory board rather than an administrative cell. Taha Yasin Ramadan, head of FOLEX and Minister for Industry at the time, in coordination with the Ministry of Defence, developed new military industrial complexes and revived those that had been formerly established, as a matter of priority. This became the foundation upon which Iraq’s military industrialization was built.

FOLEX oversaw the construction of a production complex for the manufacture of explosives, pyrotechnics, propellants and their ingredients and raw materials in Latifiyah, known as the Al Qaa Qaa State Establishment. This was Iraq’s largest military industrial complex, and was later instrumental in supporting Iraq’s chemical, nuclear and missile programmes. Another facility for testing and production of artillery ammunition and associated components, later known as the Al Hutteen State Establishment, was constructed at Iskandariyah. In order to expedite the establishment of military industries in Iraq, the Ministry of Industry created its own construction company, Al Saad, later known as the Al Fao General Establishment. The chemical weapons (CW) and biological weapons (BW) programmes as well as long-range missile systems at that stage were not part of this early military industrialization effort.

The first interest in CW was expressed by Iraq’s Ministry of Defence in 1971, when it established a chemical laboratory complex to obtain practical experience in the synthesis of chemical warfare agents. In 1973, the Arab-Israel war sparked further interest towards the acquisition of a chemical and biological warfare capability. In 1974, the Al Hazen Ibn Al Haitham Institute was created to conduct scientific, academic and applied research in the fields of chemistry, physics and microorganisms. The new organization was attached to the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, but was in reality affiliated to and run by the State Intelligence and Security Apparatus. It was also supported by the Ministry of Industry with regard to the construction of its infrastructure and the acquisition of necessary technology, equipment and materials.

**State Organization for Technical Industries**

In April 1974, FOLEX was reformed into the State Organization for Technical Industries (SOTI). SOTI was in charge of military industrial activities, while the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Heavy Industries were in charge of the civilian sector.

SOTI was created to oversee and coordinate the development of Iraq’s military industries and weapons programmes. It was run by a board of directors that included high-ranking officers.

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1 The Al Hazen Ibn Al Haitham Institute is discussed in greater detail in Chapter V: Iraq’s Biological Weapons Programme. It had facilities located in Salman Pak (biological and chemical forensic laboratories) and in Baghdad (electronics laboratories and the Headquarters).
representatives from the office of the President of Iraq, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Industry. Its organizational structure reflected the major directions of its activities that included artillery production, aerial weapons and air defence.

SOTI had some oversight and input into some WMD programmes, especially those relating to CW and long-range missiles, but provided much less direct support to the BW programme. After the Iran-Iraq war began in 1980, the CW programme became a top priority for SOTI. By a decision of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), these projects were given an extraordinary degree of authority. SOTI managed its establishments through the creation of multiple boards and committees. For example, a Board of Directors headed by a chairman was formed at the State Establishment for Pesticide Production (SEPP), later known as the Muthanna State Establishment (MSE), Iraq’s prime CW facility. The Board included members from SEPP/MSE and representatives from the Ministry of Defence (MoD), Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Higher Education and SOTI. Meetings were held to formulate the five-year plan.

In essence SEPP was run jointly by both the MoD and SOTI. For operational requirements relating to the production (types and quantities) of chemical weapons, SEPP was directed by the MoD and reported directly to the Minister. SOTI had responsibility for matters such as the budget, finance, procurement and construction, but in 1987, when the Board of Directors was abandoned and MSE was headed by a Director-General, it was placed under the authority of MIC.

The Technical Research Centre (TRC), which encompassed the BW programme, was created in 1985 (replacing the previously created Scientific and Technical Research Centre) as a research and development branch of the intelligence and security apparatus. The TRC was connected to the Presidential Secretariat Office and came under the direct supervision of General Hussein Kamel personally (as head of the intelligence and security apparatus) and although it cooperated with SOTI, it was technically outside its authority. SOTI was able to consolidate Iraq’s industrial capabilities and to use them for various weapons programmes. SOTI was transformed in August 1987 into the Military Industrialization Commission (MIC) headed by General Hussein Kamel. When General Hussein Kamel took over responsibilities for military industrialization in 1987, he also maintained his control over the intelligence and security apparatus, which included the TRC and thus, although the TRC was in theory under the auspices of the MIC, it reported directly to him as supervisor of MIC.

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2 The Technical Research Centre with its main location at Salman Pak is separate from the Scientific Research Council (SRC), which had its facilities mainly in Jadiriyah near Baghdad University and was abolished in November 1989.

3 Hussein Kamel was later promoted to the rank of Lt. General and was supervisor of MIC as one of his many ministerial responsibilities.
The Military Industrialization Commission (MIC)

Iraq promulgated the Law of Military Industrialization in August 1987. This new law created the Military Industrialization Commission (MIC) and disbanded the previous organization, SOTI. MIC has also been translated as ‘Military Industrialization Corporation, Organization of Military Industrialization (OMI), and Military Industrialization Organization (MIO); in Arabic it is “Hai’a attu al-Tasnia al-Askaree”. MIC’s structure comprised the headquarters and several dozen establishments, sites and offices around the country. In essence, much of Iraq’s economy was under the network of the military industrial complex controlled by MIC.

Chain of command and control

The all-encompassing control by MIC of all weapons programmes included two aspects: the decision-making process, and the security and control system. All formal decisions relating to Iraq’s weapons programmes required the endorsement and backing from the highest political level. This illustrated Iraq’s determination in this area. There were several documents devoted to weapons developments issued by the Revolutionary Command Council, chaired by the President. The implication was that the documents represented the expressed decisions of President Saddam Hussein himself. The chain of command in 1987, is illustrated in Figure II.I below.

Figure II.I Iraqi Chain of Command in 1987
As for control of weapons programmes, in most cases, the President’s inner circle of Ministers maintained a tight grip over experts, their work and achievements. The President or his representatives maintained all decision-making responsibilities through confidential reports submitted by managers, the security apparatus and special correspondents.

Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization

After the success of several projects carried out by SOTI and MIC that were critical for waging war with Iran, in particular the development of the CW programme and the modification of the foreign-procured SCUD-B missile into an extended range Al Hussein missile making it capable of reaching Tehran, the role of military industrialization grew further. In 1988, this resulted in General Hussein Kamel creating the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMI) by merging MIC with the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Light Industries. His close family connection (son-in-law) to the President of Iraq also facilitated the decision to create a “super” ministry that would consolidate all industrial capabilities available in Iraq.

All weapons-related activities came under the authority of MIMI. In addition to the CW programme and missile projects, these included the weaponisation part of Iraq’s nuclear programme and the BW programme run by the TRC. The organizational structure of Iraq’s military industries as of 1990 is shown in Figure II.II.

In 1990, MIMI supervised over 100 establishments, factories, plants and research centres in Iraq. Of these, some 35 facilities were directly involved in the research, development and production of various types of arms, including chemical and biological weapons and missile systems. The centralized management and structure of industries allowed Iraq to utilize all available industrial capabilities of the other establishments in support of ongoing weapons development and production.

Shortly after the 1991 Gulf war, MIMI was dissolved. The Ministry of Industry and Minerals was created and MIC was re-established as a separate agency with the remains of other military industrial establishments. A National Monitoring Directorate under MIC was created by Iraq to interact with UN inspectors.
Some 35 establishments, factories and research centres controlled by MIMI were directly involved in military work.

**Nuclear Programme:**
- Petrochemical Complex 3

**CW Programme:**
- Muthanna State Establishment

**BW Programme:**
- Technical Research Centre

**Missile Programme**
- Project BADR 2000; Al Hussein Missile, Project Ababil, Al Karama Project and others

**Administrative Supervision**
- Support
- Contracts
Military industries and human resources

The state-sponsored education and training of a national cadre of scientists, engineers and military officers was an integral part of the reforms introduced by the Iraqi Government in 1968. A core of military officers, who later became involved in and moved Iraq’s CW programme forward, was trained abroad in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s. The scope of foreign training was dramatically expanded in the mid 1970’s. The expansion occurred both in terms of educational profile involving advanced university degrees and doctorates in the areas of science and technology corresponding to developments of military industries in Iraq, and in the number of foreign countries that provided such training. The Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research and Iraqi security and intelligence agencies were usually involved in the organization of foreign training.

With the growth in recognition and prestige of the military industries in Iraq, SOTI recruited the most talented young officers, engineers and scientists. A career with the military industrialization complex provided solid social status, further educational opportunities, including studies abroad, and even exemption from regular military service during the Iran-Iraq war. The most dedicated young recruits formed a core of some one hundred top executives of Iraqi military industries by 1991. Characteristic steps in the career development of one of the managers of military industries can be illustrated by the following example: military officer, foreign training, researcher, head of department in a research branch of intelligence, director of establishment, head of weapons programme, to deputy minister. Iraq’s CW and BW programmes and proscribed missile projects had a workforce, which included over 2,000 managers, scientists and engineers.

In addition, several Iraqi military industrialization establishments and weapons programmes in the 1980s, especially missile projects, contracted foreign experts as consultants and even hired foreigners.

MIC was particularly active in the selection and recruitment of weapons experts. Correspondents from industrial organizations involved in the selection of new talent were placed in higher education and research establishments. Students were observed, interviewed and recruited by MIC or by other weapons-related institutions and organizations under the auspices of the security apparatus. Civilian enterprises were used as covers for the transfer of technology and procurement of weapons-related items.

The development of a project

After an idea for a project had emerged, higher authorities would make a formal decision to hire an expert or a group of experts. These specialists would be selected and recruited from academic or industrial sections or organizations. Experts would be tasked to provide a report to the higher authorities on all aspects of the project including objectives, required support, equipment, materials and budget. After its final evaluation by a senior manager, the report would be presented to President Saddam Hussein for his final approval. With the President’s consent, experts would then be given roles of project
managers and would be responsible for the entire project cycle, including procurement, personnel recruitment and scientific development. MIC would offer support, specialized companies and offices for the training and the selection of experts, procurement, financial requirements, security and logistical support.

Iraq’s policy with respect to its weapons programmes often involved competing projects in the same field of study and development. Such an approach had both advantages and disadvantages. In Iraq’s case, since it did not have an over-abundance of technical talent, this tactic resulted in spreading thinly the available resources rather than spurring achievement. Furthermore, the policy was severely skewed by clashes between individual managers and establishments, plagiarism, re-distribution of the expert manpower, appropriation of equipment and materials and waste of funds. Subsequently, multiple problems developed and specific projects sometimes failed. Nevertheless, Iraq’s past weapons programmes appeared to be generally coherent in terms of industrial and technical developments. Iraq gradually acquired necessary knowledge, know-how, expertise, technology, and infrastructure to develop weapons projects. MIC was undoubtedly responsible for this achievement.

Lieutenant General Hussein Kamel Hassan and MIC

Between 1987 and 1991, Lieutenant General Hussein Kamel Hassan (General Hussein Kamel) was the Minister of Industry and Military Industrialization. As this Ministry incorporated the Military Industrialization Commission (MIC), General Hussein Kamel became its supervisor. A Senior Deputy Minister for Military Industrialization Affairs assisted him, Lieutenant General Amer Hamudi Hasan Al Sa’adi with Lieutenant-General Engineer Amer Muhammad Rashid appointed as the Deputy Minister for Military Research and Development.

General Hussein Kamel had enormous influence on MIC’s activities and weapons programmes. In a political system where individuals can be very powerful, General Hussein Kamel quickly realized the wide range of opportunities available in the area of military industrialization. He actively engaged in absorbing and expanding industries under his control and promoted Iraq’s weapons capabilities. However, he had few technical qualifications and was ill-placed often to accurately judge the progress of a particular project.

As an illustration, he conveyed to the President that some specific programmes, such as production of the CW agent VX, were well advanced, when actually the work was far from being finalized. He was probably influenced by reports from project managers who were afraid to admit that their programmes had not yet achieved expected results. It seems likely that General Hussein Kamel had often exaggerated achievements of military industrialization to gain more influence and power.
Comment

Under General Hussein Kamel’s supervision, the MIC grew substantially in size and function. Instead of responding to the needs and requirements of the military, which was the original intention of the organisation, the MIC began to dictate what would be supplied to the military especially in the area of strategic weapons systems and WMD. For example, under MIC’s stewardship, several fixed missile launch sites were constructed in the western desert area of Iraq not because it was a military requirement but because this was a concept promoted by MIC. Iraq’s Strategic Rocket Forces never used these sites. Because MIC developed its own military capabilities, it meant that priorities were reassigned and that resources were diverted from conventional arms production, maintenance and repair to long-range missile projects and CBW projects. With General Hussein Kamel setting the priorities, none was willing to challenge or question his authority.

MIC 1991-1998

Saddam Hussein reorganized the Council of Ministers following the 1991 Gulf War, which resulted in General Hussein Kamel being transferred from MIMI to be the Minister of Defence. In the autumn of 1991, MIMI was dissolved into its former structure of MIC and the Ministry of Industry and Minerals (MIM) (a combination of the former Ministries of [Heavy] Industry and Light Industry). In early 1992, General Hussein Kamel was reinstated as supervising Minister responsible for MIC, MIM, Ministry of Oil and the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission. From early 1992 until July 1995, General Amer Rashid acted as General Hussein Kamel’s deputy although he was officially Director of MIC. In July 1995 General Amer Rashid became Minister of Oil.

As a priority, General Hussein Kamel tried to organize the rebuilding of MIC industries and infrastructure destroyed in the war as well as expanding MIC into non-defence related production. The Security Council’s sanctions imposed severe limitations on Iraq’s economic activity and resulted in a shortage of equipment, materials and other resources available for MIC industries. General Hussein Kamel retained his position as Minister supervising MIC until his departure for Jordan in August 1995.

Following General Hussein Kamel’s defection, the MIC structure suffered and many of its industries were stripped from its control. Budget restrictions and low morale meant that many MIC enterprises languished at least for a year or so.

MIC headquarters comprised several directorates. The Technical Directorate played an important role in the procurement of equipment and materials to support MIC projects. When difficulties were encountered with the procurement of essential equipment and materials, MIC used front companies. Some personnel rotated from the MIC Technical Department to manage a project and then back again. Such people generally had the status and rank of Director General.
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CHAPTER II

The aim of the Research Directorate was to follow-up on research programmes. The six sub-directorates of MIC reviewed all research and development work performed by its establishments. The directorate accumulated and summarized the studies performed by the facilities, and meetings were held routinely to review the progress and status of projects. In December 1995, the Research Directorate had a staff of about 30.

The Projects Department was created in June 1996 as a part of the MIC Headquarters. Its chief held the rank of a Director General. The Investment and Contracts Bureau, Commercial Affairs Department and Administration and Fiscal Departments were important elements of MIC, where all financial and commercial documents related to transactions and procurement were maintained and archived.

MIC controlled an additional group of facilities composed of the former state organizations. Sites involved in past proscribed weapons programmes were included in this category, such as the Muthanna State Establishment and the former Technical Research Centre.

Normally, facilities carrying the status of a state establishment were large research and production facilities with sizable workforces headed by a Director General. These establishments often had multiple product lines and subordinate factories. The facilities designated as centres were usually involved in research and development, design, or pilot-scale production, had smaller size physical plants and workshops or laboratories, and was usually headed by a Director. Factories were either subordinates to state establishments or independent entities that reported directly to the Military Industrialization Commission.

In March 1997, many MIC establishments changed their respective names and status. Descriptive names that indicated fields of activities, such as State Establishment for Industrial Chemical Research, were usually replaced with names from Arabic history, such as Ibn Sina. In 1998, the state establishments were renamed as state companies. A company included at least a physical facility and in most cases, several other properties, such as the Al Karama State Companies with five physical facilities.

After December 1998, when UNSCOM was withdrawn from Iraq, MIC again assumed a full responsibility for the rebuilding of military and industrial capabilities of the country. MIC led numerous projects and provided support and logistics to several priority developments, including the acquisition of missile parts and components to support indigenous missile projects such as the Al Samoud-2 project.

MIC and the private sector, 1998-2002

During the period 1998-2002, Iraq made important changes to its economy. Reducing dependency on government finance and becoming more financially independent through sale of output or products became a priority for many establishments. These companies and facilities were, however, very much controlled by the government and were not
private companies by “Western” standards. A lot of companies were created mainly to support trading and import-export activities. Other areas that were expanded under MIC included design and consulting functions. MIC was still a centralized company under Ministerial control but subcontractors from the private sector assumed a more important part in its activities.

MIC’s organization did not alter substantially but there were some minor changes. For example, in August 1998, all state establishments and most centres under MIC were re-designated as companies. This change served to distinguish the various functions of organizations. Iraq probably tried to remove any visible linkage between the military industrial facilities and the Government.

MIC continued to develop a full variety of skills and knowledge and it developed industrial and production aspects of military technology. Later on, design centres, quality control laboratories, computer and software centres were all controlled by MIC. In order to achieve this, MIC established several cooperative relationships with private companies, offices and mixed its activities with certain private enterprises.

MIC also played an active role in the assistance to private sector by providing important industrial equipment needed to maintain industrial capabilities. The Governmental trading companies, which belonged to MIC, were recreated and associations, joint ventures and other partnerships were developed in Iraq and abroad. This aspect gave MIC an important position in Iraq. MIC was directly involved in many transactions and acquisitions that generated large amounts of cash revenues. Although MIC was no longer a key component in the development of Iraq’s weapons, it nevertheless remained a key structure in Saddam Hussein’s inner circle.

The procurement companies had monopolies in Iraq over trading activities and maintained links and networks outside the country. MIC also owned companies, shares and bank accounts abroad. It became much more a real business organization while probably its military activities became less important in terms of their input.

The stability of Iraq’s presidential regime during the course of 20 years was a “sine qua non” for its success. SOTI and then the MIC were the key organizations that interpreted and managed the president’s decisions from their inception to completion. MIC managed this effort for more than 15 years.

Although MIC was built and developed by General Hussein Kamel, the organization survived his departure and was kept as an important part of military programmes. The MIC experience in the area of the management, recruitment, financing and procurement, production, research and development helped Iraq to build essential weapons capabilities.
The Technical Research Centre (TRC)

The TRC was established on 14 March 1985 with its main chemical and biological forensic laboratories located near the town of Salman Pak. The TRC evolved from the Scientific and Technical Research Centre and its predecessor the Technical Affairs General Directorate, which was established in 1980. The Technical Affairs General Directorate contained a chemical and, later, a small biological laboratory, which did chemical analysis of possible contamination of food and water supply as well as analysis of other imported items. The laboratory also worked on secret ink and other material, presumably for the intelligence and security apparatus. Biological analysis focused on water quality, particularly after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. The chemical and biological sections used the same building for forensic analysis. Later in 1980 an electronic laboratory was added.

According to Iraq’s declarations, the Technical Affairs General Directorate did not adequately fulfill its functions and was replaced in 1984 by the Scientific and Technical Research Centre. This Centre only lasted a year before being replaced by the Technical Research Centre in 1985. The evolution of the TRC is shown in Figure II.III.

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4 Biological FFCD June 1996 section 11.2
The TRC was established through the Revolutionary Command Council’s Decision No 340 of 14 March 1985. This Decision established the TRC as a Centre connected to the Presidential Secretariat’s Office. The TRC had authorisation to operate independently, financially and administratively and was to be represented by a chairman of the Board of Directors. The Board was formed from one manager from each of the intelligence and security agencies. The Decision 340 establishing the TRC also stated that “the Centre will seek to make available and to manage intelligence work for the security force directly or indirectly or to give technical assistance needed”....in relation to...

1. Listening
2. Transfer of releases and phone calls within special net
3. Automation of releases and intelligence information.
4. Design, production and use of electronic, mechanical, chemical and biological (forensic)”

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5 The Revolutionary Command Council Decision No/340 14 March 1985
Although there is an incomplete understanding of all of the aspects of the TRC, it appears it was the technical arm of the intelligence and security apparatus of Iraq.

The TRC was divided into nine branches as shown in Figure II.IV below.

Figure II.IV The Structure of the Technical Research Centre in 1990

The Forensic Research Department and the Al Hakam Factory were within the TRC structure. The Forensic Research Department incorporated the BW military programme during 1987. The Al Hakam Factory, which later (1990) became the Al Hakam Division, included the Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine facility at Al Dora and part of the Agricultural and Water Resources Research Facility at Fudaliyah as shown in Figure II.V below.
Figure II.V Structure of T-3 and T-5 in 1990

Comment:
According to Iraq’s declarations and interview testimony, “the TRC was created to satisfy the security needs of the State in securing Government communications against intrusion (the Electronics departments) and the safety of food for consumption (the Forensic department)”\(^6\). However since the TRC was an element of the intelligence and security apparatus there was a concern by some UN inspectors that the TRC supported a clandestine section of the intelligence apparatus as well as performing the declared role with regard to food and water safety. The concern was based on several observations which included the continued development of the Salman Peninsula (which housed the Forensic Departments) after the closure of the Al Hazen Institute, the buildings and equipment present in the Forensic department before the biological group moved there from Muthanna and the presence of counter-terrorist training facilities in the adjacent area. The research and development work done by the TRC on both wheat smut and ricin were outside and separate from the BW agent programme pursued by Dr Taha’s group both at Salman and within the Al Hakam Division and the experiments performed by Dr

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\(^6\) Biological FFCD September 1997 page 13
Zubaidy in the T-3 department, were said to be without help from the biological group transferred from Muthanna. The T-3 Forensic section was never incorporated into the Al Hakam Division (which produced bulk quantities of BW agent) and so again it could suggest that this facility at Al Salman was involved in producing BW agents for the intelligence and security services. The whole peninsula, which housed the Forensic and part of the Electronics sections of TRC was controlled by the intelligence and security apparatus.

Further exploration by UN inspectors of the possible involvement of Iraq’s intelligence and security apparatus in using chemical or biological agents was tempered by the perception, understanding or direction that the UN mandate applied specifically to weapons of mass destruction issues and not to the use of biological and chemical agents in general. Iraqi representatives on several occasions refused to answer questions when they thought that UN inspectors were asking questions beyond the scope of the Security Council mandate.

The TRC from its inception until the creation of MIC in 1987 was affiliated with the security apparatus through the Office of the President. General Hussein Kamel personally supervised the TRC as head of the Security Apparatus from 1985, and then as head of MIC from 1987.

The biological research section, which included the BW group relocated from Muthanna, was administratively annexed to the Forensic Research Department as a separate section. However it appears from interviews and from information contained in the 1997 BW FFCD that on substantive matters Dr Taha reported directly to the Director General of the TRC, General Ahmed Murtada (PhD Engineer), and only on administrative matters did she report through the head of the T-3 section. This again suggests a separation of activities between the normal T-3 responsibilities and those of the biological research staff who would later transfer to the T-5 Al Hakam Division.

TRC used the Technical and Scientific Materials Import Division (TSMID) an organization created in 1982, as its commercial arm to procure necessary equipment and materials from overseas: more details on the role of TSMID are reported later (Chapter VI). However, TSMID acted for all of the sections of the TRC and not only the T-3 and T-5 sections. Each section had a coded import reference number used by TSMID. Both TSMID and the TRC were dissolved in 1991.

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7 BW FFCD Sept 1997 Chapter 5 section 5.2.5.5