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Hitler's Generals : Bribed but Despised

The relationship between Adolf Hitler and the Wehrmacht officer corps represented one of the most dysfunctional civil-military relationships in modern history, characterized by systematic bribery, mutual contempt, and catastrophic strategic consequences. From the moment Hitler assumed power in 1933, the relationship between the Nazi regime and the Prussian-dominated military establishment was fundamentally adversarial. The officer corps initially regarded Hitler as an upstart Austrian corporal lacking both social pedigree and military sophistication, while Hitler viewed the generals as conservative elitists who might undermine his revolutionary ambitions.¹ This mutual suspicion would define their interaction throughout the Third Reich's existence and contribute significantly to Germany's military defeat.

The Wehrmacht's leadership had initially been skeptical of the Nazi movement, viewing Hitler's rise with concern. Many senior officers came from aristocratic backgrounds and maintained allegiance to traditional Prussian military values that emphasized apolitical professionalism. However, Hitler skillfully exploited several factors to secure their acquiescence if not their genuine loyalty. The generals believed the "stab in the back" myth from World War I, which blamed Germany's defeat on Jews and leftists rather than military failure. They saw another war as necessary to restore German honor and believed only an authoritarian government could successfully prosecute total war. Hitler's promise to rebuild the military after the humiliations of the Versailles Treaty proved particularly seductive.² Additionally, a strong strain of antisemitism ran through the military establishment, creating ideological common ground with certain aspects of Nazi doctrine.

The systematic corruption of the officer corps

Hitler constructed what historian Gerhard Weinberg characterized as "a vast secret program of bribery involving practically all at the highest levels of command."³ This corruption system differed fundamentally from traditional European practices of rewarding officers after successful campaigns. While Prussian kings might award estates publicly after victories, Hitler dispensed rewards secretly during the war itself, creating financial dependence that compromised military judgment. The bribes took multiple forms including direct cash payments, confiscated estates, luxury automobiles, and lifetime tax exemptions. Field marshals received monthly payments of four thousand Reichsmarks from a special fund known as Konto 5, while other senior officers received two thousand Reichsmarks monthly. These payments were strictly illegal under German law and recipients were explicitly warned to maintain secrecy and keep minimal written records.⁴

The first officer to receive such inducements was Field Marshal August von Mackensen, who in February 1935 criticized the Nazi regime's murder of General Kurt von Schleicher before the General Staff Association. To silence him, Hitler presented Mackensen with a free estate of 1,250 hectares later that year. While this particular grant was public, most subsequent bribes remained secret. The arrangement largely succeeded, though Mackensen violated their informal agreement in 1940 when he told Walther von Brauchitsch that the army had disgraced itself through massacres in Poland.⁵ By 1942, the bribery system had become so normalized that many officers expected substantial gifts from Hitler and proved unwilling to challenge the hand that fed them so generously. When Field Marshal Fedor von Bock was dismissed in December 1941, his first reaction was to contact Hitler's aide Rudolf Schmundt asking whether his firing meant he would lose his monthly payments from Konto 5.

Perhaps the most striking example of how financial inducements shaped military behavior involved General Heinz Guderian. In early 1943, Guderian was informed he could select any Polish estate he desired, and it would be confiscated from its owner and given to him tax-free for life. Guderian made several trips to Poland to choose the right property, a 937-hectare estate that required negotiation with the SS over competing claims. Historian Norman Goda noted that after Guderian received his Polish estate, the doubts he had been expressing about Hitler's military leadership suddenly ceased, and he became what Joseph Goebbels described as "a glowing and unqualified follower of the Führer."⁶ Before receiving the estate, Guderian had opposed Operation Zitadelle (the Battle of Kursk); afterward, rather than openly criticizing the plan, he approached Goebbels privately to see if Hitler might be dissuaded. During the July 20, 1944 assassination attempt, Guderian eagerly ordered Panzer units to Berlin to crush the conspiracy and served with considerable zeal on the Court of Honor that expelled involved officers so they could be tried before the People's Court. Only after January 1945, when his Polish estate fell behind Soviet lines, did Guderian resume disagreeing with Hitler, resulting in his dismissal as Chief of the General Staff in March 1945.

The corruption operated on a differential basis. Officers known to harbor reservations about Hitler's military decisions, such as Field Marshals Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, Erich Raeder, and Gerd von Rundstedt, received larger bribes than those already committed to National Socialism like Field Marshals Walter Model, Karl Dönitz, and Ferdinand Schörner. In one notable incident, Field Marshal von Leeb protested Wehrmacht cooperation with Einsatzgruppen massacres in the Soviet Union. Hitler's aide Schmundt reminded Leeb of his monthly Konto 5 payments and mentioned that the Führer planned to give him 250,000 Reichsmarks for his birthday. Leeb never again protested the massacres and duly received the payment. That same month, Einsatzgruppe A commander Franz Walter Stahlecker praised Leeb's Army Group for its exemplary cooperation.⁷

The professional mechanisms of control

Beyond financial corruption, Hitler exploited the Wehrmacht's own institutional culture to ensure compliance. The officer corps prided itself on apolitical professionalism and obedience to legitimate authority. When President Paul von Hindenburg died in August 1934, Hitler required all military personnel to swear a personal oath of loyalty not to Germany or its constitution, but to Hitler himself. For many officers, this oath became an insurmountable psychological barrier to resistance. Their sense of honor and professional duty, which had traditionally served as a check on arbitrary power, was thus manipulated to serve the regime. Even officers who privately opposed Hitler's decisions felt bound by this oath, creating what amounted to a self-imposed prison.⁸

Hitler systematically removed potential challengers and replaced them with more pliable commanders. During the February 1938 reorganization that created the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), Hitler dismissed War Minister Werner von Blomberg and Army Commander-in-Chief Werner von Fritsch on fabricated charges, effectively decapitating the traditional military leadership. He assumed personal command as Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht and installed the compliant Wilhelm Keitel as OKW chief. Throughout the war, Hitler maintained this pattern of removing generals who questioned his judgment. Of 92 German generals who held active major commands or key positions in the Wehrmacht High Command between 1933 and 1945, approximately 35 were relieved or dismissed in disgrace due to disagreement with Hitler, while eight more were disciplined with dishonorable discharge—representing nearly fifty percent of the total. Of seventeen field marshals, ten were relieved, with only one retaining his command until war's end. Of 36 four-star generals, 26 were relieved, and only three survived the war in their positions.⁹

Hitler's contempt for military expertise

As the war progressed, Hitler's distrust of his generals intensified into open contempt. He increasingly viewed them as defeatist, unimaginative, and lacking the willpower necessary for total war. This attitude was reinforced by his early successes, when his aggressive moves into the Rhineland, Austria, and Czechoslovakia succeeded despite military opposition. The stunning victory over France in 1940, achieved partly through Hitler's willingness to accept risk that his generals deemed unacceptable, convinced him that he possessed superior strategic vision. By 1941-42, Hitler routinely overruled military advice and began assuming direct operational command of military operations. Following the Soviet counteroffensive outside Moscow in December 1941, Hitler dismissed Commander-in-Chief Walther von Brauchitsch and assumed personal command of the army, making him simultaneously head of state, supreme commander of all armed forces, and commander of the army in the field—a concentration of authority unprecedented in modern German history.

Hitler's micromanagement extended to tactical details that properly belonged to field commanders. He forbade retreats even when militarily sensible, insisted on defending indefensible positions, and made strategic decisions based on ideological considerations rather than military logic. The disaster at Stalingrad exemplified this dynamic. When Soviet forces encircled the Sixth Army in November 1942, Hitler's insistence on holding the city regardless of cost, combined with his refusal to authorize a breakout, doomed approximately 300,000 German troops. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein's professional advice to evacuate was rejected. Hitler's decision reflected not military calculation but his ideological conviction that willpower trumped material reality and his concern that any retreat would appear weak.¹⁰

The generals' perspective

From the Wehrmacht's side, professional contempt for Hitler grew steadily, though it rarely translated into effective opposition. The generals recognized Hitler as a military amateur whose intuition occasionally produced brilliant results but more often led to catastrophe. They resented his interference in operational matters and his refusal to accept professional military advice. Many privately called him a "Bohemian corporal" and mocked his lack of formal military education. Yet their sense of professional duty, financial dependence, fear of consequences, and the genuine successes of 1939-1941 kept most of them compliant. Additionally, many generals shared responsibility for the regime's crimes. The Wehrmacht was deeply complicit in the Holocaust and other war crimes, providing logistical support to Einsatzgruppen, participating directly in massacres, and implementing criminal orders such as the Commissar Order that mandated execution of captured Soviet political officers.¹¹

Some officers attempted resistance. Colonel General Ludwig Beck resigned as Chief of the General Staff in 1938 over Hitler's aggressive war plans and later became a central figure in the resistance. The July 20, 1944 assassination attempt represented the culmination of military opposition, led by Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg and involving numerous senior officers including Field Marshal Erwin Rommel. However, the plot's failure led to a massive purge. Over 7,000 individuals were arrested, and approximately 4,980 were executed through shooting, hanging, or torture. The Gestapo systematically dismantled the resistance network, and Hitler introduced the concept of Sippenhaft (blood guilt), allowing punishment of conspirators' families. The purge extended beyond active plotters to anyone who had expressed doubts about Hitler's leadership or maintained connections to the conspirators. After July 20, all Wehrmacht members were required to renew their personal oath of loyalty to Hitler, further cementing his control.¹²

Strategic consequences of the dysfunctional relationship

The poisonous civil-military relationship had devastating strategic consequences for Germany. Hitler's refusal to accept professional military advice led to repeated strategic disasters including the failure to secure Moscow in 1941, the Stalingrad debacle, the abortive Kursk offensive in 1943, and the catastrophic Ardennes offensive in late 1944. His insistence on defending every inch of ground regardless of tactical necessity squandered mobile reserves and prevented the flexible defense that might have prolonged German resistance. The bribery system ensured that even generals who recognized these errors were reluctant to press their objections too forcefully. Those who did object found themselves dismissed or worse, while those who accommodated Hitler's wishes received rewards and advancement.

The Wehrmacht's complicity in Nazi crimes further corrupted the relationship. Officers who might have opposed Hitler on military grounds found themselves compromised by their participation in or knowledge of atrocities. The financial bribes particularly corrupted those officers who had accepted estates confiscated from murdered Jews or enslaved Poles. This created a perverse incentive structure where opposing Hitler meant not only risking one's career and life but also potentially losing ill-gotten wealth and facing accountability for war crimes. The system thus ensured that the Wehrmacht leadership remained bound to Hitler's regime even as it became clear that Germany was heading toward total defeat.

Conclusion

The relationship between Hitler and the Wehrmacht represents a cautionary example of how authoritarian leaders can corrupt military institutions through a combination of financial inducements, exploitation of professional values, systematic purges, and complicity in criminal conduct. The officer corps that prided itself on honor and professionalism found itself thoroughly compromised, serving a leader it increasingly despised yet felt unable to effectively resist. The mutual contempt between Hitler and his generals produced a command structure characterized by distrust, poor communication, and catastrophic decision-making. While individual officers showed remarkable tactical competence, the strategic leadership of the German war effort was fundamentally broken. The financial corruption, ideological contamination, and criminal complicity that characterized Wehrmacht leadership under Hitler ensured that even when individual generals recognized the need for change, they lacked the moral authority, institutional independence, and practical means to effect it. The result was military defeat, national catastrophe, and enduring disgrace for an institution that had once epitomized Prussian military excellence.