Kela Plan
The March 2003 multiyear defense plan was known as the Kela Plan. Anthony H. Cordesman noted in 2004 that Israel’s use of reserves made it dependent on timely mobilization for its war fighting capability. Israel required 36-48 hours of strategic warning and reaction time to fully prepare its defenses in the Golan -- its most vulnerable front. Only about one-third of Israel’s total manpower consisted of full time actives, and much of this manpower consisted of conscripts. Some of Israel’s best troops consisted of its younger reserves.
Several reports indicated that the IDF would cut its ground forces by more than 25% over the next five years. These sources describe a ‘Kela 2008’ plan, where reserve armored units will be reduced drastically and most of the M60 and Merkava Mk1 tanks will be converted to APCs. The military will outsource maintenance and administration functions in an effort to cut costs further. Initiatives that will surely raise concerns among soldiers and veterans are a move to cut wages up to 20%, the elimination of welfare programs for officers, and the increase in the minimum retirement age. Overall, the army will cut 10% of its regular forces and minimize the use of unskilled reservists who typically incur large operating expenses.
The effect these cuts would have on the IDF’s ability to confront Palestinian militants was also unclear. Some reports indicated that the IDF believed that Kela 2008 will streamline their forces, make them more effective, and cut unnecessary costs. However, some of the measures, such as the pay cuts and elimination of jobs, were likely to be highly unpopular and run the risk of fomenting discontent within the military. At a time when Israel leaned increasingly heavily on the IDF despite reduced threats from Iraq and Syria, cuts in benefits are likely to discourage Israelis from pursuing long-term military careers.
In addition, a panel of industrialists, former generals, and security experts recommended further reductions on top of the Kela plan. In fact, defense budgets were cut significantly below the levels specified in the Kela Plan. The annual budget was eventually set at NIS [new Israeli shekel] 2.5 billion [approximately US$566 million] less than the Kela plan’s base budget. In this situation the military rightly decided it would be correct that risk-taking be mainly in the area of war preparedness (inventory levels, technical competence, training levels). Since this area, unlike others, was given to changes and improvement within several months from the issue of a warning, everyone was convinced that enough lead time would be available.
Winograd Commission was very clear on this point, noting on p. 258 that "the defense budget cuts caused the IDF, in accordance with the prioritization that it carried out in accordance with its considerations, to cut back on training and exercises, in the standing forces, and in the reserve forces alike. These constraints, together with the assessment that a significant military conflagration within the close radius to Israel (beyond the activity in the Gaza, Judea, and Samaria areas) was considered a possibility — if that — only after a gradual deterioration and escalation, or [upon] . . . Israel’s initiative, led to the decision that it would be correct for the IDF to take a calculated risk and count on the option of the IDF preparing for a campaign, including gap closure in training and arming, in the event that this would be required.""
By 2006 the IDF was in a transition, begun in the mid-1990s, away from a traditional, “symmetrical” view of warfare. This shift was summed up in the final report of the Winograd Commission: "The IDF’s operational concept (the old concept) was devised at the time vis-à-vis known threats in a “symmetrical” environment that was familiar and stationary and focused on eliminating them. The “motto” included the following three elements: deterrence, early-warning, and deciding the battle. The basic idea was to concentrate a large ground force, with support from the Air Force, to transport the war quickly into enemy territory, and to attain a quick decision of the battle by capturing enemy territory and defeating the army in terms of its ability and desire to pursue the war. This was complemented by the basic postulation of “blue skies,” namely the Air Force superiority, and the avoidance of exposing the home front to real attacks."
This shift made sense. Many believed that there had been a “transition from a pattern of symmetri- cal wars between regular armies and sovereign, solidified countries to asymmetrical conflicts with limited or high intensity against armed elements that rely on a sympathetic local population that assists non-government bodies from within.” This view had been reinforced by Israeli experiences during the two intifadas and by the low level of threat from neighboring states.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
