Opening Statement  
Senator Richard Lugar  
Hearing on U.S. Non-proliferation Programs  
March 19, 2003

Today, the Committee meets to receive testimony on non-proliferation programs in the Fiscal Year 2004 budget request of the Department of State.

The United States is engaged in a global war against terrorism. The war proceeds in a world awash with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and materials of mass destruction. Throughout much of the past decade, vulnerability to the use of weapons of mass destruction has been the number one national security dilemma confronting the United States. We are poised to use massive military force in Iraq in response to the threat of weapons of mass destruction.

Terrorist organizations have demonstrated suicidal tendencies and are beyond deterrence. We must anticipate that they will use weapons of mass destruction if allowed the opportunity. The minimum standard for victory in this war is the prevention of any of the individual terrorists or terrorists cells from obtaining weapons or materials of mass destruction.

In September 2002, President Bush stated that “Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination.” Less than one month later, the Administration released its National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, which declares that strengthening non-proliferation programs is vital to our national security.

For more than eleven years, the United States has been engaged in efforts through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to address proliferation at its most likely source: the former Soviet Union. Through these efforts, more than 6,000 warheads have been deactivated, numerous storage locations have been secured, and tens of thousands of former weapons scientists have been employed in peaceful endeavors.

We have come further than many thought that we could, but much more needs to be done, and it needs to be done quickly. When the Nunn-Lugar program was conceived, the terrorist threat was real, but it appeared distant. Now we live in an era when catastrophic terrorism is our foremost security concern. We must not only accelerate weapons dismantlement efforts in Russia, we must broaden our capability to address proliferation risks in other countries and attempt to build a global coalition against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Last year I introduced legislation to facilitate the use of the Nunn-Lugar program outside the former Soviet Union. The restrictions that limit cooperative threat reduction to the former Soviet Union are an unacceptable hindrance to our national security. The President must have the ability to respond to threats posed by weapons of mass destruction anywhere in the world.

For Fiscal Year 2004, the Department has requested $385.2 million for the Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, De-mining, and Related Programs account. This is a slight increase over FY 2003. I am hopeful that funding for this critical account can be enhanced.
Within the NADR account, the Non-proliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) has made tremendous contributions to U.S. national security. Just last year, NDF managed the removal of more than 100 pounds of highly-enriched uranium from the Vinca research reactor in Belgrade. The program has destroyed 24 SS-23 missiles, 47 SCUD missiles, and 50 FROG or intermediate-range rocket systems. The Administration has requested $35 million for the program in fiscal year 2004, up from $14 million in fiscal year 2003. This increase reflects the need for funds in a new NDF program – the Dangerous Materials Initiative. This program will focus on identifying, securing, and removing dangerous materials from locations worldwide. This proposal has been dubbed a pilot effort, but I believe that it should be made permanent.

Another important program in the NADR account is the International Science and Technology Centers. Tens of thousands of Russian weapons scientists have been employed by the United States in peaceful pursuits under this program. If Russian weapons experts are placed in a position of economic desperation, they are more likely to sell their services elsewhere. I have encouraged U.S. corporations to explore the possibility of investing in Russian laboratories. This would complement our work to provide Russian weapons scientists with long-term employment options. I look forward to working with the Department to improve these important initiatives.

Lastly, I am hopeful that the Committee soon will receive the State Department’s views on the Nuclear and Radiological Threat Reduction Act of 2002. This bill offered by Senators Biden, Domenici and myself provides a strategy for addressing “dirty bombs.” A CIA assessment released last January called the use of radiological weapons “a highly credible threat.” We want to join with the Department to provide legislative authority that will assist in preventing the terrorist use of a radiological weapon.

We appreciate very much the witnesses who have come before us today. They possess extraordinary expertise about the proliferation threats that we face and the steps that we can take to protect our nation.

The Committee will hear from two panels. First, John Wolf, Assistant Secretary of State for Non-proliferation, will present the Administration’s budget request for these key programs. Then, on the second panel, three witnesses will appear: The Honorable Charles S. Curtis, President and CEO of the Nuclear Threat Initiative and a former Deputy Secretary of Energy; Rose Gottemoeller, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former Deputy Undersecretary of Energy for Nuclear Non-proliferation; and Amy Smithson, a Senior Associate at the Stimson Center. Welcome to you all.