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AE1107

The Rolls-Royce AE1107C is a 6250 shaft horsepower turboshaft engine manufactured by Allison Engine Co. (AEC). Two Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC) fly-by-wire technology AE1107C engines are installed on each V-22 aircraft. The AE1107C has been certified as a Commercial Item under FAR 2.101 and Section 10 U.S.C. 2464.

The AE1107C shares a common engine core and high parts commonality with other members of the AE family of commercial engines. The family includes the AE2100 turboprop engine (T56-A military application on the C-130J) and the AE3007 turbofan engine (military application on the Global Hawk). Allison anticipates worldwide sales of the AE family of engines to exceed 14,000 engines. The V-22 is being acquired for service in the Marine Corps as the MV-22, the Air Force as the CV-22, and the Navy as the HV-22. The total engine acquisition, installs and spares, is approximately 1,080.

The Allision AE1107C engine was developed for the tilt rotor V-22 Osprey propulsion system. The advanced technology features include; all-axial high efficiency turbo-machinery components, only four main rotor bearings, positive sump scavenging, modular construction and dual independent Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC). The AE 1107C is capable of developing over seven shaft horsepower per pound of weight - the highest ratio of any engine in its class. Its modern design offers a versatile core common to the AE 2100 turboprop. The core technology benefits from 200 million T56 operating hours across the full range of military operations and over one million hours on the Rolls-Royce AE family of engines. The two-shaft axial design consists of a 14-stage compressor followed by an effusion-cooled annular combustor, a two-stage gas generator turbine and a two-stage power turbine. It features six rows of variable compressor vanes, dual FADEC, a self-contained oil system that allows for vertical operation, modular construction, and an "on-condition" maintenance capability.

The AE1107C Program will be maintained through a Power By the Hour (PBTH is registered by Rolls Royce) contract with AEC. The support system is a 2 level system with an organic Organizational Level and a commercial Depot Level. AEC performs all maintenance above the Organizational Level for engines/components and provides replenishment of all parts and components used at the Organizational Level. The contractor is responsible for parts and material for repair of engines/components above the Organizational Level. The contractor is paid a fixed dollar amount per each engine hour flown.

The contractor will maintain each engine upon Government acceptance of the V-22 aircraft into which the engine is installed or, in the case of spare engines, post installation functional test of the engine and V-22 aircraft. Engines will be covered by a contractor warranty from production delivery until they become eligible for PBTH coverage as outlined above.

The contractor will perform Integrated Logistics Program Management of the AE1107C. The contractor shall establish management controls to assure that the AE1107C production engine configuration reflects contractual requirements and that the Integrated Logistics Support program reflects the support requirements driven by the production design. The contractor shall maintain the Logistics Support Analysis Record Database for Organizational Level Maintenance. Commercial data will support maintenance and supply above the Organizational Level. The Government and contractor are jointly responsibility for determining appropriate sparing levels for engines/WRA's/components.

The contractor maintains maximum Configuration Control authority in order to keep the engine configuration as close as possible to the commercial variant. The contractor has full authority for class 2 ECP's while the Government retains final authority for class 1 ECP's. The contractor is responsible for supply and maintenance actions required to maintain configuration control of engines/WRA's/components. The contractor will repurchase spare WRA's and components owned by the Government as a result of configuration changes, increased reliability or faulty sparing recommendations. The contractor will provide increased spares to the Government free-of-charge if the shortage is caused by faulty sparing recommendations or reduced reliability.

PBTH is expected to reduce Life-Cycle-Costs for support by over $500 Million. A 28% increase in engine readiness is predicted. Maintenance and supply funding is directly tied to Operating levels. Significant increases in engine Mean-Time-Between-Removals are expected by tying into the commercial marketplace. Maintaining a common configuration with the commercial airline fleet significantly minimizes technical obsolescence. Maximized contractor Configuration Management reduces costs by allowing the contractor to invest in production efficiencies that are capitalized across the entire market. The contractor's profit incentive will drive AEC to maximize MTBR and reduce the cost of manufacture and support.

Up-front Government support costs are avoided. The Government does not need to heavily invest in Intermediate and Depot Repair facilities, tooling, equipment and spares. The Government avoided buying unnecessary technical data in exchange for technical data guarantees for future data if the contract ends due to contractor causes. Long-term support contracts reduce costs by allowing the contractor to capitalize infrastructure over longer periods. The contractor is able to build a more efficient support infrastructure in consonance with commercial support requirements. Reduced support infrastructure risk reduces the Government's costs.

High commonality with commercial engines significantly reduces the cost to carry inventory. Inventory costs to support a system are not linear with the number of systems supported. AEC's increased costs to support 14,000 AE engines over 13,000 engines is insignificant when compared to the Government's cost if supporting a fleet of 1080 unique engines. The Government would be required to lay-in the entire range and depth necessary to support a unique engine whereas under PBTH, AEC will need to invest in only the marginal difference between 13 and 14 thousand engines. Inventory costs are shared with the entire market place instead of being borne wholly by the Government.

The engine is FAA type certified. Certification allows high commonality with commercial variants of the AE family. Design, testing, manufacturing and inservice support benefit from Single Process Initiatives under the purview of the FAA. Navy certification of the engine and associated processes has been melded into a unified process with the FAA to avoid duplication of effort and to reach the lowest cost solution. FAA type certification allows use of commercial in-service support, replacement parts and Integrated Logistics elements. FAA supervision of repair stations eliminates the need to perform military supervision and certification of the repair process and products.

Program shortcomings in regard to logistics support include total reliance on the contractor for repair of engines/WRA's/components. This is mitigated by the contractor's series of 6 worldwide repair centers for the AE family of engines. High commonality with the large population of commercial engines is a significant benefit for the Government. AEC's inability to meet commercial requirements has a much more immediate and drastic impact on AEC's business than would not meeting the Government's needs under a separate contract with a unique engine configuration. The Government has substantial protection for termination due to the fault of the contractor.

Funding policies do not facilitate a system that directly ties maintenance and supply funding to operating usage. A program with support costs linearly tied to the operating usage by contract should have the funding tied to operating usage also. In this case, the optimum funding policy would be to include engine PBTH funding in the OP-20. Core requirements, interpretations and prejudices are substantial barriers. The V-22 program withstood four months of Congressional and legal challenges, including a GAO audit, attempting to reverse the commercial support decision in the face of substantial predicted cost savings and readiness increases.

Analytical tools and processes are not in place to facilitate the type of analysis required to evaluate support concepts with commercial applications. Traditional logistics analysis tools are intended to provide Government managers with the knowledge and capability to build Organic support systems. (e) Cost analysis procedures do not provide methodologies to easily analyze costs. The sensitivity of Government cost data bases does not allow accurate cost analysis. Results can be easily misunderstood - analyses of Government support costs only estimate a minimum base of the cost. Significant cost elements are under reported or missed entirely. Commercial support costs can be accurately analyzed because they are established in a contract. Errors occur when organic costs are directly compared to commercial support costs and the Government costs are assumed to be exact. Significant cultural prejudices must be overcome when introducing commercial support to Fleet/Field units.




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