STATEMENT OF

ADMIRAL JAMES O. ELLIS, JR., USN

COMMANDER

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON

MISSILE DEFENSE

MARCH 11, 2004
The Operationalization of Global Missile Defense

I. Introduction

It is my honor to appear before the Senate Armed Services Committee today to discuss the role of US Strategic Command in operationalizing the Global Ballistic Missile Defense (GBMD) system.

In the words of Secretary Rumsfeld, “We have truly entered a new age – one that may well be the most dangerous America and the democracies of the world have ever faced.” Our ever-increasing dependence of space systems, computer technologies, and information management systems, combined with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the threat from continued Global Terrorism, has forever changed the security environment in which we live. The United States (US) can no longer know for certain which nation, combination of nations, or non-state actors may pose threats to our vital interests. Many of the threats we face are global in nature, often operating in the seams between national boundaries, political systems, and ideologies.

Clearly, the tragedy of September 11th 2001 demonstrated the challenges of “one-size-fits-all deterrence.” These attacks led us to accelerate the reexamination of how we defend the homeland and further served to accelerate ongoing discussions regarding the effectiveness of strictly threat-based approaches towards potential adversaries.

Our changing national security environment demands new ways of thinking and a strategy that anticipates capabilities of rogue states and non-state actors and seeks to dissuade or deter the action of potential adversaries. Preparing for the future requires us to develop capabilities that can adapt quickly to new challenges and to unexpected
circumstances. Tomorrow’s conflicts will likely consist of asymmetric attacks focused on perceived US vulnerabilities.

The effects of globalization and the growth of transnational threats continue to reshape the Department of Defense’s thinking in all fundamental mission areas. Reflective of this effort, Change One to the 2002 Unified Command Plan combined the former US Strategic Command and US Space Command on 1 October 2002.

Three months later, on 10 January 2003, President Bush assigned US Strategic Command the responsibility of planning, integrating, coordinating and, when directed, executing four previously unassigned mission areas: Global Strike, Global Missile Defense, Department of Defense Information Operations, and Command and Control, Computers, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR). As is the case with the traditional missions of nuclear deterrence and space operations, this new portfolio of missions transcends geographical boundaries.

Missions that cross regional boundaries require a global approach. US Strategic Command is specifically tasked to integrate each of those missions in support of warfighters around the globe. We believe that integrating these capabilities can maximize our Nation’s ability to respond to a broad range of global threats and contribute significantly to our Nation’s security.

II. US Strategic Command’s Role in Global Ballistic Missile Defense

The missile defense mission requires a global approach. Missile defense concepts have evolved from separate efforts focused on terminal intercept of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and mid-course intercept of intercontinental ballistic missiles, to a multi-layered missile defense system contributing to the defense of the US, our
allies, and our forces and interests abroad. Change Two of the 2002 Unified Command Plan tasked US Strategic Command to plan, integrate, and coordinate the global missile defense capabilities of the Nation.

US Strategic Command is operationalizing the capabilities being developed and deployed by the Missile Defense Agency. We are leading the development of the necessary doctrine, concepts of operations, and operational plans in coordination with our subordinate Service component commands and the other combatant commands. This effort requires that we define the broad interrelationships among the Global Ballistic Missile Defense mission and other mission areas, such as intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance, strike operations, and information operations. Operationalizing Global Missile Defense capabilities also requires detailed planning to address the policy, rules of engagement, force employment, force readiness, and logistics support, and tying together diverse system elements including sensors, interceptors, and the command and control network.

The Unified Command Plan also tasks US Strategic Command with advocating the desired global missile defense and missile warning characteristics and capabilities as a spokesman for all combatant commanders. As the advocate for Global Ballistic Missile Defense, US Strategic Command, in coordination with our fellow combatant commands, provides direct input to the Missile Defense Agency and the Department of Defense requirements process regarding our operational and technical views on the system, all aspects of the Ballistic Missile Defense System integration, and the desired capabilities for future incremental (Block) improvements. Clearly, close cooperation between operators and developers is essential. Unequivocally, US Strategic Command and the Missile Defense Agency have forged a strong relationship over the past
18 months affording us the opportunity to shape the program to better represent the needs of the combatant commanders and the nation.

US Northern Command and US Pacific Command are our principal warfighting partners in preparation for activation of the initial defensive capability. With them, we are continuing to refine and validate our plans in a series of exercises and readiness assessments designed to prepare the responsible combatant commands, comprised of Army, Navy, and Air Force units, for assuming operational responsibility for the initial elements of this nascent defensive system. In addition, we are working closely with the Missile Defense Agency to identify and develop procedures to share assets that must support both ongoing Ballistic Missile Defense System development and testing as well as the operational alert forces.

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) demonstrated an unprecedented level of cross-theater missile defense cooperation and coordination. Integrated early warning data from Army, Navy, Air Force, and other intelligence sensors provided vital data supporting Patriot missile engagements of all threatening theater ballistic missile launches. Expanding upon OIF’s example of an integrated and effective defense, US Strategic Command is developing the global missile defense concept of operations and the battle management architecture to provide full capabilities for regional combatant commanders to defend their areas of responsibility.

**Concept of Operations**

The foundation for the Global Ballistic Missile Defense Concept of Operations is centralized planning, led by US Strategic Command, with decentralized execution by the Regional Combatant Commanders (RCC) employing their assigned forces. This concept of operations also
achieves unity of effort by placing under US Strategic Command the overarching responsibility for Global Ballistic Missile Defense.

US Strategic Command synchronizes and integrates all combatant commanders’ Ballistic Missile Defense plans into a fully coordinated, cohesive Global Ballistic Missile Defense strategy. The concept is designed to minimize operational vulnerabilities, mitigate risk, and appropriately set and prioritize resource requirements from a global perspective. Additionally, US Strategic Command monitors and assesses vulnerabilities that may arise in a potential crisis and recommends to the Nation’s senior civilian leaders courses of action such as the reallocation of forces, to mitigate risks to the overall strategy.

Of the $10.2 billion requested for the missile defense program in FY 05, about $3.2 billion will go to the anti-ICBM portion of the overall system – Ground-Based Midcourse Defense. This includes approximately $860 million for deployment. Most of the remaining funding will go to other elements of missile defense including procurement, upgrades, and advanced research on systems such as THAAD, PAC-3, SM-3, and the AEGIS—all systems that provide medium and short-range protection to our troops.

The Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system is a primary element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System initially designed to protect the fifty United States. US Strategic Command’s component, Army Strategic Command, oversees the Army element that will man and employ the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system. This element consists of both the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Brigade and Battalion, under the operational control of US Northern Command for execution of defense of the US and other areas as directed by the President and Secretary of Defense. Commander, US Northern Command will protect Hawaii in support of Commander, US Pacific Command. US Pacific Command’s
primary role in missile defense at Initial Defensive Operations is the employment of Aegis Surveillance & Tracking capabilities in the Pacific Region to provide direct threat tracking support to US Northern Command’s defense of the Homeland.

**Command and Control**

The Command and Control Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC) system will be integral to the execution of the Global Ballistic Missile Defense mission. This system will link combatant commanders, enabling them to share a common operational picture and conduct near real-time collaborative planning and execution of global missile defense operations. The C2BMC system provides new missile defense displays and will supplement the routine voice conferences that have been expanded to address both offensive and defensive operations.

The C2BMC system will be installed at US Strategic Command and US Northern Command in late July. During that same installation, US Pacific Command will have access to the system’s situational awareness displays. The complete suite of command and control equipment will be installed in the Pacific Command by December 2005. The system, as initially deployed, will provide the essential functionality for executing the global ballistic missile defense system.

The global focus and reach of US Strategic Command’s operations have raised significant interest among international friends and allies. US Strategic Command is exploring the implications of future multi-national system participation in the missile defense mission area by continuing dialogue with our military counterparts including the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Denmark, and Japan.
Offense/Defense Integration

In May 2001, President Bush stated, “We need new concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and defensive forces.” The inclusion of active and passive defenses in America’s deterrent strategy and force posture is a significant departure from past strategy. Circumstances have changed profoundly; the threat may be numerically smaller, but it is certainly more diverse and less stable.

Currently, our only defense against an adversary with long-range ballistic missile technology is our offensive strike capability. Deployment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System gives our Nation a military capability with greater flexibility to assure our friends and allies, adds to the deterrent equation, and begins to actively defend and protect our interests on a global scale.

US Strategic Command, in coordination with US Northern Command and US Pacific Command, is refining the cross-command procedures for integrating offensive and defensive operations. Potential offense response options will include both kinetic and non-kinetic conventional weapon systems and information operations.

An active missile defense provides a broader range of options to senior leadership decision-makers while adding additional strategic deterrent capability. Integrating these capabilities with responsive offensive actions further increases the probability of success in countering an adversary’s attack.

Information and Intelligence Support

A key enabler for Global Ballistic Missile Defense operations is real-time, unambiguous intelligence. We are working closely with the department’s intelligence organizations to develop and disseminate
necessary intelligence information in order to further enhance missile defense capabilities.

Part of our responsibility is to ensure each combatant commander is working from the same intelligence threat assessment baseline. That effort will be coordinated by the US Strategic Command’s Joint Intelligence Center. A common intelligence assessment will ensure all combatant commanders are planning their active defense, passive defense, sensor positioning, readiness levels, and ready attack options to counter a consistent threat.

Enabling capabilities, such as the Defense Support Program (DSP) and Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS), will be vital components of the development of more advanced missile defense systems. For the initial missile defense capability, the on-orbit DSP will provide the necessary indications and warning to fully support our operations against long-range ballistic missiles. SBIRS will expand our ability beyond the current capabilities of the DSP to detect shorter-range missiles. Unlike DSP, SBIRS was designed from the outset to support both tactical and strategic requirements. DSP and SBIRS, once operational, will likely remain the source of the first missile warning we receive, and as such, will represent the essential first link in the chain of a layered, integrated missile defense.

III. Training, Exercises, and Readiness Assessment

To validate operational capabilities, US Strategic Command, in coordination with US Northern Command, US Pacific Command, and the Missile Defense Agency, developed a series of exercises designed to assess our ability to perform critical tasks for missile defense. The series, referred to as Thor’s Shield, is part of a continuous process designed to ensure readiness and to provide feedback to the Missile
Defense Agency for development of future capabilities. The combatant commanders will use Thor’s Shield to incrementally certify their forces and exercise global ballistic missile defense across their areas of responsibility at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

The initial cadre of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Brigade was established on 16 October 2003. The subordinate Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Battalion was activated in Fort Greeley, Alaska, in January 2004. The Army National Guard is being trained to operate both units. All missile defense crews will complete their initial training by summer 2004 and will be certified ready to conduct sustained operations by this fall.

At the tactical level, training and certification for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense Brigade have been in process for over a year. At the operational level, US Pacific Command, US Northern Command, and US Strategic Command staffs are being trained and will be ready to support Initial Defense Operations. Combatant Command participation in Thor’s Shield will continue to support development of the current command and control structure, rules of engagement, and other key operational doctrine. This process contributes to developing operator competency and proficiency prior to Initial Defense Operations and ensures trained operators and a responsive command and control structure will be available to meet contingency missions. Of course, user confidence and proficiency will continue to grow with increased hands-on training experience with the deployed system.

At the strategic level, in November 2003, we completed a senior military and civilian leadership exercise to help formulate key national policy guidance. Interim proposed Ground-Based Midcourse Defense employment policy guidelines for Initial Defensive Operations are currently under final review.
In addition to events dedicated to training, warfighters from US Strategic Command, US Northern Command, US Pacific Command, along with their component commands, are active participants with the Missile Defense Agency in all Ground-based Midcourse Defense flight and ground tests and wargame exercises. This broad participation has proven invaluable in documenting and assessing the military utility of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense System and increasing the warfighters’ confidence in its system capabilities and performance.

**Military Utility Assessment (MUA)**

US Strategic Command is responsible for conducting a Military Utility Assessment (MUA) of the Ballistic Missile Defense System. The MUA is designed to support two purposes. First, to provide the Combatant Commanders’ view of the military utility of the Ballistic Missile Defense System at Initial Defensive Operations in 2004. Second, to provide the Combatant Commanders’ assessment of the Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Initial Defensive Operations capabilities and limitations. These assessments will be derived from system and element testing and simulation by the Operational Test Agencies working for the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. Overall, the MUA serves as a report to the Secretary of Defense on the progress made to date and the projected utility of the system. US Strategic Command and the Joint Theater Air & Missile Defense Organization, in coordination with US Northern Command, US Pacific Command, the Operational Test Agencies, and Missile Defense Agency, will assess the degree to which delivered capabilities support execution of the missile defense mission with a focus on three key metrics: effectiveness, interoperability, and suitability.
The Military Utility Assessment is an iterative, event-driven process. The initial increment of the assessment is based on data available on Ballistic Missile Defense System performance in the September-December 2003 timeframe and provides preliminary conclusions on Initial Defensive Operations military utility and capabilities and limitations at IDO. A more comprehensive assessment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System capabilities for Initial Defensive Operations will be based on test events that are executed in 2004, including both flight tests and ground tests. Additionally, we will draw insights from exercises and wargames that employ C2BMC elements and guide the development and refinement of operating procedures. Confidence in assessed capabilities will improve as more system performance data is gathered and analyzed, and future iterations of the assessment will be adjusted to match any change in testing or schedule.

The MUA and the assessment of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation are closely related in that they share a common database of observations on BMDS capabilities and limitations derived from system and element testing and simulation. The information in the database developed by the Operational Test Agencies provides the information critical to the conduct of the Military Utility Assessment process. We rely on the expertise within the test community of more than a hundred highly skilled data collectors and analysts who utilize an array of analytical tools to evaluate system performance and characterize system behavior. The warfighter and Operational Test Agencies have been involved in the collaborative process and we continue to influence the development of test objectives through close coordination with the developer and the operational test community. Working closely with Mr. Christie’s team, the developers in the Missile Defense Agency, and, importantly, the users of the system in the
Combatant Commands and Services, we will quantify system performance and assess mission execution, fully mindful of the developmental capabilities and limitations identified. We will work closely with the developer to define and evaluate any required corrective action. Observations and insights on system performance gained from wargames will be added to determine whether modifications to tactics, techniques, and procedures can further enhance system capabilities.

Unlike classic OT&E evaluations, the MUA is not assessing the system performance against a hard and fast performance threshold. The MUA is instead a determination of the extent to which the capability provided by a developmental system contributes to mission accomplishment and national security even as the system continues to evolve and mature.

The MUA is properly baselined against today’s capability – an inability to intercept any long-range ballistic missile launched against the United States. At IDO, the BMDS is intended to provide a rudimentary capability to defend against a limited, long-range ballistic missile attack against the United States. We are confident that we are on track from both the technical and operational perspectives to successfully field and operate an initial ballistic missile defense capability. Further testing, wargames, and exercises in 2004 and beyond will provide us with additional data for completing a more in-depth assessment.

IV. Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, US Strategic Command is ready to meet the critical challenges of operationalizing all elements of the Global Ballistic Missile Defense System.
We will be ready to operate an initial defensive capability this year. In the years ahead, we will fulfill the Nation’s goal of deploying a system to defend the United States, our deployed forces, and our allies against the full spectrum of ballistic missile threats. This global system will ultimately deliver a military capability we currently do not have to defend the Nation. When fully fielded, this capability will increase the operational flexibility of our forces and dramatically increase the range of options available to our national leadership. Future advances will have great potential to similarly protect and assure our allies. In the face of adversaries seeking more sophisticated means to threaten our Nation, we must continue to pursue and rigorously assess evolutionary capabilities in order to further improve our ballistic missile defense.

We are mindful of the magnitude of the task before us, but remain confident in the talent of our staff, components, and industry and agency mission partners. Ours is a very different time, fraught with very different challenges. In the words of Abraham Lincoln, “The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew.”

I appreciate your continued support of the men and women of US Strategic Command and the unique and essential contributions they continue to make to safeguard our nation. I look forward to reporting our progress to you in the future and I welcome your questions.