



PRESS RELEASE

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Opening Statement of Chairman Hunter
Hearing on Intelligence Implications of the 9-11 Commission Report for DOD

The committee meets today to continue its review of the findings and recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. Our distinguished witnesses are:

The Honorable Stephen Cambone
Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence

Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby, USN
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Major General Raymond Odierno USA
Former Commander, 4th Infantry Division

Yesterday, the committee heard from the 9-11 Commission leadership and from senior DOD officials on the broad strategy recommendations found in Chapter 12 of the Commission report.

Today, we turn attention to the more prescriptive recommendations found in Chapter 13 of the report specifically dealing with how to reorganize national and defense intelligence agencies.

Our objective is to better understand the substance, merit and implications of these recommendations in preparation for the likely legislative action to follow.

As the Armed Services Committee of the House, it is our responsibility to explore in sufficient depth and detail the possible impacts that any such reforms could have on the ability of our military to fight and prevail on tomorrow's battlefields. Some choose to characterize such scrutiny as undermining the Commission's work, I consider it our duty and obligation to the millions of men and women that wear our nation's uniform.

Simply put, we must get this right. If we allow a rush to judgment dictated more by the election cycle than by the demands of national security, then we will make ourselves more vulnerable and cause the nation more harm.

The 9-11 Commission's report has highlighted some very important findings. First, the intelligence community continues to suffer from "stove-piping," meaning that sometimes the left hand doesn't know what the right hand is doing. Second, the Commission found that the traditional principle of

“need to know” often conflicts with the “need to share,” meaning that protecting sources and methods sometimes undermines the ability of analysts from different agencies to put together a comprehensive picture of threats based on fragmentary evidence. Third, the Commission highlighted the difficulty of coordinating multiple intelligence agencies while also running the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Commission recommended modeling the solution after the Goldwater-Nichols reforms of the Department of Defense. That legislation succeeded because it sought unity of command, developed personnel policies that rewarded joint assignments, and reduced the layers of bureaucracy between the President and the commanders in the field.

In endorsing the Commission’s findings, the President appears to be keeping these principles firmly in mind. He agrees with the need to improve cooperation and coordination by establishing the National Intelligence Director and separating that function from the management of a single agency. He also seeks to break down stovepipes by creating the National Counter-Terrorism Center and strengthen the unity of command by ensuring that it doesn’t undermine his authorities and responsibilities as commander-in-chief.

Undoubtedly, we will have a few ideas of our own. For example, I am concerned that some of the Commission’s recommendations if not carefully implemented, may increase the gap between warfighters and the national intelligence capabilities they rely on to protect our forces and defeat our enemies. Over the last decade, the military has grown more dependent on improved national intelligence systems for precise maneuvers and application of firepower. The Department’s transformation plans will only increase that dependence. Transferring DOD national intelligence capabilities to an outside entity could end up dulling our military edge—which would ultimately make us less secure.

Our witnesses this morning will help us sort through these issues, both from the standpoint of the warfighter’s need for intelligence and the Department’s relationship to other agencies.

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