ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

Planned Conversions Are a Positive Step, but Unvalidated Combat Forces Remain
Previous GAO reports\(^1\) and the Department of Defense (DOD) report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces\(^2\) discussed the need to make better use of reserve forces. We reviewed the Army National Guard Division Redesign Study to determine how the study addressed this need. We recently briefed your staff on these issues. The information we provided at those briefings is detailed in the sections following this letter.

Background

By the end of fiscal year 1999, the Army National Guard plans to have 367,000 personnel in 54 separate state and territorial military commands in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Guam. This number includes about 187,000 personnel organized into 8 combat divisions that include 3 brigades each, 15 enhanced brigades, and 3 separate combat units, consisting of 2 separate brigades and a scout group. In addition to the combat units, the Guard has elements that support combat units, such as engineers, military police, military intelligence, and transportation. The Guard is to be organized and resourced for federal wartime missions but is also available to fulfill state missions.

As we mentioned in our March 1996 report, war planners and DOD and Army studies noted that many Guard combat units are not needed to meet the national security strategy of fighting and winning two nearly


simultaneous major regional conflicts. According to DOD documents and Army officials, these excess forces are assigned to secondary missions such as providing wartime rotational forces, serving as a deterrent hedge to future adversarial regimes, and supporting civil authorities at home.

Both the Commission’s report and our March 1996 report recommended that DOD determine the number of Guard combat spaces that are needed; use unneeded spaces to fill needed, but unresourced, support requirements; and eliminate the excess. In response to our recommendations, DOD stated that the Army National Guard Division Redesign Study and other studies being conducted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation and the Joint Chiefs of Staff would address these issues.

Results in Brief

The Army National Guard Division Redesign Study developed an option that provides for the conversion of some Guard combat and supporting forces to fill needed, but unresourced, support requirements. This planned conversion is a step in the right direction. However, neither this study nor the studies from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation deal with the critical issues of validating the need for the remaining Guard combat structure and eliminating any excess forces. As a result, the studies leave substantial Guard structure in place that has no valid war-fighting mission. According to DOD and Joint Staff officials, however, the Quadrennial Defense Review may consider them.

The Army National Guard Division Redesign Study working group (chartered by the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans) and a parallel study group (the Guard’s Division Project Action Committee) considered several options to redesign the Guard combat divisions to fill support requirements. Three of these options were evaluated to determine initial costs and feasibility.

A General Officers Working Group then selected the option to convert 2 of the Guard’s combat divisions and 6 combat brigades—about 42,700 spaces—into required support spaces. This option also allows the Guard to keep the other six combat divisions, minus three combat brigades, and create two new divisions with each division containing three enhanced brigades and an active duty administrative headquarters. The study’s preliminary estimates are that it would take about $2.8 billion to

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3This review, established in the Fiscal Year 1997 Defense Authorization Act, is to be a comprehensive examination of the defense program and policies.
convert these combat spaces and could take from 10 to 29 years, depending upon annual funding, to complete the conversion. However, the Army does not plan to begin this conversion until it has purchased all the equipment needed to convert another 66,000 active and reserve support spaces, identified through another Army analysis, into required support spaces. The total cost for this first conversion effort is an estimated $2.6 billion. The final costs and implementation time frame for the Division Redesign Study and the feasibility of the new divisions are still being evaluated and will not be addressed in this report. According to Army officials, preliminary results from the cost evaluation indicate that costs could be less than originally estimated.

Recommendation

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense, as he guides the Quadrennial Defense Review, direct that the review process validate requirements for Guard combat structure. We further recommend that, once this validation is complete, the Secretary of Defense, in concert with the Secretary of the Army, eliminate any structure beyond that which is needed to carry out the national security strategy.

Scope and Methodology

To assess DOD’s and the Army’s efforts to redesign the Guard combat divisions, we interviewed cognizant officials and obtained and analyzed the Army National Guard Division Redesign Study and other relevant documents from DOD; the Army; the Army National Guard; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Calibre Systems, Inc.; and DOD’s Commission on Roles and Missions.

We requested written comments from DOD, but none were provided. We discussed the information in this report with cognizant officials and have made changes where appropriate.

We conducted this review from August to November 1996 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are providing copies of this report to appropriate House and Senate committees; the Secretaries of Defense and the Army; the Director of the Army National Guard; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also provide copies to other interested parties upon request.
Please contact me at (202) 512-3504 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. The major contributors to this report were Robert Pelletier, Ann Borseth, and Lisa Quinn.

Richard Davis
Director, National Security Analysis
Letter

Briefing Section I
Background
Previous Studies Call for Changes to Guard Combat Divisions

Briefing Section II
The Army National Guard Division Redesign Study
Army Vice Chief of Staff Chartered Redesign Working Group
Two Groups Conduct Study by Using a Three-Phased Approach
Phase One: Options Developed for Alternative Force Structure
Phase One: Three Options
Phase Two: Detailed Cost Analysis
Decisions Reached Prior to Phase Three
Phase Three: Feasibility Analysis
Comparison of Options

Briefing Section III
The Decision
Working Group Selects Option One
Illustrative Time Frames for Implementation

Briefing Section IV
Response to Prior Recommendations
Studies Did Not Address All of Previous Recommendations

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense
DIVPAC Division Project Action Committee
DCSOPS Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
PA&E Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation
Previous Studies Call for Changes to Guard Combat Divisions

- RAND study: large percentage of Guard not needed for state requirements
- 1996 GAO report and Commission study:
  - No wartime mission for eight Guard combat divisions
  - Eight divisions too large for secondary missions

By the end of fiscal year 1999, the Army National Guard plans to have 367,000 personnel in 54 separate state and territorial military commands in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Guam. This number includes about 187,000 personnel organized into 8 combat divisions that include 3 brigades each; 15 enhanced brigades; and 3 separate combat units, consisting of 2 separate brigades and a scout group. In addition to the combat units, the Guard has elements that
Briefing Section I
Background

support combat units, such as engineers, military police, military intelligence, and transportation.

According to Guard policy, the Guard is to be organized and resourced for federal wartime missions but is also available to fulfill state missions. According to a recent study by RAND’s National Defense Research Institute, the Guard over the last decade has used only a small percentage of its total personnel to meet state requirements. RAND also reported that, nationally, state demands on the Guard are not significant. RAND concluded that, even in a peak use year, state missions would not require a large portion of the Guard.

As we reported in our March 1996 report, war planners and Department of Defense (DOD) studies stated that the eight combat divisions are not needed to meet the national security strategy of fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. According to DOD’s 1993 Report on the Bottom-Up Review, these forces are assigned to fill secondary missions such as providing wartime rotational forces, serving as a deterrent hedge to future adversarial regimes, and supporting civil authorities at home.

However, the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces reported that eight Guard combat divisions are too large a force for these secondary missions and concluded that reserve component forces with lower priority tasks should be eliminated or reorganized to fill shortfalls in higher priority areas. It also concluded that even after filling the shortfalls, the total Army would still have more combat spaces than required and recommended that these should be eliminated from the active or reserve components.

In response to the recommendations in our March 1996 report, DOD stated that the Army National Guard Division Redesign Study and other studies being conducted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation and the Joint Chiefs of Staff would address these issues.

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1Assessing the State and Federal Missions of the National Guard, RAND, (Santa Monica, Calif.: 1995).

Army Vice Chief of Staff Chartered Redesign Working Group

- In part, the Group was to
  - develop options for changing Guard structure to meet future Army requirements
  - prioritize options for senior Army leadership
- In part, the Group was not to
  - change the number of Guard headquarters
  - change force structure and end strength allowance
  - eliminate ability to respond to state missions
The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army signed a charter on May 16, 1995, that established the Army National Guard Division Redesign General Officer Working Group. According to the Group’s charter, the Group was formed because the Army is in critically short supply of support forces but continues to maintain Guard combat units that are excess to war-fighting requirements.

The purpose of the Working Group was to (1) review the Army’s future unresourced support requirements, (2) review the structure and missions of the Guard combat elements and develop options for changing Guard structure to meet future Army requirements, (3) conduct a resource feasibility assessment of the options, and, (4) refine and prioritize the options for presentation to the senior Army leadership. The guiding principles of the Group, in part, were to (1) not cause a reduction in the number of Guard division headquarters, (2) operate within existing Guard force structure and end strength, and (3) consider the Guard’s need to respond to state missions.

Members of the Working Group included the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS); the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; the Director, Army National Guard; the Chief, Army Reserve; the Chief of Staff, Training and Doctrine Command; the Director of Operations, Forces Command; and representatives from the Office of the Inspector General, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, and the Office of the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation. The Ohio Adjutant General, whose role was to act as spokesman for the 54 Adjutants General, was added after approval of the charter and study plan. According to Guard officials, this was the first time that the Guard had been invited to sit on a general officer working group to discuss issues affecting the Guard.
Two Groups Conduct Study by Using a Three-Phased Approach

- Two groups
  - Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
  - Army National Guard Division Project Action Committee
- Three-phased approach established by the Working Group
  - develop options
  - analyze one-time and recurring costs
  - analyze feasibility
Two groups worked on options to redesign the Guard combat divisions. One group, under the direction of the Army’s DCSOPS, was composed of a working council of colonels and members of the Working Group. The second group, the Army National Guard Division Project Action Committee (DIVPAC), was composed of the 54 Adjutants General, representing each state and territory, and the commanders of the 8 Guard combat divisions.

The Working Group established a three-phased study protocol by which the two groups would conduct their studies. During the first phase, the two groups were to develop several options for alternative force structures that would reduce the unresourced support shortfall and add relevance to the remaining Guard force structure without violating the guiding principles of the charter. Once the options had been developed, they would be narrowed to those options that would be presented to the Working Group. The Group would then recommend which options would proceed to phase two of the study. In phase two, the one-time and recurring costs associated with implementing the options were to be developed and analyzed. In phase three, the results from the other phases, along with other relevant criteria to determine the feasibility of implementing the recommended options, would be analyzed. From this phase, a final option would be chosen and briefed to senior Army leadership for a decision and implementation.

\(^6\)As defined in the study’s final report, “relevance” means to “enhance warfighting capabilities of America’s Army.” This includes the missions of supporting the two major regional contingency scenario, providing a deterrent hedge, and enhancing mobilization.
Phase One: Options Developed for Alternative Force Structure

- DCSOPS developed 11 options
  - 2 of the 11 options proceeded to phase two
- DIVPAC developed 9 options
  - 1 option proceeded to phase two
Using a baseline force of 8 Guard divisions, 3 separate combat units, and 15 enhanced brigades, the first phase of the study focused on developing a broad range of options for consideration by the Working Group. Both study groups used certain design considerations that were developed early on. Specifically, the groups were to focus on enhancing the war-fighting capability of America's Army, reduce the unresourced support shortfall, provide a force that could respond to operations other than war, address war-fight requirements of the Commanders in Chief of the Unified Commands, and meet state-unique requirements where possible. Building a force to respond to operations other than war was later removed as a design consideration.

Using these design considerations, the DCSOPS study team developed 11 options and the DIVPAC developed 9. The DCSOPS study team presented their 11 options to the Working Group, which then chose 2 of the 11 for further consideration. The DIVPAC analyzed their 9 options by measuring them against a weighted criteria, ultimately choosing one option to be presented to the Working Group for further consideration and evaluation. Finally, three options—one DIVPAC option and two DCSOPS options—were approved by the Working Group for further cost analysis in phase two of the study. All three options provided structure to reduce the unresourced support shortfall and assigned missions that could add to the relevance of the remaining Guard structure, as defined by the study's final report.
Phase One: Three Options

Option one (DIVPAC)
- As-Is
- As-Is w/1 EB
- CA
- AC/NG w/3 EB
- EB
- AC w/ integrated EB

Option two (DCSOPS)
- As-Is
- CA
- OPFOR
- RS10I
- OPFOR
- OOTW

Option three (DCSOPS)
- CA
- RS0I
- AC
- As-Is

Legend: xx - division; x - brigade; EB - enhanced brigade; CA - combined arms; AC - active component; NG - National Guard; OPFOR - opposing force; RSOI - reception, staging, onward movement, and integration; OOTW - operations other than war.

6,600 support migrates from AC to NG
The three options selected by the Working Group were as follows:

Option one, developed by the DIVPAC, contains the following: three Guard divisions that remain in their current configuration and could be used as a deterrent hedge; three Guard divisions that replace one division maneuver brigade with an enhanced brigade; two Guard divisions that would be converted from combat divisions into combined arms divisions with one combat maneuver brigade and various support units; two new active component/Guard divisions, each containing an active component headquarters and three Guard enhanced brigades as maneuver brigades; two enhanced brigades that remain in their current configuration; four active component divisions, each having an integrated enhanced brigade; and six Guard combined arms brigades converted from the three separate combat units and the three divisional maneuver brigades. Additionally, this option provided that the missions of 6,600 active component support spaces would migrate to the Guard.

Option two, developed by the DCSOPS group, contains the following: three Guard divisions in their current configuration; three Guard combined arms divisions; one Guard reception, staging, onward movement, and integration division;7 and one Guard opposing force division, which would help train the enhanced brigades during mobilization. The 15 enhanced brigades and 2 of the 3 separate combat units remain stand-alone entities and are not shown in the previous chart. The third separate unit is used as a maneuver brigade in a combined arms division.

Option three, also developed by the DCSOPS group, contains the following: four Guard divisions in their current configuration; one Guard combined arms division; one Guard reception, staging, onward movement, and integration division; one Guard opposing force division; and one Guard division to respond to operations other than war. As in option two, the 15 enhanced brigades and 2 of the 3 separate combat units remain stand-alone entities and are not shown in the previous chart. The third separate unit is again used as a maneuver brigade in a combined arms division.

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7A reception, staging, onward movement, and integration division assists in the deployment process. The structure is similar to the combined arms division, but without the maneuver brigade.
The Working Group stated that the lowest cost option would not necessarily be the best alternative.

*One-time costs were calculated two different ways: (1) with equipment substitutions and (2) without equipment substitutions.

*These reductions in recurring costs will not be realized until implementation is complete.
The cost analysis conducted on the three options considered one-time costs (such as procurement, retraining, facilities, and second destination transportation costs) and recurring costs (such as annual operating costs). According to Army and Guard officials, the analysis was done by the Army's contractor, Calibre Systems, Inc., to provide a consistent analysis for both options.

The contractor calculated the one-time procurement costs in two ways. First, it allowed for the use of equipment on hand that matched the requirement of the new unit, with no substitutions, and computed the purchase cost of new equipment to fill the remaining requirements. Second, it allowed for the use of equipment on hand that matched or could be substituted for the new unit’s equipment requirements and computed the purchase cost of new equipment to fill the remaining requirements. The second calculation produced the lower estimate. Both cost estimates were presented in the final assessment.

The contractor did not consider those offsets that could be achieved by (1) using equipment that was excess to the new unit’s requirements to fill other Army requirements, (2) selling the excess equipment through foreign military sales, and (3) using equipment passed to the Guard from inactivated units or programmed for units through the modernization process.

The first two options were both less expensive to operate annually, but their one-time costs were greater. The third option was the most expensive option to operate annually but would have incurred lower one-time costs. However, the Working Group had decided that cost would be treated as an independent variable and that the lowest cost option would not necessarily be the best alternative.

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8Prior to the analysis, the Working Group directed the contractor to exclude the cost impact of the migration of missions for 6,600 support spaces that were included as part of option one.
Decisions Reached Prior to Phase Three

Option three was eliminated from consideration.

Option one was modified. The four integrated enhanced brigades were deleted from the active component divisions and retained as stand-alone brigades.
Options one and two were selected by the Working Group to proceed to phase three of the study. Option three was dropped from further consideration because it reduced the support shortfall by the least amount and contained a division created to respond to operations other than war. The Working Group determined that this was a mission that could be satisfied by a division remaining in its current configuration.

In addition, the DIVPAC modified their option by deleting the integration of four enhanced brigades into four active component divisions. The four enhanced brigades were to remain stand-alone brigades, thus retaining six enhanced brigades in that status.
Phase Three: Feasibility Analysis

- Working Group uses nine weighted criteria to evaluate options
- Option two receives better score, but difference between the options is negligible
- Cost is considered as independent variable
Once the two options were selected for further study, the Working Group then addressed the feasibility of implementing each option. This phase of the study was done by developing and defining the criteria to be used to show the strengths and weaknesses of each option, subjectively assessing the advantages and disadvantages of each criterion, and factoring in the costs determined in phase two as an independent variable.

The Group approved nine criteria to be used. These were relevance to the war-fight, reduction of unresourced support shortfall, impact on the active force, amount of Guard maneuver/combat troops integrated into the war-fight mission, turbulence on Guard units, readiness impact on lower tiered units, impact on full-time support ratios, impact on professional development, and impact on force mix. Each of the criteria was assigned a weight by using a standard Army computer program. Throughout this process, advantages and disadvantages of each option were subjectively evaluated.

According to the study, the lowest score is the preferred option when based on the weighted criteria. When the scores were summed, option two received the lowest score. Option two converts more combat into support spaces, impacts the active component the least, and would have the least amount of turbulence to the Guard units. Option one scored better than option two in two criteria: It provides more professional development opportunities, and it would not generate as many full-time personnel support requirements. However, the study’s final report stated that the differences between the two options were slight.

During this phase, the estimated costs originally developed in phase two were revisited as an independent variable. As stated previously, option two yields the most expensive one-time costs and the least amount of savings in recurring costs. The difference between option one and two could be greater than reflected in phase two because, among other things, the one-time and recurring cost estimates associated with option one do not include the costs related to the two new active component/Guard divisions.
Comparison of Options

Option one (DIVPAC)
- 42,700 support spaces

Option two (DCSOPS)
- 44,100 support spaces

Differences:
- EBs
- 6,600 migration
- OPFOR

6,600 support migrates from AC to NG
The structural similarities of each option are presented in the shaded areas on the previous page. For example, each option maintains three Guard combat divisions as currently configured. Each option also converts some Guard combat brigades and/or divisions into combined arms units to satisfy an almost identical amount of unresourced support requirements that have similar missions. Specifically, option one would convert about 42,700 combat spaces to support spaces; option two would convert about 44,100.

The principal differences between the options are presented in the lighter areas on the previous page and focus on three areas: use of the enhanced brigades, the migration of spaces, and the opposing force division.

- Option one moves three of the enhanced brigades into three Guard divisions to free up divisional brigades for conversion to support spaces. The option also uses the separate combat units for conversion to support spaces. Option two leaves the enhanced brigades as they are currently configured, uses one separate unit as a maneuver brigade for a combined arms division, and gets all of the unresourced support requirements from the converted divisions.
- Option one includes the migration of the missions of 6,600 existing support spaces from the active component to the Guard. Option two does not include this migration.
- Option two includes an opposing force division. Option one does not, but instead has divisions that could be task organized to handle this mission.

In addition to the difference in the amount of support spaces the options create, there are also differences in the number and type of the support units themselves. For example, option one creates 108 quartermaster units with 15,825 spaces, while option two creates 159 quartermaster units with 21,436 spaces. Also, option one creates 15 signal corps units with 4,029 spaces, while option two creates 3 signal corps units with 624 spaces.

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9As previously stated, a reception, staging, onward movement, and integration division is a variation of the combined arms division without the maneuver brigade.
Working Group Selects Option One

Option one (DIVPAC)

XX
As-Is

XX
As-Is w/1 EB

XX
CA

XX
AC/NG w/3 EB

x
EB

x
CA

6,800 support
migrates from
AC to NG
On the basis of its evaluation of the feasibility analysis, the Working Group selected option one to present to the senior Army leadership. According to the study’s final report, this decision was based on the similarities of the support units, the negligible difference in the support spaces created, and the slight difference in the costs of the two options.

However, the Working Group required two modifications before proceeding with this option: (1) the missions of the 6,600 spaces that were to migrate from the active component would not migrate now but could migrate into the Guard once the Army’s current initiative to redesign the force for the future is completed and (2) the proposal for the two new active component/Guard divisions would be revisited after the next update of the national security strategy. This proposal is currently being tested by the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command to determine the viability of the concept.

The Secretary of the Army approved the Working Group’s modified recommendation on May 14, 1996, and sent a letter to the Secretary of Defense informing him of the Army’s decision. According to Army officials, the Secretary of Defense was briefed on August 26, 1996, and concurred with the Secretary of the Army’s decision.
**Illustrative Time Frames for Implementation**

Time-phased resourcing based on $400 M per fiscal year

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Time-phased resourcing based on $200 M per fiscal year

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Time-phased resourcing based on $100 M per fiscal year

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The previous page depicts illustrative time frames for implementing option one based on different resourcing alternatives and using the highest estimated one-time costs. For example, if $400 million is provided each fiscal year beginning in 1998, the study’s final report estimated it would take 8 years, or until 2006, to procure new equipment and an additional 2 years, or until 2008, to complete implementation. As shown on the previous page, the less funding that is made available each fiscal year lengthens the time it takes to complete the conversion.

However, it is unlikely that funding for the Guard Division Redesign will be available as early as fiscal year 1998. According to Army force structure officials, the support shortfall at the end of the Total Army Analysis process for the planning period ending in fiscal year 2003 would be almost 125,000 spaces.\textsuperscript{10} Over 66,000 spaces of this shortfall are to be filled through the conversion of existing support units in both the active and reserve components. The procurement phase of this conversion is to be fully funded before any of the redesign effort will be undertaken. The entire conversion, including procurement and implementation, of the 66,000 spaces is estimated to cost about $2.6 billion. However, according to Army officials, funding for this conversion has not been established and, therefore, it is not known when the conversion will be completed.

It appears, therefore, that the redesign will not begin for several years and that, regardless of which funding alternative on the previous page is chosen, implementation will take a prolonged period of time—10 to 29 years. However, the contractor is currently refining the final costs and implementation time frames for the chosen option. According to Army officials, preliminary results from this effort indicate that costs could be less than originally estimated.

\textsuperscript{10}The Total Army Analysis is the process by which the Army determines the nondivisional support requirements, based on war-fighting scenarios developed by DOD.
Response to Prior Recommendations

GAO Studies Did Not Address All of Previous Recommendations

- Recommendations
  - Validate the number of combat troops needed to carry out the national security strategy
  - Use some of the support and combat forces of the Guard to fill needed, but unresourced, support requirements
  - Consider eliminating any forces that exceed validated requirements
  - Redesign study did not fully validate combat troops needed or discuss elimination of any excess troops
  - Other studies conducted by JCS and PA&E did not address recommendations
  - Opportunity for the Quadrennial Defense Review to revisit these issues

According to DOD, our recommendations and those of the Commission on Roles and Missions were to be addressed by this study and other studies conducted by the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). However, while the Army National Guard Division Redesign Study and the resulting decision provides for some Guard support and combat forces to fill needed, but unresourced, support requirements, none of the studies were chartered to validate the combat needs or eliminate any excess forces. This leaves substantial Guard
structure in place that has no valid war-fight mission. We still believe these are critical steps that should be taken.

According to the study's final report, three of the Guard divisions remaining in their current configuration were assigned a mission of deterrent hedge, one of the missions that would add relevance to the Guard structure. The report states that this mission was based on requirements stated in concept plans developed by the Commanders in Chief of the Unified Commands. However, on the basis of our review of war planning documents and discussions with Army war planning officials, this requirement does not exist in either Commanders' concept plans, the current Defense Planning Guidance, or any other war planning documents. Furthermore, the three divisions, which include an enhanced brigade in each, were assigned the mission of enhancing mobilization, also to add relevance. Both these missions met the definition of relevance approved by the Working Group. However, according to Army war planning officials, there is a formal analysis process to validate combat and support missions and requirements needed to carry out the national security strategy that goes beyond assigning missions to structure. The study did not follow this process to determine that the missions assigned to the structure were valid.

In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (P.L. 104-201), the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is to conduct a Quadrennial Defense Review as recommended by the Commission. This review would be a comprehensive examination of the defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, budget plans, infrastructure, and other elements of the defense program and policies with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States, and establishing a revised defense program through the year 2005. According to both Joint Chiefs of Staff and Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation officials, this review is another opportunity for DOD to revisit the Commission's and our recommendations to validate combat forces and eliminate excess Guard structure.

We concur with these officials and recommend that the Secretary of Defense, as he guides the review, direct that the review process validate requirements for Guard combat structure. We further recommend that, once this validation is complete, the Secretary of Defense, in concert with the Secretary of the Army, eliminate any structure beyond that which is needed to carry out the national security strategy.
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