Today the Committee meets to hear testimony on the G-8 Summit recently concluded at Sea Island, Georgia, and the future of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

In June 2002, at Kananaskis, Canada, the G-8 announced the creation of the Global Partnership to confront the threat posed by the potential proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and materials emanating from the Former Soviet Union. The European Union, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the United Kingdom pledged to match U.S. funding of non-proliferation programs – $10 billion over the next ten years. If all pledges are realized, the resources available to prevent proliferation from the Former Soviet Union would effectively double. This would allow for an acceleration of the work of the Nunn-Lugar program and related programs at the Departments of State and Energy, which have been safeguarding and destroying weapons and materials of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union for more than a decade.

To date, the weapons systems deactivated or destroyed by the United States under these programs include:

- 6,312 nuclear warheads;
- 535 ICBMs;
- 459 ICBM silos;
- 11 ICBM mobile missile launchers;
- 128 bombers;
- 708 nuclear air-to-surface missiles;
- 408 submarine missile launchers;
- 496 submarine launched missiles;
- 27 nuclear submarines; and
- 194 nuclear test tunnels.

In addition:

- 260 tons of fissile material have received either comprehensive or rapid security upgrades;
- Security upgrades have been made at some 60 nuclear warhead storage sites;
- 208 metric tons of Highly Enriched Uranium has been blended down to Low Enriched Uranium;
- 35 percent of Russia’s chemical weapons have received security upgrades;
- Joint U.S.-Russian research is being conducted at 49 former biological weapons production facilities, and security improvements are underway at 4 biological weapons sites;
- The International Science and Technology Center operated by the State Department has engaged 58,000 former weapons scientists at 765 institutes in peaceful work; and
- The International Proliferation Prevention Program has funded 750 projects involving 14,000 former weapons scientists and created some 580 new peaceful high-tech jobs.
Despite this impressive record of achievement, there is much work left to be done. For example:

- Some 340 metric tons of fissile material are still awaiting security upgrades;
- Approximately 70 warhead storage facilities are awaiting security upgrades;
- Negotiations with Russia have not produced an agreement on the destruction of 68 metric tons of plutonium in the U.S. and Russia;
- 5,400 metric tons of nerve agent await destruction;
- 62 nuclear-powered submarines await destruction;
- Security upgrades are still needed at 20 sites housing dangerous biological pathogens; and
- In the future, some 35,000 former nuclear weapons experts will be cut from the Russian nuclear program and will be seeking work.

We have a window of opportunity to address these threats. We must take advantage of this time in history to destroy these weapons that threaten not only the American people, but people throughout the world.

Unfortunately, recent pledges made by our G-8 partners are about $3 billion below the commitments made at Kananaskis in 2002. Moreover, few of the funds pledged by other members of the G-8 have been allocated for actual Global Partnership projects. Our allies must turn their pledges into projects.

Funding shortfalls are not the only problem delaying progress by the Global Partnership. Russia has refused to provide the necessary access to Partnership dismantlement sites. Moscow has not granted Partnership participants tax-free status on their assistance. In addition, the lack of adequate liability protections plagues the Global Partnership, as it has the Plutonium Disposition Program.

If the Global Partnership is to be successful, Russia must be forthcoming with basic programmatic protections. Despite repeated requests from Moscow for dismantlement help, Russian leaders continue to erect roadblocks that complicate the delivery of assistance.

In addition, President Putin has not yet submitted the Nunn-Lugar Umbrella Agreement to the Duma and Federation Council for approval. This agreement, if approved, would codify the tenants under which the Nunn-Lugar Program operates in Russia. Senator Biden and I sent a letter to the Russian Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs urging prompt action on the agreement. The Kremlin must understand that failure to approve this agreement places U.S.-Russian cooperation at risk.

Despite these trouble spots, President Bush made important progress at Sea Island with respect to the Global Partnership:

- Australia, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, New Zealand, and South Korea joined as donors; They join Norway, Poland, Switzerland, Finland, and Sweden as non-G-8 nations participating in the Global Partnership;
- The G-8 agreed to coordinate activities in other states where there have been weapons of mass destruction programs, such as Libya and Iraq; and
- G-8 leaders embraced President Bush’s proposals on tightening the loopholes that currently exist in non-proliferation treaty regimes.
Specifically, the leaders agreed to ban the transfer of civil nuclear technologies to countries that have not concluded an Additional Protocol with the IAEA and to create a special committee of the IAEA to study how to further tighten verification and safeguards measures. The leaders also supported an effort to require countries under investigation by the IAEA to recuse themselves from IAEA board decisions. In addition, they agreed to a one-year freeze on new transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technology to states that do not currently possess it.

Just prior to Sea Island, Secretary of Energy Abraham announced the creation of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative in a speech in Vienna. It will secure high-risk nuclear materials around the world by consolidating and accelerating retrieval efforts and by completing an inventory of materials worldwide to rapidly identify any gaps in non-proliferation efforts. I applaud this initiative and look forward to working closely with Secretary Abraham to ensure that it has sufficient funding.

Another important announcement was made in Moscow late last month. Russia has agreed to join the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Last year, President Bush established the PSI, a multilateral effort designed to interdict weapons and materials of mass destruction. Two weeks ago, more than sixty nations met to celebrate the first anniversary of the PSI and to underscore their commitment to preventing rogue states and non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

Today it is my pleasure to welcome two distinguished panels to discuss U.S. non-proliferation policy and the events at Sea Island. First, we will hear from our good friend and colleague Senator Pete Domenici of New Mexico. Senator Domenici has long been a key advocate in Congress for strong and innovative non-proliferation policies. I have enjoyed working closely with him for more than ten years on these important matters. His leadership was crucial to the establishment of the Plutonium Disposition Program and numerous other initiatives. Just recently, his amendment lent Congressional support to the Global Threat Reduction Initiative.

On our second panel, we will hear from two administration officials with oversight of important aspects of our non-proliferation policies. We welcome John Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security and Ambassador Linton Brooks, Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration. I thank all our witnesses for coming today to share their insights on recent non-proliferation developments and the events at the G-8 summit.

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