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STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD

Introduction

Chairman Tauscher, Ranking Member Everett, Members of the Subcommittee, it
is a pleasure to appear before you today. I am here to discuss missile defense in the
context of national defense strategy and to review our progress in carrying out the
President’s ballistic missile defense policy.

New Strategic Environment

Ballistic missile defense remains a top priority of the Administration. This
priority is driven by needs defined by the new and evolving strategic environment, and
continues to be validated by recent events.

Our national security focus changed in the early 1990s with the demise of the
Soviet Union. We realized that we faced a broader range of threats from a broader range
of aggressive and unpredictable adversaries. Threats posed by rogue nations, such as Iran
and North Korea, and transnational non-state actors, such as al-Qaida, continue to
challenge our notions of deterrence and defense. Surprise – strategic, tactical, and
technical – is an expected feature of the security landscape. While deterrence remains the
cornerstone of our strategy, we recognize an increased risk that deterrence may fail.
Under such circumstances, missile defenses are highly desirable because they both
reinforce deterrence and hedge against its failure.

Potential adversaries see ballistic missiles armed with Weapons of Mass
 Destruction (WMD) as low-cost, high impact asymmetric options to counter other U.S.
military advantages. WMDs and ballistic missile delivery vehicles have become the weapon of choice for countries seeking to coerce their neighbors and limit U.S. freedom of action. LTG Michael Maples, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said earlier this year that “after global terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains the most significant threat to our homeland, deployed forces, allies and interests.”

The threat from the increasing numbers and capabilities of ballistic missiles is pronounced. This threat is highlighted by proliferation of ballistic missiles by countries such as North Korea and China, and secretive networks, such as the one run by A.Q. Khan, selling nuclear technology and expertise. Not only is the threat from the numbers and capabilities of ballistic missiles increasing, but the group of countries possessing ballistic missiles includes some of the world’s most threatening and least responsible regimes, such as North Korea and Iran.

As LTG Michael Maples recently testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in unclassified session, “North Korea has an ambitious ballistic missile development program and has exported missiles and missile technology to other countries, including Iran and Pakistan. North Korea continues to develop the Taepo Dong 2, which could reach parts of the United States and is capable of carrying a nuclear payload. On 4 July 2006, North Korea conducted seven widely-publicized launches. The Taepo Dong 2 space launch vehicle / intercontinental ballistic missile was flight-tested for the first time and failed shortly after launch. Despite the failure of the Taepo Dong 2, North Korea successfully tested six theater ballistic missiles, demonstrating the capability
to target U.S. forces and our allies in South Korea and Japan. North Korea is also
developing a new intermediate-range ballistic missile and a new short-range, solid-
propellant ballistic missile. Export of North Korea ballistic missiles will continue to be a
concern.”

Turning to the Middle East, Iran represents a dangerous nexus, combining a
vigorous ballistic missile program, a desire to develop nuclear weapons, and a history of
support for international terrorism. Terrorism has been part of Tehran’s arsenal for
decades. In fact, before the 9/11 attacks, more Americans had been killed by Iranian-
backed terrorists like Hezbollah than by any other terrorist group. Iran has made ballistic
missiles an important part of its defense strategy. As former Director of National
Intelligence, John Negroponte, testified last year, “The danger that it will acquire a
nuclear weapon and the ability to integrate it with the ballistic missiles Iran already
possesses is a reason for immediate concern. Iran already has among the largest
inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, and Tehran views its ballistic missiles
as an integral part of its strategy to deter – and if necessary retaliate against – forces in
the region, including U.S. forces.”

In this environment, recent statements by Iranian President Ahmadi-Nejad
threatening the United States and its friends in the region, most notably Israel, are of
particular concern. In October 2005, Ahmadi-Nejad declared that “Israel should be
wiped off the map. And God willing, with the force of God behind it, we shall soon
experience a world without the United States and Zionism.” He also said that “anybody
who recognizes Israel will burn in the fire of the Islamic nation’s fury.”
Iran also continues to develop ballistic missiles of increasing range and sophistication that may one day be able to deliver a nuclear weapon. Lt. Gen. Michael Maples recently testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that Iran continues its efforts to develop and acquire ballistic missiles capable of striking Israel and Europe. Iran’s ballistic missiles already cast a shadow over U.S. friends and allies, and our deployed forces, in the Middle East. Moreover, the Intelligence Community assesses that Iran would be able to develop an ICBM before 2015 if it chose to do so. The addition of nuclear warheads and an ICBM that could reach the U.S. would further extend Iran’s ability to coerce others and threaten the U.S.

Iran has also claimed it is pursuing a space-launch capability. Although space launch vehicles can be used for peaceful purposes, if Iran were to achieve such a capability, it would also be demonstrating the key technologies needed to deliver payloads at intercontinental ranges.

**Overall Defense Strategy and U.S. Defense Goals**

Ballistic missile defenses remain an important part of our overall defense strategy. Last year, the Department of Defense released the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR recognized U.S. superiority in traditional warfare, but stressed that improvements are needed in non-traditional warfare. The QDR identified a number of priorities to operationalize the National Defense Strategy, including: 1) defending the homeland in depth; 2) shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads; and 3) preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using weapons of mass
destruction. Ballistic missile defenses can make important contributions to each of these priorities. They can be part of a layered defense against the use of ballistic missiles to attack the population and territory of the U.S., its deployed forces, or its friends and allies. They can also help dissuade countries from choosing to compete militarily with the U.S by increasing the cost of competition and decreasing the certainty that a ballistic missile attack will succeed.

The 2001 QDR outlined four broad defense policy goals: to assure, dissuade, deter, and if necessary, defend and defeat. Missile defenses support these goals in the following ways:

Assure allies and friends that threats by nations armed with ballistic missiles will not be able to deter the U.S. from fulfilling its security commitments, coerce our allies, or undermine a coalition;

Dissuade potential adversaries from investing in or developing ballistic missiles by reducing the value of such weapons;

Deter ballistic missile attacks and threats by reducing an adversary’s confidence in the success of an attack; and

Defeat missile attacks against the United States, its deployed forces, and its friends and allies in the event that deterrence fails.

Presidential Direction

Upon taking office, President Bush embarked on a bold new course for strategic deterrence and defense. The President issued NSPD-23, National Policy on Ballistic
Missile Defense. The President directed us to field an initial missile defense capability in 2004 consisting of ground- and sea-based interceptors, additional PATRIOT units, and sensors on land, at sea, and in space. The initial capability was only a starting point. Using an evolutionary acquisition approach, we are improving these capabilities over time to meet the changing threat and to take advantage of emerging technology. We must continue a robust research and development effort, in addition to fielding adequate quantities of interceptors.

As technology changes over time, so will the composition of our missile defense force. There will be no fixed, final force structure. We will change the number and locations of our missile defenses to counter emerging threats and to take advantage of geographic opportunities. Some threats, like Libya, may recede, while others, like Iran, will grow. Our missile defenses must have global reach to counter threats wherever they may appear.

The U.S. is making steady progress in meeting these goals. We now have ground-based interceptors deployed in Alaska and California; sea-based interceptors available for deployment aboard Aegis Cruisers and Destroyers; more PATRIOT units; sensors on land, at sea and in space; an evolving command and control system to tie it all together; and trained warfighters on station.

**International Missile Defense Cooperation**

International cooperation is one of the cornerstones of our national policy on ballistic missile defense. In 2002, the President directed that missile defense cooperation
will be a feature of U.S. relations with close, long-standing allies, and an important means to build new relationships with new friends. The U.S. has made progress in carrying out this direction, with cooperative efforts underway with many countries. Today, more than 15 countries (including nearly 10 in NATO alone) are engaged in missile defense efforts of some kind, whether by hosting key facilities or assets on their territory or actively discussing this possibility, pursuing R&D programs, signing cooperative agreements with the U.S., or maintaining capabilities. The list includes the Australia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Israel, India, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Taiwan, Ukraine, U.S., and U.K.,. And I would point out that Russia clearly believes in the value of missile defense as it continues to maintain a missile defense system around its major population center, Moscow, and has developed defenses against shorter-range missiles. Let me briefly describe some of these efforts.

- North Korea ballistic missiles pose a direct and immediate threat to Japan. This threat encouraged Japan to seek closer cooperation with the U.S. The Japanese are now one of our pre-eminent missile defense partners.
  - Japan is deploying a multi-layered system comprised of upgraded Aegis ships with Standard Missile (SM) -3 interceptors, PATRIOT Advanced Capability (PAC) -3 systems, new and refurbished warning radars and an upgraded command and control system.
  - Japan and the U.S. are co-developing the SM-3 Block IIA, the next-generation sea-based interceptor. This larger, more capable interceptor will enable Aegis ships to intercept longer-range missiles.


- Japan agreed to host a U.S. forward-based X-band missile defense radar.
- Three U.S. Aegis engagement ships are forward-deployed to Japan, along with several more missile defense surveillance and tracking ships.
- We deployed a U.S. PAC-3 battalion to Japan last year.
- We are also deepening coordination of our missile defense operations and to share missile defense information.

- We are cooperating with Israel on the Arrow System Improvement Program. The Arrow System is now deployed and protecting Israeli citizens and property.

- Germany, Italy and the U.S. are co-developing the Medium Extended Air Defense System, a replacement for PATRIOT systems in the next decade.

- We have upgraded and are testing the early warning radar at Fylingdales, U.K. this year; a second early warning radar in Thule, Greenland, is scheduled to be upgraded and tested in a few years.

- NATO is developing the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense system, a command and control backbone for member countries’ theater missile defenses. In addition, the NATO Feasibility Study released in 2005 confirmed that missile defenses to protect European citizens are, indeed, feasible.

- We have concluded agreements with the U.K., Japan, Australia, Israel, Italy, and Denmark to facilitate government-to-government and industry-to-industry missile defense cooperation. We are also holding discussions or working on technology efforts with Germany, India, the Netherlands, Spain, Ukraine, and France.
In his 2002 direction, the President specifically called for cooperation to build new relationships with friends, like Russia. While that prospect at times seems remote, there are positive developments to report. We are continuing negotiations on a Defense Technical Cooperation Agreement with Russia to facilitate both government-to-government as well as industry-to-industry missile defense cooperation, and we continue to seek practical areas of cooperation with Russia on a bilateral basis as well as in the NATO-Russia context.

U.S. Missile Defenses in Europe

In January of this year, President Bush directed us to proceed with discussions on basing U.S. missile defenses in Europe. These defenses are intended to counter the increasing threat from Iranian missiles. While our intelligence community assesses that Iran would be able to develop an ICBM before 2015 if it chose to do so, we must start now in order to field an initial capability before 2011.

Current plans call for basing in Poland ten Ground-Based Interceptors similar to those currently deployed in Alaska and California, and a midcourse radar in the Czech Republic. The midcourse radar is an existing radar in use at the Reagan Test Range. It will be refurbished and moved to the Czech Republic. Negotiations are ongoing and, pending a successful outcome, work is planned to begin at the sites in 2008. These missile defense assets would be integrated with existing radars in Fylingdales, U.K., and Thule, Greenland, as well as the U.S. Ground-based Midcourse Defense system,
consisting of, for example, existing missile defense interceptors located in California and Alaska.

Here are the key benefits of U.S. missile defense deployments in Europe:

- It would be capable of intercepting not only intercontinental ballistic missiles but also intermediate-range ballistic missiles launched out of the Middle East. The U.S. goal is to optimize the defensive coverage of both Europe and the U.S.

- With the protection afforded by these U.S. defensive capabilities in Europe, NATO member states could resist attempts by hostile states to intimidate or coerce the Alliance or its members from taking actions in a coalition.

- Missile defense provides another avenue for burden sharing. If negotiations are successfully concluded, Poland and the Czech Republic would be providing a significant contribution to the collective security of the NATO Alliance by hosting BMD assets.

**Criticism from Russia**

Ten ground-based missile defense interceptors and an X-band radar for midcourse tracking and discrimination of warheads located in central Europe would have no capability against an ICBM launched out of Russia at the United States in a one-on-one engagement. Furthermore ten interceptors are simply not a threat to Russia and cannot diminish Russia’s deterrent of hundreds of missiles and thousands of warheads.

We have been transparent with Russia with our plans and capabilities. Senior State, Defense, and MDA officials have frequently briefed senior Russian counterparts,
as well as their experts, on the proposed U.S. European missile defense deployments in numerous locations in Washington, D.C., Moscow, Brussels, and elsewhere. Senior Russian officials as well as their experts understand the limited capabilities of the interceptors and the X-band radar, including why the European-based assets would have no capability against Russian ICBMs launched at the United States, and how it is optimized for engaging ballistic missile threats launched out of Iran. Russian officials, and their experts, fully understand the technical limitations and parameters of the proposed defensive capabilities.

Providing Russia transparency and predictability in our missile defense policy, plans, and programs is certainly in the interest of the United States. We will continue to keep Russia informed about the status of our programs and decisions, explore the possibility of additional confidence-building measures, and seek opportunities to cooperate on missile defense in the future.

Furthermore, we are disappointed that Russia has chosen to link possible withdrawal from the INF Treaty with our discussion with NATO Allies about a missile defense system to address a shared threat from the Middle East. Russia’s potential interest in withdrawing from the INF Treaty is not new. Russia discussed possible withdrawal from the INF Treaty with us in the United States two years ago, well before the President’s decision in mid-January to initiate negotiations regarding missile defense facilities in Europe. The United States has declined to withdraw from the INF Treaty.
Conclusion

In conclusion, we have made great progress in meeting the goals the President set over four years ago. Missile defenses are an essential element of our overall national security strategy to dissuade and deter rogue nations from acquiring or using ballistic missiles and to protect our citizens from the threat of terrorist attack. As the threat of ballistic missiles and WMDs increases, more allies and friends are choosing to work with us on missile defense projects. Given these results, we will continue the current policies. Subject to your questions, this concludes my statement.