The number one national security threat facing our country is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their intersection with terrorist groups and rogue states. Today, the Committee meets to consider U.S. efforts to respond to this threat through bilateral and multilateral non-proliferation and arms control. I believe there is much that can be done to make existing institutions more effective.

Too often, opponents and proponents of arms control view bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements in absolute terms. Some opponents unjustly dismiss treaties as unverifiable and a threat to U.S. security, because they believe parties cannot be stopped from cheating. Some proponents see arms control agreements almost as ends in themselves, even in cases when poor enforcement mechanisms or shifts in political or technological realities have diminished their usefulness.

Absolutist arguments fail to describe the complexities of the current non-proliferation environment. Treaties and non-proliferation programs can be effective and can make significant contributions to U.S. national security when verified and enforced aggressively. But the international community must commit itself to such a course. Even the most carefully written and intrusive arms control pact will fail if the political will to enforce it is lacking.

Our experiences with the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) are illustrative of the centrality of effective enforcement. The NPT has contributed greatly to the prevention of new nuclear weapons states. But at the same time, the NPT has been ineffective in stopping determined cheaters, such as Iran, from pursuing a nuclear weapons capability.

Iran’s clandestine drive toward a nuclear weapons capability was exposed by an Iranian resistance group and confirmed by the IAEA. Far from the complete cooperation pledged by Iran, inspectors are involved in a complex chess match, where each request for information or access is met with Iranian misdirection, contradiction, and lies. Tehran has been caught red-handed with a weapons program, but continues to obfuscate. In fact, Iran has not even fully abided by the agreement it made in October with Great Britain, France, and Germany. Iran’s Foreign Minister hedged on his country’s commitment by suggesting that Tehran had agreed “to the suspension, not stopping, of the uranium enrichment process.”

The IAEA Board of Governors is locked in debate over what to do about Iran. The United States, Canada, and Australia continue to push the Board to take real steps to enforce the NPT. But despite the clear evidence that Iran is a determined cheater, concerns have been raised about the implications of decisive action. Some worry that a Board referral of non-compliance to the United Nations Security Council would push Iran’s leadership to abandon the NPT. Even if this were true, keeping Iran in the NPT should not be an end in itself.
Iran claims that it has the right to develop a nuclear fuel cycle to support a domestic nuclear energy program. Many nations, including Iran, point to the NPT’s assurance of access to peaceful nuclear technology as one of the principle rationales for their accession. Unfortunately, in the case of Iran, this access to technology has been exploited as a loop-hole that allows states to pursue weapons under the guise of peaceful nuclear power.

Adding to the complexities faced by the international community, the nuclear fuel-cycle itself produces dangerous fissile materials and radiological waste that can be used to construct a dirty bomb. More needs to be done to head off this type of threat.

Last month, in a speech at the National Defense University, President Bush made a number of useful proposals in the area of arms control. With regard to the NPT, the President proposed that the forty members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group should refuse to sell uranium enrichment reprocessing equipment to any state that does not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment or reprocessing plants. Additionally, the President proposed that all states seeking access to civilian nuclear power should sign an additional protocol with the IAEA by next year as a condition of their access to civilian nuclear technology.

With regard to the IAEA, the President proposed two important changes. First, he called on the IAEA Board of Governors to create a special committee on safeguards and verification, to improve the organization's ability to enforce compliance with nuclear non-proliferation obligations. Second, the President urged that no state under investigation for proliferation violations should be allowed to serve on the IAEA Board of Governors or on the new special committee.

The Bush Administration also has pursued the Proliferation Security Initiative, or PSI. The sixteen nations that participate in the PSI have had notable successes. The seizure last October of a ship bound for Libya carrying Malaysian-manufactured centrifuge components helped initiate revelations about Pakistani scientists’ clandestine nuclear-weapons network and provided further motivation for Libya to disarm.

The PSI provides a flexible, immediate and cooperative approach to weapons proliferation. It can be described as an operational component of non-proliferation. The legal and organizational apparatus associated with traditional arms control or non-proliferation agreements rarely allow for such speed.

Today we welcome good friends to the Committee. William Perry is a former Secretary of Defense and is currently a professor at Stanford University. Ash Carter is a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for National Security Policy and is currently a Professor at Harvard University. Arnold Kanter is a former Undersecretary of State and is currently a Principal of the Scowcroft Group.

Our witnesses were joined by former National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, in writing an op-ed in the New York Times last December that paralleled some of the President’s proposals. I am eager to hear their views of President Bush’s non-proliferation policy. Furthermore, we would appreciate their insights into what additional steps the United States might take on a bilateral or multilateral basis to reduce the threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

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