

## DEDICATION

This book is dedicated to those brave and devoted law enforcement officers who daily put their lives on the line to combat the drug menace.

# STRATEGIC PLANNING AND THE DRUG THREAT

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and  
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE . . . . .	vii
ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . .	xi
CHAPTER 1. UNDERSTANDING THE DRUG PROBLEM . . . . .	1
Overview . . . . .	1
The Drugs of Choice . . . . .	1
How Do They Get Here? Source Countries and Trafficking Routes . . . . .	5
The Problems They Cause . . . . .	8
Combating the Problem . . . . .	11
The Bottom Line . . . . .	15
Endnotes - Chapter 1 . . . . .	17
CHAPTER 2. THE DOMESTIC COUNTERDRUG EFFORT . . . . .	21
Three Levels of Effort . . . . .	21
The Strategic Level . . . . .	22
The Operational Level . . . . .	38
The Tactical Level . . . . .	54
Endnotes - Chapter 2 . . . . .	57
CHAPTER 3. THE OVERSEAS EFFORT . . . . .	63
Overseas Strategy . . . . .	63
The Strategic Level . . . . .	64
The Operational Level . . . . .	75
The Tactical Level . . . . .	79
Endnotes - Chapter 3 . . . . .	80
CHAPTER 4. A STRATEGY PROCESS . . . . .	83
The Strategy Requirement . . . . .	83
Developing the Strategy . . . . .	84
Evaluating the Strategy. . . . .	87
Endnotes - Chapter 4 . . . . .	88
ANNEX. STRATEGY FORMAT . . . . .	89
CHAPTER 5. OPERATIONAL PLANNING: FILLING THE GAP BETWEEN STRATEGY AND TACTICS . . . . .	91
Operational Art . . . . .	91
Campaign Planning Process. . . . .	93
Campaign Plans: How Do They Apply to the Drug Control Effort? . . . . .	95
Conclusion . . . . .	97
Endnotes - Chapter 5 . . . . .	97



CHAPTER 6. PLANNING THE COUNTERDRUG EFFORT . . . . .	99
Strategic Direction—The National Level . . . . .	99
Strategic Direction and Campaign Planning—The Regional Level . . . . .	101
Operation Alliance—A Coalition Strategy. . . . .	102
Campaign Planning—Bridging the Operational Gap . . . . .	103
A Format and Notional Plan . . . . .	104
Endnotes - Chapter 6 . . . . .	105
ANNEX. CAMPAIGN PLAN FORMAT FOR DLEAs . . . . .	107
CHAPTER 7. PLANNING AND THE INTERAGENCY ARENA:	
THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE . . . . .	113
The Search for Effective Counterdrug Organization . . . . .	113
Planning Considerations for the Counterdrug Effort . . . . .	114
A Unified Action Plan for Supply Reduction Operations . . . . .	115
Planning and the Interagency Arena—Can It Work? . . . . .	119
Endnote - Chapter 7 . . . . .	120
CHAPTER 8. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS . . . . .	121
ELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .	125
APPENDIX A. EXAMPLE (NOTIONAL) STRATEGY . . . . .	A-1
APPENDIX B. EXAMPLE OF A MULTIAGENCY CAMPAIGN PLAN . . . . .	B-1
APPENDIX C. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GUIDANCE SUPPORTING THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY . . . . .	C-1
APPENDIX D. DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT AND MILITARY ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS . . . . .	D-1
APPENDIX E. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . .	E-1



## FIGURES

Figure 1. Ways Americans are Affected by Drug Abuse. . . . .	viii
Figure 2. Emergency Room Episodes and Drug Mentions. . . . .	2
Figure 3. Price and Purity Data, 1995. . . . .	3
Figure 4. Worldwide Drug Smuggling Routes . . . . .	6
Figure 5. Estimate of Approximate Quantities of Illicit Drugs Available Consumption in the United States, 1993-95 . . . . .	7
Figure 6. Illicit Drugs Major Southwest Border Crossing Routes . . . . .	8
Figure 7. Percentage of Male Arrestees Testing Positive of Drugs in 12 Cities . . . . .	9
Figure 8. Prisoner Population as a Percentage of Designed Capacity . . . . .	10
Figure 9. Various Local, State, and Federal Drug Law Enforcement Agencies and Task Forces . . . . .	22
Figure 10. The Office of National Drug Control Policy . . . . .	23
Figure 11. National Drug Intelligence Center. . . . .	29
Figure 12. Department of Defense Drug Control Funding Request, FY 98 . . . . .	33
Figure 13. The Southwest Border Region Showing the Southwest Border DTA Counties . . . . .	39
Figure 14. Operation Alliance Tactical Coordinator's Reporting Chains . . . . .	40
Figure 15. Operation Alliance Coordination Center . . . . .	41
Figure 16. Project North Star Joint Coordination Group Regions . . . . .	44
Figure 17. Senior Law Enforcement Advisory Board Area. . . . .	45
Figure 18. Joint Task Force 6 Organization. . . . .	48
Figure 19. El Paso Intelligence Center Organization. . . . .	52
Figure 20. Key U.S. Overseas Players. . . . .	65
Figure 21. National Security Council . . . . .	66
Figure 22. The Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs . . . . .	69
Figure 23. J3 Operations Directorate, Counternarcotics Division . . . . .	72
Figure 24. Joint Interagency Task Force South. . . . .	77
Figure 25. Example Plan Format . . . . .	96
Figure 26. Interagency Operating Areas . . . . .	116

Victory is defined as reducing the level of drug abuse, drug crime, and drug-related violence to a level tolerable to the U.S. society.

# PREFACE

The primary purpose of this publication is to show how the principles and techniques of strategic and operational planning can be applied to the supply reduction side of our national effort to curb the trafficking of illicit drugs. An earlier version was published in 1991 which introduced campaign planning methodology as a means to help bridge the gap existing between the policy and strategy documents of higher echelons and the tactical plans developed at the field level. These campaign planning principles, formats, and examples of operational level techniques have been retained and updated for use as models for current interagency actions. This expanded edition provides a more detailed overview of the drug problem in the opening chapter and adds a new chapter devoted to strategy—what are the key ingredients and how is an effective strategy formulated?

The content, which supports the goals set forth in the National Drug Control Strategy, is intended to provoke thought within the interagency arena regarding better ways to synchronize and sustain cooperative multiagency assaults on drug trafficking networks. Never before has this been more important. The United States is at a critical juncture in its campaign to eliminate the rampant drug problem. Past gains are in danger of being lost. Recent trends suggest a resurgence in illicit drug use and that younger and younger Americans are falling prey to the drug pusher.

There is no single issue now more damaging to our social institutions. (See Figure 1.) It brings violence to our streets, robs our economy, threatens our criminal justice system, and imperils the youth of America. Although victory\* may be years away and our resolve tested, we must continue to attack the drug abuse problem and the crime and human misery it creates. While recognizing that eliminating the demand for drugs is the best and perhaps only lasting solution to the larger problem, we also recognize that such can never be achieved without complementary supply reduction actions that curtail the international drug producers, the traffickers and the local pusher from selling their seductive wares.

When facing an enemy that is capable of outspending us several times over in the tactical arena, the planning and programming procedures we employ are vital to success. The efficient use of available assets is paramount. A timely and coherent strategy is required. Yet even the most brilliant strategies falter when those involved in planning do not translate strategy into a coordinated sequence of properly supported tactical actions. This is true for military campaigns and the same is likely true for law enforcement efforts when attempted on a grand scale. The drug war battlefield is international as well as domestic, and border defense is a major component of the battle plan. Such a widely spread arena requires integrated planning and programming efforts at the strategic, operational and tactical levels if we are to maximize the return on our expenditures and substantially reduce the flow of illicit drugs into the United States.

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\* Victory is defined as "Reducing the level of drug abuse, drug crime, and drug related violence to a level tolerable to U.S. society."




Figure 1. Ways Americans are Affected by Drug Abuse.

To further the effectiveness of counterdrug actions, we suggest that strategic planning and campaign planning techniques can be useful means to establish unity of effort among drug law enforcement agencies (DLEAs) at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of activity. Campaign planning methodology is especially important when resources are limited and must be applied in a sequential manner in order to achieve strategic objectives. The campaign planning approach, therefore, affords a framework that would encourage drug law enforcement agencies to program and budget resources for operations several years ahead. Such campaign planning techniques can also help the Department of Defense (DOD) provide more extensive and timely support to the DLEAs. This is because the military can synchronize its training and budget programs with the planned actions of civilian law enforcement authority.

It would be naive to believe that integrated interagency planning and programming for counterdrug activities will be easily accomplished. Waging coalition warfare or conducting combined operations is never easy. Real obstacles exist, both within the system and at the human level. But it was allied efforts that won World War II and the Persian Gulf War (DESERT STORM). Perhaps operational planning techniques can be of benefit only within individual agencies. Nevertheless, combating international drug trafficking on the current scale is a complex endeavor and the stakes are high enough to make us give interagency operations a determined try.



The national leadership has set forth a National Counterdrug Strategy which provides guidance for both supply reduction and demand reduction activities. A variety of offices, committees, and working groups have been established within the bureaucracy to disseminate policy guidance to subordinate organizations. Congress has supported the national strategy with appropriate legislation and has formed oversight committees to assist in implementation. Supplemental strategic guidance has been issued by the Departments of State, Justice, Treasury, Transportation and Defense for prosecuting such efforts as the International Heroin Strategy and the International Cocaine Strategy. Subordinate federal organizations and headquarters such as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the U.S. Customs Service (USCS), the U.S. Southern Command, the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs) and others are developing their own strategies and operational plans in support of the national strategy. Meanwhile, at the tactical level, thousands of field operatives work diligently in dangerous conditions to stem the drug flow. To assist in this effort, material in the following chapters will cover the fundamentals of strategy formulation and operational planning with the intent of identifying techniques that can be used by strategists and planners at all levels.

A secondary objective of this publication is to acquaint the reader with the fundamental concerns resulting from the U.S. drug problem and with the organizational structure of the two major U.S. counterdrug systems involved in supply reduction. Chapter 1 provides basic information necessary to understand the magnitude of the problem and what is at stake in the War on Drugs. In Chapters 2 and 3, the reader learns the complexities of the domestic and international systems. While the system which controls counterdrug activities within the continental United States (CONUS) differs substantially from that outside the continental limits (OCONUS), they are closely interrelated. Likewise the several organizations within each system must work closely together. Without this knowledge of the "cast of characters" and the roles they play, planning at the operational level for tactical actions and military support cannot be effectively accomplished.

Chapters 1, 2, and 3 are therefore intended for the reader who seeks an understanding of the drug problem and the U.S. counternarcotics infrastructure that has evolved to combat the supply of illicit drugs. Readers who already understand both the problem and U.S. counternarcotics organizations, but are interested in strategic and operational planning techniques and how they can be applied in the drug war, can move directly to Chapters 4 through 8. Chapter 4 concerns the principles of strategy formulation and how they can be applied for multiagency efforts. It includes a sample HIDTA strategy format. The next two chapters discuss the translation of policy documents/grand strategy of the upper echelons into planning documents at the operational level. This operational planning guidance is the vital link too often missing when field units begin to develop their tactical plans for counterdrug efforts. A suggested model format is provided along with advice on how to use the model in developing a campaign plan.

Chapter 7 covers some of the real world problems involved when attempting cohesive planning in the interagency arena. What is reasonable to expect? What is involved in coalition efforts? Can a Unified Action Plan be achieved?

Ending with Chapter 8, this edition presents the authors' conclusions regarding what experience has shown in terms of preparation to conduct large-scale and sustained counterdrug operations. What have we learned? What do we do well? What appears to be inefficient or counterproductive? Finally, what can we do better that will enhance our chances of success in combating the trafficking of illicit drugs.

The methodology used in preparing this book consisted of in-depth interviews with responsible individuals who work or have recently worked in U.S. counterdrug efforts. We thank them for their kindnesses in meeting with us and for the dedication they display and the many hours they devote in combatting the drug problem. They included officials of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), the Departments of State, Justice, Treasury, and Defense, and members of several specific federal and state agencies involved in drug law enforcement. Interviewees ranged from those in Washington, DC, concerned with high-level policy development to state government and regional-level law enforcement officials, to local judges, prosecutors, and field agents involved in detecting, investigating, and arresting individuals for trafficking in drugs. Military personnel interviewed ranged from officers at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) level to National Guardsmen involved in military support operations. Information from interviews supplemented data available from ONDCP, congressional reports, Departments of State, Defense and Health & Human Services documents, the U.S. intelligence community and various drug law enforcement organizations. Scholarly journals and reputable media publications were also used. While information from these various sources is appropriately attributed, the assessments and conclusions are the authors' alone.

We hope the reader will not only gain an insight into the existing supply reduction organizational systems but also an appreciation of strategy development and the need for an efficient planning mechanism to integrate and sustain U.S. drug law enforcement activities. To these ends, this study was written.

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## ABOUT THE AUTHORS

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# CHAPTER 1

## UNDERSTANDING THE DRUG PROBLEM

### OVERVIEW

The United States is facing a threat as dangerous to the national well-being and moral fiber of its society as anything encountered in the past 200 years. From without and within, our country is under attack from those who operate the illicit drug industry. In their pursuit of profit and power, the drug traffickers have become as threatening to our social and political institutions as any foe we may face in the next decade. They reap fortunes while sowing the seeds of societal destruction.

During 1995, some 20 million Americans, about 1 in 9 of our citizens, used some form of illicit drug and 12.8 million of those can be termed regular drug users.<sup>1</sup> Between 1992 and 1995, the rate of increasing drug use by teen-agers more than doubled.<sup>2</sup> The demand for drugs has created a climate of fear in many neighborhoods as drug-related violence and street crime are prevalent throughout the nation. Citizens are demanding greater protection—yet combating drug-related crime is already overtaxing both our criminal justice system and our penal system. Also in danger of being overburdened is our health care system. Those who use and abuse drugs by sharing contaminated needles spread the AIDS virus and other diseases. Those who seek medical and psychological rehabilitation to free themselves from drug addiction are draining assets from those needing treatment of disorders unrelated to drugs. We cannot deny that the situation is serious.

All responsible Americans have the obligation to help create and maintain a drug-free society for the health and well-being of the people of the United States. Achieving this will require a concerted national effort incurring considerable expense of time and resources. To sustain support for any long-term counterdrug campaign, it is essential that the nature and magnitude of the threat be understood by the American public. This chapter sets forth basic information that portrays the drug situation of the late 1990s. Included are the principal drugs of choice; where they come from and how they get here; some effects they are having on American society and the basic approach taken to combat the drug problem.

### THE DRUGS OF CHOICE

What Are They? The three principal drugs of abuse within the United States are marijuana, cocaine, and heroin. Other dangerous drugs include methamphetamine, lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), phencyclidine (PCP), Rohypnol (a brand name for flunitrazepam), and illegally obtained prescription drugs. All can markedly influence human behavior and are either illegal or rigidly controlled because of the potential damage they can do to the user, and the dangers improper use can pose for society. These drugs are being consumed by a

significant percentage of the populace and the perceived dangers that caused them to be declared illegal have become manifest problems for our society.

Marijuana is the most frequently used illicit drug in America. Commonly believed to give users a relaxed contentment or “mellow” feeling, it can also induce anxiety and hyperactivity. Within the marijuana plant, it is the chemical compound THC (delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol) that impairs the user’s judgment and psychomotor performance, lowers inhibitions, and can lead to short-term memory loss and decreased learning ability. While the effects on the individual of long-term marijuana use have not been firmly accessed, many medical and law enforcement experts feel that its use is a menace to public safety and a “gateway” to other stronger and more dangerous drugs. Some 19.2 million Americans, (about 9 percent of the population over age 12) are believed to have used marijuana in 1995 and about 12 million U.S. citizens regularly use it.<sup>3</sup> According to the 1995 National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NICC) Report, today’s marijuana is, on the average, much more potent (3.3 percent to 6.6 percent THC) than that commonly used in the 1970s (less than 2 percent THC). For the period 1992-95, as potency increased so did emergency room admissions and many users combined marijuana with other drugs such as cocaine, PCP, and alcohol (see Figure 2).

Emergency Room Episodes and Drug Mentions	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Total drug episodes (person cases)	371,208	393,968	433,493	460,910	508,895	531,800
Total cocaine mentions	80,355	101,189	119,843	123,423	142,410	142,494
Total heroin mentions	33,884	35,898	48,003	63,232	64,221	76,000
Total marijuana/hashish mentions	15,706	16,251	23,997	28,873	40,101	47,100
Source: Drug Abuse Warning Network, National Institute on Drug Abuse (1988-91) and Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (1992-1995).						

Figure 2. Emergency Room Episodes and Drug Mentions.

Cocaine remained the drug most threatening to U.S. society as of late 1996, and is readily available throughout the United States. In large cities multikilogram quantities can be acquired while multiounce buys can be made in most smaller cities. An estimated 4.3 million U.S. citizens used cocaine (either in powder form or the crystalline “crack” variety) in 1995. Of these, at least 1.8 million could be classed as heavy users.<sup>4</sup> The dangers of cocaine use are not well understood by most Americans, particularly teen-agers and young adults. Believed by many to be a safe “recreational” drug which can bring a “high,” a strong feeling of euphoria and well-being, its use can also damage both mind and body. Addiction is common. Prolonged use can bring about decided psychological changes. Depression, feelings of paranoia, anxiety and inability to concentrate or remember often result. The heavy user, particularly those smoking the “crack” variety, can develop a severe psychosis requiring long-term psychiatric care. Physical effects include neurological damage, arterial brain damage, irregular heart

beats, danger of heart attack or stroke and the possibility of instant death from unintended overdose. (According to the NHSDA, there were 142,000 emergency room visits related to cocaine during 1995.) It also costs considerable money to use cocaine. A "coke-head" could spend over \$200 per week on his habit while those hooked on the "crack" variety of cocaine may easily spend over \$500 per week. Few young people realize that "crack" use can become quickly addictive and an overdose can easily be fatal. During 1995, the average purity of a kilogram of cocaine arriving in the United States was 80 to 90 percent and there was no shortage of supply.<sup>5</sup>

Heroin use is on the increase. After years of a rather constant estimate of one half million U.S. heroin addicts, the number is now between 600,000 and one million.<sup>6</sup> Heroin production worldwide (heroin is a derivative of opium) showed an upward trend from 1990-1995 (except for 1994 due to poor growing conditions in SE Asia) and the overall import purity of SE Asian and Latin American heroin in the United States averages about 76 percent (See Figure 3). In late 1996, heroin displaced cocaine and became the drug of choice in a number of communities in the metropolitan Northeast and Pacific Northwest. The reasons for this increase are unclear but probably include the greater availability and increased marketing of a high quality, less expensive product. Competition between the heroin traffickers is now intense and violence is commonplace. In September 1996, in the Boston area, heroin from SE Asia,

Based on field investigations and laboratory analysis of DEA drug buys and seizures, the national ranges for the price and purity of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana for the first quarter of 1995 were reported as follows:

Cocaine	Price	Purity
kilogram	\$10,500 - \$36,000	85%
ounce	400 - 2,000	70
gram	30 - 200	63
Heroin <sup>a</sup>		
kilogram	\$75,000 - \$260,000	76%
ounce	800 - 18,000	59 - 68
gram <sup>b</sup>	70 - 800	56 - 64
Marijuana <sup>c</sup>		
pound	\$300 - \$4,000	5.79% <sup>d</sup>
ounce	50 - 320	

<sup>a</sup> Includes Mexican, Southeast Asian, and Southwest Asian heroin.  
<sup>b</sup> Price per gram for powder heroin ranged from \$70 - \$800; price per gram for black tar heroin ranged from \$80 - 500.  
<sup>c</sup> Commercial grade; includes kilodrick, loose plant materials, and buds.  
<sup>d</sup> Indicates THC potency. (DEA reports average retail potency is 3.3%)

Source: ONDCP, Drugs & Crime Data Factsheet, Drug Data Summary, July 1996

Figure 3. Price and Purity Data, 1995.



South America and SW Asia could be purchased at bargain prices and with a purity that exceeds 90 percent.<sup>7</sup> The higher purity nationwide is partially responsible for a more than two-fold increase in heroin-related emergency room admissions between 1990 (33,884)<sup>8</sup> and 1995 (76,000).<sup>9</sup>

Heroin depresses the nervous system, and places the user in a tranquil state. For the beginning user, anxiety, pain and the concerns of daily life are reduced or eliminated. For the addict or prolonged user, life can become an endless search for normalcy as increasing amounts of heroin are required to simply function in society. A vast majority of heroin users inject the drug intravenously thereby subjecting them to disease, infection, allergic reaction and overdose. As a consequence, addicts in their twenties face the same death rate as the normal seventy year old.<sup>10</sup>

Other dangerous drugs are continuing to create serious problems for our society. Of these, methamphetamine (meth) currently presents the greatest threat. Cheaper and longer lasting, this alternative to cocaine threatens to gain acceptance by drug users nationwide. Clandestinely produced in Mexico and the United States, distribution is controlled in most part by Mexican criminal groups and to a lesser degree by outlaw motorcycle gangs. Methamphetamine (known in street slang as meth, crank, speed, or ice) can be smoked, injected, snorted, or taken orally. A powerful stimulant, it produces euphoria, greater alertness and a sense of increased energy. Physical effects include a rise in body temperature, blood pressure and heart rate together with a dilation of the pupils. Meth, like cocaine, stimulates the central nervous system but, unlike cocaine which is rapidly metabolized, may take two days or more to be eliminated from the body. Abusers often experience rapid mood changes and tend to engage in violent behavior. Withdrawal from high doses of meth can lead to severe depression. Major use was previously confined to the southwestern and western states, but by early 1997 meth is increasingly prevalent in the prairie and midwestern states. Meth has become the drug of choice in certain areas of California, Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, and Utah, and has created significant law enforcement and public health problems in Los Angeles, Phoenix, San Diego, and San Francisco. A crystal form of methamphetamine, known as "ice," is prevalent in Hawaii. It is of high purity and is smoked in a manner similar to crack cocaine. The majority of ice is imported from South Korea and Taiwan. A new ephedrine-based methamphetamine produces effects even stronger than crack cocaine and brings "highs" that can last up to 15 days. Methamphetamine, and its structural analogs methcathinone (cat) and cathinone, are dangerous and unpredictable drugs that are threatening to create widespread problems.<sup>11</sup>

Three hallucinogens, LSD (acid, trips, blotter, etc.); PCP (angel dust); and MDMA<sup>12</sup> (ecstasy, XTC, doctor, etc.), cause problems throughout the country. Readily available and relatively inexpensive, they are favorites of many young drug users. Often in evidence at rock concerts, they induce visual hallucinations, euphoria, relaxation, and emotional warmth. Bad reactions include disorientation, anxiety, panic, and paranoid delusions.

Abuse of other controlled drugs continue to be a threat. In addition to long-time misuse of legal pharmaceutical drugs such as morphine, codeine, and the depressant benzodiazepines (Valium and Xanax), the illegal depressant, Rohypnol has become a serious problem.

Legally manufactured in Mexico, Colombia and Switzerland, Rophynol is increasingly being smuggled into the United States. This so-called date-rape drug is 7-10 times more potent than Valium and creates confusion, disorientation and short-term memory loss. Overdose could be lethal. Public warnings regarding the potential dangers of this drug are needed, particularly to young men and women of high school and college age.

## HOW DO THEY GET HERE? SOURCE COUNTRIES AND TRAFFICKING ROUTES

To meet this huge demand, traffickers daily move large quantities of marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and other dangerous drugs into and throughout the United States. Figure 4 shows worldwide smuggling routes for the three principal drugs of choice. Although no one knows the true quantities of import tonnage or consumption, Figure 5 reflects the data available on worldwide production of the three major drugs which is considered sufficiently reliable to indicate both magnitudes and trends.

A large majority of the illicit drugs which enter the United States originate in Latin America and the Caribbean region. Virtually all of the world's cocaine and most of the marijuana comes from Latin America and the Caribbean. While Asia remains the principal source of heroin, South America is now providing a significant percentage of high grade product. South American heroin is distributed nationwide in large part by the same trafficking network that distributes cocaine. In fact, some higher level cocaine traffickers are requiring that the regional and local distributors buy heroin as a prerequisite to obtaining cocaine.<sup>13</sup> Mexico is also a heroin producer with a brown powder form and the more common "black tar" variety. Mexican heroin production is consumed almost entirely in the United States, primarily in the southwestern, western and central states. The United States is a major producer of marijuana and an exporter of the higher grades of this product. However, no accurate data is currently available on total U.S. marijuana production.

It is generally accepted that a majority of the illicit drugs entering the United States do so across the US-Mexican border. The estimated percentage is often stated as 70 percent however no definitive evidence supports that figure and many DLEA members believe it may be too high. In any event, considerable quantities of cocaine and heroin enter the United States through Gulf Coast ports; Caribbean routes to Florida, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands; both east and west coast ports of entry and from Canada. While it is true that Caribbean Sea routes are constricted at the Yucatan Channel and the Windward, Mona, and Anegada Passages and that trafficker use of the sea and air routes through the Caribbean has been substantially reduced by U.S. interdiction efforts, the magnitude of the drug problem in Florida and the fact that Puerto Rico/USVI have been declared a High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) shows that considerable use of Caribbean routes continues and may be increasing. There is evidence of significant air transport via the Caribbean and east of Bermuda into eastern Canada.<sup>14</sup>






Figure 4. Worldwide Drug Smuggling Routes.



<b><u>Drug - (Potential Production)</u></b>	<b><u>1993</u></b>	<b><u>1994</u></b>	<b><u>1995</u></b>
Marijuana (foreign in metric tons)*	14,407	13,386	11,489
Marijuana (domestic production)**	?	?	?
Cocaine HCL (metric tons)*	715	760	780
Heroin (metric tons)*	322	294	363

\* *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, 1996, U.S. Department of State

\*\* A search revealed no reliable data or responsible estimates concerning the total amount of marijuana produced within the United States. Interviews and literature available indicated that approximately 35 percent to 40 percent of the marijuana used by U.S. citizens was domestically produced.

Figure 5. Estimate of Approximate Quantities of Illicit Drugs Available for Consumption in the United States, 1993-95.

Perhaps the most used smuggling routes are along the coasts and over Central America and Mexico. Many drug-carrying aircraft enter northern Mexico, transfer drugs to various Mexican smuggling organizations which in turn bring them across the southwest border to regional distributors in the United States (see Figure 6). Sea routes along the western coast of Mexico and the United States are used not only for container-concealed drug shipments, but mother ships also have been reported making sea drops in the Pacific northwest.

The large areas involved, plus limited interdiction assets and remarkable trafficker initiative and sophistication, place the odds for success largely with the drug smugglers. This is even more true for the air routes despite laudable successes in the Florida/Bahamas region. Problems in detecting illicit drugs crossing the 2000 mile Mexican border are enormous. This is due in large part to the massive flow of vehicular and foot crossings each day and the practical constraints involved in trying to patrol such distances and inspect such a volume with limited assets of men and modern technology. U.S. Customs officials, the U.S. Border Patrol and other federal, state and local supporting forces are making magnificent efforts but, under current conditions, will continue to have great difficulty stemming the overland flow of drugs through and around the official crossing stations.

Opiates (heroin, opium, morphine) from Southeast Asia which formerly entered the United States primarily in the western states now also enter along the east coast and across the US-Canadian border. Similar drugs from Southwest Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran) follow a different route through the Middle East and southern Turkey or Africa, then enter the northeastern United States directly or through Europe or Canada. (It must be stated however, that modern commercial air travel now permits the adventurous smuggler to take varied routes and enter the United States at almost any international airport.)




Figure 6. Illicit Drugs Major Southwest Border Crossing Routes.

## THE PROBLEMS THEY CAUSE

The consumption of illicit narcotics by both casual users and addicts has profound implications for the citizenry as a whole. The direct and indirect economic drain, the social and political effects of drug-related crimes, and the individual and family problems resulting from drug abuse must be corrected if we are to preserve a way of life commensurate with traditional American values. Consider the following:

*Economic Loss.* The losses resulting from the “drug problem” are staggering, particularly during periods of slow economic growth. On the global scene, the drug trade may absorb \$500 billion annually. That exceeds the value of all U.S. currency in circulation.<sup>15</sup> The \$140 to \$150 billion total direct loss each year to the U.S. economy is more than American consumers spend each year for gasoline and motor oil and more than three times the amount spent on tobacco products.<sup>16</sup> Amazingly, this is also more than the combined profits earned in 1995 by the top 100 U.S. companies on the *Fortune 500* list.<sup>17</sup>

There is an indirect loss as well. Business and industrial leaders are aware that drug abuse is reducing their profits through lost efficiency and diminished productivity, accidents,

medical expense, absenteeism, and theft by employees to support their habits. This type of employee behavior can result in enormous indirect losses to the economy each year. Past studies have shown that:

- Drug users are three-and-a-half times as likely to be involved in a plant accident.
- Drug users are five times as likely to file a worker's compensation claim.
- Drug users receive three times the average level of sick benefits.
- Drug users function at 67 percent of their work potential.<sup>18</sup>

*Overloaded Criminal Justice System/Courts and Prisons.* Besides pronouncing punishment for crimes committed, the court system has traditionally served to deter potential violators. Because of the magnitude of drug trafficking and substance abuse in recent years, this is changing. American courts have become grossly overloaded with drug-related cases. In Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, a Commonwealth Court Judge stated,

I frequently ask defendants why they commit certain offenses. Often, the answer is that the defendant needed drug money. Easily more than half of the theft cases, especially retail theft cases, robbery and burglary cases are committed for the purpose of obtaining drug money. . . . I think that it is safe to say that of non-DUI (*alcohol*) offenses, fully a third to forty percent are drug offenses or drug related offenses.<sup>19</sup>

A Superior Court Judge in Los Angeles County stated that of the 30 cases per day average for his court, 75 percent are drug related.<sup>20</sup> The same is true in other metropolitan areas where a survey of 12 cities showed 60 to 80 percent of all male arrestees tested positive for drug use (see Figure 7).




Figure 7. Percentage of Male Arrestees Testing Positive for Drugs in 12 Cities.

The large numbers of drug cases have had several significant results. Prosecutors can no longer spend much time on cases involving small amounts of drugs. In many of these, the small-time offender pleads guilty to a lesser drug charge, receives a short sentence (30-90 days), or receives probation. In some areas, he may never even face trial. In 1994, there were 14,514 drug offense convictions in the State of Pennsylvania. Of those convicted, only 64 percent were sentenced to jail or prison. Over one third (36 percent) received probation.<sup>21</sup> According to the Center for Addiction and Substance Abuse, as many as 60 percent of federal prisoners and 80 percent of state prisoners are incarcerated for drug or alcohol related crimes.

Probation, lesser sentences, or early release may also result because of overcrowded jails and prisons. Virtually all state and federal prisons are confining more felons than the designed capacity. Figure 8 illustrates seriousness of the situation. Some county and city jails may be even worse. The Los Angeles County jail, with a 1989 design capacity of 5,500 prisoners, was housing almost 8,000 inmates in November of that year (78 percent of whom were convicted on drug related charges).<sup>22</sup> By November 14, 1996, the population had more than doubled to a total of 19,079 inmates while the design capacity continued to lag far behind.<sup>23</sup> The end result of dockets and insufficient prison cells is more drug criminals on the street and less deterrent value of the court and penal systems.




Figure 8. Prisoner Population as a Percentage of Designed Capacity.

*Social Damage.* The dispassionate statistics showing the extent of drug abuse by American citizens translates directly into human misery and financial despair. Young women addicted to crack cocaine are producing thousands of babies each year who are malnourished and have birth defects. Many are born addicted to cocaine. Women and men have turned to prostitution and other criminal pursuits as a means to support their drug habits. The advent of AIDS in the addict population portends a more rapid spread of the disease. In each home where drug addiction exists, there is high potential for health problems, financial need, disruptive behavior, and criminal acts. Data collected by crises intervention workers reveals that 70 percent of adults calling for help indicated that cocaine was more important to them than family or friends. Of these adult callers 45 percent admitted stealing from either



employers, friends, or family to pay for drugs. Of the teenagers calling, 89 percent admitted to family problems because of their drug use and 48 percent said they sold drugs in their school to support their own habits.<sup>24</sup> Such behavior strikes at the heart of American family life. It contributes to lower social values and strains the fabric of our society. We must find ways to counter these problems.

*National Security Implications.* Trafficking and consumption of illicit narcotics generate national security problems at home and abroad. Considering the enormous sums of money involved and the sophistication of the larger trafficking operations, efforts by drug cartels to either buy the support of government officials or intimidate them must be expected. Such activities are undermining governments friendly to the United States and have subverted the loyalties of some U.S. political, judicial, law enforcement, and military personnel. Insurgent and revolutionary groups in Colombia and Peru often support illicit drug trafficking as a source of revenue. Private armies operating in southeast Asia are supported by traffic in drugs and are degrading the effectiveness of the governments of Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. Additionally, the tremendous social impact of widespread U.S. drug abuse and the drain on the American economy have indirect but real national security implications.

Recognizing the threat, President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 221 declaring the international drug trade a threat to national security. President Bush affirmed this condition in 1989, the U.S. Congress concurred and financed the Administration's "War on Drugs." President Clinton restated and expanded this theme in Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)14. He went further by giving Cabinet rank to the Director of ONDCP and in 1996 made the Director a member of the National Security Council.

In reality, the three Presidents only confirmed the obvious. Whenever a nation is menaced by forces capable of creating the social, economic, and political disruptions described above, the national security of that nation is in jeopardy. The United States can ill-afford to have the governments of other Western Hemisphere nations weakened by corruption, compromised by the drug trafficker or fall prey to insurgents sustained by arms and equipment financed by narcodollars. Not even a nation as powerful and prosperous as the United States can afford to lose nearly \$200 billion annually to an underground economy, in absorbing the medical and rehabilitation expenses and in lost productivity. It cannot afford a degradation of social and moral values among its youth as that which now endangers its younger generations. Certainly no country should tolerate the drug-related deaths of 20,000 of its younger citizens each year.<sup>25</sup>

## COMBATING THE PROBLEM

Drug trafficking on a large scale will end only when it is no longer profitable to continue. Either the numbers of individuals wanting drugs must fall to an insignificant level or the costs of doing business must become unbearably high. A combination of these would be the

ideal. Such business costs are measured in terms of whatever the trafficker holds dear; his fortune, his freedom, or his life.

It is unlikely that any single approach can solve the drug problem. Neither a “demand reduction solution” or a “supply reduction solution” can do the job alone. The magnitude of the drug threat is directly proportional to the sum of the quantity of illicit drugs being consumed and the quantity of illicit drugs available. As long as there is demand, there will be those trying to supply that demand. Likewise, as long as there is a ready supply, there will be individuals susceptible to the lure of the drug life and those who will seek to spread that lifestyle. The greater the demand for drugs and the greater the available supply, the greater the threat to our society.

The National Drug Control Strategy recognizes that a dual approach is required. The 1997 version sets forth five strategic goals, each with several specific objectives, that guide the national drug control effort. The five goals are:

1. Educate and enable America's youth to reject illegal drugs as well as alcohol and tobacco.
2. Increase the safety of America's citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence.
3. Reduce health and social costs of illegal drug use to the public.
4. Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat.
5. Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.

Goals 1 through 3 are demand reduction oriented, while goals 4 and 5 target the supply side. Goal 4 has subordinate objectives which are both demand and supply reduction oriented.

The Clinton administration has requested \$16 billion for FY 1998 to support national drug control programs. Of the total request, \$5.5 billion (34 percent) is targeted for demand reduction; \$8.4 billion (52 percent) for domestic law enforcement; \$1.6 billion (10 percent) for interdiction efforts; and \$488 million (3 percent) for international programs.<sup>26</sup>

## Demand Reduction.

Demand reduction includes resources for treatment, education, prevention and research. A combination of programs, all of which show promise, are now underway to help reduce the demand for drugs. The most fundamental ones concern education, community involvement, and a cooperative effort by management and labor to keep drugs from the workplace. The education programs begin in grammar schools and continue through the college level to inform young Americans of the harmful effects of drug use. The education approach continues through media campaigns to educate youngsters and adults alike. Demand reduction is also

fostered by a number of community action efforts designed to stimulate participation by neighborhood organizations such as civic groups, churches, or other citizens' organizations. Another attack on drug demand is being conducted at the workplace where screening of job applicants and testing of workers are gaining acceptance as means to curtail drug use. Particular efforts are being made in the transportation industry where public safety is threatened by those working under the influence of drugs.

As demand reduction programs become more successful, the burden of those involved in supply reduction will ease. If fully implemented, programs suggested in the National Drug Control Strategy can be effective.

## Supply Reduction.

The second approach to curtail drug abuse and drug trafficking is by reducing the supply. Supply reduction enhances demand reduction by limiting drugs available, and by making them more difficult and more expensive to obtain. However the main purpose of supply reduction efforts is to put the traffickers out of business. Whether it be by attacking the production source, interdiction efforts on the drug routes, or the apprehension, conviction, and incarceration of drug criminals in the United States, the objective is the same—to stop the drug flow. The principal actors in the supply reduction operations are the various drug law enforcement agencies and the organizations that directly support them.

## The Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (DLEAs).

A knowledge of the various agencies' roles and missions and how they normally operate is necessary before any attempt can be made at interagency campaign planning. At present some 50 federal agencies are involved in some aspect of drug law enforcement. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is the principal investigative agency and works closely with other organizations such as the U.S. Customs Service (USCS); the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG); the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP); and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in apprehending drug law offenders. Chapter 2 will discuss in detail the various federal DLEAs and how they interrelate. In addition to the federal agencies, there are myriad state and local law enforcement groups that are at least partially engaged in counterdrug operations.

Despite marginal success in increasing their ranks, the DLEAs are making more drug crime arrests, and vigorously searching for ways to apprehend even more of those profiting from the drug trade. In general, they demonstrate a high degree of professionalism and remarkable dedication despite frustration with what sometimes seems to be a never-ending stream of drug traffic and the inability of the courts and prisons to handle the load.

In comparison with the money available to their criminal adversaries, DLEAs are significantly underfunded. At present the drug trafficking networks appear to have better transportation and communication equipment, more sophisticated firearms, and more

effective intelligence support than do the DLEAs. Even though additional manpower was recently authorized, both the U.S. Border Patrol and the U.S. Customs Service need more manpower for border monitoring and investigations. Some border states have as few as three U.S. Customs Service Agents to handle all investigations. The Drug Enforcement Administration also needs more officers for intelligence gathering and investigating drug cases.

DLEAs are making significant progress in interagency cooperation within and among local, state and federal forces. Problems remain however. Turf battles occasionally create some problems as the varying DLEAs compete for federal dollars while operating in overlapping jurisdictions. Federal, state, and local law enforcement groups often have differing perspectives that inhibit cooperation and intelligence sharing. Joint organizations like Operation Alliance (along the southwest border); Project North Star (the U.S./Canadian border) and the various HDTAs and Organized Crime/Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs) have done much to enhance interagency cooperation. However, another problem, now minor but potentially dangerous, are the instances of corruption found in DLEAs. With so much drug money available for bribery, plus the added threats of violence to those who do not cooperate, it is not surprising that some law officers are corrupted. Similar cases have occurred in the U.S. military. Fortunately, the instances in both the DLEAs and the military are relatively few.

## Military Support to the DLEAs.

The Department of Defense and the several armed services have supported national counterdrug efforts for many years by providing DLEAs with equipment and training services and with limited operational assistance such as providing transportation platforms and general intelligence data. Army and Air National Guard units have been the major providers of military support within the nation's boundaries. Operating in a state status (U.S. Code, Title 32) and less restricted by the Posse Comitatus Act, they have provided men, equipment, and services in a wide range of counterdrug activities. Since September 1989, federal military forces have increasingly been involved in a comprehensive military support role of counternarcotics activities. Defense Department assets support the National Drug Control Strategy of attacking drugs at the production source, while in transit, and within the United States. The Secretary of Defense has directed those Unified and Specified Commanders, who can contribute, to assist in detecting and countering illicit drug entry into the United States to the limits that law and mission availability permit. Joint Task Force 6 in El Paso, Texas provides and coordinates federal military support to DLEAs throughout the United States. This and three other joint task forces, each with specific areas of responsibility, are described in Chapter 2. Careful to follow DOD policy and the Posse Comitatus Law which prohibits the Federal military from conducting law enforcement activities such as searches, seizures, or arrests, the military establishment has become a more significant provider of support to the criminal justice community.

The military is also active on the demand reduction side with educational and counseling services, medical assistance, drug testing, and drug offender programs. Reducing drug use



within the military has been a success story. The major drug-related disciplinary and efficiency problems of the 1970s and early 1980s have nearly vanished. Though military life is much different from civilian society, perhaps some lessons learned by the military have application in the civilian work place.

## THE BOTTOM LINE

### Dangers And Damage: The Bad News.

Drug abuse and drug trafficking pose dangers of far greater magnitude to the United States than is commonly perceived. This lack of public awareness is due in part to a decline in media coverage and a curtailment of the educational campaign and public service announcements that were proving so effective as the 1990s began. (600 antidrug stories were shown on the the three major television networks in 1989 compared with only 65 stories in 1995.)<sup>27</sup> For example, while most Americans are aware of drug-related problems in their communities, few realize that over 200,000 Americans have died from the effects of drug abuse during the past decade (more than twice the number killed during Viet Nam and Korean Wars combined). Knowing that 292,131 U.S. service personnel were killed in action in *all of World War II*, 33,870 were killed in action in the Korean War, and 47,000 were killed in action in the Vietnam War should lend perspective to the threatening dimension of America's drug problem—and should enjoin the Nation's commitment to counter the drug scourge.<sup>28</sup>

Many Americans know that drug abuse can lead to health problems but they are unaware that intravenous drug use is a major source of HIV/AIDS infection and over one third of all AIDS deaths are drug related.<sup>29</sup> Little publicized was the 124 percent increase in heroin related emergency hospital admissions between 1990 and 1994. During the same period, there was also a 28 percent rise in overall drug related emergency admissions. Also little publicized were the thousands of babies born each year to the mothers who use illegal drugs.<sup>30</sup> The toll in human misery is incalculable and the public must understand their families are not immune to such suffering.

In addition to the social and human costs, there is an economic cost as well. By varying degrees, all Americans pay for the over \$50 billion that annually flows directly to the drug dealers and the additional \$80-\$100 billion or more that is spent on reducing the demand for drugs; limiting the supply available; fighting drug-related crime; giving medical and counseling assistance to drug users and their families; or being lost through absenteeism, accidents, embezzlement and nonproductivity. All economic groups and social classes in the United States are affected by the drug problem.

Perhaps the more insidious and dangerous cost is what the drug problem is doing to the traditional American way of life. At a time when some segments of society appear to tolerate or even glamorize a lifestyle which includes the use of illegal drugs, the drug trafficker is targeting the youth of America as never before. As basic standards of right and wrong are being challenged by the drug counter-culture and family values are under attack, drugs are available in most high schools and are finding their way to into junior high schools and grade

schools. As a result, there is a reversal underway of the gains made during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The rate of drug use among teen-agers doubled between 1992 and 1996 as greater numbers of young people are being drawn into the drug scene.<sup>31</sup> If the trends of the mid-1990s continue unabated, the domestic problems caused by drug abuse may become catastrophic.

## Hope for the Future: The Good News.

With so much attention devoted to the problems at hand and the bad news of increasing drug use among the nation's young, we sometimes fail to realize all the progress that has been made. Since the end of the 1970s, there have been many successes. Overall drug use is down. The number of regular users (use in the past 30 days) has decreased to 12.2 million in 1995—less than half the number of the early 1980s. Cocaine use has fallen dramatically, a reported 30 percent decrease in the past three years. Both the Medellin and Cali cartels have been damaged and a number of their upper-level leaders are in jail or have been killed. A significant portion of Latin American cocaine, perhaps up to 30 percent, is being seized or destroyed before reaching the market. Interdiction efforts have significantly impeded the traffic of drugs through the Caribbean and disrupted the flow into the southeastern United States. Peru and Colombia, with U.S. assistance, have dealt punishing blows to the drug production and distribution systems in their respective countries. Mexico appears to be increasing its counterdrug efforts. The United Nations has facilitated multinational agreements designed to combat international drug trafficking. International cooperation has increased the successes of our campaign against money laundering. Drug criminals are losing over \$700 million annually to the assets forfeiture program. Drug use in the workplace dropped from 19 percent in 1979 to 8.1 percent in 1993. These are but a few of the positive results stemming from demand and supply reduction efforts of the past.<sup>32</sup> They provide encouragement and assurance that future victories will be forthcoming.

Success in reducing the drug problem from major threat to mere nuisance will most probably result from the long-term pursuit of a multifaceted strategy which addresses both the national and international dimensions of the problem. The strategy must also achieve a proper balance in the distribution of resources for demand reduction and supply reduction efforts. The National Drug Control Strategy of 1997 and the call for a future 10 year strategy supported by 5-year planning and programming budget cycles provide an encouraging start in this direction.

We must remember however, that national policy and national strategy are nothing but words unless translated into practical concepts for counterdrug action—backed by adequate resources. Strategic planning and campaign planning are essential for this process.

Following chapters set forth the current U.S. counterdrug organizational system. They propose methods for developing subordinate strategies and operational plans for agency level and below.

## ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), Drugs and Crime Clearinghouse, National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS), *Drugs & Crime Data, Fact Sheet, Drug Use Trends*, NCJ-160044, Rockville, Maryland: July 1996, p. 2. Reference states that at least 19.2 million persons reported use of illicit drugs at least once in 1995. Data was derived from the National Household Survey of Drug Abuse (NHSDA) which is considered by many to give conservative estimates of drug use in the United States.
2. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services (USDHHS), Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), National Household Survey of Drug Abuse (NHSDA) 1992, 1993, 1994, and the 1995 NHSDA Highlights from the SAMHSA Internet Web Page, <http://www.samhsa.gov/oas/nhsda/ar18t003.htm>, October 16, 1996.
3. ONDCP, Drugs and Crime Clearinghouse, NCJRS, *Drugs and Crime Fact Sheet, Drug Use Trends*, NCJ-160044, Rockville, MD: July 1996, p. 2.
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7. Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Boston, briefing and nonattribution interview, at Project North Star Eastern Joint Command Group Meeting, Hyannis, MA, September 19, 1996.
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10. Leif R. Rosenberger, *America's Drug War Debacle*, Brookville, VT, 1996, p. 8.
11. U.S. Department of Justice, DEA, *Methamphetamine Situation in the United States*, Washington, DC: March 1996.

12. MDMA is an acronym for 3,4 methylenedioxymethamphetamine, an analog of methamphetamine.

13. DEA and Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Boston, briefing at Project North Star Eastern Joint Command Group Meeting, Hyannis, MA, September 19, 1996.

14. Royal Canadian Mounted Police briefing, Project North Star, Eastern Joint Command Group meeting at Hyannis, MA, September 18, 1996. In September 1996, an aircraft traveling from Colombia to Canada air dropped 510 kilograms of cocaine in Quebec Province. It was seized by Canadian officials.

15. U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration, Bureau of Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1995*, Table No. 815, Money, Stock and Liquid Assets 1980-1994, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1995, p. 527. Data shows that \$354 billion in currency was circulating worldwide in 1994. This does not count money in the U.S. Treasury, Federal Reserve Banks, and on deposit in banking and lending institutions.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 458. Table No. 709, Personal Consumption Expenditures by Type, 1980-1993, shows that \$105.6 billion was spent on gasoline and motor oil in 1993, and \$50.5 billion was spent on tobacco products.

17. "The Fortune 500, The Largest U.S. Industrial and Service Corporations," *Fortune*, April 29, 1996, pp. F-1 through F-4. The aggregate net total profits of the top 100 companies listed in the reference is \$126.15 billion. See Profits column on pp. F-1 and F-3.

18. John C. Lawn, former Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, "Drugs in America: Our Problem, Our Solution," *Vital Speeches of the Day*, Vol. LII, No. 2, March 15, 1986, p. 323.

19. Kevin A. Hess, Judge, Commonwealth Court of Cumberland County, PA, telephone interview and letter to authors, Carlisle, PA, October 18, 1996.

20. J. D. Smith, Judge of the Superior Court, Los Angeles, CA, presentation at the Armed Forces Reserve Center, Los Alamitos, CA, November 19, 1989.

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27. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, House Report 104-486, *National Drug Control Policy: A Review of the Status of the Drug War*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 19, 1996, p. 13.
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# CHAPTER 2

## THE DOMESTIC COUNTERDRUG EFFORT

### THREE LEVELS OF EFFORT

Three levels of effort apply to drug law enforcement throughout the United States. The strategic, operational and tactical levels are a range of overlapping activities and planning responsibilities. Drug law enforcement leaders translate national policy and strategic objectives into supporting strategies and operational direction; and their operational plans and instructions specify the tactical actions of law officers who must confront drug criminals face-to-face.

At the *strategic level*, the President, cabinet officers, and congressional leaders establish broad national policy and desired conditions. At this level, leaders set forth policy goals and specific strategic objectives (what needs to be done to support policy and protect our interests), strategic concepts (how we are going to do it), and priorities for resources (what will it take in terms of money, manpower, time and so on to get the job done). The Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy assists the President by consolidating this strategic guidance in the annual National Drug Control Strategy document (signed by the President), and by providing oversight of national implementing actions. Law enforcement officers with broad regional or functional responsibilities can design supporting strategies and plans to accomplish the goals and objectives of these high-level strategies.

At the *operational level* are organizations and planners that translate the broad vision and strategic intent of the national and regional leadership into practical direction to achieve strategic objectives. Ideally, officials at this level would have the authority of law and regulation to compel the synchronized efforts of the many supporting tactical elements that are often involved in large and long-term law enforcement actions. With Federal, state and local law enforcement agencies often participating together in counterdrug operations, it is sometimes unrealistic to expect that an agreed formal "chain of command" will be established. Rather, the "lead agency concept" is often used, where the seemingly most involved agency leads a joint action and contributing agencies agree to cooperate and support. Synchronization of such efforts can be accomplished through operational level planning which phases joint-interagency operations and the application of resources.

At the *tactical level* the actual law enforcement "battles and engagements" are fought within the intent of the strategic guidance and operational plans. At this level, the critical investigative work is done. Here are found Federal, state and local drug law enforcement personnel combined in functional task forces and small teams.

This chapter describes key government organizations and drug law enforcement agencies (DLEAs) that are involved in fighting the supply side of America's drug war within the

continental United States. It identifies positions and organizations with strategic, operational, and tactical responsibilities for organizing and leading the drug law enforcement system. See Figure 9.




Figure 9. Various Local, State, Federal Drug Law Enforcement Agencies and Task Forces.

## THE STRATEGIC LEVEL

At the top level of the U.S. counterdrug effort are the departments and administrations that provide the policy direction for the drug war. A few have formalized their top down guidance in strategies to provide a clear sense of vision, objectives and concepts to subordinates. Following are a sample of some key activities that play an important role as National Drug Control Program agencies.

### Office of National Drug Control Policy.

*The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), established in 1988, is headed by a Director appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate.*<sup>1</sup> The Director

is assisted by three component heads also appointed by the President: the Deputy Director for Demand Reduction, the Deputy Director for Supply Reduction, and the Associate Director for State and Local Affairs. The Director appoints a Chief of Staff and a fourth component head, the Technology Director. See Figure 10.




Figure 10. The Office of National Drug Control Policy.

The Director of ONDCP enjoys considerable visibility as a Cabinet-rank member of the Executive Office of the President charged by law to provide drug program oversight and interagency coordination. He is also a Presidentially designated advisor on the National Security Council, but has limited statutory authority to compel vigorous support for the Drug Strategy. The Director can, however, advise the President on the performance of Federal agencies in supporting the Drug Strategy.

*The President's Drug Policy Council* oversees the implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy and supports the Director, ONDCP, as the President's senior drug policy official. By Executive Order, departments and agencies are directed to cooperate with the Council and provide ". . . assistance, information, and advice. . . ." <sup>2</sup> It meets quarterly to encourage coordination among departments and agencies. This is a significant challenge in terms of scope and complexity.



Drug policy is coordinated among an immense span of interagency players—some 50 Federal departments or agencies, agencies of 54 state governments and territories, as well as 3,200 counties, and 13,000 city governments.<sup>3</sup> In 1992 the ONDCP staff was reduced from about 140 managers and analysts to 25, then it bounced back to 40 people. In 1996 under a new “Drug Czar,” the office began rebuilding to a staff expected to number about 150 (including 30 military staff). As indicated by the Director, “ONDCP engages in activities that both meet the requirements of its authorization and represent the values and commitments of the President and its Director.”<sup>4</sup>

This is reflected in the ONDCP drug control priorities: (1) Treatment, (2) Prevention, (3) Domestic Law Enforcement, and (4) Interdiction and International.<sup>5</sup> The National Drug Control Strategy identifies five generalized goals (with subordinate objectives) directed toward educating youth to reject drugs, reducing drug crime and related crime, health and welfare costs, protecting the frontiers, and breaking the sources of supply. Thus, ONDCP devises policies, objectives, and priorities for the nation’s counterdrug activities and coordinates these policies with Federal, State and local efforts. Each year ONDCP develops the National Drug Control Strategy for the President’s submission to the Congress. By law, the Strategy is to include comprehensive, research-based, long-range goals for reducing drug abuse and short term measurable (and realistic) objectives that are achievable in a 2-year period.<sup>6</sup>

ONDCP also develops and executes the supporting National Drug Control Budget which has increased annually since 1988 (\$4.7 to \$13.7 billion over the past 9 years—\$15 billion proposed for fiscal year 1997). The drug budget provides funding for the criminal justice system, drug treatment and prevention, international counterdrug activities, interdiction, research, and intelligence. For example, in the 1996 budget request, just 2 percent of the total budget supported international drug control efforts, while over half of the budget was spent on domestic law enforcement.<sup>7</sup>

Budget process guidance to ONDCP originates in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. It instructs the Director of ONDCP to “develop for each fiscal year, with the advice of the program managers of Departments and agencies with responsibilities under the National Drug Control Program, a consolidated National Drug Control Program budget proposal to implement the National Drug Control Strategy, and . . . [to] transmit such budget proposal to the President and to the Congress.” Moreover, the law requires the Director to “certify in writing as to the adequacy” of each drug control agency’s drug budget request. That is, does the agency’s proposed budget support the Strategy goals, objectives, and priorities? This gives ONDCP some influence over the level of funding and content of agency budget requests. Furthermore, once the budgets are certified, agencies cannot reprogram monies from the drug program without ONDCP approval.<sup>8</sup>

The Certification Process is one way by which the Director of ONDCP can make an impact on an agency’s drug control policy and budget proposal. The certification process can affect the way an agency formulates its forthcoming fiscal year budget for proposal to Congress, but it does not evaluate appropriations already approved by Congress. Because few agencies have dedicated drug accounts into which drug program resources are apportioned, most agencies

use methods of estimating the parts of their appropriations that support the Drug Strategy.<sup>9</sup> This contributes to an involved system for certification that is the prominent feature of the ONDCP 18-month budget process.

In the early spring of each year, ONDCP sends program and budget planning guidance to the drug control agencies. Throughout the spring and summer, the ONDCP staff reviews and certifies the budget proposals that are under development by about 50 bureaus and 17 departments. In the fall, as the Office of Management and Budget formulates the President's budget proposal, any final appeals to the certification process can be made. In February of the next year, the budget is submitted to Congress, and if funds are appropriated on time, then the new fiscal year budget begins October 1.

The Director of ONDCP can also influence drug strategy implementation by his direction and influence over drug control programs and his leadership in several interagency committees. One major strategic concept of the National Drug Control Strategy is the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Program—the HIDTA Program.

The HIDTA Program originated as a key feature of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 and, by law, an integral part of the ONDCP strategy. Congress intended to provide “increased Federal assistance” to areas of the United States that were having a harmful impact on other areas of the country, were centers of illegal drug production, manufacturing, importation, or distribution, and indicated a determination to respond to the drug threat.<sup>10</sup> The Director of ONDCP designates the HIDTA areas after consultation with the heads of the drug control agencies and the respective governors.

The National HIDTA Coordination Committee (which includes state and local representatives) promotes interagency coordination among Federal, state and local drug enforcement actions. The ONDCP chairs the committee, and the committee makes policy and budget recommendations to the Director, ONDCP.

In the 1990 National Drug Control Strategy, five areas were originally designated HDTAs because of the seriousness of their drug trafficking problems and their impact on the rest of the nation. They were New York City, Los Angeles, Miami, Houston, and the Southwest Border area (Southern California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas).

Subsequent iterations of the National Drug Control Strategy announced the ONDCP Director's increase in the number and type of HDTAs. In 1994, he designated an HIDTA in the Washington-Baltimore area to address the extensive drug distribution networks which serve hardcore drug users. That year he also designated Puerto Rico-U.S. Virgin Islands as a Gateway HIDTA because of the significant amount of drugs smuggled through this region. Three Empowerment HDTAs were added in 1995: Atlanta, Chicago, and Philadelphia-Camden. Designated in 1996 were five additional HDTAs: Rocky Mountains (Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming); Gulf Coast (Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi); Lake County, Indiana; Midwest (Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, and South Dakota); and the Pacific Northwest.<sup>11</sup>

In the early years of the program the authors heard complaints from state and local agencies that the HIDTA program favored Federal agencies operating in the designated areas. After 7 years of development, the mature HIDTA program is one of ONDCP's most effective initiatives. Today, the HIDTA Program Director and National HIDTA Committee ensure that approximately half of the Program's \$140 million (FY 1997) is provided to the state and local level—primarily to multiagency task forces that fight drug crime. This is consistent with the HIDTA Program Director's strategic intent to push "power down" to the local officers and agents who face the drug scourge every day.

The HIDTA resources will support 150-200 collocated officer and agent task forces, mutually supporting local and state drug trafficking and money laundering task forces, and information analysis and sharing networks. Some HDTAs will support drug treatment, treatment accountability systems, and drug use prevention programs. These HIDTA initiatives are reviewed each fiscal year to measure their impacts upon regional drug threats, and assess their viability for continuation in the program.

The ONDCP Director influences his Drug Strategy outcomes through various interagency committees. The Counternarcotics Interagency Working Group (CN-IWG) develops national counterdrug policy guidance over a broad range of issues related to both the domestic and international dimensions of the Strategy. It is chaired by a National Security Council member, or an Assistant Secretary. Its participants can include government officials at the Assistant Secretary and Deputy Assistant Secretary levels. Sub-groups may include various staff officers at the Director level of government. Other committees are the Research, Data, and Evaluation Advisory Committee, the Prevention, Treatment, and Medical Research Subcommittee, and a second subcommittee for Science and Technology.

*The Interdiction Committee* (TIC; was formerly the *BIC*, Border Interdiction Committee), chaired by the Commissioner of Customs, advises the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator (currently the Commandant of the Coast Guard) about interdiction priorities and policy. It is also chartered to advise the CN-IWG concerning programs to enhance interdiction efforts. A major function of this committee is to coordinate efforts to integrate "... international, border, and domestic interdiction efforts in support of strategy goals . . . [but] . . . No operational authority is vested in the TIC."<sup>12</sup> Its members are the Commissioner of the U.S. Customs Service (initial Chairman), the Department of Defense Drug coordinator, the Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Commissioner of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Director of Operations Joint Chiefs of Staff. The TIC is chartered to meet quarterly (at about the same time as the DoD-JCS J3 Counterdrug Quarterly Planning Conference) at the leadership level of agency principals or their deputies.

As described, the Director, ONDCP has no formal directive authority over the myriad National Drug Control Program agencies. Instead, he places the National Drug Control Strategy into action by his Presidential backing, moral presence, the development of a coherent Strategy, the budget certification process, and interagency coordination among the

departments of the Federal Government. Following are several leading departments that support the National Drug Control Strategy.<sup>13</sup>

## Department of Justice.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) is a principal player in the counterdrug effort, with a variety of activities to oversee. These include supervision of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). An example of DOJ's direct role in the drug war is the Southwest Border Project which targets major Mexican drug transportation organizations dealing in heroin, marijuana, methamphetamine, and cocaine on the Southwest Border. The Southwest Border Project is a joint DOJ-DEA-FBI program supervised by the Special Agent-in-Charge of the DEA Special Operations Division.<sup>14</sup>

The project is implemented by a DEA/FBI Southwest Border Regional Operations Plan which emphasizes working jointly with Mexican agencies to counter the trafficking of illicit drugs, money laundering and the large criminal organizations. The main idea is to increase the pace of counterdrug operations on both sides of the Southwest border. Bi-National Task Forces in Tijuana, Juarez, Monterrey and other locations, along with the Mexican counterdrug infrastructure (such as Ministry of Justice (PRG), Mexican Federal Judicial Police (MFJP), the National Institute for the Combat of Drugs (INCD), and the National Drug Control and Planning Center (CENDRO)), will assist U.S. DLEAs to cut trafficking routes and put effective investigative and prosecutorial pressure on major drug trafficking organizations. The plan requires the close coordination of multiple U.S. DLEAs and the Mexican counterdrug authorities to achieve an end goal of incarcerating the major drug traffickers in the region and dismantling their organizations.

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), a Justice Department activity, enforces narcotics and controlled substance laws. It is the primary investigative agency for major interstate and international drug violations. DEA is responsible, within the policy guidance of the Department of State and the Chiefs of U.S. missions, for cooperation with counterpart agencies abroad. DEA's Special Agents-in-Charge (SACs) operate under the policy guidelines of the "Administrator's Vision," the capstone of the Strategic Management System. Included in this system are strategies for countering the distribution of cocaine, heroin and methamphetamine. The typical components of these strategies include legislation, law enforcement, training, chemical regulation, international cooperation, environmental protection, education and addiction treatment.

In guiding DEA operations, a central theme of the "Administrator's Vision" is a law enforcement strategy "emphasizing common goals and cooperation with our counterparts who have drug enforcement or drug intelligence responsibilities. . . ." <sup>15</sup> The operational focus of DEA strategy is placed on major national and international cases; major regional cases; violent drug organizations, gangs, local impact issues; and domestically produced drugs.

A major mission of DEA is the management of a national narcotics intelligence system. DEA chairs the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (reports on drug production and trafficking, abuse trends), and manages the El Paso Intelligence Center (strategic and tactical case-related drug intelligence).

DEA has 20 domestic Field Divisions (the newest is Puerto Rico) and 72 offices in 51 foreign countries, with new offices opened up in Beijing and Moscow. While DEA is well known for its overseas activities in Colombia, Bolivia and Peru, about 90 percent of DEA investigative work is actually done in the United States.<sup>16</sup>

Located at DEA headquarters is an Interagency Coordinating Group (ICG), a coordinating center for Federal efforts in money laundering investigations. Its mission is to coordinate Treasury Department and DEA financial drug investigations, provide DLEAs with access to files and information, and to provide training assistance to DLEAs and private industry (especially banking). Members of the ICG are from DEA, FBI, Customs, IRS and the U.S. Postal Service. Most investigative effort is currently directed toward international investigations.<sup>17</sup>

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) shares concurrent jurisdiction (with DEA) over investigations of drug violations. The FBI has experience with prosecuting organized crime, and therefore, it focuses its efforts against major trafficking organizations and gangs in the United States. In order to collect information for prosecution, the FBI also maintains a network of agents overseas.

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) tasks include the prevention of unlawful entry into the United States. Its subordinate organization, the Border Patrol (USBP), works to deter illegal entry and the smuggling of contraband into the United States. INS is headed by a commissioner, who reports to the Attorney General.

Operational functions of the INS include enforcement and examinations programs conducted by 33 districts and 21 border patrol sectors throughout the United States. Four regional offices provide administrative support to the field offices. INS also maintains three district offices in Bangkok, Thailand; Mexico City, Mexico; and Rome, Italy.<sup>18</sup>

The INS mission is to facilitate the entry of persons legally admissible to the United States, provide assistance to people seeking resident status or naturalization, and grant them benefits under the Immigration and Nationality Act.<sup>19</sup> INS also attempts to prevent unlawful entry, employment and receipt of benefits to foreign people who are not entitled to them. Within the limits of its resources, INS apprehends and removes aliens who enter or remain illegally in the United States.

Since September 1993, the INS-Border Patrol has increased efforts on the Southwest border to deter the illegal crossing of drug smugglers and other "illegals" by strengthening officer presence. This concept has been seen in a number of operations with names like "Operation Blockade," "Operation Hold the Line," "Operation Gatekeeper," and "Operation Safeguard." The result has been very positive wherever intensified protection is focused.<sup>20</sup>

The National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, is a multiagency organization of about 200 agents, analysts and technicians. The 1990 National Drug Control Strategy established the requirement for an agency as a coordinating center for law enforcement intelligence. NDIC is under the direction of the U.S. Attorney General, but works with and in support of DLEAs at Federal, state and local levels.

The mission of NDIC is “to collect and consolidate multisource drug information to produce organizational and strategic intelligence analyses for use by national policy makers, diverse law enforcement entities, and the intelligence community.” It also promotes information sharing and compatibility standards for drug intelligence collection systems.<sup>21</sup>

The main effort at NDIC is devoted to strategic and organizational intelligence and document exploitation. Analysts develop finished intelligence on the infrastructure of significant trafficking groups, their methods of operation, financial activity, communications systems and relationships with other criminal groups. Figure 11 provides the NDIC organization.

Strategic intelligence is developed concerning illegal drugs, their production, transportation and distribution. Typical program areas include Asian, Colombian Jamaican, Mexican, Nigerian-West African, and Russian drug trafficking organizations. Special studies




Figure 11. National Drug Intelligence Center.



include topics such as hallucinogens, and cocaine trafficking in Europe and Africa. The document exploitation project electronically scans large amounts of documents so that they can be organized, stored, retrieved and sorted in support of law enforcement investigations.<sup>22</sup> NDIC products include situation reports, national estimates, organizational estimates and profiles, warning reports, and other current intelligence assessments.

## Department of the Treasury.

The U.S. Customs Service is Treasury's principal border enforcement agency. Customs interdicts and seizes contraband at U.S. ports of entry and border areas. It is responsible for ensuring that all goods entering the United States comply with U.S. laws and regulations; collecting duties, taxes, and fees; intercepting contraband; and enforcing the laws and regulations of other U.S. Government agencies.

As a move to more aggressively interdict illicit drugs crossing the Southwest border, Customs is leading a Treasury Department priority effort called "Operation Hard Line." Since January 1995, Operation Hard Line had increased inspection resources on the border according to the Treasury Department. Preliminary results have been a 24 percent increase in illicit drug seizures (measured in pounds) and a 51 percent decrease in port runnings—attempts to ram a vehicle or run on foot through a port.<sup>23</sup>

"Operation Gateway" was initiated in March 1996 to intercept the flow of illicit drugs through Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. It involves the joint efforts of Customs with DoD and the Coast Guard. Gateway concepts include expanded maritime and air enforcement, outbound cargo examination, small vessel searches and enhanced technology support. In the first six months of Operation Gateway, Customs seized 68 pounds of heroin and 2,727 pounds of cocaine in Puerto Rico (a 100 percent increase in heroin and 300 percent increase in cocaine over the same period in 1995).

Under U.S. Customs The Domestic Air Interdiction Coordination Center (DIACC), located on March AFB, Riverside, CA, was developed as a result of the National Interdiction Command and Control Plan (based on a Presidential requirement to streamline interdiction efforts). The DIACC evolved from the Customs Command, Control, Coordination, and Intelligence (C<sup>3</sup>I) Center concept. The DAICC mission is to interdict air targets of interest entering the United States. It is further discussed later in this chapter.

Also, the U.S. Customs National Aviation Center (CNAC) at Oklahoma City, OK, allocates and schedules Customs' long-range surveillance aircraft. It coordinates tracker and interceptor aircraft across Customs operational boundaries, and it serves as a back-up to the DIACC.

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) has become engaged in the counterdrug effort because of the involvement of numerous drug trafficking organizations in smuggling multiple kinds of contraband in addition to illicit drugs. For instance, some of the Mexican trafficking organizations originated from historically established smuggling groups

or families who now smuggle guns, cocaine, marijuana, and methamphetamine. Illicit weapons smuggling has become a problem because of the rise of numerous guerrilla and criminal groups operating inside Mexico.

The Internal Revenue Service supports the drug interdiction effort through its mission of administering and enforcing the tax laws. It is especially effective in tracking large sums of money to counter money laundering attempts at home and abroad. In this regard, the Department of the Treasury created the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) in 1989 to develop intelligence on financial crimes. This is a multidiscipline activity with participants from Internal Revenue Service and other government and law enforcement agencies. Through analysis of its data, the FinCEN detects irregularities that indicate criminal activity such as money laundering.

## Department of Transportation.

The Department of Transportation provides U.S. Coast Guard and Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) support to drug interdiction. The FAA assists investigative agencies by providing information and special agent support concerning aircraft and pilots to help counter drug smuggling by general and commercial aviation.

The U.S. Coast Guard plays a major role in drug traffic interdiction. It works with U.S. Customs within the 12-mile coastal limit, and working with other U.S. Government agencies and other governments, the Coast Guard is the primary agent to interdict the seaborne flow of drugs into the United States. For instance, Commanders, Coast Guard Pacific and Atlantic Areas respond to maritime border incursions from the Pacific and Gulf coasts, and when feasible, coordinate operations with the Mexican Navy. The Coast Guard shares responsibility for air interdiction with U.S. Customs. Since 1994, the Commandant of the Coast Guard has also served as U.S. Interdiction Coordinator (USIC).

This additional duty came to the Commandant as a result of Presidential Decision Directive 14, which called in part for streamlining counterdrug intelligence and command and control centers. Three Joint Interagency Task Forces (Joint Interagency Task Force South [JIATF-South] in Panama; JIATF-East, Key West, FL; JIATF-West, March AFB, CA; and the Domestic Air Interdiction Coordination Center (DAICC), March AFB were identified as the new centers for interdiction efforts in the April 1994 National Interdiction Command and Control Plan. The plan tasked the USIC to "oversee the coordination of this effort."<sup>24</sup> A USIC Charter of May 1994 provided the Commandant with a ". . . framework for implementing the various facets of oversight coordination."<sup>25</sup>

The Interdiction Coordinator is charged to ensure that assets committed to international interdiction are adequate. He works in concert with the Counternarcotics Interagency Working Group to enhance interdiction efforts first in the source countries, then in the transit zone. The USIC oversight coordination authority extends throughout the Western Hemisphere, but does not include the borders of the United States.

The USIC ensures that assets are committed against targets cued by tactical intelligence in situations where detection, arrests and seizures are most likely (critical hubs and choke points). He reviews needs for source country and transit zone support and monitors interdiction activities to see that detection and monitoring efforts support law enforcement agencies. In addition, the USIC monitors intelligence support to international interdiction to ensure that the national interdiction centers are provided access to tactical information necessary to perform their mission. In this regard an Anti-Drug Network (ADNET) helps to ensure that the JIATFs and the DIACC are interconnected and are provided access to the tactical information and data bases.

## Department of the Interior.

Under the Department of the Interior, the Bureaus of Land Management and Indian Affairs and the National Park Service directly support the National Drug Control Strategy through their efforts to maintain public access to Federal Lands and prevent the use of these lands by the illicit drug trade. The Department of the Interior has provided the lead or participated in interagency marijuana eradication efforts involving numerous state and local DLEAs as well as the military.

Federal lands are attractive to drug criminals because of the freedom from surveillance and anonymity they afford in growing marijuana, transporting drugs, and establishing methamphetamine labs. All of this puts citizens using recreation lands in great danger when they happen upon these activities.

## Department of Defense.

The Secretary of Defense has identified five key mission areas for supporting DLEAs. These include providing training and operational support to drug-source nations; supporting the DEA's efforts to dismantle the cocaine business overseas; detecting and monitoring the illicit air and sea drug transportation network; supporting the stateside Federal, state and local DLEAs; assisting with the demand reduction strategy in the local community and within DoD.<sup>26</sup>

Out of the DoD Counterdrug Budget, well over half is spent on projects to stop the flow of illicit drugs to consumers: Caribbean detection and monitoring; counterdrug command and control networks (ADNET); Southwest border support (see JTF-6 below); counterdrug operations in the Bahamas, Caicos, and Turks Islands (OPBAT); radars; National Guard marijuana eradication; military working dogs, and the like. See Figure 12.

One-fifth of the DoD drug budget goes to overseas (source nation–Bolivia, Colombia, Peru) support activities such as detection and monitoring, reconnaissance, training, intelligence and planning support to U.S. DLEAs. Nearly 90 percent of this money is spent on operations




Figure 12. Department of Defense Drug Control Funding Request, FY 98.

and maintenance (aircraft, radar, riverine operations). The rest is spent on procurement and research.<sup>27</sup>

While efforts to assist host nations have seen a number of positive results in the way of increased police and military operational effectiveness, increased professionalism and concern for individual rights and the rule of law, there has not been a reduction of the flow of illicit drugs into the United States. In fact, the success of U.S. efforts in stopping the flow of cocaine by small aircraft from Bolivia and Peru to Colombia has served to push drug traffic onto the rivers and trails—and into Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela.<sup>28</sup> Similarly, the effective detection and monitoring of drug traffickers through the Caribbean by DoD assets has made Mexico the route most favored by Latin American drug thugs for moving illicit drugs into the United States.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC) serves as the DoD Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support (DEP&S). The Secretary has stated that the DoD Coordinator, DEP&S is the single focal point for DoD's counterdrug efforts. In turn, the DoD Coordinator chairs quarterly meetings with the Joint Staff, the four military Services, Comptroller, General Counsel and other principal decisionmakers to ensure the success of the Department's counterdrug programs.<sup>29</sup>

The Coordinator is assisted by a Deputy Assistant Secretary and a DEP&S staff of about 25 people organized in three functional divisions: Plans and Support (P&S—Heroin, Transit Zone, Mexico, Domestic, Source Country); Program and Budget (P&B); Demand Reduction

and Systems (D&S). This office broadly oversees DoD's responsibilities as a National Drug Control Program agency. DEP&S provides policy guidance through the National Guard Bureau to enjoin the participation of National Guard units. These units function under state governors in accordance with Title 32 of the U.S. Code. The DEP&S staff promulgates policy guidance and monitors DoD counterdrug missions and programs such as detection and monitoring, building the counterdrug command and control system, and providing excess equipment and direct support to the DLEAs.

Detection and monitoring (D&M) of Air and Maritime Transit of illegal drugs into the United States was assigned to DoD as a lead agency responsibility under the Fiscal Year 1989 Defense Authorization Act. Especially through the Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) commanded by Atlantic, Pacific and Southern Commands, DoD has developed an effective D&M radar network covering three million square miles of the Caribbean Basin and portions of the Atlantic and Pacific. DoD also provides D&M support along the Southwest border and Andean ridge (the Peru to Colombia drug route).

Integrating command, control, communications, and intelligence (C<sup>3</sup>I) capabilities for the drug law enforcement community was also mandated by the 1989 Defense Authorization Act. After an initial effort through 1992 to integrate C3I assets at the strategic and operational levels for (essentially) the Federal agencies, DoD is now turning its assistance effort to the state and local DLEAs. The C3I mission accomplishments are impressive: over \$150 million of communications equipment has been passed to the DLEAs; an anti-drug network (ADNET) connects DoD counterdrug elements with the DLEAs and a command management system (CMS) connects U.S. Southern Command to ADNET and to the U.S. Embassy counterdrug elements. Supporting this communications set up are intelligence centers and assigned analysts to support ongoing operations.

Excess equipment for law enforcement agencies is provided by DoD through its Counterdrug Support Office (CDSO). This is discussed later in the chapter (see CDSO).

Direct support to law enforcement agencies is provided by U.S. Active Duty and Reserve Component forces that respond to DoD and U.S. combatant command taskings for operational and nonoperational support. Operational support includes units and military personnel in support of DLEAs and host countries. Nonoperational support is a broad category which can include facilities, training opportunities, intelligence, equipment loans, counternarcotics funding, and personnel support to non-DoD agencies. In this last category, the services are providing 88 DoD detailees to assist the DLEAS, including 30 military staff assigned to ONDCP.

In order to make the best use of operational and nonoperational supporting resources, the DoD Coordinator (DEP&S) has established clearly defined policies, procedures and priorities.<sup>30</sup> Before honoring a DLEA request for support, there must be a valid counterdrug nexus, and there must be military training value associated with the counterdrug support. In the case of operational support, units must receive a mission related benefit, and for individuals, support must be tied to military skills. The National Guard Bureau has approved an exception to this policy for supporting U.S. Customs and Postal Service inspections.

Priority for DoD counterdrug support goes to DLEA multijurisdictional, multiagency task forces that are in a HIDTA, then to individual DLEAs in a HIDTA. Third priority is to multijurisdictional, multiagency task forces not in a HIDTA, then lastly to individual DLEAs not in a HIDTA. This prioritization directly supports the intent of Congress as outlined in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 and is consistent with the National Drug Control Strategy.

Approval authority for nonoperational support rests with the services and defense agencies. The transfer of excess property has been redelegated from DEP&S to the Defense Logistics Agency's Counterdrug Support Office (CDSO). Operational support to DLEAs within the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands rests with JTF-6 (see below). Support involving large units of 400 personnel or more or extending more than 179 days must be approved by the Secretary of Defense.<sup>31</sup>

DoD-Mexico Cooperation was seen by the DoD Coordinator (DEP&S) as a necessary precursor to supply reduction success. "Unless we engage Mexico and do much more," he said, "the DLEAs will not be fully successful."<sup>32</sup> Thus through the military-to-military process and in coordination with the Department of State, DoD has initiated cooperative efforts with the Mexican military. In a bilateral working group, Secretary of Defense Perry met with Mexican Secretary of Defense Cervantes in October 1995 and April 1996 to consider a range of cooperative activities such as force modernization, disaster relief, and drug interdiction. A high-level contact group (Director, ONDCP; Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; Mexican Foreign Minister, and Mexican Attorney General) meets annually to discuss U.S.-Mexico border issues and counterdrug cooperation.

DoD is providing specialized training to Mexican units to conduct counterdrug missions against drug traffickers. This will result in 12 special forces counterdrug teams for use by military region commanders. Coastal and riverine training is provided to the Mexican Naval Infantry. Upon congressional approval, 73 UH1 helicopters will be transferred to the Mexican Defense Ministry. Also planned are a combined threat assessment and a combined strategy.

## U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM).

U.S. Atlantic Command is the principal combatant command for providing military support to domestic law enforcement agencies. USACOM is also active in providing support to U.S. counterdrug initiatives with host nations, especially in the Caribbean and Mexico. USACOM's intelligence and operational support is provided with priority to U.S. and host nation DLEAs operating with Mexico, along the U.S. Southwest Border, and in the Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands areas. The command employs its military resources through Forces Command (its Army Component) and several other subordinate military organizations. Among these is Joint Interagency Task Force East (JIATF-East) located at Key West, Florida. The JIATF-East mission is focused on the detection and monitoring of drug trafficking ships and aircraft approaching the United States through the Caribbean and along the Atlantic and Pacific coastlines. When U.S. Southern Command assumes full responsibility for the Caribbean region, it is likely that JIATF-East will become a Southern Command unit. The JIATF is discussed in greater detail below.



Forces Command exercises oversight of domestic military support to the DLEAs. To manage this function, FORSCOM has an 8-man Counterdrug Division at its headquarters in Atlanta, GA.

FORSCOM oversees a 6-man Information Analysis Center located with the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, to facilitate counterdrug cooperating activities with Mexican authorities. It also provides the oversight function for Joint Task Force Six located at El Paso, TX. The JTF-6 commander has a staff of 156 personnel to do the actual work of supervising operations and providing resources to support the DLEAs in the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. JTF-6 is discussed later in this chapter.

Through JIATF East and JTF-6, USACOM conducts operations based on intelligence assessments that promise a high pay-off against drug targets. Typical targets could include fast maritime surface vessels in the Western Caribbean, multi-ton maritime surface shipments in the Eastern Pacific, known high volume transshipment points along the Southwest Border, and intelligence-cued air and maritime traffic through the Eastern Caribbean to Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.

In summary, the line of communications for providing active duty and Reserve DoD support to the DLEAs located in the United States starts with the President and Secretary of Defense, via the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (assisted by the Joint Staff Counternarcotics Division—CND—discussed in Chapter 3), to USACOM, to Army Forces Command, and to JTF-6. Support to the DLEAs by the National Guard is managed differently.

## National Guard Bureau and State Military Forces.

The National Guard was an early advocate of military support to counterdrug activities and is today an eager and valuable participant. States such as Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, New Mexico, Tennessee, and Texas have long been involved in supporting drug law enforcement and have developed considerable expertise in combating the drug trafficker.

In October of 1995 the National Guard Bureau (NGB) consolidated Army and Air Guard counterdrug programs and formed-up a Counterdrug Directorate to manage the revitalized program. The Director of the NGB Counterdrug Directorate is a senior colonel who manages four interlocking staff teams. These include the Finance, State Plans, Air Operations, and Special Projects Teams. They manage a huge program. In any given day, the National Guard will have about 1300 operational missions (large and small) and about 3970 personnel on duty.<sup>33</sup>

The Guard provides support for cargo inspection in support of U.S. Customs at ports of entry, aerial and surface reconnaissance, ground and air operations in support of the Border Patrol, marijuana location and eradication efforts in support of state and local law enforcement agencies, intelligence analysis and linguist assistance. Virtually all states now have significant counterdrug programs that include both demand and supply reduction

activities. The Guard provides nearly one million man-days of support to counterdrug missions and conducts about six thousand operations per year.

The Guard's domestic interdiction program is the largest in DoD. In a Title 32 status while working for the state governors, the Guard is especially useful to support law enforcement. Nevertheless, in recent years, the National Guard budget has been reduced from \$230 million in 1993 to \$158 million in 1996. This budget reduction has been accompanied by a reduction of Guard-assisted drug interdiction results over the same period: cocaine down from 78 to 68 metric tons; heroin seizures down from 1508.2 to 741 kilos; marijuana plants down from 206 to 105 million; processed marijuana down from 404 to 373 metric tons.

The Guard also conducts demand reduction initiatives within its own ranks. The New Mexico and the District of Columbia National Guard have been particularly involved in demand reduction programs, and throughout the Nation, the Guard has been the leader in bringing anti-drug education into the local schools and communities. The Guard's emphasis on education as one means to counter the drug scourge is seen through its development of counterdrug training centers for military, law enforcement and civilian leaders—each with the mission of enhancing interagency cooperation and military support to civil authorities.

The National Guard Bureau Training Centers include the Regional Counterdrug Training Academy at Meridian, MS, develops counterdrug teamwork at the tactical (strike force) level; the Multi-Jurisdictional Counterdrug Task Force Training Center at St. Petersburg, FL, provides operational level multiagency training; the National Interagency Counterdrug Institute (NICI) at San Luis Obispo, CA, as the flagship institution, provides college-level (and accredited) training to mid-level and senior managers in the law enforcement, civil and military sectors to increase their skills to lead and follow in the interagency environment.

The National Interagency Counterdrug Institute is especially important to the counterdrug effort for its unique courses that help leaders implement the demand reduction and supply reduction objectives of the National Drug Control Strategy through interagency teamwork. The Drug Prevention and Demand Reduction Course trains students to develop effective drug prevention and demand reduction programs and integrate the skills and resources found at the Federal, state and local levels. The course focuses on exercises, case studies and the planning process. Subjects include health model pharmacology, legal issues, public affairs, and community mobilization. The *Counterdrug Managers' Course* trains students on the process for planning and conducting effective interagency counterdrug operations in both supply and demand reduction. Students are typically law enforcement, military and community leaders and planners. Subjects include national strategy; operational planning; military, Federal, state and community organizations and perspectives; intelligence systems; legal issues; and public affairs. The course relies on case studies and exercises.<sup>34</sup>

Finally, The State Adjutants General (TAGs), working under the policy guidance of the National Guard Bureau, provide essential National Guard troop support to DLEAs under Title 32 of the U.S. Code. This support is funded by DoD through the National Guard Bureau

(a strong and effective promoter of military support to drug law enforcement), but must be approved by the State Governor. Each spring the State TAGs develop their proposed counterdrug budgets for the next fiscal year. In June these budgets are put before a joint board of officers from the DoD Office of Drug Enforcement Policy and Support and the National Guard Bureau. In this way, the TAGs' counterdrug budgets are ranked in a priority listing that determines each state's share of the roughly \$100 million of Guard counterdrug funding. State troops operating under Title 32 are not subject to the Posse Comitatus law which prohibits Federal troops (Active and Reserve) from conducting law enforcement activities. As a matter of policy, however, all National Guard troops avoid participation in such law enforcement actions as seizing and arresting civilians and do not participate in intelligence activities that are proscribed by law and Executive directives.

## THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

Other organizations critical for success in the drug war are at the middle level of counterdrug law enforcement. They are positioned to take guidance from the strategic level and to develop the operational direction needed to coordinate law enforcement activities at the tactical level. The following are examples of organizations that work routinely at the operational level.

### Operation Alliance.

Since 1986, Operation Alliance has been the senior interagency coordinating center for promoting the integration of multiagency law enforcement skills and assets and for deconflicting law enforcement operations along the Southwest border. In March 1996, the Interdiction Committee recommended Operation Alliance as the single point of contact for coordinating and deconflicting law enforcement support requests for military active duty and reserve (Title 10) support to DLEAs throughout the United States, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. This recommendation was then forwarded to ONDCP for approval as a part of its new policy (under development) for the Southwest Border area.<sup>35</sup> See Figure 13.

Alliance creates and promotes interagency cooperation and coordination among DLEAs in the fields of interdiction, intelligence, and investigations. It sets priorities for military support to the DLEAs in the United States, and it promulgates plans for interagency cooperative operations. Alliance establishes that there is a valid counterdrug nexus involving proposed military support to law enforcement agencies, a significant DoD policy imperative. In this regard, it works closely with JTF-6, collocated with Alliance at Biggs Army Air Field, Fort Bliss, TX.

The Operation Alliance Joint Command Group (OAJCG) functions as a coordinating and planning group. Membership includes 27 Federal, state and local DLEAs and military organizations.<sup>36</sup> Originally the OACG was envisioned as a committee of field commanders that would make operational decisions; today the group has several participants from the




Figure 13. The Southwest Border Region, Showing the Southwest Border HIDTA Counties.

Washington arena. Group meetings are chaired by the Senior Tactical Coordinator of Operation Alliance who has influence in establishing its agenda. The Director of the Southwest Border HIDTA participates as a member of the OAJCG.

The command group serves as a consensus-building and coordinating forum to ensure intelligence sharing among participants, to examine appropriate investigative responses to drug seizures, and to define objectives and performance measures for operations. In essence, the OAJCG was established to plan and guide the coordinated efforts of Operation Alliance and to promote effective liaison between participating agencies.

To run Alliance on a daily basis, three tactical coordinators are provided, one each by the Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Border Patrol. The senior tactical coordinator position is rotated among the three tactical coordinators every 2 years. The three tactical coordinators take guidance from their own agencies. In addition, the senior tactical coordinator operates under the policy guidance of the ONDCP Interdiction Committee (TIC, an interagency committee with Customs, DEA, and INS representation) and the Operation Alliance Joint Command Group. See Figure 14.

The authority of Operation Alliance as a National Drug Control Program Agency to coordinate SW Border drug law enforcement activity can be traced through the ONDCP Interdiction Committee and participating Alliance agencies (Customs, Border Patrol and DEA) to The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (21 USC 1502). This requires the Director, ONDCP to "coordinate and oversee the implementation . . . of the policies, objectives, and priorities established [by the Director]." The National Drug Control agencies are those U.S. Government departments and agencies that are tasked under the National Drug Control Strategy, or designated by the President, or tasked jointly by the head of a department or agency and the Director, ONDCP.<sup>37</sup>




Figure 14. Operation Alliance Tactical Coordinator's Reporting Chains.

Title 21, therefore, obligates government Drug Control Program agencies to support ONDCP's strategy, yet it does not define specific command relationships for getting the job done. By extension, Alliance functions under the Title 21 authority of the ONDCP Interdiction Committee and the Federal, state and local interagency consensus established in the Joint Command Group quarterly meetings. Further, by the procedure of identifying participating DLEAs in operational and tactical actions, Alliance provides a focus for support

which creates unity of effort. Still, Alliance has no formal command or policy authority over its participating OAJCG agencies, or over agencies in other regions.

The Operation Alliance Coordination Center is managed by the senior tactical coordinator with assistance from the senior management team (the other two deputy tactical coordinators). A permanent Alliance staff of about 14 full time and 6 part time people assists the regional law enforcement agencies. Functional staff management includes these areas: requests for military assistance, strategic and operational planning and support; logistics support; statistics; liaison. Operation Alliance responds to requests for operational support from all DLEAs in the continental United States. See Figure 15.

The planning process of Operation Alliance illustrates the use of consensus-building to encourage joint operations. The first Operation Alliance Southwest Border Drug Control Strategy was published in July 1990. It was created by a writing team representing the membership of the Joint Command Group, and approved by the OAJCG and an ONDCP interagency committee. In the process for writing the Alliance 1992 Strategy II, joint campaign planning was introduced as a way to implement strategy objectives. It was envisioned that an overarching SW Border Campaign Plan would be written in two parts: a concept for the campaign with priorities and objectives; and supporting plans for operations or programs to carry out phased objectives. The primary contribution of these initial plans was to establish an agreed set of common objectives for all DLEAs.<sup>38</sup>




Figure 15. Operation Alliance Coordination Center.



The current Alliance plan is a well-crafted plan of campaign for the Southwest border region for interdiction and investigations that extends its objectives and concepts in three phases through September 1999. The objective is to disrupt drug trafficking and dismantle major drug trafficking organizations.

The Operation Alliance "Southwest Border Project/Action Plan" incorporates the Justice Department's Southwest Border Project (particularly the DEA/FBI SWB Regional Operations Plan), the U.S. Border Patrol Southwest Border Project/Action Plan for ground interdiction, U.S. Customs air interdiction, U.S. Coast Guard maritime interdiction, the JTF-6 Southwest Border Support Plan, and the actions of other Federal, state and local agencies. As much as possible, U.S. agencies will work with Mexican counterdrug agencies to attack drug trafficking, money laundering, and the large criminal drug organizations.

The Operation Alliance Special Operations Notification System (SONS) is an ongoing program to ensure coordination and deconfliction of law enforcement operations in the four Southwest states. SONS provides information on ongoing and planned law enforcement operations without compromising operational security. SONS promotes coordination and officer safety. Under the SONS system, Alliance compiles information about special operations such as drug interdiction, weapons smuggling, money laundering, eradication, chemicals and labs, fugitives, gangs and so on. The information is provided to agencies in routine reports. Agencies may also request that information on their operations not be disseminated.

Alliance Military Support Priorities are determined by Alliance planners based on DLEA input. This assists Alliance and JTF-6 to establish long-range requirements for Title 10 military support to these agencies. A periodic survey of Southwest border and metropolitan HIDTAs and Federal, state and local DLEAs establishes their most important military support needs. The information helps Alliance and JTF-6 establish strategic and operational support plans. Recent Alliance survey results show a consistent (5-year) interest in these categories of support (by priority): Personnel Support, Training Support, Air Support, Ground Support, Engineer Support, and lastly Maritime Support. Concerning the specific types of support, assistance from intelligence analysts and training for DLEA intelligence analysts and planners are consistently top priorities. Engineer and maritime support are generally low priorities except for the Border Patrol and the U.S. Coast Guard.<sup>39</sup>

Alliance deconfliction of requests for military assistance includes coordination with Project North Star (northern states mainly along the border with Canada) and the Senior Law Enforcement Advisory Board (central states) as well as the HIDTAs. Alliance also maintains close liaison with the National Guard Title 32 support efforts. Requests for assistance are considered in a national context and coordinated with JTF-6 for action.

While Alliance has traditionally focused its coordination efforts on the Southwest border with Mexico, a similar coordinating organization was formed to coordinate law enforcement support and activities on the northern border with Canada—this is Project North Star.

## Project North Star.

Project North Star is a drug law enforcement coordinating center established in 1990 at Buffalo, NY. Its mission is to assist northern tier law enforcement agencies with information sharing, operational planning, coordination, and resource acquisition. Unlike Operation Alliance on the Southwest border, Project North Star has been able to incorporate foreign, cross-border participation. Canadian law enforcement actively participates as an equal partner in North Star projects. Leadership of North Star resides in the Director of Enforcement. This position rotates annually between a Chief Border Patrol Agent and a U.S. Customs Supervisory Special Agent who each report to their agency counterparts in Operation Alliance. The Director of Enforcement chairs meetings of the Joint Coordination Group (JCG), a multiagency committee that sets policy guidance.

Because the North Star area is very large, its area is divided into three regions: West, Central, and East, each with a Joint Command Group for administration and coordination.<sup>40</sup> Within these three JCGs, each state can have four members (representing state, county, municipal, and national guard organizations); a Royal Canadian Mounted Police officer represents each of the Provinces, except that Ontario and Quebec each have a Provincial Police representative. See Figure 16.

An Executive Steering Committee helps the Director of Enforcement maintain strategic oversight of this diverse organization. Its 11 members are the chairmen and co-chairmen of the Regional JCGs, a Royal Canadian Mounted Police representative, plus chairmen of functional committees such as the Technology and Training Committees.<sup>41</sup> Additional support was given North Star by the Immigration and Naturalization Service Border Patrol and the U.S. Customs Office of Enforcement which "have directed their field offices to coordinate all border special operations through the North Star Coordination Center in Buffalo, NY."<sup>42</sup>

The coordination center is staffed with about 20 personnel, including representatives from the Border Patrol, Customs, National Guard Bureau, the New York National Guard, and JTF-6. Requests for military assistance to DLEAs in the northern states are consolidated at North Star, then passed to JTF-6, and coordinated with Operation Alliance. The operating focus at the coordination center is on intelligence, interdiction, training, and investigation support.

The planning process at North Star has made use of the three Joint Coordination Groups to build consensus as a regional strategy is being developed. Sequestered for a week in June 1992 at a small conference facility in North Carolina, about 18 Canadians and Americans representing the JCG membership hammered-out the Project North Star Strategy, named "Polaris." It was coordinated with American and Canadian agencies for approval.

The Polaris Strategy sets a goal of identifying, interdicting and destroying criminal organizations. To accomplish this it provides a vision for near, mid and far term periods. In the near (2-year) term, priority for resources is placed on intelligence, law enforcement training, and public education. Law enforcement officials from both the United States and




Figure 16. Project North Star Joint Coordination Group Regions.

Canada have stated that the drug education process is a top priority that can reduce the demand for drugs.<sup>43</sup> A large share of the North Star effort is placed on demand reduction programs to inform the public about the myth of drugs, especially children in the grade schools.<sup>44</sup>

Polaris mid-term goals center on investigations, interdiction, and prosecution. North Star DLEAs focus on specific weaknesses of criminal organizations. For example, intelligence is used to target specific criminal organizations and special effort is placed on the problem of cross-border money laundering.<sup>45</sup>

The far-term goal of the strategy is to continue the destruction of kingpin drug organizations while the JCGs assess the strategic situation for future needs.<sup>46</sup>

In addition to the Polaris strategy, Project North Star has assembled a system of planning documents to pass strategic guidance to the JCGs. A Drug Threat Assessment has been produced with the staff assistance of Forces Command, and a campaign plan has been developed by each of the Joint Coordination Groups.

## The Senior Law Enforcement Advisory Board.

Although Project North Star provided the prioritization, coordination, and validation functions of military support requests along the northern tier of states, and Alliance historically provided these functions in the Southwest, there was a need for this service in the central United States. Therefore, DoD formed the Senior Law Enforcement Advisory Board as a supporting working group to assist the Commanding General, JTF-6 with this task.<sup>47</sup> Working with Operation Alliance and JTF-6, the board reviews and prioritizes law enforcement requests for military support. See Figure 17.

The Board is made up of one representative from the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), National Sheriffs' Association (NSA), and eight Federal agencies. These agencies are the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Department of the Interior, Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Forest Service; and the U.S. Marshals Service.

Operation Alliance, along with Project North Star and the Senior Law Enforcement Advisory Board, are important for the interagency coordination and military support prioritization and validation they bring to the counterdrug effort. In a similar way, the HIDTA Program validates ONDCP funding support.




Figure 17. Senior Law Enforcement Advisory Board Area.

## HIDTA Program the Operational Level.

The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Program (introduced in the ONDCP section above) focuses on the major retailers and wholesalers of illicit drugs through efforts to integrate the drug enforcement capabilities of Federal, state and local law enforcement agencies.<sup>48</sup> The HIDTAs in the field function mainly at the operational level of counterdrug effort, with some strategic level interaction in the multiagency environment. These organizations have tasks at both the strategic and operational levels. They are responsible for developing strategies for their areas while providing sufficient operational planning and direction to ensure that measurable, strategic objectives are achieved. There is a need for strategic planning (a HIDTA strategy) to implement the policy guidance from ONDCP, and in some instances, a need for operational level plans (a HIDTA campaign plan) for linking the activities of several task forces in a coherent manner to achieve a strategic objective.

The HIDTAs have been directed by ONDCP to develop strategies that begin with an area assessment to establish a baseline of criminal activity and intent. Then a strategy is to be written incorporating measurable strategic objectives. Specific initiatives (operations) are conducted, supported by HIDTA budgets. Finally the HIDTAs are tasked to report to ONDCP annually on how well their budgeted initiatives have affected the baseline of criminal activity in their area. Indicators of success are based on statistical data, observed changes in operational modes made by drug criminals as a result of HIDTA initiatives, and the impact on dismantling or disrupting significant drug trafficking organizations.<sup>49</sup>

Each HIDTA area has similar organization: one or more collocated joint law enforcement task forces (officers and agents from state and local agencies, plus Departments of Justice and Treasury); an intelligence-sharing center; and a multiagency executive committee that develops the area strategies and operational initiatives (with supporting budget). The range of HIDTA joint operations includes interdiction, investigations, prosecution, treatment, and drug abuse prevention. How much funding a HIDTA gets depends upon the joint performance of participating agencies in achieving measurable objectives.<sup>50</sup> The Southwest Border HIDTA is discussed in some detail below because it is unique and for its close relationship with Operation Alliance.

The Southwest Border High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (SWB HIDTA) differs from the metropolitan HIDTAs by its vast area covering the border regions of California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. This is shown in Figure 13. It does not incorporate the Los Angeles and Houston HIDTAs, which are separate operating areas. The Southwest Border HIDTA Director is located in San Diego.

There are five regions with Executive Committees representing regional partnerships in Southern California, Arizona, New Mexico, West Texas, and South Texas. They are the California Regional Border Alliance Group in San Diego; the Arizona Alliance Planning Committee in Tucson; the New Mexico Regional Executive Committee in Albuquerque; the West Texas Regional Executive Committee at El Paso; and the South Texas Regional Executive Committee in San Antonio. The chair and one or two delegates from each of these

committees sit on the Southwest Border Executive Committee which is chaired by the Southwest Border HIDTA Director.

These Regional Executive Committees support and overwatch the federal, state, and local law enforcement task forces that receive the HIDTA funds. They assess the criminal threat, develop and revise strategies, design initiatives and update them, and program and monitor funds. The Task Forces are expected to reside in a centrally located facility, be mutually supporting, share intelligence, and be in a major city under the control of a state HIDTA executive committee.

According to Richard Y. Yamamoto, HIDTA Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy, the purpose behind the current organization of the SWB HIDTA is to achieve efficiency through eliminating bureaucratic layering in the funding process and to push "power down" to the federal, state, and local task forces. Thus, HIDTA funding and program guidance is directed through the HIDTA Coordinator in San Diego to the State-Regional Executive Committees, and then to the collocated task forces in Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas. This places national support directly at the tactical level.

The South Florida HIDTA also holds a unique place in the HIDTA Program by its oversight responsibility for the HIDTA Assistance Center. The Assistance Center is a training organization formed to support all the HIDTAs throughout the Nation. Its central mission is to support the HIDTA agents in the field with a program of professional development and technical courses. The Center emphasises multidisciplinary and multiagency training for personnel of all Federal, state and local agencies in a wide variety of subjects such as aircraft drug smuggling, strategic planning, and link analysis.<sup>51</sup>

A Community Empowerment Program (CEP) developed by the South Florida HIDTA complements its supply reduction and interdiction mission. John Wilson, Director of the HIDTA's State and Local Programs has created a generic model that can be tailored to fit specific communities in other HIDTAs. The CEP has a broad range of measurable objectives such as reducing drug trafficking in the community, decreasing people's dependence on public assistance, education, and role model mentoring. An important thrust of the CEP is finding ways to help the youth of impoverished neighborhoods.

## Joint Task Force 6.

Joint Task Force 6 (JTF-6) was established by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on November 13, 1989, at Fort Bliss, TX. JTF-6 supports the National Drug Control Strategy goal of countering the flow of illicit drugs across U.S. borders by coordinating military support requested by counterdrug law enforcement agencies (DLEA). Priority of support is to the High Intensity Trafficking Areas (HIDTA).<sup>52</sup>

JTF-6 works closely with Operation Alliance in planning and coordinating Department of Defense active and reserve component (Title 10, USC) support to Federal, state and local DLEAs. By working with the Governors' state Adjutants General, JTF-6 also integrates



National Guard units (under Title 32, USC) into joint support operations. In 1995 the JTF-6 area of responsibility (AOR) was expanded from its original four-state Southwest Border region to include support responsibilities for the entire United States, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. The Joint Task Force is organized with a commander, deputy commander, and a joint staff (J1 through J6). Its chain of command runs upward through the Army's Forces Command to U.S. Atlantic Command and the Secretary of Defense. Figure 18 depicts the staff organization of JTF-6.

Requests for military counterdrug support are submitted by DLEAs to JTF-6 through one of four law enforcement review agencies: Operation Alliance (which is collocated with JTF-6; Project Northstar in Buffalo, NY (linked to Operation Alliance); any of the HIDTAs; and the Senior Law Enforcement Advisory Board for LEAs not covered by one of the above-mentioned agencies. These agencies not only screen support requests to ensure (among other factors) that there is a valid counterdrug nexus, but also to prioritize the requests when there are competing support requests. When support to a DLEA is approved, JTF-6 will attempt to source the mission with a volunteer Title 10 unit. The unit operates in direct support of the supported LEA but under the tactical control (TACON) of JTF-6. When a mission is referred to a National Guard unit, command of that unit remains with the state military authority, and the unit directly supports the DLEA.<sup>53</sup>




Figure 18. Joint Task Force 6 Organization.

JTF-6 provides planning and tactical intelligence support to military units conducting counterdrug missions. The JTF-6 intelligence directorate primary mission is to provide terrain analysis and threat information to military units only—DLEAs receive law enforcement intelligence through their own channels from elements such as the National Drug Intelligence Center and the El Paso Intelligence Center. The leadership of units participating in JTF-6 missions attend an initial planning conference which prepares them for duty in the law enforcement environment, and they must brief an operations order for JTF-6 approval before deployment. Military support is further categorized by JTF-6 as operational, general support, rapid support, intelligence, and engineer.

Operational Support involves military units providing tactical support through the execution of mission related training. This includes such activities as aviation medical evacuation, aviation operations, ground reconnaissance, sensors, unmanned aerial vehicles, and ground transportation. Ground reconnaissance, for example, consists of two types of missions. One involves covering large terrain areas to seek out marijuana growing sites or identify smuggling routes and clandestine airfields. The other type of mission involves forces occupying listening posts/observation posts on likely smuggling routes. These missions can involve elements from squad-sized to several hundred soldiers or Marines. They typically avoid civilian contact and rely on night vision devices and daylight long-range vision means.<sup>54</sup> Of 131 operational support missions conducted during Fiscal Year (FY) 1996, 5.3 percent were ground sensor employment; 23 percent were aviation reconnaissance and support; transportation was 3 percent; medevac was 9.4 percent; controlled delivery of sensitive drug material was 12.2 percent; and ground reconnaissance was 46.6 percent.

General Support is the provision of military skills and expertise through military training teams and technology demonstrations. For example, the U.S. Army Military Police School may be requested to conduct a Counterdrug Investigations Course or the U.S. Army Intelligence School may be requested to demonstrate the counterdrug capabilities of various unmanned aerial vehicles. Of 124 general support missions during FY 96, nearly all (96 percent) were mobile training teams.

Rapid Support refers to the capability of JTF-6 to quickly respond to actionable intelligence through use of a rapid support unit (RSU). Consisting of an attached Special Forces company (B Team) and 4-6 "A-Teams," the RSU can operate anywhere within the JTF-6 AOR. The RSU is especially capable of conducting special reconnaissance missions (detection-oriented operations) designed to enhance LEA interdiction efforts. Of 85 RSU missions during Fiscal Year 1996, 69 were ground reconnaissance and 16 percent were mobile training teams.

Engineer Support involves road repair, vertical and horizontal construction. Typical missions include constructing border fences, lighting, and LEA training facilities. At Tucson, Nogales, and Douglas, AZ, 87 miles of roads have been upgraded to assist the U.S. Border Patrol; at San Ysidro, CA, both fencing and roads help control the drug traffickers' access to U.S. territory. An engineering assessment of the tunnel built under the border at Otay Mesa, CA, has helped the DLEAs understand ways to combat this drug threat.<sup>55</sup> During FY 1996, 24

engineer support missions were distributed as follows: fence construction and repair, 50.1 percent; engineer assessments, 13.6 percent; facilities, 13.6 percent; and roads, 22.7 percent.

Intelligence Support is the provision of specialists that can assist DLEAs with training and analysis processes. Typical missions include photo imagery interpretation, translator and linguistic support, and analyst support. Intelligence Support is the use of trained military intelligence analysts, translators, and linguists to provide DLEAs with enhanced case analysis, language capabilities, and intelligence architecture analysis support. During FY 1996, 349 intelligence analysts and translators were provided to DLEAs for missions like drug trafficking organization analysis, link and pattern analysis, intelligence data base construction and management, situation briefs, and linguistic support.<sup>56</sup>

The JTF-6 strategy guides these operations on a daily basis. The commander's intent is to provide good military training while supporting the DLEAs counterdrug mission. Thus, strategy objectives are to support law enforcement in reducing the domestic drug scourge; assist with improvements to illicit drug interdiction and intelligence; and provide wartime-related training for military units and people.

A JTF-6 Southwest Border Support Plan was developed during FY 1996 to support the DOJ Southwest Border Project and the Operation Alliance implementing counterdrug plan (discussed above). Priority regions and their avenues of approach and mobility corridors along the 2000 mile border have been identified. Intelligence will drive the phased application of military resources against major drug trafficking organizations.

The concept is to contribute to the proficiency and effectiveness of the DLEAs in their interdiction operations at and between Ports of Entry by means of reconnaissance, intelligence support and engineer projects that detect and disrupt drug smuggling. Mobile training teams also will be used. The Commander, JTF-6 wants to achieve at least a 50 percent disruption of the drug smuggling operations of the large drug organizations. The plan calls for these operations to continue until October 1999.

JTF-6 is an active organization, conducting 530 missions during FY 1996. For example, JTF-6 provided the DLEAs with about 12,000 pages of translated documents, trained 4,000 law enforcement officers, constructed or improved 23 miles of roads and 8 miles of fence in border areas, and upgraded 6 law enforcement facilities, for a savings of \$5.4 million to law enforcement agencies. The JTF trained a total of 1525 military personnel during the same period. Although JTF-6 provides tactical intelligence support to its units and personnel, it is not involved in processing intelligence for law enforcement. This mission is done by law enforcement organizations such as the DEA-sponsored El Paso Intelligence Center.

## El Paso Intelligence Center.

The El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) was organized in 1974 by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the U.S. Customs Service (USCS) and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). EPIC operates under an advisory board chaired by DEA's

Office of Intelligence. Participating in this intelligence center are 15 member agencies.<sup>57</sup> Associate member agencies represent the 50 states (plus Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Guam, District of Columbia). The Bureau of Prisons, National Marine Fisheries, Amtrack, and JTF-6 are also associate members.

The EPIC mission is to collect, process, and disseminate intelligence information concerning illicit drug and currency movement, alien smuggling, weapons trafficking and related activity. EPIC intends to disrupt the flow of illicit drugs at the highest trafficking level by means of exchanging tactical intelligence dealing with drug movement, and it supports other programs of interest to its members.

Supported by the data bases developed by its participating members, EPIC assists law officers with case inquiries and lookouts. Inquiries can involve drug trafficking; immigration violation suspects (alien smuggling, suspect fraudulent documents, criminal aliens); FAA information regarding pilots and aircraft; fugitives; weapons and explosives trafficking; and stolen vehicles, weapons and aircraft. Lookouts are requested by EPIC members for individuals entering the United States from foreign countries on commercial carriers, vehicles entering the United States, and suspect aircraft within the United States, Caribbean, Northern Mexico, Panama, and Canada. Lookouts provide tactical, time-sensitive information used by case officers for immediate requirements and are not generally used for long-term monitoring of people or conveyances.

The EPIC organization includes four major staff sections: Information Management, Watch Operations, Tactical Operations, Research and Analysis. EPIC also has DoD liaison officers, and a statistics element. The organization has a staff of about 260 personnel; 60 percent of these are from DEA. To accommodate this large staff, the EPIC physical plant is undergoing an expansion. See Figure 19.

The EPIC Research and Analysis Section provides real-time operational leads to law enforcement officers based on its analysis of information available in the automated databases of the EPIC Information System. The section provides analytical support to ongoing investigations and operations, and produces trend analyses for use by law enforcement agents. Information developed from analysis that links separate investigations by various offices and agencies together is passed by the section to agents in the field.

A number of ongoing programs benefit from EPIC research with information such as modus-operandi, intelligence on organizations under investigation, and movement trend intelligence. Some program examples are Operation PIPELINE (movement of drugs and drug currency via the U.S. interstate highway system by private auto); Operation BAY WATCH (movement of illicit drugs through Central America and Mexico to the United States); Operation CHARLIE "T" (drug movement by sea and air in the Pacific); Operation JETWAY (movement of narcotics and drug currency by commercial aircraft in the United States); Operation CONVOY (movement of drugs and drug money by commercial vehicle); and Operation WINTER NIGHT (smuggling of narcotics into the United States by commercial air, sea, and land cargo).




Figure 19. El Paso Intelligence Center Organization.

## DLEA Field Management Structure.

The local (tactical) actions of law enforcement activities such as the Drug Enforcement Administration, for example, are supervised by field offices that have defined geographic regions. The U.S. Customs special agent-in-charge and Customs management center (SAC/CMC) and the DEA field division agent-in-charge are at a level to synchronize tactical actions within their separate organizations or in the interagency arena. The District Offices of the U.S. Attorneys can influence tactical actions via HIDTA policy direction and case load guidance for Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces and the like.

## The Joint Interagency Task Forces–The JIATFs.

The Joint Interagency Task Forces (see Transportation Department, Coast Guard, above) are DoD-sponsored interagency task forces. They have an organic intelligence gathering capability, and they have assigned DoD personnel and DLEA liaison officers.

JIATF East (formerly JTF-4) is a subordinate joint command of U.S. Atlantic Command located in Key West, FL. JIATF-East coordinates surveillance (detection and monitoring) of the air and sea approaches to the United States through the Atlantic Ocean, Eastern Pacific

(east of 92 degrees west longitude), and Caribbean Sea. Its principal mission is to help DLEAs reduce the flow of drugs and other contraband from Latin America. The Director of JIATF East is a Navy admiral, and Customs and the Coast Guard provide deputy directors. By DoD's Unified Command Plan, after June 1, 1997 the Caribbean Sea area will likely fall under the Area of Responsibility of U.S. Southern Command; thus, it is possible that JIATF East will transfer from the operational command of Atlantic Command to Southern Command.

JIATF West (formerly JTF-5), at March AFB, CA, is a subordinate joint command of U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). JIATF West's mission is to detect and monitor maritime and air drugtrafficking in the Eastern Pacific, west of 92 degrees west longitude. JIATF West develops intelligence concerning heroin and other illicit drugs coming into the United States from Southeast and Southwest Asia. It also supports host nations that are in the U.S. commander-in-chief's area of responsibility.

## Domestic Air Interdiction Coordination Center (DAICC).

The Domestic Air Interdiction Coordination Center (DAICC) at Riverside, California was reorganized under guidelines that restructured the nationwide radar surveillance system to enhance coordination of the detection, interception and apprehension of aircraft that illegally cross into U.S. airspace carrying drugs and other contraband. The DAICC monitors 150 miles seaward around Puerto Rico and 100 miles seaward around U.S. coastlines. (The DAICC has a subordinate operations center in Puerto Rico to extend radar coverage into the Caribbean.)

In consideration of the Posse Comitatus law, the DAICC provides the law enforcement interdiction and apprehension functions to counter air drug trafficking criminals that enter U.S. territory. The DAICC provides radar detection and monitoring for the Southwest border of the United States. Some emphasis is placed on the northern region of Mexico, near the border, where air and ground activity indicate a high probability of drug smuggling activity inbound to the United States.

From the DAICC, air controllers can vector jets and helicopters to intercept and track potential drug trafficking aircraft entering U.S. territory. Receiving the hand-off of inbound radar tracks of suspected drug trafficker aircraft from military-based Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) precludes the inadvertent involvement of U.S. military personnel in law enforcement activities on U.S. soil.<sup>58</sup>

The DAICC Director and his assistant are Customs officers who report for administrative purposes to the Customs National Aviation Center (CNAC) in Oklahoma City. The DAICC is an interagency operation, with representatives from FAA, Coast Guard, and Border Patrol manning the Center.<sup>59</sup> The DAICC operates under the oversight coordination of the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator and with other interagency task forces also described in Chapter 3.

## Counterdrug Support Office.

The Counterdrug Support Offices (CDSO), located at Fort Belvoir, VA, and Segundo, CA, replace four former Regional Logistics Support Offices which are now closing down. The CDSO is a Defense Logistics Agency staff that facilitates the transfer of excess Defense property to domestic law enforcement agencies under Section 1208 of the Defense Authorization Act of 1990 and 1991. State and local agencies, working through their designated state agent or coordinator, have equal access to Defense property and support.

Under this program, about \$1 billion was passed to DLEAs during fiscal year 1995, including sophisticated equipment such as helicopters. The criteria for approving what type of support can be transferred to DLEAs rests with the DoD Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support.<sup>60</sup> Support can include temporary loan of equipment, training from various service schools, and transfer of excess DoD property.

## THE TACTICAL LEVEL

This section describes some of the many Drug Control Program activities at the tactical level, fighting the battles and engagements of the drug interdiction effort. Law enforcement counterdrug efforts at this level are often case-specific. The result can be isolated arrests and prosecutions that are useful in their own right. Yet, they may not support a larger strategy or campaign that encourages Federal, state and local officers to work together to put criminals in jail. The increasing emphasis on task force organizations have addressed this situation by bringing a sense of focus to law enforcement efforts. After the municipal police department, sheriff's office, or state police, the fundamental building block at the tactical level has become the task force organization.

## The Task Force Organization.

While there is no overarching guidance or standing procedure for forming-up and running task forces, the Federal Government has encouraged task force organizations as a way to integrate skills and resources in the pursuit of counterdrug objectives. The use of task forces gives local agencies flexibility in attacking the drug problem, and asset forfeiture rules have ensured the viability of task forces.<sup>61</sup> The International Association of Chiefs of Police reported that 72 percent of the departments they surveyed participated in multijurisdictional counterdrug task forces.<sup>62</sup> A recent survey conducted by Operation Alliance of 350 counties in four Southwest states provides some insight about the nature of task forces today.<sup>63</sup>

The Alliance survey found that in 60 percent of 182 task forces located in Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California, state and local agencies were the predominant level of participating agency. About 31 percent of task forces are composed of all three government levels: Federal, state and local. On average a task force will have about 6 or 7 participating agencies.

About 86 percent of task forces are permanently collocated and ongoing, with 27 percent of the task forces overall having their own intelligence units or groups. Funding through the HIDTA Program, the OCDETF Program, and the Bureau of Justice Assistance has encouraged the development of task forces that are ongoing and have their own intelligence centers. Several examples of task forces follow.

The Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) is a Department of Justice program which integrates law enforcement agencies and skills to identify and dismantle large, sophisticated drug trafficking organizations. OCDETFs are located in core cities across the United States with the purpose of attacking the criminal organizations that are inflicting significant violence or major property loss on the community.

The OCDETF process reviews significant drug cases in meetings chaired by an Assistant U.S. Attorney. About a dozen agencies are represented in these meetings where cases may be presented for committee review. When a case is seen to have broad implications requiring significant resources, the case is transferred from the individual agency to OCDETF for further action. A task force is established with agents from appropriate agencies assigned to the case.

In a large HIDTA such as Houston, 20 or more agents may be dedicated to an OCDETF case (although the agents may work several cases simultaneously). These are usually interstate cases that local police forces cannot work by themselves. In order to fund the OCDETF, each participating agency requests money from its department in Washington, plus the Department of Justice apportions OCDETF money as requested by the U.S. Attorneys' offices.<sup>64</sup>

On the Southwest border, over 40 law enforcement elements working in the OCDETF Program concluded "Operation Zorro II" in the spring of 1996. Operation Zorro resulted in the arrests in Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, El Paso and Midland, TX, of operatives working for the suppliers in Colombia and distributors in Mexico that smuggled cocaine into the United States. In the Midwest, OCDETF units focused on large crack-dealing gangs such as the Gangster Disciples and Vice Lords. Together, these Illinois gangs were selling over 500 kilograms of crack cocaine per year. Through 1996, Operation CRACKSHOT has decreased gang-related violent crime by 70 percent and resulted in dozens of indictments and convictions of gang leaders.<sup>65</sup>

The DEA, State and Local Task Forces are units with dedicated investigators and staff. They were established to "promote cooperation between DEA and State and local law enforcement officials, with the goal of immobilizing local drug trafficking groups."<sup>66</sup> They pursue open-ended drug problems such as money laundering, the Jamaican connection, and Nigerian smugglers.

A recent innovation is the DEA Mobile Enforcement Team (MET) concept to target violent organizations involved in drug trafficking. MET teams have been operational since March 1995, working out of 15 domestic divisions to aid local law enforcement agencies and communities. DEA has deployed 24 teams to such locations as Selma, Alabama and San Luis



Obispo County, California. These teams “provide trained personnel to do intelligence appraisals; money to make undercover buys and to pay informants to penetrate criminal organizations; sophisticated investigative and technical tools; and money to relocate witnesses to avoid reprisals from violent drug traffickers.”<sup>67</sup> The mission of MET is to identify violators, collect, analyze and share intelligence, and manage investigations and prosecutions to a successful culmination. Also, the DEA State and Local Task Force Program addresses the need of local communities.

Numerous other organizations of federal, state, and local governments at the tactical level are grouped together under the term Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (DLEA). Examples of Federal, state and local DLEAs include: State Departments of Justice and Public Safety, State Police, metropolitan police, county sheriffs, prison officials, U.S. Marshals Service agents, Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs) aboard U.S. Navy ships, and even U.S. Forest Service agents cutting marijuana plants on Federal land.

These tactical elements are often effective when organized as interdisciplinary teams, or “task forces,” guided by a strategy and operational plans for action. Deputy U.S. Attorney General Jamie Gorelick credits the task force concept with reducing violent crime in virtually every major city in the country, much of it associated with narcotics. “And while I wouldn’t tell you that we’ve made interagency competition magically disappear overnight, we do have task forces of Federal, state and local law enforcement officials working effectively together all around the country.”<sup>68</sup> The task force concept has proven effective within state and local domains.

Pennsylvania, for example, has over 1,000 police departments, some with only 10 officers. Over the past 6 years, the Pennsylvania State Attorney for Organized Crime and Counternarcotics has put together a Municipal Drug Task Force Program with participation by about 800 police departments supporting some 5,000 law officers.

Using a DOJ grant, funding from the state legislature, and asset forfeiture money, the state program evolved to counter drug crime at the local level. The Municipal Drug Task Force Program is guided by an oversight board of chiefs who facilitate interagency agreements for multijurisdictional law enforcement. Currently, Pennsylvania has 9 Task Forces (ranging from 10-30 people) located around the state. Typically the Task Force has representation from the State Bureau of Narcotics Investigation, State Police, local police, and a full-time state attorney to augment the team.<sup>69</sup>

These Pennsylvania task forces and their officers represent the foot soldiers who fight the war against drugs every day in every state. As one state officer said, “From a law enforcement perspective we are doing fine, but law enforcement isn’t the answer—drug use is up because of a lack of a consistent anti-drug education system.” They recognize that the “drug war” will ultimately be won through demand reduction efforts, but meanwhile they are willing to hold the line against drug criminals.

Their unselfish and heroic actions deserve thoughtful policy direction and a cogent national drug strategy backed-up by coherent operational plans. The diversity of these

operations requires some unity of effort to synchronize their actions at the operational and tactical levels. The system for countering drug trafficking in overseas areas resides in different domains than discussed here. The next chapter looks at the U.S. organizations that prosecute the drug war overseas.

## ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) was established by the *Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988* (Title I, Coordination of National Drug Policy, Subtitle A, National Drug Control Program is also cited as the National Narcotics Leadership Act of 1988), Public Law 100-690 [H.R. 5210], [21 U.S.C. 1501 *et seq*], November 18, 1988.

2. William J. Clinton, "President's Council on Counter-Narcotics," Executive Order, Washington, DC, March 15, 1996. Designated membership includes the President as Chair; Vice President; Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, and Transportation; Attorney General; U.N. Representative; Director of OMB; President's Chief of Staff; Director ONDCP; Director of Central Intelligence; President's Assistant for National Security Affairs; Counsel to the President; Chairman JCS; National Security Advisor for the Vice President; and other appointed officials. Suggesting a secondary focus on demand reduction for the Council, the Executive Order states that "As applicable, the Council shall also comprise the Secretary of Health and Human Services; the Secretary of Education; and the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy and such other officials of the departments and agencies as the President may, from time to time, designate."

3. ONDCP, "A Revitalized Office of National Drug Control Policy 1996, Protecting the American People from the Drug Menace," information paper and interviews at ONDCP, Washington, DC, March 19, 1996.

4. Barry R. McCaffrey, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy, Washington, DC: Internet, ONDCP Homepage, <http://www1.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/ondcp/html/ondcp-plain.htm>, August 5, 1996.

5. ONDCP Homepage, Internet, <http://www1.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/ondcp/html/ondcp-plain.htm>, September 10, 1996.

6. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Section 1005.

7. William J. Clinton, *The National Drug Control Strategy, 1996*, Washington, DC, 1996, p. 67.

8. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Section 1003.

9. Office of Planning, Budget, and Research, ONDCP, Briefing with General McCaffrey on February 15, 1996. ONDCP states that decertification has occurred infrequently, but has

been threatened often to coerce agencies into amending their budgets to meet the goals, priorities, and objectives of the strategy.

10. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Section 1005 (c).

11. Richard Y. Yamamoto, Director HIDTA Program, Office of National Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the President, interview by authors, Washington, DC, March 19, 1996. Also, Executive Office of the President, Office of National Drug Control Policy, "High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program, Fiscal Year 1997," Washington, DC, November 1996.

12. Lee P. Brown, Director, "The Interdiction Committee Charter and Organization," Office of National Drug Control Policy, Washington, DC, May 24, 1996, p. 1.

13. Compliance by the Departments of the U.S. Government with the National Drug Control Strategy is based on the theory that National Drug Control Program agencies (that is those identified "with responsibilities under the Strategy") will comply with the strategy's objectives, shaping their budgets accordingly. See Sec. 1010 (5) and (6) of PL 100-690, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, and remainder of Act.

14. Drug Enforcement Administration, nonattribution interview and memoranda provided, Washington, DC, March 21, 1996.

15. Thomas A. Constantine, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, "Administrator's Vision," FY 1995 Strategic Management System, Washington, DC, September 6, 1994.

16. Richard Bly, Assistant Administrator for Intelligence, DEA, interview by authors, Washington, DC, March 21, 1996.

17. Interviews and memoranda provided authors at headquarters of DEA, Washington, DC, March 21 1996.

18. Doris Meissner, Commissioner, INS, Washington, DC: Internet, INS Homepage, <http://justice2.usdoj.gov/ins/>, August 9, 1996.

19. As amended by the Immigration Act of 1990 (8 U.S.C. 1101 note).

20. Valorie J. Cooksey, U.S. Customs and Larry Carver, U.S. Border Patrol, interviews along Southwest Border at Sunland, New Mexico and El Paso, Texas, August 21, 1996. Also, see Wade Graham, "Masters of the Game; How the U.S. Protects the Traffic in Cheap Mexican Labor," *Harpers Magazine*, July 1996, for a good description of border policy and activities. Border neighborhoods in El Paso, Texas, Nogales, Arizona and Chula Vista, California have seen significant decreases in violent crime and robbery. Negative results have been observed also: drug smugglers now swing wide of intensely guarded crossing areas to enter the United

States, and much of the smuggling has moved to commercial cargo for which an effective means of inspection has yet to be figured out.

21. U.S. Department of Justice, "National Drug Intelligence Center," Johnstown, PA: September 1993. See also, George Bush, *National Drug Control Strategy*, Washington, DC, January 1990, pp. 6, 83-4.

22. *Ibid.* NDIC Division Chiefs, interviews and research visit, Johnstown, PA, January 26, 1994.

23. ONDCP, President's Council on Counter-Narcotics, *Department/Agency Reports: Implementation of the 1996 National Drug Control Strategy*, Washington, DC, May 28, 1996, p. 32. As one example, according to authors' interview, September 6, 1995, with Joyce Henderson, U.S. Customs, Director of Cargo Processing at the Otey Mesa Port of Entry near Chula Vista, CA, port runnings decreased from as much as 350 a month to about 3.

24. ONDCP, Executive Office of the President, "National Interdiction Command and Control Plan," Washington, DC, April 7, 1994, p. 7.

25. J.W. Kime, Admiral, USCG, letter to Lee P. Brown, Director, ONDCP, [transmitting interagency-staffed USIC Charter], Washington, DC, May 10, 1994.

26. William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, Memorandum, "Department of Defense Guidance for Implementation of National Drug Control Policy, Washington, DC, October 27, 1993. See also Perry, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, Washington, DC, March 1996, p. 9.

27. Department of Defense, Office of ASD SO/LIC (DEP&S), *Comprehensive Review DoD Counterdrug Program*, Washington, DC, September 1993, pp. 56-74. This *Review* is an excellent summary of DoD activities in support of the National Drug Control Strategy.

28. Drug Enforcement Administration, The National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee, *The NNICC Report 1994*, Washington, DC, August 1995, p. 3.

29. William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, Memorandum, "Counterdrug Operations and Programs," Washington, DC, April 17, 1995.

30. Department of Defense, Office of ASD SO/LIC (DEP&S), Memorandum, "Priorities, Policies and Procedures for Department of Defense Counterdrug Support to Domestic Drug Law Enforcement Agencies," Washington, DC, January 26, 1995.

31. U.S. Army Forces Command, Memorandum, "Delegation of Authority for Approving Counterdrug (CD) Operational Support to Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (DLEA)," Fort McPherson, GA, April 16, 1996.

32. Brian Sheridan, [former] Department of Defense Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support, lecture at Southwest Border Conference, San Diego, CA, September 7, 1995.

33. David Friestad, Colonel, ANG, Director, NGB Counterdrug Directorate, interview, Washington, DC, March 20, 1996.

34. Louis J. Antonetti, Colonel, California National Guard, Director, National Interagency Counterdrug Institute, interview, San Luis Obispo, CA, June 4, 1996.

35. Brian Pledger, U.S. Customs, Senior Tactical Coordinator, Operation Alliance, interview, El Paso, TX, August 21, 1996.

36. The Operation Alliance Command Group includes representatives from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; Drug Enforcement Administration; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Immigration and Naturalization Service/Border Patrol; Internal Revenue Service; Joint Task Force Six (DoD); U.S. Coast Guard; U.S. Customs Service; Department of Interior; U.S. Forestry Service; U.S. Marshals Service; U.S. Secret Service; Arizona Department of Public Safety; California Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement; New Mexico Department of Public Safety; Texas Department of Public Safety; Texas Narcotics Control Program; The Southwest Border HIDTA; El Paso Intelligence Center; Adjutants General (National Guard) of Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas; plus safety offices of Arizona's Pima County, California's Imperial County, and New Mexico's Eddy County.

37. 21 USC 1507. See Section 1010 (6), Definitions.

38. Valerie Cooksey, U.S. Customs, Plans Officer, Operation Alliance, interview, El Paso, TX, August 21, 1996. See Operation Alliance, *Southwest Border Drug Control Strategy II*, El Paso, TX, June 1992, p. 107. For detailed description of the campaign planning process used, see Chapter IIF, Unified Implementation of Objectives, Appendix C, Priority of Effort, and Appendix D, Operational Plan Sample.

39. Operation Alliance, "Military Support Priorities, Title 10," El Paso, TX, June 1996.

40. Ronald L. Carnes, Director, Enforcement, Project North Star, statement before the U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, Hearing on Drug Trafficking in Western New York: Assessing the Threat on the Northern Border, at Buffalo, NY, July 15, 1991, p. 9.

41. Project North Star, Joint Coordination Group Bylaws, Buffalo, NY, October 4, 1991, Articles IV-VIII.

42. Ronald L. Carnes statement.

43. Agnes Palazzetti, "Drug Traffic Between U.S., Canada Called Growing Threat," *The Buffalo News*, July 16, 1991, pp. B1, 4.

44. Project North Star, *Polaris*, Buffalo, NY, August 1992, p. 12.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

47. The board represents Nevada, Utah, Wyoming, Colorado, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, Iowa, Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Delaware, and Maryland.

48. Clinton, *The National Drug Control Strategy*, p. 15.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 72.

50. Yamamoto interview.

51. John Wilson, Deputy Director South Florida HIDTA, and Director State and Local Programs, interview by authors, Miami, FL, April 16 and July 8, 1996.

52. Discussion of JTF-6 based in part on staff input provided by Lieutenant Colonel Jesse Acosta, U.S. Army, J3, JTF-6, via internet (Army E-mail) correspondence, January 15, 1997.

53. Thomas R. Kelly, Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps, Deputy Commander, JTF-6, briefing and discussion, El Paso, TX, August 19, 1996.

54. Joint Task Force Six, *Operational Support Planning Guide*, El Paso, TX, JTF-6, July 1, 1996, p. C-8.

55. Otay Mesa tunnel; interview with California National Guard personnel and observations, Otay Mesa, CA, August 1995.

56. JTF-6 Command Briefing, El Paso, TX, August 20, 1996.

57. U.S. Department of Justice, *EPIC User Guide*, El Paso, TX: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995. The 15 members of EPIC include DEA, INS, U.S. Customs, Coast Guard, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, FAA, U.S. Marshals Service, FBI, IRS, U.S. Secret Service, Department of State, Department of Interior, CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, and DoD.

58. ONDCP, "National Interdiction Command and Control Plan."

59. Vincent Bond, U.S. Customs, Domestic Air Interdiction Coordination Center, "Drug Interdiction Radar Centers Consolidated," *The Informant*, San Luis Obispo, CA: National Interagency Counterdrug Institute, Vol. 6, No. 1, March 1996, p. 9. Also, telephone interview with Vincent Bond, August 12, 1996.

60. John B. Stinson, Sr., Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Domestic Policy, Plans and Support Division, OASD SO/LIC, (DEP&S), interview by authors, Washington, DC, August 28, 1996.

61. James R. Coldren, Jr., "Drug Control Task Forces, Creating and Implementing a Multijurisdictional Unit," National Institute of Justice, Washington, DC: Department of Justice, May 1993, pp. 1-2.

62. David W. Hayeslip, Jr., "Local-level Drug Enforcement: New Strategies," *National Institute of Justice Reports*, No. 213, March-April 1989.

63. Operation Alliance, *Operation Alliance Review & Profile of Southwest Border Task Forces*, El Paso, TX, 1995.

64. Kenneth Magidson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, July 20, 1990, interview by authors.

65. ONDCP, "Department/Agency Reports: Implementing the 1996 National Drug Control Strategy," pp. 15, 50.

66. George Bush, *National Drug Control Strategy*, Washington, DC: The White House, January 25, 1990, p. 96.

67. Clinton, *National Drug Control Strategy*, 1996, p. 25.

68. James Kitfield, "Drug Warrior," *Government Executive*, August 1996, p. 18.

69. Joe Peters, Assistant State Attorney for Organized Crime and Counternarcotics, interview by authors, Harrisburg, PA, August 29, 1996.

# CHAPTER 3

## THE OVERSEAS EFFORT

### OVERSEAS STRATEGY

Integrating the skills and resources represented by the large number of government agencies under a coherent strategy and implementing plans is a significant challenge. To set the stage for a later discussion of strategy and planning, this chapter briefly identifies the overseas part of our national drug control strategy (Latin America focus), provides a view of government agencies involved, and identifies some of their counterdrug operations.

The U.S. National Drug Control Strategy is meant to “break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply,” and “shield America’s air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat.”<sup>1</sup> Bilateral and multilateral efforts are intended to destroy drug trafficking organizations and dismantle the means of growing and producing illicit drugs. This supply reduction strategy calls for intelligence sharing, eradication of drug crops, assistance for crop substitution, and continued interdiction of the drug trade in the transit zone and within host nations (such as Bolivia and Peru). These actions are consistent with wider U.S. national security strategy goals for promoting democracy and sustainable development abroad.<sup>2</sup>

The U.S. strategy reflects the commitment made at Cartagena, Colombia, in February 1990. There, the U.S. President, with the Presidents of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, pledged “to step up efforts within their own countries to interdict illegal drugs and to increase coordination and cooperation among them to facilitate this fight.”<sup>3</sup> The Presidents agreed that future U.S. assistance would be based on counterdrug performance and sound economic planning, and that interdiction efforts would be in the context of demand reduction and economic development.

The Declaration of Cartagena gave credence to the concept of an internationally coordinated attack against illicit drug production and trafficking and criminal organizations, combined with economic development for the region. It was the foundation for what was popularly called “the Andean Ridge Strategy.” At the outset, military and law enforcement cooperation was important because principal drugtrafficking activities would have to be disabled. The combined efforts of U.S. and international agencies would be needed. It suggested the need for coordinated interagency strategies and campaign plans.

In May 1993 a Presidential review of the international counterdrug strategy determined that too much effort was being placed on interdiction in the Caribbean. It suggested that resources should be shifted to the drug source countries to enhance host nation interdiction and training and support in order to counter drug kingpins and their money laundering. The result of the review was Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 14, which now serves as the framework for U.S. overseas counterdrug strategy and the basis for interagency planning.



PDD 14 provided concepts for interdiction at the U.S. border, in the transit zone, and in the drug source countries, but it also shifted emphasis away from interdiction in the transit zone to favor helping the host nation. An interagency effort was directed to provide sustainable development (especially Colombia, Peru, Bolivia); attack the drug kingpins, their essential chemicals, and money laundering; and help shore-up host government institutions through training and foreign assistance.<sup>4</sup>

Thus, U.S. overseas counterdrug strategy reflects the agreement at Cartagena, subsequent Presidential Directives, and the goals of the National Drug Control Strategy. Current counterdrug objectives can be summarized this way: develop bilateral and multilateral intelligence sharing to thwart drug trafficking by air, land, and sea; use technology to help stop the flow of drugs; conduct maritime and aerial interdiction in drug transit zones; destroy major drug organizations; reduce and eradicate drug crops; attack drug essential chemicals and money laundering; strengthen host nation institutions and political will. Meanwhile, the United States will reduce domestic drug production. To accomplish all of this, a key concept is to “make greater use of multilateral organizations to share the burdens and costs of international narcotics control.” This complex and interrelated set of activities requires interagency and international coordination and highlights the need for a coherent approach to planning.<sup>5</sup>

In recent years, a top priority has been to stop cocaine, then other drugs such as heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine. Because virtually all cocaine is grown in Latin America, counterdrug organizations and efforts there provide the model for this discussion, although major drug trafficking industries centered in Thailand, Pakistan, Nigeria, and other countries are also important cases. Following is a review of the principal organizations overseas that support U.S. counterdrug policy. A view of the relationships among key overseas U.S. players is seen in Figure 20.

## THE STRATEGIC LEVEL

Strategic level players who write, coordinate, and oversee our international drug supply reduction effort are discussed here. Direction for overseas initiatives begins with the President, who often transmits his drug strategy decisions into the interagency arena through the National Security Council.

### National Security Council.

The National Security Council (NSC) is the principal forum for national security issues that require Presidential decision.<sup>6</sup> Its statutory function is to advise the President on the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security so as to enable the departments and agencies of government to cooperate effectively.<sup>7</sup> It develops interagency policies and strategies for Presidential consideration. Once the President makes a decision, the NSC Staff assists in the promulgation of national security directives and




Figure 20. Key U.S. Overseas Players.

coordinates and monitors their implementation. The NSC is chaired by the President. He presides over meetings with his cabinet members, statutory advisors (such as the Chairman, JCS and Director of Central Intelligence) and other advisors, depending upon the subject at hand. The NSC is supported in information fusion and policy development by the NSC Staff and its interagency groups.

Below the NSC, the interagency groups in the NSC system are the Principals Committee, the Deputies Committee, and various Interagency Working Groups (IWG). As the senior sub-cabinet forum, the Principals Committee is chaired by the National Security Advisor and composed of the NSC cabinet-rank leaders, minus the President and Vice-President. The sub-cabinet level Deputies Committee is chaired by a deputy national security advisor and has a membership made of deputies and under secretaries of the departments and agencies. By Presidential decisions and directives of the executive secretary of the NSC, IWGs are formed to provide the routine assessment, coordination and policy development for issues of concern to the NSC members. See Figure 21.<sup>8</sup>




Figure 21. National Security Council.

Most of the important ground-work leading to Presidential policy decisions is done at the IWG level by members who typically are at the assistant secretary, deputy assistant secretary and staff (action officer) levels of departments and agencies. Chairmen may be from the NSC staff, departments, or agencies, depending upon the issue under consideration. These interagency groups constitute the principal mechanism for developing advice for the President. They formulate, recommend, coordinate, and monitor the implementation of national security policy and strategy.

A representative sample of working groups active since the publication of the first national drug control strategy in 1989 is instructive. The Andean counterdrug implementation working group, chaired by ONDCP and NSC, was formed to oversee the implementation of Department of State plans and to evaluate host nation and U.S. agency

performance. A Cartagena working group, chaired by State Inter-American Affairs/international Narcotics and Law Enforcement, dealt with Presidential counterdrug agreements in the Document of Cartagena, especially for economic cooperation and trade. The heroin strategy working group, chaired by the State Department developed a policy approach toward heroin. Other functional groups included the military initiatives working group, transit and secondary source working group, and foreign intelligence working group. All of these have proven helpful in coordinating policy development for international initiatives in the drug war. Upon Presidential approval, the elements of the Federal Government, such as the Department of State and the Drug Enforcement Administration, implement the policy developed by such groups. Today, the counternarcotics interagency working group (CN-IWG), chaired by ONDCP, brings together the principal officers of government for counterdrug policy meetings.

## Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP).

The Director of ONDCP assists the President in developing and disseminating international counterdrug policy and providing leadership for counterdrug matters in the interagency and international areas. ONDCP leads the development of the classified annex to the national drug control strategy. This is written to give direction for classified activities that are required to fully implement the international goals of the President's strategy:

Goal 4: Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat.

Goal 5: Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.

The classified annex provides guidance to agencies of the U.S. Government for implementing Presidential Decision Directive 14 on international drug control activities and Presidential Decision Directive 44 concerning the U.S. international heroin control strategy. By his participation in international fora, the director plays a direct role in enjoining cooperation and unity of effort in bilateral and multinational efforts to counter the drug scourge.

ONDCP also provides the Chairman for the CN-IWG where he leads the process of developing policy recommendations for Presidential decision. Thus, ONDCP is a central actor in the interagency fora which function under the NSC system of committees and working groups. ONDCP has an additional role in supervising the High Level Contact Group for Cooperation between the United States and Mexico.

## Department of State.

The Department of State (DOS) is a key participant in the interagency process. It is a major contributor of goals and concepts for international initiatives in the national drug

control strategy assembled by ONDCP. Several bureaus of DOS are active in developing policy aims for overseas counterdrug activities.

The Under Secretary for Political Affairs handles DOS crisis management and integrates political, economic, global, and security issues. He oversees six geographic bureaus which coordinate the conduct of U.S. foreign relations: African Affairs (AF); East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP); European and Canadian Affairs (EUR); Near Eastern Affairs (NEA); South Asian Affairs (SA); and Inter-American Affairs (for Latin America and the Caribbean—ARA).

The Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) is subordinate to the Under Secretary for Global Affairs. Created as International Narcotics Matters in 1978, INL is the State Department point of contact for all international illicit drug matters. In 1994, the INL mission was changed to include responsibility for international crime that threatens U.S. security.

The INL mission is to coordinate international drug control programs of all U.S. Government agencies and to provide policy direction to U.S. missions abroad. INL negotiates cooperative agreements with foreign governments and represents the United States at the United Nations and other drug control organizations. It administers the International Narcotics Control Program under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. INL is also charged to promote international law enforcement initiatives, improve international law enforcement cooperation, and develop training programs to strengthen police and criminal justice institutions in democracies.<sup>9</sup>

The INL Bureau plays both diplomatic and programmatic roles. It uses diplomacy to convince other governments and international organizations to halt the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. It supports programs that provide assistance to foreign governments to eradicate narcotics crops, destroy illicit laboratories, train interdiction personnel, and develop education programs to counter drug abuse by their populations.<sup>10</sup> INL purchases personnel services and goods, and it funds host nation contracts in support of overseas counterdrug initiatives.

INL is staffed with 126 personnel. Of these, 28 American foreign service officers, 18 foreign service nationals, and about 180 contract employees are in jobs overseas; 80 civil and foreign service staff work in Washington. The bureau is organized by functional programs, such as international criminal justice, policy and planning, and regional activities (Latin America, Asia-Europe-Africa). It provides administrative, policy, and technical guidance to narcotics assistance sections (formerly units) located with the Ambassador's staff (country team). See Figure 22.

The Chief of Mission—the Ambassador—represents the President, but takes policy guidance from the Secretary of State via regional and other bureaus. Responsible for all U.S. activities within the host nation, the Ambassador interprets U.S. national drug policy and strategy and oversees its application. He uses his country team to assist in translating strategy or policy into operational direction within the country. For counterdrug issues, the




Figure 22. The Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.

deputy chief of mission is often tasked to be the embassy or mission coordinator for Narcotics affairs (CNA).

The CNA coordinates all INL program activities and keeps abreast of host nation counterdrug activities. He provides policy oversight for counterdrug activities of all government agencies at the mission, initiates requests for INL-funded projects, and is the point of contact for visitors from U.S. Government national drug control program agencies.

The Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) is headed by a narcotics affairs officer (NAO) who participates as a member of the country team and reports to the CNA. With INL's new responsibility for international crime and law enforcement issues, the NAS has become involved in crime issues as well as the counterdrug strategy. The mission of the NAS is to manage routine counterdrug actions in cooperation with the host government. The NAS works with the host government to develop narcotics control programs—crop control and eradication, law enforcement, interdiction (with DEA), demand reduction, and related crime programs. The section also prepares the annual budget request for narcotics control funds

and provides oversight of host nation use of U.S.-provided support.<sup>11</sup> For procurement requirements, INL is authorized to use USAID acquisition regulations in addition to those of State.

## U.S. Agency for International Development.

USAID is responsible for the design and conduct of development assistance programs worldwide. It administers U.S. economic and humanitarian assistance designed to promote sustainable development in countries in Africa, Asia, the Near East, the new independent states of the former Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean. USAID programs address issues of health and population, the environment, economic growth, and supporting democracy. AID promotes conditions that expand markets for U.S. goods and services in developing countries. It funds technical assistance and commodity assistance, trains thousands of foreign students each year at American colleges, and supports development research.

In the counterdrug strategy, AID helps the Andean Ridge countries to diversify their economies and depart from dependency on the coca industry. AID attempts to help host countries achieve lasting economic growth, strengthen democratic institutions, and improve respect for human rights. AID also sponsors anti-drug education programs.<sup>12</sup>

## Transportation Department.

The Transportation Department's U.S. Coast Guard intercepts and apprehends drug traffickers on the high seas and (with host nation permission) in foreign waters. It employs aircraft and cutters in support of the interdiction part of the drug control strategy. The Coast Guard provides law enforcement detachments aboard U.S. Navy ships to support maritime detection, interception, and apprehension of drug smugglers. It also works with drug-producing and transshipment countries in a program of on-site training.

The Commandant of the Coast Guard has been appointed by the Director, ONDCP to be the U.S. interdiction coordinator (USIC). He is responsible for monitoring and overseeing the U.S. interdiction program in the Western Hemisphere, near U.S. borders, in narcotrafficking transit zones, and in host countries (with permission) to optimize interdiction effectiveness. To ensure that assets are adequate, the commandant coordinates with USG departments and agencies that have overseas interdiction missions, to include embassies and military commands.

The U.S. interdiction coordinator provides "oversight coordination" over four counterdrug coordination centers (see discussion of JIATFs in Chapter 2). Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South), a U.S. Southern Command unit in Panama, looks at the hemisphere from Belize southward through the Andean Ridge. JIATF-East, at Key West, FL, is a U.S. Atlantic Command unit that monitors the Caribbean north of Venezuela-Colombia and up

the Atlantic Coast. It is also responsible for Mexico. As DoD's Unified Command Plan assigns responsibility for the Caribbean region to U.S. Southern Command after mid-1997, Southern Command is likely to take over operational command of JIATF-East.

JIATF-West, March AFB, CA, a U.S. Pacific Command unit, has an operating area in the Pacific and southward to South America. The Domestic Air Interdiction Coordination Center (DAICC), March AFB, a U.S. Customs unit, monitors 150 miles seaward around Puerto Rico and 100 miles seaward around U.S. coastlines. (The DAICC is discussed in Chapter 2.) These joint task forces are composed of drug law enforcement officers (especially Customs and Drug Enforcement Administration), and military officers of all services, and often have foreign liaison offices.

The JIATF East and West are essentially information and intelligence fusion centers that conduct the DoD-assigned mission of detection and monitoring of suspected drug trafficking aircraft and vessels headed toward the U.S. border. The JIATFs pass this information to the Coast Guard (or Navy ships with Coast Guard law enforcement detachments aboard) and to the DAICC. The U.S. Customs' DAICC performs the law enforcement mission of vectoring Customs aircraft to intercept smugglers, follow them to ground, and arrest them. The Coast Guard performs the law enforcement function of arresting criminals at sea. Because its extended counterdrug mission throughout Latin America provides some interesting examples, JIATF-South is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.

## Department of Defense.

Three of the five counterdrug mission areas identified by the Secretary of Defense directly concern overseas initiatives: training and operational support to drug-source nations; supporting the DEA to dismantle the cocaine business; and, detecting and monitoring (D&M) illicit air and sea smuggling traffic.<sup>13</sup> The ASD (SO/LIC) Drug Enforcement Policy and Support staff develops, coordinates and oversees policy and planning for these overseas counterdrug missions. DoD, as the lead agency for D&M, operates the JIATFs (discussed previously) through U.S. combatant commands. DoD provides training and technical assistance to host nations, and it is responsible for integrating the counterdrug C3I network that has been especially effective throughout Latin America. The Joint Staff plays an important role in supporting the Secretary's counterdrug plans.

The J3 Operations Directorate, Counternarcotics Division (CND) is the Joint Staff focal point for strategic, policy and budgetary matters associated with military support to the national drug control strategy. CND monitors military, political and intelligence situations and develops courses of action to support counterdrug strategy.<sup>14</sup>

For strategic direction CND relies upon the President's national drug control strategy and Presidential decision directives which implement the international parts of the strategy. Other strategic guidance comes from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, who play direct roles in coordinating the counter narcotics actions of the combatant commanders-in-chief (CINCs). Finally, CND representatives attend various



interagency meetings held under the aegis of the National Security Council and ONDCP where international drug policy is developed.

In the Counternarcotics Division, the Strategy and Policy Branch is responsible for plans, policy and strategy relating to Defense counterdrug efforts worldwide. It concentrates on supporting drug source nations in their fight to dismantle drug cartels, detection and monitoring activities, and drug law enforcement agencies along the Southwest border and within the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas identified in the national drug control strategy. The Programming, Budget, and Requirements Branch reviews the DOD program and budget and ensures that resources are on hand to support the operational requirements of the counterdrug strategy.<sup>15</sup> See Figure 23.




Figure 23. J3 Operations Directorate, Counternarcotics Division.

The U.S. Combatant Commands support the national drug control strategy in response to their regional counterdrug threat situation, missions, and concepts of operations. This section narrows the discussion to U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) activities as it is most directly involved in countering overseas cocaine trafficking.

U.S. Southern Command maintains operational direction over U.S. military activities throughout Latin America from its headquarters at Quarry Heights, Panama. (In 1997 it began establishing a new headquarters in Miami, FL). Every year, SOUTHCOM's service components, special operations component, and two joint task forces deploy and support over 50,000 troops in the southern region. They conduct a range of operations supporting U.S. interests in Latin America: reducing inter-state and regional tensions; encouraging military accommodation to civilian control, human rights and the rule of law; engaging with regional nations and their military establishments; and stopping the production and flow of illicit drugs into the United States.<sup>16</sup> For the counterdrug part of its strategy, SOUTHCOM programs support U.S. ambassadors, drug law enforcement agencies, and host nations to counteract illicit drug trafficking and its negative effect upon regional countries and their citizens.<sup>17</sup>

The SOUTHCOM area of responsibility (operating area) of Central and South America is strategically significant for its geography which lends support to drug production, manufacturing and trafficking. Foremost, the Andean Ridge is the only region in the world that produces commercially viable coca leaves. Drug trafficking is facilitated by the operating area's maritime characteristics, with 23,000 miles of coastline on the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and major river systems that are navigable for thousands of miles by ocean-going vessels. For instance, the Amazon river is navigable from Iquitos, Peru to the Atlantic Ocean by 20-foot draft ships.

Many of the central areas of South America sustain fluvial societies, and this environment makes government presence and the rule of law difficult to establish. Since June 1997, the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility has incorporated the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico—along with the additional challenges of dealing with drug trafficking routes through the island nations. Also, since road networks are limited, most nations of the region have a seemingly limitless number of small (often illegal) airstrips (*pistas*) that are needed to facilitate communications by legitimate businessmen and narcotraffickers alike.

In this environment, current threats facing SOUTHCOM include illegal migrations and refugee flows, international crime and terrorism, environmental degradation, rapid population growth, drug trafficking, weapons proliferation, and regional instability such as the Amazon border dispute between Ecuador and Peru. Throughout this huge area, SOUTHCOM deals with 32 sovereign nations (but not Mexico) and 12 protectorates in pursuit of its strategic objectives.

SOUTHCOM's strategic objectives are to defend U.S. interests and to promote and enhance democracy and stability in Latin America. A few of the ways the command intends to achieve these objectives is by combating terrorism, drug trafficking and international crime. The success of these actions is linked to other SOUTHCOM concepts: promoting cooperative security measures; conducting military-to-military contacts; strengthening democratic institutions and human rights practices. Success in the counterdrug effort will require the coordinated application of these programs throughout the region. This synergism is created through the interagency cooperation of leaders at the operational level of the drug war.<sup>18</sup> An

example of this is seen in Operation LASER STRIKE, a counterdrug operation conducted at the request of the U.S. interdiction coordinator.

The LASER STRIKE operation evolved from the DEA interdiction concepts developed under the Support Justice (later Steady State) series of programs in the Andean countries in 1991 through 1994. Under the Support Justice program, Operation GHOST ZONE in the Chapare region of Bolivia proved the effectiveness of combined riverine, ground, and especially air interdiction to shut down the flow of coca product to refiners in Colombia. It was a brilliant plan conceived with the help of SOUTHCOM planning assistance.<sup>19</sup> A follow-on operation called GREEN CLOVER concentrated detection and monitoring assets in source countries to support interdiction.

The impact of these operations against the Peru-to-Colombia "air bridge" is that coca leaf and base prices paid to coca farmers have dropped. "As a result, an increased number of farmers expressed interest in U.S. AID alternative development programs in the region."<sup>20</sup> Meanwhile, drug traffickers are finding new routes through Brazil and Bolivia. Operation LASER STRIKE, begun April 1996, continues with increased intelligence support to U.S. country teams and host nation DLEAs. It also includes increased support to Peruvian and Colombian counterdrug forward operating bases.

## Additional Federal Departments.

Numerous additional federal departments support the national drug control strategy's international initiatives. They are briefly mentioned here to round-out the view of the overseas counterdrug effort.

The Treasury Department is responsible for money laundering control programs and its U.S. Customs Service works to disrupt the smuggling of contraband and drugs through U.S. ports of entry. Customs has the authority for investigating drug-related crimes, including smuggling and money laundering. As suggested in the discussion of the DAICC above, Customs has developed a sophisticated electronic and visual interception capability to hunt down drug smuggling aircraft. It also provides technical assistance and training programs to host countries. Customs is active in joint enforcement operations with drug money laundering, transit and source countries as targets.

The Justice Department has the lead in counterdrug cases and prosecuting drug criminals. It also works with Department of State to negotiate extradition treaties and mutual legal assistance treaties.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) works in foreign countries to collect information supporting drug-related investigations of major drug organizations. It conducts long-term domestic investigations aimed at prosecuting the leaders in major criminal organizations and dismantling these organizations. In prosecuting drug criminals, the FBI often attends to domestic and overseas dimensions of the case.

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) conducts investigative work overseas with foreign law enforcement agencies. It provides technical support and training to these organizations to disrupt the production and transport of illicit drugs. DEA coordinates drug intelligence collection and works with host countries on counter narcotics operations. For example, in the summer of 1986, Operation BLAST FURNACE was organized by DEA to destroy coca-processing facilities in Bolivia. Operation GHOST ZONE in 1992 interdicted Andean Ridge transit routes (air, land, rivers) that linked coca growers in Bolivia to cocaine processors in Colombia. This successful concept of operations continues today in similar operations throughout the Andean Ridge, with air interdiction especially effective in Peru.

In Bolivia, DEA officers direct the embassy drug intelligence center (EDIC) which includes a tactical analysis team and operations planning group. The EDIC coordinates investigations and interdiction operations in the Chapare Valley and Beni Region with the Bolivian National Police.<sup>21</sup>

In Colombia, DEA targets the cocaine production and transportation vulnerabilities of Colombian drug criminals. Operation SELVA VERDE is a combined interdiction program with the Colombian National Police (CNP) that has seized 25 metric tons of cocaine base and cocaine-hydrochloride, 63 metric tons of marijuana, 120 kg of heroin and morphine, and destroyed 52 cocaine production facilities (1995 figures). Operation SKYWEB is a joint DEA-CNP aircraft interdiction effort that has successfully targeted the drug mafia's general aviation fleet.

In Peru, a combined Peruvian national police (PNP)-DEA intelligence program has reported the interdiction and seizure of six drug aircraft in 1995. US Southern Command has reported for 1995 that the Peruvian air force shot down nine and seized 2 aircraft.<sup>22</sup> (These figures may be overlapping.) A PNP-DEA major violators task force (MVTF) of some 30 PNP investigators are at work dismantling kingpin drug organizations. At the same time the PNP has been highly successful in its operations to dismantle the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path-SL) and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA). The Sendero has had a long-standing relationship with narcotraffickers in Peru. DEA's overseas activities highlight the multiagency, international dimension of counterdrug planning and operations.

## THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

Several organizations are in good position to translate U.S. policy and strategy objectives into operational direction and synchronize counter narcotics tactical actions within the host countries. These organizations reside at a level below the strategic players. Given the authority to coordinate and the comity of participating agencies, they could make a major contribution toward unity of effort in the overseas drug war. Most prominent of these are the U.S. Ambassadors' country teams.

## The Ambassador's Country Team.

The US diplomatic mission to a foreign country includes representatives of the U.S. departments and agencies present in the country. On average, the State Department supplies only about 38 percent of the U.S. Government employees working at an embassy; the rest are from DOD (36 percent), DOJ (5 percent), Department of Transportation (3 percent), along with others such as Treasury, Agriculture, and Commerce.<sup>23</sup> The President gives his ambassador direction and control over these U.S. Government personnel, except for those assigned to another mission, international agency, or a DOD combatant command (the U.S. CINCs).

The country team organization facilitates interagency coordination within the embassy. The composition of a country team varies widely, depending on the desires of the chief of mission, the in-country situation, and the number and levels of U.S. departments and agencies present. The principal military members of the country team are the defense attache and the chief of the security assistance office (SAO). The U.S. regional combatant commander (the CINC) can be represented by the SAO chief or another officer in meetings and coordination conducted by the country team.<sup>24</sup>

The country team meets in various configurations to address issues, but when it assembles to coordinate in-country counterdrug actions, it is usually chaired by the CNA (most often the deputy chief of mission acting as coordinator for narcotics affairs). Principal players can include the Chief, Security Assistance Office (SAO), Chief of Station, DEA narcotics attache, INS attache, Customs attache, Narcotics assistance section (Department of State, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs), FBI legal attache, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. Information Service, and the Defense Attache.

Many country team members maintain direct communications with parent organizations located stateside as well as directive authority for any related subordinate teams they may have operating within the host country. For example the narcotics attache maintains a link with DEA in Arlington, VA, while he also directs actions of DEA teams in the field. The same stovepipe effect is true of the legal attache (FBI), security assistance officer (Defense Security Assistance Agency and Unified Command), Defense attache (Defense Intelligence Agency), public affairs/USIS Officer (U.S. Information Agency), the narcotics assistance section officer, and so on. In addition, the Treasury Department's U.S. Customs Service, Justice Department's U.S. Border Patrol, and Transportation Department's Coast Guard send training teams to numerous countries to assist in professionalizing those host nation institutions.

This mixed group demands the close attention of the Ambassador and his CNA to ensure coordinated action within the host country. This underscores the necessity of effective strategic and operational planning on the part the Ambassador and his country team members.

## USSOUTHCOM Subordinate Commands.

Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South), is located at Howard Air Force Base, collocated with the U.S. Air Force Southern Command (USSOUTHAF) Joint Air Operations Center. JIATF-South is a SOUTHCOM unit which operates under the combatant command of USCINCSOUTH and the policy guidance of the Commandant of the Coast Guard, acting as the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator.<sup>25</sup> JIATF-South assists host nations to destroy drug trafficking organizations, drug crops, and drug production facilities; and track and seize drugs scheduled to be shipped to the United States. The JIATF-South integrated system of detection and monitoring includes riverine and land operations as well as air surveillance. Its activities include detection and monitoring, intelligence, training, planning, logistics, and communications in support of U.S. and host nation law enforcement.<sup>26</sup> It passes the movement information of suspected drug trafficking aircraft and ships to U.S. and host nation law enforcement agencies for seizure. Its area of operations is Belize southward through the Andean Ridge.

JIATF-South is organized under the command of the SOUTHCOM Director of Operations, J3. Other SOUTHCOM staff divisions participate in the JIATF. In addition it has an interagency targeting cell made up of representatives from JIATF-East, Customs, Defense Intelligence Agency, DEA, and SOUTHCOM staff and air component officers. See Figure 24.




Figure 24. Joint Interagency Task Force South.

Most successful to date has been the interdiction of airborne drug routes, especially in Peru. This can involve cuing and initial detection, airborne monitoring, tracking the target, and finally, host nation pursuit using reaction forces. Flights of E3C Sentry airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft extend coverage by JIATF-South supported TPS-43 radars based at Lago Agrio, Ecuador; Yurimaguas, Peru; and, Araracuara and Leticia, Colombia. Relocatable over the horizon radar (ROTHAR) operating from Puerto Rico, Texas, and Virginia extend coverage into Bolivia, Brazil, and Peru. During its 12-hour, air-refueled flights over the Andean Ridge, the AWACS affords a real-time link to host nation air forces for intercepting drug trafficking aircraft.<sup>27</sup>

The JIATF's combined air interdiction operations with host nations have changed the way drug criminals have to operate in Peru. "[Air space] . . . control has been so tight that aircraft don't come in any more," a police commander has said, "the drugtrafficking is starting to spread out to the south—down to the Bolivian border, and into Brazil."<sup>28</sup> Indeed, since 1995 and this partial success of the Andean Ridge Strategy, the Brazilian border town of Tabatinga on the Amazon River has swelled with several thousand Peruvians directly and indirectly involved in the illegal contraband trade.<sup>29</sup> SOUTHCOM owes part of its operational success to the intelligence and planning assistance teams that work with U.S. Government agencies and the host nations.

Tactical Analysis Teams (TAT), organized and deployed by the JIATF, provide intelligence support to the country teams. They work under the direction of the SOUTHCOM J2 counterdrug intelligence officer. These small intelligence teams focus intelligence collection assets (imagery, communication) to support country team planning and counterdrug operations. The TATs provide a real-time link between the country team and U.S. SOUTHCOM. There are now ten TATs in Latin America.

Planning Assistance Teams (PATs—11 currently) are helping host nation and country team officials plan and conduct counterdrug operations in embassy and field locations in Guatemala, Venezuela, Colombia, Equador, Peru, and Bolivia. For example, the operations planning group and tactical analysis team of DEA's EDIC in Bolivia are manned by TAT and PAT personnel provided by SOUTHCOM. The PAT and TAT program is one way that SOUTHCOM's service component personnel directly participate in overseas counterdrug support activities.

Joint Task Force Bravo (JTF-B) located at Soto Cano Airbase, Comayagua, Honduras, is a support facility of about 500 service personnel whose mission is to conduct training, perform contingency planning, and support nation assistance projects within Honduras.<sup>30</sup> Current activities include humanitarian and civic assistance missions in Honduras and providing staff training for regional military leaders. The airbase can support counterdrug aircraft that are involved in JIATF-South missions, and it has a C5B Galaxy aircraft capability to facilitate the off-load of heavy equipment. JTF Bravo is in an excellent location to support U.S. Government and host nation agencies in their efforts to gather information about, and conduct operations against, the transiting of drugs and other contraband through Central America.

## USACOM Subordinate Commands.

In addition to JIATF-East previously mentioned, U.S. Atlantic Command provides an information analysis center (IAC) to assist the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico and his country team. The IAC falls under the staff supervision of the Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) Director of Operations, and it takes its interagency lead for in-country actions from the country team's DEA attache. The IAC currently has five communications and information analysts, and it will probably add logistical and operations planners to complete its organization at about 9 people.

The Information Analysis Center is a communications link that provides counterdrug information to support country team cooperative programs with Mexican authorities and U.S. DLEAs in Mexico. The IAC develops information products (such as terrain and movement analysis), assists with operational planning, analyzes multiagency counterdrug information, and provides tracking and technical data to Mexican and U.S. DLEAs.<sup>31</sup>

The IAC sustains a 24-hours-a-day communications and analysis center that coordinates overflight and air safety information to U.S. aircraft. It assists the hand-off of counterdrug actions from U.S. assets to Mexican authorities in order to deal with drug criminals within the sovereign territory of Mexico. In this regard, the IAC coordinates support to the Mexican Northern Border Response Force (NBRF), a Mexican counterdrug law enforcement team that intercepts drug criminals. As the focal point for DoD detection and monitoring requirements for Mexico, the IAC is an important asset for coordinating with JTF-6, in El Paso, TX, operations that are close to Mexico's northern border. The IAC's communication and coordination functions are critical for ensuring that counterdrug law enforcement efforts on the U.S.-Mexico border enjoy international and interagency cooperation and are conducted safely at the tactical level.

## THE TACTICAL LEVEL

The United States has provided functional teams that assist host countries to fight the drug war at the tactical level. In most cases, these are training teams that work with host country counterparts to help them improve their law enforcement and military capabilities, develop planning and logistics skills, and encourage conduct appropriate for government officials and institutions in a democratic society.

U.S. Customs Service often provides teams for counterpart training in nations around the world. The DEA has agents working with host country officials to develop intelligence about narcotrafficking, and they contribute training and planning assistance to enhance front-line law enforcement capabilities. Narcotics assistance section agents and contract personnel coordinate with the host country to spray drug crops with defoliants, while U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) personnel seek to construct crop substitution and economic development programs. Military training teams working in a supporting role under the Ambassadors' country teams endeavor to improve the viability and professionalism of the



host country military structure while contributing to humanitarian assistance and nation building projects.

These illustrations evidence the need for the close coordination and cooperation of these teams. In the overseas arena, the tactical activities are coordinated by the U.S. Ambassador through his country team process and by the Unified Commander (CINC) through joint planning procedures. When compared with their stateside counterparts, both the Ambassador and the CINC have considerably more authority to effect tactical cross-department coordination within their domains.

If we are going to be successful in projecting the national drug control strategy overseas, it will be with the cooperation of the international community. The Ambassador's country team and his country plans will remain the most effective means of guiding our counternarcotics efforts within the host nations. Regional approaches will be difficult to implement until multilateral agreements provide the foundation for combined law enforcement and military actions.

With the large number of U.S. agencies engaged in overseas counterdrug activities, the need for a coherent strategy and implementing campaign plans is apparent. The following chapters propose models for planning the counterdrug effort. These are useful for coordinating counterdrug activities at the strategic and operational levels.

## ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. William J. Clinton, *The National Drug Control Strategy: 1997*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996, p. 31.

2. William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997, p. 18.

3. "Declaration of Cartagena," *Congressional Record*, Washington, DC: March 6, 1990, E522. The Declaration covered agreements in principle in these areas: (1) alternative development and crop substitution; (2) interdiction; (3) involvement of the armed forces of the respective countries; (4) information sharing and intelligence cooperation; (5) eradication and discouragement of illicit crops; (6) control of financial assets; (7) forfeiture and sharing of illegal drug proceeds; (8) control of essential chemicals; (9) control of weapons, planes, ships, explosives, and communications equipment; and, (10) legal cooperation.

4. Leif R. Rosenberger, *America's Drug War Debacle*, Brookfield, VT: Avebury Ashgate Publishing Company, 1996, p. 55.

5. Clinton, *The National Drug Control Strategy: 1996*, p. 21.

6. William J. Clinton, Letter, SUBJECT, Organization of the National Security Council, Washington, DC: The White House, January 20, 1993, p. 1.

7. 50 USC 402.

8. Figure 20 was developed by Professor Robert D. Walz, Department of Joint and Combined Operations, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

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19. Operation GHOST ZONE, the model for later operations, was developed by then U.S. Army Major Chick Garland, working on a planning assistance team with the DEA.

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# CHAPTER 4

## A STRATEGY PROCESS

### THE STRATEGY REQUIREMENT

The dimensions of our counterdrug effort, reaching throughout the United States and overseas, and involving a seeming infinite number of drug law enforcement agencies, make evident the need for strategies and plans. The diversity of counterdrug activities makes the case. On any given day, DoD is conducting detection and monitoring, Transportation Department (Coast Guard, USIC) is conducting maritime interception, Treasury Department (U.S. Customs) is conducting aerial interception, Justice Department (DEA) is leading the attack on drug kingpins, U.S. AID is administering sustainable development, and the State Department (NAS) is conducting aerial spraying of herbicides in a country overseas. It is easy to see that strategies and plans are critical for getting things organized and integrating such a wide range of activities.

The National Drug Control Strategy establishes policy and a general sense of direction for the counterdrug effort. The National Drug Control Program agencies need supporting strategies too, in order to effectively direct a myriad of subordinate actions.

The concern for “greater efficiency and effectiveness and less unnecessary cost” was expressed by President Clinton as he signed The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993. In the President’s words, the Act “requires the formulation of strategic plans, of setting yearly goals and . . . measuring and reporting how well programs actually perform.”<sup>1</sup> The intent of Congress is to improve program efficiency and effectiveness through performance budgeting at Washington’s top levels of government, but the basic ideas of GPRA (strategic objectives and concepts, relationship of goals to performance) also apply in the field to our leading counterdrug organizations.<sup>2</sup>

Strategic plans are needed to establish objectives, tell subordinates how the outfit will accomplish the objectives, and what resources are in place to get things done. Then, at the end of the planning period, an evaluation of performance can offer feedback on what works well, and what needs improving.

Strategic plans are important for telling strategists in other organizations what you are doing for the long haul. Thus, they can accommodate to your concepts in their strategies and can know how to support you. And, the long-range nature of a strategy makes it important as a compelling rationale for future funding requirements.

While there is a clear need for a strategy, it is not clearly agreed what strategy is or what a strategy document should look like when it is written down for others to see. A good counterdrug strategy should coordinate the instruments of counterdrug power to achieve

objectives that will contribute to national security and a vision for “success” in the counterdrug effort.

These instruments of counterdrug power are the organizations and skilled personnel competent at anti-drug education, drug abuse rehabilitation, technology, criminal justice (investigation and prosecution), finance and accounting, interdiction, detection and monitoring, and intelligence. The strategist also makes use of traditional elements of power whenever they are appropriate and available: the diplomatic, economic, military, and informational elements that are often accessible for overseas initiatives.

All this must be put into a strategy document, but how does one go about writing the strategy? Following is one approach to consider. While this is not a performance budgeting process, it is consistent with, and fits into, the GPRA framework used at the top levels of the government.

## DEVELOPING THE STRATEGY

One distinguished strategist summed up the definition of strategy this way: Strategy equals Ends (objectives towards which one strives) plus Ways (courses of action) plus Means (instruments by which some end can be achieved).<sup>3</sup> Constructs involving anything less are simply wishful thinking. This formula enjoins the strategic planner to fully account for *What* is to be done, *How* he plans to do it, and what *Resources* will it take to get the job done. The message is clear; any viable strategy requires the planner to examine his operating environment (assessment), then identify:

- Measurable Objectives
- Concepts for Operations
- Resources

The extent of imbalance among these three elements of strategy will suggest the degree of risk inherent in the strategy. A partial strategy written without regard to resources is at grave risk. Here, the authors take a direct approach to conceptualizing strategy: first look at the strategic environment, then establish strategic objectives, and concepts for accomplishing them. Determine what resources will be needed to make the strategy effective. Finally, consider a plan or method of evaluating how well the strategy is working—so that it can be adjusted.

*First, Examine the Environment.* National interests drive U.S. Government behavior in a region of the world, in the local community, or in a functional policy area such as countering illicit drugs. A statement of interests should be expressed as a desired end state or condition. Counterdrug examples at the national level might be stated this way:

The United States has an interest in:

- Safe communities free from drug crime and terror
- Educated citizens resistant to illicit drugs
- Effective drug treatment programs within the community and the criminal justice system
- Border security that resists penetration by drug smugglers
- Strong allies that can fight illicit drug production and trafficking in overseas areas.

Once interests are identified, the planner can identify political, economic, geographical, social, and law enforcement factors, trends, and events that affect these kinds of interests. In other words, what is going on within your domain that has an effect on your counterdrug interests. When completed, this examination of the strategic environment becomes the “threat assessment” that establishes a baseline of criminal activity from which you can later measure the success of your strategy. A threat assessment is likely to be a large, stand alone document. Thus, a good approach is to use a synopsis of the threat assessment in your strategy document (examine the environment), and place the full assessment in an annex to your strategy.

There are likely to be specific factors of criminality that adversely impact your interests. Consideration of these will help you to decide what should be done.

*Second, Establish Strategic (Measurable) Objectives.* In each case where our counterdrug interests are threatened by drug criminals or found to be at risk in some other way, strategic objectives should be identified to protect, defend, and enhance the interest(s). In this way, the planner identifies what needs to be accomplished with our counterdrug resources to protect our interests. Such objectives are best stated with action verbs and should include some way to measure progress toward achieving the objective. Objectives supporting our interests in “safe communities free from drug crime” could be stated this way (using a High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area for this example):

The HIDTA will:

- Dismantle the money laundering operations of the two major drug trafficking organizations now operating in Western Texas not later than January 1, 1998.
- Defeat maritime parasitic smuggling operations of the Pena Gang in San Diego County by the end of FY 97.
- Identify causal factors of drug trafficking and abuse and incorporate these factors into the FY 98 HIDTA strategy objectives and concepts.

When an objective cannot be written in terms that can be evaluated easily or measured in some way to determine later success, consider developing one or more supporting performance objectives. Because of the multiagency environment in which we plan and operate, strategic objectives may not be exclusively law enforcement. Law enforcement activities may be supporting, parallel, or complementary resources for a wider strategic objective developed by another agency of government.

*Third, Formulate Concepts for Programs or Counterdrug Operations.* Concepts are courses of action that tell how our power resources will be used to achieve strategic objectives. The concept should be explicit enough so that organization members and supporting agencies can clearly see *how* things are going to be done, so that it can serve as a basis for their planning and programming. Collectively, concepts should address all strategic objectives identified in the assessment process. One concept (related here to *interest* and *objective*) could be stated this way:

*Interest:* Safe communities free from drug crime and terror.

*Objective:* Dismantle the money laundering cells of the two major drug trafficking organizations in Imperial County by January 1, 1998, to include bankers, financiers, investment counselors, attorneys, accountants, realtors, couriers, and those involved with the financial management of the drug cartels.

*Concept:* An interagency cooperative program headed by the San Diego Financial Task Force (SDFTF) will incorporate seven critical activities: intelligence gathering and analysis; detection and analysis of currency transactions; financial audits and accounting; undercover techniques; electronic surveillance; asset forfeiture and seizure; and use of designated investigator-prosecutor teams to focus effort.

As planners develop a strategy, it is likely that there will be a number of objectives and concepts identified to support or protect each interest, and there may be a degree of overlap among them. The final step is identifying necessary resources to support the objectives (what) and concepts (how).

*Fourth, Determine Required Resources.* Here the strategist needs to determine what it will take in terms of law enforcement organizations, training, practice exercises, logistics (materiel, services and maintenance), military support, and so on. The need for resources must be considered in light of each concept. Resources should be defined clearly enough to tell planners and participating agencies what will be needed to do the job (organizations, man-days, hardware, dollar costs, and so on).

Formulating a strategy requires that the planner think broadly about the resources needed. Statements of required resources should be simple and direct and not drift into a count of night sticks and batteries. Resources are stated in terms of major items of equipment, training programs and major funding requirements, and so on. Here are some notional examples:

### *Resources:*

- To support on-going investigation and prosecution during FY 97, \$410K will be required for operations and maintenance funding for five Regional Border Alliance Group collocated task forces: San Diego Integrated Narcotic Task Force; Imperial County Multiagency Narcotic Task Force; Operation Alliance; San Diego International Airport/Harbor Narcotic Task Force; and the San Diego Financial Task Force.
- To support analysis of currency transactions, \$80K operating funds will be required to sustain Operation BORDER EXCHANGE IV during FY 97.
- Computer equipment is required to access the Western States Information Network and other RISS Projects, EPIC, NADDIS, U.S. Army Forces Command Intelligence Center, and the state data bases; start-up costs (hardware, software, installation) is \$12K for FY 97, with \$4K required for each of the three following FYs.
- To support Border Patrol interdiction efforts in Roosevelt National Forest, one Army reconnaissance and observation team and one Spanish translator will be required for each of six 2-week operations during FY 97.

The *resources* section of the strategy provides a strong rationale for budget decisions and the apportionment of resources by your higher headquarters.

The resources section should include input from all available sources. For example, beyond considering funding from the National HIDTA Program, a HIDTA could receive resources (money, equipment, people) from federal, state and local agencies, from private agencies, and from asset forfeitures. These should be included in the budget. If such inputs are not firmly assured at the time the strategy is published, then these additional inputs can be identified as budget assumptions—but they should be recognized.

At the conclusion of this chapter, an example strategy of a notional HIDTA is provided. It includes two “displays” which outline the resources needed to support the strategy. In the figures, the resource requirements are carried forward for a 5-year period. This can be useful to establish a foundation for long-term vision and to keep all members of the HIDTA on course.

## EVALUATING THE STRATEGY.

Prior to the annual update of the strategy, conduct an evaluation of successes and failures. Review the success of the strategy; evaluate how well it did; describe and explain why parts of the strategy may not have achieved success. Describe how well the strategy fits with the strategies and operations of higher headquarters and other parallel agencies. Describe how any strategic objectives, concepts or resources need to be changed to better meet the strategy’s



vision, and indicate how the higher headquarters can help. Apply the lessons learned to the revised strategy.

In sum, the process suggested above requires that interests in the national counterdrug effort which are at risk need measurable objectives to protect, defend, and enhance these interests; objectives will require strategic concepts (courses of action) to indicate how to do the job; and strategic concepts will need adequate resources to get the job done. The construct reflects the imperative that a strategy requires full consideration of ends, ways, and means. While this formula may seem a bit involved, the hardest task is to write the initial strategy. In subsequent years, updating the strategy will be easier.

Americans have a great deal of experience with strategic planning, in corporate America, scientific enterprises, and in governmental operations. The DLEAs can take advantage of the strategy process for large-scale, multiagency counterdrug endeavors to promulgate a vision and strategic direction. And while there has often been little specific guidance available about the process for writing a strategy, the formula suggested here (strategy = ends + ways + means), is a common-sense framework that can help.

Appendix A provides an example of a strategy that will be useful to planners tasked with producing a DLEA strategy document. The Annex below provides an abbreviated format. The format lends itself to modification to meet administrative and organizational requirements. The next chapter moves from strategic planning to the idea of campaign planning—a way to place strategic concepts into operation.

## ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. William J. Clinton, Remarks by The President at Bill Signing for The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Washington, DC, August 3, 1993, Internet, [//library.whitehouse.gov/request=all](http://library.whitehouse.gov/request=all).

2. 5 USC Sec. 306.

3. Colonel Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., U.S. Army (Retired), "Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy," *Military Strategy: Theory and Application*, Carlisle, PA, U.S. Army War College, 1993, p. 3.

# ANNEX

## STRATEGY FORMAT

Copy No. \_\_\_\_\_  
Organization's Name  
Location and Date

NAME of STRATEGY

### I. INTRODUCTION.

### II. STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT. (Attach lengthy appraisal, assessment as an appendix or enclosure)

- A. Organizational Interests.
- B. Significant General Factors Affecting Interests.
- C. Law Enforcement and Criminal Factors Affecting Interests.
  - 1. External Factors.
  - 2. Internal Factors.

### III. NATIONAL POLICY AND STRATEGIC GUIDANCE.

- A. Vision, Intent, Missions of higher-level leaders and organizations.
- B. Policy Guidance, Goals, Objectives of higher-level leaders.

### IV. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES. [ENDS]

- A. Director's/SAC's/Leader's Vision.
- B. Strategic Intent.
- C. Mission of the Organization.
- D. Strategic Objectives [what].
  - 1.
  - 2.
  - X. Etc....

## V. STRATEGIC CONCEPTS[how] for Operations and/or Programs. [WAYS]

A.

B.

X. Etc....

## VI. RESOURCES. [MEANS]

A. Requirements (resources for each objective/concept/program).

B. Other Requirements.

1. Operations and Maintenance.

2. Training.

3. Administration.

4. Contingency.

## VII. STRATEGY REVIEW.

(Plan for annual review of the strategy: measuring success, assessing the changing environment, updating the strategy with refined/new objectives and concepts, and deleting objectives/concepts that do not prove effective.)

# CHAPTER 5

## OPERATIONAL PLANNING: FILLING THE GAP BETWEEN STRATEGY AND TACTICS

The first *National Drug Control Strategy* suggested that "... a truly integrated, effective and efficient national strategy requires that various law enforcement authorities coordinate their efforts when drugs are involved." <sup>1</sup> This chapter offers the thesis that the ideas of military strategy and campaign planning can make a significant contribution toward unified counterdrug action. The issue is not limiting the authorities and jurisdictions of the many drug law enforcement agencies; rather, it is synchronizing the inherently interdisciplinary counternarcotics effort among well-established, if overlapping, domains.

In the last chapter, the idea of strategic planning was introduced. Here, some techniques of military planning are suggested as a way to place counterdrug strategy into action. The chapter describes a campaign planning process and suggests that the process can be applied to counterdrug planning. Finally, the chapter posits several tenets of campaign planning for guiding counterdrug operations.

### OPERATIONAL ART

In military parlance, operational art is the employment of forces to attain strategic or operational objectives through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and their major operations. Operational art translates strategy into operational and, ultimately, tactical action. No specific level of command is solely concerned with operational art. Operational art is the skill that causes strategic intent to influence operational design and tactical action. Operational art facilitates the top-down relationships among national military strategy, theater strategy, theater campaigns (strategic level), subordinate campaigns (operational level), and tactical battles. In turn, campaigns are "a series of related military operations aimed to accomplish a strategic or operational objective within a given space and time."<sup>2</sup>

### Campaigns.

Campaigns are the way a commander employs and sustains his forces in a phased series of unified or joint actions to achieve strategic objectives. The synergistic effect of these phased operations creates an advantage, or leverage, which makes the opponent's position untenable. An important characteristic of the campaign is the authority given its commander to synchronize air, land, and sea efforts to attain his objective.<sup>3</sup>

Campaigns can be conducted at the strategic and operational levels. At the strategic level, campaigns achieve theater of war strategic objectives by the conduct of a series of related unified operations. When there are several lines of action within a theater of war, the commander-in-chief (CINC) may establish subordinate theaters of operation. Each theater of operation commander could conduct subordinate (operational level) campaigns to achieve both the CINC's strategic objectives as well as supporting operational objectives by the conduct of a series of related joint and service operations.

## Campaign Plans.

A theater campaign plan translates strategic intent into operational focus for subordinates. It provides the theater commander's intent—what he plans to do with his resources to achieve strategic objectives. This includes a description of the condition or desired end-state he wants to achieve. The campaign plan provides broad concepts for phased operations and sustainment. The plan defines the initial phases(s) of the campaign clearly and establishes what spells success at the end of the campaign; however, to the extent that the commander comprehends the potential for war's "fog and friction" which may affect planning and operations, the mid-phases of the campaign may show less definition. Campaign plans, therefore, are supplemented with contingency plans to provide flexibility in dealing with changing situations.

## Center of Gravity.

Both strategic and operational level campaign plans orient on the enemy's center of gravity (in order to put him at a disadvantage, rob him of the initiative or will to continue, and defeat him). The center of gravity has been described by Clausewitz as the "hub of . . . power and movement, on which everything depends."<sup>4</sup> The Joint Chiefs of Staff *Basic National Defense Doctrine* (Final Draft) describes center of gravity in these terms:

The characteristic, capability, or locality from which an opposing nation or alliance derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight is called the enemy strategic center of gravity. If it can be reduced to a singular capability, that . . . should be the . . . objective. If complete destruction or neutralization of the center of gravity is not feasible, major inroads against several components thereof may provide . . . [success].<sup>5</sup>

The center of gravity is not a vulnerability or a weakness. Rather, it is easiest to discern in terms of that main concentration of an opponent's power which can interpose itself between us and our strategic objective, thus causing our campaign to fail. Other components that are considered during the process of identifying the center of gravity have been described as decisive points, critical nodes, intermediate objectives and the like.

In a counterdrug campaign, examples of an enemy's center of gravity could include key individuals (first and second echelon leaders); key nodes in the distribution system; major transportation assets, communications capabilities; or, perhaps most important, the

financial war chest, i.e, major money caches necessary to sustain operations. In identifying the enemy's center of gravity, one might ask what could win for the enemy or what is vital to the enemy to accomplish his strategic aim.<sup>6</sup>

## Unity of Effort.

Most important is that the campaign plan synchronizes the varied and diverse actions of subordinate commands to achieve a synergistic effect in attacking the center of gravity and its components. Such synchronization enjoins unity of effort, the prerequisite for success.

Unity of effort is created by establishing command relationships among the commander, his subordinates, and those other commands and agencies charged to support him. This authority, written into the plan, is based on law, treaties, regulations, and standing procedures.

Of course, the campaign plan can exact unity of effort by way of its commander's precise mission statement, his statement of intent (what he intends to accomplish), and his phased concept for operations throughout the campaign. The plan organizes the terrain and key functions to delineate responsibility, and it composes forces into unified and joint forces for the operations of each phase of the campaign. The campaign plan provides a theater logistics concept for sustaining the command throughout the campaign. This includes logistics goals and priorities for each phase of the campaign. It describes, by phase, direction for procuring resources, establishing logistics bases for operations, and opening and maintaining lines of communication (supply) to the fighting forces. The campaign plan, therefore, provides a logical and powerful rationale to justify the funding programs requisite for success.

## CAMPAIGN PLANNING PROCESS.

Having discussed the campaign plan's contents and its relationship to strategy, it is now useful to address the process—how to do it. Here, a conceptual procedure for writing the plan is suggested. Reduced to its essentials, operational art requires the leader to answer these questions: what condition must be produced to achieve the strategic objective; what sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition; and how should resources be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? The process for campaign planning describes the leader's vision for fighting and articulates his intent.

This process is a cognitive and conceptual exercise of conducting an assessment (estimate of the situation); developing campaign design through assigned missions, concepts of operation and logistics; establishing theater organization and command relationships; writing these into a plan; and leading its execution.

## Assessment.

In the assessment a myriad of variables must be considered. Intelligence resources are an essential aid in the assessment for both historical and predictive information of enemy capabilities and intent. Yet other information is also critical in assessing the strategic situation: political-diplomatic considerations, personalities of key leaders, the cultural and religious environment, geography and climate, and so on.

Staff techniques used by the military services can facilitate this assessment process. Joint planners look at command, control, and communications countermeasures to thwart the enemy's capability to perform his mission. For example, Air Force planners (targeteers) look for "critical nodes" in enemy command and control systems in order to disadvantage the enemy at points where he is vulnerable.

The Army's intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is a process uniquely suited to effect predictive intelligence fusion. The IPB process integrates known enemy procedures and activities with environmental factors and relates these to the mission at hand. IPB "provides a basis for determining and evaluating enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action. These staff processes are helpful in assessing the situation at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The excellent staff analysis at JTF-6 (see Chapter 2) has demonstrated the usefulness of IPB for supporting law enforcement counterdrug activities.

## Design.

Campaign design addresses the concepts of center of gravity (discussed above), lines of operation, culminating points, and offense and defense. The line of operation connects the force with its base of operations at the rear (where it gets its reinforcements and supplies) and its objective at the front (where it operates against the enemy). This is important for developing a zone of supply, communication, transportation, and the like. Another concept for campaign design is the notion of culminating point—the point in time and space at which the offensive becomes overextended and offensive combat power no longer sufficiently exceeds that of the defender to allow continuation of the offense.

This is a useful concept as it reminds the leader to generate sufficient resources to enable him to achieve the strategic objective before reaching the culminating point—running out of steam! Conversely, when on the defensive, the leader draws his enemy to culmination, then strikes him when he has exhausted his resources. This goes hand-in-hand with the essential decision of offense or defense, and various combinations of these at both strategic and operational levels.

Other classic elements of design are self-explained but deserve mention. Also considered are objectives, sequence of operations (deployment, phased employment, sustainment), intelligence architecture, maneuver, firepower, and deception. So, many factors are

considered in designing the traditional military campaign, and some of these can be helpful to the interagency planner as well.

## Organization and Command Relationships.

While considering the conceptual constructs described above, the campaign planner decides how to get organized. Both area and functional organization are considered. Often a combination of area commands (theaters, regions, sectors, zones) and functional commands (air support, transportation, intelligence) is decided. As the organization is determined, the command relationship among units and their commanders must be described based upon the authority given the commander by law, regulation, or directive. Command relationships answer the question, "Who's in charge?" Also described are subordinate and supporting relationships. When authority for establishing firm relationships is not granted the leader, his campaign is placed at risk in execution by the competing demands within participating organizations.

In any event, command relationships should be described in specific terms: command, operational control, tactical control, attachment, coordinating authority, or support. Each of these must be defined in the plan so that all participants understand their meaning.

## Writing the Plan.

With all this conceptualizing, it eventually becomes necessary to write the commander's vision into a coherent command and control instrument—the campaign plan. The best format is the simple military order: friendly and enemy situation (assessment); mission; execution (phased concept of operations); logistics (sustainment); and command and communications. (See Figure 25.) The Annex, Campaign Plan Format, suggests a detailed format for a campaign plan that can be helpful to DLEAs.

## Leadership.

Finally, as the campaign plan is published, the leader must supervise its execution by his technical competence, his timely commitment and positioning of resources, and his presence.

## CAMPAIGN PLANS: HOW DO THEY APPLY TO THE DRUG CONTROL EFFORT?

The campaign planning process can be helpful in tying together the broad strategic objectives and concepts of the national drug control strategy, other strategies and policy, and the tactical efforts of federal, state, and local drug law enforcement agencies. The campaign






Figure 25. Example Plan Format.

plan is an effective command and control instrument that fills the gap between strategy and tactics.

## The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas—An Example.

The HIDTAs could design campaign plans to accomplish the strategic objectives of their strategies. While strategies are generalized and long term, the campaign plan accomplishes a particular strategic objective of the strategy in the near term—perhaps a year or so. This could synchronize the efforts of diverse DLEAs and task forces in the HIDTA area, such as DEA, state, and local task forces, organized crime drug enforcement task forces, and police and sheriffs' departments in a phased manner to achieve the objectives of strategy. This kind of a plan would logically justify the apportionment of HIDTA money to the DLEAs in accordance with the phases of a campaign.

A coherent campaign plan at the HIDTA (or Operation Alliance, Operation NORTH STAR) level would be especially helpful to those who provide support to the DLEAs. The Counterdrug Support Office (CDSO), Joint Task Force Six, State Adjutants General (National Guard), National Guard Bureau, and the Joint Staff all would provide improved support if they could develop supporting plans in line with an overall campaign plan. Such a campaign plan would go a long way to answering the lament, "Who's in charge here?"

The DLEA task forces that exist throughout the nation, and other mid-level DLEAs, could also make use of the campaign planning technique. Especially in task forces with many players and large operating areas, the campaign plan can help to create a unity of effort.

## Tenets of Campaign Planning.

The following tenets of campaign planning can guide the supply side counterdrug planning process. These tenets describe what a campaign plan is and does:

- Orients on the center of gravity of the threat;
- Provides concepts for operations and sustainment to achieve strategic objectives;
- Displays the commander's vision and intent;
- Provides the basis for subordinate planning and clearly defines what constitutes success;
- Phases a series of major operations and their tactical actions;
- Provides operational direction and tasks to subordinates; and,
- Composes subordinate forces and designates command relationships.<sup>7</sup>

## CONCLUSION

In the final analysis, the campaign planning process described in this chapter is not important for the written plan—a document to be placed on the shelf. Rather, it is the process itself that is significant—the process of the leader's vision and guidance, the planning conferences, the liaison visits, the building of consensus toward specific goals, and the continuous talking together at all levels. The campaign planning process provides a structure and sense of direction which can encourage a community of cooperation, even where formal authority and command relationships are inadequate.

The following chapter withdraws from this theoretical construct to describe current strategic planning and suggests a model for campaign planning at the operational level.

## ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. George Bush, *National Drug Control Strategy*, Washington: The White House, September 5, 1989, p. 28.

2. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Washington, DC, February 1, 1995, p. GL-3.

3. William W. Mendel and Floyd T. Banks, *Campaign Planning*, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1988, pp. 98-99.

4. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 595-596.

5. The draft of *Joint Publication 0-1, Basic National Defense Doctrine* was not in final "approved" form for publication and distribution as of this writing (January 1997).

6. Larry Izzo, "The Center of Gravity is Not an Achilles Heel," *Military Review*, January 1988, pp. 72-77. This brief article provides an excellent description of center of gravity.

7. Mendel and Banks, p. 100; see also *Joint Pub 3-0*, p. III-8.

# CHAPTER 6

## PLANNING THE COUNTERDRUG EFFORT

The previous chapter offered a campaign planning process and tenets which can be followed in developing a military campaign. Several examples of the strategy and campaigning process employed today, as well as some ideas for using the campaign planning model at the operational level, follow. First, we will look at national level strategic direction practiced within the Department of Defense and the Drug Enforcement Administration within the Justice Department. Then, we will review regional strategies and campaign plans. The chapter concludes with a notional campaign plan format (see Annex) adapted for use at the strategic and operational levels of the drug war. A fictional example of how this format can be applied is also provided in Appendix B.

### STRATEGIC DIRECTION—THE NATIONAL LEVEL

In developing strategy and campaign plans, the first step is conducting an assessment of the strategic environment or situation. While many variables (discussed in Chapter 4) are considered, the most compelling task is assembling the strategic guidance, missions, and tasks promulgated by higher authorities. This is a difficult chore because the reality of high level, interagency bureaucracy finds that our key civilian and military leaders often work for several bosses. So strategic guidance can come from many directions. After getting the lay of the land, the leader can begin to provide his own strategic guidance to subordinates. The military describes this process as estimating the situation and providing initial and subsequent commander's planning guidance.

#### Department of Defense.

One historical example of the product of this process is seen in the Department of Defense "Guidance for Implementation of the President's National Drug Control Strategy" (Appendix C).<sup>1</sup> This document is historically significant because it was instrumental in getting the military fully involved in supporting the DLEAs. It drew upon Presidential and congressional guidance to frame its strategic concepts, briefly assessed the drug threat, and identified tasks required by the President and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.

The broad concept of supply interdiction that it outlined was repeated from the President's drug control strategy: attack the flow of drugs to the United States in source countries, in transit, and within the United States. It was a broad policy statement that underscored the Secretary's intent to use DOD assets to support the national drug control strategy.

As a supplement to the DOD guidance document, the Secretary provided a memorandum of instruction to his staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It directed the department to “undertake immediately the initial actions set forth . . .” in the memorandum—such as training assistance, establishing regional logistical support offices providing equipment to DLEAs, and expanding the National Guard effort.<sup>2</sup> At high levels of authority, a memorandum is a likely policy document for providing direction.

In this manner, several unified and specified commanders received memorandums of instruction which told the combatant commanders what to do and synchronized their actions in accordance with the DOD Guidance. For example, Atlantic Command was tasked to deploy a Caribbean counterdrug task force (which became JTF-5, later JIATF-East); Pacific and Southern Commands were to combat drug production and trafficking in coordination with host countries; and North American Aerospace Defense Command was to complement and support the DLEAs through detection and countering illegal drug trafficking.

In subsequent years, this initial guidance has been supplemented by Presidential Decision Directives, policy guidance from the DoD Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support, and strategic guidance emanating from the Joint Staff. These are examples of sources for strategic guidance that helps the planner get started on developing a strategy or a campaign plan. Other departments of government have similar documents, but DEA made a strong effort in the early 1990s to make strategic guidance readily available to its agents in the field.

## Department of Justice and Its Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).

Through the summer of 1990 the DEA developed a draft DEA Strategic Management System (SMS). It was produced in the Office of the Assistant Administrator for Investigations and Planning with assistance from military planners. DEA's SMS set forth the objectives and priorities for dealing with its environment in three levels of documents: at the macro level was the drug strategy; supplementing the strategy were program directives and regional and field plans.<sup>3</sup> The full system is organized this way:

- Strategic Management System—Administrator's overarching strategy
- Domestic field management plans—annually by each domestic office
- Foreign Regional Operation Plans—for drug source and transit regions:
  - South America regional operation plan
  - Central America and Mexico regional operation plan
  - Caribbean regional operation plan

— Far East regional operation plan

- Southwest Border regional operation plan (with FBI and other agencies).

Budget cut-backs in the mid-1990s gave the SMS a temporary set-back. As one DEA strategist indicated, there was a problem with strategic goals that were not linked to the declining budget. By placing budgeteers and strategists in the same office, DEA has been able to keep strategic objectives and concepts in line with finite resources. The SMS continues as an important guiding document.

Currently the DEA strategy provides an assessment of the environment and provides the administrator's strategic vision (what he will accomplish) and mission. Subordinate functional plans concern such things as training, intelligence, investigations, and management. Several "sub-strategies" orient on categories of drugs: cocaine, marijuana, heroin, diverted legal drugs, and chemically produced drugs.

Field management plans are required of special agents in charge at various domestic field divisions and offices. In turn, the special agent-in-charge (SAC) provides DEA headquarters his "SAC Outlook" in a format designed under the SMS. To support the SACs plans, the DEA Operations and Management Office prepares a "Tasking Book" for each functional or critical area to coordinate Administration support of the SACs in the field.<sup>4</sup>

The DEA SMS represents an important example of departmental strategy and planning. It is designed to coordinate the planning and operations of the administration headquarters with 20 field divisions within the United States, and offices in 44 foreign countries. How good it is and how much it plays a central role in leading the counter drug war depends upon the interest and involvement of key leaders in the strategy's development and execution. It is a practical and logical planning system designed to synchronize effort at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The SMS applies within DEA and carries no authority across departmental lines; however, by establishing vision and direction, it would assist supporting agencies to efficiently focus their help in useful areas if it were disseminated widely.

## STRATEGIC DIRECTION AND CAMPAIGN PLANNING— THE REGIONAL LEVEL

The pattern for direction at regional levels includes broad strategies and specific action plans. In the U.S. joint military arena, unified commanders (such as U.S. CINCSOUTH) write theater strategies and augment these with campaign plans. The same approach, if less structured, can be found in civilian agencies. The military and civilian regional planning efforts described below represent current efforts to bridge the operational gap in the drug war with strategic and operational direction.

## U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)–Strategy and Campaign Plans.

Southern theater strategy and operations are focused on nontraditional threats. SOUTHCOM mission areas include: regional cooperative security measures; encouraging Latin American militaries to consider security roles appropriate to national requirements, civilian control, human rights, and the rule of law; developing SOUTHCOM plans and resources to remain actively engaged with regional nations and their military establishments; and supporting the national drug control strategy and U.S. drug law enforcement agencies to reduce illicit drug production and trafficking.

Rather than attempting a Southern Region counterdrug strategy that would tie-together all U.S. counterdrug activities in Latin America, the Southern Command supports the Ambassadors' counterdrug initiatives and the actions of U.S. and host nation law enforcement agencies in the region. The supporting "counterdrug campaign" is conducted by Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South).

JIATF-South (mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3) provides the strategic and operational direction for Southern Command counterdrug activities. As the leading U.S. military organization, it provides the operation orders that direct military counterdrug support. Typically, these tasks include assisting host nations to destroy drug trafficking organizations and drug crops, leveling drug production facilities, and tracking and seizing drugs scheduled to be shipped to the United States. (SOUTHCOM is revising its strategy and plans in light of its forthcoming move from Panama to Miami, Florida in the 1997-2000 time-frame.)

## OPERATION ALLIANCE–A COALITION STRATEGY.

In 1990, the Director of Operation Alliance (who was also the SW Border HIDTA Coordinator at that time) produced a drug control strategy for his region. Although Operation Alliance lacks the authority to compel the cooperation of DLEAs in the drug interdiction effort, the strategy has served as a means of consensus building. Using the guidance of the national drug control strategy, authors nominated by the Operation Alliance Joint Command Group wrote the initial draft during a strategy authors' convention. Some 21 Southwest Border agencies provided authors to build the strategy.<sup>5</sup> The result is a generalized document which announces a consensus on the strategic situation (threat), strategic objectives, and support requirements and resources needed for drug interdiction in the Southwest Border area.

The Operation Alliance strategy provides the agreed framework for drug law enforcement actions in the Southwest Border area, yet by definition, strategies lack the specific coordinating guidance by which subordinates must operate. For this, campaign plans are used. Indeed, the essence of operational art is achieving the objectives of strategy through campaigns.

The reason for campaign plans, after all, is that we seldom have the resources at hand to achieve strategic objectives at once. The strategic situation is complex, the enemy difficult and our resources limited. We, therefore, visualize a desired end-state or condition and phase the application of resources over time toward its achievement. The phases of a campaign represent a series of major operations, or events, along the path toward success. Given such a phased plan, subordinates can plan their major operations in coordination with each other, and supporting agencies can estimate when, where, and why their support will be needed. For these reasons, Operation Alliance has recommended that law enforcement agencies jointly develop a campaign plan, with the participation of JTF-6 Staff, to address operations in the SW Border area.

An Operation Alliance campaign plan would be a useful planning vehicle for coordinating DLEA activity over a period of time. The Operation Alliance campaign plan would enable JTF-6 to program military resources over time to support DLEA operations. Such a phased plan would assist the DEA SAC, the Customs SACs and CMCs, and the Chief, Border Patrol, in programming their resources to support the phases of the Alliance campaign as requested by the DEA, Border Patrol, and Customs tactical coordinators.

Finally, by establishing a plan for action within the limits of its own domain, an organization can generate the dynamic effect of pulling along the participation of other agencies because the plan is cogent and compelling in its support of the President's national drug strategy. This effect can be seen in USCINCSOUTH's strategy and campaign plans discussed above. Lacking the authority over U.S. Ambassadors and various stovepipe activities throughout Latin America, the USCINCSOUTH regional strategy and campaign plans have encouraged coordinated counterdrug and counterinsurgency effort because they set logical objectives, and provide concepts and resources. It is no surprise that USCINCSOUTH's coordinating efforts have been most successful in areas where he has had the resources to commit. Money talks, and it is the glue which binds together disparate agencies with common goals. Campaign plans, if well-conceived and properly presented, provide sound bases for congressional budgetary support of counterdrug efforts.

## CAMPAIGN PLANNING-BRIDGING THE OPERATIONAL GAP

The idea for a campaign plan to bridge the gap between strategy and tactics has equal application with other mid-level agencies. The campaign planning methodology could also be helpful to coordinate various field divisions within single agencies such as DEA and Customs. For example, in developing the DEA domestic field management plans, the SAC of various field divisions could use the campaign planning process and tenets cited in Chapter 5 to ensure a coordinated effort to attain the goals of the DEA strategy and program directives. The DEA foreign regional operations plans mentioned earlier are considered by DEA planners as campaign plans for specific areas.<sup>6</sup>

In overseas areas, a country team campaign plan can be effective in coordinating the activities of its members in harmony with a logical, phased plan. Members of the Security Assistance organization, who already coordinate their actions under the CINC's campaign



plan, could help the Deputy Chief of Mission in designing the campaign and supervising its execution.

There should be no illusions about the effectiveness of such campaign plans when participating agencies determine not to cooperate. Because operational leaders in the drug war lack command authority, the tenets of campaign planning (described in the previous chapter) will be imperfectly satisfied. Even with this problem, it is better to proceed by a plan of vision than to operate on a near-term basis without a sure sense of strategic destiny. From the review of counterdrug planning in this chapter, it is apparent that the effort and guidance provided has been largely at the strategic level. Strategic objectives and concepts are important but necessarily generalized. At lower echelons, campaign plans are harder to write and specifics are needed. There is no mystique associated with campaign plans—research, planning conferences, coordination, and hard work. The campaign plan is simply another plan with a certain style.

## Predictive Intelligence Support.

Timely and effective intelligence support will be critical for law enforcement agencies in developing their campaign plans. “To be truly dynamic, campaign planning must have a predictive intelligence fusion process.”<sup>7</sup> Military staff officers assigned to DLEAs from the military services bring to drug law enforcement planning such critical capabilities and techniques as the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process. In his article on “Counterdrug IPB,” Christopher M. Schnaubelt describes the process in these terms: defining the environment; describing the effects of the environment upon drug traffickers; evaluating the criminal threat; and determining the criminals’ likely courses of action.<sup>8</sup> As the services lend more of their intelligence support to the counterdrug effort, organizations such as EPIC, the NDIC, and the Customs DAICC could benefit from predictive intelligence techniques such as IPB.

## A FORMAT AND NOTIONAL PLAN

This chapter has described current strategic planning and suggested that law enforcement agencies will find campaign planning useful as they prosecute the drug war. To help the DLEA planner tackle the task of campaign planning, the authors suggest a format (see annex that follows) that has proven useful to military planners; and to give the DLEA planner a sense of the flavor and style of a campaign plan, a notional plan has been written. Appendix B illustrates how this format can be used in counterdrug planning. A countermarijuana campaign for federal lands in northern California, Oregon, and Washington is described.

Clearly format is much less important than content, but the authors suggest that a universally accepted format would be helpful in improving communications among the many organizations involved in counterdrug operations. When organizations opt to use other

established formats, the “campaign planning Tenets” found at the end of Chapter 5 will provide a solid touchstone for effective planning.

The following chapter addresses what is feasible in developing a national counterdrug structure that can plan campaigns and provide the command and control necessary to conduct America’s war on drugs.

## ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6

1. Richard B. Cheney, Secretary, Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Guidance for Implementation of the President’s National Drug Control Strategy,” Washington, DC, September 18, 1989).

2. Richard B. Cheney, Secretary, Department of Defense, Memorandum, “Initial Additional Actions to Implement the National Drug Control Strategy and Related DoD Guidance,” Washington, DC, September 18, 1989).

3. Tom E. Swain, interview by authors at Investigations and Planning Office, Drug Enforcement Administration, Washington, DC, June 21, 1990).

4. Don Sturn, Deputy Chief, Office of Operations Management, DEA , interview by authors, Washington, DC, March 17, 1996).

5. Operation Alliance, *Southwest Border Drug Control Strategy*, El Paso, TX, July 1990, pp. 140-142. Agencies which participated in writing this strategy include Arizona Department of Public Safety; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; Bureau of Land Management; Bureau of Prisons; California Department of Justice Bureau of Narcotics; California National Guard; Drug Enforcement Administration; El Paso intelligence Center; FBI; IRS; JTF-6; Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department; New Mexico Department of Public Safety; New Mexico Region VI Drug Enforcement Coordinating Committee; Pima County Sheriff’s Department, Tucson, AZ; Texas Department of Public Safety; Texas National Guard; U.S. Border Patrol; U.S. Customs Service; U.S. Forest Service; and U.S. Marshals Service. In addition, these organizations provided input: the ONDCP Border Interdiction Committee; Financial Crimes Enforcement Center; International Criminal Police Organization, U.S. National Central Bureau; New Mexico Department of Public Safety, Office of Drug Control; Texas Commission on Alcohol and Drug Abuse; and U.S. Attorney’s Office, Albuquerque, NM.

6. Frank Ylinen, Strategy and Planning Unit, Office of Operations Management, DEA, phone discussion with author (Mendel), Washington, DC, December 19, 1996).

7. Lieutenant General Dennis J. Reimer, U.S. Army, former Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, letter to Major General Paul G. Cerjan, Commandant, U.S. Army War College, Washington, DC, January 1991). (General Reimer subsequently became Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.)

8. Christopher M. Schnaubelt, Chief, Research and Analysis Division, National Interagency Counterdrug Institute, "Intelligence During OOTW: Counterdrug IPB," *Military Intelligence*, January-March 1995, p. 19.

# ANNEX

## CAMPAIGN PLAN FORMAT FOR DLEAs

(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)

Copy No. \_\_\_\_\_  
Issuing Task Force/ Agency  
Place of Issue  
Date/Time Plan Signed

DRUG INTERDICTION campaign plan: (Number or Code Name)

References: Maps, charts, and other relevant documents

1. Situation. Briefly describe the situation that the plan addresses.

a. *Strategic Guidance*. Provide a summary of directives, letters of instructions, memorandums, and strategic plans, including plans from higher authority, that apply to the plan.

(1) Relate the strategic direction to the situation in your domain.

(2) List strategic objectives and tasks assigned.

(3) Constraints: List actions that are prohibited or required by higher authority (rules of engagement, legal, jurisdictional).

b. *Criminal Forces (the drug threat)*. Provide a summary of criminal intelligence:

(1) Composition, location, disposition, movements, and strengths of drug traffickers that can influence your domain.

(2) Strategic concept. Describe criminal intentions.

(3) Major criminal objectives.

(Note: Consider an intelligence annex for adding detailed information.)

(4) Idiosyncrasies and operating patterns of key personalities and organizations.

(5) Operational and logistics capabilities.

(6) Vulnerabilities.

(7) Center of gravity. Describe the main source of the criminal's power.

c. *Friendly Forces*. State here information on friendly Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (DLEAs) or supporting military forces not assigned or attached that may directly affect the organization:

(1) Intent of higher, parallel and supporting agencies, task forces, units.

(2) Intent of higher, parallel and supporting foreign agencies.

d. *Assumptions*. State here assumptions applicable to the plan as a whole. [Remember that assumptions are contingent conditions, the *absence* of which will make you revise your plan.]

2. Mission. State the task(s) of the organization and the purpose(s) and relationship(s) to achieving the strategic objectives(s). State in terms of who, what, where, when and why.

3. Execution.

a. *Overall Concept*. State the broad concept (how) for the deployment, employment, and logistics support of participating DLEAs during the counterdrug campaign overall. In the narrative paragraph, include this information:

(1 ) Area or functional organization (geographic or technical area for each participating DLEA).

(2) Objectives for overall campaign.

(3) Phases of major events or operations of the campaign.

(4) Timing. Indicate the expected time periods of each phase. EXAMPLES: Phase I, D-Day–D+45, or Phase I, March 29–August 1, etc.

b. *Phase I (Timing for Phase).*

(1) Operational Concept. How will participating DLEAs and supporting activities accomplish the objectives of this phase. Include operational objectives, and detailed scheme of operation (actions) for the phase. Indicate lead and supporting DLEAs required to do the job. Consider any roles of supporting Department of Defense forces.

(2) Tasks of DLEAs and other units participating in this phase of the campaign. (List each organization separately and assign it a job for this phase).

(3) Forces Held in Reserve. Location and composition. Explain “be prepared” missions.

(4) Deception and Protection. Consider a concept for deception and for protecting your units/personnel from criminal counteractions. Describe your concept. Who do you wish to trick; what behavior do you want him to effect; what do you wish to protect; what (friendly force) will do the deception effort; what extra resources will be needed? [Use an annex for details if necessary.]

(5) Psychological. Describe any psychological operations that might support your strategic objectives.

c. *Phases II–Through Subsequent Phases.* Cite information as stated in subparagraph 3.b. above for each subsequent phase. Provide a separate phase for each step in the campaign at the end of which a major reorganization of forces may be required and/or another significant action initiated.

d. *Coordinating Instructions.* General instructions applicable to two or more phases or multiple elements of the organization may be placed here.

4. Logistics. Brief, broad paragraph describing how you will provide supply, services, and other administrative support over the course of the campaign. Provide overall goals and priorities for sustaining your organization throughout the operation.

a. *Phase I (Timing–same as in Paragraph 3).* Consider providing the following information as it applies to your plan.

(1) Assumptions.

(2) Logistics goals and priorities for this phase of the campaign.

(3) Supply aspects (include role of each DLEA in providing supplies; consider any participating foreign DLEAs).

(4) Base development (develop a base from which you will provide supply and services if required).

(5) Transportation.

(6) Maintenance of equipment.

(7) Medical services.

(8) Personnel (common procedure for replacements, manning, etc).

(9) Administration (describe any administrative management procedures which impact on the counterdrug campaign).

b. *Phases II through Subsequent Phases.* Cite information stated in subparagraph 4.a. above for each subsequent phase.

## 5. Command and Communications

a. *Command Relationships.* If using lead agency concept, state lead agency by phase. State generally the command/coordination relationships for the entire campaign or phases thereof. Indicate any shifts of command or lead contemplated during the campaign, indicating time of the expected shift. These changes should be consistent with the operational phasing in paragraph 3. Give location of Special Agent-in-Charge or other official in charge and command posts. If the SAC or lead agency official is out of action, state who is the deputy or the next in charge.

b. *Communications.* Plans of communications. [May be contained in an annex.] Include time zone to be used; rendezvous, recognition, and identification instructions, and plans for using

radio, telephone, and computer networks. Consider encryption and special needs for rural and city environments.

(Signed)\_\_\_\_\_

(SAC, or other Official-in-Charge)

ANNEXES: As required

DISTRIBUTION:

(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)



## CHAPTER 7

# PLANNING AND THE INTERAGENCY ARENA: THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE

Earlier chapters described the problems caused by drug trafficking, listed the key organizations involved, and set forth strategy and planning principles that could be followed in guiding most any group. Unfortunately, real world situations seldom permit the formulation of an ideal plan, or the optimum use of all assets, even when unity of authority is present and all subordinates try to be cooperative. Theory often falls victim to reality, impelling compromise—or outright changes to our ways of thinking.

It is reasonable to expect that any counterdrug campaign involving different DLEAs, and supporting military units operating in areas of overlapping jurisdictions, will involve some honest disagreements. But this does not alter the fact that adhering to the basic tenets of strategic and operational planning will enhance the effectiveness of tactical actions directed towards a defined objective. This is true whether the organization is a business, a military command, or a group of DLEAs responsible for areas along the U.S. border.

The challenge is to determine how strategic and operational planning techniques can be made useful to DLEAs and the military units that support them. What organizational structure is possible that can use this kind of planning for integrating multiple agencies in large counterdrug initiatives? This chapter addresses that question.

## THE SEARCH FOR EFFECTIVE COUNTERDRUG ORGANIZATION

The quest for an organizational structure that can efficiently and effectively meet the challenge of drug trafficking is not new. There have been numerous attempts to reorganize Federal drug control programs. Theoretically, what is needed is a single organization, properly manned and funded, that operates under one leader who has directive authority to control all counterdrug programming, planning, and tactical efforts, both domestically and overseas. That will not happen.

The need for a single agency was recognized by the Nixon administration, and attempts in that direction were made during the 1973 Executive Branch reorganizations. The effort failed for bureaucratic and political reasons, but the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was formed and made lead agency for investigating violations of federal narcotics and dangerous drug law. However, other federal agencies, such as the U.S. Customs Service and the U.S. Coast Guard, retained primary law enforcement roles in preventing the entry of illicit drugs into the United States.

Today some 50 federal agencies (to include such seemingly unrelated agencies as the Bureau of Land Management; the Internal Revenue Service; Bureau of Indian Affairs; and the Federal Aviation Administration have responsibilities as national drug control program agencies in combating the flow of drugs. Then, too, the states and most large cities have their own counterdrug bureaus and teams.

No one person or agency (excluding, perhaps, the President) coordinates or integrates the operational planning or tactical actions of the many agencies. The ONDCP is not given this authority, nor is it structured accordingly. The ONDCP is a policy developing organization, concerned with national drug strategy, and serves as a coordinating mechanism at the national level for implementing Presidential policy. In interagency operations at the operational (campaign) planning level and at the tactical level, no one agency is "in total command" nor in our system is it likely that any one agency ever will. This does not mean that efficient operational and tactical activities cannot be accomplished. It means only that they must be done through efforts in a multiagency coalition. The "headquarters" or designated leading agency must be supported by diverse groups with common interests, much in the way our nation has used alliances or coalitions in international initiatives—particularly when facing grave threats to our interests.

## PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE COUNTERDRUG EFFORT

Many common considerations exist between the planning efforts for a military operation and interagency efforts in an international and domestic war on drugs. Defining the strategic objectives, understanding enemy (drug trafficker) intentions and capabilities, specifying areas of operations, setting priorities of effort, establishing organizations with workable command and control structures, sequencing operations, following span of control principles, and making sound resource allocation should be similar in either military or drug law enforcement strategic and operational planning.

As an example, when fighting a war that is spread over vast areas, the strategist determines what functional and geographic subdivisions should be made in order to organize and effectively combat the enemy. He considers all the factors mentioned above plus time-distance factors, international law, sovereignty issues, the interests and objectives of his allies, domestic political considerations, and budget constraints. In large conflicts, geographic subdivisions are often called theaters of war (strategic level) and theaters of operation (operational level). A theater commander is appointed who devises a theater strategy which complements national military strategy and, within his resource allocation, he begins formulating operational-level campaign plan(s) to attain the strategic objectives. His plans consider not only the organizations and assets under his control but also those friendly forces that may become available.

In coalition efforts, the leader also becomes a diplomat in order to achieve harmony and unity of effort among the allies involved. He must consider the agendas and objectives of all forces under his authority if he is to be successful in obtaining maximum effort against the enemy. Compromise is both necessary and productive in coalition warfare.

Many of these principles also apply to drug war planning where multiagency coalitions must be formed to integrate activities. The drug threat is immense by any measure. Coherent long-term planning within a unified framework is needed for successful multiagency efforts on a scale adequate to counter the threat.

## A UNIFIED ACTION PLAN FOR SUPPLY REDUCTION OPERATIONS

A look at the strategic environment from a geographic and functional perspective might lead to greater efficiency in countering the drug problem. Although the authors do not pretend an *optimum solution*, the organizational concept described in the next several paragraphs provide an example of what could be a sound organizational structure to facilitate unified actions and one that may be politically feasible.

### Multiagency Actions within the United States.


The continental United States can be viewed as a National Interagency Area (NIA) that encompasses functional and regional counterdrug activities. The Director, ONDCP, could serve as NIA Director, or he could nominate a Chief of the NIA to the President for approval. In any event, the Chief of the NIA would provide strategic guidelines for subordinate areas in order to achieve a unity of effort. The term interagency operating area (IOA) may be a good descriptor of these subordinate areas since interagency DLEA effort is required. See Figure 26.

Within the continental United States, certain operating areas lend themselves to geographic breakout for supply reduction operations. The Southwest Border area; the Central region; the Southeastern region; and the U.S.-Canada border states are appropriate IOAs that merit an operational level headquarters for counterdrug planning.

Some IOAs can be functional, rather than geographic. These "areas" might include the function of detection and monitoring or the function of financial crimes enforcement. The U.S. Interdiction Coordinator (USIC) (discussed in previous chapters) is one prototype example of this approach to strategic direction. In this case, the USIC sets the goals and provides strategic direction for the functional area of international interdiction, in the host countries and in the transit zone. Although he does not exercise directive authority over U.S. drug agencies in a specific area of the world, the USIC has "oversight coordination" authority over U.S. agencies supporting the interdiction function.

We suggest that a lead agency be designated for each IOA within the United States. That agency would designate an IOA Chief who has the authority and responsibility for preparing regional strategies and campaign plans for multiagency counterdrug operations when they are needed. This would involve the cooperative participation of appropriate federal agencies (plus state and local agencies). Federal DLEAs playing a major counterdrug role might be

# National Interagency Operations Areas



OPERATING AREA		LEAD AGENCY	
<span style="color: green;">■</span>	U.S. - Canadian Border	U.S. Customs Service	
<span style="color: blue;">■</span>	U.S. Maritime Borders	U.S. Coast Guard	
<span style="color: orange;">■</span>	U.S. - Mexican Border	U.S. Customs Service	
<span style="color: lightblue;">■</span>	Interior IOAs	Drug Enforcement Administration	
<span style="color: yellow;">●</span>	HIDTAs	Department of Justice	
(Unmarked)	All U.S. Ports of Entry	U.S. Customs Service	

Note: The OR and Lead Agencies as shown become funding only for large-scale multi-agency coordinated operations. They in no way affect an agency's normal operations as set forth by statute.

Figure 26. Interagency Operating Areas.

designated a lead agency for an IOA related to its primary function. It would designate a senior executive to serve as IOA Director. In those IOAs where it is not the lead agency, the DLEA would serve in a supporting role.

The suggested organizational concept plays to the strength of each group by selecting as lead agency that agency best suited for the IOA environment. Such an arrangement also gives each major DLEA a special domain in which to excel. Cooperative efforts are enhanced in that each agency needs help from the others in order to succeed within its IOA. Agency heads will encourage the cooperation of their subordinate officers assigned to IOAs where they are not the leading agency.

The description of the IOAs shown in the Figure 26 is offered for illustration only. Recommending geographical boundaries, functional areas, and lead agency designations is more appropriately the role of ONDCP in responding to legislative requirements and Executive guidance, and with consultation with the departments and agencies involved. But the point to be made is that wherever multiagency operations are appropriate, they should be guided by coherent strategies and plans, and implemented under authoritative direction.

## Regional Operations Overseas.

In overseas operations, the designation of a leading agency is more complicated. International law, treaty agreements, U.S. foreign policy objectives, security considerations, military-to-military relationships, the role of an American Ambassador and his country team, and the internal social and political environment of the foreign nation concerned are all piled upon and intertwined with drug war problems. Over 50 U.S. Government agencies are involved in activities outside the United States, particularly Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, and Justice. Many of these agencies have important contributions to make in the overseas counterdrug effort. But our foreign policy-strategy apparatus, unchanged since the end of World War II, is challenged by the need to integrate U.S. overseas activities for coherent and efficient actions.<sup>1</sup> For the national drug control strategy, it is especially difficult to specify one lead agency or theater headquarters to provide leadership and planning.

One solution is that the responsibility for developing and implementing drug strategy in an overseas region should reside with a senior executive, serving under the Director, ONDCP. He would carry the authority of the Executive Office of the President to implement drug policy and build effective counterdrug coalitions overseas. Because of the myriad of complex issues that pertain to every region of the world, several regional coordinators might be needed: for example, Western Hemisphere, Asia, and Middle East.

A regional coordinator would work closely with the Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement and the Director of Political-Military Affairs, in consultation with other national leaders such as the Attorney General, Secretary of the Treasury, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the regional military Commander-in-Chief. In this way the coordinator would be in good position to lead the regional strategy formulation process. The regional coordinator would interact with this leadership group by

way of his chairmanship of a regional interagency working group for international counterdrug activities. He would take charge of U.S. drug policy and strategy in a region, and ensure that law enforcement, the military, and other elements were effectively integrating their skills and resources toward a common goal.

When it comes to operational planning, however, the American Ambassador and his country team are the only persons in place with the knowledge, access, and opportunity to develop plans for an in-country combined counterdrug campaign. The geographic U.S. military CINC (example, CINC, U.S. Southern Command) can provide both strategic and operational planning *support* as requested by the regional coordinator in charge or the American Ambassador concerned. To under-use the talents and assets of the regional military headquarters would be a mistake. (The regional military headquarters can provide considerable intelligence data to the several lead DLEAs in the United States regarding the flow of narcotics from overseas theaters to the United States.)

### The Layer Cake Effect.

Most any proposal for improving interagency coordination and the integration of multiple agencies in a common endeavor could be vulnerable to adding another layer of bureaucracy—perhaps impeding the good intentions originally conceived. This notional proposal would make use of existing organizations, and bring to these organizations leaders with the authority and budget to implement strategic concepts.

Some staffs and Coordination centers are already in place to assist the IOA directors perform their duties: in the Northern Tier, Project North Star can provide the basis for a headquarters; in the Southwest Border IOA, Operation Alliance could take on this additional requirement. Each of the IOAs would be supported by JTF-6 for military assistance to drug law enforcement, as well as the Adjutants General of states within the IOA. These military headquarters can assist in operational planning and in providing federal assets for mission accomplishment.

In the main, new staffs need not be created to support this Unified Action Plan concept. What are required for interagency cooperation and integration are leaders with the authority to coordinate coherent strategies and plans.

## PLANNING AND THE INTERAGENCY ARENA—CAN IT WORK?

There is the compelling need for a solution to the drug problem, and no single approach will suffice. While demand reduction programs proceed apace, supply reduction efforts must become more effective—and efficient.

The authors are convinced that the supply reduction effort can benefit from initiatives that stress interagency cooperation and mid and long-range planning. Strategic and

operational (campaign) planning are integral to joint, combined, and interagency operations. They are adaptable to drug law enforcement operations, too. An organization responsible for coordinating coalition efforts within a geographic area can use business and military planning techniques to great advantage. The same principles apply to U.S. elements operating in an overseas environment. Necessity stimulates innovation, and both a strategic plan and campaign planning are within the art of the possible.

History teaches us that coalitions of different forces working toward a common goal have been successful—particularly when the threat is beyond the capability of any one coalition member to defeat. The drug threat is of that magnitude. A coalition of various drug law enforcement entities, supported by the U.S. military and other agencies of the government, is feasible, desirable, and necessary if the United States is to continue its progress in defeating the drug trafficker.

## Planning in the Separate Drug Law Enforcement Agencies.

The strategy and campaign planning processes can also be helpful within the separate DLEAs to coordinate their tactical actions. From the administrator level to the agent in charge of a field division, these planning methods can be important for keeping concepts for operations in line with available resources. Other opportunities for applying planning methods might be found at regional, area or sector offices.

The planning techniques discussed here have been implemented by various DLEAs. The DEA strategic planning system has been previously cited as an administration leadership and planning tool. Operation Alliance has had considerable experience in developing a strategy process although implementation has proven difficult. Project North Star's "Polaris" strategy has been put to good use in recent years. The HIDTA program is based on a strategic approach: threat assessment; strategic planning to address the threat; initiatives and budgets to implement the strategy; and annual reports as to progress made in countering the threat. In the past, however, some of these strategies often have been unable to realize their full potential because the allocated resources (budget) were insufficient to place strategic concepts into play, or the leaders responsible were not empowered to direct planning and operations. Nevertheless, the strategies have been useful to coordinate counterdrug activities and maintain focus on the organization's goals.

Through strategic and operational planning, senior and mid-level leadership within the chains of command of our DLEAs have a means to synchronize their activities in phased operations to achieve their objectives. Whether it is a part of strategic level endeavors as posited in this chapter, or at the action level of a regional law enforcement bureau, strategic planning and campaign planning can be critical for long-range success. In the following chapter, the authors offer some concluding thoughts about the national drug problem and the role of strategic planning in the counterdrug effort.

## ENDNOTE - CHAPTER 7

1. Roger Sperry, Director Management Studies, National Academy of Public Administration, "Diplomatic Disorder," *Government Executive*, July 1996, pp. 17-18. The article describes the State Department preference for "high policy" (diplomacy and reporting) and its avoidance of "low policy" such as managing the *implementation* of high policy—making things happen. Sperry suggests that the consolidation of functions and agencies operating overseas "will happen as a matter of time."



# CHAPTER 8

## CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Research for this publication included numerous interviews with officials at national, state, and local levels concerned with drug supply reduction, as well as field visits involving direct observation of law enforcement and military personnel engaged in tactical operations. The authors also did extensive reading on the drug trafficking problem. These experiences led to the following conclusions regarding the drug war and how it should be waged.

- The problems created by drug abuse and drug trafficking are enormous. American social structures and moral standards are being degraded, and the economic drain is staggering. The \$150 billion yearly drain on the U.S. economy from drug trafficking and abuse is intolerable and unacceptable. Drug-related problems have impaired our relationships with foreign governments, and our national security programs have been jeopardized. In the long run, America's counterdrug campaign is more critical for U.S. national interests than terrorism or regional conflicts in places like Southwest Asia, Africa, or even the Persian Gulf.
- After over two decades of fighting the drug problem, we may see the gains made in reducing the numbers of drug users vanish as the traffickers concentrate on targeting our youth. Regardless of their individual situations or their rationale for dealing in illegal drugs, drug traffickers are the enemies of American society. They, in effect, are waging an undeclared war against the institutions of the United States. They must be vigorously pursued and punished to the limit of the law. To do this successfully, a concerted national effort is required to mobilize the resources and will of the public.
- The American people continue to demand a solution to the drug dilemma. As evidenced by legislation enacted and by continued concern of several congressional committees, the Congress appears quite sensitive to these demands. In 1996 the Executive Branch revitalized its counterdrug program and provided a much needed push to the national counterdrug effort. However, unless the effort is sustained, Congress is likely to mandate additional measures.
- The drug war is winnable, but the United States is not yet winning. We define winning the war as reducing the amount of drug abuse and drug traffic to a level which is acceptable to U.S. society and which does not seriously degrade our national security, our economic well-being, and our social order.
- In our system, no one but the President can really be in overall control of the drug war at the national level. Only he can be the "Drug Czar," for only someone above the Cabinet level has sufficient authority to control the departments and agencies which are responsible for the various counterdrug forces. This does not preclude strong influence by subordinates in policy development, strategy formulation, and operational guidance.

It simply ensures centralized authority. Nor does it interfere with the execution of policy by DLEAs in the several interagency operating areas. Rather it ensures uniformity of guidance.

- By ensuring that the Director of ONDCP enjoys Cabinet-level status and remains a member of the NSC, and by participating in the Presidentially-chaired Drug Policy Council, the credibility of ONDCP can be maintained. This will enhance cooperation among the several departments and agencies. While ONDCP can develop and administer strategy and policy guidance for the President, through his Cabinet level board, he must play an active, continuous role in directing the interagency counterdrug effort. Only by his direct participation can we hope to pull together and fully integrate our counterdrug efforts in the United States with those overseas.
- While some improvement has been made in past years, the 50-some federal agencies involved in drug law enforcement actions and the myriad of state and local law enforcement entities are not yet working effectively together in a synchronized or coherent manner nationwide. Operation Alliance, Project North Star, and JTF-6 are examples of large scale, sustained interagency cooperation—but there is much room for improvement.
- The campaign planning process can serve the drug law enforcement community as a planning technique to synchronize interagency operations in the war on drugs. The stakes in this war are high. Thousands of dedicated people work long hours, often in dangerous situations, attempting to stem the flow of drugs. They deserve more and better support than they now receive, particularly in terms of personnel resourcing, current technology, and interagency coordination. When fighting a foe that is cunning, ruthless, and well-financed, to win we need a force of sufficient size that is better trained and at least equally well-equipped. That force should use the best methods known to plan and control the battles. Until demand reduction programs are successful, we must continue the supply reduction struggle.
- Strategy and campaign plans shape our tactical actions, but strategy and plans can only work if there is an agreed theory or doctrine available to provide principles and rules to guide our actions. Drug law enforcement employees, U.S. military personnel, and the Washington bureaucracy (to include the Congress) all speak different professional languages. Ways must be found to improve communications. ONDCP should promote an interagency effort to publish a doctrinal concept for drug interdiction activities to include a dictionary of common terms. The nation would greatly benefit from the establishing of a Law enforcement interagency senior level college for promising mid-level DLEA officers—in the same form now enjoyed by the military services. We must train together in order to operate together.
- At the tactical level, interagency cooperation and joint operations have proven quite feasible. Such operations flourish when an atmosphere of understanding and trust is established. This has often been accomplished by continuous liaison, frequent planning

conferences, and working together in joint operations. The challenge is to achieve similar harmony at the operational and strategic levels.

- Designating a lead agency to coordinate and control all joint (interagency) planning and tactical operations within a geographical area (an IOA) is a feasible way to reap the benefits of strategic and operational (campaign) planning.
- The U.S. military is making a substantial contribution to the drug war. It must continue to actively seek its proper supporting role and act in a positive but noncompetitive manner. Temptation to go beyond a support role when providing needed help for DLEAs, American embassy country teams, and friendly foreign governments should continue to be avoided. The military should continue to be proactive within the rules of engagement.
- The military should offer greater participation in the area of predictive intelligence production and fusion (to include systems architecture, collection methods, analysis, dissemination, and retrievability) and in strategic and operational level planning at various DLEA and interagency headquarters and offices. The excellent intelligence analysis methodology practiced at JTF-6 provides current intelligence to military units supporting the DLEAs.
- Though not endorsed by many, some well-meaning individuals have called for legalization and the controlled sale of drugs to raise funds for education, medical, and rehabilitation efforts to reduce demand. These critics of current policy argue that present counterdrug efforts have failed, and that monies now going to drug dealers could be channeled into demand reduction programs. Presidents of both political parties, and other national leaders, feel this argument is ill-conceived and would do much more harm than good. We agree with them. The "War on Drugs" can be won, legalization is morally repugnant, and the problems caused by any legalization could be more severe than those now at hand.
- The authors recognize that the terms "Drug War" and "War on Drugs" may be imperfect metaphors for the complex social and legal situations involved in reducing drug abuse and bringing drug law offenders to justice. However, they are useful and perhaps descriptive in referring to what may be the level of effort necessary to stop the illegal trafficking of drugs which is so damaging to our society. While compassion, medical treatment, and rehabilitation assistance is called for in helping the user and addict, there is little room for sympathy when dealing with those who traffic in human misery for personal gain. While education, example, and patience are vital in deterring our youth from falling prey to the drug dealer, no tolerance should be given the drug cartel, the international smuggler, or those distributors and pushers who feed such poisons to our children. They must be held responsible for their actions.

The principal point the authors wish to convey is that there is a better way to plan for sustained counterdrug efforts. If joint efforts can be coordinated under lead agency supervision, and the method for planning a campaign and marshaling assets needed is used,

then greater success in our counterdrug effort can be realized. Ultimately we will win the nation's war on drugs.

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# APPENDIX A

## EXAMPLE (NOTIONAL) STRATEGY

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Copy No. \_\_\_\_\_  
Executive Committee,  
Olympia HIDTA  
Seattle, Washington  
30 August 2000

### OLYMPIA HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA (HIDTA) STRATEGY OLYMPIA 2005

#### I. INTRODUCTION.

A. This document represents the Olympia HIDTA strategy for the 5-year period beginning in FY 2001. By HIDTA Committee policy, this strategy will be reviewed, and evaluated annually, during the third quarter of the Fiscal Year (FY).

B. The Olympia HIDTA was established in 1997 by the Director, ONDCP after consultation with the U.S. Attorney General, heads of National Drug Control Program Agencies, and the governor of Washington. The Olympia HIDTA consists of the seven Washington counties of Thurston, Pierce and Yakima in the south; King and Snohomish in the center; and Skagit and Whatcom (on the border) in the north. They extend eastward from the eastern side of Puget Sound running 125 miles northward from Tacoma through Seattle to Blain on the border with Canada. It includes the Yakima River valley which extends to the southeast from the Tacoma-Seattle area.

C. The HIDTA is operated under the aegis of the HIDTA Executive Committee. It has a collocated staff which includes an administrative headquarters group, a Communications and Support Center, and an Intelligence Group. Four Task Forces are located in Seattle, Tacoma, Yakima, and Blaine. The Olympia Executive Committee meets quarterly and on call. The current chairman is Sheriff Jane Summers and the HIDTA director is William Dickerson, DEA.

D. The range of HIDTA task force activities in the past year has included drug interdiction, drug trafficking and financial crime investigations, support for prosecutions, and drug abuse prevention initiatives.

## II. THE OLYMPIA STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT. (See Annex A, HIDTA Threat Assessment.) [omitted]

### A. *The citizens of the OLYMPIA HIDTA have an interest in:*

1. Healthy children, free of the burden of substance abuse.
2. Safe streets, free of violent crime and gang activity.
3. A Northwest region resistant to illicit drug importation and throughput.
4. An educated adult citizenry—resistant to illicit drug abuse.
5. An effective drug treatment program within the HIDTA region.

### B. *Significant General Factors Affecting HIDTA Interests:*

1. The Olympia HIDTA area represents a major gateway for drugs to enter the United States from Canada, Latin America, and Asia. It is also a hub for distribution of illicit drugs throughout the United States. The HIDTA has a large, drug-dependent population.

2. The Seattle-Tacoma area is the most important economic and cultural hub in the Northwest region of the United States. The SeaTac International Airport is a major trans-shipment point for U.S. international trade with the countries of the Pacific rim. After Los Angeles, the area is the second largest commercial container shipping area in the United States. The Ports of Seattle and Tacoma process annually nearly 3 million containers, and this throughput is continuing to grow annually. About 5,000 of the 7,000 commercial vessels arriving annually in the Pacific Northwest pass through ports in source countries in Asia. The high density of international trade has made the region vulnerable to illicit drug trafficking, and drug traffickers have taken advantage of this factor.

3. The HIDTA region is a significant marine smuggling target for vessels coming from the Far East, Southern California, and Latin America. Smuggling organizations operate from Canada and the Pacific Northwest. The Puget Sound region has hundreds of marinas and isolated coves, and about 170 remote islands in Northwestern Washington. These islands are located in San Juan County and have been traditional points for smuggling operations. There are no specific lines of operation or choke points to facilitate concentrating law enforcement assets; the border with Canada is open and without barriers to impede traffic. Water obstacles are used to advantage by smugglers who use small and large water craft for illicit drug trade. Local roads facilitate smuggling operations.

4. Over 3 million people live in the Olympia HIDTA area. In the past 4 years the region has experienced a growing epidemic of drug-related crime and drug abuse. Emergency room visits related to drug abuse have increased by 25 percent over the last 3 years, and drug-related admissions are 50 percent higher than the national average (1999 figures). Area demand for opium products has held steady in the past 4 years, sparking local opium production (indoors). Methadone treatment programs have not had any significant impact on the demand for heroin-opium products. The Washington Division of Alcohol and Substance Abuse

advises that 14 percent of the state population has a chemical dependency. Drug-related deaths are higher in the HIDTA area than the national rate and hospital overdose admissions are 75 percent higher than the rest of the nation.

### *C. Law Enforcement and Crime Factors Affecting HIDTA Interests:*

#### 1. External Factors.

a. Drugs. Illicit drugs entering the HIDTA region are predominantly heroin (from Latin America and Far East), marijuana (from Northern California, Canada, and Mexico), cocaine (via Latin America), hashish (Southwest Asia), and methamphetamine (from Mexico and California). Foreign-based drug traffickers are using the Blaine border crossing on the border with Canada, and the Yakima Valley agricultural region as the principal points of infiltration and transshipment. Illegal aliens coming north from Mexico bring Mexican black tar and brown powder heroin and cocaine into Yakima Valley for storage and transshipment to other regions of the United States. Asian gangs have been active importing heroin via Blaine for sales in Tacoma-Seattle and transport to the south and east. Cocaine and Latin American-produced heroin are mostly routed from Andean countries, usually via Mexico, to California, and then to Yakima Valley for distribution by Mexican drug criminals and local gangs.

#### b. Crime.

(1) The Mexicans. The predominant foreign drug trafficking organization in the HIDTA region is the Northern branch of the Pena-Martinez organization. The patron, Oscar Pena-Martinez is based in the town of Uruapan, state of Michoacan, Mexico, located about 180 miles west of Mexico City. All of the Mexican heroin is processed in Mexico, then shipped to market. The Pena-Martinez gang has a well-established forward-based organization operating at two identified locations in Seattle. Through his control of migrants in the Yakima Valley, and a loose alliance with Seattle gangs, Pena-Martinez has become an efficient importer of Mexican heroin, methamphetamine and Colombian cocaine and heroin. It appears that most illicit drugs are smuggled in cars and trucks on a continuing basis throughout the year. Pena-Martinez appears to have ceded marijuana trafficking to U.S. criminal groups. In attempting to attack the problem at its source over the past 5 years, cooperative initiatives with Mexican Federal and state law enforcement officials have consistently failed.

(2) The Asians. Asian gangs in Korea and Hawaii have been active in smuggling crystal (ice) methamphetamine and heroin into the HIDTA region. Such drugs have been intercepted on vessels and in the mail system. A recent take-down of ice traffickers from Hawaii found that they were shipping one hundred kilo quantities of ice via containerized cargo into Tacoma-Seattle for nation-wide distribution. Thai marijuana and hashish smuggling organizations off-load mother ships in the Puget Sound region to make use of marinas and isolated coves, and islands. Also, immediately prior to China's acquisition of Hong Kong, numerous Hong Kong-based criminals immigrated to British Columbia. These criminals have been actively importing SEA heroin for sales in Canada and the United States. Little is yet known about these gangs, and Canadian officials have been unable to significantly curtail these operations.

## 2. Internal Factors.

a. Criminals. Locally-based criminals have been active in the past 2 years growing marijuana and opium poppies indoors throughout the 7-county region. Prosecutions for heroin trafficking have increased nearly 200 percent over the past 4 years. Violent crime is part of the turf wars among drug dealers and the large drug trafficking organizations. Afro-American Crips and Blood gang members have been operating in the Seattle-Tacoma area for over 10 years. Violence in the form of street killings has directly resulted from turf wars over crack cocaine and methamphetamine markets. Violent crime is also routine with users who must support drug habits with rip-off money. Though the youth population has decreased by 5 percent, violent crime by youths has doubled over the past 10 years. About 100 youth gangs have been identified in the HIDTA region (but only ten of these are responsible for half of the killings). A recent survey indicated that 25 percent of HIDTA teenagers carried a gun to school within the past year.

b. Heroin. There has been approximately a 50 percent increase in availability of back tar heroin as observed by police in Tacoma; Seattle police have made similar reports. The seven seizures of back tar heroin in the HIDTA region (1999), for a total of nearly 470 pounds, indicates that the area is a likely transshipment region as well as a lucrative market. The purity of heroin in the HIDTA region has increased significantly over the past 9 years. In 1990, the purity of heroin imports averaged between 60 and 80 percent. Today in the HIDTA area, the average is about 90 percent, leading to expected criminal and health outcomes. In-hospital admissions for heroin overdose have increased by 45 percent over last year, and the region now suffers 7 heroin deaths per 100 thousand people each year. In 1998, the seven county area suffered 195 heroin overdose deaths; preliminary figures for the first half of 1999 appear that these annual figures will be surpassed.

c. Cocaine. Cocaine continues as a popular illicit drug. There has been a 40 percent increase in cocaine overdose deaths from 1997 to the end of 1998. To June 30, 45 cocaine deaths have been reported by local hospitals, indicating a potential annual figure for 1999 that may approach 100 deaths. The HIDTA area is a major storage and transshipment area for cocaine going to Canada and the Midwestern United States. Canadian marijuana is often exchanged for cocaine, and then peddled in Canadian markets.

d. Methamphetamine. DEA estimates that 75 percent of the meth entering the HIDTA region is the result of Mexican and California-based (motorcycle gang) smuggling operations. But, there has been an increase in discovering local production labs: 1998, 4 labs; 1999 through second quarter, 9 labs. Hydriodic acid and other essential chemicals are increasingly being interdicted at the Canadian border. Precursor chemicals penetration via the Canadian border are becoming a serious threat to the HIDTA region. The port of entry at Blaine, Washington has reported a ten-fold increase in the confiscation of precursor and essential chemicals over the past 2 years. With increasing threats from both Mexican trafficking organizations and local labs, it is anticipated that there will be a greater danger to the population from methamphetamine in the next few years.

e. Marijuana. Marijuana is increasingly being grown indoors in Canada, then smuggled into the United States in direct competition with California, Oregon and Washing -

ton growers. Last year, the DEA Domestic Cannabis Eradication Program supported a major counter-marijuana program in the HIDTA. About 31,000 plants were eradicated in some 345 indoor nursery operations. Local growing is so successful that Washington state now exports Marijuana to Hawaii and elsewhere in the United States.

### III. NATIONAL POLICY AND STRATEGIC GUIDANCE.

A. *Vision, Intent, Missions.* The President has said that our common purpose is to reduce illegal drug use and its consequences in America. His long-range vision for this effort is the effective prevention of illicit drug use by Americans; quality and readily available drug treatment; dedicated and energetic citizens working to counter drug abuse and drug crime; and effective and cooperative law enforcement and defense agencies effective against drug trafficking and drug crime.

B. *Policy Guidance, Goals and Objectives.* The National Drug Control Strategy identifies five goals. Because of the strategic environment of the Pacific Northwest, all five of these goals apply to the Olympia HIDTA.

1. Motivate youth to reject illegal drugs and substance abuse.
2. Increase the safety of America's citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence.
3. Reduce health, welfare, and crime costs resulting from illegal drug use.
4. Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat.
5. Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.

C. *Primary HIDTA Objective.* The primary objective of the HIDTA program falls under Goal 2: Improve the ability of the HIDTA to counter drug trafficking.

### IV. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

A. *Vision Statement.* The HIDTA Executive Committee foresees a Northwest Region effective in its resistance to drug trafficking, drug distribution, and drug abuse, and a region of citizens that enjoy a safe and healthful community environment, free of the scourge of illicit drugs.

B. *Intent.* The HIDTA Executive Committee intends to put drug criminals in jail and shut down major drug operations with coordinated, multiagency task force intelligence, investigations, prosecutions, and other initiatives; the HIDTA intends to develop and sustain effective

anti-drug education programs for children and adults; and it intends to achieve effective drug rehabilitation programs via regional government and private groups.

*C. Mission Statement.* The Olympia HIDTA coordinates and provides funding support to the HIDTA multiagency task forces to dismantle or severely disrupt major regional and local traffickers of illicit drugs; facilitates the flow of intelligence information among member agencies; assists regional public and private health agencies to reduce the demand for illicit drugs and improve rehabilitation programs.

*D. Strategic Objectives.*

1. Dismantle illicit drug trafficking and distribution organizations so that the Pena-Martinez organization is disestablished by the end of FY 2002, and no other large organization has replaced it through the end of the strategy planning period (30 September 2005).

2. Promote an effective anti-drug education program for children and adults of the region so that the percent of children using drugs is reduced from 12 percent to 10 percent by 30 September 2002; reduced incrementally to 1 percent by 2005. Adult usage rates should demonstrate an annual, incremental reduction from the current 17 percent to 5 percent by 2005.

3. Increase the effectiveness of drug rehabilitation programs with priority to the criminal justice system programs to reduce the recidivism rate from 85 percent to under 50 percent by 2005. Mid-point goal for 30 September 1993 is 65 percent.

4. Increase the effectiveness of drug interdiction in the HIDTA region as measured by a 15 percent increase of the street prices of drugs and a 40 percent drop in drug-related hospital admissions in the Seattle-Tacoma area through 2005.

## V. CONCEPTS for OPERATIONS and/or PROGRAMS.

*A. Intelligence Group.* To dismantle illicit drug trafficking and distribution organizations and increase the effectiveness of drug interdiction efforts, intelligence sharing among Federal, state and local agencies will be improved. The Intelligence Group will be strengthened with six additional analysts (two from the National Guard) to provide increased case support and analytical services for investigations, and to provide information about large drug trafficking organizations in the region. The Intelligence Group will complete the process of consolidating intelligence within the Intelligence Group database by the end of FY 2001. The Greater Olympia HIDTA-wide Strategic Information Network (GOHSIN) will be completed by the end of FY 2002, with terminals supporting local police departments lacking intelligence units and task force participation.

*B. Campaign Chill Blaine.* Counter-smuggling Campaign "Chill-Blaine" will be conducted for the 3-year period FY 2001 through 2003 to decrease the incidence of drug-related violent

crime, drug smuggling and drug trafficking. The campaign will be in three phases. *Phase I, Operation "Black Diamond,"* 1 October 2000 through 30 June 2001, will take drug crime off the streets of metropolitan Seattle and Tacoma and place emphasis on citizen and local police neighborhood cooperation and education programs. *Phase II, "Operation White Swan,"* 1 May 2001 through 1 March 2002, will focus on investigations of countering drug criminals in the Yakima Valley region and interdiction efforts along the Interstate 90 corridor. *Phase III, "Operation Nighthawk,"* 1 May 2002 through 30 August 2003, will focus on the northern border with Canada from Blaine westward to Nighthawk; during Nighthawk operations along the border to reduce smuggling and incidents of port running, interdiction operations will continue along Interstate Highways 90 and 5. Campaign Chill Blaine success will be measured by a 15 percent reduction in the incidents of violent crime in metropolitan Seattle and Tacoma, a 15 percent increase in the street prices of drugs, and by a 40 percent reduction in the number of drug-related emergency room admissions throughout the HIDTA by 1 October 2003.

*C. Task Force Support.* Law enforcement-unique equipment, to include an electronic wire intercept facility, will be made available with priority to all HIDTA task forces. Task forces within the HIDTA will be reinforced with additional intelligence support, HIDTA funding, military operational and non-operational support.

*D. Demand Reduction.* A comprehensive, HIDTA-wide demand reduction program will be developed, integrating the resources and skills of local government and private organizations, mutually supported by local, state and HIDTA funding. Washington Army National Guard will be the coordinator for support activities for this program.

*E. Criminal Justice System.* Drug courts and related treatment programs will be extended to include all eligible defendants using multiagency planning and programming to support a long-range program for the region.

*F. Asset Forfeiture.* A comprehensive asset forfeiture program will be continued that targets major area drug organizations with the purpose of damaging their financial capabilities.

*X. (Additional Concepts as required.)*

## VI. RESOURCES.

*A. Director's Resource and Budgeting Guidance.* HIDTA resource requirements are projected for the next Fiscal Year, and the following four years thereafter, to give a picture of the expected long-range costs of the HIDTA programs. Programs will be reviewed annually to determine their effectiveness in meeting HIDTA objectives; the objectives and concepts of



programs that demonstrate an inability to meet objectives will be reviewed for necessary changes or elimination from HIDTA funding.

*B. Asset Forfeiture Funds.* The 5-year average annual input of forfeiture assets made available to the HIDTA has been \$870K. For planning the support of this strategy, the HIDTA will assume receiving \$850K in assets forfeiture resources during FY 2001, and the four years following. Failure to receive this amount will require adjustment to the strategy budget.

*C. Strategy Resource Requirements, FY 2001 through 2005:*

1. Intelligence Group Operations and Enhancements \$815K for FY 2001. For the period FY 2001 through 2005, \$325K in salaries for FY2001, increasing to \$350K by FY 2005, plus \$85K additional will be required each year to support temporary hire of two additional analysts for the Intelligence Group; data base consolidation process will require \$110K during FY 2001, and \$3K maintenance costs for each of FY 2002 through 2005. The GOHSIN network requires an annual contract fee of \$200K for FY 2001-3, and \$85K for FY 2004 and 2005. Operations and Maintenance requires \$70K each year through FY 2002, increasing to \$85K through FY 2005. A contingency fund for TDY and conferences and the Intelligence Group Director's discretionary account is \$25K for FY 2001-02, increasing to \$35K by FY 2005. Total cost over the 5-year planning period for Intelligence Group is \$3532K. See budget display (Figure 27).

- 2. Law Enforcement New Equipment . . .
- 3. Task Force Enhancements . . .
- 4. Overtime requirement for major investigations . . .
- 5. Training funds . . .
- 6. Maintenance of equipment . . .
- 7. Education and Rehabilitation programs . . .
- 8. Asset forfeiture use . . .
- 9. Administrative/infrastructure support . . .
- X. (Additional requirements as identified.)

*D. Resource Requirements by major program: (See Figure 27, Intelligence Group.)*

*E. Olympia HIDTA Strategy Recapitulation: (See Figure 26, Olympia HIDTA Five Year Projection.)*

Strategy Resource Requirements: INTELLIGENCE GROUP					
Objective 1: Dismantle illicit drug trafficking and distribution organizations...					
Objective 4: Increase effectiveness of drug interdiction...					
Resource Structure Costs (\$K)					
FY 2001: \$815k					
Five Year Projection: \$3532k					
Program	FY2001	FY2002	FY2003	FY2004	FY2005
Salaries	\$325	\$330	\$340	\$345	\$350
Adm Arly	85	85	85	85	85
Data Base	110	3	3	3	3
GCHSIN	200	200	200	85	85
C&M	70	70	75	75	85
TDY & Conf	25	25	30	35	35
Totals	815	713	733	628	643

Figure 27. Intelligence Group.

## VI. STRATEGY REVIEW.

A. The HIDTA Director will conduct a staff review of Olympia 2005 in August 2001 to establish the effectiveness of the objectives and concepts of the strategy, and to assess available resources to support the strategy as currently structured. Based on this assessment, the strategy will be revised and disseminated to all HIDTA activities not later than 15 September 2005.

B. Programs and operations that prove unable to meet the measurable objectives of the strategy will be deleted from the strategy, or modified to meet HIDTA expectations of effectiveness, timeliness, and economy.

C. The Strategy Review will serve as the basis for budget requests for the following fiscal year.

Strategy Resource Requirements					
OLYMPIA HIDTA					
Five Year Projections: \$____(K)					
Program	FY 2001	FY 2002	FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005
Intelligence Gp	\$ 815	\$ 713	\$ 733	\$ 628	\$ 643
Com & Spd Ctr	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
TF Blaine	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
TF Seattle	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
TF Tacoma	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
TF Yakima	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Ex Com Spd	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Drug Ed & Rehab	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Admin Spd	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Pers Overtime	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Training	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Maintenance	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Conferences	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Contingency	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
FY Totals (\$K)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

Figure 28. Olympia HIDTA Five Year Projection.

# APPENDIX B

## EXAMPLE OF A MULTIAGENCY CAMPAIGN PLAN

The following example of a multiagency campaign plan assumes that a coordinating headquarters (West Star) is established to facilitate broad based counternarcotics operations on federal land in the Western United States. It further assumes that the participating agencies under West Star provided representatives to a planning conference to develop this plan. The campaign plan provides information about the situation, describes the mission (strategic objective), identifies a lead agency for each phase of the campaign, and assigns tasks to other participating agencies. It identifies required resources and gives priorities for their use. This type of plan also can be helpful to the supervisory chain of a single agency in the conduct of extensive operations involving numerous groups.

Copy No \_\_\_\_\_  
Headquarters, Operation  
West Star  
Sacramento, California  
1 August 1997

### Drug Interdiction Campaign Plan: Paul Bunyon I

References: (Note: Here would be listed appropriate maps, or any special directives from higher echelon offices pertaining to this operation)

1. SITUATION. Marijuana consumption in the United States has declined only slightly in the past 5 years while U.S. production now exceeds 40 percent of the demand. Projections indicate this will become over 50 percent by 2001, given that the current consumption rate remains constant. With new plant materials being cultivated in the Western United States, a high concentration of THC (about 7 percent) has made the U.S. product popular with drug users at home and abroad. The governments of Mexico, Venezuela, Peru, and Barbados have reported substantial sales of high potency U.S. marijuana in their countries and have requested action be taken to curtail U.S. exports. The President has directed increased efforts be placed on marijuana eradication and on the apprehension and conviction of U.S. marijuana producers and traffickers. The Congress has been consulted and supports the effort. However no additional funds are expected this fiscal year to finance the campaign.

Much of the high potency U.S. marijuana is grown in the Operation WEST STAR area of responsibility (AOR). Intelligence reports indicate that U.S. National Parks and other federal and state-owned lands now under lease for future timber harvesting are principal growing areas for marijuana cultivation. The Northwest Border Committee will be augmented with representatives from the Interior Department, the U.S. Forest Service, the U.S. National Park

Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. This committee will furnish guidance and technical assistance for Paul Bunyon I and assist in coordination necessary between Operation WEST STAR and their respective field offices. The U.S. Attorney General has made Paul Bunyon I a priority effort and has requested the Administrator, DEA and the Director, FBI to support this campaign to the maximum extent possible. State Attorneys General in the West Star AOR have been informed and all promised their cooperation. Likewise, appropriate state police officials, federal and state military leaders, and county sheriffs have been alerted that countermarijuana efforts will be intensified.

a. *Strategic Guidance.* The National Drug Control Strategy calls for stepped-up efforts against domestic marijuana cultivation and places success or failure in this program as an indicator of national antidrug resolve. The strategic objective is a 10 percent decrease in domestic production between 1996 and 1998 and a 50 percent reduction by the year 2001. Both the U.S. Attorney General and the Administrator, DEA have directed that antimarijuana efforts be sustained and not be neglected in favor of anticocaine/heroin programs.

(1) Current strategy and Presidential direction dictate that enhanced efforts be taken to eliminate marijuana production that now exists within the West Star AOR. Action must begin as soon as feasible. Priority of effort should be at least equal to that being devoted to other illicit narcotics.

(2) ONDCP, Office of Supply Reduction policy letter of February 2, 1996 provides these policy aims:

(a) To end marijuana production on federal lands, first priority to the Western Region.

(b) To destroy the infrastructure now controlling marijuana trafficking within the United States.

(3) Normal rules of engagement apply. No operations on land affected by treaty with American Indians will be conducted without prior approval by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Care will be taken to minimize danger of forest fires. Supporting military units will be employed in accordance with current DOD policy and serve under Title 10 USC or Title 32 USC as appropriate.

b. *Criminal Forces.*

(1) A majority of the marijuana production and distribution in the Pacific Northwest is controlled by the Carlos Pena-Martinez family. Their operations are based along the coastal regions running north of Fresno, CA, to the Canadian border and inland throughout the forested areas of California, Oregon, and Washington. Marijuana cultivation occurs mainly on federally-owned lands but also has been found on state-owned lands and private property. The Pena-Martinez organization is subdivided into several distinct groups, each with different functional responsibilities. The groups may also be subdivided on a regional basis to reduce command and control problems. The exact size of the Pena-Martinez family is unknown but is believed to exceed 200 persons.

(2) Functional subdivisions include (a) cultivation and harvest operations; (b) transportation, packaging, and warehousing; (c) market and distribution; (d) finance and account-

ing; and (e) security. Each subdivision is headed either by a relative of Carlos Pena-Martinez or a trusted friend. (See Annex A, Intelligence.)

(3) Geographic subdivision of cultivation operations is based on both political boundaries and terrain features. In general, the overall operation is separated by states into California, Oregon, and Washington. State operations are further subdivided as required by terrain features. Other components of the organization operate across the boundaries set for the cultivation and harvesting division. (See Annex A, Intelligence).

(4) Pena-Martinez intends to maintain operations on National and State Parks land indefinitely. He pays nothing for the land, avoids populated areas, enjoys excellent growing conditions, and, to date, has not experienced significant loss to law enforcement actions. He is likely to expand his operation as the market permits.

(5) The family intends to expand their control over marijuana production and distribution throughout the Western United States. Pena-Martinez will avoid dealing in other narcotics but will attempt to establish connections with foreign dealers for exporting his higher grade marijuana.

(6) Pena-Martinez seldom visits his field operations, spending most of his efforts on marketing, distribution, and financial planning. His son-in-law, Eduardo Montez, acts as an "executive vicePresident" in managing routine affairs. Both Pena-Martinez and Montez are residents of Walnut Grove, California. Another son-in-law, Charles E. Kelly, is in charge of transportation and warehousing. Kelly lives in Portland, Oregon. These three individuals make the major decisions concerning operations. In charge of security is Alan Lynn, a bachelor and a loner who reports only to Carlos Pena-Martinez. Lynn resides in Oakland, CA, but constantly circulates throughout the Pacific Northwest.

(7) The operation is so large that elimination of a few fields will not substantially degrade its position. However loss of the crops and fields covered in extensive eradication operations will hurt him if the denial can be sustained. The family could suspend operations for one growing season and still be a viable organization.

(8) Vulnerabilities.

(a) The decisionmaking apparatus of the family is small. Apprehension and conviction of Pena-Martinez, Montez, Kelly, or Lynn would drastically weaken the family.

(b) Harvest season, when most members of the field divisions will be on-site, offers the best time to damage the lower levels of the organization.

(9) Center of Gravity. The main source of enemy power is the efficient and disciplined senior leadership group of the Pena-Martinez organization. There are several decisive factors contributing to the success of the organization:

(a) Their ability to control large sections of land and use it for marijuana cultivation.

(b) Substantial financial reserves which permit sustained operations and expansion even during period of decreased production.

(c) Efficient managerial expertise at the higher levels.

(d) Loyalty to Pena-Martinez and cohesion of upper echelon leadership.

*c. Friendly Forces.*

(1) ONDCP will assist in coordination with Washington, D.C.-based officials as requested. Deputy Administrator for Operations, DEA, will monitor and assist as required. Assistant Regional Commissioners, Enforcement, and U.S. Customs Service will provide support as necessary to augment Customs officials participating directly in Paul Bunyon I. U.S. Border Patrol will continue normal operations. U.S. Attorneys and State Attorneys General concerned will assist in warrant and/or wiretap assistance and advise on jurisdictional issues. Bureau of Indian Affairs Liaison will advise on any actions concerning Indian Treaty rights. State Police and Highway patrol support will be coordinated through appropriate Liaison officers. Federal military support will be coordinated through Commander, JTF-8 and state military support will be requested through The Adjutant General of the state concerned.

(2) The Royal Canadian Mounted Police will furnish a Liaison Officer to Headquarters West Star during Phases I and II of the campaign. Canadian Authority will support the operation as deemed feasible.

*d. Assumptions.*

(1) Permission to operate on federal and state-owned lands will be forthcoming throughout the duration of the campaign.

(2) State and local political support will continue throughout the campaign.

(3) Title 10 (Active and Reserve) and Title 32 (National Guard) military support will be available, especially for air transportation.

2. MISSION. West Star coordinates phased Drug Law Enforcement Agency operations to eliminate marijuana production and distribution from federal and state-owned lands within Washington, Oregon, and California (north of Fresno) and to destroy the Pena-Martinez marijuana trafficking organization.

3. EXECUTION.

a. *Concept.* The participating agencies of West Star intend to conduct phased operations over a two-and-one-half year period to stop marijuana cultivation and trafficking from federal and state-owned lands in the West Star area of operation; success in this campaign will be marked by the destruction of the Carlos Pena-Martinez organization and the incarceration of its key leaders. Participating DLEA will achieve the above objectives by a coordinated two-and-one-half year effort which will include these actions:

(1) Eliminating secure areas for cultivation of marijuana; destroying marijuana crops wherever located.

(2) Seizing drug related assets of the Pena-Martinez organization.

(3) Disrupting the Pena-Martinez transportation network by seizing or destroying transloading sites, warehousing, packaging equipment, air and ground fleet.

(4) Seizing capital (currency and other instruments) to obstruct the financing of the organization.

(5) To accomplish the above actions, a campaign in three phases is envisioned:

Phase I, Preparation (March 1 - August 1, 1998).

Phase II, Eradication, Investigations, Apprehension (August 2 - October 30, 1998).

Phase III, Exploitation (November 1, 1998 -October 1, 2000).

b. *Phase I. Preparation.* (March 1, 1998 - August 1, 1998). During Phase I, intelligence about the Pena-Martinez organization will continue to be gathered with emphasis on plots under cultivation and locations of facilities and personnel. A tactical planning work shop will be held under the aegis of DEA to prepare plans for the Phase II operation, and to effect detailed coordination among DLEA for that operation. Rehearsals will be conducted, especially with supporting military units to ensure mutual understanding of standing procedures. Late in Phase I, participating DLEA and supporting military units will deploy to forward operating areas and establish logistics/supporting bases. The time for transition to Phase II will be when the lead DLEA (DEA) establishes a forward command post and confirms that supporting agencies are ready. HQ West Star will retain the lead for overall support coordination for this campaign.

(1) *Lead Agency.* DEA is lead agency for operational planning and rehearsals in this phase; provides a special agent in charge who will coordinate DEA support from Seattle and San Francisco Field Offices. DEA takes the lead in preparing a plan for the operation in Phase II; conducts preliminary investigations and assimilates intelligence information as available; identifies support or logistics shortfalls to West Star for resolution; develops rules of engagement, guidance for legal procedures, search and seizure, arrest; establishes operational command post for Phase II; directs rehearsals as required; assures coordination with HQ West Star, within DEA supervisory chain of command, and with other law enforcement agencies.

(2) *Supporting Agencies.*

(a) State Police (Washington, Oregon, California). Provides intelligence and reconnaissance information; assists in identifying friendly facilities such as assembly points, command posts and logistics bases. Provides liaison personnel to DEA command post and provides liaison to military units as required. Provides planner to attend plan development conference.

(b) Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Forest Service, National Park Service, State Forest/Park Services. Provide operational and technical support. Advise during operations via liaison officers.

(c) Bureau of Indian Affairs. Provides technical advice via liaison officer. Supports planning phase by providing liaison officer to plan conference.

(d) NDIC/EPIC. Provides intelligence support to planning process.



(e) National Guard (Washington, Oregon, California). State Adjutants General will provide liaison personnel for planning and to support establishing command post and logistics facilities.

(f) 6th Army. Provides liaison officer to planning conference; coordinates for Federal and Reserve troop unit support.

(g) CDSO-EI Segundo, CA. Assists in planning; coordinates for federal loan and grants of DOD property in support of this plan.

(h) JTF-5. Assists West Star to coordinate Title 10 military support. Provides liaison for planning conference; provides liaison to DEA operational command post.

(i) FBI. Sacramento Field Office will provide liaison to DEA during planning and is prepared to supplement DEA investigative effort.

(j) USMS. Provides liaison support for operational planning conference.

c. *Phase II. Eradication, Investigation, Apprehension.* (August 2 - October 30, 1998). During this phase, DLEAs will isolate and destroy marijuana crops growing on federal and state-owned lands; related assets will be seized and criminals apprehended; case work in preparation for trial will continue; public relations efforts will be conducted by West Star to encourage support for countermarijuana operations. The destruction of identified growing plots and arrest of persons involved will signal the end of Phase II.

(1) *Lead Agency.* DEA is lead agency for this phase; provides Special Agent in Charge to direct operations and coordinate with DEA Field Offices. DEA will coordinate the crop eradication operation and provide guidance for arrests, seizure of property, and preparation of evidence.

(2) *Supporting Agencies.*

(a) State Police (Washington, Oregon, California). Provides support for eradication operations to include security for seized assets, highway control/access, special weapons and tactics reaction teams and intelligence support. Provides liaison officer to command post.

(b) Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Forest Service, National Park Service, State Forest Park Services. Continue with technical advice and liaison to command post. Provide facilities for DLEA operations in forest and park areas.

(c) Bureau of Indian Affairs. Continues liaison to Command Post and provides Marijuana Eradication Reconnaissance Team.

(d) NDIC/EPIC. Provides, within capabilities, intelligence concerning this campaign phase.

(e) National Guard (Washington, Oregon, California). Provides administrative, planning, intelligence and communications personnel to supplement DEA command post. Provides troop units for reconnaissance and to support crop eradication on federal and state-owned lands as directed by DEA.

(f) 6th Army. Provides troop support (one helicopter composite company) under the tactical control of JTF-5 to support Phase II. Provides communications equipment on loan basis with operators to support lead agency command post and West Star Headquarters. Provides ground sensor equipment and personnel to support lead agency.

(g) CDSO-Segundo, California. Provides coordination for grants and loans of DOD equipment and training in support of this phase.

(h) JTF-5. Conducts coordination with military services to assure DOD support; serves as single point of contact for Title 10 support for this phase.

(i) FBI. Sacramento Field Office will provide supplemental investigative support as requested by DEA. Investigative resources will focus on Pena-Martinez linkage to Mexican Drug Trafficking Organization as well as its support infrastructure to include money launderers, transporters and distributors.

(j) USMS. Supports lead agency with seizure of property related to drug trafficking, executing court orders and arrests, witness security, and apprehending fugitives.

(k) OCDETF. By approval of the Associate Attorney General and the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, the Office for U.S. Attorney, Northern California District (San Francisco) will be prepared to provide OCDETF Program support as needed. If the campaign develops a case of sufficient scope (interstate) with national implications, then OCDETF will be tasked to bring the case to court.

(l) ONDCP. Facilitates coordination and liaison for campaign with ONDCP and other Federal agencies.

d. *Phase III, Exploitation.* (November 1, 1998 - October 1, 2000). During the Exploitation Phase, investigations will be expanded based on information developed in Phase II. The DEA forward command post will be disestablished as needed. Reconnaissance will be conducted to identify new marijuana growing plots and surveillance will be maintained over areas previously subject to eradication. DEA, supported by State and local police, will maintain a rapid reaction capability to destroy new-found growing areas and apprehend persons involved. The ultimate destruction of the Pena-Martinez organization and incarceration of its leadership will mark success for this phase.

(1) Lead Agency. DEA continues as lead agency for coordinating reconnaissance, surveillance, and rapid reaction operations for further eradication, arrests, and seizure of property. Continue case work leading to prosecution.

(2) Supporting Agencies.

(a) State Police (Washington, Oregon, California). Continues Phase II support on as-needed basis to prevent resurgence of marijuana growing and trafficking.

(b) Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Forest Service, National Park Service, State Park and Forest Services. Continue support and liaison as in Phase II.

(c) Bureau of Indian Affairs. Continues support as in previous phases.

(d) NDIC/EPIC. Continues to provide information concerning marijuana trafficking.

(e) National Guard (Washington, Oregon, California). Continues to provide liaison to DEA; as forward command post is disestablished, support personnel will be released to home units. Provides troop units as in Phase II on an as-needed basis to support rapid reaction requirements.

(f) 6th Army. As in Phase II, except helicopter company availability limited to 48 hours' notice for support of reaction force.

(g) CDSO-EI Segundo, California. Same as Phase II.

(h) JTF-5. Same as Phase II.

(i) FBI. Same as Phase II.

(j) USMS. Same as Phase II.

(k) OCDETF-Office of U.S. Attorneys, Northern California District. Same as Phase II.

(l) ONDCP. Same as Phase II.

e. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) West Star retains lead for overall coordination support throughout this campaign. DLEAs should submit requests for support to HQ, West Star.

(2) HQ West Star will maintain intelligence fusion cell throughout campaign to support lead agency.

(3) Phase I planning conference for lead agency operations will be held March 29, 1997 at the Command Conference Center, Presidio of San Francisco; coordinating point of contact is West Star Senior Coordinator. Request participating agencies provide planner to conference.

(4) Code name for this campaign is Paul Bunyon I.

(5) HQ West Star will provide overall Public Affairs support. The lead agency will prepare and execute specific Public Affairs announcements concerning arrests, investigations and drug seizures conducted.

4. LOGISTICS. Throughout the campaign, supplies and services (to include maintenance) will be the responsibility of the separate DLEAs and military units except as specifically addressed in this plan or by bilateral agreements between agencies.

a. *Phase I. Preparation* (March 1, 1998 -August 1, 1998). The goal in this phase is to establish supply and service procedures and to preposition required supplies to be ready to support operations in Phase II. Priority for supply and services will be to the lead agency and its efforts to establish a forward command post for the campaign. Procedures for interagency transfer of funds will be established by participating DLEAs and military units. Require -

ments for support will be identified by the lead agency so that supporting agencies can plan for providing support.

(1) Base Development. California National Guard will provide the Gordon Dilmore Armory in Sacramento to all participating agencies for assembling vehicles, equipment and supplies as required. National Park Service will provide forward Command Post facilities at Lassen Volcanic National Park. Additional facilities will be available at Crater Lake National Park in Oregon.

(2) Transportation. Transportation will be provided by commercial contract or within the means of participating agencies.

(3) Medical Services. Medical services will be provided on a local procurement basis in accordance with the standing procedures of the DLEAs.

b. *Phase II. Eradication. Investigations. Apprehension* (August 2 - October 30, 1998). Principal logistics goal in this phase is to assure Lead Agency of sufficient transportation (especially airlift) and communications facilities to efficiently conduct eradication operations. Priority for all logistics efforts will be to support DEA then state and local agencies.

(1) Assumptions. Army helicopter support (one assault helicopter company of no less than 10 UH60 type aircraft) will be available to support the campaign in this phase. JTF-5 will coordinate for command and intelligence communication equipment with military personnel to enable 24-hour operation of forward command post.

(2) Transportation. DLEAs will use organic and commercially contracted transportation means as funded by each agency. JTF-5 will coordinate through Forces Command to provide one Army assault helicopter company in support of the lead agency throughout Phase II. In addition, TAGs of California and Oregon have agreed to provide truck transportation throughout Phase II in support of eradication efforts. Requests for additional transportation support will be forwarded to HQ West Star for action. Lead DLEA will establish priorities for transportation.

(3) Maintenance. DLEAs will be responsible for maintenance of their organic equipment. Active and Reserve component forces established in forward operating bases can provide maintenance assistance to DLEA equipment within capabilities on an interagency reimbursable basis. Maintenance for all military supporting equipment (to include C31) will be provided by sending Active/RC units.

(4) Medical. DLEAs will be responsible for routine medical support for their personnel within agency guidelines. Army helicopters will provide medical evacuation to local hospitals on emergency basis. Active and Reserve Component personnel will be evacuated through military medical channels except when sent to local hospitals for life-threatening emergencies.

(5) Personnel. DLEAs and supporting military units will be responsible to insure prompt replacements for sick or injured personnel. Temporary transfer of personnel or teams from one agency to the tactical control of another DLEA will be authorized by the sending DLEA.

(6) Administration. Procedures for loan of equipment and interagency transfer of funds will be established in bilateral agreements among DLEA.

c. *Phase III. Exploitation* (November 1, 1992 - October 1, 1994). Procedures and arrangements established to support Phase II will also apply during the Exploitation phase. It is not envisioned that a forward command post or support bases will be needed; however, DLEA and military supporting units must be prepared to provide resources as needed to support short notice response operations.

## 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS

a. *Command Relationships*. HQ West Star will retain overall support coordination authority throughout this campaign to provide a single point of contact for Federal, State and local DLEA requests for assistance (transportation, equipment, personnel). West Star will retain intelligence fusion responsibility during the campaign.

(1) *Phase I*. DEA is lead agency. It directs operational planning, rehearsals, and establishment of tactical command posts as needed. Other DLEAs and military organizations provide direct support in accordance with the objectives and priorities of the lead agency.

(2) *Phase II*. DEA is lead agency. It provides direction for conduct of investigations, eradication operations and guidance concerning arrest and evidence. Other DLEAs support. West Star continues support coordination function.

(3) *Phase III*. Initially DEA continues as lead agency, other DLEAs provide operational support. West Star continues as coordinating headquarters. On a contingency basis, OCDETF (USAO, Northern California District) is prepared to serve as lead agency if scope of case(s) developed by this campaign is sufficient to justify transfer to the OCDETF Program.

### (4) *Command Post Locations*.

(a) HQ West Star. Dilmore Reserve Armory, 133 West North Street, Sacramento, CA 94300; Telephone: 916-XXX-XXXX; Fax 916-XXX-XXXX.

(b) DEA Task Force. Phases I and III 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94102; Telephone: 415-XXX-XXXX; Fax 415-XXX-XXXX. Phase II: Honeymoon Lodge, Larsen Volcanic National Park, CA 95113; Telephone: 916-XXX-XXXX; Fax 916-XXX-XXXX.

(c). OCDETF Program. Office of U.S. Attorney, N. California District, 45 Pillory Place, San Francisco, CA 94102; Telephone: 415-XXX-XXXX; Fax 415-XXX-XXXX.

b. *Communications*. In addition to routine and organic communications provided by DLEAs, West Star will coordinate through JTF-5 to assure military communications support throughout Phase II and on-call as needed in Phase III. See Annex K, Communications Instructions.

William Walker  
Senior Tactical Coordinator  
West Star

ANNEXES (Omitted):

A - Participating agencies  
B - Intelligence assessment  
K - Communications instructions

DISTRIBUTION: A

# APPENDIX C

## DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GUIDANCE SUPPORTING THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY

The letters included in this appendix will be useful to law enforcement officials and military officers working together in the counterdrug effort. The letters describe the strategic intent of the Secretary of Defense in providing DoD support to the DLEAs and to other aspects of the national drug control strategy.

Two letters by former Secretary Dick Cheney are important for their guidance: that the military Department will support the drug war because drugs "... pose a direct threat to the sovereignty and security of the country." The letter to the Combatant Commanders (the CINCs) made it clear that the DoD counterdrug support effort "... is a high priority national security mission of the Department of Defense."

The more recent letters by Secretary William J. Perry express his "support for an aggressive and results-oriented DoD counterdrug program." His letter of 27 October 1993 outlines specific initiatives that DoD will pursue. The 15 April 1995 letter identifies DoD's "five counterdrug strategic elements" for supporting the drug strategy.

In spite of significant DoD budget and force structure draw-downs in the 1990s, the Department has been successful in providing assistance to the DLEAs. The program for providing 275 personnel from the Military Departments has been effected. The DoD is providing about 88 personnel to the DLEAs in the Detailee Program. While the Regional Logistical Support Offices mentioned by Secretary Perry have been eliminated and replaced with a Counterdrug Support Office under Defense Logistics Agency, DoD has been able to administer the Section 1208 Excess Property Program to great effect: about \$1 billion in excess property has been transferred to the DLEAs in FY 96.

These guidance letters are supplemented by numerous subordinate directives and regulations that the practitioner will want to keep on hand. The letters included here establish the framework for DoD counterdrug cooperation and support.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA  
September 18, 1989  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GUIDANCE  
FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE  
PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY

On September 5, 1989, the President issued the National Drug Control Strategy pursuant to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. The President's strategy provides for an integrated program of counternarcotics actions designed to move the country substantially closer to the goal of a drug-free America. This guidance is designed to assist in the swift and effective implementation of the President's strategy within the Department of Defense.

The supply of illicit drugs to the United States from abroad, the associated violence and international instability, and the use of illegal drugs within the country pose a direct threat to the sovereignty and security of the country. The threat of illicit drugs strikes at the heart of the Nation's values. It inflicts increased crime and violence on our society and attacks the well-being and productivity of our citizenry. One of the principal foreign policy objectives of this Administration is to reduce, and if possible to eliminate, the flow of illegal narcotic substances to the United States. Also, the Congress has by statute assigned to the Department the duty to serve as the single lead agency of the Federal Government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs to the United States. For these reasons, the detection and countering of the production, trafficking and use of illegal drugs is a high priority national security mission of the Department of Defense.

The Nation ultimately will be rid of the scourge of illegal drugs only through the sustained application of the energy, courage and determination of the American people. As the President's Strategy reflects, the Nation must seek to eliminate both the demand and the supply for illegal drugs, for the Nation will conquer neither if the other is left unchecked.

The Department of Defense, with the Department of State and U.S. Law enforcement agencies, will help lead the attack on the supply of illegal drugs from abroad under the President's Strategy. The efforts of the Department of Defense will complement those of other U.S. agencies and cooperating foreign countries. The Department of Defense will work to advance substantially the national objective of reducing the flow of illegal drugs into the United States through the effective application of available resources consistent with our national values and legal framework.



An effective attack on the flow of illegal drugs depends upon action at every phase of the flow: (1) in the countries that are the sources of the drugs, (2) in transit from the source countries to the United States, and (3) in distribution in the United States. The United States Armed Forces can assist in the attack on the supply of drugs in each of these phases.

## I. THE ATTACK ON DRUGS AT THE SOURCE

The Department of Defense will assist in the attack on production of illegal drugs at the source. The production of illegal drugs is a complex criminal enterprise. The criminal enterprise requires illicit labor, capital, entrepreneurship and a substantial infrastructure to grow the plants that are the raw materials for illegal drugs and to refine and manufacture the illegal drugs. Reducing the availability of these elements of illegal drug production in the countries from which illegal drugs originate would reduce the flow of illegal drugs to the United States.

The Department of Defense can assist in the three elements of an effective attack on the supply of drugs in source countries: (1) assistance for nation-building, (2) operational support to host-country forces, and (3) cooperation with host-country forces to prevent drug exports. Pursuant to the National Drug Control Strategy, near-term efforts will focus on the Andean nations from which most cocaine entering the United States originates. A key requirement for the success of U.S. efforts directed at the supply of illegal drugs, and in particular U.S. counternarcotics operations, will be the cooperation of the foreign countries involved.

As the National Drug Control Strategy indicates with respect to the Andean countries, a sustained, multi-year effort to provide economic, security, and law enforcement assistance is an essential element for a successful fight against illegal drugs abroad. Drug-producing criminal organizations control what amounts to private armies that challenge the law enforcement and military forces of their countries. Often such organizations are intertwined with insurgent forces that challenge directly the governments of their countries. The National Drug Control Strategy calls for the United States to reinforce the abilities of the governments of the countries cooperating in the fight against illegal drugs to combat drug producing organizations. Security assistance will help enable such a government to protect itself from criminal drug enterprises and drug-related insurgencies, and to enforce its laws against drug producers and traffickers. Future economic assistance will help to strengthen the national economy and keep the labor, capital and entrepreneurship available in the country channeled toward useful production and away from drug production. Success in other efforts to attack the supply of illegal drugs depends in the long-run upon the establishment of healthy economies in drug-producing countries and the restoration of governmental authority in those countries. To assist in the implementation of this element of the National Drug Control Strategy, the Department of Defense will execute security assistance programs in accordance with Presidential instructions and applicable law, and in coordination with the Department of State.

Effective implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy requires that the Department of Defense be prepared to provide counternarcotics operational support to the forces of cooperating countries. The U.S. Armed forces can provide foreign forces substantial assistance in training, reconnaissance, command and control, planning, logistics, medical support and civic action in connection with foreign forces' operations against the infrastructure of drug-producing criminal enterprises. Such U.S. military support would be designed to increase the effectiveness of foreign forces' efforts to destroy drug processing laboratories, disrupt drug-producing enterprises, and control the land, river, and air routes by which the enterprises exfiltrate illegal drugs from the country.

In addition to assistance for nation-building and support for foreign forces' strikes on drug-producing enterprises, the U.S. can assist law enforcement agencies of cooperating foreign countries in combating the export of drugs from those countries. The Department of Defense can assist with an improved intelligence collection effort, which will be essential not only to assist the governments of the source countries, but also for U.S. actions in the second line of defense—the attack on drugs in transit to the United States.

## II. THE ATTACK ON DRUGS IN TRANSIT

The substantially increased effort to attack drugs at their source in the drug-producing countries as a first line of defense should help reduce over time the export of illegal drugs to the U.S. Nevertheless, drug-producing criminal enterprises in those countries currently are so vast in scope that, even if U.S. efforts to attack drugs at the source are highly successful, the flow of drugs by sea, air, and land will continue. As the second line of defense against the flow of illegal drugs, the U.S. armed forces will implement the National Drug Control Strategy through substantial efforts to counter the flow of illegal drugs in transit to the United States, both outside the United States and at the Nation's borders and ports of entry. The Department's service pursuant to statutory direction as the single lead agency of the Federal Government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs to the United States will prove particularly important to the success of this effort.

Deployment of appropriate elements of the U.S. armed forces with the primary mission to interdict and deter the flow of drugs should over time help reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the U.S. At a minimum, deploying the armed forces with this mission should have the immediate effect of substantially complicating the logistical difficulties of criminal drug traffickers and increasing the costs and risks of their drug smuggling activities.

As a high priority, United States military counternarcotics deployments will emphasize combating the flow of drugs across the Caribbean Sea and across the southern border of the United States. The Department of Defense will proceed with planning to deploy a substantial Caribbean Counternarcotics Task Force, with appropriate air and maritime drug interdiction assets and aerial and maritime detection and monitoring assets, to combat the flow of illegal

drugs from Latin America through the Caribbean Sea. The Department also will proceed with planning for other deployments of U.S. forces to complement the counternarcotics actions of U.S. Law enforcement agencies and cooperating foreign governments.

Success of the attack on drugs in transit will require sustained deployment of appropriately trained and equipped members of the U.S. armed forces and substantially improved cooperation between the armed forces and U.S. Law enforcement agencies. The substantial increase in military participation in the attack on drugs in transit is intended to be in addition to, rather than in place of, Federal law enforcement agencies' efforts.

The success of interdiction and deterrence efforts will depend greatly upon the ability of the Department of Defense and law enforcement agencies to marshal effectively the myriad command, control, communications and intelligence resources they possess into an integrated counternarcotics network. The Department of Defense will serve as the single lead Federal agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs and will be prepared, with the cooperation of U.S. Law enforcement agencies, to integrate expeditiously into an effective network the Federal command, control, communications, and technical intelligence assets that are dedicated to the mission of interdicting illegal drugs from abroad. The Department of Defense will seek to develop and employ when appropriate the capability to exercise tactical control of Federal detection and monitoring assets actively dedicated to counternarcotics operations outside the United States and in border areas.

To ensure that action to implement the President's National Drug Control Strategy begins immediately, the Commanders-in-Chief of all unified and specified combatant commands will be directed to elevate substantially the mission priority within their commands of actions to fight illegal drugs.

### III. THE ATTACK ON DRUGS IN THE UNITED STATES

After the first and second lines of defense — actions directed at illegal drugs in source countries and in transit — the third line of defense against drugs will be in the United States itself. The role of the armed forces in the third line of defense includes both actions to reduce the supply of illegal drugs and actions to reduce the demand for those drugs.

Within the United States, to assist in reducing the supply of illegal drugs, the counternarcotics actions of the Department of Defense will emphasize support to Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies, and the National Guard in State status. The Department of Defense will assist requesting law enforcement agencies and the National Guard with training, reconnaissance, command and control, planning, and logistics for counternarcotics operations. In appropriate cases, armed forces personnel and equipment will be detailed directly to law enforcement agencies to assist in the fight. The Department of Defense will ensure that its administrative and command structures permit rapid and effective response to appropriate

ate requests for counternarcotics assistance from law enforcement agencies and the National Guard. The Department will continue to assist the Governors of the several States in employing the National Guard in the fight against illegal drugs.

With respect to reduction of demand for drugs within the United States, the Department of Defense bears an important responsibility to reduce the use of illegal drugs within the armed forces and among its civilian personnel. The Department of Defense has met with substantial success in its demand reduction efforts with armed forces personnel through aggressive drug abuse education and drug-testing programs — an 82% reduction in drug abuse since 1980. The Department will step up its efforts to combat illegal drug use by departmental personnel and will make available to other large organizations its experience in reducing the demand for illegal drugs. The Department also will emphasize drug abuse awareness and prevention programs in the Department's school system, which educates over 190,000 of America's children.

The Department of Defense will be prepared to assist the Department of Justice with its responsibilities for incarceration and rehabilitation of drug criminals, through means such as training Federal, State and local personnel in the conduct of rehabilitation-oriented training camps for first-offense drug abusers and providing overflow facilities for incarceration of those convicted of drug crimes.

The President's National Drug Control Strategy emphasizes a multi-national and multi-agency approach to reduction of the drug supply. The Department of Defense has a crucial role in defending the United States from the scourge of illegal drugs. The Department will employ the resources at its command to accomplish that mission effectively. Should it prove necessary in implementing the President's Strategy effectively, any needed additional statutory authority will be sought. The men and women of America's armed forces will fight the production, trafficking and use of illegal drugs, as an important part of the national effort to secure for all Americans a drug-free America.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

September 18, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDERS OF THE  
UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMBATANT COMMANDS

SUBJECT: Elevation of the Mission Priority of Counternarcotics Operations

One of the principal foreign policy objectives of this Administration is to reduce, and if possible to eliminate, the flow of illegal narcotic substances to the United States. The detection and countering of the production, trafficking and use of illegal drugs is a high priority national security mission of the Department of Defense.

I direct you to elevate the priority of the counternarcotics mission within your command. Keep me informed through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the progress of your command in carrying out this mission within your area of responsibility.

/s/ Dick Cheney

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

27 Oct 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY

DEPARTMENTS

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION

DOD COORDINATOR FOR DRUG ENFORCEMENT POLICY AND SUPPORT

COMMANDERS OF THE UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS

DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE

DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION

DIRECTOR OF PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

COMPTROLLER, DOD

GENERAL COUNSEL, DOD

INSPECTOR GENERAL, DOD

ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Department of Defense Guidance for Implementation of National Drug Control Policy

The flow of cocaine and other illegal drugs into the U.S. continues to constitute a critical national security threat. The violence accompanying the distribution and sale of these illegal drugs, and the societal toll that drug use imposes on our citizens, are national problems that affect every American. Moreover, the endemic violence and corruption that the cocaine cartels bring are significant threats to the democracies of South America.

New National-level policy has been promulgated to respond to this threat. The Interim National Drug Control Strategy recently released by the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy emphasizes the need for an integrated National drug control program, including both demand and supply reduction activities, while underscoring the crucial value of demand reduction efforts. The Interim Strategy presents an integrated anti-drug International Leadership program that supports dismantling cartels, assisting key Source and Transit nations, and the interdiction of the transport of drugs. The interdiction efforts are redirected from the Transit zone to the cocaine Source nations.

In direct support of these policy initiatives, the Department of Defense will continue to aggressively execute a comprehensive counterdrug program. The program will be refocused in order to support the new National direction outlined above, and will be shaped by the findings of the recently concluded internal Comprehensive Review of DoD counterdrug programs. The new DoD counterdrug policy will enhance programs that support cocaine Source nation activities, dismantling cartels, and demand reduction, and will address at a lesser priority the heroin threat. Consistent with applicable laws, authorities, and regulations, DoD will also continue to support Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies in their efforts to disrupt the transport of illegal drugs into the U.S., emphasizing critical border locations. As in the past, DoD will not actively participate in the arrest of traffickers or the seizure of drugs, and DoD personnel will not accompany Host Nation forces on field operations.

The Department of Defense will, through the Office of the DoD Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support, in concert with the National Policy, implement the following counterdrug program guidance:

1) Source Nation Support. The new National Strategy calls for increased support to those nations that demonstrate the political will to combat narcotrafficking. Specifically, DoD will focus its supporting efforts in Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia. Support will be aimed at strengthening the democratic institutions in these nations, encouraging national resolve and regional cooperation, and further developing air sovereignty and "endgame" (effective arrest and prosecution) capabilities. DoD will achieve these objectives by providing, to the extent feasible and effective, training and operational support to Source nation police and military through deployments funded by security assistance or counterdrug funding—primarily by increasing the utilization of authority under Section 1004 of the FY 1991 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) as amended and Sections 517 and 506(2)(A) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended.

2) Dismantling the Cartels. DoD will enhance its support of the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA's) Kingpin strategy and the Counterdrug Community's Linear strategy which are specifically designed to dismantle the cocaine cartels and the cocaine "business." DoD will enhance support to drug law enforcement agencies (DLEAs) through the use of Section 1004 authority to provide linguist and intelligence analyst-support, and by expanding intelligence gathering and sharing programs.

3) Detection and Monitoring (D&M) of the Transport of Illegal Drugs. DoD will support domestic law enforcement and host nation detection and monitoring efforts by: (a) emphasizing activities in the cocaine Source countries of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru; (b) streamlining activities in the Transit zone (the region between the Source countries and the U.S. border region)—Transit zone D&M efforts will be focused toward intelligence-cued operations that directly support the Linear strategy and Source country and Arrival zone operations; and (c) refocusing activities in the U.S. to emphasize the cocaine threat at critical border locations.

4) Direct Support to DLEAs Domestically —Emphasizing the Southwest Border and other High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas. DoD currently directly supports the DLEAs through: (a) a Detailee program that provides intelligence analysts, linguists, and support

personnel; (b) a program implementing Section 1004 that provides transportation, maintenance, equipment upgrade, etc.; (c) a program implementing Section 1208 of NDAA FY 1990 and 1991 as amended that provides excess DoD equipment to Federal, State and local DLEAS; and (d) the Governors' Plans for using the National Guard for counterdrug support to Federal, State, and local DLEAs. DoD will develop comprehensive prioritization plans for requirements submitted under these programs, emphasizing the importance of efforts at the Southwest Border and other High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas. Funding support for the Section 1004 program will be increased, and DoD will continue to execute the Detailee and Section 1208 programs at their basic FY 1993 funding and resource levels. In addition, DoD will continue to support Federal counterdrug law enforcement agencies in addressing and solving multi-agency counterdrug command, control, communications, and technical intelligence problems.

5) Demand Reduction. All Military Department and Defense Agency drug testing programs will be continued, with an emphasis placed on cost effective, automated and consolidated testing. Furthermore, the Military Departments and the National Guard will implement expanded counterdrug community outreach programs that target at-risk youth. Building on the current demand reduction outreach pilot programs, Active and Reserve CONUS units will develop new programs that use military personnel as role models. Additionally, the DoD Coordinator will study the feasibility of increasing support, under Section 1208, to institutional drug treatment programs at State and local levels.

#### Other Issues:

In order to enhance counterdrug operational response, the Chairman, Joint Staff will review the current CD operational structure, evaluating the current designation of five supported counterdrug CINCs.

Additionally, CINCUSACOM and USCINCPAC will review counterdrug intelligence centers and functions under their command in order to determine economies or consolidations which will enhance counterdrug mission accomplishment.

The Military Departments will, under a 275 billet ceiling, plan to continue outyear billet/personnel support for the counterdrug Detailee program that supports the DLEAS, and for the Regional Logistical Support Offices that are key to the very effective Section 1208 program.

/s/ William J. Perry



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

17 APR 1995

MEMORANDUM TO SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION  
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT  
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES  
COMMANDERS OF THE UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS

SUBJECT: Counterdrug Operations and Programs

On October 27, 1993, I issued policy guidance for implementation of the President's Interim National Drug Control Strategy. I stated that the flow of cocaine and other illegal drugs into the United States constitutes a critical national security threat, and that the Department would continue to execute a comprehensive counterdrug program. I want to reiterate this policy in support of the President's 1995 National Drug Control Strategy, and clearly state my support for an aggressive and results-oriented DoD counterdrug program.

The use of illegal drugs in the United States remains at crisis proportions, and the rising costs of associated violence, incarcerations, and care for drug users are causing pervasive damage to our society. Alarming, the use of illegal drugs by young people in our nation is on the rise. We must continue to make a strong contribution to the President's National program if we are to succeed in mitigating this serious threat to our nation.

The President has released the 1995 National Drug Control Strategy. My implementing guidance to the Department is clear. The Department of Defense will fully support the President's Strategy through focused efforts which further enhance our five counterdrug strategic elements; (1) source nation support, (2) dismantling the cartels, (3) detection and monitoring, (4) support to domestic drug law enforcement agencies, and (5) demand reduction. The Department will make every effort to ensure that sufficient forces are allocated to the counterdrug mission to make our support to domestic and foreign law enforcement agencies more effective and productive.

The DoD Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support, with oversight from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, is the single focal point for DoD's counterdrug efforts and will ensure that the Department develops and implements a strong counterdrug

program with direction, priorities, and measured results. To ensure that the Department is implementing a cohesive counterdrug program, the DoD Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support will chair quarterly meetings with counterdrug principal decision makers from the Joint Staff, Services, Comptroller and General Counsel. While resolving issues is important, I want this group to also focus on developing and implementing new initiatives that will ensure the success of the Department's program. The DoD Drug Coordinator will forward the results of these quarterly meetings to the Deputy Secretary, whom I have asked to give special attention to the Department's counterdrug program.

The Director, National Drug Control Policy has asked to review all drug-related proposed legislation and testimony, regulations, press statements, and speeches before they are released, and to be informed of major changes to DoD's implementation of the National Strategy before they are implemented. I ask that you satisfy the Director's request, but that all information provided to or contact with the Director, National Drug Control Policy be first coordinated with the DoD Drug Coordinator.

To be successful, the nation must work together. For our part, the Department makes an important and valuable contribution with the unique skills of its personnel, and the great capability of its military systems and intelligence assets. Please tell your personnel that the fight against illegal drug use continues to be a high priority mission of the Department of Defense. Likewise, I ask that you ensure they are recognized for their important contributions.

/s/ William J. Perry

# APPENDIX D

## DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT AND MILITARY ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADNET - Anti-Drug Network

AG - Adjutant General (also TAG, The Adjutant General)

AID - Agency for International Development

ANG - Air National Guard

AOR - Area of Responsibility

ARNG - Army National Guard

ARSTAF - Headquarters, Department of the Army Staff

ATF - Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (also BATF)

AUSA - Assistant U.S. Attorney

AWACS - E3C Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System

BATF - Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

BAY WATCH - Intelligence supported operations to counter movement of illicit drugs through Central America and Mexico to the U.S.

BIA - Bureau of Indian Affairs

BIC - Border Interdiction Committee

BLM - Bureau of Land Management

BLM - Bureau of Land Management

BOP - Bureau of Prisons

C<sup>3</sup>I - Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence

CARIB NET - Intelligence supported operations to counter movement of illicit drugs through the Caribbean

CDSO - Counterdrug Support Office (of the Defense Logistics Agency)

CHARLIE T - Intelligence collection focused on drug traffic through the Pacific by air and sea

CIA - Central Intelligence Agency

CINC - Command-in-Chief (of a U.S. Unified or Specified Command)

CINCLANTFLT DETSO - Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet Detachment South

CINCUSACOM - Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command

CINCUSOUTHCOM - Commander-in-Chief U.S. Southern Command

CMC - Customs Management Center

CMIR - Currency Monetary Instrument Report (a U.S. Treasury Form 4790 by which cash entering the U.S. is declared to Customs)

CN - Counternarcotics

CNA - Coordinator for Narcotics Affairs (usually the Deputy Chief of Mission)

CNAC - Customs National Aviation Center

CND - Joint Staff Counternarcotics Division

CNOD - Counternarcotics Operation Division, J3, The Joint Staff

CONUS - Continental United States

CONVOY - Intelligence supported operations to counter movement of illicit drugs and currency on the U.S. interstate highway system

CSGN - Coordinating Subgroup Narcotics of the NSC

CT- Counterterrorism

CTR - Currency Transaction Report (a U.S. Treasury Form 4789 by which U.S. banks report deposits over \$10,000)

D&M - Detection and Monitoring

DAICC-Domestic Air Interdiction Coordination Center (U.S. Customs)

DAWN - Drug Abuse Warning Network

DEA - Drug Enforcement Administration

DEP&S - Office of DoD Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support

DIA - Defense Intelligence Agency

DLA - Defense Logistics Agency

DLEA - Drug Law Enforcement Agency

DoD - Department of Defense

DOI - Department of Interior

DOJ - Department of Justice

DOS - Department of State

DROP-IN - Intelligence and operations directed against general aviation aircraft at remote locations within the U.S. and parts of the Caribbean

EDIC - Embassy Drug Intelligence Center at U.S. Embassy Bolivia

EPIC - El Paso Intelligence Center

FAA - Federal Aviation Administration

FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation

FDIN - Federal Drug Identification Number

FinCEN - Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

GOLDEN CARRIER - Intelligence supported operations to counter movement of illicit drugs from Asian source countries to the U.S.

GPRA - Government Performance and Results Act of 1993

GPS - Global Positioning System

GSR - Ground Surveillance Radar

HIDTA - High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area

IAC - Information Analysis Center in U.S. Embassy, Mexico City

INL - Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs of the Under Secretary for Global Affairs, U.S. State Department

INM - International Narcotics Matters

INS - Immigration and Naturalization Service

INSINC - INS Integrated Network Communications System

INTERPOL - International Organization of Police Forces

IOA - Interagency Operating Area

IPB - Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

IRS - Internal Revenue Service

IWG - Interagency Working Group

JCG - Joint Command Group

JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff

JETWAY - Intelligence supported operations to counter movement of illicit drugs via commercial aircraft within the U.S.

JIATF- Joint Interagency Task Force

JICC - Joint Information Coordination Center

JOA - Joint Operations Area

JSCP - Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

JTF - Joint Task Force

JUST - Justice Department Telecommunications System

Laser Strike - U.S. Southern Command supported, U.S. and host nation interagency interdiction effort to counter drug trafficking in Andean Ridge countries

LECC - Law Enforcement Coordinating Committee

LEDET - Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment

LEIS II - Coast Guard Law Enforcement Information System

LNO - Liaison Officer

MAAG - Military Assistance and Advisory Group

MARFORLANT LN ELM - Marine Forces Atlantic Liaison Element

MEDEVAC - Medical Evacuation

MET - DEA Mobile Enforcement Team

MILGROUP - Military Group

MTT - Mobile Training Team

NADDIS - DEA Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Information System

NAS - Narcotics Affairs Section of the Country Team

NCIC - National Criminal Information Center

NDIC - National Drug Intelligence Center

NG - National Guard

NGB - National Guard Bureau

NICC - National Intelligence Consumers Committee

NICI - National Interagency Counterdrug Institute

NIIS - INS Non-immigrant Information System

NISU - INS Nationality Identification Search Unit

NLETS - National Law Enforcement Teletype System

NNBIS - National Narcotics Border Interdiction System

NNICC - National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee

NORAD - North American Aerospace Defense Command

NPS - National Park Service

NSC - National Security Council

NSDD - National Security Decision Directive (of the President of the U.S.)

NVG - Night Vision Goggles

OAJCG - Operation Alliance Joint Command Group

OASIS - Operation Activities Special Information System (Immigration and Naturalization Service's file on aliens, drug smugglers and fraudulent documents)

OCDETF - Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force

OCONUS - Outside the Continental United States (overseas)

OMB - Office of Management and Budget

ONDCP - Office of National Drug Control Policy

OPALL - Operation Alliance

OPBAT - Operation Bahamas, Caicos, and Turks Islands

OPCON - Operational Control

OPORD - Operation Order

PAT - U.S. Southern Command Planning Assistance Team

PCC - Policy Coordinating Committee of the NSC

PDD - Presidential Decision Directive

PIPELINE - Intelligence supported operations to counter movement of illicit drugs via the U.S. highways by private auto

PNS - Project North Star

POI - Program of Instruction

POM - Program Objective Memorandum

RDD - Required Delivery date

RECON - Reconnaissance

RLSO - Regional Logistics Support Office

RMIN - Rocky Mountain Information Network

ROE - Rules of Engagement

RSU - Rapid Support Unit

SAC - Special Agent-in-Charge

SAO - Security Assistance Office

SEALS - Sea Air Land Navy Special Operations (Team)

SENTRY - Federal Bureau of Prisons Database

SFOD-A - Special Forces Operational Detachment, Alpha

SKYWEB - DEA and Colombian National Police operation to interdict drug aircraft

SMURF - To make a number of deposits under \$10,000 into a bank to avoid CTR requirements of Department of Treasury

SOCOM - Special Operations Command

SOC SOUTH - Special Operations Command South (a Subordinate Unified Command of US - SOUTHCOM)

SWB - Southwest Border

TACON - Tactical Control

TACSAT - Tactical Satellite

TAG - The Adjutant General

TAT - U.S. Southern Command Tactical Analysis Team

TECS II - Treasury Enforcement Communications System Data Base

TIC - The Interdiction Committee of ONDCP

Title 10 Forces - Forces Under Federal Control

Title 32 Forces - Forces Under National Guard (State) Control

TRADOC - U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

TRANSCOM - U.S. Transportation Command

USACOM - U.S. Atlantic Command

USAID - U.S. Agency for International Development

USAO - U.S. Attorney's Office

USARPAC - U.S. Army, Pacific

USARSO - U.S. Army, South

USBP - U.S. Border Patrol

USCG - U.S. Coast Guard

USCS - U.S. Customs Service

USDA - U.S. Department of Agriculture

USFORSCOM - U.S. Forces Command

USG - U.S. Government

USIC - U.S. Interdiction Coordinator

USIS - U.S. Information Service

USMS - U.S. Marshals Service



USPACOM - U.S. Pacific Command

USSOUTHAF FWD - U.S. Air Force South, Forward

USSOUTHCOM - U.S. Southern Command

USSS - U.S. Secret Service

WINTERNIGHT - Intelligence supported operations to counter the smuggling of narcotics into the U.S. via commercial air, maritime and overland cargo

WSIN - Western States Information Network (state and local DLEA network for criminal case information)

# APPENDIX E

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