As of December 31, 2009, the United States had allocated $24.52 billion, obligated $23.17 billion, and expended $21.25 billion for programs and projects to develop the ISF and support the rule of law in Iraq.117 This quarter, security programs accounted for 18% of all new obligations and 58% of all new expenditures from the four major reconstruction funds.118 For the status of U.S. funding for security, see Figure 3.2 and Table 3.2.

There were $72.8 million in net obligations for security programs this quarter, 93% fewer than last quarter. Training and Sustainment for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) accounted for most new obligations this quarter. They were partially offset by large de-obligations for Ministry of Interior (MOI) equipment and smaller de-obligations for Infrastructure. The ISFF accounted for all new obligations reported for security programs; $257,000 was de-obligated from ESF-funded programs.119

This quarter, expenditures for security programs rose by $520.3 million, 68% less than last quarter. Equipment procurement for the ISF accounted for nearly half of all new expenditures in the security sector. Training for the MOI was the next largest expenditure. The ISFF accounted for virtually all new expenditures reported for security programs, and the CERP accounted for just $3.0 million of total reported expenditures.120

Security Concerns

Overall security incidents in Iraq have decreased by 83% over the past two years, and U.S. military deaths have decreased by more than 90%. Improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in Iraq have

Continuing the Transition of Security Responsibilities

DoD reports that U.S. forces in Iraq are “fully engaged,” supporting the mission in two primary ways:111

- partnering with the ISF in combat operations outside the cities

- providing important “enabling functions” for Iraqi soldiers and police within the cities, such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as communications, explosive ordnance disposal, and crime-scene analysis

For information on historical security trends since 2003 and the status of security personnel operating in Iraq, see Figure 3.3.

Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. OSD does not report CERP allocation, obligation, and expenditure data for project categories on a quarterly basis for all fiscal year appropriations. SIGIR pulls CERP allocation, obligation, and expenditure data from the IRMS, which lags in reporting by one quarter. Therefore, totals may not match top-line values found in the Funding Sources subsection of this Report.

 decreased nearly 80% during the same time, while car bomb and suicide-vest attacks decreased by 92%. November 2009 saw the lowest number of security incidents and civilian deaths since the war began in 2003. And December 2009 was the first month since the commencement of the war in which no U.S. troops died as a result of hostilities.

DoD reports that the al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) terrorist network has been degraded and its funding reduced by 50%. Nonetheless, high-profile bombings continue, such as the multiple attacks in October and December 2009 near Iraqi government sites in Baghdad. These attacks claimed the lives of hundreds of people and injured more than 1,000.

Many underlying sources of instability persist, potentially putting recent security gains at risk. Internal ethno-sectarian divisions remain at the forefront of disputes over political borders in the contest for natural resources. The AQI, as well as Kurdish, Sunni, and Shia militants, appear to be targeting mixed urban areas—including those in Ninewa, Tameem, Diyala, and Baghdad provinces—with the intent of inciting sectarian violence as well as undermining public perception of the Iraqi government. For additional information on deaths associated with multiple-fatality bombings over

**Table 3.2**

**Security: Status of Funds, by Sector, with Selected Programs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Status of Funds</th>
<th>Quarterly Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Obligated</td>
<td>Expended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>MOD Equipment (ISFF)</td>
<td>4,412.0</td>
<td>4,155.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MOI Equipment (ISFF)</td>
<td>1,699.8</td>
<td>1,441.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>690.9</td>
<td>690.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>6,802.7</td>
<td>6,287.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>MOI Training (ISFF)</td>
<td>2,422.3</td>
<td>2,359.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MOD Training (ISFF)</td>
<td>428.1</td>
<td>372.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2,875.7</td>
<td>2,848.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>5,726.0</td>
<td>5,580.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>MOD Infrastructure (ISFF)</td>
<td>3,084.7</td>
<td>2,740.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MOI Infrastructure (ISFF)</td>
<td>1,377.5</td>
<td>1,102.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,081.5</td>
<td>1,074.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>5,543.7</td>
<td>4,917.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainment</td>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>2,453.0</td>
<td>2,178.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>1,486.8</td>
<td>1,274.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Related Activities</td>
<td>Related Activities (ISFF)</td>
<td>868.1</td>
<td>737.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>287.4</td>
<td>273.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>1,155.5</td>
<td>1,010.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>23,167.8</td>
<td>21,249.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. The status and quarterly change for programs in the “Other” categories may be found in Appendix C. OSD does not report CERP allocation, obligation, and expenditure data for project categories on a quarterly basis for all fiscal year appropriations. SIGIR pulls CERP allocation, obligation, and expenditure data from the IRMS, which lags in reporting by one quarter. Therefore, totals may not match top-line values found in the Funding Sources subsection of this Report.

Figure 3.3

Security Forces Protecting Iraq

Monthly Security Incidents and Civilian Fatalities

Monthly Security Force and Contractor Fatalities

Annual Security Incidents per 10,000 People, by Province

Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. "U.S. Surge" denotes period when at least 150,000 U.S. troops were in Iraq. The MOI and MOD historical line represents trained forces; the totals represent assigned forces. Total fatalities for the BF exclude fatalities before 1/1/2005, because of lack of data. Security incidents data from two sources are displayed: MNC-I, for 1/1/2004–5/31/2009, and USF-I for 4/1/2009–12/31/2009 (USF-I incorporates GOI reports). Data supplied by USF-I were incomplete, and SIGIR projected monthly totals for July and December 2009.

Figure 3.4
Deaths Associated with Multiple-fatality Bombings in Iraq, by Group Targeted, 1/1/2007–12/31/2009

Note: Totals correspond with attacks that targeted a particular group or occurred in an area in which the group was in the majority. "Indiscriminate" bombings occurred in areas with mixed sectarian populations. "Unknown" corresponds with attacks where no sectarian information or location was reported.


Figure 3.5
Significant Security Incidents by Region, 10/21/2009–1/13/2010
(Resulting in Two or More Deaths)

Source: SIGIR analysis of open sources as well as official English and Arabic documents, studies, maps, and satellite imagery.

the past three years, see Figure 3.4; and for recent security incidents resulting in the death of two or more people, see Figure 3.5. For more information on ongoing political and legislative issues affecting both the GOI and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), including efforts to resolve differences, see the Governance subsection.

Iraqi Security Forces

As of December 2009, ISF force strength in the MOI, MOD, and Iraqi National Counter-Terrorism Force reportedly totaled 660,334 assigned personnel. The MOD has approved a force structure that calls for 14 Iraqi Army (IA) divisions; a Navy of 3,800 personnel, including two Marine battalions; and an Air Force of 6,000 personnel. The MOD has also begun to develop and plan for units across a range of disciplines: engineering, bomb disposal, medical evacuation, signal, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

The MOI continues to make organizational adjustments in its forces. However, GOI budget constraints are limiting MOI expansion of security forces and delaying equipment and sustainment priorities. Both the MOI and MOD had a hiring freeze throughout 2009. According to DoD, the MOI has improved its training capacity, but still suffers from generally poor facilities and budget shortfalls. The MOD faces budget constraints, logistical and sustainment challenges, a recruiting shortfall, and a shortage of mid-grade leadership among officers and non-commissioned officers.

The Iraq Training and Advisory Mission (ITAM) has set a priority for developing minimal essential capabilities within the Iraqi security ministries by December 31, 2011, and emphasizing like capabilities in the MOI and MOD to enhance coordination and information sharing, ITAM notes that the ISF must still overcome significant challenges to developing self-sustaining capacity in its combined forces.
employment and overcoming the challenges of what DoD describes as an inefficient pay system.\textsuperscript{149}

DoD reports that more than 38,000 SOI members have been transitioned to non-security ministry jobs since 2008, and an additional 4,565 have joined the ISF. Targeting of SOI by AQI and various other extremist groups continues to pose a threat to SOI.\textsuperscript{150}

The GOI has been addressing increased demand for female security personnel following more than 40 suicide attacks carried out by women in 2008—primarily in Diyala, Baghdad, and Anbar. This quarter, U.S. forces supported a four-day course that taught members of the Daughters of Iraq (DOI) basic search techniques ahead of their stationing at various locations within the community, such as bridges, government buildings, mosques, banks, and schools. In 2009, only three women carried out suicide bomb attacks.\textsuperscript{151}

In Baghdad, 3 DOI members have transitioned into the Iraqi Police (IP), and 10 recently graduated from the Iraqi Police College. Another 32 are being paid by the GOI to continue working with the SOI. In Anbar, 49 DOI have been hired by the MOI. However, there is no plan to transition...
As of December 31, 2009, the United States had allocated $1.50 billion, obligated $1.49 billion, and expended $1.27 billion to improve rule of law, including human rights, in Iraq. Programs and projects include reconstructing judicial and corrections facilities, investigating crimes against humanity, improving the capacity and professionalism of law enforcement institutions, funding legal defense centers to promote fair trial practices, paying Iraqi attorneys to represent the indigent, and assigning Judge Advocate General Attorneys and specialists to review files for Coalition-held detainees, thereby reducing pre-trial detention time.

Supporting Recovery of the MOJ and HJC

The mass bombings of October 25 and December 8, 2009, posed new challenges for U.S. rule-of-law (RoL) efforts in Iraq and caused previously identified problems to resurface. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad’s RoL Director noted that, despite after-action discussions with the GOI that followed bombings in August 2009, the Iraqi response to the October 25 bombings indicate that greater cooperation is required among the multiple directorates of the MOI and between the MOI and MOD.

The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) building was badly damaged in the October attack, requiring relocation of 1,200 ministry personnel as well as other GOI functions located in the building, including the Higher Judicial Council (HJC). The ministry faced many other challenges as it re-established authority over operations at new locations throughout greater Baghdad. The bombing killed 21 MOJ employees, and more than 160 were severely injured, requiring medical treatment or hospitalization. Since the October 25 bombings, heightened security has slowed the engagement of U.S. government personnel and contractors with key ministry staff.

DoS’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) provided more than $300,000 to the MOJ and HJC in post-blast support
for computers, printers, office furniture, and other equipment, as well as a security assessment and loaned vehicles. USAID also provided support through a Quick Response Fund grant of $199,950 under the Iraq Rapid Assistance Program.162

Judicial Security
Under Minister al-Bolani, the MOI has increased its commitment to providing protection for the judiciary. In late 2008, the MOI and HJC began to develop a national judicial security plan, which calls for the MOI to establish a Judicial Protection Unit (JPU) to provide a personal security detachment (PSD) of five personnel for each of Iraq’s 1,200-plus judges. Currently, the PSDs are staffed by 5,000 HJC security personnel working side by side with MOI police.163

Additionally, USF-I is coordinating with INL and the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) to support the MOI in delivering two separate PSD training courses. The course at Camp Dublin focuses on training MOI police officers, and the course at the Baghdad Police College trains smaller groups of HJC guards. INL continues its capacity-building project within the judiciary’s security force by developing with HJC a four-week Facilities Protection Service (FPS) basic-officer training course.164

Forming the JPU has been a slow process, and Chief Justice Medhat al-Mahmoud has noted the difficulties inherent in having security personnel receiving orders from two different agencies. To address these problems, the MOI recently announced several reforms that it has yet to implement:165

- HJC officers participating in the program will be transferred to the MOI.
- PSDs will eventually be staffed completely by MOI police officers.
- Judges may select the police officers assigned to their PSDs.

Court Docket Backlog
U.S. officials report that Iraq’s civil and other cases outside the criminal system appear to be adjudicated under a relatively normal timeline. But the criminal justice docket continues to be mired with military security-detainee cases. At some large detention facilities, such as the one located at Rusafa, the U.S. government has funded legal defense centers similar to U.S. public-defender programs. Salaried Iraqi defense attorneys employed at such centers are made available to defendants who otherwise would be forced to rely on the traditional court-appointed counsel system, which is generally regarded as ineffectual. While affording a better level of representation to these defendants, these U.S.-funded Iraqi attorneys also help relieve the case backlog.166

Of greater effect, however, is the major GOI effort throughout 2009 to provide acceptable evidence to the courts for the thousands of individuals detained during security operations. Until January 1, 2009, under authority of UN Security Council resolutions, Coalition forces detained large numbers of individuals believed to present security threats. In many cases, neither the information that served as the basis for the detention nor information obtained at the time the person was detained could be released because of security concerns. The consequent lack of a proper “evidentiary” file acceptable to an Iraqi investigative judge effectively stalled these cases.167

Throughout 2009, the U.S. military devoted substantial resources, including Judge Advocate General attorneys and specialists from other disciplines, to review the files for every Coalition-held detainee and assemble releasable information that can be provided to the Iraqi court system for consideration by judges. This effort not only allows cases to proceed on the basis of available evidence, but enhances the potential for a just determination in these cases.168

In addition, INL has been working since 2005 with the HJC to support the development of a case tracking system as part of the Iraq Justice Integration Project. This system provides the evolution of a case management system and shares a framework for data transfer with the MOJ and MOI. In 2009,
The HJC rolled out several pilot sites in Baghdad with INL support, and five additional sites are expected in early 2010. The system will mitigate the docket backlog caused by the rapid increase in detention cases by allowing for better information and resource management.\textsuperscript{169}

The United States has been working with the GOI to release approximately 750 detainees each month and to transfer another 250 to the GOI for processing. USF-I continues to assess detainee release lists provided by U.S. forces to the GOI Security Committee (at least 45 days before the scheduled release). In addition, USF-I continues to identify former detainees who have been re-captured after their release. The Security Committee reviews the list to identify any detainees who are also wanted by the GOI. Those facing charges by the GOI are taken off of the U.S. release list and queued for transfer to the GOI.\textsuperscript{170}

As of November 2009, the GOI had reviewed 11,119 detainee summary cases, providing arrest warrants for 1,545 and approving the rest for release. Since February 1, 2009, U.S. forces have released more than 4,600 detainees and transferred another 877 to the GOI pursuant to warrants. Less than 7,000 detainees remain in U.S. custody.\textsuperscript{171}

**Corrections**

The U.S.-funded International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) continues to train, advise, and mentor officials of the Iraqi Correctional Service (ICS) to develop the capacity of senior management. INL reported that ICITAP continues to assist in operations at the U.S.-funded Chamchamal Correctional Facility, which opened last quarter, and with the activation of the nearly completed prison-expansion project at Fort Suse.\textsuperscript{172}

ICITAP continues to work with USF-I to transition U.S. detention facilities to the GOI. INL reported that Camp Cropper is scheduled for transfer by September 2010, and the Taji Theatre Internment Facility Reintegration Center, for March 2010. The transition of a new DoD-funded Correctional Training Center (CTC) at Forward Operating Base Future occurred on schedule, in December 2009, and ICITAP reports that it continues to provide assistance to the ICS staff assigned there.\textsuperscript{173}

**RoL Initiatives in the Provinces**

Implementation of the rule of law in Anbar improved this quarter, due in part to the opening of the Anbar Criminal Court complex and the installation of two criminal court panels, which have allowed judges to increase their case load. A new jail was made available at Hurricane Point in Anbar this quarter to address overcrowding in area detention facilities, but the provincial police

### Table 3.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Project</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Cost ($ millions)</th>
<th>% Complete (as of 12/31/2009)</th>
<th>Est. Date of Completion</th>
<th>Est. Capacity</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basrah Central</td>
<td>Basrah</td>
<td>10.34</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>3/2010</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>The contractor’s design submittal encountered delays and the MOJ requested additional work beyond the original scope.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Suse: Phase I</td>
<td>Sulaymaniyah</td>
<td>6.16</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>12/2009</td>
<td>2,189</td>
<td>The contractor is currently working on finalizing the punch list. USACE is preparing the Letter of Acceptance for GOI’s signature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Suse: Phase III</td>
<td>Sulaymaniyah</td>
<td>12.57</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>1/2010</td>
<td>2,689</td>
<td>Contractor has encountered delays by USACE for poor design submittals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nassriya: Phase II</td>
<td>Thi-Qar</td>
<td>8.79</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>3/2010</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>GRC advised INL that the contractor submitted two equitable adjustments, which GRC has approved.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

chief has yet to begin housing prisoners there. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad received reports of detainee abuse and at least one death of an inmate under Iraqi custody this quarter.\textsuperscript{174}

PRT Baghdad reported that the rule of law has improved slightly in the province as the Iraqi police force made progress in securing the Muhalla neighborhood. However, the PRT reported a growing concern among civilians that corruption in the police forces was on the rise, and the Iraqi media continued to question the capability of police to protect the population. The MOI moved to exercise more control over the Iraqi Police, leading to a reduction in influence by the militias.\textsuperscript{175}

In Thi-Qar province, the PRT reported increased citizen trust in the police, noting that a new initiative to remove unqualified personnel has begun. By contrast, PRT Diyala reported that “judicial and law enforcement dysfunction” continue. The PRT described the absence of judicial assassinations as encouraging, but said there had been no improvement in addressing the endemic problems of providing adequate personal security for judges. Moreover, it characterized the police as sectarian and ineffective, and the jails as severely overcrowded. Prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges were still threatened, intimidated, and attacked.\textsuperscript{176}

PRT Wassit reported that instances of corruption among police had diminished; however, this may be due to a lack of reporting. The PRT also noted that judges appeared increasingly sensitive to basic needs of prisoners for food, medicine, and sleeping quarters.\textsuperscript{177} For the locations of U.S.-provided RoL assistance, see Figure 3.6.

**UN and Other Observations on Human Rights**

The 2008 establishment of Iraq’s Independent High Commission for Human Rights (IHCHR) was at the time considered a “milestone” that would further the GOI’s efforts to address its human rights problems.\textsuperscript{178} Notwithstanding these efforts and contrary to the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), however, these more recent reports covering Iraq indicate that universally recognized rights are not protected:

- *Human Rights Report* issued by the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), December 14, 2009

Table 3.4 reviews selected rights according to the UDHR, along with the latest observations and ongoing developments.\textsuperscript{179}

**Figure 3.6**

*Rule of Law Assistance to GOI’s Judicial System*

*Source: U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, RO, response to SIGIR data call, 1/18/2010.*
### Human Rights Obligations pursuant to the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UDHR Right</th>
<th>UNAMI Observations</th>
<th>Ongoing Developments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom from arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life</td>
<td>UNAMI reports that security forces, high-ranking officials and civil servants, religious and political leaders, and professionals, such as journalists, educators, medical doctors, judges, and lawyers, continued to be the targets of attacks and killings. Despite lack of due process and reportedly unfair trial procedures, according to the HJC, between January 1 and May 31, Iraqi courts (except for those in the KRG) passed 324 death sentences, 60% of which were for crimes under the Anti-Terrorism Law.</td>
<td>UNAMI and OHCHR have urged the GOI to declare a moratorium on all executions, at least until the international standards for a fair trial are respected. INL reports that in late 2008, the MOI and HJC began to develop a national judicial security plan, which calls for the MOI to establish a Judicial Protection Unit (JPU) to provide for a five-person personal security detachment (PSD) to each of Iraq’s approximately 1,300 judges. Currently, the PSDs are staffed by 5,000 security personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment</td>
<td>The UNAMI report notes the “use of torture or physical abuse against detainees to extract confessions” and reports of physical abuse by Iraqi security forces of persons in detentions facilities.</td>
<td>DoS reports that GOI Minister of Human Rights, the Parliament’s Committee on Human Rights, and the ICRC have positive assessments of Cropper and Taji (USF-I prisons).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention</td>
<td>UNAMI reports of lengthy detention without charge or trial at both GOI- and U.S.-run detention facilities.</td>
<td>DoS reports that the GOI has been working throughout 2009 to provide a proper evidentiary file to the courts so that cases will be able to move through the courts. In November, the CCC-I assigned five judges to hear Coalition cases to ease the backlog.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair public trial</td>
<td>UNAMI reports that the Iraqi criminal justice system does not provide sufficient fair trial guarantees. Suspects lack access to judicial review or legal counsel, convictions are based on confessions often gathered under duress or torture, and the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess guilt is often violated.</td>
<td>U.S. RoI programs have funded legal defense centers and have provided Iraqi attorneys to indigents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of speech and press</td>
<td>UNAMI received reports of intimidation and harassment of media professionals. Journalists and media workers reported to be continuously subjected to ill-treatment and arbitrary detention by MoD personnel and officials’ body guards. UNAMI reports that journalists have received prison sentences in the KRG for criticizing state institutions.</td>
<td>UNAMI welcomed measures taken by the Minister of Interior against 20 employees who assaulted journalists and media workers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of religion</td>
<td>According to DoS’s most recent International Religious Freedom Report 2009, the GOI has not generally persecuted any religious group, and has called for tolerance and acceptance of all religious minorities since 2003. Nevertheless, Christians and Yazidis living north of Mosul claimed that the KRG confiscated their property without compensation, and Assyrian Christians alleged that the KDP-led judiciary in Ninewa discriminated against non-Muslims. Further, the UNAMI report states that Christians continued to be targeted in Mosul, Kirkuk, and Baghdad. DoS reports that though sectarian violence decreased during the reporting period, many individuals from various groups were targeted due to religious identity or secular leanings, with the Shia constituting the majority of mass casualties.</td>
<td>DoS reports that senior U.S. administration and Embassy officials have called for unity in the face of sectarian violence and pressed for greater inclusion of minorities in the political process. On November 10, 2009, Human Rights Watch appealed to the GOI to protect minority rights and to investigate individuals, including Kurdish security forces, alleged to be responsible for the displacement and killings of Assyrian Christians and other minority groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of movement and protection of internally displaced persons, refugees, and stateless persons</td>
<td>According to UNHCR, serious human rights violations and continuing security incidents throughout Iraq, predominantly in the central provinces, require international protection for Iraqis seeking asylum.</td>
<td>DoS reports that in December 2010, the Department of State decided not to extend temporary protected status (TPS) for Iraq. This decision was based on the understanding that conditions in Iraq, including political and security instability, are no longer threatening to the safety of Iraqis in the United States.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>