THE U.S. PRESENCE IN 2011

This quarter, Ambassador James Jeffrey continued to lead U.S. reconstruction and diplomatic efforts as the U.S. Chief of Mission in Iraq. As of December 31, 2010, there were approximately 910 civilian employees and 5,273 contractors supporting U.S. Embassy activities in Iraq. An additional 3,934 contractors supported U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) activities. For details on U.S. Embassy-Baghdad activities, staffing, and life support, see the Embassy and Contracting subsections below.

As of January 1, 2011, there were 49,712 U.S. troops in Iraq under the command of General Lloyd Austin. As of November 30, 2010, 72,663 contractors supported Department of Defense (DoD) activities in Iraq.

Troop levels are virtually unchanged from last quarter, and the Administration anticipates a comparable force strength for most of the duration of Operation New Dawn—the United States’ post-combat mission that began on August 31, 2010—until it declines before the deadline for withdrawal of all U.S. troops on December 31, 2011.

U.S. Embassy-Baghdad: Building Capacity To Sustain the Assistance Program

U.S. Embassy-Baghdad continues to consolidate reconstruction activities and attempt to “normalize” operations in Iraq. According to U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, administration of the Economic Support Fund (ESF) and other reconstruction assistance will be performed at U.S. Embassy-Baghdad and its Embassy Branch Offices (EBOs) and Consulates General, as well as in Washington, D.C., after the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) shut down in September 2011.

According to U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, each of the EBOs and Consulates General will have a substantive staff—including political, economic, public affairs, consular, and management officers—to support ongoing activities. In addition, the Department of State (DoS) Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) will implement its planned Police Development Program (PDP), and the planned Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) will implement a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.

Of the 910 total U.S. government civilian employees at U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, it is unclear how many support reconstruction activities. According to U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, there were only 10 such employees supporting reconstruction efforts as of December 31, 2010—all of whom worked in the Iraq Strategic Partnership Office (ISPO). The Embassy’s newly restrictive definition of “reconstruction” excludes programs implemented by the PRTs, INL, USAID, and other offices, agencies, and bureaus that use foreign assistance funds under the oversight jurisdiction of SIGIR. However, the Embassy said that there were “many other” U.S. government civilian employees supporting “traditional” assistance programs.

Other elements of the U.S. Mission will provide to the EBOs and Consulates General overarching and essential direct support in the areas of life support/medical, security, communications,
Current plans call for a core staff of 157 full-time personnel to provide overall management at OSC-I: 118 military personnel, 9 U.S. government civilians, and 30 locally employed staff. Security Assistance Teams (SATs) will supplement the core staff as required to provide advice, training, technical assistance, and support. U.S. military, DoD civilian, and contractor personnel will be deployed in SATs on a temporary basis to support specific FMS agreements to acquire defense articles and services that the U.S. government proposes to sell or provide. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad anticipates that there could be approximately 750 SAT members in Iraq at the beginning of 2012, depending on the status of current and future FMS cases.

Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq

This quarter, USF-I continued preparations for the establishment of OSC-I with the assistance of the Political-Military section at U.S. Embassy-Baghdad. OSC-I is scheduled to assume responsibility for security assistance oversight from USF-I on October 1, 2011, and become a section within U.S. Embassy-Baghdad under Chief of Mission authority.

The overall purpose of OSC-I is to carry out the security assistance mission in Iraq as authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act. According to U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, these activities include:

• providing interface for exchange of information and advice between the Iraqi military, the U.S. Embassy, and DoD components responsible for security-assistance programs, including promotion of standardization, interoperability, and other cooperative measures
• evaluating Iraqi ability to employ and maintain security-related equipment and assistance
• performing programming, planning, management, and implementation functions related to FMS, the Foreign Military Finance (FMF) program, the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, joint exercise planning, and other forms of bilateral military engagement

ISPO

According to U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, ISPO continued regular project monitoring, dialogue, and assistance efforts this quarter. As of December 31, 2010, ISPO was staffed by 10 U.S. civilian employees and 2 embedded U.S. military officers.

This quarter, ISPO conducted site visits to two construction projects that are well behind their original schedules: the ESF-funded Missan Surgical Hospital, and the al-Mamoon Exchange and Telecommunications Center, funded by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). Re-awards were made for the Missan Carriageway and the Wazareah National Electrical Training Center. No projects were de-scoped or canceled. Also this quarter, 22 projects managed by ISPO, worth nearly $75 million, were completed. For details, see Table 3.1.
As of December 31, 2010, there were 89 ongoing ISPO-managed projects valued at $416 million. Of those ongoing projects, 25 projects with a combined cost of $236 million had previously been scheduled for completion on or before December 31, 2010.145

### USACE

This quarter, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) completed 63 projects at a cost of nearly $227 million (some of which were managed by ISPO and are included in Table 3.1). As of December 31, 2010, there were 152 ongoing USACE-implemented projects, valued at $535 million. Of those projects, 110 projects with a combined cost of $419 million had been originally scheduled for completion on or before December 31, 2010.146

As USACE prepares to close down its operations in Iraq, it has continued to manage two nationwide sustainment programs designed to train Iraqis to operate and manage U.S.-funded water, sanitation, and other projects: a $2.6 million ESF-funded segment of a $4.8 million project to train professional...
Iraqi engineers and a $245,000 ESF-funded segment of a $5.6 million nationwide project to provide one-on-one mentoring to Iraqi engineers. The goal is to train Iraqis so that the GOI is able to benefit from U.S. government projects following their completion and transfer to GOI control. Both sustainment programs are scheduled for completion in March 2011.

Transitioning to the INL Police Development Program

According to U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, planning is underway for the INL’s Police Development Program. Once up and running, the PDP will be the primary means by which the United States provides assistance to the Iraqi police. According to INL, the program will seek to develop the capabilities of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI) to manage and sustain a full range of internal security operations, including:

- continued development of law enforcement institutions and personnel by developing leadership and management capacity
- enhancing community policing and specialized skills
- strengthening border enforcement and cultivating sustainable training systems

Currently, PDP planning calls for reduced numbers of advisors and more limited geographic reach than originally envisioned, due to refined requirements and costs as well as limited availability of funds. INL reported that these cuts will not affect the overall mission or goals of its program, but progress may be slowed. For the PDP implementation time line, see Figure 3.1.

Basing, Staffing, and Life Support

According to INL, the PDP will include an estimated 190 police and subject-matter expert advisors based in three cities:

- Baghdad, at a stand-alone facility on the grounds of Joint Security Station (JSS) Shield
- Basrah, co-located with the proposed Consulate
- Erbil, co-located with U.S. Embassy-Baghdad’s aviation personnel

U.S. Embassy-Baghdad will manage all security, logistics, and life-support contracts at all locations, with INL paying for its share of services. Currently, INL does not plan to base any PDP personnel at the EBOs, but may use the EBOs in Kirkuk and Mosul as potential rotary-wing landing areas. The PDP may also be supported by Quick Reaction Forces out of the EBOs if needed.

Despite the program being smaller than originally envisioned, INL maintains that the program will continue to have a broad geographic and functional reach.

Coordination between USF-I and INL

In anticipation of the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces in December 2011, USF-I and INL regularly meet to coordinate implementation of the ongoing USF-I police training program and to plan for the
follow-on INL program. In addition, USF-I has a full-time military liaison officer in INL’s Baghdad office, and INL has deployed five personnel to serve as representatives on USF-I’s ITAM staff.

**Indications of Iraqi Buy-In**

According to INL, the MOI’s current training curriculum meets international policing standards. It includes more than 400 courses conducted by Iraqi police professionals throughout the country at Police Colleges and Regional Training Centers. According to U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, the PDP will complement the MOI’s training program by emphasizing “train-the-trainer” activities so that the MOI can maintain its own specialized training capability when the PDP ends.

U.S. Embassy-Baghdad reports that MOI officials are “in accord” with the PDP’s mission to move beyond basic-level training and force generation—the focus of U.S. efforts to date—to a program that helps produce a “broad upper level police cadre.” The Iraqi Minister of Interior has reportedly endorsed the PDP and welcomed the use of the current JSS Shield site to carry out PDP activities. Further support, according to U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, comes from “all levels” of the MOI, including deputy ministers, directors general, provincial chiefs of police, uniformed police, career civilian professionals, and top-level policy advisors, as well as members of the Iraqi Council of Representatives. However, some MOI officials have expressed concern to SIGIR that urgently needed criminal investigative training has not been sufficiently prioritized.

**PRT Program Drawdown**

As of December 31, 2010, the PRT footprint in Iraq comprises 15 PRTs, 1 Regional Reconstruction Team (RRT), and 7 Forward Presence locations. According to the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA), which manages the PRTs, there were 698 civilian and military personnel staffing the PRTs. For details, see Figure 3.2 and Table 3.2.

**Figure 3.2**

**Provincial Reconstruction Team Footprint, as of 12/31/2010**

According to U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, the PRT closure schedule has not been finalized. PRT staff will gradually decrease in the coming months in anticipation of formal closure, but will be “adequately staffed” through the end date. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad plans to maintain the current number of PRTs/RRTs at 16 through May 2011, although as of January 1, 2011, OPA had transferred responsibility for the activities of Erbil RRT to other Embassy sections. From June to September 2011, U.S. Embassy-Baghdad plans to close 12 PRTs. After September, reconstruction elements will remain at four locations: the Consulates General in Erbil and Basrah and the EBOs in Mosul and Kirkuk. These posts will continue after the scheduled withdrawal of U.S. troops in December 2011.
Transitioning OPA/PRT Responsibilities to Other Embassy Sections

In a recent “task binning” exercise, OPA catalogued 117 tasks performed by its staff members that would need to be transferred to other U.S. Embassy-Baghdad sections to support the enduring provincial presences after OPA closes. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad leadership incorporated this information into their long-term planning efforts, but postponed detailed planning until next quarter, when the work demands related to Iraqi government formation were expected to subside.\(^\text{160}\)

According to U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, the PRTs have redoubled their efforts toward building the capacity of provincial governments and to mitigating internal conflicts and flash points over the last year. In recent months, they have initiated few non-capacity building reconstruction projects and plan to have ongoing projects completed as scheduled or transitioned to enduring reconstruction elements in the EBOs. The PRT responsibilities that will be handed off to EBOs and Consulates General are defined in the “Provincial Presence Mission Statement” prepared by DoS with input from U.S. Embassy-Baghdad and the PRTs.\(^\text{161}\) For details, see Figure 3.3.

Iraqi NGO Partners

According to U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, PRTs work with Iraqi non-governmental organizations (NGOs), when appropriate, to accomplish PRT work plan objectives. Areas of cooperation have included:\(^\text{162}\)
- English language training
- women’s and children’s rights awareness campaigns
- women’s entrepreneurship training
- projects to increase agricultural production capacity
- school construction in areas with high concentrations of minorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.2</th>
<th>Number of Personnel, by PRT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyala</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninewa</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tameem</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anbar</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erbil</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basrah</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salah Al-Din</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thi-Qar</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babylon</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muthanna</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerbala</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missan</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Najaf</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasit</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qadissiya</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>698</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Total includes civilian and military personnel.


Figure 3.3

Provincial Presence Mission Statement
The provincial presences will contribute to a sovereign, stable and self-reliant Iraq by seeking to:
- mitigate and mediate Arab-Kurd, Sunni-Shia, and provincial-Baghdad tensions
- strengthen the Rule of Law and the capacity of provincial institutions in key flashpoint locations
- balance foreign interference
- provide a platform for the United Nations and other organizations
- promote the safe return and resettlement of displaced persons
- encourage foreign investment, economic growth, and development
- report on strategic trends, events, and drivers of Iraqi instability
- present American policy and promote mutual understanding and respect for American values
- provide limited services to American citizens

CONTRACTING

Private Security Contractors

At the end of 2010, more than 15,300 contractors were providing security services for DoD (13,603) and USAID (1,741). As USF-I approaches the end of its mission, these agencies anticipate significant declines in the number of private security contractors (PSCs) they employ. Although DoS is the managing authority for PSCs in Iraq, U.S. Embassy-Baghdad reported that it could not provide information for security contractors by nationality or civilian agency.

According to U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, PSCs continue to cope with GOI delays in registering weapons and licensing vehicles. The overlapping jurisdictions of the Ministries of Interior and Defense reportedly have resulted in PSCs being detained and experiencing unannounced inspections of their compounds by multiple GOI agencies not understood to be directly involved in PSC regulation. Notwithstanding these continuing challenges, the Embassy reported this quarter that—for the first time—a GOI security agency shared intelligence with contractor companies that were being targeted by terrorist groups.

Contracting Actions and Grants

As of December 31, 2010, DoD, DoS, and USAID had reported 69,531 contracting actions or grants, totaling $39.04 billion in cumulative obligations. This accounts for 84% of the $46.24 billion in reported financial obligations from the IRRF, ESF, Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF), and Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP). This quarter, DoD, DoS, and USAID reported 640 new contracting actions or grants, resulting in $510 million in new obligations and $608 million in new expenditures.

For an overview of the status and quarterly change of contracting actions and grants, see Table 3.3. For a complete list of contracting actions and grants, as reported to SIGIR, visit www.sigir.mil.

Although DoS is the managing authority for PSCs in Iraq, U.S. Embassy-Baghdad reported that it could not provide information for security contractors by nationality or civilian agency.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.3</th>
<th>Contracting Actions and Grants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>$ Millions</strong></td>
<td><strong>Current Status</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fund</td>
<td>Count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISFF</td>
<td>18,124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRRF</td>
<td>8,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERP</td>
<td>35,542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>7,381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>69,531</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. Tables represent only those contracting actions that were reported by the agencies; they do not reflect all obligations or expenditures made in Iraq.

FOCUS ON BASRAH

Background
Basrah City, once known as the Venice of the Middle East, sits 30 miles northwest of the Persian Gulf on the Shatt al-Arab waterway. The GOI estimates Basrah’s population at 2.87 million people, making it by far the largest urban center south of Baghdad. Most residents are Shia, and although the city remains home to Sunnis and even some Christian enclaves, many minorities were forced out by Shia militia groups during 2006–2008.

Historically home to a thriving and diverse merchant class, Basrah became the Ottoman Empire’s administrative hub for what is now southern Iraq in the nineteenth century. During the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), much of the province’s infrastructure was damaged or destroyed, as Basrah bore witness to some of the conflict’s fiercest fighting. Today, Basrah is the capital of the eponymous, oil-rich Iraqi province that shares a border with Iran and Kuwait.

Just to the west and north of Basrah City lies much of Iraq’s national patrimony in four globally significant oil fields that were only recently re-opened to large-scale international investment: West Qurna, al-Rumaila, Majnoon, and al-Zubair. Together, these fields hold more than 80 billion barrels in proved reserves—more than half of Iraq’s oil wealth. Unique among Iraq’s provinces, Basrah has access to the sea, making it the country’s gateway to the wider world of international commerce.

Basrah province is also home to the southernmost terminus of Iraq’s railway network—where the last leg of Imperial Germany’s fabled Berlin-to-Baghdad line would have met the sea—as well as a fast-growing international airport. Although the oil fields, railways, and port facilities suffered greatly from years of war and neglect, international investors are actively rehabilitating Basrah’s infrastructure. If successful, Basrah may yet stand beside the other oil-rich cities of the Gulf, realizing its manifest economic potential and providing the GOI with a reliable revenue stream to finance much-needed reconstruction projects.

Security
On April 7, 2003, Basrah City fell to British forces led by the fabled 7th Armored Brigade, direct descendants of General Montgomery’s “Desert Rats” of WWII. Initially, Basrah was one of Iraq’s success stories, with a permissive security environment that allowed UK forces to patrol the streets sans helmets and body armor. In the years that followed, the situation deteriorated, as Shia militia groups gradually grew in prominence, forcing the British to withdraw from downtown Basrah to their main base at Basrah International Airport in late 2007. By March 2008, more than 4,000 police in Basrah City and the surrounding area were under the control of various Shia militia groups.

Figure A displays key events affecting Basrah’s security since 2003, and Figure B charts the number of reported security incidents in the entire province since 2004.

The definitive event in post-Saddam Basrah was Operation Charge of the Knights. Prime Minister al-Maliki launched this operation in late March 2008 to re-take Basrah from Shia militias, such as Muqtada al-Sadr’s Jaish al-Mahdi, which had come to control large swaths of the city and neighboring port facilities. Several of these armed groups received
**FOCUS ON BASRAH**

### Figure A


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>March: UK forces enter Iraq from Kuwait.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May: About 26,000 UK troops in Iraq, mainly in the southeast.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>July: Approximately 9,000 UK forces remain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>August 9: Basrah residents riot over fuel and electricity shortages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April 21: Multiple car bombs kill more than 70 in Basrah City.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April 7: UK forces take control of Basrah City and patrol with Iraqi police.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>March: Sadrist militia attack female Basrah University student; public demonstrations ensue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>January 31: SCIRI-dominated Shia coalition wins control of Basrah provincial council. Fadhlia party (Shia) finishes second; secures governorship in later ballot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>September 29: UK forces launch Operation Sinbad to regain control of Basrah City.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>March: Operation Sinbad ends inconclusively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>December 25: UK forces battle with pro-militia Iraqi police units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October 30: Shia militias kill 17 Sunni police recruits near an Iraqi-run training center.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April–May: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Early April: Cease-fire between ISF and militias Gradually implemented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April–May: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>March 25: PM al-Maliki launches Operation Charge of the Knights to restore order in Basrah City.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March 26–27: ISF encounters fierce resistance from Iranian-supplied Shia militia forces; U.S. military rushes air assets and other support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>November 8: 10 killed and more than 40 wounded by car bomb in western Basrah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March 31: UK ends mission and turns over command of Coalition military operations in southern Iraq to the United States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>June 19: 2 killed in Basrah electricity protests.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** This time line is intended to highlight selected major events since April 2003. It is not intended to be a comprehensive account of events over the past seven years.

**Source:** SIGIR analysis of GOI and U.S. government documents and open-source information in Arabic and English.

### Figure B


- [Sadists declare cease-fire](#)
- [Operation Charge of the Knights](#)

**Source:** USF-I, response to SIGIR data call, 1/4/2011.

U.S., British, and Iraqi representatives at a ceremony marking the completion of the British mission in Basrah. (UK MOD Crown Copyright 2009)

Substantial support from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Iraqi forces leading the operation initially encountered fierce resistance, and U.S. commanders rushed reinforcements to the theater. But after several weeks of fighting, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) consolidated their positions and cleared most of the remaining militia strongholds.

At the moment, Basrah is relatively stable, but insurgent violence still occurs. Notable recent security incidents include:

- **November 8:** At least 12 people were killed and more than 30 others injured when a car bomb exploded on a busy street in southwestern Basrah.

- **November–December 2010:** Basrah International Airport was sporadically subjected to rocket and mortar attacks. Although largely ineffective, these attacks interrupted scheduled service and, if they continue, could potentially dissuade investors from traveling there.

**ISF Readiness**

In their meetings with SIGIR in January 2011, Basrah’s local Iraqi Army and police commanders commented on the continued need for international...
support, even after the scheduled departure of U.S. forces in December 2011. According to Lieutenant General Mohamad, commander of Iraq’s army units in the province, the Iraqi police require additional investigative and forensic training. But he noted that evidence-collection techniques taught to them by U.S. and U.K. trainers have increased the number of criminals brought to justice. He also noted that while the Iraqi Army and police are self-sufficient in meeting their basic training needs, they continue to need assistance in developing their medical, transportation, and logistics cadres.185

**Governance**

**Elections**

In Iraq’s first-ever Provincial Council elections, held in January 2005, Basrah voters strongly backed a Shia coalition led by the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI, which is now known as the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, or ISCI).186 When the votes were counted, SCIRI had won 20 of the 41 seats at stake. Another Shia party, al-Fadhila, finished second, but was able to secure the provincial governorship for one of its own, Mohamad al-Waeli, in February 2005.187 Under Governor al-Waeli, extremist supporters of al-Fadhila quickly gained control of key police units and were soon enmeshed in oil smuggling and extortion schemes. Violence spiked as the various Shia factions fought—sometimes openly, but more often, through indirect means—for control of lucrative port concessions.188

Four years later, Basrah voters handed a decisive defeat to these Shia religious parties, with Prime Minister al-Maliki’s State of Law (SoL) Coalition winning an absolute majority of seats on the Provincial Council in the aftermath of the successful ISF offensive of March 2008.189

**Life in Basrah**

In the 1970s, the thriving Basrah nightlife attracted patrons from throughout the region, but society grew more conservative over time. The community is now very conservative; most of Basrah’s female residents do not leave their homes without donning a veil. Despite this, a large percentage of college students are women. But life remains difficult for what remains of Basrah’s Christian community, and jobs are difficult for them to come by.195

There have been significant changes to daily life since the end of Ba‘athist rule, with many residents now owning cars and cell phones. Apartments in Basrah City rent for $500 per month in better neighborhoods, but commercial land can cost up to $5,000 per square meter.

Basrah has also become a fiercely competitive media market. Today, almost everyone has television, and hundreds of channels are available. Some Basrawis with whom SIGIR met stated that they favored the U.S.-funded television station al-Hurra and the U.S.-funded Radio Sawa because they appreciate their balanced approach to the news. Many middle-class families have access to the Internet at home, although the connections are slow and expensive. In addition, several new private schools have opened recently and—with the increase in salaries for GOI employees—some middle-class

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**Figure C**

Basrah Provincial Election Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ISCI</th>
<th>State of Law Coalition (Al-Maliki)</th>
<th>Al-Fadhila</th>
<th>Al-Sadr</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

residents (most of whom work for the state) are able to send children to private academies. Average salaries for Director General-level GOI officials in Basrah are about $3,000 per month, with lower-level government workers earning monthly wages of about $1,000 to $1,500.196

Public services, however, remain meager. GOI officials and local residents report that new water treatment plants are being built and that the water sector is one of the government’s reconstruction priorities. They caution, however, that no one trusts the water supply’s quality, and most everyone still buys bottled water for drinking.197

Standard of Living
While almost one-third of Basrah province’s population falls below the national poverty line of $2.20 per day, Basrah performs relatively better than the rest of Iraq by several other measures.198 For example, Basrah’s infant mortality rate is 17% lower than the national average, and 97% of births are attended by health professionals, compared with the national average of 88.5%.199 But cancer rates in Basrah appear to be higher than found elsewhere in Iraq. In 1998, Basrah province accounted for 9.2% of Iraq’s registered cancer cases, up from 5.5% in 1989.200

Displaced Persons
The relative calm that has prevailed in Basrah since spring 2008 has made it an attractive option for internally displaced persons (IDPs) who fled their homes during the widespread sectarian violence following the bombing of the Samarra mosque in February 2006. According to the UN, 85% of Basrah’s IDPs—most of whom came from Baghdad—would like to settle locally.201 However, more than 90% of Basrah IDPs surveyed by the UN expressed grave concerns about local housing shortages and access to job opportunities in the province.202

Economic Development
Provincial Council members stated to SIGIR that international firms wishing to do business in Basrah do not need to establish a permanent base of operations there. Instead, they encourage partnering with local Iraqi firms, as Basrah has large numbers of skilled professionals in need of work. The Basrah Investment

Al-Rumaila Oil Field: A Case Study
In 2009, a consortium consisting of British Petroleum (BP) and the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) won the right to develop al-Rumaila in partnership with Iraq’s state-owned South Oil Company (SOC). BP has a history in the area, having worked extensively in Basrah before the rise of Saddam Hussein, leaving only in 1976.203

To facilitate exploitation of this giant field, BP, CNPC, and the SOC formed the al-Rumaila Operations Organization (ROO). This quarter, SIGIR met with the ROO’s general manager, who reported the ROO is currently staffed by more than 4,000 personnel, around 3,400 of whom have been transferred to the ROO from the SOC. As of mid-January 2011, more than 10,000 contractors and sub-contractors also work at the site.204

ROO officials reported to SIGIR that production targets set for mid-2011 have already been exceeded. As of January 2011, al-Rumaila was producing 1.25 MBPD, exceeding the initial baseline production of 1.05 MBPD and above the 110% of initial production threshold the consortium needed to reach to qualify for payments from the Ministry of Oil. In addition to the critical increases in production, the ROO’s initial successes have resulted in it entering into many contracts with Iraqi and international firms to provide a wide array of services. The contracts and subcontracts signed by the ROO have been substantial. The ROO’s general manager described his task as managing “a Fortune 500 company.” To better account for the ROO’s cash flow, BP has begun training an Iraqi team on internal controls, contracting, and financial management.

The overall security situation for international oil companies operating in the province is excellent. The al-Rumaila field has never been attacked since international firms began operations there. General Mohamad, commander of the Iraqi Army’s 14th Corps and ranking officer in the province, commented that: “Business is booming. . . . The presence of Lukoil, Shell, and BP in Basrah is a good indicator of how secure Basrah is. The fact that none of these [companies’ employees] have been attacked, kidnapped, or extorted says a lot about the security situation.” He also noted that there has been more than $1.5 billion in investment in Basrah over the past two years, triple the annual budget for the province.205

Security for al-Rumaila is provided by the Oil Protection Force (OPF). ISF officials remarked that the OPF needs additional training and to be consolidated with the regular ISF at some point. To meet this need, BP believes that the GOI should pay for the training, whereas other foreign firms—notably CNPC and Royal Dutch Shell, which also operates in Basrah province—favor an “adopt a battalion” model, where the companies finance improved training for local OPF units.206

The biggest challenge facing al-Rumaila, however, is not security, but maintenance. ROO is incentivizing its staff with bonuses to get workers to keep down-time to a minimum. Maintenance-related delays also reduce electricity production. In commenting on the state of the field’s infrastructure, the general manager of the ROO stated that he is facing 30–40 years of accrued bad maintenance and that reversing this will be his main focus in 2011.207
Commission (BIC) gives top priority to deals involving local firms, followed in succession by deals involving Iraqis living abroad and then ventures involving foreign investors.\(^{208}\) But the Chairman of the BIC cautioned that development will take time.\(^{209}\)

Unemployment
The recent growth in the hydrocarbon sector has done little to improve the lot of Basrah’s unemployed. About 35% of those employed work for the government, with agricultural workers making up another 20% of the workforce.\(^{210}\) GOI officials estimate the provincial unemployment rate at 25%, with the rate among recent university graduates hovering near 50%.\(^{211}\) When the State Oil Marketing Organization advertised open positions, it received more than 30,000 applications, and Provincial Council officials estimate that at least 52,000 residents are actively looking for employment.\(^{212}\)

Hydrocarbons
In 2009, Iraq conducted two rounds of bidding for oil services contracts. More than 20 international companies participated, and 10 contracts were ultimately awarded. Figure D shows the winning bidders for the major fields in the vicinity of Basrah.

Under the terms of their contracts with the GOI, the winning bidders pledged to raise production to certain benchmarks in return for remuneration. This quarter, the Eni-Occidental consortium developing the al-Zubair field and the BP-CNPC consortium developing the al-Rumaila field announced that they both had met their initial production goals. Other recent developments in Basrah’s oil and gas sector included:\(^{213}\)

- The Exxon-Royal Dutch Shell consortium developing West Qurna Phase-1 raised its target for oil production about 22% to more than 2.8 million barrels per day (MBPD) in six to seven years. There are currently 360 wells at the field, and plans call for 2,000 more to be drilled over the life of the 20-year contract.
- The Russo-Norwegian venture drilling the previously untapped West Qurna Phase-2 field reportedly plans to drill about 70 more wells early in 2011.
- Royal Dutch Shell and Malaysia’s Petronas announced that they anticipate producing 175,000 BPD from the Majnoon field by the end of 2012.
- On October 20, a Kuwaiti-Turkish joint venture won the rights to develop Siba, a relatively small non-associated gas field with estimated reserves of about 1.5 trillion cubic feet.

Iraq’s dilapidated pipeline, power, and transportation infrastructure has...
FOCUS ON BASRAH

long inhibited its export capacity. This quarter, the Ministry of Oil announced that contracts for two of four new off-shore mooring stations had been signed. When finished, the four stations will have the combined effect of more than doubling current export capacity to an estimated 4 MBPD. The Ministry of Oil also signed its first contract for a new pipeline to connect to the new single-point mooring stations this quarter.

Problems with Petrodollars
An innovative provision contained in Iraq’s 2010 budget provides provincial governments with specific financial benefits (“petrodollars”) for producing and refining hydrocarbons, including $1 for every barrel of oil produced in their province and $1 for every barrel refined. In 2010, this amounted to about $900 million for Basrah Province. The provincial government reported receiving approximately $160 million in petrodollars from the Ministry of Finance, but this pool of money is encumbered by many restrictions on its use:

• Projects funded by petrodollars must first be approved by the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation. Only then will the Ministry of Finance provide the funds.
• Petrodollars may only fund infrastructure projects; they may not be used for operating expenses, such as salaries.
• Ironically, petrodollars are provided to the provinces in Iraqi dinars. Consequently, if a province wants to enter into a contract with a foreign firm, the Central Bank of Iraq and the Trade Bank of Iraq must be involved in the transaction, potentially increasing transaction costs and complicating dealings with foreign firms.

In January, Provincial Council members and representatives from the governor’s office told SIGIR that they have identified several worthy projects, but they have yet to get them off the ground because of bureaucratic difficulties. For example, the GOI has purchased 12 generators from General Electric. Basrah’s provincial government has identified land to locate four of those generators on, and wants to use $450 million from its petrodollar budget to install them. However, the Ministry of Electricity (MOE) wants to select the contractors who will do the installation. Basrah officials feel this is a choice that they should rightly make and expressed a preference for using a U.S. firm, even as they noted that few U.S. firms want to operate there. Thus, a stalemate has ensued, and no agreements have been reached. Basrah officials further indicated to SIGIR that the MOE may wish to install these generators in Najaf, even though Basrah has superior access to fuel and electricity distribution networks.

Electricity
Persistent power outages also affect the investment climate, as electricity shortages in the summer months are widespread. Last summer, as temperatures topped 120 degrees Fahrenheit in Basrah, residents took to the streets to protest the frequent blackouts. On June 19, ISF units fired on a demonstration there, killing two protestors and wounding two others. Two days later, after similar protests occurred in the southern town of Nassiriya, the Minister of Electricity resigned from office and was replaced by the Minister of Oil.

The failure to move forward with the installation of additional generators (such as the ones built by GE) raises the odds that Basrah will face another long, hot summer of blackouts and power shortages in 2011, as local demand for inexpensive, state-supplied electricity continues to outpace supply. In the winter, total demand is about 1,350 megawatts (MW), climbing to 2,300 MW in the summer, outstripping supply by several hundred megawatts. Industrial requirements for oil facilities, water plants, and hospitals take precedence over residential needs. In their discussions with SIGIR, Basrah officials contended that the MOE is diverting some of the power produced in the province, further exacerbating power outages in residential neighborhoods. With industrial activity expected to expand this year, and no short-term increase in generation in sight, the potential for severe electricity shortages looms as summer approaches.

Agriculture
Many residents are strongly attached to traditional agriculture, especially the cultivation of date palm trees. But the agricultural sector suffered under years of Ba’athist oppression, as local needs were neglected by a Sunni central government that viewed Basrah as part of a perpetually rebellious Shia south. Moreover, because of the lure of oil riches, the current provincial government’s economic development priorities lie with modernizing the hydrocarbon infrastructure and refurbishing the port facilities at Umm Qasr, leaving agricultural development a second-tier priority at best. Basrah province has three types of agricultural production:

• date palm groves, producing what was once regarded as the world’s premier date crop
approximately 10,000 farms in the deserts surrounding the city, cultivating tomatoes, eggplants, onions, and other vegetables
- wheat- and barley-producing regions north of the city

The single-biggest problem faced by Basrah’s farmers today is the post-2003 opening of the borders to cheaper agricultural imports from Iran and China. Other significant challenges include:
- escalating cost of materials, such as the plastic sheets needed to cover vegetable fields
- lack of access to food processing factories
- GOI restrictions on exporting agricultural products

The date palm groves have especially suffered. According to one prominent local farmer, several decades ago there were 11 million date palm trees in the province, producing dates renowned— and in high demand overseas—for their rich, succulent flavor. However, the Iran-Iraq war destroyed much of these crops, and sanctions further affected the agricultural sector by making certain tools and chemicals more difficult to obtain. The increased salinity of the Shatt al-Arab waterway has also hurt the date crop, reducing the number of varieties grown there from 350 to around 100. Today, there are only about 2.7 million date trees in Basrah. PRT Basrah has helped to connect Basrah date farmers with date growers in California so that they could visit and learn about new production techniques. (California can produce 500–700 kilograms per tree, whereas Iraq produces, on average, 50–100 kilograms per tree.)

This quarter, Basrah officials participated in the ceremonial setting of the cornerstone for a $300 million GOI-funded project that will irrigate approximately 60,000 acres of farmland near Basrah. In December, the provincial government concluded an agreement with the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to implement several agricultural development projects. FAO also agreed to develop an agricultural research center at Basrah University and assist in developing the province’s fisheries.

Investment
As the security situation stabilized in the second-half of 2008, local and foreign investors began to commit resources to projects outside the oil sector. In their recent visits with SIGIR, Basrah officials remarked on the prevalence of Chinese and Turkish companies operating in the province, noting that the Iranian presence there is focused more on cross-border trading activities, whereas the Chinese and Turks appear to be concentrating on establishing a sustained commercial presence.

The BIC serves as a one-stop shop for investors seeking to do business in the province. “You need to be a little bit bold to do business in Basrah now.” This statement by a representative from the governor’s office sums up the current investment climate in Basrah—one of improving security and growing potential. Table A presents examples of some recent foreign investment activity in the province.

Barriers to Foreign Investment
The deleterious legacy of Ba’athist central planning and bureaucracy still affects foreigners’ ability to conduct business in Basrah. Several GOI officials contend that strict visa requirements, haphazard regulatory enforcement, and the limited capacity of the local government to expeditiously process licenses leads some investors to take their capital elsewhere rather than battle the bureaucracy in Basrah. One prominent local business leader lamented that these barriers to investment appear to be particularly formidable to U.S. companies, noting that European and Asian investors are more prevalent in Basrah than U.S. firms.

Archaic Laws Hinder Efficient Land Use
The Saddam-era “Hydrocarbons Production Law” gives the SOC the right to prevent development on any land potentially affecting oil development. A representative from the provincial governor’s office stated to SIGIR that the SOC has been very reluctant to give permission to build on such properties, and other Basrah officials pointed to this statute as one of the main obstacles to economic development and new housing construction. The Chairman of the BIC confirmed this observation, noting that about 60% of available land in the province is potentially affected by this law.

Compounding these problems is a degree of legal uncertainty about which part of the GOI can reform local land-use laws: the CoR, the provincial government, Ministry of Oil, the SOC, or some combination of all of them. Squatters also pose a problem for businesses seeking to operate in Basrah, as they occupy many potentially valuable sites. Thus, despite interest by investors to build new housing, there is a problem identifying legally unencumbered land. This problem was illustrated by one Basrah official who said that the governor was denied permission from the SOC to use a parcel of land to construct a hospital despite the fact that an adjoining property was the site of a housing compound for SOC employees.
Notwithstanding these legal issues, the housing sector remains enticing to foreign investors, with U.S., Iranian, and Kuwaiti firms all seeking to build residential units (and the associated infrastructure) that would be sold only to Iraqi citizens. Local officials also noted that the constrained supply of new housing has driven up prices and that this inflationary spike is only somewhat mitigated by government workers’ housing subsidies.229

### Challenges to Building the Rule of Law

Operating from a U.S.-funded courthouse complex completed about two years ago, many of Basrah’s judges have made progress in managing their dockets more efficiently in recent months, with 85 of them being recognized by the Higher Judicial Council (HJC) for issuing a ruling on 98% of the cases brought before them. However, the judges with whom SIGIR met in January admitted that a yawning gap exists between issuing an order or a warrant and getting it enforced by the local police, citing a lack of local police capability as one of the primary challenges to building the rule of law in Basrah.230

Basrah’s judiciary reported that the continued lack of judicial security was the other main challenge they encounter on a daily basis. Judges are allotted two security personnel each, but they travel to work unarmed in their personal vehicles.231

Corruption also remains a problem in Basrah. In December, local police officials reported that 199 persons wanted on charges of administrative or financial corruption had been arrested in Basrah during 2010.232 The GOI’s Commission of Integrity (COI) has traditionally found it difficult to operate in Basrah. In the first eight months of 2010, the COI reported obtaining only seven convictions in the entire province, or about 2% of all convictions obtained nationwide during that period.233

### Reconstruction

#### Coalition Presence and Programs

From 2003 to 2009, UK military and civilian personnel took the lead in stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Basrah province. The deteriorating security situation in 2006–2007, however, limited the ability of the British to implement programs and complete projects. By September 2006, British forces needed to deploy an entire convoy of armored personnel carriers to ferry a few police trainers to a single police station. Nonessential movements were halted, and much of the reconstruction program ground to a halt.234

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**Table A**

**Recent, Non-Hydrocarbon Foreign Investment in Basrah Province**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Build 2,500 residential housing units (contract valued at $220 million)</td>
<td>Under contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States (joint venture with Iraq)</td>
<td>Sports</td>
<td>Construct a new sports complex, including two stadiums</td>
<td>In progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Build approximately 4,500 residential housing units (contract valued at $240 million)</td>
<td>In progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Build 6,200 residential housing units for northern Basrah</td>
<td>Pending final approvals from GOI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Build 5,000 residential housing units (contract valued at $938 million)</td>
<td>Pending final approvals from GOI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE (joint venture with Iraq)</td>
<td>Maritime</td>
<td>Increase port capacity by 58,000 tons per year</td>
<td>Under contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Maritime</td>
<td>Rehabilitate port facilities at Umm Qasr (contract valued at about $69 million)</td>
<td>In progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Healthcare</td>
<td>Build a hospital with approximately 400 beds</td>
<td>Under contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>Construct 15 new power distribution stations</td>
<td>Under contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>Plastics</td>
<td>Build a petrochemical complex capable of producing an array of plastics (contract valued at approximately $3 billion)</td>
<td>Under contract</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** All dollar values are approximate, and all reported projects are subject to delay, modification, or cancellation.

**Source:** SIGIR analysis of open-source Arabic- and English-language documents.
A total of $2.17 billion has been spent by the United States on projects in Basrah province. As of December 31, 2010, DoS’s Iraq Strategic Partnership Office (ISPO) had three ongoing or recently completed reconstruction projects in Basrah province, all funded with money from the Economic Support Fund and managed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE):

- **Al-Kibla Sewer and Storm Network**—an $11 million project to design and construct a sewer system is 64% complete, and work is expected to be completed in June 2011.
- **Al-Abbas Sanitation Network**—an $11.2 million contract to install approximately 26 kilometers of sewer lines and two pumping stations was virtually complete.
- **Basrah Modern Slaughterhouse**—a $5.6 million project to design and build a sheep- and cattle-slaughtering facility is 90% complete; estimated completion is February 2011. A SIGIR inspection in 2009 found that this project was poorly planned and that the results achieved as of April 2009 were not consistent with the original objectives.

Since 2003, USACE has managed more than 280 reconstruction contracts in Basrah province, including:
- a $51.5 million, Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) project to rehabilitate Basrah’s sewer system
- a $46 million project to repair Umm Qasr’s pier and seawall, which was funded through the Foreign Military Sales program
- a $13.5 million, IRRF-funded project to rehabilitate a 132 kilovolt electricity substation

SIGIR Oversight
Since 2005, SIGIR has conducted 24 on-site assessments of U.S.-funded reconstruction projects in the greater Basrah area. For example:
- **Basrah Children’s Hospital**. The project’s objective was to build a “state of the art” pediatric oncology hospital. The original cost of $50 million grew to approximately $166 million (this total includes more than $100 million in U.S. funds as well as other donor funds). SIGIR found that several factors contributed to the substantial delays and cost overruns that plagued this project since its inception, including unrealistic time frames for design and construction, the security situation, and the GOI not following through on its obligations. In October 2010, the hospital opened, but is only seeing patients on a limited basis. According to PRT officials, the Ministry of Health has assumed full responsibility for maintaining the hospital.
- **Roll-On/Roll-Off Berth**. This $2.7 million project increased the operational efficiency and capacity of the Port of Umm Qasr, allowing additional vessels to dock at the port, thereby increasing the amount of imports and exports flowing through the port and reducing the time for loading and unloading freight. SIGIR’s inspection report concluded that the construction of the Roll-On/Roll-Off Berth was adequate, aside from some minor damage.
- **Basrah Courthouse and Witness Protection Facility**. This $11 million regional courthouse and witness protection facility is now operating and serves as one of the province’s most significant judicial centers. SIGIR’s inspection in 2008 found some minor construction deficiencies with a staircase and a water line, but determined that the facility was adequately constructed.
### Table B
**SIGIR Oversight in Basrah Area, 2005—2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment Number</th>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>Funds</th>
<th>Contractor</th>
<th>Met Contract</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR PA-06-080</td>
<td>Al-Basrah Oil Terminal</td>
<td>$48,239,066 (IRRF)</td>
<td>Parsons Iraqi Joint Venture</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR PA-08-160</td>
<td>Basrah Children’s Hospital</td>
<td>$37,682,169 (IRRF, CERP, and Child Survivor Health Fund)</td>
<td>Bechtel National, Inc. &amp; MID Contracting</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR PA-05-028</td>
<td>Umm Qasr Water Scheme</td>
<td>$10,517,308 (IRRF)</td>
<td>Washington International</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR PA-05-005</td>
<td>Al-Hakamia Substation</td>
<td>$5,933,973 (IRRF)</td>
<td>Perini</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR PA-05-007</td>
<td>Al-Kaffat Substation</td>
<td>$5,933,973 (IRRF)</td>
<td>Perini</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR PA-05-008</td>
<td>Al-Seraji Substation</td>
<td>$5,709,225 (IRRF)</td>
<td>Perini</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR PA-06-082</td>
<td>Electrical Substation Sustainment (Same site as 05-005)</td>
<td>$5,654,000 (IRRF)</td>
<td>Perini</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR PA-05-027</td>
<td>Military Base Umm Qasr–Ammo Supply Point</td>
<td>$2,550,841 (IRRF)</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR PA-09-169</td>
<td>Construct Witness Protection Basrah–Witness Security Facility</td>
<td>$2,195,235 (IRRF)</td>
<td>See PA-08-159</td>
<td>See PA-08-159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR PA-06-182</td>
<td>Roll-On/Roll-Off Berth in the Port of Umm Qasr</td>
<td>$2,734,500 (IRRF)</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIGIR PA-06-051</td>
<td>Police Station–Safwan–IHP 404</td>
<td>$2,550,841 (IRRF)</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIGIR PA-09-190</td>
<td>Al-Hadi Permanent Police Station</td>
<td>$1,274,339 (ISFF)</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIGIR PA-05-026</td>
<td>Operation Center and Security</td>
<td>$408,433 (IRRF)</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIGIR PA-05-050</td>
<td>Basrah International Airport–Air Side Supply</td>
<td>$383,043 (IRRF)</td>
<td>Reyam Ltd.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR PA-05-025</td>
<td>Military Base Umm Qasr–Ammo Supply Point</td>
<td>$252,650 (IRRF)</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This amount represents one segment of the overall project. Total U.S. funding exceeded $100 million.