STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD

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BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

AUGUST 11, 2004

IMPLICATIONS OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE 9/11 COMMISSION ON THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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INTRODUCTION

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee for inviting me here today. I appreciate this opportunity to speak to you about the 9/11 Commission recommendations.

The 9/11 Commission recommendations have provided the country an opportunity to debate a topic of surpassing importance: the organization and operation of the nation’s intelligence apparatus. Its recommendations urge us to focus closely on two important missions of the Intelligence Community (IC):

• Indications and warning of pending events--especially terrorist events--in enough time to allow the Executive Branch to take action

• Providing the operational elements of the U.S. government, not only DoD but the Departments of State, Homeland Security, Justice, Treasury
and others, as well as state and local governments with timely or “actionable” intelligence to support their operations—especially, but not exclusively, counter-terrorism operations.

As a result of its focus on these two missions—Indications & Warning (I&W) and “actionable” intelligence—the Commission’s recommendations urge us to consider three major areas for improvement within the field of intelligence:

- There is a need for an improved domestic intelligence capability and that capability must be aligned with the broader U.S. intelligence enterprise;
- There is a need to update the information security policies of the Intelligence Community and to build cross agency information technology (IT) systems to permit and promote the sharing not only of finished intelligence but making it possible for an analyst to access all available information and data needed to do his/her job and to make possible the pursuit of competitive analysis;
- There is a need to infuse the Intelligence Community with a joint mission orientation and provide it with leadership able to adjust resources and personnel to meet enduring challenges and emergent threats.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE

The Department has an interest in seeing a robust domestic intelligence capability that can assist in its force protection mission for our military members, our civilians and the numerous DoD installations in this country and overseas. It can also complement foreign and military intelligence to help address abroad the variety of transnational and global problems that are the hallmark of the 21st century. The FBI has made significant progress since 9/11. In the continuing enhancement of our domestic capability, special care will be needed to safeguard the rights and liberties of American citizens. There is no good trade between liberty and security.

INFORMATION AND DATA SHARING

With respect to reforming information security and expanding IT regimes to enable information and data sharing, the Department is fully conversant with and convinced of the force multiplying effects of networked operations in which its analysts and operators have access to data on the net. Those effects have been publicly displayed in OEF in Afghanistan and OIF in Iraq. The prospect of harnessing the power of networked operations to networked intelligence is one the Department supports.
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It is worth noting that achieving the level of networked proficiency the DoD enjoys today has taken more than twenty years. Despite this effort our level of proficiency is not what we would like or think we need. It is for that reason we continue to seek upwards of $30B over the FYDP for network related systems, software and other applications.

Although the Intelligence Community has made great progress in this area through the information sharing working group, it will take more time and effort networking the domestic, foreign, and military intelligence organizations to achieve what we need it to be.

JOINT MISSION FOCUS

With respect to a joint perspective, the Department has had nearly twenty years of experience with “jointness.” It knows how powerful a joint perspective driving joint operations can be.

It is important to realize that a joint perspective does not arise easily. Individuals naturally associate themselves with their own--families or clans, provinces or districts, states and nations. It is no different for service members who take great pride in the history, tradition and accomplishments of their parent service. Nevertheless, a joint perspective in DoD was motivated and pursued by a
recognition that singular organizations--essential though a service specialty may be--were not sufficiently capable to meet the broad range of military objectives assigned to the Department. Propelled by the Goldwater-Nichols reforms of the mid-1980s, the Department learned how to do centralized planning by Combatant Commanders employing joint staffs directing decentralized execution in which subordinate commanders in turn integrated land, sea, air and space forces into powerful joint task forces or JTFs. The JTFs are the engines of our military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.

An approach to implementing the Commission’s recommendations that adopts the “best practices” from the Department’s experience with jointness could yield a number of benefits.

In particular, an emphasis on joint centralized planning and joint decentralized execution might bring in its wake:

• Inclusion by the National Intelligence Director (NID) in his planning the experience and expertise of collectors, analysts and operators from across the government. This would in turn suppose some responsibility by the NID for oversight and direction in the career development and management of those collectors, analysts and operators.

• Improvement in the all source analytic capabilities of the domestic and
military intelligence sectors as they seek to fully match the capabilities within the foreign intelligence sector, especially at CIA. This would imply some responsibility by the NID to oversee IT builds, establish and enforce policies and standards for mutual access to databases and conduct periodic evaluations of the performance of the foreign, domestic, and military intelligence components with the IC.

- A determination to form, at the operating level, within the departments of the government, joint intelligence-operations organizations similar to the national level National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC). This could result in lead responsibility for operations being assigned to a domestic, foreign, or military department, with others in support, depending on the issue. With respect to intelligence, that department could be assured that an interagency JTF-like organization would have access to departmental intelligence as well as that of the entire IC. Such an organization could enable a lead department to act quickly on strategic-level I&W. Moreover, within departments, it could create the synergy between intelligence and operations that generates the “actionable” intelligence to support an ongoing effort. That is, intelligence would feed operations; operations would create new
intelligence by virtue of its actions; and the cycle would be reinforced within the JTF-like structure, which itself would have a communications link to the NID.

- Although the NCTC will concentrate analytical expertise on foreign and domestic terrorism in one location, the President has made clear that the NCTC will assure the flow of alternative analytic views, to the extent they exist in the Center and among agencies and departments, to policymakers, including the President. This would provide the NID with three opportunities to test hypotheses and analysis: first, by sparking competition within the agencies performing domestic, foreign and military intelligence; second, among them when a problem crosses over the boundaries of their expertise; and third, between the NID’s staff and one or more components within the IC. This could enrich analysis at all levels, drive collectors to gather more evidence to support contrary positions and improve the product provided to the President and the NSC, as well as to the departments with operational responsibilities.

In summary, the prospect of increased jointness within the Intelligence Community is very attractive to DoD. But as in the case of information security, information and data sharing and IT, how that joint environment is designed, when
and how planning and execution is done, what authorities are invested in whom—all are terribly important and complicated.

**National Intelligence Director**

The President has decided to establish a National Intelligence Director (NID). As the President made clear, the NID will serve as the President’s principal intelligence advisor and will oversee and coordinate the foreign and domestic activities of our Nation’s intelligence services. The President has made clear that the NID will assume the broader responsibility of leading the Intelligence Community across our government. The President has also endorsed a National Counter Terrorism Center. As the President said, the NCTC will ensure effective joint action to counter terrorism, and that our efforts are unified in priority and purpose. And, he has endorsed changes in Congressional oversight of the IC.

I did not come today prepared to discuss Congressional oversight. Here I think the Secretary’s advice to listen and learn from the debate on the subject is appropriate.

With respect to the NCTC, I have already touched on the value of a joint organization in which intelligence and operations are more closely coupled.

With respect to the NID, there is much to be developed in the way of detail
on the precise authorities and responsibilities of the NID. There will be considerable debate and discussion on these issues.

But in the end, it will be important that the resulting Intelligence Community:

- Include an appropriately aligned domestic intelligence component;

- Operate under 21st century information management and technology standards so that domestic, foreign, and military intelligence components located in US government Departments and Agencies have access to databases across the IC, conduct all-source analysis and provide the NID with competitive analysis and alternative hypotheses to improve support to planners and operators throughout the federal government and in state and local governments;

- Take on a “joint” perspective to breakdown the institutional barriers and restrictions to horizontal integration and cooperation across agencies and to permit it the centralized planning and decentralized execution needed to provide the I&W and rapid reaction to intelligence.

These are difficult objectives to achieve. But they are central to meeting the challenges identified by the 9/11 Commission.

An issue that is frequently raised in discussion of IC reorganization is the
placement of the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). All are presently located within the DoD. The first two are identified in law as “combat support agencies” (CSAs). (The Defense Intelligence Agency is a CSA, as well.) As such, these agencies perform essential functions within the DoD.

Their functions include collection of data to support development and acquisition of weapons systems, formulation of defense strategy and policy, the identification of the capabilities and intentions of potential adversary forces, indicators and warning of attack and support to the development of the deliberate and concept plans from which the operational plans such as OEF and OIF are drawn.

But the relationship between these CSAs and the warfighter is often more intimate than this abstract description would suggest:

- Bomber crews count on the product from the CSAs to help route them around deadly air defense units;

- Naval forces rely on the CSAs to provide the situational awareness key to reducing vulnerability in hostile environments;

- Ground forces depend on the support of the CSAs to locate, identify and track both the enemy and friendly forces, thereby increasing the
effectiveness of US and coalition operations while reducing the incidents of friendly fire;

- Soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines in need of rescue or relief depend on the product of those CSAs to help find them, guide the rescue or relief forces to their location and help defend all of them from attack by enemy forces.

In their “national” role, NSA and NGA—as well as the other intelligence elements within DoD such as the Defense Intelligence Agency that are designated as members of the national intelligence community—operate under the tasking of the DCI. It is he who sets the priorities for collection; it is under his auspices that differences among customers and agencies are adjudicated.

With respect to NRO, the DCI and the Secretary of Defense mutually establish the performance specifications for satellite systems acquired and operated by the NRO. And while the DCI sets the budget priorities for NRO through the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP)—thereby determining what systems will be acquired and when—the Secretary of Defense has the option to supplement the NFIP funding through the Defense Space Reconnaissance Program to add capability to a system or accelerate its procurement.

The NSA, NGA, NRO, and other elements of the IC within the DoD are of
critical importance to both the Secretary of Defense and DCI for meeting their statutory responsibilities. It is for that reason the current relationship, in effect a partnership, was forged between them in law and supporting executive orders. Each has independent responsibilities, which include exercising his authorities to ensure the other can fully discharge his responsibilities.

This partnership could be continued when the NID comes into being without moving out of the DoD the CSAs or other elements of the IC within the department.¹

CONCLUSION

Any proposed changes to the current structure of the Intelligence Community need to pass an important two-part test. First, how would they help

¹The National Security Act of 1947, also known as Title 50, establishes the general structure of the IC, describes the duties and authorities of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), and the duties of the Secretary of Defense in the Intelligence Community including the Secretary’s obligations to the DCI. In particular, in section 105 of National Security Act, the Secretary is directed to ensure that the military departments “maintain sufficient capabilities to collect and produce intelligence to meet a) the requirements of the DCI; b) the requirements of the Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; c) the requirements of the unified and specified combatant commands and of joint operations; and d) the specialized requirements of the military departments for intelligence necessary to support tactical commanders, military planners, the research and development process, the acquisition of military equipment, and training and doctrine.” The DCI and the national intelligence requirements come first.
solve problems identified by or recognized in light of the findings of the 9/11 Commission? Second, would they create new problems more difficult to overcome than those we intended to fix? Both are important. The task of capitalizing on the findings of the 9/11 Commission is difficult and complicated enough without taking on tasks that do not remedy the agreed upon problems. The latter is important because in making choices we need to be clear about how we have managed the risks we face. Few choices are risk free. We need to be certain we know and accept the risks we may create as we move to address those we know we face.

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.