United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA)
The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), the vanguard of national liberation struggle in Assam, was formed on 7th April 1979 to bear the historic responsibility of spearheading the armed democratic struggle with the ultimate aim of establishing an independent socialist sovereign Assam. ULFA represents, as its name implies, not only the Assamese nation but also the entire independent minded struggling peoples, irrespective of different race-tribe-caste-religion and nationality of Assam.
Indian augthorities claim ULFA was under the grip of foreign agencies such as Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence.
Assam, the most populous state in the region, has a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual society. A majority of ethnic Assamese and 16 tribes constitute Assam's indigenous population. Assam's peripheral location in India, its resultant under-development and dramatic changes in its demography caused by an influx of Bangladeshis across the borders have triggered militancy.
The ULFA, the most formidable insurgent outfit, demands sovereignty for Assam. It was a secessionist ethnic insurgent socialist organization employing terrorist tactics. Founded on April 7, 1979, the ULFA enjoyed mass support in its initial years but gradually lost its popularity. From its inception to 1985, ULFA failed to make any real impact since the Assam Movement against "foreigners," specifically Bengali settlers, was led by the All Assam Students' Union (AASU) and dominated the state's political scene. The Assam Movement formally ended on August 15, 1985 and some of its leaders formed the state government. It was then that ULFA made its presence felt and launched its mission to "liberate Assam from Delhi's colonialism."
New Delhi banned the ULFA in 1990 and started a military offensive against it. The ULFA's kidnappings, murders, extortion and its leadership's big business undertakings in neighboring countries -- particularly Bangladesh - harmed its public image. Public opinion turned against ULFA when its leaders expressed support for Pakistan during the 1999 Kargil military operation. In 2005, the United States added the group to the Other Selected Terrorist Organizations (OSTO) list.
In 1997 a spurt in ULFA activities led the GOI to form the Unified Command -- of army, paramilitary, police and state Government. Since 1998, hundreds of ULFA members have surrendered, but hardcore militants stayed in their camps in Bhutan, Burma and Bangladesh. The ULFA's numerical strength was depleted by the attack on its Bhutan camps in December 2003 by the Royal Bhutan Army and the Indian Army. The estimated committed cadre strength was about 700 by 2005. In its initial years, government officials, businessmen, tea planters and politicians were the major targets. In recent years it has killed civilians including children as well as Hindi-speaking migrants. In 2003 ULFA killed more than 60 "outsiders," mainly from the state of Bihar, in Assam. On August 15, 2004, India's Independence Day, a bomb blast in Dhemaji killed an estimated 13 people, including 6 children, and injured 21. In addition, numerous bomb blasts at oil installations and other infrastructure are regularly reported.
The GOI accuses ULFA of maintaining links with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Directorate General of Field Intelligence of Bangladesh. Intelligence sources believe that the ULFA procures and trades in arms with other Northeast Indian outfits and the Maoists of Nepal. The GOI claims that ULFA workers also visit Nepal and have some connection with the Maoists. Important leaders include Paresh Barua (Commander-in-Chief) and Arabinda Rajkhowa (Chairman) based in Bangladesh. ULFA workers are believed to be present in the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya and Nagaland. The ULFA has linkages with other ethnic insurgent outfits active in neighboring states like the National Socialist Council of Nagaland - Khaplang (NSCN-K) and the United National Liberation Front (UNLF). Other ULFA "satellites" - like the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and the Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO) - were badly affected by the Bhutan operation.
In 2004-2005, Assamese author Indira Goswami took the initiative to work out a way to bring the GOI and the ULFA to the negotiating table. Despite the GOI's willingness, the ULFA time and again set conditions for talks that are difficult to fulfill. The outfit insisted on the pre-condition that sovereignty should figure in the talks, a provision the GOI reportedly accepted with some reluctance in the hope that this would facilitate peace. But then the ULFA leadership insisted that those leaders of the outfit who have been arrested and detained in Assam should be released. As of July 2005, this has created a deadlock since the government cannot release insurgent leaders without formal assurance of a ceasefire and negotiations by the ULFA.
Assam's Congress Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi was reportedly keen that the detainees be released, but New Delhi was reluctant. New Delhi has also tried to persuade Bangladesh to crack down on Indian militant camps on its soil and to extradite ULFA leader Anup Chetia. Significantly, although the ULFA has attacked "outsiders," it has not targeted Bangladeshi migrants in Assam in recent times. Analysts interpret this as the result of a tacit understanding between the outfit and the Bangladesh authorities that shelter its leaders.
The ULFA's inclusion in the U.S. OSTO list drew a favorable response from Assam's security officials, although the Congress, preparing for state elections in 2006, expressed reservations on the timing of this development. Security analysts felt that the listing was not only a warning to the ULFA, but also to Bangladesh where the militant leadership lives with support from the establishment. However, the ULFA responded with an appeal to the U.S. to intervene in the "political conflict" and help peace dawn on Assam - a sign that the outfit was responsive to U.S. and global opinion.
The United Liberation Front of Assam, one of the militant organisations operating in the northeast region, was established in 1979 when anti-foreigners agitation launched by the All Assam Students' Union reached its peak in the state. The front was formed by Paresh Baruah along with associates including Rajiv Raj Konwar alies Arabinda Rajkhowa, Golap Baruah alies Anup Chetia, Samiran Gogoi alies Pradip Gogoi and Bhadreshwar Gohain on 7 April 1979, at the Rang Ghar pavilion of the Ahom Kings located in Sibsagar to establish a Sovereign, Socialist Assam through an armed struggle.
The front remained dormant till 1986, except recruiting its cadres between late 1983 to early 1984. Soon after establishing contacts with Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) in the year 1986 for training and procuring arms, ULFA went on a fund rising spree through a train of extortion from a circle of traders, businessmen, tea gardens, both Indian and foreign owned, and others. It also set up camps in Tinsukhia and Dibrugarh districts of the state. In view ULFA's increasing militant activities in the state, New Delhi imposed President's Rule on November 7. The entire State of Assam was declared a "disturbed area. ULFA was banned under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and Indian army launched Operation Bajrang.
From the early 1990s, the front embarked on a more aggressive campaign to further its goal by targeting security forces, blasting rail links, killing political opponents and weakening basic infrastructures. On July 1991, ULFA militants abducted 14 people, including an engineer, a national of (the erstwhile) Soviet Union and demanded huge amount of money as ransom. Throughout the 1990s, the front resorted to many terrorist activities.
According to the Indian Army sources, the total strength of ULFA was around 3,000 by the year 2005, while various other sources put the figure ranging from 4,000 to 6,000. A military wing of the ULFA, the Sanjukta Mukti Fouj (SMF) was formed on 16 March 1996. SMF has three full-fledged battalions: the 7th, 8th and the 709th. The remaining battalions exist only on paper at best they have strengths of a company or so. Their allocated spheres of operation are as follows:
7th Bn (HQ-Sukhini) was responsible for defence of General Head Quarter (GHQ).
8th Bn - Nagaon, Morigaon, Karbi Anglong
9th Bn Golaghat, Jorhat, Sibsagar
11th Bn Kamrup, Nalbari
27th Bn Barpeta, Bongaigaon, Kokrajar
28th Bn Tinsukia, Dibrugarh
709th Bn Kalikhola
In the past decade nearly 2,5000 (approximate) militants, including about 200 women cadres have surrendered to the government.
The command structure of the ULFA comprises of Arvinda Rajkhowa as the Commander-in-Chief, Paresh Baruah was the Chairman while Pradeep Gogoi was the Vice-Chairman of the front. Vice-Chairman Pradip Gogoi was arrested on April 8, 1998 and was in judicial custody in Guwahati ever since. ULFA General Secretary, Anup Chetia was also under detention at the high-security Dhaka Central Jail after his arrest in Dhaka (Bangladesh) on December 7, 1997. Chittaranjan Barua, Sasadhar Chaudhary and Matinga hold Finance, Foreign and Publicity secretaries respectively.
ULFA has a three tier organizational structure namely (i) Central Unit, (ii) District Units and (iii) Anachalik Units. The ULFA has a civil and military wing. The civil wing was headed by Paresh Baruah and military wing of the front was led by Arvinda Rajkhawa. The district units was led by district Presidents/district Commanders respectively. A district was further divided into Anchals which comprise a number of villages headed by an Anchalik President. For operational purposes, ULFA has divided entire Assam into four zones. Each zone has further divided into four regions.
In 1986, ULFA first established contacts with the then unified National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) and the Kachin Independent Army (KIA) of Myanmar for training camps and arms.
Subsequently, the front shifted to Bangladesh its training camps. ULFA's training camps have been functioning since in the Bangladeshi soil since 1989.
But its main training camps are located in Sandrup Jongkhar, a district in Southern Bhutan that borders with Assam's Nalbari district. According to Bhutan, ULFA has six major camps between Lhamoizingkha and Daifam.
On May 17, 2003, Bhutanese King Jingme Singhye Wangchuk called upon the people to volunteer for formation of a militia force to counter Indian militant groups ULFA, NDBF and the KLO on its soil. Media report says that the 81st National Assembly of Bhutan adopted a resolution for the last attempt to persuade ULFA, NBFD, and the KLO to close down their camps within this year peacefully failing which terrorist would face military action.
The funding for the front comes from three sources:
Extortion: The front's main source of income comes from extortion from businessmen, politicians, government employees, industrialists and tea companies. It also indulges in bank robberies and other criminal activities to finance its activities.
Drug Trafficking: It was reported that the front was also involved in drug smuggling. As far back as 1988, one ULFA leader was caught with seven kilograms of Burmese heroin. Drug money had been used to purchase arms at the rate of 50,000 for automatic rifles, Rs.40,000 for pistols and Rs.45,000 for wireless sets.
There was no proper source for ULFA's annual budget but according to an accomplished journalist and security analyst from Guwahati, Mr. Jaideep Saikia's calculations, the ULFA's budget for the year 2001 was a whooping Rs.31 crore plus.
After lying low for some time during the year 2002, ULFA has begun resuming its terrorist violence. Events of the first three months of the year 2003 indicate that no respite for the people in Assam from ULFA's terrorist activities. It initiated a series of attacks on the vital public installations and civilian targets towards the latter part of the last year, and which continue into the present year, in what appeared to be a concerted bid to reestablish the fact that it was still a force to be reckoned with in Assam. The major attacks in the first quarter of the year included:
21 January 2003: ULFA carried out an attack on a security force (SF) camp in the Dibrugarh district, though there were no causalities.
7 March 2003: ULFA attacked a police commando barrack in Bongaigoan town. No fatalities were reported in this incident.
8 March 2003: ULFA militants triggered an explosion at a five million-litre petrol reservoir at Digboi refinery in the Tinsukia district by throwing mortar bombs, causing property loss estimated at approximately Rs 200 million. On the same day, ULFA cadres also separately damaged a gas pipeline at Kathalguri in Tinsukia. In another incident, ULFA killed two persons at a migrant's settlement and injured six more while escaping after an attack on the Darrangiri police outpost in Goalpara district.
16 March 2003: On ULFA's Army Day, six civilians were killed and approximately 55 others injured in an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) blast under a passenger bus on National Highway No.7 in the Goalpara district.
The series of attacks also reinforces the groups consistent rejection of any plausible peace process.
The front lost many of its cadres in the past one decade. From 1992 to 2001, 855 cadres of the front were killed by the Indian security forces.
ULFA draws its main support from the upper Assam districts of Lakhimpur, Jorhat, Sibsagar, Tinsukia, Dibrugarh, Karbi Anglong, Golaghat and Sonitpur. Many of the ULFA leaders are from these districts. A large number of ULFA cadres have been recruited from the upper Assam districts. In the west, its activities and presence was low. The western districts of Assam was dominated by Bodo militants. In the districts of Kokrajhar, Barpeta and Darrang ethnic Bodo rebels such as NDFB and Bodo Security Force (BSF) militants have control over the areas. In the Southern parts of Assam, ULFA has also a low presence. The front cannot take up any activities in lower Assam districts due to lack of support base. In July ULFA went on a recruitment drive from these districts, however it received poor response from the youths and they showed their unwillingness to join the front.
The front was loosing its support because of hostile terrorist activities. Kidnapping, liquidation of common people, assassination of political opponents have caused much disenchantment among the Assamese people and their support base was beginning to dwindle in the state. The popular mood among the people of Assam was towards a negotiated settlement. Public meetings were held all over the state to issue appeals to the front to rejoin the mainstream. The pressure exerted by the military operations and the built-up public opinion took its toll on the militants morale. A section of ULFA cadres laid down their weapons en-masse before the state government in March 1992.
On ULFAs raising day (April 7, 2000) common people came out of from their home and peace rallies were held all over the state for the first time. Even newspapers carried editorials condemning the ULFA for its violence, claiming that the people were totally against its ideology. The Director General, BSF while speaking to the IAS officers course at IIC, New Delhi on October 16, 2000 stated that the ULFA has really broken up because now people are not with them.
Another set back to the ULFA came in the form of the rejection by the people of Assam of the outfit's demand for plebiscite in Assam on the issue of sovereignty under the supervision of the UN observers. As much as 70 per cent of the state's 1.4 crore voters defied the ULFA's call for 1999 Lok Sabha poll boycott and exercise their franchise. The organisation today seeks meaning in methods and motives other than the ideologies by which it came into existence on April 7, 1979. The banned outfit was looking out soft targets to spread its terror. A rather dismal picture of an organisation which was formed to bring Aikya, Biplap and Mukti to the Assamese people.
Areas of Operation
ULFAs organisational structure was divided into four command zones and the districts under each are:
|Lakhim Pur, Jorhat, Sibsagar, `Tinsukia, Dibrugarh, Bokajan of Kabri, Anglong, Golaghat, Part of Sonitpur||Dhubri, Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon, Goalpara, Barpeta, Nalbari, South Kamrup||Darrang, Karbi, Anglong, Nagaon, Moirigaon, Dhemaji, Part of Sonitpur, North Kamrup||Hailakandi, NC Hills, Cachar Hills, Karimganj|
ULFA maintains close strategic links with the National Democratic Front Bodoland (NDFB). Presently, NDFB works in tandem with the ULFA. Both outfits have also set up camps in Bhutan after were driven into the Bhutanese foothills by a major Indian military offensive in 1990-1991. Sometime in 1999, the ULFA and NDFB formed a coordination committee for launching a united struggle.
Recently it has joined hands with the Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA) to carry out joint operations in the areas dominated by immigrants.
The front maintains close relations with many militant organisations of the northeast and other groups from Myanmar. The Kachin Independent Army has traditionally been providing support to all the undergrounds in the Northeast. As per LT. Gen. V.K. Nayyer, ex Governor of Manipur, there have been confirmed reports of KIA and NSCN providing training and weapons to ULFA. But it came under pressure of joint military operations of the Indian and Myanmarese Army in April-May 1995. The ULFA and the NSCN (K) along with a foreign Army, and the Northeast Students' Organisation (NESO) have formed an umbrella organisation which calls itself the United Liberation Front of Seven Sisters with an aim of carrying out violent activites in the Northeast.
In 1989, The Indo-Burma Revolutionary Front (IBRF) was set up, which included NSCN-K, ULFA, UNLF, United Liberation Front of Bodoland, Kuki National Front (KNF) (all from India) and Chin National Front (Myanmar). It was also reported that the front has close nexus with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam. The LTTE was reported to have trained various ULFA cadres in explosives handling. The External Affairs Ministry confirmed that several top leaders of the outfit including its chairman, commander-inchief have procured foreign passports through fraudulent means.
ULFA has also established a strategic alliance with United Liberation Front (UNLF) of Manipur in August 2002. Reports hold, ULFA and NDFB procure arms from UNLF. The link between ULFA and UNLF became visible when the latter in a statement on July 17, 2002 indicated that the killing of three security forces in Assam's Cachar district by Manipur People's Army 'armed wing of UNLF was carried out at ULFA's behest. Reports indicate that ULFA, the Manipur people's Liberation Front (MPLF) a conglomerate of three militant groups United Liberation Front (UNLF), People's Liberation Army (PLA) and People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) active in Manipur, and the Tripura People's Democratic Front (TPDF), a front outfit of all the Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF), operating in Tripura under a common platform have launched a 'Coordinated Regional Military Offensive for liberation of the Region from Indian colonial occupation,' code name Operation Freedom.
ULFA and other militants groups from the Northeast maintain links with the militants of Kashmir and Punjab. It also in touch with many other organisations engaged in struggles in Andra Pradesh, Bihar and other states of India.
The ULFA chairman attended the annual session of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Population in Geneva in 1997. In the same year, a four-member delegation of the ULFA including the chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa, general secretary Anup Chetia and the foreign secretary Sasha Choudhury went to Geneva and tried to enter the Unrepresented Nations Peoples Organisation (UNPO). But the permanent representative of India in the United Nations Smt Arundhuti Ghosh objected to the presence of the ULFA leaders in the meeting and raised the issue of the killing of social worker Sanjoy Ghosh by the ULFA. Finding themselves in a tight corner, the ULFA leaders were forced to leave Geneva. Its attempt to enter the Unrepresented Nations and People's Organization was blocked by the Government of India.
Of late, ULFA has spread its tentacles in West Bengal's northern districts. It has established strategic alliance with the Kamatapur Liberation Organization (KLO). Security forces believe that it was the ULFA that propped up and got the KLO formed in December 1995. The ULFA's alliance with the KLO gives it access to certain KLO controlled corridors that provide the rebels from the Assam a bridge linking their bases in Bhutan with hideouts in Bangladesh.
Publications and Website
Swadhinata (Freedom) was the mouthpiece of the front. ULFA and three Northeast insurgents launch websites www.geocities.com/CapitalHill/Congress/7434/ulfa.htm in October 1999.
Surrendered ULFA cadres are known as SULFA. The former Chief Minster of Assam Hiteswar Saikha played a major role in splitting the front. Saikhia bestowed blue-eyed status on the surrendered boys, granting them all kinds of favours. Very soon the term syndicate, referring to its mafia-style mode of operations, became synonymous with the SULFA, coined by the local media, took on a pejorative connotation.
Many of the surrendered ULFA have joined the security forces and are working in the state and central forces. The combined onslaught of the SULFA and the security forces took their toll on a already-weaken ULFA. The SULFA has become an effective fighting machine and served as a important tool for counter insurgency in the state of Assam.
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