STATEMENT OF
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COMMANDER
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
ON
COMMAND POSTURE

APRIL 8, 2003
Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and Distinguished Members of the Committee,

It is an honor to appear before you representing the outstanding men and women of US Strategic Command. As you know, the President has asked all of us in the Department of Defense to “challenge the status quo and envision a new architecture of American defense for decades to come.” The new US Strategic Command is a clear product of that revolutionary and continuing effort. Today, the finest Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines — representing active duty, Guard and Reserves — joined by a cadre of talented civilians, are building an entirely new command, instrumental in fighting the war on terrorism and focused on reshaping the nation’s military capabilities for the demands of the 21st Century.

Capitalizing on the legacy of our predecessors, we have made tremendous strides in the short time since the key elements of US Space Command and US Strategic Command were reshaped as the new US Strategic Command. Specifically, we have:

- Created an entirely new unified command, while streamlining our headquarters management and supporting the establishment of the vitally important US Northern Command.

- Provided federated intelligence support to multiple regional combatant commands, conducting battle damage assessment and intelligence analysis, and leading the intelligence community-wide effort to find and characterize specific targets in Iraq.

- Completed a sweeping revision of the nation’s strategic plan in support of the Nuclear Posture Review, updating our deterrent force posture for the needs of the new international security environment.
• Supported the initial launches of both the Atlas V and Delta IV, a major step in sustaining assured access to space for the next decade.

• Assumed four global missions previously unassigned to any commander, in accordance with Presidential direction in Unified Command Plan Change Two.

• Began developing new partnerships with NASA, the National Security Agency, the Missile Defense Agency, and the Intelligence Community in order to better satisfy the nation’s defense needs in the 21st Century.

Each of these ongoing efforts is important to our future, but represents only the first step. They are a foundation for aggressively pursuing our next set of challenges and opportunities with our strong and growing team of defense and Agency partners. As we work to reshape ourselves for the future, we are guided by the six transformational goals Secretary Rumsfeld identified and shared with the Congress in February:

• Defend the US homeland and bases of operations overseas
• Project and sustain forces in distant theaters
• Deny enemies sanctuary
• Improve our space capabilities and maintain unhindered access to space
• Harness our advantage in information technology to link different types of US forces so they can fight jointly
• Protect US information networks from attack and disable the information networks of our adversaries
The new globally-focused US Strategic Command plays an integral and defining role in each of these six areas, and I welcome the opportunity to address the Committee on the opportunities, policies, and programs supporting the command’s posture.

Creation of the new command

Following a series of high-level studies that included the Space Commission, the Quadrennial Defense Review, and the Nuclear Posture Review, the President and Secretary of Defense directed the creation of a new unified command to effectively and efficiently anticipate and counter the diverse and increasingly complex global threats confronting our nation. These threats to our homeland, our allies, and our interests abroad range from conventional military capabilities to the asymmetric dangers of cyber attack, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and terrorism – each intended to circumvent the many strengths of the United States and exploit any perceived vulnerabilities on the ground, in the air, at sea, and in space. These threats are global in scale and often transcend geographic or regional boundaries.

The new US Strategic Command was established October 1st, 2002 to address these very threats. Uniting US Space Command and US Strategic Command will serve to strengthen the traditional relationship between strategic space-based communications and surveillance capabilities and our strong nuclear deterrent. Our new charter is to pursue an integrated, trans-regional approach to both deterrence and war fighting, and to further strengthen our complementary and supporting relationships with the Regional Combatant Commanders, each of who retains the full responsibility for meeting the regional challenges within their respective area of responsibility (AOR).
Winning the war on terrorism remains the Department’s top priority. The men and women of STRATCOM provide support to the Regional Combatant Commanders in all areas of our expertise – global strike, intelligence, planning, space-based operations, information operations, cyber warfare, and communications. Recent contributions include:

- Assured peak GPS performance for precision strikes through our GPS Enhanced Theater Support program, with the goal of reducing the number of sorties required and minimizing collateral damage.

- Adjudicated available bandwidth among the combatant commanders, leasing additional capacity on LEASAT 5, and coordinating DoD efforts to aggressively implement Demand Assigned Multiple Access (DAMA) capability in the UHF and other SATCOM spectrums. Today General Franks, for example, has more than 400 times the communications bandwidth General Schwarzkopf did in DESERT STORM.

- Space and Missile Defense Command, as the Army service component for STRATCOM, created the Mission Management Center which oversees the use of thousands of Blue Force Tracking (BFT) systems. This equipment allows us to know precisely where our military units are on the battlefield, down to the individual person or platform, reducing the potential for friendly casualties. The Grenadier Brat BFT system is currently in use by all four Services and special operations forces in Iraq.

- Through our component, the Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC), we supported US Central Command and other regional combatant commands with more than 5000 man days of information operations (IO) expertise over just the last 18 months. The result of the efforts of these talented electronic warfare and IO professionals is clearly
evident in the ongoing IO campaign against Iraq. JIOC personnel deployed to Tampa authored the first concept of operations for coordinating electronic warfare within CENTCOM. Additionally, they provided directly to CENTCOM planners more than 100 psychological perspectives/IO targeting folders.

- Deployed Theater Planning Response Cells on ten occasions to provide counter-WMD planning and consequence of execution analysis to three Regional Combatant Commanders facing the difficult challenge of targeting WMD facilities.

We are formulating new concepts to better support the staff augmentation needs of the Regional Combatant Commander. Rather than sending multiple, disparate units to support a deployed commander’s staff, we are developing a consolidated team concept that will fit seamlessly into a Regional Combatant Commander’s organization. It will provide both deployed talent and 24/7 reach-back capability to our headquarters. STRATCOM is working with regional combatant commands and US Joint Forces Command to integrate our team and communications architecture into the Regional Combatant Commander’s training and exercises in order to establish and mature the relationships that will enhance joint war fighting effectiveness in future conflicts.

**Future of our nuclear force structure**

The strategy of deterrence remains a critical component of our national security strategy. I am proud to again report that our nation’s nuclear deterrent forces are fully ready.

As you know, for more than 56 years, Strategic Air Command and the former US Strategic Command stood at the ready, supporting deterrence through rigorous and disciplined planning, effective
training, and robust command and control of our nation’s strategic nuclear forces. The professionals of the new US Strategic Command still willingly shoulder that enormous responsibility.

We remain fully confident that STRATCOM’s readiness, and that of our Service components, is the most effective guarantee that the use of these weapons will never be required. As we reshape our organization and assume broader responsibilities, we remain committed to rigorously ensuring the continued safety and surety of our nuclear arsenal and delivery systems. Zero defects remain our standard.

We are making prudent and measurable progress in moving toward achieving the President’s goal, codified in the Moscow Treaty, of reducing the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to the range of 1700 to 2200 by the year 2012. Air Force Space Command, our Air Force component, began deactivation of Peacekeeper ICBMs on 1 October 2002. This effort remains on schedule and will be complete by 2005. The Navy removed two Trident submarines from strategic nuclear service in FY03, USS OHIO and USS FLORIDA, to be followed in FY04 by USS MICHIGAN and USS GEORGIA. All four of these still capable vessels will be reconfigured into TOMAHAWK cruise missile carriers, designated SSGN, by the end of 2007. They will also provide a tremendous increase in the size and sustainability of support to our special operations forces. With the 1996 transition of the B-1 to a purely non-nuclear role, we are moving to retire several hundred gravity weapons in FY03, and are finalizing plans to remove many of the oldest ICBM warheads from the nation’s active nuclear stockpile.

Sustainment and Modernization. With no new nuclear systems under development, the important task of sustaining and modernizing our nation’s aging weapons and delivery platforms must be carefully managed
and appropriately resourced. These forces must remain a ready, reliable, and credible element of our nation’s security posture. Other than the submarine launched D-5 missile still in low-rate production, we are no longer building any of the weapons or platforms that comprise our strategic forces. We appreciate your continued strong support, through the Services and Agencies programs, of our key weapon, delivery platform, and communications life extension and upgrade programs. These include:

- Minuteman III Guidance Replacement Program (GRP), which replaces aging electronic components and updates software to preserve reliability, maintain accuracy, and ensure supportability through 2020. The GRP is the foundation of Minuteman III modernization and is being completed at the rate of 80 per year, with 140 deployed to date.

- Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP), which corrects age-related degrades by repouring the propellant in stages I and II, and remanufactures stage III. PRP requires GRP software for fielding, and must be sequenced appropriately. It is programmed for the rate of 96 per year, with 49 boosters deployed to date.

- B-52 Avionics Mid-life Improvement, one of STRATCOM’s highest priorities, and Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) upgrade, to ensure mission capability and assured connectivity as this aircraft continues to establish new benchmarks in service longevity.

- D5 SLBM Life Extension and Backfit Programs, which will provide a standardized fleet of 14 SSBNs for the full hull life of the Trident II. Two SSBNs are scheduled to complete the Backfit Program in FY06 and FY07. D5 Life Extension requires replacement of guidance and missile electronics on fielded D5 missiles, and procurement of 115
additional missiles to meet reliability testing needs over the 44-year life of the hull. The D5 Life Extension Program is adequately funded and on schedule for initial operational capability in FY13.

- As our satellite constellation transitions to AEHF from MILSTAR, we must ensure the B-2 communications upgrade is synchronized to allow secure and survivable connectivity with this very capable aircraft.
- Strategic War Planning System (SWPS), which recently completed an initial upgrade and is now entering a new phase. This new modernization effort will incorporate the flexibility and responsiveness envisioned by the Nuclear Posture Review and broadened to support our newly assigned non-nuclear strategic and regional missions.
- Upgrades to essential command and control systems are well underway at both Offutt AFB and Cheyenne Mountain to achieve the goal of providing communications, environmental sensing, and precise position and timing information to the common operational picture of the battlespace. Improvements include: air mission processing, giving NORAD the ability to work with FAA systems to identify and if necessary, control assets to intercept aircraft in late FY03; enhanced strategic missile warning in early FY05; and advanced space surveillance and control capabilities being delivered from FY03 through FY08.

Stockpile Stewardship. In addition to our vital life extension and modernization programs, we are working closely with our partners in the Departments of Defense and Energy, and the Congress to ensure our nuclear stockpile remains safe, reliable and credible. As the nation’s
nuclear stockpile continues to age, we must carefully monitor its condition.

Through the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program, we continue to improve our surveillance, modeling, simulation tools and processes in order to provide the critical data on aging effects, component reliability and physics phenomenon we require in the absence of nuclear weapon testing.

As you know, the essential warhead life extension programs must be carefully sequenced with scheduled warhead dismantlement so as to provide on time delivery to meet operational deterrent force requirements. We are working closely with the NNSA, the national labs and plants to shape their support to our future stockpile. With the production complex operating near its peak capacity, we will need to optimize the balance between essential life extension programs and dismantlement work.

Assessment and Testing. Annually, at the direction of the President, I provide a nuclear weapon stockpile assessment to the Secretary of Defense. The most current assessment was finalized in October 2002. Based on the information provided by my staff and independent advice from our expert Strategic Advisory Group, I remain confident in the safety and reliability of the stockpile. In fact, this was the first assessment, since the program started in 1996 that the level of confidence in the stockpile did not decline.

I attribute this significant achievement directly to the continued improvements in and funding for the Stockpile Stewardship Program, to the steps taken by NNSA and the Services to diligently address previously reported technical issues, and to the progress of the ongoing life extension programs.
I agree with the rigorous technical analysis conducted, and confirmed to the Secretary there is currently no need to recommend resumption of nuclear testing. I appreciate your strong support for funding of the NNSA, enabling continuation of their important work.

**Infrastructure Security.** As we continue to sustain and modernize our forces, we are also working closely with the Services and the Department of Energy to address the critical anti-terrorism and force protection requirements associated with safeguarding the nation’s nuclear systems. The ongoing MIGHTY GUARDIAN exercise series and the Nuclear Command and Control System Federal Advisory Committee End-to-End Review have helped the Services and the Department of Energy to better focus their security efforts.

While the changing character of the postulated threats requires continuous evaluation, I believe the Services are making concrete improvements in physical security. We will continue to advocate for these efforts through the STRATCOM Integrated Priority List and will remain an active participant in the creation of implementation guidance that will flow from the recently completed Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) policy studies.

**Space operations**

The United States is the preeminent space-faring nation in the world and, as you know, space operations have evolved into far more than a critical American military capability. Space related technologies are now a powerful economic force, intricately woven into almost every facet of our lives. Entire new industries have been created around space applications, and approximately 100 billion US dollars are today invested in space assets. The message is clear: the
US and, in many ways all nations are increasingly reliant on platforms operating in the medium of space.

As the provider of space support to the war fighter, US Strategic Command is committed to bringing a focused operational perspective to our on-orbit capabilities. Our satellite systems are essential, not just enabling, to each of our own disparate missions, and they underpin many of the distinct technological advantages we have over our potential adversaries. US Strategic Command is working diligently to ensure that the extraordinary global communication, navigation, surveillance, weather, and missile warning capabilities we have will continue to provide robust and reliable contributions to the nation’s security.

One of my new responsibilities is the DoD Manager for Manned Space Flight Support (DDMS), and as such, am responsible for all military support for manned space flights. Originally the DoD Mercury Support Office, DDMS was formed in 1959 to coordinate the unique support NASA required from DoD agencies.

Our immediate response to the Columbia disaster was begun by our Support Operations Center which initiated actions and activated national search and rescue forces through the Air Force Rescue and Coordination Center. Also, the DDMS office coordinated prearranged military airlift to take personnel to Barksdale, AFB, LA, to standup the Mishap Investigation Team and recovery operation.

We have provided tracking information from all available sensors to include: radar, on-orbit space surveillance, video, optical, and telemetry data and have, with our component Air Force Space Command, dedicated more than 15 personnel to support the ongoing investigation.
**Assured Access to Space.** Assured access to space is the prerequisite for all our on-orbit capabilities, and is essential to our national interests. As the heritage space launch systems, Titan II and IV, Atlas II, and Delta II, near the end of their lives, the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program remains the Department’s primary option for safe and responsive orbital launch. Although the contraction in the commercial launch market has changed the business case for EELV, it remains a promising avenue, as demonstrated by the recent successful launches of both vehicles.

As we have seen in our nation’s ongoing war on terrorism, we may not always know when or where around the globe our next challenge will arise. Surprise will remain a part of the international security environment, and it is prudent to have flexibility designed into not only our weapons systems, but also our communications and intelligence architectures. Uninterrupted, responsive access to space is critical to ensuring the responsiveness necessary to replenish or augment our critical on-orbit capabilities.

Inextricably linked to assured access is the sustainment of viable gateways to space. Our East and West Coast ranges continue to provide safe, effective spacelift and test and evaluation services to military, civil, and commercial users. We must work with our partners in government and industry to pursue effective and fiscally responsible strategies to ensure the continued health of these vital facilities.

**Enhancing Space Control.** Space will continue to be a realm we share with industry, our allies, and increasingly, others who may not share our interests. While access to space is clearly a vital national interest, space control is the means by which we assure it. We are
attentive to emergent threats that may well challenge our space preeminence.

From the coalition victory in Desert Storm through the recent conflicts in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the United States enjoyed space dominance because it controlled the “higher ground.” It is true that we possessed superior technologies or strategies, but in all honesty, our past adversaries did not have the capability to fully exploit space, or act to negate US space systems. The US cannot rely on potential adversaries to cede this advantage in the future.

Future foes may threaten any component of space systems – the satellite, the ground segment, or the link between the two. Even the less technically advanced nations and non-state actors may employ techniques such as electronic jamming or attacks against ground facilities.

One of US Strategic Command’s roles is to ensure the US fully meets these challenges, providing uninterrupted access to space and on-orbit capabilities. To ensure our satellites, communications links, and ground stations remain on line, we maintain, evaluate and enhance the physical protection of our vital space assets. US Strategic Command is working with our components and other agencies to identify critical components and define the most effective ways to safeguard our on-orbit capabilities and the terrestrial support systems.

A crucial aspect of our on-orbit security is ensuring space situational awareness through enhanced surveillance capability and improvements to our global sensor network. To ensure a comprehensive and responsive ability to monitor and safeguard our on-orbit systems, we will work with the Services as the Navy’s Space Surveillance System is transitioned to the Air Force. The associated service life extension program (SLEP) will improve surveillance capabilities by
detecting objects as small as 5 centimeters and cataloging up to 100,000 objects, a dramatic increase over the current capability.

**Developing Space Professionals.** Success in any of our missions depends on our number one asset – our people. Maintaining the culture of excellence in highly technical space operations depends on recruiting, training, and retaining the best and the brightest. We will also need to develop an entirely new set of skills, leveraging our air defenders and space operators, to expand our cadre of missile defense experts. I fully support General Lord’s efforts at Air Force Space Command to chart a course for space professional development, as recommended by the Space Commission. I also applaud Lieutenant General Cosumano’s personal management of the Army’s dedicated space operations officer career field, as well as Vice Admiral Mayo’s Space Cadre Initiative within the Navy.

**Newly assigned missions.** Initially assigned responsibility for nuclear deterrence, space operations and computer network operations, the new US Strategic Command’s role expanded when the President, on January 10, 2003, added four additional mission areas previously unassigned to any command. These include global strike planning and execution; integration of Department of Defense information operations; global missile defense integration; and oversight of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) in support of strategic and global operations. These missions will broaden our global supporting role, further strengthen our nation’s deterrent posture and bring focused responsibility and authority to our space and integrated information operation missions.
The vision for US Strategic Command is exciting. It requires rethinking, operationalizing, and, in some cases, building from the ground up, every mission in our portfolio. Fortunately, the experience gained from carrying out our space operations and nuclear deterrent roles will facilitate development of our newly assigned mission areas. The rigor and exactness of nuclear planning, the robust command and control of our operational forces, and the cutting edge technology and war fighter support of our space and information operations missions translate directly to our newly assigned global tasks.

Global Strike. The global strike mission extends our long-standing and globally focused deterrent capabilities to the broader spectrum of conflict. Whether addressing homeland security or threats halfway around the world, the incorporation of conventional, non-kinetic, and special operations capabilities into a full-spectrum contingency arsenal will offer a wider range of options to the nation’s leaders. As the concept matures, the command will be able to deliberately and adaptively plan, and, if deterrence fails, deliver rapid, limited-duration, extended-range combat power anywhere in the world.

As envisioned, global strike can be conducted by STRATCOM at the direction of our national leadership with the support of or in a supporting role to a Regional Combatant Commander. By offering additional options to the President or Secretary of Defense, global strike will provide the nation a rapid ability to engage a time critical target by moving quickly from actionable intelligence, through adaptive planning, to national-level decision-making and the delivery of effects across thousands of miles.
In its supporting role, global strike will provide Regional Combatant Commanders what may be the most critical element early in the fight – time. As a Regional Combatant Commander assembles and moves forces into position, needs to strike into denied areas, or prizes the element of surprise, US Strategic Command can provide early planning and tangible, long range combat capability.

This committee’s support of advanced conventional weapons initiatives such as SSGN reconfiguration and the Common Aerospace Vehicle will play a large part in improving our effectiveness in the global strike arena.

Integrated Information Operations. Quite simply, we believe that effective, integrated information operations comprise the next revolution in war fighting. Our focus will be to integrate and coordinate all of the core DoD information operations capabilities: military psychological operations, electronic warfare, operational security, military deception, and computer network attack and defense. This nascent mission area promises to dramatically improve our offensive and defensive capabilities. Successful integration of these capabilities could very well lead to a reassessment of the types of weapons required in our arsenal and the force composition supporting future conflicts.

Our vision is of STRATCOM as the central IO armory for the war fighter. While we should not and will not own all IO programs, nor execute all IO missions, we will have full insight and access to all DoD IO capabilities. With this knowledge, we can build on our 56-year foundation of rigorous planning and analysis to bring an integrated, deliberate planning process to the IO realm. We envision providing weapons with a known system reliability and analytically-based
estimates of consequences and effectiveness, just as we have done for decades with the nation’s nuclear forces. We will support an expeditious national-level approval process for conducting IO, and we will work to ensure war fighters have what they need at their disposal, not only during crisis but also during the critical planning, training, exercise, and deployment phases.

Just as we look to information operations as a potential avenue for bringing asymmetric effects to the battle space, to some degree, so do our adversaries. Securing cyberspace is a difficult strategic challenge that requires coordinated and focused effort from our entire society - the federal government, state and local governments, the private sector, and the American people.

STRATCOM is the military lead responsible for DoD computer network defense and attack. In concert with ASD(C3), DISA, the Services and external agencies and through our Joint Task Force-Computer Network Operations (JTF-CNO) we developed a Computer Network Defense Plan of Action and Milestones to better focus the Department’s information assurance and computer network defense effort. When fully executed, this plan of action will support rapid information assurance and computer network defense tool identification, testing, and selection for DoD enterprise-wide solutions.

Looking to improve future capabilities, we strive to innovate and recently completed a year-long information operations experiment. Partnering with Department of Energy labs and a number of DoD agencies, we were able to successfully plan and execute a computer network operation on a closed infrastructure system. This is a first step towards developing a process for integrating real IO capabilities into contingency plans.
**Missile Defense.** The danger posed by weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems is clearly one of our nation’s top concerns. The Missile Defense Agency is actively developing a multi-system ballistic missile defense capability to provide an additional level of protection for our homeland, our allies, and our forces in the field. As General Myers noted recently before Congress, missile defense is inherently a multi-command and multi-regional task, and, as the Missile Defense Agency acquires missile defense systems, US Strategic Command will bring a war fighting focus to most effectively and efficiently integrate and operationalize the system on a global scale. We are fully partnering with the Missile Defense Agency, and are developing a global ballistic missile defense concept of operations and associated command and control architecture to provide the full support needed by the Regional Combatant Commanders to defend their theaters, including the ballistic missile defense of the continental United States.

Ballistic missile defense has evolved from an effort focused on a mid-course intercept of missiles to an integrated, multi-system, cross-AOR approach to meet the challenge of achieving an Initial Defensive Operations (IDO) capability by late 2004. A critical element of any global ballistic missile defense capability will be detailed and effective tactical warning, which we will continue to provide to national leadership and Regional Combatant Commanders. US Strategic Command currently supplies sensor information for the ballistic missile warning component of integrated tactical warning and attack assessment, and we appreciate your support of the systems that will improve our warning capabilities in response to changing threats and expanded intelligence requirements. The Space Based Infra Red System (SBIRS) which is appropriately funded in the President’s budget, will
significantly improve the timeliness and accuracy of enemy missile launch and impact points, thereby saving lives and allowing for efficient use of ballistic missile defense systems.

Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4). Although “C4ISR” represents several related and essential capabilities, we are deliberately parsing out the acronym into its key elements to better address the very different challenges in each area. Under the Unified Command Plan, the command is assigned the role of tasking and coordinating C4 in support of strategic force employment. Our objective is to provide the means to integrate, synchronize, coordinate, and convey information to support senior decision-making and tasking at any level from the President to the front-line war fighter.

The events of September 11th reinforced the need to improve our national command and control architecture. We are working with our partners at US Joint Forces Command, the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, and Communications ASD(C3) to craft a new national-level C4 system that provides improved information flow, rapid decision-making, and dramatic improvements in our current bandwidth capability. While this is important for all missions in our net-centric forces, it is imperative for the integrated missile defense, strategic deterrence, and global strike missions, where data gathering, decision-making, and execution must occur on dramatically compressed timelines. We will remain the spokesman for the war fighters’ needs as the development of advanced systems continues.

UHF satellite communication is the primary command and control source for our mobile war fighters and STRATCOM is leading the effort
to identify and reduce interference that robs us of useable capacity in this spectrum. Using new capabilities and streamlined processes, we have been able to recover six channels in CONUS. With authorization from OSD, we spearheaded the effort to partner with the Department of State and pursue electromagnetic interference emanating from foreign countries. This effort is showing early signs of success; specifically, two partner nations changed UHF frequencies in order to eliminate interference with CENTCOM communications in Afghanistan. Each channel we recover would cost 83,000 dollars per year to replace from a commercial source.

**Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR).**

Comprehensive ISR is clearly one of the most valuable contributors to securing our homeland. US Strategic Command is tasked under the Unified Command Plan to plan, coordinate, and integrate ISR for the Department of Defense in support of global and strategic operations. Recent world events have demonstrated the critical role comprehensive ISR operations play in senior-level decision-making, tactical planning and even deterrence.

We are working closely with Department of Defense and Intelligence Community partners to develop and institutionalize the processes and systems necessary to maximize the capabilities of existing systems and assess intelligence collection priorities. New concepts in active ISR could take us beyond passive collection benefits, especially when integrated with critical human intelligence and technical data. Our objective is to not only better provide persistent and actionable intelligence, but also bring space-based and advanced air-breathing, terrestrial and maritime elements into a global
architecture. Systems such as SBIRS and Space Based Radar represent the on-orbit part of a spectrum that must meet all national and regional needs across the continuum of peace, crisis, and conflict.

**Mission Integration.** As we further refine our current missions and build to our new tasking, the interrelationships and interdependencies among all our missions are increasingly apparent. Global strikes may include options for employment of information operations. Information operations may require space-based communications architecture for implementation. Space-based communications and sensor capabilities will be a crucial enabler for missile defense options. US Strategic Command is committed to improving joint combat effectiveness by modernizing systems, streamlining processes, and providing fully integrated mission capabilities to the war fighter and our national leaders.

In our specialized mission areas, we are also trying new and promising methods to integrate all of the capabilities of our most valuable asset – our people. The Joint Information Operations Center has initiated a program to integrate Reserve component capabilities into the IO force. Some examples include an Army military intelligence-trained reservist who also has a degree in applied psychology, and an Air Force electronic warfare reservist who as a civilian works in signals intelligence. Leveraging both military and civilian-acquired skills is a true force multiplier and will be even more important in the future as the IO mission area matures.

**Componency.**

As we design concepts of operations for the globally focused and increasingly operational US Strategic Command, we are pursuing
innovative concepts for new Service relationships that tap unique skills, capabilities, and expertise resident in other organizations. We are fortunate to have strong relationships with many national Agencies. As we refine each of our new mission areas, we will need even stronger ties to both our current and new Agency partners. We are exploring component-like relationships with the Agencies, as well as with the national laboratories that play a large role in supporting our technological and planning needs. We are excited about the opportunities to leverage their expertise as we expand and develop capabilities applicable to our new missions.

**Challenges and Opportunities.**

As we work to achieve the opportunities envisioned by the creation of the new command, we will face many challenges in systems, organizations, processes, and relationships. These include:

- Implementing the recommendations of the Nuclear Posture Review, to include developing advanced offensive and defensive capabilities, along with analytical tools, that will allow us to meet the President’s goal of minimizing our reliance on nuclear weapons.
- Assuring affordable and responsive access to space
- Delivering on the promise of Information Operations to the war fighter.
- Integrating global missile defense to protect the nation and our forces in the field.
- Providing adequate bandwidth and a robust communications architecture for rapid decision-making and global combat operations.
- Streamlining the ISR process to ensure comprehensive, persistent, predictive, and actionable intelligence in the 21st Century.
• Ensuring the right organizational structure and component relationships to make our missions possible in a reduced-manpower environment.

• Defending the Department of Defense’s computer networks as we become every more reliant upon them.

• Ensuring robust anti-terrorism/force protection measures for our critical nuclear facilities and space-related capabilities.

All of these challenges will require a team effort, inside and outside the command. We look forward to working with you and our many partners to adequately meet these and all challenges and opportunities that lie ahead.

**Conclusion.**

Never before has such a broad array of missions been combined under one combatant command. We are aggressively building the right teams, the right organizational structure, and the right plans to move confidently from concepts of operation to tangible combat capability. We will leverage our historic strategic planning expertise and our space, information operations, and regional support heritage to become a more globally focused operational headquarters, one that is better equipped to provide the combat capabilities required by our national leaders and war fighters.

As the President said in October 2001, “The best defense against terror is a global offensive against terror, wherever it might be found.” Under the umbrella of our revised mission set, we are taking the first steps in the evolution of our strategic capabilities, and we
embrace the challenge of delivering on the promise of more effectively meeting the nation’s global war fighting needs.

I appreciate your continued support of the men and women of US Strategic Command and the unique and essential contributions they continue to make to safeguard our nation. I look forward to reporting our progress to you in the future as we continue to build the new US Strategic Command.

Thank you, and I welcome your questions.