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and Nonproliferation

Nonproliferation and the Group of Eight (G-8)

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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, it is an honor to once again testify before the subcommittee on an issue of such critical importance to our nation's security. The urgency of the multiple nuclear threats facing all Americans, as well as our friends and allies around the world cannot be understated. Yet despite the grave reality of these threats, these dangers continue to be underappreciated by the public and in many quarters of the U.S. and foreign governments. I commend you for helping to raise the profile of this issue and spur debate on what the United States Government is doing, is not doing, and can do better to protect our great country from this, our top security threat.

Mr. Chairman, I have commended the current administration for championing the role of the G-8 in the cause of nonproliferation. Building on groundwork laid by its predecessor, the Bush administration helped galvanize international awareness that the affects of a nuclear attack would be felt far beyond the blast zone. A nuclear terrorist strike would have unprecedented and global societal, political and economic implications. Self-interest dictates that the G-8 countries – as the countries with the most economically to lose from such an attack -- take action to prevent such a nightmare from becoming reality. The creation of the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction remains a high water point for efforts by this administration to confront this acute danger and for that it should be recognized. The formation of the Global Partnership, initially known as the **Ten Plus Ten Over Ten** (\$10 billion from the US, \$10 billion from other G-8 partners over 10 years) is a true accomplishment and a symbol of America's ability to harness its economic and political relationships to the broader good, as well as in its own self-interests.

Yet despite broad rhetorical support and the pledges of additional financial resources by our G-8 partners, I am sorry to say that efforts by our government and the G-8 collectively are falling short and our urgency is fading fast. Worse, this is not just a flaw within the Global Partnership, but symptomatic of our broader anti-proliferation efforts within the United States. We have not yet learned the lesson that good is just not good

enough in the battle against nuclear terrorism. The vast majority of G-8 pledges are just that, pledges. The money and expertise are needed now to ensure that the threats we all face are reduced and eliminated as quickly as possible. A number of factors have delayed the rapid implementation of critical projects. To be sure, one of the top reasons is the lack of effective leadership and management from and with Russia, which must do more to deserve its place in the partnership as more than just a mere recipient. While some progress has been made in helping Russia see the need to take independent action and organize more effectively, much remains to be done. But in the end, we are here to assess our own record and consider what policies the United States might adopt to ensure its own interests and those of our G-8 partners. That record leaves much to be desired.

It has been said many times but perhaps said best by Senator Sam Nunn. We are in a race for our lives. It is us versus the terrorists and the terrorists are winning. A quick review of the administration's own milestones makes clear that despite good words and intentions, we are not giving steps to prevent a nuclear attack against this country the utmost urgency they demand. As examples, let me cite just two key objectives many experts see as absolute requirements to protect this country from a terrorist nuclear attack – securing nuclear materials in Russia and recovering nuclear materials from research facilities around the globe – respectively known as MPC&A and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative. Both of these vital programs have timelines that stretch out far too long. While the Bush administration has recently moved up the MPC&A program timetable and stated its intention to complete nuclear security upgrades in the former Soviet Union by 2008 instead of the 2013 originally envisioned, no one believes that this objectives will be achieved. The political resources are just not there and there are real concerns that this new aggressive target is as much a result of statistical “creativity” as project engineering. Likewise, the GTRI or Global Clean out, designed to keep those materials most likely to end up in the hands of terrorists – those poorly protected in research facilities across the globe - is now slated to be completed in 10 years. WWII was fought and won in just over half that time. My colleagues and I at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace have recommended in our recent policy proposal

*Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security*¹ that the United States undertake and complete the same task in 4 years, with the requisite dedication of resources, including manpower and incentives for other countries to cooperate.

And I am sorry to say that when one looks at the pace of cooperation and achievements within the G-8 Global Partnership, the results and sense of urgency track the same as with these other important activities. In some areas, we are moving at the same or even a slower pace that before the 9/11 attacks. Yes, our G-8 partners have committed substantial resources to the challenge, and they now help share the burden. But these pledges have fallen far short of the initial goal of 10 billion additional dollars hoped for. This is to say nothing of the ambition that the \$20 billion should be seen as a floor, not a ceiling to the international commitment of resources. As of June 2005, pledges to the G-8 Global Partnership totaled roughly \$17 billion. It is good news that thirteen non-G-8 states have committed to making pledges including Australia, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Korea, Sweden, and Switzerland. But only eight have actually made pledges thus far (Australia, Czech Republic, Finland, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland). These partners and their pledges are a sign of hard work and good governance and we should not lose sight of this progress. But we need more than commitments -- we need action. Results matter.

Even in the best of lights, the G-8 Global Partnership target of \$20 billion still falls far short of the \$30 billion target recommended by the Department of Energy's own high level advisory panel, chaired by Ambassador Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler, who's recent passing we all mourned. I believe that had this report been written after 9/11, we would have seen even greater emphasis placed on the speed with which these resources should have been spent. Those bi-partisan leaders saw an urgency before the terror attack in 2001 that I am afraid has not been recognized by the rest of the Government, even after those strikes.

¹ Available at www.carnegieendowment.org/strategy

Ladies and gentlemen, analysts such as I often make financial comparisons to prove our point. These are made not to disparage the programs we compare them to, but to force people to consider the relative security gained per dollar spent. It seems to me that if we can spend \$10 billion a year on National Missile Defense, designed to protect against a limited threat that even the Joint Chiefs rank relatively low on their threat board, then we can surely spend more than 1 tenth of that amount on a known and defined threat we all must recognize. Likewise, the war in Iraq has already cost well over 20 times in money alone what the US plans to spend in 10 years on the Global Partnership. Just as we must urgently win the war in Iraq, we must urgently win the war against those who would use nuclear materials against our allies and ourselves.

Key problems have plagued the implementation of the G-8 beyond financial resources. My colleagues have or will catalogue many of them. But it is important to note that this is not just about money. More money is needed, but it was international coordination through the G-8 that was supposed to catalyze our efforts to prevent proliferation. Yet the coordination efforts have been lacking among the G-8 partners and we have seen a bureaucratically tangled effort in the United States become magnified eightfold. We are not organized for success. It remains difficult to understand why the G-8 leaders have not established single, responsible coordinators within each government with full time responsibilities over these critical efforts. Even those who argue against the creation of a nonproliferation Czar within the US Government should see the value in having a coordinating position that can cut across the multiple government agencies with a hand in the Global Partnership. While early problems with coordination have improved, it is still not surprising for government officials from G-8 countries or prospective contributors to approach non-governmental experts asking to find their counterparts in the United States structure. That 3 years after the partnership was launched that there is no central points of contacts and clear understanding of parallel government programs is a major concern. So in addition to financial concerns, it seems obvious, based on the record to date that we have not invested the organizational and political resources needed to ensure the success of the G-8 effort. More must be done, and it must be done quickly.

Mr. Chairman, I have talked about the challenges facing the G-8 Global Partnership. I'd like to add a few words, however, in a larger perspective on the G-8 and the anti-proliferation effort. I began my remarks by noting that the G-8 nations have the much to lose from the use of nuclear weapons. Too date, however, the G-8 nations have not used their political clout to address the broader problem of proliferation, including demand for and access to these capabilities. We will hear a lot at the Gleneagles summit about debt relief for Africa, an important issue that demonstrates the type of collective economic and political leadership that must be brought to bear on complex issues. I believe the United States must now look to additional sources of international legitimacy and capabilities on proliferation, including the G-8. As a start, G-8 members should be asked to develop and maintain the highest standards for protecting nuclear materials and controlling sensitive exports. Today's physical protections standards are woefully inadequate. The G-8 must set an example to have both the unity and the moral authority to address these challenges. This is no different from the issue of debt relief. Thus, G-8 countries should take the lead by fully implementing the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and should adopt and implement new, high standards of protecting nuclear materials.

Another key step, as my colleagues from the Nuclear Threat Initiative have championed, would be for the G-8 countries to all immediately agree to phase out the use of weapons-uranium in research facilities. Today, at least 5 of the 8 members states, including the United States run peaceful research facilities with the very same materials needed to make nuclear weapons and this despite long-standing U.S. and international efforts to end the civilian use of this dangerous material.

Moreover, I believe the United States should be more creative and effective at using the opportunity presented by the G-8 on nonproliferation. One of the underlying issues that holds back greater cooperation between the United States and other close allies is that we do not share the same perception of the threats and risks posed by the possible spread and use of these weapons and materials. Berlin sees a different threat than Washington does, just as Tokyo faces a different threat than London. In addition to the urgent need for the United States to develop joint proliferation risk assessments with our close allies in

Europe and East Asia, I believe it is time for the United States to pursue a joint economic risk assessment through the G-8. Helping the world's leading market economies agree on and understand the dramatic economic costs of a nuclear attack would help improve the outlook for commitments from these states to address these dangers. The need for a common U.S. –European proliferation risk assessment is long overdue. I would imagine that my colleague, Michele Flournoy who has worked for several years to help improve European understanding of the proliferation risks could readily attest to this basic observation. While no replacement for the desperately needed common threat assessment, the development of this economic risk assessment could have great value, reinvigorate cooperative nonproliferation efforts and should be actively considered. I am not an economist, but I am confident that such an assessment would show the clear cost/benefit value in investing more resources now to prevent the threats we are discussing from becoming realities.

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, if the leading economic powers on earth cannot demonstrate the commitment and urgency the threat of nuclear terrorism and proliferation demand, then we have little hope of preventing those who seek to use nuclear capabilities against us from succeeding. But in making this choice, we have to remember that there are no good responses once a nuclear weapon or enough nuclear material to produce one goes missing. Prevention is all we have, and we must do better than we are today.