

RECONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT IN TRANSITION

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THE CHANGING U.S. PRESENCE

On August 31, 2010, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) officially ended, and with it the U.S. combat mission in Iraq. Two weeks earlier, the Army's Fourth Stryker Brigade—the last U.S. combat brigade in Iraq—left the country,¹⁷⁷ fulfilling a pledge that President Obama made in his February 2009 address at Camp Lejeune.¹⁷⁸

Strategic Direction

President Obama marked the end of OIF with an Oval Office address on August 31, 2010, in which he acknowledged the sacrifices made by U.S. service members and affirmed the United States's ongoing commitment to Iraq. He also noted the major changes in the U.S. presence over the last 18 months—including drawing down nearly 100,000 U.S. troops, closing or transferring to the Iraqis hundreds of bases, and moving millions of pieces of equipment—and reiterated that all U.S. troops will be out of Iraq by the end of 2011.¹⁷⁹

For the interim, the President laid out the mission of the transitional force of U.S. troops in Iraq:¹⁸⁰

- advising and assisting the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
- supporting Iraqi troops in targeted counterterrorism missions
- protecting U.S. civilians


As the military withdraws, civilian agencies are taking the lead on policy development and program implementation. According to the President, “this new approach reflects our long-term partnership with Iraq—one built upon mutual interest and mutual respect.”¹⁸¹

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Operation New Dawn and the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement

The end of OIF also marked the beginning of Operation New Dawn. Combat operations have officially concluded, but many day-to-day operations remain the same: the U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) will continue to conduct force protection and stability

FIGURE 3.1
TRANSITION MILESTONES
U.S. Troops



Sources: The Brookings Institution, *Iraq Index*, 9/1/2010, p. 19; “Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq,” 11/17/2008; White House, Remarks of President Barack Obama as prepared for delivery, “Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq,” 2/27/2009, www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-Responsibly-Ending-the-War-in-Iraq/, accessed 9/23/2010; White House, Remarks by the President, “Address to the Nation on the End of Combat Operations in Iraq,” 8/31/2010, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/08/31/remarks-president-address-nation-end-combat-operations-iraq, accessed 9/23/2010.

operations, with the primary emphasis on training, equipping, and advising the ISF. USF-I remains combat-ready and will assist the ISF with counterterrorism operations.¹⁸²

USF-I continues to operate in Iraq under the legal framework of the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement (SA), which was signed on November 17, 2008. The SA set forth a series of deadlines governing USF-I operations in Iraq between January 2009 and December 2011 and provided limits on the types of activities U.S. forces can perform. It also removed the immunity afforded to contractors under Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order 17 and required that USF-I obtain a warrant from an Iraqi judge before detaining an Iraqi citizen.¹⁸³

For an overview of the transition milestones, see Figure 3.1. For more information on the current security situation in Iraq, and the activities of USF-I and the ISF, see the Security discussion in Section 4 of this Report.

Renewed Diplomatic Engagement and Development Efforts under the Strategic Framework Agreement

As the U.S. military withdraws from Iraq, the bilateral relationship is shifting from one based on military-led security assistance and capacity building to civilian-led engagement on a broad array of priorities, including shared security, political, economic, and cultural interests. Officials at the Department of State (DoS) envision a three- to five-year “bridge” period to a more normal bilateral relationship, during which U.S. civilian advisors will help to build Iraqi capacity to maintain U.S.-initiated projects and to plan and implement new projects.¹⁸⁴

U.S. diplomatic engagement and development efforts are guided by the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA), which was signed on November 17, 2008. The SFA outlines the broad contours of the bilateral relationship between the two countries in a series of key areas, including: political and diplomatic cooperation, defense, culture, economics, energy, health, the environment, communications,

and the rule of law. It entered into force on January 1, 2009, and will remain so indefinitely unless one of the parties elects to terminate it.¹⁸⁵

Over the past two years, the United States and the Government of Iraq (GOI) have established six Joint Coordinating Committees (JCCs) and 24 Implementation Working Groups (WGs) to oversee and execute the SFA and assist in the resolution of any disputes that arise under its terms. The JCCs and WGs are staffed by government officials from both nations with expertise in the relevant subject matter areas. According to U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, delays in government formation and transfers of Embassy staff have negatively affected the regularity of the meetings over the past quarter, but the groups have continued to accomplish tasks in support of the SFA goals.¹⁸⁶

Managing the Transition


On August 16, 2010, Ambassador James Jeffrey was sworn in as the new U.S. Chief of Mission in Iraq, replacing Ambassador Christopher Hill. Ambassador Jeffrey served as U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Iraq from March 2005 to June 2005 and as Deputy Chief of Mission in Iraq from June 2004 through March 2005.¹⁸⁷ On September 1, 2010, recently promoted General Lloyd Austin replaced General Raymond Odierno as the commander of USF-I.¹⁸⁸ General Austin served as the commander of

Officials at the Department of State envision a three- to five-year “bridge” period to a more normal bilateral relationship.



U.S. Ambassador Jeffrey participates in a ceremony marking the return of antiquities to the Iraq National Museum. (U.S. Embassy-Baghdad photo)

FIGURE 3.2
U.S. EMBASSY-BAGHDAD AND USF-I STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS



Sources: U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, responses to SIGIR data calls, 7/2/2010 and 10/4/2010; USF-I, response to SIGIR data call, 1/4/2010.



Marine General Mattis, commander of U.S. CENTCOM, passes the colors to incoming USF-I commander General Austin. (USF-I photo)

Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) from February 2008 to April 2009.¹⁸⁹ As of September 30, 2010, there were an estimated 49,775 U.S. troops in Iraq—less than one-third the approximately 176,000 U.S. troops that were in Iraq at the height of the U.S. “surge” in October 2007.¹⁹⁰


For details on the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad organization and the USF-I command structure, see Figure 3.2.

U.S. Embassy-Baghdad: Building Capacity To Sustain the Assistance Program

The scale and scope of the reconstruction program that DoS is inheriting from the Department of Defense (DoD) is “virtually unprecedented,” according to then-Deputy Secretary of State Jacob Lew. “While everything that we’ll be doing, we’ve done in other places, we’re doing it in a different way, in a different intensity and in a more difficult environment than ever before.”¹⁹¹

DoS does not have the capacity or the resources to continue DoD-initiated programs, such as police training, on a one-to-one basis. Instead, according to the Deputy Secretary, “our civilian-led programmings will be qualitatively different from existing military programs and they’ll be designed to meet the needs of today and tomorrow.”¹⁹² This sentiment was echoed in-country by Ambassador Peter Bodde, the Assistant Chief of Mission, who said DoS was looking to use its “Expeditionary Embassy Model,” which he defined as robust, flexible, and able to adjust to conditions. Although U.S.

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Embassy-Baghdad will be the largest in the world, it has significantly fewer resources than the U.S. military has had in Iraq.¹⁹³

U.S. Embassy-Baghdad recently issued guidance on the direction of the U.S. program in the coming year:¹⁹⁴

- The future relationship will be guided by the SFA, “which features cooperation well beyond security, across a range of sectors, in line with Iraqi priorities.”
- In addition to the Embassy in Baghdad, plans call for consulates in Erbil and Basrah, and temporary Embassy Branch Offices in Mosul and Kirkuk, to “ensure that the U.S.-Iraq relationship is not limited to Baghdad, but extends throughout the country.”
- The civilian-led programs “are different from existing military programs,” and “will not duplicate everything the military has been doing.”
- U.S. assistance will shift from reconstruction of infrastructure and institutions “to providing technical assistance to strengthen Iraqi capacity in key fields such as health, education, civil society, agriculture, and economic diversification.”

These changes will be accompanied by a dramatic increase in the number of U.S. personnel under Chief of Mission (COM) authority. As of July 1, 2010, there were 6,787 personnel under COM authority in Baghdad and 794 in the provinces.

In addition, DoS is preparing to open an Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) under COM authority by mid-2011. OSC-I will oversee U.S. military assistance to the ISF, including administering Foreign Military Sales. Current plans call for OSC-I to be staffed by a combination of military, civilian, and local personnel augmented by security and support contractors.¹⁹⁶

INL: Assuming Police Training Responsibility

USF-I’s Iraq Training and Advisory Mission (ITAM) runs the current police training program with the assistance of police advisors provided through a contract managed by DoS’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). Program activities focus on mentoring and advising Iraqi Police at the station-house level, as well as providing technical assistance at district and

provincial police headquarters. ITAM is also providing management support to Ministry of Interior (MOI) senior officials and helping to increase MOI's training capacity at the basic and advanced levels.¹⁹⁷ INL has full contract-management responsibility, working with DoD to ensure an adequate number of police advisors with the proper qualifications are actively involved in training.¹⁹⁸

ITAM will retain the lead in police training through July 1, 2011, when INL is scheduled to assume interim operational control. INL will assume full responsibility on October 1, 2011,¹⁹⁹ when its Police Development Program (PDP) is set to officially begin.²⁰⁰ According to INL, the PDP will focus on management and leadership mentoring and on advising senior police officials at the ministry and provincial levels. It will also feature a train-the-trainer program to further develop MOI capacity to provide specialized training in advanced policing skills.²⁰¹ INL reported that it was currently finalizing plans for basing and facilities, life and mission support, security, air and ground transportation, and other logistical support for the PDP.²⁰² INL also reported that it was bringing in specialists and expanding its staff in Baghdad to fully coordinate with the GOI and the DoD regarding the transition of police training responsibility.²⁰³

The Congress provided FY 2010 supplemental appropriations to INL to fund implementation costs associated with the transition period, as well as start-up costs related to facility upgrades and acquisition of rotary-wing aircraft to support the PDP.²⁰⁴ In total, the Congress appropriated \$650 million: \$450 million for one-time start-up costs and limited operations (\$67 million less than requested) and an unrequested \$200 million for implementation, management, and security during the transition.²⁰⁵ INL effectively received \$133 million more than requested.²⁰⁶ However, according to INL, the unrequested \$200 million was "forward-funded" from the \$314 million requested in the FY 2011 regular appropriations request for the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account, which the Congress is still considering.²⁰⁷


Despite the new funding, there are lingering concerns about INL's capacity to run such a large program. As police training responsibilities transition to INL, the number of police advisors appears set to fall to around 200; DoS had originally planned for approximately 350 police advisors.²⁰⁸ According to U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, these staffing cuts reflect a reduced U.S. mission footprint and budgetary pressures.²⁰⁹

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PRT Program: A Shrinking Footprint

As of September 30, 2010, the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) footprint comprised 25 sites in Iraq: 15 PRTs, 1 Regional Reconstruction Team (RRT), and 9 Forward Presence locations.²¹⁰ For the locations of current PRTs, see Figure 3.4.

FIGURE 3.4
PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM FOOTPRINT, AS OF 9/30/2010



Source: U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, OPA, response to SIGIR data call, 10/4/2010.

According to U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, a Forward Presence post is a PRT branch office, colocated on a U.S. military installation, that is intended to reduce the travel time and risks associated with moving PRT members to distant areas of their assigned province for routine meetings.²¹¹ A Forward Presence post is typically staffed with only one to four team members, who are usually Bilingual Bicultural Advisors (BBAs) or Section 3161 DoS direct-hire personnel. They report to the Foreign Service Officer Team Leader at their parent PRT.²¹²

This quarter, the last embedded PRTs (ePRTs) were disbanded, as the Brigade Combat Teams to which they were assigned departed Iraq. The ePRTs were designed specifically for counterinsurgency operations during the U.S. “surge.” According to U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, the operational focus has since evolved from counterinsurgency to stability operations, and responsibility for civil capacity development has shifted from a military to a civilian lead. Consequently, there is no longer an operational need to have civilian subject-matter experts assigned to military units.²¹³

ISPO and USACE: Completion or Cancellation of Reconstruction Projects

This quarter, U.S. Embassy-Baghdad’s Iraq Strategic Partnership Office (ISPO) focused on coordinating the completion of construction projects and grants and the transfer of completed facilities to the GOI. ISPO also provided technical assistance to select Iraqi ministries that focus on providing essential services—primarily electricity.²¹⁴

As the successor to the Iraq Transition Assistance Office (ITAO), ISPO is responsible for completing any remaining coordination, oversight, and reporting functions for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) monies.²¹⁵ According to ISPO, as of September 30, 2010, there were 25 ongoing IRRF projects, with a total cost of nearly \$330 million.²¹⁶ For a complete list of ongoing IRRF-funded projects, see Section 2 of this Report.

Under the guidance of the Assistant Chief of Mission for Assistance Transition, ISPO coordinates its efforts to descope, cancel, or complete remaining projects with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the U.S. Embassy’s Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA), the PRTs, and the GOI ministries that would accept responsibility for such projects.²¹⁷ According to ISPO, its aim is to continually assess progress and help redress challenges that can affect project completion. If changes in a project’s parameters are warranted, the involved parties are consulted and agreement on a path forward is sought.²¹⁸

This quarter, U.S. Embassy-Baghdad notified the Congress of its intent to cancel 10 of the 150 projects being implemented by USACE under the Provincial Reconstruction Development Council (PRDC) program and the Infrastructure Security Program (ISP) in order to transfer the funds to higher priority activities. As a result of these cancellations, a combined \$82.1 million of FY 2006 and FY 2007 Economic Support Fund (ESF) appropriations were available for reprogramming, including proposed reprogrammings to the PRT Quick Response Fund (\$21.8 million), the Community Action Program (\$10 million), and rule-of-law programs (\$8.7 million).²¹⁹

USACE is also now working more closely with Iraqi counterparts to finish or transfer its projects. According to the GOI’s Deputy Minister of Electricity, USACE is working to ensure that the ministry is able to finish projects that USACE contractors were unable to complete. Under a memorandum of understanding, the MOE would complete the project, USACE would visit the site to ensure that the work was done, and the MOE would then submit paperwork for reimbursement by the United States. According to the Deputy Minister, the agreement so far seems to be working, but the ministry wants assurance from the Embassy that it will be reimbursed for the work—particularly as the U.S. military prepares to depart in 2011.²²⁰ ♦

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CONTRACTING

Contractor and Grantee Support

As of September 30, 2010, DoD, DoS, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) reported 88,448 U.S.-funded contractors and grantees supporting the U.S. reconstruction program in Iraq—a net decline of 25,201 (22%) from the number of contractors and grantees reported last quarter. In general, the trend in contractors and grantees matches the shift in leadership from DoD to DoS:²²¹

- The number of reported DoD contractors and grantees declined by 26,642 (25%).
- The number of reported DoS contractors and grantees increased by 310 (6%). However, reporting has been inconsistent, and the net change obscures large changes within the non-security and private security contractor (PSC) categories.
- The number of USAID contractors and grantees increased by 1,131 (45%). USAID reported a particularly large increase in the number of Iraqi nationals providing non-security services.

As of September 30, 2010, approximately 15% of all reported contractors and grantees in Iraq were PSCs.²²² For details on the number of reported contractors and grantees, see Figure 3.5.

Contractor Deaths and Injuries

Unlike military casualties, data on contractor deaths and injuries has not been systematically tracked by agencies. The Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) was designed, in part, to address that gap and thereby improve oversight of contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements. Each agency is required by law to track the number of personnel killed or wounded while working on contracts or other assistance instruments. However, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), only DoS and USAID have done so.²²³

The most reliable data continues to come from the U.S. Department of Labor (DoL) Division of Longshore and Harbor Worker Compensation, which administers insurance benefits under the Defense Base Act. However, this information only reflects those deaths and injuries submitted to DoL for compensation.²²⁴

The number of claims for contractor deaths has generally declined since early 2007, but military fatalities have declined even more. Consequently, the number of military fatalities and contractor deaths is now similar.²²⁵ According to GAO analysis of DoL data, approximately 26% of contractor deaths in FY 2009 and the first half of FY 2010 were due to hostile incidents, mostly resulting from improvised explosive devices.²²⁶ Contractor injuries increased sharply in late 2006 and began rising again in 2009.²²⁷

For details on the number of reported contractor deaths and injuries, compared with military casualties, see Figure 3.5.

Role of Private Security Contractors


U.S. Embassy-Baghdad reported that the number of security incidents involving PSCs appears to have been holding steady over the past several months, and these incidents do not appear to be directly linked to the drawdown of U.S. forces. Although the MOI is credited with making progress in regulating the PSC industry in Iraq, ISF guarding entry control points (ECPs) to the International Zone have reportedly used disproportionate security measures with PSCs. Most incidents are resolved at the ECPs with only a delay, but some PSC personnel have been detained or have had their equipment seized. According to U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, PSCs will often take longer, less secure routes to avoid the more problematic ECPs. The situation has been exacerbated by the inability of PSCs to register U.S.-government-furnished

The trend in contractors and grantees matches the shift in leadership from DoD to DoS.

FIGURE 3.5
U.S.-FUNDED CONTRACTORS AND GRANTEES IN IRAQ
 Number of Contractors and Quarterly Change

AGENCY	PURPOSE	U.S. CITIZENS		THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONAL		IRAQI NATIONAL		TOTAL	
		STATUS	CHANGE OVER QUARTER	STATUS	CHANGE OVER QUARTER	STATUS	CHANGE OVER QUARTER	STATUS	CHANGE OVER QUARTER
DoD	Non-security	21,731	-30% ↓	36,449	171% ↑	10,028	-78% ↓	68,208	-24% ↓
	PSCs	1,030	-25% ↓	9,699	-31% ↓	684	-48% ↓	11,413	-32% ↓
	Subtotal	22,761	-30% ↓	46,148	67% ↑	10,712	-77% ↓	79,621	-25% ↓
DoS	Non-security	2,710	N/A	1,898	N/A	228	N/A	4,836	N/A
	PSCs	12	-99% ↓	331	-87% ↓	1	-100% ↓	344	-93% ↓
	Subtotal	2,722	126% ↑	2,229	-11% ↓	229	-81% ↓	5,180	6% ↑
USAID	Non-security	161	3% ↑	108	-91% ↑	2,034	1,374% ↑	2,303	55% ↑
	PSCs	3	0%	266	-51% ↓	1,075	121% ↑	1,344	30% ↑
	Subtotal	164	3% ↑	374	-78% ↓	3,109	397% ↑	3,647	45% ↑
Total		25,647	-24% ↓	48,751	53% ↑	14,050	-71% ↓	88,448	-22% ↓

U.S. Military Fatalities and Wounded vs. Contractor Deaths and Injuries, by Quarter



CONTRACTOR DEATHS, BY EMPLOYER, 3/2003–9/2010

EMPLOYER	DEATHS
L-3 Communications - Titan Corporation	165
Titan Corporation	149
Service Employees International, Inc.	89
Hart GMSSCO LTD.	60
ArmorGroup International Limited	59
Corporatebank Financial Services, Inc.	56
PWC Logistics	54
Kulak Construction Company	33
Aegis Defence Services	32
Prime Projects International	31

CONTRACTOR INJURIES, BY EMPLOYER, 3/2003–9/2010

EMPLOYER	INJURIES
Service Employees International, Inc.	7,213
Triple Canopy	491
EG&G Technical Service	425
L-3 Communications - Titan Corporation	370
Global Linguist Solutions	369
L-3 Communications Corporation	329
Blackwater Security Consulting	327
DynCorp Technical Services	320
DynCorp International	295
Prime Projects International	283

Notes: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. U.S. military *fatalities* include deaths of military personnel arising from hostile and non-hostile incidents, and *wounded* values refer to combat-related injuries. Statistics on military fatalities and wounded are compiled by The Brookings Institution using daily DoD reports. Contractor *deaths* and *injuries* reflect those reported to the U.S. DoL Division of Longshore and Harbor Worker Compensation in claims seeking compensation under the Defense Base Act. Contractor injuries reported to the DoL resulted in at least one day of lost time. The *status* of contractors reflects the most recent data available, as reported by the agencies: 9/30/2010 for DoS and USAID and 8/7/2010 for DoD.

Sources: The Brookings Institution, *Iraq Index*, 9/30/2010, pp. 13–14; DoL, responses to SIGIR data calls, 11/25/2009, 1/5/2010, 4/12/2010, 7/7/2010, 10/4/2010, and 10/7/2010; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, RSO, responses to SIGIR data calls, 7/1/2010 and 10/4/2010; USF-I, responses to SIGIR data calls, 7/1/2010 and 10/4/2010; USAID, responses to SIGIR data calls, 7/2/2010 and 10/3/2010; USACE, response to SIGIR data call, 7/3/2010.

weapons or vehicles. GOI law does not allow the registration of this equipment, which is used widely by PSCs during the course of their duties. The Embassy continues to work with the GOI to resolve these issues, but legislation cannot be passed until the new government is formed.²²⁸

Contracting Actions and Grants

As of September 30, 2010, DoD, DoS, and USAID had reported 68,836 contracting actions or grants,²²⁹ totaling \$38.74 billion in cumulative obligations.²³⁰ This accounts for 85% of the \$45.62 billion in reported financial obligations from the IRRF, ESF, Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF), and Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP).²³¹ This quarter, DoD, DoS, and USAID reported 1,731 new contracting actions or grants, resulting in \$1.18 billion in new obligations and \$716 million in new expenditures.²³²

For an overview of the status and quarterly change of contracting actions and grants, see Table 3.1. For a list of the top contractors and grantees in Iraq, see Table 3.3. For a complete list of contracting actions and grants, as reported to SIGIR, visit: www.sigir.mil.

Contracts and Grants Awarded to Iraqis

For security reasons, SIGIR does not publish the names of Iraqi contractors or grantees. In the list of contracting actions and grants published on the SIGIR website, Iraqi contractors and grantees are indicated by a unique identification number.²³³

Since 2003, U.S. agencies have reported contracting actions or grants with 1,468 total unique Iraqi contractors and grantees using IRRF, ISFF, or ESF funds.²³⁴ For a breakdown of the number and

TABLE 3.1

CONTRACTING ACTIONS AND GRANTS

\$ Millions

FUND	STATUS AS OF 9/30/2010			CHANGE OVER QUARTER		
	COUNT	OBLIGATED	EXPENDED	COUNT	OBLIGATED	EXPENDED
ISFF	17,765	\$17,189.1	\$16,091.2	811 (5%)	\$548.5 (3%)	\$470.0 (3%)
IRRF	8,472	\$14,408.8	\$14,254.2	11 (0%)	\$3.7 (0%)	\$15.3 (0%)
ESF	7,194	\$3,497.7	\$3,069.3	174 (2%)	\$211.6 (6%)	\$217.3 (8%)
CERP	35,405	\$3,640.6	\$2,911.6	735 (2%)	\$412.0 (13%)	\$13.8 (0%)
Total	68,836	\$38,736.0	\$36,326.4	1,731 (3%)	\$1,175.7 (3%)	\$716.3 (2%)

Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. Tables represent only those contracting actions that were reported by the agencies; they do not reflect all obligations or expenditures made in Iraq.

Sources: CEFMS, ESF, IRRF: Construction, IRRF: Non-construction, ISFF, 7/6/2010 and 10/1/2010; DoS, responses to SIGIR data calls, 7/8/2010 and 10/6/2010; USAID, response to SIGIR data call, 1/22/2010.

TABLE 3.2

CONTRACTING ACTIONS AND GRANTS WITH IRAQI PARTNERS

\$ Millions

FUND	STATUS AS OF 9/30/2010			CHANGE OVER QUARTER		
	COUNT	OBLIGATED	EXPENDED	COUNT	OBLIGATED	EXPENDED
CERP	35,405	\$3,640.6	\$2,911.6	735 (2%)	\$412.0 (13%)	\$13.8 (0%)
IRRF	2,400	\$1,547.7	\$1,529.0	-2 (0%)	\$-1.5 (0%)	\$11.5 (1%)
ISFF	6,359	\$1,545.4	\$1,418.6	218 (4%)	\$-13.3 (1%)	\$30.0 (2%)
ESF	1,490	\$598.2	\$561.0	26 (2%)	\$3.7 (1%)	\$9.3 (2%)
Total	45,654	\$7,331.8	\$6,420.2	977 (2%)	\$400.9 (6%)	\$64.6 (1%)

Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. Tables represent only those contracting actions that were reported by the agencies; they do not reflect all obligations or expenditures made in Iraq. Iraqi contractors and grantees are not identified as such by the agencies; SIGIR assigns a unique identification number for only those contractors and grantees that it can identify as Iraqi.

Sources: CEFMS, ESF, IRRF: Construction, IRRF: Non-construction, ISFF, 7/6/2010 and 10/1/2010; DoS, responses to SIGIR data calls, 7/8/2010 and 10/6/2010; USAID, response to SIGIR data call, 1/22/2010.

value of contracting actions with Iraqi vendors, by fund, see Table 3.2. Based on available data, SIGIR cannot determine the identity of CERP recipients; consequently, it is not possible to determine the number of unique contractors and grantees. Since 2004, OSD has reported 35,405 contracting actions or grants using CERP funds (this value is used in place of the count of unique contractors or grantees in the CERP row of Table 3.2). ♦

TABLE 3.3
TOP CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ, AS OF 9/30/2010
 \$ Millions

CONTRACTOR	OBLIGATED				EXPENDED			
	IRRF	ISFF	ESF	TOTAL	IRRF	ISFF	ESF	TOTAL
Bechtel National, Inc.	1,186.6			1,186.6	1,180.2			1,180.2
Environmental Chemical Corporation	350.9	766.1		1,117.0	349.5	751.6		1,101.1
FluorAMEC, LLC	943.6			943.6	942.1			942.1
AECOM Government Services, Inc.	11.5	949.3		960.8	11.5	878.2		889.7
Washington Group International	509.5	164.8		674.3	508.2	163.7		672.0
Parsons Global Services, Inc.	687.0	3.6		690.5	665.5	3.6		669.1
International Relief and Development			686.7	686.7			651.7	651.7
Parsons Iraq Joint Venture	632.2			632.2	630.2			630.2
Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc.	630.0	9.7		639.7	620.4	6.3		626.7
Navistar	68.7	560.7		629.4	68.7	499.0		567.7
American Equipment Company (AMERCO)	0.2	516.9		517.1	0.2	511.7		511.9
Research Triangle Institute			435.5	435.5			370.2	370.2
Iraqi Contractor - 5300	16.6	339.1	10.5	366.2	16.6	321.3	10.5	348.4
ToITest, Inc.	86.1	266.8		352.8	82.4	262.9		345.3
Tetra International, LLC	67.4	276.2	0.4	344.0	67.4	274.6	0.4	342.4
Laguna Construction Company, Inc.	156.7	179.6		336.2	155.8	165.3		321.1
AMEC Earth & Environmental, Inc.	134.6	183.3		317.8	134.4	182.7		317.1
Innovative Technical Solutions, Inc.	25.6	283.9		309.6	25.6	279.4		305.0
MAC International FZE	177.3	118.6		295.9	177.2	113.9		291.1
Research Triangle Institute (RTI)	287.7			287.7	287.4			287.4
Weston Solutions, Inc.	114.1	170.3		284.4	114.1	170.0		284.1
Management Systems International, Inc.			304.4	304.4			276.8	276.8
Anham Joint Venture	258.5	6.3		264.8	258.5	6.3		264.8
Symbion Power, LLC	258.5			258.5	254.1			254.1
CHF International	51.4		210.9	262.3	51.3		193.8	245.1
BearingPoint, Inc.	154.4		85.0	239.4	153.3		85.0	238.3
Siemens	217.9		6.4	224.3	217.9		6.4	224.3
Washington International/ Black & Veatch	224.6		0.5	225.0	221.7		0.4	222.1
URS Group, Inc.		225.8		225.8		218.4		218.4
Louis Berger International, Inc.			266.4	266.4			208.1	208.1

Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. Table represents only those contracting actions that were reported by the agencies; they do not reflect all obligations or expenditures made in Iraq.

Sources: CEFMS, ESF, IRRF: Construction, IRRF: Non-construction, ISFF, 10/1/2010; DoS, response to SIGIR data call, 10/6/2010; USAID, response to SIGIR data call, 1/22/2010.

