THE SIX-PARTY TALKS AND THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE: OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES?

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THURSDAY, OCTOBER 6, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order.

Ambassador Hill, we are very happy that you have taken time from what we know to be a very busy schedule to be with us today. Carrying out negotiations with North Korea, as Washington has learned over five decades of bitter experience, is never easy nor pleasant. You and your team of negotiators are to be highly commended for the forbearance and tact which you have demonstrated at the recent fourth round of Six-Party Talks in Beijing. We thank you all for your tireless efforts.

One cannot examine the results of the latest round of negotiations in Beijing without coming away with a sense, as Yogi Berra once famously put it, of “deja vu all over again.” The Joint Statement issued in Beijing is noteworthy both for what is included from the past and what is omitted.

The subject of the provision of the light water reactor to North Korea, for example, which many in the Congress had assumed was forever laid to rest with the demise of the Agreed Framework, has made a miraculous reappearance in the final text of the Joint Statement. There are now even hints that the Korean Peninsula, the energy development organization, the chief vehicle for light water reactor construction under the Agreed Framework, may have a new lease on life and may not be terminated by year’s end as was originally suggested.

Such developments lead us to wonder if, in a roundabout way, we are not turning back toward a son of Agreed Framework and spinning our wheels in the process. Congress’ view on the severe limitations of the Agreed Framework is a matter of public record. A North Korea Advisory Group, made up of both House Members and staff, issued a report to Speaker Hastert in November 1999, which included the following in its summary:

“North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction programs pose a major threat to the United States and its allies.”
This threat has advanced considerably over the past 5 years, particularly with the enhancement of North Korea's missile capabilities. There is significant evidence that undeclared nuclear weapons development activity continues, including efforts to acquire uranium enrichment technologies and recent nuclear-related high explosive tests.

We now know, of course, that this congressional report was pre-scient in its discussion of a highly enriched uranium program in North Korea, for it was the verification of highly enriched uranium activity in 2002 which led to the current impasse. Yet in a Joint Statement in Beijing there is no precise mention of highly enriched uranium, the eye at the center of the current North Korean nuclear storm. American press reports have carried claims that pressure from Beijing, and even our ally South Korea, led us to make concessions on this issue as well as on other key points in the Six-Party negotiations.

Washington's one-time resolute call for a complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of Pyongyang's nuclear weapons has also apparently just faded away.

Is CVID no longer in our negotiating lexicon? Can anything less than CVID guarantee the security of the American people and ensure that the rogue regime in Pyongyang will not sell weapons of mass destruction to terrorists who would threaten our very shores and seaports?

I am also concerned that the Joint Statement specifically raises a key Pyongyang propaganda point aimed directly at the South Korean public. This is the clear reference to supposed United States hostile intent. The statement says:

"The United States affirmed that it has no nuclear weapon on the Korean Peninsula and has no intention to attack or invade North Korea with nuclear or conventional weapons."

Yet where in any portion of the statement is there a reference to Pyongyang's half century of unswerving hostile intent directed at the Republic of Korea? This hostility is clearly demonstrated by a forward deployment of North Korean conventional forces and artillery near the demilitarized zone, designed to turn Seoul into a sea of fire. There is no mention of this present threat at all, notwithstanding the fact that its existence is the cornerstone of our 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea.

A recent poll in a South Korean newspaper indicated that 65.9 percent of South Korean youth would take North Korea's side in the event of the outbreak of hostilities. This clearly demonstrates that we cannot afford to cede any propaganda points to Pyongyang at this critical juncture. The future of our very alliance is at stake as we compete for the hearts and minds of South Korea's people.

The House of Representatives is the holder of the purse strings of the American people. This is a sacred trust. The Joint Statement from the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks declares that China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States stated their willingness to provide energy assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at a time of overwhelming national concern for homeless fellow citizens along the gulf coast without electricity due
to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Any energy deal for North Korea will not be an easy matter for consideration by Congress.

More shipments of heavy fuel oil to Pyongyang, when the price of gasoline in the United States averages $3 a gallon, will be met with an angry shriek. The green eye shades of congressional accountants will go over any final agreement that involves the commitment of U.S. tax dollars with a fine-tooth comb. Such a final deal must be air-tight to ensure we haven't given away the farm with little in return beyond more broken promises from Pyongyang.

In conclusion, Mr. Ambassador, I must return to those famous words of President Ronald Reagan when considering the ongoing Six-Party Talks in Beijing, “Trust but verify.”

If verification was crucial to success in Cold War negotiations with the Soviet Union, it is even more so in striking any deal with the secret, active, and patently nontransparent North Korean regime. How can we reach a final agreement that is acceptable to all the parties concerned and yet which passes this verification test? The welfare of the American people and our allies hangs in the balance.

We look forward to hearing your thoughts. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

And now, I turn to my friend Mr. Lantos, the Ranking Democratic Member, for any remarks he wishes to make.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me first thank you for calling today's important hearing on North Korea with Assistant Secretary of State, Christopher Hill. Welcome, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. Chairman, I have traveled to Pyongyang over the past year on two occasions to promote a negotiated, peaceful solution to the nuclear tensions on the Korean Peninsula. When I arrived in Pyongyang on a bitterly cold day in January, my first visit, my goal was simple: To convince the North Koreans to return to the Six-Party Talks. I made it clear that the Six-Party Talks were the only venue to resolve the deep divisions between our two nations. Their hopes of Presidential visits to Pyongyang to negotiate a deal were simply a pipe dream.

I have been advised that my January visit to North Korea contributed to the North Korean decision to return to the Six-Party Talks in Beijing.

My second visit to North Korea, along with my good friend and colleague, Jim Leach, in September, had a more nuanced message. Now that Pyongyang had decided to return to the Six-Party Talks, it was essential that it approach the negotiations with increased flexibility. Nothing could be accomplished between our countries unless they agreed to the basic statement, the principles to govern the Six-Party Talks.

North Korea’s subsequent decision to negotiate and sign the deal in Beijing was a very positive development, although its later pronouncement about its desire for civilian nuclear power plants before it disarms raises legitimate questions about the durability of the Beijing agreement.

But Mr. Chairman, the United States must keep its eye on the prize and not allow itself to be sidetracked by overheated North Korean rhetoric and dubious negotiating tactics. The reality is that
the agreement in Beijing, skillfully negotiated by our witness today, represents a major step toward peace on the Korean Peninsula.

For the first time, the nations of Northeast Asia have agreed that North Korea would eliminate all of its nuclear programs, and the nations of Northeast Asia have joined with the United States in rejecting North Korea's day-after public relations spin.

Now that a statement of principles has been set, the hard work of negotiating a comprehensive, verifiable Six-Party deal lies ahead. Flexibility and creative diplomacy by all parties is absolutely essential if this effort is to succeed.

The great hurricane hit our gulf during our last visit to Pyongyang. I made it clear to the North Koreans that the hurricane devastating our gulf area will cause the American people to be inwardly focused for quite some time. With the additional impact of a second hurricane and dramatically rising gas prices, this phenomenon is now doubly true.

The Administration and Congress will not have the patience, or the will, to tolerate dilatory negotiating tactics in Beijing when the talks resume next month.

Ambassador Hill's performance in the Six-Party Talks has been truly exceptional, and his personable and diplomatic approach marks a major shift from past Administration practices of shunning the North Korean delegation and reading preapproved talking points in a wooden and uncompromising manner.

But now we need to take the next step in building trust and confidence between the United States and North Korea to pave the way for a true Six-Party agreement. In this connection, let me just digress for a moment.

When I first arrived in Pyongyang, on a bitter January morning, I was handed the proposed schedule for my visit by North Korean Foreign Ministry officials. I read over the proposed schedule, which we subsequently modified dramatically, but the most significant item was a question mark. It was next to the last evening of our proposed visit to North Korea. I asked my North Korean host, “What does this question mark mean?” And he said, “Well, we don’t know whether you will reciprocate the dinner that we are planning for you on the first night of your visit.”

I laughed, and I told him that Mrs. Lantos and I were very much looking forward to hosting a dinner in honor of our North Korean hosts. And the atmosphere from that moment on became progressively less rigid, more informal, more cordial, and more civilized.

In dealing with North Korea at this stage of our relations, it is exceptional important to understand that the United States looks like not only the world’s one remaining Superpower, but a country of incredible power and wealth, which, looked at from Pyongyang, looks even more overwhelming. And if we wish to make headway, as I certainly do, we must be exceptionally aware of the enormously inequitable and uneven relationship between our two countries. It is very important to go the extra mile in assuring them that we have no hostile intent, as we clearly do not, and to be understanding of their great anxiety and concern in dealing with the United States.
Based upon my experience during my recent discussions in North Korea, it is my strong recommendation to you, Ambassador Hill, that you travel to North Korea at the earliest possible time. The goal of a mission to Pyongyang is not to land a breakthrough deal, which you will not be able to achieve; rather, it is to continue working on establishing some civility in the discourse and the beginnings of mutual confidence so that a comprehensive verifiable Six-Party agreement would become achievable.

We must open new channels of communication between the United States and North Korea not only for our diplomats, but also on the cultural and the educational front. For that reason, during my last visit to Pyongyang, I indicated to the North Korean leadership that the United States would look favorably on the request by the Pyongyang Circus to visit the United States. I am also pleased that recently North Korea has decided to allow limited visits by American tourists. Both of these measures are small steps in terms of people-to-people contact.

But let us not forget that the incredibly complex and growing United States-China relationship began with ping-pong diplomacy with China in the 1970s of singularly humble origin.

I hope that through these more informal contacts the North Koreans will begin to understand that the United States and its people do not harbor hostile intent toward North Korea. Perhaps they will better understand our deep concern about Pyongyang’s recent decision to end all international humanitarian aid to North Korea by the end of the year, including aid by the World Food Program to over 6½ million North Korean women and children. This is an issue I hope to explore with Ambassador Hill during our questioning.

It boggles the mind to think that the North Korean Government would actually cut off food to children in elementary schools simply because it doesn’t like the optics of receiving humanitarian aid.

It remains truly disturbing that there has been no improvement whatsoever in the human rights situation in North Korea. I have made it abundantly clear to the North Koreans that the United States will not remain quiet about the lack of freedom and democracy in North Korea. I told them that the United States has full diplomatic relations with China, including a robust commercial and investment relationship. Yet the State Department’s Annual Human Rights Report devotes more than 70 pages to criticizing China’s human rights record. North Korea needs to understand that years from now, the United States will continue to deplore the lack of freedom and democracy in North Korea, and they should feel free to respond to these charges as they see fit.

Mr. Chairman, I am not naive about the prospects for success in the Six-Party Talks. These discussions remain a long-shot at best. But in dealing with North Korea, there are few good options at the moment. And I want to commend Secretary Rice and Secretary Hill for their decision to attempt to move ahead. We must persevere with patience and determination to achieve in North Korea what we have achieved in Libya, a basic decision by Pyongyang to abandon nuclear weapons and to enter a new and constructive phase in United States-North Korean relations.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Hyde. Thank you, Mr. Lantos.

We'll now entertain opening statements by the Members, such Members as wish to make them. We will confine them to 1 minute so that we can get to the witness today and not stretch his appearance out indefinitely.

However, Mr. Leach, who just returned with Mr. Lantos from North Korea, will be given such additional time as he wishes to make his opening statement.

Mr. Leach.

Mr. Leach. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Tom, for a fine statement.

I would like to begin by commending Assistant Secretary Hill and his team for their diplomatic creativity, professionalism, and tenacity during the fourth round of the Six Party Talks. During our trip to Pyongyang last month, Mr. Lantos and I received a preview of the newly hardened North Korean stance Ambassador Hill encountered during the last round. And it is clear that any progress was hard-won.

In terms of process, it is ironic that the U.S. Government policy, previously criticized for being too unilateral, was criticized as too multilateral during the formative stages of the Six-Party process. While auxiliary cultural exchanges, such as Tom Lantos suggested with the circus, as I suggested with the wrestling exchange, and actually a poetry exchange, should be developed and bilateral government contacts expanded. The Six-Party framework remains the most credible primary forum for pursuing resolution of the North Korea nuclear problem.

In this connection, this Committee is obligated to take note of the constructive leadership of China in hosting the talks.

Turning to the product of the most recent round of Beijing's meetings, it bears emphasizing that the Joint Statement is an assertion of principles to guide future negotiations. It is not an implementable agreement. And as awkward as some of the language in the Joint Statement is, Secretary Hill's strategy in the beginning of the process with a statement of principles is promising, perhaps visionary. There must, however, be a realistic recognition that the more difficult portions of the process lie ahead, not behind. Any attempt to declare it a victory or failure on the basis of the statement of principles is premature.

But my personal sense is one of optimism. While the Joint Statement is open to conflicting interpretations, and has already revealed differing national priorities among the parties, it does provide a directional basis for the more substantial nuanced work ahead. One can begin to discern a credible assumption of mutual self-interest among the parties which could ultimately lead to agreement based on; one, economic and energy incentives provided to North Korea, largely by nations other than the United States; two, greater normalization of relations between the U.S. and the DPRK with certain security assurances provided by the United States; and third, which is first and foremost, the categorical reversal of nuclear initiatives by North Korea.

At this point, the key remaining issues concern the depth of North Korea's commitment to genuine denuclearization, the timing and sequence of the commitments, actions, and subsequent agree-
ments, and the extent of common purpose and coordination among the United States and other parties to the talks.

The most profound question remains. Whose side is time on? From an American perspective, we have no interest in the status quo which allows North Korea to pursue the headlong development of additional nuclear weapons and materials. By the same token, North Korea also should have no interest in the status quo, which means its continued isolation from the progressive economic and social march of the rest of Asia.

Let me conclude by affirming my solidarity with Secretary Hill and the Administration seeking substantial, substantive progress from North Korea at the earliest possible date. We cannot remain content with the affirmations of common principles if North Korea continues to reprocess plutonium and construct new reactors, as was represented to Tom Lantos and my delegation during the visit to Pyongyang.

I look forward to Assistant Secretary Hill’s views on these issues and thank him for making himself available to the Committee this morning.

I would just like to conclude with one comment, Mr. Chairman, if you don’t mind. Your statement represented a very thoughtful expression of concern, and it underscores to me the strong vested interests that North Korea has in dealing with this Administration. And just as Nixon went to China with the support of more people than would otherwise be the case, I think American concerns in Congress are so deep, based upon past actions of the North Koreans, that for them not to deal with the hard-headed Administration that is currently in power would be a major mistake. And the more timely and the more active, from their perspective, an agreement process is developed, the better for all parties.

Thank you very much.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you.

Now, for a 1-minute statement, Mr. Faleomavaega of American Samoa.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I do want to join in expressing my absolute support to you, Mr. Chairman, if you don’t mind. Your statement represented a very thoughtful expression of concern, and it underscores to me the strong vested interests that North Korea has in dealing with this Administration. And just as Nixon went to China with the support of more people than would otherwise be the case, I think American concerns in Congress are so deep, based upon past actions of the North Koreans, that for them not to deal with the hard-headed Administration that is currently in power would be a major mistake. And the more timely and the more active, from their perspective, an agreement process is developed, the better for all parties.

Thank you very much.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you.

Ms. Lee of California.

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I do want to join in expressing my absolute support to you and our senior Ranking Member for your eloquent statements, and I certainly commend Secretary Hill for his presence again before this Committee and certainly thank him for all the tireless efforts and for his leadership in representing our government in the Six-Party Talks.

I look forward to Secretary Hill’s statement and want to raise some of the questions that have come over as a result of what has happened now with the Six-Party Talks. I also want to express my commendation to our Chairman of our Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific for his observations, keen observations, of the problems affecting the Six-Party Talks.

And again, welcome, Secretary Hill, and I look forward to hearing from you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. Ms. Lee of California.

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I actually want to thank you, Ranking Member Lantos, and our witness, Mr. Secretary, for being here today.
The specter of nuclear proliferation continues to be one of the most serious threats, as you know, that we face in the world today. And that is why like many of my colleagues, I was very encouraged by the reports last month of the Six-Party Talks. However, there are still many questions that loom over this agreement, and I hope those questions will be answered today.

For example, how do you see the timeline for disarming North Korea's nuclear programs? Furthermore, the demand for the light water reactors before disarming and the United States' reluctance to agree at this point as to the opening move—what is the next step and how all of these issues play—before this agreement can be signed.

So I hope that we are not at a stalemate with some of these looming issues, but I look forward to hearing your response, Ambassador Hill. Thank you again for being here.

Chairman HYDE. The gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

For the last few years that both the Six-Party Talks on North Korea and the EU talks with Iran have been taking place, proliferation and regional experts have been emphasizing a possible correlation between our actions toward North Korea and Iranian behavior, and response to international calls for it to stop its nuclear program.

North Korea is now demanding a range of economic benefits and concessions from the United States and Japan and is demanding receiving light water nuclear reactors in exchange for dismantlement. These demands are eerily reminiscent of the Iranian request from the European Union.

When talking about state sponsors of terrorism, any nuclear program is a proliferation concern. And so our actions and those of the international community have reverberations for our overall non-proliferation efforts, particularly with respect to rogue nations. North Korea's Six-Party statement failed to address core issues about timing, about the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and about the scope of the safeguard inspection process. I hope that our witness could address the issue of whether dismantlement and verification would follow the Libyan example where there was a clear United States role.

I thank the witness for being here today, and I look forward to his response to all of our questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. I believe those are all of the opening statements?

Mr. Poe has an opening statement. He will be recognized for 1 minute.

Mr. Poe. Thank you.

For over a decade, North Korea has been deceiving the entire national community. That regime has been breaking promises and disregards treaties it signs. It has played political games since the North Korean nuclear threat first emerged.

It is discouraging to see the outcome of the recent Six-Party Talks. China virtually guaranteed that the games North Korea has been playing will continue indefinitely, and now South Korea appears to be jumping on the same bandwagon.
It seems to me that negotiations with North Korea haven’t moved beyond where they were over 10 years ago, and yet we continue the facade and continue to cajole this totalitarian dictatorship. I personally don’t understand why we deal with outlaw, rogue nations in this unrealistic manner.

But I appreciate your time this morning, Mr. Hill, and look forward to hearing your perspective on this due to your involvement in these negotiations.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you.

Are there any more opening statements? If not, Assistant Secretary Christopher Hill is a career Foreign Service officer who previously served as Ambassador to Poland and to Macedonia and as Special Envoy during the Kosovo crisis. He was part of the diplomatic team which negotiated the Dayton Peace Accord in the mid-1990s which ended the war in Bosnia. Ambassador Hill served as a U.S. Peace Corps volunteer in Cameroon before joining the Department of State.

Ambassador, we are grateful that you could join us today, and please proceed with a 5-minute summary of your prepared testimony. Your actual full statement will be made a part of the record.

And Christopher—Ambassador Christopher Hill.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER R. HILL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. HILL. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for this opportunity to review the results of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing some 2 weeks ago and to discuss the way forward.

Ambassador Joseph DeTrani, the U.S. Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks, is here at my side as he was throughout the talks and he will also be happy to respond to questions from the Committee.

The key outcome in the September 19th Joint Statement is clear and unambiguous. It is the DPRK commitment to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, past and present, and to return at an early date to the Nonproliferation Treaty and to the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. The Joint Statement is intended as a set of signposts that guide us to the end point of the process.

That is, from the DPRK, we seek denuclearization. It must be denuclearization that is complete, because we cannot accept incomplete denuclearization and denuclearization that is verifiable, because we cannot accept denuclearization on the basis of trust. We need to do it on the basis of being able to verify. We also seek denuclearization that is irreversible, because we can’t have a situation where they can once again renuclearize. And we seek denuclearization on the basis of dismantlement, dismantlement that is taking apart these programs so that they cannot be put back together.

Of course, from the other parties there are also undertakings, undertakings in the areas of economic cooperation, energy assistance, and steps toward normalization of relations, provided that matters of bilateral concerns, such as human rights, are indeed addressed.
The parties agree to meet again in Beijing in November for the next phase of the talks, the working out the details, including the timing of the DPRK's denuclearization, as well as corresponding measures that the other parties will take. And these talks, to be sure, will involve some very, very tough negotiations.

There has been considerable comment on the question of the DPRK's right to a civilian nuclear program. The DPRK in the Joint Statement asserted that it has the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy. The other parties took note of this assertion and agreed to discuss, at an appropriate time, the subject of the provision of a light water reactor to the DPRK.

I will make clear again today, as I did in the talks in Beijing, that the United States would support a discussion about the subject of the provision of a light water reactor only—only—after the DPRK has promptly eliminated all nuclear weapons and all nuclear programs; that this has been verified to the satisfaction of all parties by credible international means, including the IAEA; and after the DPRK has come into full compliance with a nonproliferation treaty and IAEA safeguards, has demonstrated a sustained commitment to cooperation and to transparency and has ceased proliferating nuclear technology.

The Republic of Korea, Japanese, Russians, and Chinese delegations all made statements in this regard, each specifying they would handle any energy cooperation with the DPRK in strict accordance with their rights and their obligations under the Non-proliferation Treaty and with IAEA safeguards.

None of these members of the Six-Party process expressed a willingness to provide the DPRK with a light water reactor, understanding that the DPRK's legitimate energy needs are best met through other means.

We are preparing now for discussions at the next round of talks on DPRK actions to declare and dismantle its nuclear weapons programs and actions that the international community will take to verify that dismantlement. We will also need to consider economic cooperation, energy assistance, and normalization. We will be drawing up timelines and a sequencing of actions. Through diplomatic channels, we are in touch with the other parties.

The issues are indeed complex and interrelated, and negotiations will definitely be difficult. But I believe that each of the parties recognize that the realization of the vision laid out in the September 19th Joint Statement is in its fundamental interests. This provides a firm basis on which to proceed, and we will continue to work closely with the Committee, with Members of Congress, as we do so.

Mr. Chairman, I am here to answer any and all of your questions, and indeed I look forward to picking up on some of the themes that were raised in the opening statements. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hill follows:]
forward. Ambassador Joseph DeTrani, U. S. Special Envoy for Six-Party Talks, is appearing with me today, and while Ambassador DeTrani does not have a statement, he will be happy to respond to questions from the Committee.

The key outcome of the last round of Six-Party talks is clear, unambiguous, and endorsed by all Six Parties to the talks: It is the DPRK commitment to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and to return, at an early date, to the NPT and to IAEA safeguards.

The September 19 Joint Statement is a statement of principles designed to guide the parties on the way forward. It gives a vision of the end-point of the process—from the DPRK, prompt and verifiable denuclearization; from the other parties, economic cooperation, energy assistance, and steps toward normalization of relations, provided that matters of bilateral concern such as human rights are addressed.

The DPRK's agreement to abandon all of its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs is a critical step toward a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, and toward a more stable and secure Northeast Asia. The next phase, working out the details of the DPRK's denuclearization as well as corresponding measures that other parties will take, will involve tough negotiations. The DPRK's nuclear weapons and programs threaten peace and stability in the Northeast Asian region and beyond, as well as global nonproliferation regime. We believe that the Six-Party Talks are the best means of dealing with this threat. We are beginning to see results. But the time has come to move from declarations to real action. The parties agreed to hold the fifth round of Talks in Beijing in November, where the next step is to discuss a process and timetable for denuclearization.

In my remarks today, Mr. Chairman, I'll give a sense of the dynamic of the talks earlier this month in Beijing, elaborate on the elements of the agreement reached, and sketch out where we will go from here.

THE BEIJING TALKS

We held intensive discussions July 26 through August 7, recessing so delegations could consult with capitals and reconvening September 13 through 19. The six parties met together in plenary or smaller session most days, sometimes multiple times a day. We met with our allies, Japan and the Republic of Korea, daily. We met nearly every day with the Chinese delegation and the DPRK delegation, and most days as well with the Russian delegation.

All the delegations were serious and well-prepared, and the atmosphere was business-like. There was very little in the way of polemics. Discussions were to the point and focused on getting agreement on a package of elements for a joint statement that would bring us to the implementation phase.

I want to make special note of the important role China played in this round of Talks. China was a full participant. It also chaired the Talks. It pursued its national interests, but the Chinese delegation also acted as a kind of Secretariat, extracting from the positions put forward by all the parties elements that could be combined to form the basis of a joint statement. China circulated five drafts of the joint agreement during the fourth round, and I must say the Chinese drafting was deft. I don't think any of the parties were completely satisfied with the final product; that is the way with consensus documents, on which all parties have to make compromises. Still, the document allows us to get to the implementation phase as quickly as possible, and to move closer to the goal of denuclearization.

ELEMENTS OF THE JOINT STATEMENT

I'll now discuss the specific text of the Joint Statement.

For the first time, the DPRK committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards. The new DPRK commitment is broader in scope than was the case under the Agreed Framework, under which the DPRK agreed to cease a series of defined nuclear activities at specific facilities. While North Korea did freeze its graphite-moderated reactor programs, it subsequently violated the Agreed Framework and the 1992 inter-Korean joint declaration on denuclearizing the Peninsula by pursuing a clandestine uranium enrichment program. Although the DPRK's new pledge to dismantle is unambiguous, the proof of its intent will of course be in the nature of its declaration of nuclear weapons and programs, and then in the speed with which it abandons them.

In my closing statement at the talks, Mr. Chairman, I specified that the DPRK must comprehensively declare, and then completely, verifiably and irreversibly eliminate, all elements of its past and present nuclear programs—plutonium and uranium—and all of its nuclear weapons, and not reconstitute those programs in the
future. I made clear that to return to the NPT and come into full compliance with IAEA safeguards, the DPRK would, among other things, need to cooperate on all steps deemed necessary to verify the correctness and completeness of its declarations of nuclear materials and activities. My counterparts from all the other parties to the Six-Party Talks stipulated in their own closing remarks that the signal achievement of the fourth round was the DPRK's commitment to undertake full denuclearization. All my counterparts stressed that it was incumbent on the DPRK to abandon its nuclear status, return to the NPT and abide by IAEA safeguards.

There has been much comment on the DPRK's future right to a civilian nuclear program. The DPRK, in the Joint Statement, asserted that it has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The other parties took note of this assertion and agreed to discuss, at an appropriate time, the subject of the provision of a light water reactor to the DPRK.

We have been crystal clear with respect to when the “appropriate time” would be to discuss with the DPRK provision of a light water reactor. The U.S. will only support such a discussion:

- after the DPRK had promptly eliminated all nuclear weapons and all nuclear programs, and this had been verified to the satisfaction of all parties by credible international means, including the IAEA; and
- after the DPRK had come into full compliance with the NPT and IAEA safeguards, had demonstrated a sustained commitment to cooperation and transparency, and had ceased proliferating nuclear technology.

The Korean, Japanese, Russian and Chinese delegations made statements in this regard, each specifying that they would handle any energy cooperation with DPRK in strict accordance with rights and obligations under the NPT and IAEA safeguards. None of them expressed a willingness to provide the DPRK with an LWR, understanding that the DPRK's legitimate energy needs are best met through other means. The DPRK Foreign Ministry, in a September 20 press statement, said the DPRK would return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards only after it received a light water reactor from the United States. The September 20 assertion is inconsistent with the language in the Joint Statement and at odds with statements made by all of the other parties. Subsequent DPRK comments appear to modify the September 20 demand, but do not provide the clarity that we need. I will note again that none of the other parties expressed a willingness to provide the DPRK with an LWR.

In my closing statement in Beijing, I noted that the NPT recognized that Treaty parties could pursue peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the context of compliance with Articles I and II of the Treaty. Foremost among the Treaty's obligations for all but the five nuclear-weapons states is the commitment not to possess or pursue nuclear weapons. The Treaty also calls for its parties to adhere to safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Thus, the DPRK's statement concerning its “right” to peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be premised on the verifiable elimination of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs as well as the nation's coming into full compliance with the NPT and IAEA safeguards.

I also noted in my statement that the United States supported a decision by the end of this year to terminate KEDO and its light-water reactor project. We believe that KEDO as an organization has served its purpose and that now we need new, more secure, arrangements to carry out denuclearization.

As the DPRK takes steps to denuclearize, the other parties have agreed to a number of corresponding measures. In the Joint Statement, the U.S. affirmed that we have no nuclear weapons on the territory of the ROK and that we have no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons. But we do continue to worry about the large conventional forces the DPRK maintains. Let me underscore that the U.S. remains committed to our alliance with the ROK, and has no plan to withdraw additional troops from the Peninsula.

The Joint Statement specifies in the context of denuclearization, the U.S. and the DPRK will take steps to normalize bilateral relations, subject to bilateral policies. In my statement, I made clear the United States desires to normalize relations subject to resolution of our longstanding concerns. By this I meant that as a necessary part of the process leading to normalization, we must discuss important issues including human rights, biological and chemical weapons, ballistic missile programs, proliferation of conventional weapons, terrorism and other illicit activities. I left no doubt that if the DPRK wished to return to the international community, it would have to commit to international standards across the board, and then prove its intentions.

In the Joint Statement, the U.S. and its partners agreed to identify means of addressing the DPRK’s energy needs. The ROK reaffirmed its proposal of July 12, 2005 concerning the provision of 2 million kilowatts of electric power to the DPRK.
The proposal provides an expedited and non-nuclear solution to the DPRK's urgent need for energy, opening the way for economic modernization and development. The United States is considering how it might participate in provision of energy assistance. We are also thinking about how we might assist with retraining the DPRK's nuclear scientists and workers.

Throughout the talks we appreciated the close cooperation and steadfast support of our Japanese and ROK allies. Our trilateral consultations allowed us to achieve progress. We were pleased to see that the GOJ and DPRK in the Joint Statement said that they would undertake to normalize their relations in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of settlement of the unfortunate past and outstanding issues of concern. Japan's delegate, in his closing statement, made clear that those issues included missiles and abductions; the U.S. supports this position. When implemented, the total package of the undertakings in the Joint Statement will advance the U.S. national interest by denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. The package is aimed at eliciting North Korean actions that will enhance the integrity of the global non-proliferation regime. If implemented, it will provide new opportunities for growth and stability in East Asia, and a new and better future for the North Korean people.

NEXT STEPS

The parties agreed to hold the Fifth Round of Six-Party Talks in Beijing in early November. We are preparing for those meetings now. The next step will be to have discussions on key elements of the Joint Statement, especially regarding DPRK actions to declare and dismantle its nuclear weapons program, and actions that the international community will take to verify that dismantlement. We will also begin to consider economic cooperation, energy assistance and a normalization process. We will be drawing up time-lines and sequencing of actions. Through diplomatic channels, we are in touch with the other parties.

As we implement key elements of the Joint Statement, we will continue to take steps to protect ourselves and our allies from North Korea's proliferation and illicit activities. We have recently strengthened the Proliferation Security Initiative, consulted with key partners on DPRK conventional arms sales, and taken action under Section 311 of the Patriot Act against a bank in Macau used by the North Koreans for money laundering.

The way forward is to build on the agreement that we reached last month in Beijing. The issues are complex and interrelated, and negotiations will be difficult. But I believe that each of the parties recognizes that the realization of the vision laid out in the September 19 Joint Statement is in its fundamental interest. This provides a firm basis on which to proceed. We will continue to work closely with the Committee as we do so.

Chairman Hyde. Thank you, Ambassador Hill. Mr. Lantos.

Mr. Lantos. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to use some of my time to react to some of the opening statements because I think purely denouncing the Government of North Korea and rehashing its past mistakes is not very productive. Dramatically more severe criticisms could have been laid at the doorstep of the Soviet Union for over a period of 70 years, yet the Reagan Administration proceeded with a willingness to recognize that it is conceivable that new directions will be followed by the Soviet Union.

And while I have plenty of criticism for the Putin regime, the fact is that the Soviet Union has changed its policies. In point of fact, it no longer exists as such. Some of its former constituent republics are democratic in nature, not just the three Baltic States, and the whole world is infinitely better off that the Cold War is behind us. So regurgitating criticism of the North Korean regime I don't think at this stage is helpful at all.

Secondly, I believe that we need to look at the human tragedy which has unfolded in North Korea in recent years. Estimates vary as to the number of people who starved to death during the last decade, ranging from 1 million to 2 1/2 million people, which in
American terms would be something like 20 to 30 million people starving to death in the United States.

Jan Égelant, the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator, stated in late September, and I quote:

“Abruptly halting humanitarian assistance programs at the end of the year would be potentially disastrous for the millions of people who benefit from humanitarian assistance, including food and medicines provided by the United Nations.”

According to United Nations statistics, and even if these are not precise and accurate, Mr. Chairman, they give one a feel for the orders of magnitude for the humanitarian crisis North Korea faces, 40 percent of North Korean children suffer from stunted growth, 20 percent are underweight, and the average 7-year-old boy is 7 inches shorter and 20 pounds lighter than his South Korean counterpart. Now, we all have experience with 7-year-old boys, our own, or grandchildren, or friends’ children. And to visualize a peninsula basically made up of a homogenous ethnic stock where children above the 38th parallel at age seven are 7 inches shorter and 20 pounds lighter than the same children south of the 38th parallel is a shocking fact of life.

My judgment is that we have an opportunity for a breakthrough. And as I mentioned in my opening comments, Secretary Rice and Ambassador Hill deserve our full support as they explore an incredibly difficult negotiating terrain with North Korea.

The current issue of the Weekly Standard has a delightful parody of negotiations with North Korea. I urge all of my colleagues to read that parody, because it captures the enormous difficulties our negotiators will face when they return to the Six-Party Talks.

But we have moved ahead. When I visited in January, there was no guarantee that they would return to the talks. And when my colleague Mr. Leach and I visited in September, there was no guarantee that the Agreement on Principles would be signed.

Both of these things happened. The negotiations resume in November. And I would like to ask, Secretary Hill, where does your proposed visit to North Korea stand? I think it is exceptionally important for you to visit them in their own country and to continue developing the relationship which I know you have begun to develop with them because they told Mr. Leach and me that they have enjoyed their dealings with you and they view you as a singularly appropriate interlocutor.

Ambassador Hill. Mr. Congressman, with respect to our contacts with the DPRK, we have been guided by the concept that we are prepared to reach an arrangement, reach a settlement, with the DPRK in the context of the Six-Party Talks. That is, we do not want to seek a bilateral settlement. We want it to be multilateral. This is based on the fact that nuclear weapons in the DPRK are not just the United States’ problem; they are the problem of many other countries, especially their neighbors.

Mr. LANTOS. If I may interrupt you for a minute. Both in January and in September, Mr. Leach and I made it crystal-clear that we view the appropriate venue to be the Six-Party Talks and only the Six-Party Talks.
Ambassador Hill. Thank you. And this is important, because we want it to be clear that if the DPRK wants to back away from this agreement, it backs away not only from the United States, it backs away from its neighbors. And its neighbors have been there for thousands of years and are likely to be there for another 1,000 years. So it is very important that everybody be engaged.

It is also very important, in my opinion, that we have these contacts with the DPRK, albeit within the framework of the Six-Party Talks. We need to be able to talk to them and to hear what they are saying, and we need our message to get very directly to them.

So in that spirit, I had numerous contacts with the DPRK through the Beijing—in the Beijing talks, but actually preceding the Beijing talks when I met with them, when I met with my DPRK counterpart on July 9th in Beijing to begin this process.

We have also had considerable contacts through what we call the New York channel. This is through the DPRK diplomatic representatives in New York. In particular, Ambassador DeTrani has been the point man for this.

With respect to additional contacts, I believe it is very important to keep the momentum of this process going, and therefore, we need to be talking with them. But with respect to travel plans at this point, I do not have travel plans to DPRK or to any other country at this point. We have been here in Washington since the last round. We have been working very hard within the U.S. Government agencies to prepare ourselves for the next round. So this period—let me call it a sort of interagency bureaucratic period—will be followed in coming weeks by a diplomatic process where we will be reaching out to partners. And at that time, we will be making a determination of the precise travel schedules.

Mr. LANTOS. Would you like to visit North Korea?

Ambassador Hill. Well, if I can be sure that this will advance our country's interests in the Six-Party process, yes, I would.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Leach.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have several broad questions, and let me just lay it out.

According to the Joint Statement, North Korea is committed to returning at an early date to the Treaty of Nonproliferation and the IAEA safeguards. And so one of my queries will be, what does this mean, an early date? A few weeks, a few months a few years?

And as part of that, during our discussions with the North Korean officials they asserted that they are continuing with reactor construction and plutonium reprocessing at Yongbyon. Will this come under IAEA safeguards soon, or do you expect that to cease as part of this agreement?

The second set of questions relates to the Joint Statement, specifically, raising normalization of relations between Washington and Pyongyang. How do you see that as proceeding? And in that context, do you see a role, as Congressman Lantos and I have suggested, of greater exchanges, people-to-people types of things, whether it be circuses, whether it be wrestling teams, or poets or whatever? And where does the Administration at this time stand on that set of issues?
Ambassador Hill. Well, the sequence of North Korean obligations in the statement is as it is stated; that is, first, we want them to abandon their weapons. And by abandon, we mean to have them essentially taken away. We need for them to abandon all nuclear programs, all existing nuclear programs. This is very important because we did not want to get into an argument of which program is related to nuclear weapons and which is not.

What we wanted to make very clear—and this was accepted by the DPRK delegation—that all of their existing programs to date are, in fact, weapons-related. They are all weapons-related, and therefore, all their programs should be abandoned.

So the concept here is that they get rid of their weapons and all their programs. They then reenter the Nonproliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state. And once they reenter, they accept the IAEA safeguards. At that point we would be prepared, subject to the appropriate time—and the appropriate time comes after that point, to have a discussion about peaceful nuclear energy; i.e., about the subject of a provision of a light water reactor.

So the sequence is as it is shown in the agreement. First they get out of the weapons business. Then they get back into the treaty.

Now, how long that will take is hard to say because no country has ever pulled itself out of the NPT before. This was rather unusual, to be sure. And so there has to be a determination of the time frame and of how they would get in, how the IAEA would verify that they are indeed a non-nuclear state at that point. So these details have to be worked out.

And I cannot emphasize enough the fact that what we have here is really the beginning of the process; that it is an agreement on principle, principle that they get out of the nuclear business, agreement on the principle that they should be back in the NPT.

So the sequence of this is stated from the agreement, but the timing is—the timing is not. So I suspect we will have some work to do.

With regard or with respect to the issue of our normalization, this is a process that will take some time because the United States does not establish diplomatic relations solely on the basis of whether a country is ceasing to make nuclear weapons. There will be bilateral policies that will need to be observed. And one of these policies that is very important to us is the issue of human rights. North Korea's human rights record is, to be sure, among one of the worst. And to be sure, this has to be addressed. I know a lot of people believe that to raise human rights in the context of a subject like nuclear weapons is somehow a subject that is difficult for those negotiations.

In fact, if the purpose of this overall negotiation is that North Korea denuclearizes and in return North Korea enters the international community, the international community has some standards with respect to human rights, and it is absolutely appropriate to discuss some of those standards sooner rather than later. I know many countries have difficulties with having their human rights record discussed. But it is something every country submits itself to, including ours. And there is no reason why the DPRK cannot also get used to this fact.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Faleomavaega.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I may be wrong, but it seems to me that one cannot package the Six-Party Talks in one little issue, in and of itself, without considering other forces or events that have greatly influenced certain countries that have publicly announced their intentions to develop nuclear capability, not only for peaceful purposes but also for a nuclear weapons capability. And I sense that North Korea is one of these countries.

It seems to me that there are two elements, in my humble opinion, that are very critical in these negotiations. And one of them being trust or distrust of each other. It seems to me from the very beginning, 4, 5 years ago, that this was always the element, whether North Koreans have had a very strong distrust of our intentions, the presence of some 37,000 military troops in South Korea, the fear that we may have nuclear capability to respond, given the fact that Seoul is so close to the borderline of the 38th parallel. So I think without this as an essential element in the negotiations process, you are in for some very difficult times in negotiating with North Korea.

The other critical element that I believe is, as it was raised earlier by some of my colleagues, the whole issue of nonproliferation. As it is clearly demonstrated in recent failure among the nuclear haves and the nuclear have-nots. The conference that was held at the United Nations in New York. I believe a couple of months ago was, I call it, a complete failure because there was no agreement. There was an absolute stalemate of countries that don’t have nuclear weapons telling countries that have nuclear weapons—saying, where is it? That to say that you have the right to have nuclear weapons and the rest of us do not? And we have got two countries that are not part of that nuclear club, if you will, and one in Pakistan and India; one is controlled by a military officer and one is also under control by one of the largest democracies in the world. That is of India.

And I have said time and time again over the years, when India exploded its first nuclear device in 1974 and made an appeal before the United Nations, especially among the nuclear countries, when are we going to be serious about nuclear nonproliferation for the countries that do have nuclear weapons to start dismantling them at some time period or some time frame so that we don’t have this madness, if you will, or the real serious problem of dealing with nuclear weapons?

And I cannot agree more with President Reagan’s favorite proverbial expression, “Trust but verify,” but then this expression goes both ways. How will it be for the North Koreans to know for sure that we don’t have nuclear weapons in South Korea? I mean we can tell them, yes, trust us. It is the honor of our country that makes a statement, whether in writing or through verbal expression that we don’t have nuclear weapons. But going back to that very expression, trust but verify, I think it goes both ways.

And in my humble opinion, Mr. Secretary, that trust, it seems to me, is probably the most crucial element in this whole negotiation process; if we could get the trust of the North Koreans then
the North Koreans will have their absolute trust in what we say and what we do. This is really that important.

Do you believe, Mr. Secretary, that Iran’s recent announcements that it will proceed to develop its nuclear programs, supposedly for peaceful needs, do you think that the North Koreans may not have taken notice of this—I wouldn’t say defiance, but certainly telling the world we want to do this because it is critically needed by our country. Why is it the United States is objecting to this if it is for peaceful purposes? I wanted to ask you that first question.

Ambassador Hill. I will answer that first question, and go to the others. Actually I will answer that last question because it is fairly easy for me to answer.

In the Bureau of the East Asian Pacific Affairs, I have got a lot of problems and a lot of headaches but, unfortunately, Iran is not one of them. However, I would be happy to go back and speak to my colleague, David Welsh, that you would like him to come and give a discussion about Iran. But truly I have a lot of issues on my plate, and Iran is handled in a neighboring bureau. But you have picked up on a lot of very important points here, and let me try to address them.

First of all, with respect to peaceful purposes and whether North Korea has a right to peaceful use of energy, I think it is important to keep in mind that North Korea has had a nuclear energy program for some 25 years. To date, it has not connected a single kilowatt hour into the national electricity grid. North Korea’s nuclear energy program has produced a lot more plutonium than it has lit up any light bulbs.

So to believe that they have in mind a peaceful purpose is really to overlook the fact that, historically, they have had real troubles keeping peaceful programs peaceful. So we have to be very vigilant about this and very concerned. I think the way we have laid it out that they first need to get rid of these programs, get themselves back into international standing as a non-nuclear state, is the right procedure. And I was very pleased that with respect to the other partners in this process, the Russians, the Chinese, the South Koreans, the Japanese, nobody, nobody was interested in addressing nuclear cooperation with North Korea while they are out of this status. So I think we have got that right, and the issue will be to get it implemented.

With regard to trust, as a career diplomat, it is always a source of irony to me people think to be diplomatic is not to tell the truth. I think frankly speaking it is quite the opposite. I think it is so important in my line of work to make sure that the person on the other side of the table understands me clearly. Because if I have miscommunicated something, if I have said that something is not important when something is important, it can lead to very, very serious consequences. So I think it is very important for us to be clear and honest with each other, and I think frankly that also is the way to build up trust.

For example, I did mention human rights. I did talk about human rights because to ignore human rights is to pretend that that issue is somehow not important or will not emerge as a problem down the road. So I think it is very important to be honest
with people. You do not have to be rude. You just have to be honest.

So I like to think that I have put my cards on the table in a spirit of trying to solve problems. And to be very clear with people and to not hide from the facts is, I think, the way to overcome this ocean of mistrust.

To be short, we are going to need verification. When one is discussing nuclear weapons one cannot rely on trust, as President Reagan famously said. We do need a verification system that is adequate to our purposes. We need to be able to go in front of Committees, such as yours, and say honestly that we can certify what is going on. So we do need a verification system.

With respect to our troops in South Korea, no reasonable person can believe that our troops in South Korea are there to invade North Korea. They are there to protect South Korea and to uphold our treaty responsibilities to South Korea. I know there are efforts from time to time by North Korea to put the United States, South Korean treaty on the table. The treaty that we have with the Republic of Korea is between us and the Republic of Korea. It is not for North Korea to somehow undermine. They can try all they want, but it is a very important treaty for our interests. I would also argue it is a very important treaty for South Korea's interests. We have made some assurances to North Korea, and I think these assurances should be taken very seriously. When we say we have no intention to attack North Korea, either by conventional or nuclear weapons, this is a very important assurance that I think they can take very, very seriously.

So I think in regard to our relationships on the Korean peninsula with the Republic of Korea we are in a very good position. We are working very closely with them. And it is our sincerest hope that with North Korea we can achieve this agreement and then get on to some kind of relationship because all of the humanitarian issues that Mr. Lantos describes are very real, and I think they should affect us all as human beings.

When we hear statistics like that about the children in North Korea we should all be very moved by it and moved to find ways to address it. So we do, indeed, have a lot of work ahead of us.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Newsweek reported in its October 3 issue that Chinese officials pressured the American delegation on the wording of the joint statement, reportedly asserting that this is the final draft, take it or leave it. And there have always been press reports in South Korea that Seoul pushed the United States to give in to North Korea.

What kind of pressure was put on our delegation from other participants in the Six-Party Talks, and what were the impact of this pressure on the text. And secondly, Ambassador Hill, at the U.S. Institute of Peace, you recently stated that China is in agreement with the United States that the sequencing of measures described in the Six-Party statement must begin with dismantlement. Do you
believe that China would abide by such a commitment? And when you consider China's proliferation and assistance to Iran, for example, do you think that China can be trusted to make this commitment to the Bush Administration and to others in the talks? Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador Hill. Thank you. With regard to the issue of delegations pressuring each other, I want to assure you that I exerted a little pressure of my own. And these were tough, very tough last 48 hours of negotiation. The way the process worked is that the Chinese delegation also acted as a sort of secretariat to the Six-Party Talks, and as such they would produce drafts. In fact, they produced four drafts, and then on the last day they produced changes to the fourth draft. In so doing they would take the comments of the various delegations, and they would incorporate the comments into the draft on the basis of forming their own compromises. That is saying, okay, side A seems to really want this sentence, so we are going to put this in there. And this other sentence did not seem as important to side A, but country C wanted that. So there were no brackets in the text. These were intended as final documents if they could get everyone to agree to them. There were elements of the earlier drafts that I simply told the Chinese were absolutely unacceptable, and we had some vigorous discussions about those, often through interpreters, which perhaps was useful at certain moments, I must say, since certain words did not get translated in ways that would embarrass any of us. But we, I think, had very, very clear understanding of what our bottom lines were.

I must tell you that the presence of the term “light water reactor” was not welcomed on our side. It was clear it was put in there in an effort to make the deal palatable to the DPRK, but our concern was to make sure in looking at that reference to make sure it did not put us in a situation where we have to agree to a light water reactor in advance of dismantlement or that we have to agree that we will provide a light water reactor if they dismantle. So the way it was put was we would agree at an appropriate time, which would be determined by all of us, including the U.S. Delegation, at an appropriate time we would agree to a discussion about the subject, about the provision of a light water reactor.

So we looked hard at that language with the view of determining does that box us in, does that create a situation where we somehow give the wrong signals? And we felt we could live with that. And so we went with that.

Certainly the Chinese were very interested in reaching a deal. And frankly, we want them to be interested in reaching a deal. We do not want a situation where only the U.S. cares about a deal. We want the other countries, especially China, to understand that this deal is important to us all. And so the degree to which the Chinese were concerned about trying to get this deal, I think, is a very positive step. I might add, I think, it is also a very positive step for United States-Chinese relations that we can work together on a very tough issue, and make no mistake, dealing with North Koreans and their nuclear weapons programs is a tough issue.

I must say I used to work in the Balkans, and now I think that I have realized, at least, none of those countries had nuclear weap-
ons. I wish I had been comforted by that thought at the time. But I think we can work well with the Chinese. They care about this, and I think this is a positive development in our relations with China.

Chairman Hyde. Ms. Lee.

Ms. Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador Hill, again, for your very straightforward answers. I want to follow up with Mr. Faleomavaega's question with regard to verification.

I think we all agree that it is extremely important that the United States seek verification in our nonproliferation efforts. The world could blow up as a result of nuclear weapons. With regard to North Korea, I want to ask you, do think that same right because when you responded to Mr. Faleomavaega, you said we had given them assurances we have no intentions, and we know they need to take us seriously. So I am trying to understand that kind of inconsistency or consistency in our policy, first of all.

My second question goes to the light water reactor, in terms of the North Koreans, how do they see this? It is my understanding, and I want you to clarify this, that they believe, or they are not going to abandon its nuclear programs until the United States gives some sort of assurances with regard to light water reactor.

Now, again, as I said in my opening statement, could this be a stalemate? It almost seems like a Catch 22, and how do we get past that if that is the North Koreans' perception of this provision?

Finally, let me say, you referred to the light water reactor as a light water reactor in the statement. It says light water reactor, and I know there has been some confusion. Are we talking about light water reactors or a light water reactor? What exactly are we talking about in the statement?

Ambassador Hill. With respect to the light water reactor, I think the concept there was one light water reactor. I would like to point out that the so-called agreed framework of 1994 had in it the provision of two light water reactors, and the total involved some 2,000 megawatts, that is 1,000 megawatt per light water reactor. In this Six-Party statement of principles, the energy that would have been provided by those two light water reactors, that is the 2,000 megawatts is to be provided by conventional power from South Korea. So the energy portion of this agreement is different from the agreed framework in that instead of light water reactors it is conventional power from South Korea.

The provision, or the subject of the provision, or the discussion of the discussion of the provision of a light water reactor, is something very much in the future and has not been described, because the discussion will not start until the appropriate time, and we have said the appropriate time comes after North Korea is back in the NPT with IAEA safeguards and assurances.

Ms. Lee. And the agreement lays that time table out? That is what appropriate time means per the agreement? Because in reading the agreement, it is hard to discern when that is.

Ambassador Hill. The agreement only says the word, the term “appropriate time.” We said in our statement, in the closing plenary, we defined appropriate time as did the Japanese delegation, as did the South Korean delegation, and that was, in fact, posted on the South Korean foreign ministry Web site for easy reference.
Let me say something about the United States assurances because what the DPRK has said is they need a nuclear weapons program in order to provide for their security. And we have tried to make the point that a nuclear weapons program is doing anything but providing for security. What the DPRK needs to provide for its security is to have good attention relations with its neighbors and good relations with important countries, like the United States. And so what this agreement will do, provided it is implemented, is that it will hope the road for the DPRK to have these good relations, and those good relations will provide far more security than the nuclear weapons programs they have today.

Ms. Lee. But do they have a right to verification just as we have?

Ambassador Hill. Well, they have a right to be sure that what we are saying is, in fact, truthful, and we will make sure that that is adequate.

Ms. Lee. But not consistent with how we conduct our verification process?

Ambassador Hill. Are you referring to United States nuclear weapons? The agreement involves South Korea will make an affirmation that it has no nuclear weapons on its territory.

Ms. Lee. Can North Korea verify that?

Ambassador Hill. Well, we have not worked out how North Korea will accept that statement, but we believe we can do that.

Ms. Lee. Thank you.

Chairman Hyde. Mr. Boozman.

Mr. Boozman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to follow up just a little bit on what you were just talking about in the sense that I understand the principles of getting out of the nuclear business, and that we are trying to do that and getting back into the NPT. I guess it would help me if you could give us your opinion as to why North Korea is pursuing what it is doing. Is it a status thing, or do they really need the energy? Do they want to sell these weapons? Do you feel like they will be using them on other countries in the region, South Korea or whatever? But I think it really would help me just to get your opinion as to the thinking, or is it possible that the regime is so unpredictable that we really do not know what they are thinking.

Ambassador Hill. Well, I think the nuclear weapons program in North Korea has been around for some 25 years, so we are talking about a mindset there. It is not just the product of the current leadership. It has been around for quite a while. I think it is related to some concept of status, that somehow being a member of nuclear weapons club is a sign that the country has achieved some international standing. Remember, when this program got going, that was often how you defined how a country was doing, was whether it was in this nuclear weapons club. Clearly that has been overtaken by events, and what we find today is that countries aspiring to nuclear weapons are often countries that are not doing very well otherwise. So as for proliferation, we have seen many signs. Unfortunately, many signs that the DPRK tries to use weapons technology and its missile technology, for example, its various weapons technologies and tried to proliferate that. For that reason, the United States needs to, and we are doing this, embark on our
defensive measures to make sure that this sort of thing does not harm us. And we have made absolutely clear that if we find this kind of this type of material in the hands of outside of DPRK, there would be very serious consequences indeed, and they understand that.

We have also had very clear understandings with our partners about this, and frankly, the way the DPRK has behaved in trying to achieve in trying to proliferate various weapons technology has assisted us in working with other countries because they understand that the threat is real.

Mr. BOOZMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Schiff.

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador, thank you for your time today. I had a couple of discrete questions in somewhat different areas, and let me see how many I can get through. The first is, I am interested in what effect, if any, the proposed nuclear deal with India has had on the negotiations. You mentioned the centrality of China’s role. I agree China is a key player. Has China, or any of the five members of the Six-Party Talks, raised a concern about the India deal, particularly when it has been disclosed or alleged that the motivation behind the India deal is to provide a nuclear check to China? Has North Korea or China raised any complication of giving the benefits of essentially NPT compliance to a nation that is out of compliance and not a member of the NPT?

Ambassador HILL. Well, I must say that in the course of my conversations in the Six-Party process, the subject of India did not come up. It did not come up with the DPRK delegation; it did not come up with the Chinese either. I understand the question, because obviously, the subject matter very much relates. But to answer your question, it did not come up.

Mr. SCHIFF. Do you know whether China has raised objection outside the Six-Party Talks to the proposed deal with India?

Ambassador HILL. I am not aware of that, but I will get back to you on that.

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you. Another question I had was what impact the discussions, and again, if you do not know we can follow up later, what impact the discussions with North Korea has had with respect to our discussions, or lack of discussions with Iran? I understand the compelling points made in favor of Six-Party Talks with North Korea. It does raise a question about whether it would be desirable to have Six-Party Talks with India with the different six party involved but Russia, Germany, France, Britain, the United States. Is there any thought given to Six-Party structure for dealing with Iran?

Ambassador HILL. I am not aware that there has been a thought given to that, but I do want to emphasize that I do not deal with the Iran question. I certainly am aware of the issues there, but I am not the person to ask about this. I can certainly make sure that you get a good answer to your question.

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you. Let me focus more on what you have been directly addressing. In the prior Administration, there was a more or less two-track strategy of carrots and sticks. The carrots being engagements, being light water reactors, some normal
sayings of relations. The sticks being punitive action, economic sanction, the threat of possible military force. Has there been a plan B communicated to North Korea about what United States policy is likely to be if North Korea basically filibusters the talks and they do not produce the result or it backs away from the agreement that has been reached thus far?

Ambassador Hill. We have made abundantly clear to the North Koreans that we have a lot of different options for dealing with this problem. We have taken nothing off the table in that regard. But the one option we do not have is to walk away. So we have to deal with this problem. We have to solve this problem. We have certainly spoken in very clear terms about how North Korea would face, truly, if they turn their backs on this process and walked away from us and from the other their four neighbors, they would truly be walking off into a wilderness of isolation.

To be sure, in saying that, we will pursue this, and we will eventually address this problem. I have not resorted to specific threats of that kind. Except to say that we will address this and that all means will be on the table. I believe the North Koreans understand that. I believe they understand that we are very, very serious about this subject. And I am hopeful that their participation in this fourth round, which was of a qualitative improvement compared to previous participations, I think that really shows that they are serious about it. But we will see.

Chairman Hyde. Ambassador, I was concerned to note the injection of the light water reactor issue in the talks after, I guess, three or four drafts had already been vetted, suddenly North Korea comes in with a requirement that they get a light water reactor. And then I note it takes about 10 years to get a light water reactor built from scratch, even though there are other beginnings of light water reactors that have been suspend. But does not the injection of that issue when it was introduced indicate a lack of seriousness on the part of North Korea to reach an agreement?

Ambassador Hill. Well, we have taken the view that with respect to energy, what North Korea needs is electricity, not more nuclear energy. And indeed, this statement of principles includes the reference to the 2,000 megawatts of conventional power supplied by South Korea, and the North Koreans accepted that. The fact that they want, at some point, a provision of a light water reactor is something that, at this point, we have no interest in supporting. As I said earlier, they have had trouble keeping peaceful programs peaceful. Indeed, in their 25 years of nuclear energy they have not produced any electricity. They have just produced plutonium metal.

So we have made it clear that we are not interested in pursuing this. But we did, in looking at the overall agreement, feel it was in our interests to proceed with this agreement because the reference to the light water reactor refers to the fact that the other parties will at an appropriate time, an appropriate time which we have defined and the other parties have defined as coming after the DPRK is in its international status, and it is outside of its international status today, that after that we would agree to a discussion.
If the DPRK takes that to mean that they must get a light water reactor before they abandon their weapons programs, that is a complete, that is a willful misreading of the agreement. And it means essentially that they are backing away from this agreement, backing away from us and backing away from all our other partners. When they back away from the agreement on the basis of this light water reactor, or on the basis of something else, it is the same thing; they are backing away from the agreement.

So if they want to back away from the agreement, they could use the excuse of the light water reactor. They could use a lot of excuses. So I firmly believe there is nothing in this agreement with respect to light water reactor that encumbers us or undermines our goal of getting them out of the nuclear business forthwith.

Chairman Hyde. Thank you, Ambassador. We have exhausted all of our questions for the moment. If we have any more we will submit them in writing. I want to congratulate you on doing a most difficult job with grace and with sincerity and with productivity. It is about as tough a negotiation as there is and you handled it very well. And we wish you continued good luck. Thank you.

The Committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]