As of December 31, 2009, the United States had allocated $7.64 billion, obligated $7.40 billion, and expended $6.36 billion from the four major funds to help Iraq strengthen its government institutions and political processes for long-term sustainability and provide health care, education, and other public services. The status of U.S. funding for governance programs, see Figure 3.15 and Table 3.9.

This quarter, governance programs accounted for 78% of all new obligations of Iraq reconstruction funds and 35% of new expenditures. There were $312.5 million in new obligations for governance programs this quarter, 25% more than last quarter. Slightly more than half of new obligations were made for Democracy and Civil Society programs, including the Civil Society Development Program (associated with the ESF-funded Community Action Program). Other major obligations were made for Iraqi Refugees in Jordan, the GRD-administered PRT/PRDC Projects, and the USAID-administered PRT Quick Response Fund. The ESF accounted for all new obligations reported for governance programs.

This quarter, total expenditures rose by $318.3 million, 61% more than last quarter. The majority (44%) were made for Democracy and Civil Society programs. Major expenditures were also made for Iraqi Refugees in Jordan and PRT/PRDC Projects. The ESF accounted for 79% of all new expenditures, and IRRF 2 accounted for 18%.

Overview of U.S. Governance Programs

The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and USAID continue to develop Iraq’s provincial governments through capacity development, democracy and civil society, humanitarian relief, and other programs. This quarter, USAID’s National Capacity Development program (“Tatweer,” Arabic for “Development”) expended $20.2 million to strengthen Iraq’s provincial governments, including training more than 8,000 local government workers. USAID’s Community Action Program expended $32.1 million this quarter on programs to foster citizen participation in local governments. Meanwhile, USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) continues to implement humanitarian assistance programs through partner organizations.

A SIGIR audit issued this quarter determined that DoS had only limited oversight over the costs and impact of grants that DRL awarded to the National Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute between August 2004 and June 2009. Of the $114 million in democracy-building

The endemic corruption within the Iraqi system—not only the security forces, but the system—is still probably the biggest problem facing Iraq.

—General Raymond Odierno, Commander, USF-I September 15, 2009

Figure 3.15
Governance: Status of Funds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Obligated</th>
<th>Expended</th>
<th>Allocated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy and Civil Society</td>
<td>$0.40</td>
<td></td>
<td>$0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Relief</td>
<td>$0.10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Services</td>
<td>$0.18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Development</td>
<td>$0.36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unexpended Obligations</td>
<td>$1.04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. OSD does not report CERP allocation, obligation, and expenditure data for project categories on a quarterly basis for all fiscal year appropriations; SIGIR pulls CERP allocation, obligation, and expenditure data from the IRMS, which lags in reporting by one quarter. Therefore, totals may not match top-line values found in the Funding Sources subsection of this Report.

grant expenditures reviewed, only 41% was spent on direct program activities. Moreover, DoS cannot document whether the grants are meeting their intended goals.270 For a summary of the audit’s findings and recommendations, see Section 4.

Elections

On December 6, 2009, after months of negotiations, Iraq’s Council of Representatives (CoR) approved the Elections Law that authorizes the national parliamentary elections scheduled for March 7, 2010.271 The law had originally passed the CoR on November 8, 2009, but was vetoed on November 18 by Vice President al-Hashimi on the grounds that Iraqis living abroad would not be sufficiently represented.272 The new law increases the number of seats in the CoR from 275 to 325, including 8 seats for minorities (5 for Christians and 1 each for Mandeans, Shabak, and Yazidis).273 As in the 2005 election, seats are allocated by province, with additional seats allocated to parties that won a high percentage of the national vote, but did not win a similarly large number of provincial votes.274 See Section 1 for more detailed analysis.

This quarter, the United States continued to support the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) in the areas of database management, out-of-country voting, public outreach, information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Obligated</th>
<th>Expended</th>
<th>Obligated</th>
<th>Expended</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Development</td>
<td>PRT/PRDC Projects - (ESF)</td>
<td>498.6</td>
<td>405.0</td>
<td>21.2 (4%)</td>
<td>52.0 (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PRT Quick Response Fund - (ESF)</td>
<td>220.1</td>
<td>146.2</td>
<td>19.6 (10%)</td>
<td>14.2 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Capacity Development - (ESF)</td>
<td>309.4</td>
<td>244.5</td>
<td>21.2 (9%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,315.9</td>
<td>1,192.7</td>
<td>6.6 (1%)</td>
<td>4.9 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,344.0</td>
<td>1,988.4</td>
<td>47.3 (2%)</td>
<td>92.3 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy and Civil Society</td>
<td>Civil Society Development - (ESF)</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democracy and Civil Society - (ESF)</td>
<td>259.4</td>
<td>148.0</td>
<td>74.2 (40%)</td>
<td>3.5 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education, Refugees, Democracy, &amp; Governance - Governance - (IRRF 2)</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>29.0 (73%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elections (IFES) - (ESF)</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local Governance Program - (ESF)</td>
<td>410.5</td>
<td>295.0</td>
<td>23.6 (9%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,356.3</td>
<td>1,236.6</td>
<td>33.6 (3%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,199.2</td>
<td>1,800.0</td>
<td>157.8 (8%)</td>
<td>141.5 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Relief</td>
<td>Iraqi Refugees (Jordan) - (ESF)</td>
<td>165.3</td>
<td>111.2</td>
<td>107.3 (185%)</td>
<td>75.2 (209%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>762.0</td>
<td>711.7</td>
<td>0.5 (0%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td></td>
<td>927.3</td>
<td>822.9</td>
<td>107.3 (13%)</td>
<td>75.7 (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Services</td>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>1,924.9</td>
<td>1,746.1</td>
<td>8.8 (1%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,395.3</td>
<td>6,357.3</td>
<td>312.5 (4%)</td>
<td>318.3 (5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
technology, and the provincial electoral offices. For the 2010 elections, approximately $6 million has been allocated through cooperative agreements with the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and the Iraq Rapid Assistance Program (IRAP) contract with a U.S.-based company.275

In cooperation with USAID, IHEC, and DoS, the PRTs provided election support in the provinces, including public-service announcements and other voter-education programs. The DoS Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) reported $71 million in ongoing programs to support NGO partners in assisting political party leaders and various other organizations to conduct campaign activities and prepare election facilities in the provinces.276 DRL considered input from the PRTs and other U.S. Embassy offices when deciding which election programs to fund.277

Legislation

U.S. Embassy-Baghdad reports that several important laws remain on the agenda, but action on all but the most time-sensitive are likely to be deferred until after the March 7 elections.278 Iraq’s Minister of Finance believes that the long-awaited hydrocarbons legislation package will pass sometime after the new parliament is installed.279 This legislation would address revenue distribution between the GOI and the provinces, and is considered a key element to reconciliation and realization of benefits from oil exports.280 For a historical perspective and more information on ongoing political and legislative issues affecting both the GOI and the KRG, see Figure 3.16.

On November 16, 2009, Iraq’s Council of Ministers approved a draft law to create a monetary and banking training center to prepare personnel for working at the Central Bank of Iraq. The law was subsequently referred to the CoR for approval.281 The CoR also passed an amendment to the National Investment Law on November 23, 2009.282 For more information on this law, see the Economy subsection.

Anticorruption

In meetings with SIGIR this quarter, two Iraqi ministers and the Iraqi Chief Justice expressed frustration with the ubiquitous presence of corruption at all levels of society and addressed the need for more high-level accountability. According to the Minister of Finance, corruption has never been worse, and the solution must begin with the highest ranks of government.283 The Minister of Justice similarly expressed the need for fairness and accountability at all levels.284 Further, Chief Justice Medhat al-Mahmoud, of the Higher Judicial Council (HJC), said that strong leadership within the ranks of government is needed to combat corruption.285 In January 2010, the Chief Justice issued an anticorruption judicial order establishing within the HJC a three-judge prosecution committee that the Chief Justice will head with the Public Prosecutor.286 For more information on Iraqi efforts to combat corruption, see Section 1.

This quarter, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) summarized a benchmark report (not yet released to the public) on improving integrity and transparency in Iraq’s public procurement system.287 OECD found that, despite Iraq’s comprehensive procurement law and regulations, several challenges remain:288

- The process of awarding public contracts in Iraq is still not transparent.
- Open competitive tender is not required.
- Accountability chains are “fuzzy.”
- There is, at best, limited coordination of procurement practices across government.
- Control institutions, including the IGs, BSA, and COI, do not coordinate.

Iraq Conducts First Democratic Elections

On December 15, 2005, Iraq conducted its first-ever democratic parliamentary elections. Under tight security, the Iraqi people went to the polls to elect 275 members of the Council of Representatives. Largely incident free, these elections resulted in the United Iraqi Alliance (a coalition of Shia parties) winning control of the GOI.
**Figure 3.16**

**Ongoing Political Issues between the GOI and KRG: A Historical Perspective**

**Five Issues Outstanding between the GOI and KRG:**

- **Disputed Territories:** Both the GOI and KRG claim territory in several of Iraq’s northern provinces, including Nineawa, Salah Al-Din, Diyala, and Tameem.
- **Federal Hydrocarbons Law:** The KRG and GOI have not reached an agreement on a package of federal hydrocarbons laws, and fundamental differences remain over contracting and management of the oil and gas sector.
- **Power-Sharing and Constitutional Reform:** At the heart of the constitutional reform debate is the GOI's desire to reinforce a strong central government and the KRG's push for decentralization. In 2008, a constitutional review committee recommended 50 changes to the Constitution, but efforts to implement the recommendations remain stalled.
- **Security:** In August 2009, GOI and KRG leadership laid preliminary groundwork for an interim security agreement, and joint patrols of Iraqi and Kurdish forces were established in Diyala. Efforts were underway to establish patrols in Salah Al-Din and Tameem, attempts to establish similar joint patrols in Nineawa initially stalled, but went into effect in January 2010.
- **Foreign Policy:** The Iraqi Constitution gives the GOI power to formulate foreign, economic, and trade policies. However, the KRG has been developing independent economic and political ties with foreign countries, signing separate oil deals, and meeting separately with foreign heads of state.

**Legislative Issues:** Iraq’s Constitution, ratified in 2005, governs the relationship between the GOI and the KRG, but disputes continue over legislative initiatives that affect both entities, including:

- **Article 23:** which governs property rights and prohibits the "ownership of property for the purposes of demographic change," a clause that is particularly relevant in provinces where boundaries are in dispute.
- **Article 140:** which requires the GOI to implement Article 58 of the Interim Transitional Administrative Law, passed in 2003. The law contained a formula for solving territorial disputes, including conducting a national census and holding a referendum on Tameem province. As of this quarter, no census or referendum had been scheduled.
- **Article 141:** which recognizes legislation enacted by the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament (IKP), provided it does not contradict the Iraqi Constitution. On June 24, 2009, the IKP passed a draft constitution for the Kurdistan Region that claimed territory in Tameem province, pending a referendum in the July 25, 2009, KRG elections. Members of the CoR objected to the draft, and the referendum was not included on the ballot.

**Efforts To Resolve Issues Outstanding between the GOI and KRG:**

- **In September 2008,** a 7-member committee was set up to recommend solutions for power sharing, voter rolls, and property violations that would pave the way for Tameem province to participate in provincial elections. The committee missed three self-imposed deadlines and handed the matter to the CoR on May 31, 2009.
- **In November 2008,** the CoR created five “leadership committees” to resolve the five outstanding issues between the GOI and KRG. The committee on disputed territories recommended dividing senior government posts in Tameem province, but negotiations broke down over power sharing at lower levels of government. All committees have since suspended their work.
- **Since June 2009,** GOI and KRG officials have participated in a high-level task force led by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) to negotiate a solution to disputed territories and other outstanding issues.

The organization noted that public procurement was the government activity most likely to attract waste, fraud, and corruption.289

On International Anti-Corruption Day (December 9), U.S. Embassy-Baghdad assessed what it termed the GOI’s “measured progress,” citing COI, BSA, and IG accomplishments.290 For example, the COI increased to almost 1,000 the number of cases it processed and sent to investigative judges in 2009, triple the number processed in 2008.291 The COI also has been forwarding increasing numbers of cases to the judiciary. The COI announced in November that it was investigating 10,000 cases involving falsified educational certificates and was creating a blacklist for those found to have used false credentials to get their jobs.292 In addition to COI efforts, the IGs are expanding their workload of investigations.293 And in 2009, the BSA conducted approximately 3,300 external audits and consultations.294

**Corruption Prosecutions**

In December 2009, the COI announced convictions for corruption of four standing senior officials.295 Of the three former senior Ministry of Trade officials convicted of corruption charges, one defendant received a two-year prison term, and the other two received one-year terms.296 The lead figure in the case, former Minister Abdel Falah al-Sudani, resigned amid corruption allegations and currently awaits trial.297 The Central Criminal Court of Iraq also convicted the former Deputy Minister of Transportation on bribery charges and sentenced him to eight years in prison.298

In November, various employees in Baghdad’s municipal government were arrested for embezzling $20 million.299 And in October, some members of the CoR alleged corruption against the head of the IHEC and the Minister of Electricity.300 To date, there has been no follow-up investigation or sanctioning of either official by the COI or judiciary.301

A comparison of 2008 and 2009 corruption prosecution data indicates that while convictions for corruption are increasing in number, a very small percentage of cases involve high-level officials. The latest COI annual report, released in December 2009 with 2008 data, shows that in 2008 Iraq issued 630 arrest warrants for officials suspected of corruption—206 for Ministry of the Interior officials and 52 for Ministry of Oil officials.302 Only two of those cases were initiated against senior government officials.303 Six of 630 were employees at the "General Director" level or above, which is equivalent to U.S. "senior management" level.304 A total of 97 officials were convicted, and 2,772 cases were abandoned because the suspects were covered under the amnesty law.305

In 2009, there were 3,272 open cases, four of which were initiated against high-level officials and resulted in convictions. A total of 285 officials were convicted in 2009.306 Table 3.10 provides more detailed analysis of corruption prosecutions.

**Table 3.10**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corruption Prosecutions, 2008 vs. 2009</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Open Corruption Cases</td>
<td>3,402</td>
<td>3,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Convictions</td>
<td>97 (15%)</td>
<td>285 (29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Standing Senior Officials Prosecuted</td>
<td>2 (&lt;0%)</td>
<td>4 (&lt;0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Standing Senior Officials Convicted</td>
<td>2 (&lt;0%)</td>
<td>4 (&lt;0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Other Iraqi Anticorruption Efforts**

On November 9–13, 2009, Iraq participated in the Third Conference of State Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in Doha, Qatar.307 The parties adopted a mechanism to allow UN monitoring of Iraq’s UNCAC implementation once every five years.308

Also in November, the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament (IKP) established an Anti-Corruption Committee, following the KRG’s release of its *Good Governance and Transparency Strategy* in July.309 Data on its progress is not available. The IKP also attended the Sixth Global Forum on Fighting
Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity in Doha on November 7–8, 2009.310

On January 10–11, 2010, Iraq held an Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) conference to launch measures aimed at fulfilling EITI candidature requirements.311 Created to promote greater transparency in countries rich in natural resources, EITI requires its permanent members to regularly publish all material revenues received in oil, gas, and mining; and companies must report on all payments to governments in those industries.312

Notwithstanding these high-level efforts, Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer reports that Iraq is still one of the top 8 countries (of 69) most affected by petty bribery, with public officials and civil servants the most likely recipients of bribes.313 Employment middlemen are also likely to receive bribes. Though DoS reports that Iraqis remain hopeful about finding employment, Iraq’s unemployed are concerned about the need to pay bribes to get a job through a dealer.314

U.S. Anticorruption Programs

The U.S. Embassy-Baghdad’s Anti-Corruption Coordination Office (ACCO) is among a number of U.S. government civilian and military offices that work with Iraqis to strengthen anticorruption efforts.315 Besides currently coordinating the various U.S. government programs, ACCO uses its own resources to fund and oversee specific initiatives.316 As of December 31, 2009, ACCO had obligated approximately $16.6 million and disbursed approximately $6.21 million to anticorruption initiatives.317 Though ACCO issues a listing of U.S. government-sponsored anticorruption programs, DoS does not have exact figures for all programs conducted by ACCO or for all overall U.S. government allocations, obligations, and disbursements to anticorruption initiatives.318

One of ACCO’s main initiatives involves alliances with various implementing partners, such as the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the University of Utah. As part of an $8 million ACCO-funded project, UNDP, ACCO, and senior Iraqi officials moved forward on a new five-year national anticorruption strategy in January 2010.319 ACCO also contributed $2 million to an existing UNDP anticorruption project in the Kurdistan Region, while at the same time adding $5 million in support for provincial-level anticorruption efforts. ACCO is drawing from an additional $4 million to provide legal training for the COI legal affairs office and forensic accounting training for COI investigators.320

Humanitarian Relief

As of December 31, 2009, the United States had allocated $927 million, obligated $927 million, and expended $823 million to support humanitarian relief programs in Iraq.321 Most humanitarian programs are implemented multilaterally by partner organizations. See Appendix D for more information on international funding involved.

UN Humanitarian Relief

Pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1883, which broadened the responsibilities of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), the Consolidated Appeals (CAP) action for Iraq and the region raised $650 million in 2009.322 Facilitated by OCHA, a CAP occurs when there is an acute humanitarian need caused by a conflict, the government is unable or unwilling to address the need, and a single UN agency cannot meet needs.323 As of November 2009, 62% of the $650 million ($401.7 million) had been funded, with the United States providing almost 60% of that funding.324 OCHAs 2010 Iraq Humanitarian Action Plan (IHAP) reports that lack of water, shelter, food, protection, and access to education and health care have reached proportions that require a humanitarian response to meet immediate needs.325 Developed by 9 UN agencies, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and 12 non-profit governmental organizations in Iraq, the IHAP addresses these humanitarian themes.326
In FY 2009, about 25% of all refugees admitted to the United States were Iraqi (nearly 19,000).334 This quarter, 3,639 more Iraqis were settled in the United States.335 As of December 22, 2009, U.S. Embassy-Baghdad’s Consular Section had issued 2,903 special immigrant visas in FY 2010 under the authority of section 1059 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2006 and section 1244 of the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act.336

The European Union (EU) is also assisting. According to a December 2009 Eurostat report, EU member states granted 16,600 Iraqi refugees asylum in the EU in 2008, making Iraqis the largest group (22%) of persons granted protection status in Europe.337 Most of the Iraqis settled in Germany and Sweden. Moreover, with 13,200 asylum applicants, Iraq is the country of origin of most asylum applicants worldwide for the fourth consecutive year.338

Mounting Difficulties for Refugees and IDPs as Displacement Continues

Currently, nearly 1.7 million Iraqi refugees are estimated to live outside Iraq’s borders.339 Precise numbers cannot be determined because not all refugees have registered.340 About 74% of the registered and active refugee population lives in Syria, where refugees face mounting difficulties:341

- Though constituting one of the largest urban refugee populations in the world, Iraqis in Syria...
are dispersed among many large cities and often lack the ability to reach UNHCR services.342

- Iraqi refugees in Syria are barred from formal employment. The situation for Iraqi refugees thus becomes more precarious with time as their savings run out.343
- The UNHCR in Syria operates without the protection of a formal legal agreement, instead relying on the Syrian government’s tacit permission to provide services. Syria allegedly detained and forcibly deported Iraqi refugees in 2009.344

In addition to refugees, an additional 2.9 million Iraqis are displaced within Iraq’s borders.345 Though protected by international human rights law, and humanitarian law in situations of armed conflict, IDPs are not protected by international refugee law because they have not crossed an international border.346 One-fifth of IDPs in Iraq are living in public buildings or shelters, and two-thirds of families do not have a breadwinner.347 See the Security subsection for more detailed analysis on the human rights implications for refugees and IDPs.

Refugee and IDP Returns
Though the UNHCR estimates that in 2008 and 2009 more than 300,000 IDPs returned home and nearly 80,000 refugees returned to Iraq, there has not yet been a large-scale return of refugees to Iraq.348 The UNHCR reports that poor conditions in Iraq, such as violence and lack of access to essential services, hinder returns.349 On December 11, 2009, UNHCR called on refugee host nations to refrain from forcibly returning asylum-seekers to Baghdad, Tameem, and other violence-prone areas until there is a substantial improvement in the security and human rights situation.350 Despite the impossibility of integrating with legal protection in Syria—the UNHCR states that integration in Syria is “not an option”—some returned refugees reportedly fled back to Syria.351

As for the internally displaced, the MODM estimates that 55% may not wish to return to their homes of origin.352 Baghdad has the highest number of returnees: DoS estimates that 37% of all IDPs returned to Baghdad, and the IOM reports that 58% of identified returnees returned to Baghdad.353 Figure 3.17 shows the demographic breakout for IDPs in the provinces where they now live against the small combined total of former IDPs and refugees who have returned to their provinces of origin.

Ethnoreligious Factors for Refugees and IDPs Contemplating a Return
Notwithstanding difficulties in obtaining accurate data on IDPs, refugees, and returnees, the IOM has assessed more than 1.2 million IDPs and nearly 60,000 returnees (including the formerly displaced and returned refugees).354 Based on these assessments, the IOM reports an increasing homogenization along ethnoreligious lines as IDPs either return to their province of origin or remain in their current location:

- IOM statistics show that some ethnic and religious groups among displaced populations have not returned to particular provinces.355 For example, 62% of IDPs displaced from Anbar were Arab Shia Muslim, whereas currently only 1% of the province’s returnee population is estimated to be Arab Shia Muslim.356
- Although the GOI continues to assert that return remains possible or desirable for all IDPs, nationwide the desire to integrate after displacement is 25%. Most of the IDPs in the south wish to integrate rather than return. In Basrah, an estimated 80% of IDPs wish to remain in the local population.357 Many of the IDPs in the south who wish to stay are Arab Shia Muslims.
- Many IDPs fled to the north, where the environment is more tolerant, particularly for minorities and Kurds.358 According to IOM assessments, more than two-thirds of Ninewa’s IDP families are members of Iraq’s minority communities, including Christians, Turkomen, Kurds, and others.359 Nearly half of IOM-assessed IDPs in Dahuk are Christians.360
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) periodically assess provincial governments’ progress toward self-reliance in five categories as part of a project called the Maturity Model Quarterly Assessment (MMQA), formerly called the Capability Maturity Model. The most recent assessment of the “national unity” category, completed in September and covering the period June 1, 2009, to August 31, 2009, shows uneven achievements toward political reconciliation in the provinces. Wassit, for instance, was the only province to achieve self-reliance in the national unity category. But Ninewa, Diyala, and Qadissiya, with pronounced ethnosec- tarian tensions and political rivalries, were rated “developing”—just one step above “beginning.”

A province’s degree of national unity—which often accompanies greater security—may influence IDPs’ and refugees’ decisions of whether to return home or integrate locally. The IOM reports, however, other factors besides greater security that influence the decision, including the availability of shelter, employment, and basic services. For instance, in Wassit, 92% of IOM-assessed IDPs (98% of whom are Shia Muslim) said that they intend to integrate locally with Wassit’s majority Shia Muslim population rather than return to their places of origin. However, while national unity has improved in Anbar province, a majority of IDPs in Anbar said they intend to return to their provinces of origin. In Qadissiya, where national unity remains low, only 41% of IDPs said that they wanted to stay in the province, even though most are Shia Muslims, and the host population is 98% Shia Muslim. For a detailed view of provincial progress in the national unity category, see Figure 3.18.
GOVERNANCE

Health Care

The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), USF-I, DoS, USAID, Naval Medical Research Unit 3 in Cairo, and USACE supported health care in Iraq this quarter. According to the Office of the Health Attaché (OHA) at U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, however, the OHA will not likely be maintained past the spring of 2010.369

Improving Iraq’s Public Health Workforce

U.S. training courses this quarter continued to build the capacity of local healthcare facilities. DoS-funded training courses educated Iraqis in telemedicine technology and distance-learning programs, as well as the development of medical specialists.370

U.S.-funded programs offered this quarter by the nonprofit International Medical Corps (IMC) included four courses on capacity-building training for medical educators, gastrointestinal laparoscopic surgery, orthopedic surgery, and acute pediatric care. IMC also designed and implemented a curriculum for Radiation Oncology.371

U.S.-funded Hospital Construction Projects

On October 1, 2009, DoD transferred the Ibn Sina Hospital back to the GOI. Formerly a large U.S. combat support hospital in Baghdad, Ibn Sina has treated U.S., Iraqi, and Coalition personnel and civilians since 2003.372 The hospital was transferred without 100 of the approximately 9,800 pieces of equipment, such as intensive care unit beds and

Figure 3.18
PRT Maturity Assessment of National Unity, as of 8/2009

Anbar: Moved Forward
There was greater power-sharing among political parties on Anbar’s Provincial Council, and the Sunni-dominated provincial government engaged constructively with the Shia-led central government.

Nineeva: Moved Backward
There was a series of high-profile attacks on minority groups. National unity remains unlikely without resolving the internally disputed boundaries and the status of Kurdish forces in Nineeva. Arab and Kurdish communities are divided along ethnosectarian lines.

Tameem: Moved Backward
The future status of Tameem province remains a major challenge to national unity. The three main ethnoreligious groups refused to make concessions on issues such as elections out of fear that any compromise could harm their future territorial claims in the province. The presence of security forces controlled by political parties remains a major concern.

trauma centers, which were not covered as “excess to the needs of the Army” under section 644 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. According to OHA, the GOI plans to reopen Ibn Sina Hospital in January 2010. On December 7, 2009, the ESF-funded Zakho Emergency Hospital was officially opened in Dahuk province. The $2.6 million, 40-bed trauma center includes surgical wards, X-ray and MRI facilities, and a plant to provide dedicated electrical power. The KRG’s Ministry of Finance provided approximately $1 million for additional equipment.

Status of Outbreaks, Illnesses, and Infant Mortality in Iraq
The World Health Organization (WHO) continues to monitor outbreaks of the H1N1 virus in Iraq. As of November 25, 2009, WHO reported 2,466 laboratory-confirmed cases, 15 of which resulted in deaths. The GOI Ministry of Health has been collaborating with WHO to prevent and monitor the spread of the virus.

Iraqi officials report that Iraq is witnessing a large rise in infant deformities and cancer rates. The board of directors at Falluja’s main hospital formed a task force to investigate these cases.

Iraq ranks 60th among 224 countries in infant mortality, with an estimated 44 deaths per 1,000 live births. Angola tops the list. By comparison, Afghanistan ranks 3rd, with 152 deaths for 1,000 live births, and the United States ranks 180th.

For more on infant mortality rates in selected countries, see Table 3.11.

### Table 3.11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Infant Mortality/1,000 Live Births</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>4.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>6.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>16.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>27.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>43.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>65.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>151.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Education
U.S. assistance in the education sector continues to transition from construction and rehabilitation efforts to capacity development and logistical support for schools. In accordance with the Strategic Framework Agreement, the United States and GOI are currently collaborating on programs designed to expand educational exchange opportunities between the two countries.

This quarter, U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, in cooperation with the nonprofit Academy for Educational Development, launched a $1.2 million series of workshops to train more than 200 Iraqi professionals in the field of student advising and career development, specifically to prepare them to advise Iraqi exchange students. In addition, in November 2009, U.S. Embassy-Baghdad expanded the Fulbright Visiting Scholar Program for Iraq.

USACE reported that construction of a $2 million, ESF-funded school in Sadr City was completed this quarter. The Al Khawarizmy Intermediate School is designed to accommodate more than 1,500 students.