STATEMENT

OF

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OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

CONCERNING

THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION
IN HAMDAN v. RUMSFELD

PRESENTED ON

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Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Skelton, and Members of the Committee.

I am pleased to appear here today on behalf of the Administration to discuss the proposed legislation that we believe Congress should put in place to respond to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.

Earlier this week, the President transmitted to Congress a legislative proposal reflecting the outcome of two months of discussions within the Executive Branch and between the political Branches of Government. In early July, I testified before this Committee on these issues together with Principal Deputy General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Daniel Dell’Orto. I and others within the Administration have testified before other congressional committees, and we have engaged in numerous informal consultations with Members of Congress and their staffs. These discussions have been equally extensive within the Administration, and they have included detailed discussion with and input from the military lawyers in all branches of the Armed
Services, including the TJAGs who are here today. They and their staffs have been active participants in our deliberations, and many of their comments, as well as the comments from the Hill, are reflected in the legislative package that the President has recommended for the consideration of Congress.

**Military Commission Procedures**

Mr. Chairman, first and foremost, the proposed legislative package responds to the Supreme Court’s decision in *Hamdan* by establishing statutory military commissions to try captured terrorists for violations of the laws of war. Shortly after the atrocities of 9/11, President Bush directed the Department of Defense to establish military commissions for trying the terrorists responsible for those and other war crimes. The path to those prosecutions has not been easy, however, as the procedures have been challenged in litigation over the past several years. Now that the Supreme Court has decided *Hamdan*, we believe it is time to establish military commissions as a matter of statute that will satisfy the issues raised by the Court and that will enable the United States to prosecute and bring to justice members of al Qaeda and the Taliban for their war crimes.

We therefore would propose that Congress enact a new Code of Military Commissions, modeled on the court-martial procedures of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or “UCMJ,” but adapted for use in the special context of military commission trials of terrorists. The proposed legislation would create a new chapter for military commission procedures in title 10 of the U.S. Code, which would follow immediately after the UCMJ. These military commissions would have jurisdiction to try alien unlawful enemy combatants—that is, members of groups, such as al Qaeda and the Taliban, who wage war against the United States in disregard of the established law of
In many respects, the new Code of Military Commissions would track closely the procedures and structure of the UCMJ. We have proposed a system of military commissions, presided over by a military judge, with commission members drawn from the Armed Forces. The prosecution and defense counsel would be appointed from the JAG corps with the ability of the accused to retain a civilian counsel, in addition to assigned military defense counsel, and with the possibility that some prosecutors may be experienced prosecutors from the Department of Justice. Trial procedures, sentencing, and appellate review would largely track those currently provided under the UCMJ (albeit with federal court review in the D.C. Circuit, as Congress provided in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, or “DTA”).

Because of the specific concerns raised by the Supreme Court, and because of comments from the Hill and within the Pentagon, the new Code of Military Commissions would differ in significant respects from the military-commission procedures established before Hamdan.

In particular, the presiding officer would be a certified military judge with the traditional authority of a judge to make final rulings at trial on law and evidence, just as in courts-martial. And as with courts-martial, the military judge would not be a voting member of the commission.

We also propose increasing the minimum number of commission members to five, from three, and require twelve members of the commission for any case in which the death penalty is sought. As is the case under the current military-commission procedures, and just as under the UCMJ, the Government would bear the burden of proving the
accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and a conviction would require a vote of two-thirds of the commission members in a non-death penalty case. As under the UCMJ, the death penalty would require a unanimous vote of all 12 commission members.

In addition, the Code of Military Commissions would establish a military appeals system that parallels the appellate process under the UCMJ. The draft legislation would create a Court of Military Commission Review within DoD to hear appeals on questions of law. The legislation would provide for judicial review of final military commission decisions in the D.C. Circuit, the same Article III court that currently hears those appeals and other detainee actions under the DTA. The bill would give all convicted detainees an appeal as of right, regardless of the length of their sentence, as opposed to the pre-
Hamdan system, which provides for discretionary review of sentences under 10 years. The Supreme Court could review the D.C. Circuit’s decisions through petitions for a writ of certiorari.

While the proposed military commissions would track the UCMJ in many ways, the Code of Military Commissions would depart from court-martial procedures in those instances where applying the UCMJ’s provisions would be inappropriate or impractical. This is critical, because military necessity would not permit the strict application of all court-martial procedures, and because there are relevant differences between the procedures appropriate for trying our service members and those appropriate for trying the terrorists whom they fight.

For instance, the UCMJ provides Miranda-type protections for U.S. military personnel that are broader than the civilian rule and that could impede or limit evidence obtained during the interrogation of terrorist detainees. I do not believe that anyone
contends that terrorists should be given *Miranda* warnings before interrogations. The draft legislation therefore would not include such *Miranda* requirements. At the same time, it would provide the accused with counsel once charges are brought and would grant the accused a privilege against self-incrimination during the trial.

The military-commission procedures also would not include the UCMJ’s Article 32 investigation, which is a pre-charging proceeding that is akin to, but considerably more protective than, the civilian grand jury. Such a proceeding is appropriate when applied to U.S. military personnel, but is unnecessary and inappropriate for the trial of captured unlawful combatants, who are already subject to detention under the laws of war.

Because military commissions must try crimes based on evidence collected everywhere from the battlefields in Afghanistan to foreign terrorist safe houses, we believe that the Code of Military Commissions should provide for the introduction of all probative evidence, including hearsay evidence, where such evidence is reliable. Like a civilian judge, the military judge may exclude such evidence if the probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. But the Code of Military Commissions must provide a standard of admissibility broader than that applied in court-martial proceedings.

Court-martial rules of evidence track those in civilian courts, reflecting the fact that the overwhelming majority of court-martial prosecutions arise from every-day violations of the military code of conduct, far from the battlefield. By contrast, military commissions must permit the introduction of a broader range of evidence, including hearsay statements, because many witnesses are likely to be foreign nationals who are not
amenable to process, and other witnesses may be unavailable because of military necessity, incarceration, injury, or death. In this respect, the Code of Military Commissions follows the practice of international war crimes tribunals, which similarly recognize the need for broad evidentiary rules when dealing with evidence obtained under conditions of war.

Court-martial rules of evidence also require that classified evidence, if it is to be used at a court martial, be shared with the accused. In the midst of the current conflict, we simply cannot consider sharing with captured terrorists the highly sensitive intelligence that may be relevant to military-commission prosecutions. In the court-martial context, the Government must choose between disclosing the evidence to the accused or allowing the accused to evade prosecution. Putting the Government to that choice may be entirely appropriate when it comes to the trial of members of our own Armed Forces, but the Administration does not believe that imposing that dilemma is either necessary or appropriate when it comes to trying alien unlawful combatants for violations of the laws of war. We therefore believe it critical to ensure that military commissions have the discretion, under defined and limited circumstances, to admit classified evidence not shared with the accused.

To this end, the proposed legislation would require that before any classified evidence is to be introduced outside the accused’s presence, the head of the executive department or agency that has classified the evidence must certify that sharing the evidence would harm national security and that the evidence has been declassified to the maximum extent possible. The military judge then would be required to make specific findings that the exclusion is warranted, is no broader than necessary, and would not
compromise the accused’s right to a full and fair trial. At least one defense counsel, properly cleared, would be able to represent the accused at all proceedings where evidence is offered against the accused. Additionally, the proposed legislation provides the accused with an unclassified version of the classified information introduced against them, consistent with national security concerns. These procedures, properly administered by the military judge, would strike the appropriate balance between safeguarding our Nation’s secrets and ensuring a fair trial of the accused.

**Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions**

Mr. Chairman, the Administration also believes that the draft legislation must address the Supreme Court’s ruling in *Hamdan* that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies to our armed conflict with al Qaeda. The United States has never before applied Common Article 3 in the context of an armed conflict with international terrorists.

In my previous testimony before the Committee, I discussed with the Committee the problems caused by the vagueness of some terms in Common Article 3, particularly its prohibition of “[o]utrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment,” a phrase that is susceptible of uncertain and unpredictable application. If left undefined by statute, the application of Common Article 3 will subject those who fight to defend America from terrorist attack to an uncertain legal standard that may be influenced by foreign tribunals.

The Supreme Court has said that in interpreting a treaty provision such as Common Article 3, the meaning given to the treaty language by international tribunals must be accorded “respectful consideration,” and the interpretations adopted by other
state parties to the treaty are due “considerable weight.” Accordingly, without the bill’s provisions, the meaning of Common Article 3—the standard that now applies to the conduct of U.S. personnel in the War on Terror—would be informed by the evolving interpretations of tribunals and governments outside the United States.

We believe that the standards governing the treatment of detainees by United States personnel in the War on Terror should be certain, and that those standards should be defined clearly by U.S. law, consistent with our international obligations. The draft legislation therefore would define our obligations under the relevant treatment provisions of Common Article 3 by reference to the U.S. constitutional standard already adopted by Congress in the McCain Amendment, which are fully consistent with United States international obligations.

Last year, after a significant public debate on the standard that should govern the treatment of captured al Qaeda terrorists, Congress adopted the McCain Amendment as part of the Detainee Treatment Act. That Amendment prohibits “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,” as defined by reference to the established meaning of our Constitution, for all detainees held by the United States, regardless of nationality or geographic location. Indeed, the same provision was used to clarify similarly vague provisions in another treaty—the Convention Against Torture. Congress rightly assumed that the enactment of the Detainee Treatment Act settled questions about the baseline standard that would govern the treatment of detainees by the United States in the War on Terror.

The Administration further believes that we owe it to those called upon to handle detainees in the War on Terror to ensure that legislation addressing the *Hamdan* decision
brings clarity and certainty to the War Crimes Act. To that end, the proposed legislation sets forth a definite and clear list of nine offenses serious enough to be considered “war crimes,” punishable as the most serious breaches of Common Article 3, including clear and serious “outrages upon human dignity,” such as rape, sexual assault, and conducting Nazi-like human experiments.

**Judicial Review of Detainee Claims**

Finally, Mr. Chairman, the draft legislation would clarify how the judicial review provisions of the DTA apply. Some have argued that *Hamdan* makes the DTA inapplicable to the hundreds of habeas petitions brought by the Guantanamo detainees to challenge their detention as enemy combatants. While we disagree with that reading, the proposed legislation would make clear that alien detainees held as enemy combatants by the United States in the War on Terror may not challenge their detention or trial in advance of a final judgment of a military commission or a final order of a Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

We believe that that was Congress’s original intent under the DTA, and we believe that it makes sense, as in the civilian justice system, to restrict the accused’s ability to pursue appellate remedies until after the trial has been completed. Our courts should not be misused to hear all manner of other challenges by terrorists lawfully held as enemy combatants in wartime.

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I look forward to discussing these subjects with the Committee this morning.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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