UNITED24 - Make a charitable donation in support of Ukraine!


OIF - Iraq Significant Activities (SIGACTS)

The term "attacks" refers to all incidents reported to Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) through daily Significant Activity Reports. It includes known attacks on Coalition forces, Iraqi Security Forces, the civilian population, and infrastructure. It does not include criminal activity, nor does it include attacks initiated by Coalition or Iraqi Security Forces. The complexity and effectiveness of these attacks vary. They can range from a single insurgent firing a single shot causing no casualties to a highly coordinated complex attack using two or more weapon systems.

May 2009 SIGACTS Recap

June 2008 SIGACTS Recap (2)

The overall levels of violence in Iraq—as measured by enemy-initiated attacks—decreased about 70 percent from June 2007 to February 2008, a significant reduction from the high levels of violence in 2006 and the first half of 2007. Similarly, the average daily number of enemy-initiated attacks declined from about 180 in June 2007 to about 60 in November 2007 and declined further to about 50 in February 2008. From 2003 through 2007, enemy-initiated attacks had increased around major political and religious events, such as Iraqi elections and Ramadan. In 2007, attacks did not increase during Ramadan. In a March 2008 report, DOD noted that reductions in violence across Iraq have enabled a return to normal life and growth in local economies.

However, data for March 2008 show an increase in violence in Iraq. Security conditions deteriorated in March 2008, with the average number of attacks increasing from about 50 per day in February 2008 to about 70 attacks per day in March—about a 40 percent increase. According to an April 2008 UN report, the increase in attacks resulted from Shi’a militias fighting Iraqi security forces throughout southern Iraq, as well as an increase in incidents of roadside bomb attacks against Iraqi security forces and MNF-I in Baghdad. The average number of attacks declined to about 65 per day in April and to about 45 per day in May.

The enemy-initiated attacks counted in the Defense Intelligence Agency’s (DIA) reporting include car, suicide, and other bombs; ambushes; murders, executions, and assassinations; sniper fire; indirect fire (mortars or rockets); direct fire (small arms or rocket-propelled grenades); surface-to-air fire (such as man-portable air defense systems, or MANPADS); and other attacks on civilians. They do not include violent incidents that coalition or Iraqi security forces initiate, such as cordon and searches, raids, arrests, and caches cleared.

According to DIA, the incidents captured in military reporting do not account for all violence throughout Iraq.

According to DOD reports, the reduction in overall violence resulted primarily from steep declines in violence in Baghdad and Anbar provinces, though the violence in Baghdad increased in March 2008. These two provinces had accounted for just over half of all attacks in Iraq around the time the President announced The New Way Forward. As of February 2008, during one of the lowest periods for attacks in Iraq since the start of The New Way Forward, about one-third of all attacks in Iraq occurred in Baghdad and Anbar provinces.

June 2008 SIGACTS Recap

Improvements in the security environment were substantial over the previous nine months but significant challenges remained. The cumulative effect of Coalition and ISF efforts continued to shrink the areas in which AQI and its insurgent allies enjoyed support and sanctuary. In a particularly noteworthy development, Iraqi forces launched clearing operations in Ninewa Province on May 10, 2008, that disrupted AQI’s grip on Mosul. Nevertheless, AQI remained a dangerous and adaptable enemy seeking to control areas where Coalition and Iraqi force presence was minimal. As AQI came under increased pressure in Mosul, there were indications that it was attempting to regroup along the upper Euphrates River. AQI also remained capable of high-profile attacks, though its indiscriminate targeting of civilians continued to alienate AQI from the mainstream Sunni population it claimed to represent. After an increase in attacks related to the late March 2008 activities in Basrah, Baghdad and other southern provinces, most key security indicators trended downward, though many have yet to reach pre-March 2008 levels. Iraqwide, total monthly security incidents for April 2008 were comparable to the last months of 2007.

May 2008 SIGACTS Recap

Slide from Gen. Petraeus Testimony.

April 2008 SIGACTS Recap

General David H. Petraeus, Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, testified on April 8, 2008, that, for nearly six months, security incidents have been at a level not seen since early-to-mid-2005, though the level did spike in recent weeks as a result of the violence in Basrah and Baghdad. The level of incidents had, however, begun to turn down again.

March 2008 SIGACTS Recap

Monthly violence levels at the beginning of 2008 were significantly lower than during the mid-summer 2007 peaks. The overall reduction in attacks, casualties and deaths is the result of multiple factors including the increased operational tempo of Coalition and Iraqi forces made possible by the surge in U.S. and Iraqi combat forces, the growth in the Sons of Iraq, sustained Iraqi and Coalition force presence among the population, increased Iraqi force capability and capacity, increasing rejection of AQI by Sunni Arabs and operations aimed at disrupting terrorist facilitation networks. In combination, these factors resulted in sustained pressure on AQI, militia extremists and insurgents and degraded their ability to carry out attacks. The continuation of Muqtada al-Sadr's August 2007 order to Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) to suspend all attacks has also contributed to the decrease in overall violence, though some Iranian-sponsored Special Group (SG) leaders have ignored the order.

December 2007 SIGACTS Recap

The increase in US and Iraqi force levels and the emphasis on population security, along with several other developments, improved the security environment during the last quarter of 2007. Overall attacks had fallen to levels seen in January 2006 - the last month before weekly attacks began the 17-month upward trend that peaked in June 2007. The last period during which attacks were consistently at this level was the summer of 2005. Overall civilian deaths, to include those associated with hostile actions, followed a similar trend both Iraq-wide and in the Baghdad security districts.

July 2007 SIGACTS Recap

While overall attacks declined in July compared to June, levels of violence remain high. Enemy initiated attacks increased around major religious and political events, including Ramadan and elections. For 2007, Ramadan was scheduled to begin in mid-September.

April 2007 SIGACTS Recap

Enemy-initiated attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners continued to increase through October 2006 and remain high. The average total number of attacks per day has risen from 71 per day in January 2006 to a record high of 176 per day in October 2006. For the last 3 months, average attacks per day were 164 in February, 157 in March, and 149 in April 2007.

October 2006 SIGACTS Recap

Since June 2003, overall security conditions in Iraq deteriorated and grew more complex, as evidenced by the increased numbers of attacks and Sunni-Shi'a sectarian strife after the February 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra. Enemy-initiated attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners continued to increase through October 2006. The average total attacks per day increased, rising from about 70 per day in January 2006 to about 180 per day in October 2006. These attacks increased around major religious and political events, including Ramadan and elections. Coalition forces were still the primary target of attacks, but the number of attacks on Iraqi security forces and civilians also did increase since 2003.

April 2006 SIGACTS Recap

Overall, average weekly attacks during the "Government Transition" period (February through April 2006) were higher than any of the previous periods. Reasons for the high level of attacks may include terrorist and insurgent attempts to exploit a perceived inability of the Iraqi government to constitute itself effectively, the rise of ethno-sectarian attacks following the Golden Mosque bombing, and enemy efforts to derail the political process leading to a new government. Overall casualty levels rose substantially, reflecting the increase in sectarian violence following the Golden Mosque bombing. Baghdad is the epicenter of attacks, experiencing 32% of the total number of incidents in this reporting period.

Baghdad's large and diverse population, its high profile as the capital, and the robust foreign presence there-political and military officials, the media, contractors, and others- drive the levels of violence. Iraq's other restive areas include al-Anbar, Salah ad Din, northern Babil, Ninawa, and southwestern Diyala provinces, and the city of Kirkuk. Violence in southern and Kurdish northern Iraq is comparatively low. Sectarian violence increased sharply in the days and weeks following the Golden Mosque attack, but did not remain at those high levels. Since then, sectarian violence has remained relatively constant, albeit at a higher level than it was prior to the attack.

The charts below depict significant insurgent activities reported throughout Iraq. Significant activities (SIGACTS) include reported attacks using improvised explosive devices (IED), vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED), mortars, rocket propelled grenades (RPG), and improvised rockets. This does not include small arms fire, hand grenade attacks, and other hostile activities.

The average level of daily attacks across Iraq, including small-arms fire, drive-by shootings, mortar and rocket assaults and roadside bombings, continued to creep up since spring 2005, and by late September 2005 stood at about 90 a day, or 2,700 each month.

December 2005 SIGACTS Recap

The bar-chart below shows enemy-initiated attacks against the coalition, its Iraqi partners, and infrastructure by Category, from June 2003 through December 2005. The number of attacks has increased in number over time with the highest peak occurring during October 2005, around the time of Ramadan and the October referendum on Iraq's constitution. This followed earlier peaks in August and November 2004 and January 2005.

CNN's Barbara Starr reported, on 7 Oct. 2005, updated data relating to insurgent activity in Iraq:

Number of Insurgent Attacks in Iraq
March 2005 1,500
September 2005 2,500

Number of IED/VBIED/Suicide Incidents in Iraq
(includes defused IEDs)
September 2004 750
September 2005 1,000

August 2005 SIGACTS Recap

The bar-chart below shows Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) data showing trends in Enemy-Initiated Attacks against the Coalition and Its Partners, by Category, June 2003 through August 2005.

February 2005 SIGACTS Recap

The bar-chart below shows Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) data showing trends in enemy initiated attacks against the coalition, its Iraqi partners, and infrastructure, with the latest data for February 2005.

These charts includes those actions affecting Coalition operations reported and documented through Coalition Joint Task Force-7.

The blue line indicates daily totals, while the red line indicates the seven-day centered moving average, which "smoothes" the trend. Small surges cause daily variances in number of attacks this week, but the overall trend is an increase of hostile actions since the peak of the Fallujah and al-Sadr sedition.

Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list

Page last modified: 05-07-2011 02:29:45 ZULU