Chairman Saxton, Congressman Meehan, Members of the Subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today to describe the Defense Department’s efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and our plan to implement recommendations outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) regarding WMD.

My goal today is to share with you many of the Department’s new approaches to stopping the proliferation of WMD, preventing its use, and enabling our warfighters to accomplish their missions in a WMD environment if necessary. This is not a new mission. Since December 2002, when the President set forth the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Department has taken a number of measures to enable us better to carry out this mission. At the same time, while adapting at the strategic level, we have been carrying out the day-to-day activities – some ongoing, some new, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) – to implement our policies in the face of the global WMD challenge.

**Strategic Guidance**

Our approach builds on the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. In particular, it states:

> Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – nuclear, biological, and chemical – in the possession of hostile states and terrorists represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States. We must pursue a comprehensive strategy to counter this threat in all of its dimensions. An effective strategy for countering WMD, including their use and further proliferation, is an integral component of the National Security Strategy of the United States of America.

The goal of this strategy was reinforced by President Bush in his January 20, 2004, State of the Union address when he stated, “America is committed to keeping the world's most dangerous weapons out of the hands of the most dangerous regimes.”
Consistent with the President’s guidance, preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD was one of the four priorities the Department identified in the QDR just issued by the Secretary. This is the first time a QDR has devoted such attention to the threat of WMD. Additionally, Joint Chiefs Chairman Peter Pace issued the first-ever National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction on February 13, 2006. Our strategic approach is built on the "three pillars" of combating WMD identified in the 2002 National Strategy to Combat WMD: nonproliferation, counterproliferation and consequence management. We define these terms as follows:

- **Nonproliferation** - Actions to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by dissuading or impeding access to, or distribution of, sensitive technologies, material, and expertise.

- **Counterproliferation** - Actions to defeat the threat and/or use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, U.S. Armed Forces, its allies, and partners.

- **WMD Consequence Management** - Actions taken to mitigate the effects of a WMD attack, or event, and to restore essential operations and services at home and abroad.

At the next level, the National Military Strategy to Combat WMD identifies eight military mission areas that support the pillars in the National Strategy: offensive operations, elimination operations, interdiction operations, active defense, passive defense, WMD consequence management, security cooperation and partner activities, and threat reduction cooperation. This new strategic framework is the Department's vehicle for dividing the broad "combating WMD" mission into specific, definable military activities that we can address with better focus in the budget, training, doctrine and policy processes.

**Organizing for the Combating WMD Mission**

In addition to this new strategic framework, the Department of Defense has transformed our organizational structure to better combat WMD. On January 6, 2005, the Secretary of Defense designated the United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) – commanded by General Cartwright – as the Department’s lead for synchronizing and integrating combating WMD operational efforts in support of our Combatant Commanders. In this new role, STRATCOM supports other Combatant Commanders as they execute combating WMD operations. On January 31, 2006, the Secretary of Defense appointed the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) with an additional duty as the Director of STRATCOM’s Combating WMD Center (SCC). This appointment was recommended by the QDR and designed to enhance STRATCOM’s ability to synchronize and integrate the Department’s combating WMD efforts. General Cartwright and his team, including Dr. Jim Tegnelia of DTRA, identify
and advocate new combating WMD requirements and shepherd them through the budget process. The first two missions to be addressed in this manner are WMD elimination and interdiction, areas where we need to increase our capacities substantially.

Complementing this reorganization, all DoD components have been directed to realign themselves to improve execution of the combating WMD mission. Within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, for example, my own office realigned over the past six months to create a near-single point of contact for policy support of the combating WMD mission. My office is now responsible for seven of eight mission areas identified in the National Military Strategy to Combat WMD: offensive operations, elimination operations, interdiction operations, active defense, passive defense, security cooperation and partner activities and threat reduction cooperation. Organizing Policy’s oversight of consequence management capabilities is something we are still working on.

To fulfill the President's commitment, the QDR directs that “national efforts to counter the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction must incorporate both preventive and responsive dimensions.” Preventive activities include those that: build and expand global partnerships aimed at preventing proliferation; stop WMD-related trafficking; help friendly governments improve controls over existing WMD; and discredit WMD as an instrument of national power. If these preventive activities fail, DoD must be prepared to respond by locating, securing and destroying WMD.

**Preventive Dimension of Combating WMD**

*The Toolkit for Preventive Activities.* With respect to the preventive dimension, we have long viewed nonproliferation treaties and export control regimes as integral elements of our strategy for combating WMD. These treaties and regimes include the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Missile Technology Control Regime. DoD brings significant policy and technical expertise to bear on enforcement of these regimes through the Office of Negotiations Policy and the Defense Technology Security Administration.

*Interdiction.* While these regimes are a first line of defense, not all countries are members of all regimes, and many countries that are members cheat. WMD programs in countries like Iran and North Korea have highlighted the need for additional measures such as interdiction. Interdiction is an essential component in our efforts to counter the proliferation activities of both suppliers and customers. Interdictions raise the costs for proliferators, but also can deter some suppliers from even getting in the business of proliferation. As part of this effort, DoD has taken steps to strengthen U.S. military capabilities to support interdiction. For example, in October 2005, the Naval War College organized the first government-wide, classified gaming exercise for all U.S. agencies involved in interdiction. In addition, the U.S. Navy has improved shipboarding
and cargo assessment by validating its new Visit Board Search and Seizure team capability. Finally, the Defense Intelligence Agency established a new division for interdiction support to DoD policy makers.

**The Proliferation Security Initiative.** In addition to U.S. domestic efforts, we have worked closely with other governments since President Bush launched the PSI in May 2003. The PSI has been a forum for the United States and other countries to collaborate on how we will work together to interdict WMD-related shipments bound to and from states of concern, and to build national capabilities so that like-minded nations collectively have a more robust arsenal of WMD interdiction tools.

PSI partners define interdiction broadly to include military, law enforcement, intelligence, and diplomatic efforts to impede and stop proliferation-related shipments, and it can involve sea, air, land, or trans-modal shipments. Today more than 70 countries have indicated support for the PSI, and we continue to discuss the initiative with states that could contribute to PSI’s mission.

**PSI Builds National Capabilities.** PSI partners are working together in the PSI Operational Experts Group (OEG) to improve their national interdiction capabilities. The OEG is an expanding network of military, law enforcement, intelligence, legal, and diplomatic experts. They develop new operational concepts for interdiction, organize a program of interdiction exercises, share information about national legal authorities, and pursue cooperation with industry sectors that can be helpful to the interdiction mission. Through these efforts, OEG participants raise the level of collective and national interdiction capabilities. The November 2005 OEG meeting was the first regionally focused OEG meeting and provided a venue for all European PSI participants to develop national and regional capabilities. The United States will host the next OEG meeting in April 2006, which for the first time will involve a South American participant, Argentina.

DoD is responsible for leading the Operational Experts Group process, the locus of operational aspects of PSI. To date, nineteen PSI exercises involving a wide range of operational assets have been held. These have included air, maritime and ground assets and have been hosted by a range of countries. Table-top games and simulations in particular have helped participants work through interdiction scenarios, and have, in many cases, improved the way participating governments organize to conduct interdictions.

**Cooperative Threat Reduction.** Mr. Chairman, the Subcommittee is already familiar with the history and details of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. CTR supports another two of the mission areas identified by the National Military Strategy to Combat WMD: threat reduction cooperation, and security cooperation/partner activities. The program continues to help eliminate WMD material and enhance security for WMD, particularly the legacy WMD of the former Soviet Union. I would like to touch on recent developments in CTR.
Fiscal years 2005 and 2006-to-date saw continued progress for CTR. This was the case both with respect to CTR’s substantive mission, as well as with respect to the revised business practices implemented after problems arose several years ago. As the subcommittee knows, these new practices extended to both policy and implementation. They included changes in personnel, application of DoD acquisition processes, extensive reviews by the DoD Inspector General and GAO, conversion of informal understandings to binding legal agreements, and establishment of a formal “executive review” process, in which implementation and policy experts review all aspects of major projects semi-annually with their Russian counterparts.

In this timeframe, CTR continued its WMD infrastructure elimination work in Russia, destroying intercontinental missiles, and continuing the rail- and road-mobile missile project that eliminates SS-24/25 missiles, as well as their launchers. CTR also continued work on the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility at Shchuch’yje. The Shchuch’yje facility will provide Russia a capability to eliminate some 2.1 million artillery shells and rockets loaded with nerve agent – one of Russia’s most dangerous chemical agents weaponized in the most proliferable form.

Also in Russia, CTR has continued its assistance to improve the security of nuclear warheads in storage. With the President’s Bratislava Nuclear Security Cooperation Initiative, we are poised to complete our security work at Russian nuclear warhead storage sites by 2008. These storage sites contain both strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons. Acceleration of the original schedule from a 2011 completion target to 2008 requires that additional funds be obligated during Fiscal Year 2006, and I want to thank the House for its inclusion of the Administration’s request for $44.5 million in its markup of the FY2006 supplemental.

Let me be clear, the U.S. is not enhancing security of warheads attached to operational nuclear delivery systems; rather, we are supporting Russia in its responsibility to secure its extensive warhead inventory across its vast and often remote array of storage facilities. The U.S. will be able to say by 2008 that we have done all we can to bring security of Russia’s nuclear weapons up to credible standards. That will be a significant achievement.

The past year has seen success in implementation of CTR’s capability to consolidate dangerous pathogen strains in Central Asian and Caucasus states. The U.S. receives samples of each strain which are used to ensure the reagents used in the rapid diagnostic equipment will accurately determine whether a disease outbreak is naturally occurring or a potential bio-terror event. This work has been a key initiative for the Administration, and we believe it helps meet a significant, unfilled requirement for the U.S. to stay abreast of the global bio-terror threat.
During the past year, CTR also saw continued progress in its WMD border security project, known as the WMD-Proliferation Prevention Initiative (PPI). PPI looks beyond the traditional CTR mission of dealing with “WMD-in-place,” and address the threat of “WMD-on-the-move.” PPI focuses on willing Central Asian countries that lack resources to build detection and interdiction capabilities on their own. We are focusing on Central Asian countries because of their proximity to Russia in order to create a WMD “safety net.” We believe WMD border security is an important element of the CTR mission, and we appreciate the interest of Armed Services staff in PPI and WMD border security.

The Department realizes the scope of U.S. international border security activities, and the need to enhance coordination of these border security programs. We can report that, as of January 2006, all international border security assistance related to nuclear detection activities is governed by guidelines promulgated and administered by the NSC’s Proliferation Strategy Policy Coordinating Committee. These guidelines will be expanded to include a process whereby all types of U.S. international border security assistance, from proliferation prevention to counter-narcotics, will be synchronized and deconflicted as effectively in Washington, as they are currently in the field.

**Responsive Dimension of Combating WMD**

*Investing for the Future.* Revising our strategies, restructuring our organizations, and changing our daily activities will not have lasting impact without adequate funding of corresponding capabilities, technologies and mission areas. The Autumn 2005 program/budget review undertook a comprehensive review of combating WMD funding which was carried through the QDR. Beginning with the FY2006 budget submission, we added $2B to the previous $7.6B Fiscal Year 2006-2011 allocation for the Chemical Biological Defense Program and related infrastructure (an increase of almost 20%). While we have made recent advances in this specific area, our effort in combating WMD funding remains a work in progress. We look forward to working with STRATCOM as they identify and define additional requirements.

*Joint Task Force for Elimination.* One of the earliest lessons learned from our military operations in Iraq was that DoD needed a well organized, well trained force to be able to quickly and systematically locate, seize, secure, disable and safeguard an adversary’s WMD program, including sites, laboratories, materials, and associated scientists and other personnel.

The Army’s 20th Support Command, located north of Baltimore at the Edgewood Area of Aberdeen Proving Ground, was stood up as an Army headquarters tasked to provide technically qualified Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield Explosives (CBRNE) response forces to support geographic Combatant Commanders. This unique organization includes the Army’s Technical Escort Battalions as well as an Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Group. While the 20th was not established
until after Operation Iraqi Freedom, many of its units participated in the search for WMD in Iraq.

The 20th Headquarters was activated in 2004. However, while the military units assigned to this headquarters are deployable, the headquarters itself cannot deploy today since nearly two-thirds of the staff is composed of government civilians or contractors. In the QDR process, DoD leadership approved a proposal to assign 20th Support Command the task of becoming a deployable headquarters that could command and control these types of operations. Establishing a joint task force for elimination is a key element of the Department’s vision, as articulated by the QDR, to deal with all aspects of the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction.

**Biodefense Initiative.** Another key conclusion of the QDR was that the Department should focus on new defensive capabilities in anticipation of the continued evolution of WMD threats. In response, DoD has decided to reallocate funding within the Chem-Bio Defense program to invest over $1.5B over the next five years to develop broad-spectrum countermeasures against advanced biological threats. For example, rather than continuing the traditional approach to developing countermeasures – which in effect results in “one drug, one bug” -- DoD will conduct research to develop drugs that could each counter many pathogens. For example, we are going to conduct research to develop a single pharmaceutical to counter all types of viral hemorrhagic fevers (like Ebola and Marburg) as well as a single pharmaceutical for all "intracellular" pathogens, like the Plague, by leveraging molecular biotechnology cutting edge technologies currently available. While supporting our combating WMD effort, these initiatives also benefit our forces who may well be ordered to deploy to places where these fevers pose a risk. Having one drug that could counter many bugs would improve military effectiveness by getting forces into the theater more quickly, protect our forces more efficiently, and complicate an adversary’s military calculus on their effect.

**Building Partner Capacity.** More than ever before, we need partners be to be prepared for operations with us in a CBRN world. In 2002, the Department proposed creation of a CBRN Defense Battalion for NATO. This U.S. concept was endorsed by NATO defense ministers during the 2002 Prague Summit, and elements of a fully operational CBRN Defense Battalion supported the 2004 Summer Olympics just over one year later. The battalion includes a CBRN joint assessment team and mobile chemical, biological and radiological laboratories; it has received personnel and capability support from seventeen NATO nations to date. The concept for the Battalion and the way it was quickly institutionalized were unprecedented at NATO. We continue to encourage strengthening of the Battalion’s capabilities to help drive member nations to improve their own combating WMD capabilities. The Battalion will be a model for future collaboration as we expand our counterproliferation discussions with other nations.

We continue to develop bilateral discussions with international partners on counterproliferation issues ranging from policy and operational support to detailed
technical cooperation. We have or are establishing such bilateral working groups with countries from Europe, the Middle East, and Asia that share our desire to prepare for defense against the WMD threat. A central goal of the bilateral working groups we establish is to ensure that U.S. and potential coalition partners can execute combined operations in a WMD environment. The challenge of interoperability is significant even in a “mere” conventional warfighting environment. However, a WMD situation raises many additional issues. For example, if our combat or transport aircraft are returning from an area where WMD has been employed, we need to know in advance what decontamination our allies will require in order to ensure ready access to important way stations and forward depots. Similar problems relate to the decontamination of forces – including potentially wounded personnel – who will require immediate evacuation and attention. We have launched discussions with our NATO allies as well as several key potential coalition partners on these and other issues we believe need to be resolved for combined operations in a WMD environment.

Building partner capacity takes many forms and can include building legal capacities. In 2005, Navy, Joint Staff, General Counsel and OSD-Policy representatives completed three years of activity to expand legal authority against maritime trafficking in WMD, and helped secure adoption of amendments to the Convention on Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea (SUA) Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation. These amendments established the first international criminal standard against shipment of WMD as well as a comprehensive boarding regime. Once the Amendment enters into force after ratification by 12 member-states, we will have a new vehicle to prosecute violators and press for greater vigilance against trafficking in WMD.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, DoD understands that combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction in a complex and uncertain world requires a new approach. This new approach is reflected in our new strategic guidance, realigned organizational structure, and in changes in our day-to-day activities. Our commitment to success in this endeavor is absolute. Failure is not an option. Congress is an essential partner in this fight, and we look forward to continuing our work together. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify.