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Foreign Relations - Confederate States of America - CSA

Howard Jones reminds readers in his Epilogue, "Historians of Blue and Gray diplomacy remain small in number particularly compared with the military and political historians [amateur and professional] of the conflict. Battles, generals and politicians all helped to determine the outcome of the war; but so did diplomats." Foreign affairs of the Civil War, more often than not, get overlooked when talking about the weaknesses of the Confederacy. The Confederacy had a de facto Government, though it was not formally recognized by any power. For over three years it made its home in Richmond, and the vast armies of the United States unsuccessfully beat against its strongholds. It adopted a flag and a seal of its own. More important than flag or seal, it had an army whose achievements won the admiration of the world; but it had no navy with which to open the blockade and give the Government that probability of permanence which was necessary to secure European recognition.

President Buchanan sympathized with the South on the slavery question and took no decided position to prevent preparations for the dissolution of the Union. He did not believe that the states had a constitutional right to secede, but neither did he think the United States Government could constitutionally prevent them. The seceding states made several unsuccessful attempts to obtain recognition at Washington, and to arrange for a peaceful secession.

The North had the advantage of resources and factories and more business men. These count in war, and made the North firmer than the South had expected. A navy large enough to blockade the Southern ports was soon created. The North had a population of 23,000,000, while the South only had 9,000,000, of which 3,500,000 were slaves.

Robert Augustus Toombs, one of the most ardent secessionists in the US Senate, was chosen Secretary of State only after Barnwell of South Carolina, had refused to accept the place. Chafing under red tape and complaining that too many were seeking bomb-proof positions under a timid administration, he soon resigned and was succeeded by R. M. T. Hunter of Virginia. The Confederacy had all the paraphernalia of a constitutional government, but in reality the executive department wielded powers far beyond those given by the constitution. During the closing months of the conflict, when the Confederacy was gasping for breath, he was rapidly losing the influence which his magnetic personality had been able to command.

Davis, like all who accept offices in exciting times, probably had to suffer from much censure that was unjust. He was as sensitive to disapprobation as Thomas Jefferson, the man of peace. He grew cold under the criticism of his qualities as a military organizer, and his appointments to civil and military positions, but he seldom changed his opinion or his policy.

The Confederacy while embarrassed by political conditions was also handicapped by lack of resources and of communication with the world. The want of skilled labor was a source of weakness. There was no direct communication with Europe, though several plans were proposed before the close of 1862. There were Government vessels most of the time from Nassau and Bermuda to Charleston and Wilmington, but supplies and dispatches were often sent by private blockade runners.

James L. Orr, chairman of the Confederate House Committee on Foreign Relations, once said that the Confederacy never had a foreign policy, and never attempted any high diplomacy. Whatever may be thought of this statement, the failure of the Confederacy was certainly not due to any deficiency in the number of its agents abroad. Jefferson Davis commissioned many diplomatic consular and secret agents to watch every opportunity to negotiate treaties or to press Confederate interests.

In 1860 the Prince of Wales visited the northern portion of the United States, going as far south as Virginia. He slept at the White House, planted a tree at the tomb of Washington, and was given a reception indicating that Anglo-American relations were more cordial than they had been for years. When the storm of the “irrepressible conflict” burst forth in torrents of fury the next year, the sympathy of Queen Victoria, Prince Albert, the Prince of Wales and the majority of the people of England was with the Union cause.

Slavery in the South had been a source of much annoyance to England, and the Northern people hoped that the secession movement would receive no support, but in this they were disappointed. Many of the aristocracy of England stood for the South. London club life was Southern in its sympathies and prominent English papers endeavored to mould England in favor of the Southern Confederacy. The Earl of Shrewsbury spoke of the trial and failure of democracy and prophesied the establishment of an aristocracy in America. In October, 1862, Gladstone said that Jefferson Davis had made an army, a navy and a nation.

News of British neutrality drew venomous attacks from the Union and wild exultation from the Confederacy. From the British perspective, the policy provided the best means for averting involvement in the war, but it recognized the existence of two belligerents and thereby infuriated the Union by awarding the Confederacy a stature higher than rebel. Confederate ships could raid Union commerce and enter neutral ports with prizes, and they could seek ship repairs in those same ports along with foods and other materials necessary for survival. Furthermore, the Confederacy could float loans, purchase war materials, and contract the building of ships.

British intervention appeared certain after the Union’s second defeat at Bull Run in the autumn of 1862. Its attempt to defeat the Confederacy had again proved impossible, a truth that seemed obvious to contemporaries three thousand miles across the Atlantic. Surely the Lincoln administration would recognize the futility of continuing a war that could destroy both antagonists. Southern separation posed the only viable alternative to mounting atrocities. From theTimesand theMorning Postcame appeals to the Palmerston ministry to recognize the Confederacy.

Turkey was among the first of the Powers to show positive friendship for the North during the Civil War. She interdicted pirates in the service of the Confederacy from making depredations upon the commerce of our country in the ports of the Turkish Empire. This was recognized by Secretary Seward in his despatch to E. Joy Morris, then our Minister to Turkey; on June 2nd, 1862, he wrote: “ The President received with profound satisfaction the decree of His Majesty the Sultan interdicting the entrance of pirates engaged in depredating upon our commerce in the ports of Turkey. ... Nor is the proceeding any the less entitled to 'our grateful acknowledgments because the piratical operations of the insurgents, such as they have been, have already been brought to an end. It will, on the contrary, be to the honor of the Sultan that he took the lead in conceding to the United States rights which it is now expected will soon be conceded by all the other maritime Powers The Turkish Government has been singularly just and liberal towards us in this emergency.”

The Confederate authorities, by sparing no pains to inform Spain that the South no longer desired Cuba, by urging mutual interests in the institution of slavery, by suggesting probable aggressive expansive designs of the United States, and by proposing a defensive alliance, made strong efforts to secure the friendship of that once powerful people; but Spain remained neutral. In Cuba there was considerable local sympathy with the Confederates; and, during the blockade, the Richmond authorities hoped to make the island an entrepot from which to obtain European supplies, and a base for forwarding despatches between the Confederacy and Europe. Seward, while denying any desire for conquest, informed Spain that the United States could not look with favor upon any policy that would make that island the fulcrum of the lever for overthrowing the Union."

The Confederacy several times tried to secure recognition by Spain, but was always disappointed, though it took fresh hope from complications. Jeff Davis sent James M. Mason and John Slidell. Mason is described by a New York paper as a "cold , calculating, stolid, sour traitor" whose heart was "gangrened with envy and pride?." John Slidell was described by William Russell thusly: "subtle, full of devices and fond of intrigue." If thrown into a dungeon, Slidell "would conspire with the mice against the cat rather than not conspire at all."

In the early part of 1863, Benjamin seeing little hope of action by England and suspecting Napoleon's designs in Texas, Louisiana and Florida, asked Slidell to open communication with Spain by suggesting the advantage of alliance and offering to join in a disclaimer as to designs on Cuba.

It was to Europe that the Confederate leaders principally looked for sympathy and assistance. Their policy of secession had been greatly influenced by the expectation of foreign aid. Naturally, in presenting their case to Europe they urged the advantages of free trade and avoided a discussion of the slavery question. They desired especially to enlist English sympathy. The Confederate constitution declared in favor of a tariff for revenue only, and the commissioners who were sent to England with instructions (of March 16) to make a treaty a practically providing for free trade were told to inform the English Government that dissolution was the result of long and mature deliberation to escape the persistent efforts to compel the South to pay bounties to the North in the shape of high protective tariffs. It was soon discovered that Seward had taken prompt steps to meet their arguments abroad.

England and France were opposed to slavery but desired commercial intercourse with the South. Palmerston, in July, 1861, said to August Belmont of New York, “ We do not like slavery but we want cotton and we dislike very much your Morrill tariff.” There was a strong party in England led by Bright, Cobden and Forster, who had pronounced sympathies with the United States and would have been glad if they could have informed their constituencies that the Lincoln administration was fighting for emancipation as well as for the integrity of the Union. But, notwithstanding the fears which had been expressed in the speeches of the Southern leaders, the Lincoln party proposed only to restrict slavery in the territories and had no emancipation policy until it came as a military exigency during the war.

Davis and his followers at first expected to produce a cotton famine which would induce England and France to break the blockade and recognize the Confederacy. Later, they were willing to offer special commercial advantages to secure the same end, and proposed to give Napoleon a large amount of cotton for the loan of a squadron. They also favored French and Spanish designs in America and, in order to obtain a treaty of alliance, intimated their readiness to guarantee the possessions of those powers. They made England and France a base for secret attempts to fit out vessels. They endeavored to disturb internal affairs and create complications which would serve the interests of the Confederacy. Finally, in a paroxysm of desperation, they proposed to secure emancipation for recognition, and in negotiations with London syndicates agreed to guarantee cotton for money to secure ships to break the blockade.

The action of France and other powers depended upon the policy of England who, though opposed to slavery, desired commercial intercourse with the South. Public opinion in favor of recognizing the Confederacy was increasing in 1862. The battle of Fredericksburg seemed to silence Southern opposition to the Confederate Government. When the British Government awaited future developments and refused to join France in a policy of mediation, the Confederate leaders were disappointed, and pronounced English neutrality a farce and an irony managed to the advantage of the United States. The Richmond Enquirer said that the English policy was to let the war continue long enough to destroy the strength of both North and South.

Davis, in a speech to the Mississippi legislature in December, after referring to former expectations of recognition and intervention by foreign nations, he said “put not your trust in princes, this war is ours; we must fight it out ourselves." Russia was friendly toward the United States and refused to receive the Confederate commissioner.

Napoleon III had long favored the Confederacy though restrained by his people’s distaste for slavery, which partly explained his reluctance to act without a British initiative. But by late 1862 domestic economic problems had threatened violence and provided a strong motivation for leading an intervention ostensibly aimed at ending the American war and securing access to southern cotton. Napoleon III, however, had more in mind. A close relationship with the Confederacy would combine with control over Mexico to facilitate his predecessor’s dream: Reestablish French influence in the New World and tip the world balance of power toward Paris.

Napoleon III was held back by England and the people. He held many conversations with Slidell and was eagerly planning in the Tuileries to recognize the South and break the blockade, but the capture of New Orleans prevented any step he may have contemplated without the cooperation of England. He afterwards seemed to favor the construction of Confederate vessels in French ports and it was principally the vigilance of Mr. Dayton, the American minister, which prevented these vessels from reaching the sea, but the Confederate agents asserted that the Emperor had wilfully tricked them.

Frequent reference is made to Russia's friendly attitude to us during the Civil War, and to her sending several war-ships to the Atlantic and to the Pacific with “Sealed Instructions." Much has been made of this, but, even if such instructions existed, is there any basis for the conclusion that they were for any other purpose than to offset England-in other words, that her actions, even during the Civil War, were but moves made by her upon the chessboard of European diplomacy.

Russia at that time was without an ally in Europe, that Nihilism was rampant, that the nobility was secretly plotting against the life and throne of the Tsar, and that the fleet was sent to the American waters for its own protection, and not for the benefit of the United States. The threat of a possible war in Europe with Great Britain and France raised the possibility that the Russian squadrons might be blockaded in ports. It was therefore decided to send them to the United States. Secretary Welles offered the Russians the use of the naval repair facilities at Brooklyn and Mare Island near San Francisco. The result was that one Russian squadron went to New York and one to San Francisco. While their ships were being repaired, the Russians became a part of the local scene for nearly a year.

That the Russian squadron came in 1863 on a mission to aid the United States is both an afterthought and a myth. Gladstone, touching upon the attitude of the English Cabinet during the Civil War, completely refutes the claim that England would have intervened in favor of the Confederacy but for the friendship of Russia towards the North.

The Emperor of the French, in an autograph letter, requested the Emperor of Russia to join a coalition already formed between the Governments of England and France for the purpose of recognizing the independence of the Confederate States of America and raising the blockade. Among the reasons given by Napoleon for this action were these : That the United States had become too powerful, would be aggressive and dangerous in the future unless curbed, the time had come to divide the country, and it should be divided because its government was so different from the legitimate governments of Europe.

To this the Emperor of Russia answered that he and his ancestors had ever been on terms of friendship with the United States, that the people of that country had a government of their own choice, that they had a perfect right to that government, that they were defending it with their best blood and treasure, and he not only would refuse to join a coalition against thein, but would reserve his freedom to act in their favor whenever he saw fit. Shortly after this correspondence a Russian fleet was despatched to American waters.

The English Government and Napoleon III could not venture to move in American affairs without at least the assured neutrality of Russia - co-operation was asked for, neutrality would have been sufficient. In Russia, however, they met determined hostility to their plans and friendship for the United States, subsequently expressed by the presence of the armed power of Russia within the territorial limits of the United States.

The Confederacy was disappointed in the power of cotton to secure foreign influence. A report to the Richmond congress in December, 1864," said that England, at the beginning of the war, possessed large stocks of cotton and cotton goods which the owners sold for exorbitant prices, doing a smaller business in quantity but a larger one in value and leaving their unemployed operators to be supported by others. Besides, from 1862 there was a steady flow of cotton to both Europe and the Northern states.

The recognition of the Confederacy did not follow. Had it taken place, with the raising of the blockade, regiment after regiment of English volunteers would have joined the armies of the Confederacy, supplies of every kind would have poured into the South. ern States, and the restoration of the Union, if not rendered impossible, would have been deferred to a remote and uncertain future. England, who had incited Napoleon III to the occupation of Mexico, and then deserted him, who had put him forward in soliciting Russia to join an anti-American coalition, could now give aid to the enemies of the United States through private channels only.