Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Resolution adopted by the Board on 13 March 2004

The Board of Governors,

(a) Recalling the resolutions adopted by the Board on 26 November 2003 (GOV/2003/81), and on 12 September 2003 (GOV/2003/69) and the statement by the Board of 19 June 2003 (GOV/OR.1072),

(b) Noting with appreciation the Director General's report of 24 February 2004 (GOV/2004/11), on the implementation of safeguards in Iran,

(c) Commending the Director General and the Secretariat for their continuing efforts to implement the Safeguards Agreement with Iran and to resolve all outstanding issues in Iran,

(d) Noting with satisfaction that Iran signed the Additional Protocol on 18 December 2003 and that, in its communication to the Director General of 10 November 2003, Iran committed itself to acting in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol with effect from that date; but also noting that the Protocol has not yet been ratified as called for in the Board's resolutions of 26 November 2003 (GOV/2003/81) and 12 September 2003 (GOV/2003/69),

(e) Noting the decision by Iran of 24 February 2004 to extend the scope of its suspension of enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, and its confirmation that the suspension applied to all facilities in Iran,

(f) Noting with serious concern that the declarations made by Iran in October 2003 did not amount to the complete and final picture of Iran’s past and present nuclear programme considered essential by the Board’s November 2003 resolution, in that the Agency has since uncovered a number of omissions -- e.g., a more advanced centrifuge design than previously declared, including associated research, manufacturing and testing activities; two mass spectrometers used in the laser enrichment programme; and designs for the construction of hot cells at the Arak heavy water research reactor -- which require further investigation, not least as they may point to nuclear activities not so far acknowledged by Iran,
(g) **Noting with equal concern** that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the development of its enrichment technology to its current extent, and that a number of other questions remain unresolved, including the sources of all HEU contamination in Iran; the location, extent, and nature of work undertaken on the basis of the advanced centrifuge design; the nature, extent and purpose of activities involving the planned heavy-water reactor; and evidence to support claims regarding the purpose of polonium-210 experiments, and

(h) **Noting with concern**, also in light of the Director General’s report of 20 February 2004 (GOV/2004/12), that, although the timelines are different, Iran's and Libya’s conversion and centrifuge programmes share several common elements, including technology largely obtained from the same foreign sources,

1. **Recognizes** that the Director General reports Iran to have been actively cooperating with the Agency in providing access to locations requested by the Agency, but, as Iran's cooperation so far has fallen short of what is required, **calls on Iran to continue and intensify its cooperation, in particular through the prompt and proactive provision of detailed and accurate information on every aspect of Iran's past and present nuclear activities**;

2. **Welcomes** Iran's signature of the Additional Protocol; **urges its prompt ratification**; **underlines the Board's understanding that, in its communication to the Director General of 10 November 2003, Iran voluntarily committed itself to acting in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol with effect from that date**; and **stresses the importance of Iran complying with the deadline for declarations envisaged in Article 3 of the Protocol**;

3. **Recalls** that in its resolutions of 26 November 2003 and 12 September 2003 the Board called on Iran to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, **notes that Iran’s voluntary decisions of 29 December 2003 and 24 February 2004 constitute useful steps in this respect, calls on Iran to extend the application of this commitment to all such activities throughout Iran, and requests the Director General to verify the full implementation of these steps**;

4. **Deplores** that Iran, as detailed in the report by the Director General, omitted any reference, in its letter of 21 October 2003 which was to have provided the "full scope of Iranian nuclear activities" and a "complete centrifuge R&D chronology", to its possession of P-2 centrifuge design drawings and to associated research, manufacturing, and mechanical testing activities -- which the Director General describes as "a matter of serious concern, particularly in view of the importance and sensitivity of those activities";

5. **Echoes** the concern expressed by the Director General over the issue of the purpose of Iran's activities related to experiments on the production and intended use of polonium-210, in the absence of information to support Iran's statements in this regard;

6. **Calls on** Iran to be pro-active in taking all necessary steps on an urgent basis to resolve all outstanding issues, including the issue of LEU and HEU contamination at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop and Natanz; the issue of the nature and scope of Iran's laser isotope enrichment research; and the issue of the experiments on the production of polonium-210;

7. **Notes with appreciation** that the Agency is investigating the supply routes and sources of technology and related equipment, and nuclear and non-nuclear materials, found in Iran, and **reiterates that the urgent, full and close cooperation with the Agency of all third countries is essential in the clarification of outstanding questions concerning Iran's nuclear programme, including the acquisition of nuclear technology from foreign sources; and also appreciates any cooperation in this regard as may already have been extended to the Agency**;
8. **Requests** the Director General to report on these issues before the end of May, as well as on the implementation of this and prior resolutions on Iran, for consideration by the June Board of Governors -- or to report earlier if appropriate;

9. **Decides** to defer until its June meeting, and after receipt of the report of the Director General referred to above, consideration of progress in verifying Iran’s declarations, and of how to respond to the above-mentioned omissions; and

10. **Decides** to remain seized of the matter.