PEACE OPERATIONS

Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to Regional Conflicts
This report discusses the impact that peace operations have on U.S. military forces, force structure limitations that may affect the military's ability to respond to other national security requirements while engaged in peace operations, and options for increasing force flexibility and response capability. We prepared the report at the request of the former Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Armed Services. The information in this report should be useful to your Committee in its deliberations on the impact of peace operations on the military. The report contains a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense concerning the staffing of high-priority support units.

We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional committees; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to others on request.

If you or your staff have any questions on this report, please call me on (202) 512-3504. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix II.

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Director, National Security Analysis
Executive Summary

Purpose

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. military has become increasingly involved in a number of peace operations, such as the ones in Somalia and Haiti. The former Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Armed Services, asked GAO to review the suitability of the current U.S. force structure for peace operations. They wanted to know whether the U.S. military had the capabilities necessary to operate effectively in a peace operations environment, while maintaining the capability to respond to two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC). GAO did not assess whether the United States should participate in peace operations. GAO examined (1) the impact that peace operations have on U.S. military forces, (2) force structure limitations that may affect the military’s ability to respond to other national security requirements while engaged in peace operations, and (3) options for increasing force flexibility and response capability.

Background

Recent changes in the international security environment, led by the collapse of the Soviet Union, are redefining the role of the U.S. military. In addition to emphasizing the capability to respond to two nearly simultaneous MRCs, the Department of Defense’s (DOD) bottom-up review notes that U.S. military forces should also be prepared for operations short of declared or intense war, including peace operations. According to the bottom-up review, U.S. forces are more likely to be involved in these other-than-war operations.

As the number, size, and scope of peace operations have increased in the past several years, the nature and extent of U.S. military participation has changed markedly. While U.S. military forces have participated in peace operations for many years, notably as part of the Multinational Force and Observers on the Sinai Peninsula, the size of the U.S. military contingent has traditionally been limited. Recently, however, the United States has used more military forces, of an increasingly varied nature, in peace operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and Northern and Southern Iraq. These operations often take place for an extended duration, usually occurring in austere environments with little or no infrastructure from which to base and sustain an operation.

1For the purpose of this report, “peace operations” includes everything from low-intensity peacekeeping operations, such as military observer duty, to high-intensity peace-enforcement operations. In addition to peace operations, DOD continues to participate in humanitarian and disaster relief operations, as it has done for many years.
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Peace operations heavily stress some U.S. military capabilities, including certain Army support forces such as quartermaster and transportation units and specialized Air Force aircraft, while having less impact on other forces, such as Army armored combat divisions and general purpose Air Force combat aircraft outside Europe. Repeated use of these forces, of which there are relatively few in the active force, has resulted in some units and personnel deploying more than once to an operation or to consecutive operations, increased the tempo of operations, and reduced the time available to prepare for combat missions. Because of their forward-deployed mode of operations, the Navy and the Marine Corps have not faced the same force structure constraints. However, the increased naval commitment to peace operations, combined with the decrease in forward-deployed forces, has escalated the tempo of operations and reduced the preparation time between deployments for certain naval forces.

Extended participation in multiple and/or large scale peace operations could impede the services’ timely response to MRCs because certain active component support units and specialized Air Force aircraft used for these operations would also be needed initially in a MRC. Contrary to the bottom-up review’s assumption, it could be difficult to disengage these support units and specialized Air Force assets quickly from a peace operation and redeploy them to a MRC. First, some of the forces needed in the early days of a MRC would also be needed to facilitate a redeployment from the peace operation. Second, airlift assets would have to be diverted to pick up personnel and equipment from the peace operation. Finally, some of the forces would need training, supplies, and equipment before deploying to another major operation.

There are a number of options available that could allow DOD to meet the demands of peace operations while maintaining the capability to respond to MRCs. These options include changing the mix of active and reserve forces and making greater use of the reserves and contractors. DOD is currently examining these and other options GAO mentions in this report. If the United States wants to continue participating in sizable peace operations for extended periods and still maintain the capability to respond rapidly to two nearly simultaneous MRCs, it must make choices involving the use of resources and the degree of military risk it is prepared to take.
### Executive Summary

**Principal Findings**

**Peace Operations Have Stressed Key Military Capabilities**

Peace operations have heavily stressed certain key military capabilities, of which there are few in the active component, particularly certain Army support forces such as quartermaster and transportation units and Air Force specialized aircraft, while having less impact on other capabilities such as Army armored combat divisions and general purpose Air Force combat aircraft. Because each peace operation is different, the experiences provided and the impact on the forces differ.

Sustaining large-scale peace operations for an extended period of time uses a large number of some kinds of active Army support forces to establish infrastructure in what is often an austere environment. Support forces provide basic necessities—food, water, toilets, and showers—to U.S. military forces and, in many cases, to coalition forces and the local population. If nation building is part of the military mission, support requirements increase even further as the military builds schools, hospitals, and local housing and establishes police and other civil administration services.

The Army’s combat support forces (such as military police) and combat service support forces (such as port handlers and quartermaster personnel) provide these important support capabilities. However, many of these forces are in the reserve component and, for the most part, have not been activated for peace operations. As a result, the responsibility for these operations has fallen on the smaller number of forces in the active component. In some cases, nearly all the active units for particular support capabilities have had to deploy to specific operations. For example, 100 percent of the air terminal movement control teams and 75 percent of the petroleum supply companies in the active component deployed to Somalia. In many cases, certain personnel have had to deploy multiple times to the same operation or to consecutive operations.

The stress of peace operations on the Army has been exacerbated by the practice of cross-leveling. This practice involves maintaining support units at about 10 to 20 percent below their authorized personnel levels during peacetime and increasing their personnel levels during deployment by borrowing personnel from units that are not deploying. Given the decrease in the size of the Army, GAO believes that this practice needs to be reassessed.
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The Army’s experience in Somalia illustrates the challenges that could lie ahead if the United States chooses to deploy sizable forces to Bosnia or to other large-scale peace operations throughout the world. While the Army provided approximately a brigade-size force to Somalia, it likely would provide a division-size force to Bosnia—roughly three times the Army’s force in Somalia. Army officials have stated that if the United States sends approximately 22,000 Army forces to Bosnia, access to the reserve component likely would be required for the second 6-month rotation because the large support requirement would exceed the number of active forces available in certain support capabilities.

The Air Force has contributed to recent peace operations by providing airlift, delivering humanitarian relief, and participating in various no fly zone air operations. Air Force officials stated that these operations have provided valuable experience in joint and coalition operations. However, they have placed considerable stress on (1) specialized capabilities that only exist in small numbers, such as command and control, surveillance, reconnaissance, and radar jamming aircraft and (2) forward-deployed units in the European theater, where most recent operations have occurred. Many of these units have experienced increased operational and personnel tempo because of sustained deployments and have had fewer opportunities for training in the broad spectrum of warfare requirements, such as night intercept operations and advanced aircraft handling characteristics. For example, 48 percent of EF-111 aircrews and 42 percent of active component F-4G aircrews received waivers for training requirements they were not able to complete during the January-June 1994 training cycle. These waivers were needed because of the crews’ extensive participation in peace operations.

In addition, deploying part but not all of a unit to peace operations has created planning and logistics challenges for the Air Force, because squadrons are structured to fight in place or deploy as a whole unit rather than in smaller packages as they are doing for peace operations. Consequently, essential unit personnel and equipment have to be shared by the forces at the home base and those in the deployed location.

The traditional practice of meeting operational requirements with a command’s own resources as much as possible combined with the drawdown of forces in Europe have increased the strain on the remaining Air Force assets in Europe. For example, since their inception in July and November 1993, the U.S. Air Force Europe’s two new F-15E squadrons, designed for delivering precision-guided munitions at night in a high-threat
environment, have been participating continuously in two peace operations—Provide Comfort and Deny Flight. Because of their participation in these operations, the squadrons have had to forego major training exercises that would have provided them with the most realistic combat training available. This training is particularly important for these squadrons because they have not had the opportunity to participate in a major tactical air combat exercise since they were established in 1993. Air Force volunteer reservists have been used in peace operations to reduce the burden on certain active component units, such as C-130, A-10, and F-16 units, but full-time jobs and family obligations prevent reservists from devoting extensive amounts of time to the operations. Many of these problems are now being addressed by heavier reliance on U.S.-based active, reserve, and Guard units that have deployed to Operations Provide Comfort and Deny Flight to relieve some of this burden.

Peace operations have not been as disruptive to the Navy and the Marine Corps because they are normally forward deployed throughout the world. Certain Navy and Marine Corps units, however, have experienced increased operating tempo and decreased time between deployments due to their increased participation in these sustained operations and to the reduced force structure available to respond to them and other forward deployment requirements. For example, a Marine Expeditionary Unit that returned on June 23, 1994, from a 6-month deployment, including 3 months off the coast of Somalia, was sent back to sea in less than 3 weeks to support U.S. operations off the coast of Haiti. Navy officials told GAO that increased operational tempo has resulted in reduced U.S. naval participation in certain training and exercises, less time for intermediate maintenance and repair, and reduced U.S. naval presence in certain geographic areas.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Participation in Peace Operations May Delay Services' Response to Major Regional Conflicts</th>
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<td>According to the bottom-up review, military forces needed for peace operations will come from the same pool of forces identified for use in the event of one or more MRCS. Certain key Army support units and specialized Air Force aircraft used in recent peace operations have been identified as being needed in the early stages of a MR. However, it may be difficult to disengage these forces from the peace operation and redeploy them quickly to the MR. This is significant because in the event of a short-warning attack, forces are needed to deploy rapidly to the theater and enter the battle as quickly as possible to halt the invasion.</td>
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During the Somalia operation, the Army used a large percentage of certain support forces needed in the early stages of a MRC, such as forces for opening ports and airfields. In certain cases, nearly 100 percent of the contingency support forces for particular capabilities had deployed to Somalia and hence were unavailable for deployment elsewhere. For example, during the course of the operation, the Army used all its contingency support forces attached to general supply, air terminal movement control, medium truck (petroleum), cargo transfer, and water purification units. Some of these support capabilities, of which there are few in the active component, would also be needed to facilitate a redeployment from the peace operation theater and hence would not be immediately available for the MRC. The Army has recognized this as a challenge and is currently examining this issue as part of the Total Army Analysis 2003, a biennial process to determine nondivisional support requirements. The Army expects to complete this analysis by mid-1995.

The Air Force is in a similar situation. Many of its special capability units have been participating in peace operations on a fairly continuous basis, yet DOD plans to use some of these units in both MRCs. While the aircraft and aircrews could easily move to another location, the supplies, equipment, and personnel associated with the support of the aircraft would have to wait for available airlift.

On the other hand, participation in the enforcement of no fly zones and other operations that require the forward deployment of U.S. forces can also enhance the ability of the U.S. military to respond quickly to regional contingencies. This was the case in Operation Vigilant Warrior in October 1994, where having U.S. aircraft already operating from Saudi Arabia greatly facilitated the initial coalition response to Iraq’s threatened aggression against Kuwait.

A Number of Options Are Available for Easing the Strain of Peace Operations

There are options available for reducing the strain of continued military participation in numerous and/or sizable sustained peace operations while maintaining the capability to rapidly respond to MRCs. DOD has a number of ongoing analyses that are examining such options. These options have their own advantages and disadvantages and will require choices on the use of the nation’s resources. While there are costs associated with some of these options, GAO has not examined their magnitude and how DOD might fund them.
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One option involves increasing the number of support forces on active duty and decreasing the number of combat forces. The Army maintains limited numbers of certain types of support capability on active duty and substantial active combat capability. While changing the mix of active combat and support forces would make more support forces available for peace operations, it would decrease available active combat forces for regional conflicts. Alternatively, GAO has recently reported that DOD may be able to increase the number of combat and combat service support forces without decreasing the number of combat forces by making more use of civilian employees.

Another option involves greater use of the reserves. This would ease the strain on Army support forces and on Air Force airlift and combat forces. The disadvantage of this option would be the disruption to reservists’ lives, which ultimately could affect the willingness of Americans to join the reserves. The President called up approximately 1,900 reservists to support the September 1994 military intervention in Haiti. Prior to that call-up, the President’s Selected Reserve Call-Up Authority had been invoked only once since its 1976 enactment—for the Gulf War. Reserves were not called up for the operations in Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1989, and Somalia in 1992. DOD is examining the issue of making greater use of the reserves for peace operations.

Other options include making greater use of contractors to augment support forces, using worldwide Air Force assets rather than regional assets to support peace operations, and changing forward presence and deployment goals to relieve the strain on naval forces. Although no one option addresses all the problems GAO has identified, a combination of these options could substantially ease the problems.

Recommendations

Congress, concerned about the bottom-up review and the defense budget, has directed DOD to review the assumptions and conclusions of the President’s budget, the bottom-up review, and the Future Years Defense Program. The review is to consider peace operations and directs among other things that the report describe in detail the force structure required to fight and win two MRCs nearly simultaneously in light of other ongoing or potential operations. Consequently, GAO is not making recommendations regarding reassessing the impact of participation in peace operations in this report.
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On another matter, however, GAO believes that because of the Army's significantly reduced size, the staffing of support forces at 10 to 20 percent below their authorized levels needs to be reassessed. Consequently, GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army, as part of the Total Army Analysis 2003, to reexamine whether high priority support units that would deploy early in a crisis should still be manned at less than 100 percent of their authorized strength.

Agency Comments

DOD's comments on a draft of this report appear in appendix I. DOD generally agrees that peace operations have stressed certain military capabilities but disagrees with GAO's conclusion that participation in peace operations could delay the timely response of U.S. forces to MRCs. Regarding GAO's recommendation, DOD states that a review of Army support requirements is underway as part of Total Army Analysis 2003.

DOD agrees that there are only a small number of certain active support units that are likely to be needed to conduct both peace operations and MRCs. However, it believes that GAO's resultant conclusions reflect a lack of understanding of how U.S. forces would respond to a MRC. GAO's conclusions in this regard focus on certain critical capabilities that exist in limited numbers, specifically certain Army support units and certain Air Force aircraft. GAO reached its conclusions through analysis of how these capabilities have been used in peace operations and past conflicts and its planned use in future conflicts. GAO agrees that most combat forces would be readily available to respond to a MRC.

DOD specifically disagrees with GAO's discussion of specialized aircraft. DOD's comments on specialized aircraft and GAO's evaluation are discussed in chapters 2 and 3.
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With the end of the Cold War, the number, scope, and size of operations other than war have increased dramatically, and the United States has become an active participant in some of these operations. Senior administration officials have testified that multilateral peace operations are an important part of this administration's national security strategy, albeit not the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy. These officials have stated that the United States must be willing to act to preserve peace and stability in order to advance and protect U.S. interests in the world. This in turn demands that the United States encourage the successful conduct of multilateral peace operations and, when it is in the United States' interests, participate in these operations.

U.S. military forces have been participating in peace operations for almost 50 years, with limited numbers of personnel. However, as the number, size, and scope of peace operations have increased dramatically in the past several years, the nature and extent of U.S. participation have changed markedly. Recently, the United States has used much larger numbers of combat and support forces to respond to events in a number of locations, including Somalia, Macedonia, Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Iraq. (See table 1.1) For example, while the United States has approximately 1,100 military personnel committed to the Multinational Force and Observers for the 12-year operation on the Sinai Peninsula, starting in December 1992 it deployed approximately 26,000 to Somalia and approximately 20,000 to Haiti beginning in September 1994.

While U.S. participation in peace operations has increased, the size of the armed forces has declined over the past 8 years. From a post-Vietnam War peak of 2.2 million in fiscal year 1987, the active armed forces have been reduced to an authorized level of 1.5 million in fiscal year 1995.

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1For the purpose of this report, “peace operations” includes everything from low-intensity peacekeeping operations, such as military observer duty, to high-intensity peace-enforcement operations. In addition to peace operations, DOD continues to participate in humanitarian and disaster relief operations, as it has done for many years.

2The Multinational Force and Observers is a buffer force of 11 nations, deployed to supervise a demilitarized zone in the Sinai. The force’s mission is to ensure that Israel and Egypt abide by the provisions of the Peace Treaty pertaining to the Sinai.
Table 1.1: U.S. Participation in Selected Peace Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Time period</th>
<th>Country or region</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Approximate maximum number of forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Multinational Force and Observers</td>
<td>1982 - present</td>
<td>Sinai</td>
<td>Sinai buffer force between Egypt and Israel</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Comfort</td>
<td>1991 - present</td>
<td>Northern Iraq</td>
<td>Provide safe havens for population of northern Iraq</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Relief/Restore Hope/Continue Hope</td>
<td>1992 - 1994</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Provide security and support for relief efforts</td>
<td>26,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Promise</td>
<td>1992 - present</td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>Provide humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deny Flight</td>
<td>1992 - present</td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>Support U.N. no fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Watch</td>
<td>1992 - present</td>
<td>Southern Iraq</td>
<td>Monitor repression of southern Iraq population</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharp Guard</td>
<td>1993 - present</td>
<td>Adriatic Sea</td>
<td>Prevent arms from entering the former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>11,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uphold Democracy</td>
<td>1994 - present</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Secure conditions for the return of democracy</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Peace Operations Require Extended Force Commitments

Peace operations tend to be sustained rather than short-term operations and sometimes have required extended force commitments from the U.S. military services. U.S. military forces continue to maintain a 12-year commitment to the Multinational Force and Observers on the Sinai Peninsula, a 3-year commitment to Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq, and were committed to Operation Restore Hope in Somalia for almost 2 years. Numerous units provide forces during these operations and are rotated to ensure a ready presence. During Operation Restore Hope, the Army rotated forces to and from Somalia approximately every 4 months. The Air Force tends to rotate its aircrew more frequently. In peace operations such as Provide Comfort, Provide Promise, Deny Flight,
and Southern Watch, it rotated forces every 3 months. In addition to the forces deployed, additional forces are preparing to deploy or have recently redeployed.

**Force Drawdown Has Increased Challenge of Responding to Peace Operations**

The continuing force drawdown has compounded challenges for the U.S. military in responding to extended peace operations. All four services have experienced reductions in personnel and equipment that have forced military planners to reevaluate how the services will respond to peace operations and major regional conflicts (MRC). For example, with the reduction in the number of overseas bases and forward-deployed forces in Europe, the Army and the Air Force have returned part of their Cold War-era European force structure to the United States and decommissioned some units. The forces that remained in the force structure, which once could have responded to peace operations from forward locations, now may have to be augmented by forces from the United States.

**Objectives, Scope, and Methodology**

The former Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Armed Services, asked us to review the suitability of the current U.S. force structure for peace operations. They wanted to know whether the U.S. military had the capabilities necessary to operate effectively in a peace operations environment, while maintaining the capability to respond to two nearly simultaneous MRCs. We did not assess whether the United States should participate in peace operations. We examined (1) the impact that peace operations have on U.S. military forces, (2) force structure limitations that may affect the military’s ability to respond to other national security requirements while engaged in peace operations, and (3) options for increasing force flexibility and response capability.

To determine the impact of peace operations on U.S. military forces, we held discussions with personnel who participated in recent peace operations. We also reviewed after-action reports and situation reports and conferred with service, unified command, and Office of the Secretary of Defense officials to identify the units involved, their level of participation, the types of capabilities provided, and the problems encountered in providing these capabilities. In addition, we reviewed the before- and after-deployment personnel and equipment readiness reports of some participating units and interviewed (1) officials responsible for
the readiness of these forces and (2) some of the forces that participated in these operations.

To determine the effect on the Army of participating in peace operations, we reviewed the experiences of combat and support forces who participated in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia and in a number of other smaller operations such as the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai. However, we focused our efforts primarily on Operation Restore Hope, the largest Army peace operation deployment to date. We also reviewed the plans for employment of Army forces in Bosnia should a peace plan be implemented. The operations in Rwanda and Haiti took place after we completed the bulk of our work, so we were not able to fully address them.

As a means of determining the effects of peace operations on the Air Force, we selected four of the specialized U.S.-based platforms identified by the Air Force as most affected by participation in peace operations, reviewed data concerning their participation, and interviewed aircrew and maintenance personnel involved in the missions. Similarly, we analyzed data and met with military personnel concerning heavily tasked Air Force units based in Europe. We concentrated our efforts on peace operations involving relatively large numbers of Air Force units, such as Operations Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq, Southern Watch in Southern Iraq, and Provide Promise and Deny Flight in Bosnia.

For the Navy, we compared pre-Desert Storm Sixth Fleet aircraft carrier deployments in the Mediterranean area with current Sixth Fleet deployments where the U.S. Navy is supporting Operations Deny Flight and Sharp Guard. We also briefly reviewed Navy participation in Haiti and Cuban operations in the Caribbean. We focused on the Marine Corps’ participation in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia since it was the largest Marine Corps participation to date in a peace operation.

To determine whether there are force structure limitations that may affect the military’s ability to respond to other national security requirements while engaged in peace operations, we held discussions with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and unified command and service officials, including officials associated with MRC planning. Using the national security requirements in the bottom-up review as our criteria, we obtained data describing the capabilities necessary to respond to a MRC within the initial days of conflict. We then compared this with the capabilities that had recently been used in peace operations and the total number of the
same capabilities available in the active force. We also discussed the actions that would be necessary to disengage from a peace operation in order to deploy to a MRC with officials from each of the military services.

To identify options for increasing force flexibility and response capability for peace operations, we reviewed pertinent documents and interviewed senior service, unified command, and other Department of Defense (DOD) officials to obtain information concerning proposed initiatives and options.

During the course of this review, we did not examine the adequacy of the funding for DOD’s participation in peace operations or the impact of participation on DOD’s planned spending. We are examining these issues as part of a separate request of the Subcommittee on Military Readiness, House Committee on National Security, and will report the results separately.

Our review was conducted primarily at Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine locations, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and component and unified command headquarters within the United States and Europe. We contacted by telephone any relevant organizations we did not visit, such as the 7th Transportation Group at Fort Eustis, Virginia; the Military Police Center and School at Fort McClellan, Alabama; the 57th Wing at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada; the 27th Operations Group at Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico; the 552nd Operations Group at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma; and the 7th Air Command and Control Squadron at Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi.

Our review was performed from August 1993 to July 1994 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We obtained DOD comments on a draft of this report.
Recent Peace Operations Have Stressed Key Military Capabilities

Peace operations have affected each of the military services differently. These operations heavily stress some U.S. military capabilities, including certain Army support forces such as quartermaster and transportation units and specialized Air Force aircraft, while having less impact on other forces, such as Army armored combat divisions and general purpose Air Force combat aircraft outside Europe.

In the Army, a large percentage of certain support capabilities in the active component have been used for peace operations. Most of these support capabilities are in the reserves and, for the most part, the reserves have not been activated for use in peace operations. The adverse impact on these support forces has been further exacerbated because the Army frequently borrows people from one unit to supplement another that lacks sufficient personnel to deploy and assigns some personnel to the same operation more than once, or to consecutive operations, because of the high demand for their capability.

In the Air Force, peace operations have placed considerable stress on the relatively limited number of forces providing specialized capabilities and on forward-deployed units in the European theater. The increased flying hours necessary to support these operations have resulted in extended temporary duty in excess of established goals, increased aircraft maintenance, cannibalization of home station aircraft, and missed training.

Peace operations have not been as disruptive to the Navy and the Marine Corps. However, forward-deployed naval forces have experienced increased operating tempo and, in some cases, reduced time to prepare for deployments, both of which have limited the forces’ availability for training. Naval officials point out, however, that in many cases, peace operations have exposed the naval services to unique experiences in joint and coalition operations.

Certain Army Support Forces in the Active Component Bear Heavy Burden

Certain kinds of Army combat support and combat service support capabilities, including quartermaster and transportation companies, are critical in peace operations. The need to establish and provide continued infrastructure support for U.S. military forces, coalition forces, and the local population is the key reason support forces are needed in peace operations. The type and amount of support differs with each operation, depending on the mission and the nature of the operating environment. Peace operations often occur in austere locations where there is limited electric power, roads, water, port facilities, and air fields. As such, support
forces have played an important role in establishing and sustaining a working infrastructure, not only for U.S. forces but also for coalition forces and the local population. In Somalia, for example, the Army encountered an environment completely devoid of any useful infrastructure and had to refurbish or build even the most basic of facilities. If nation building is part of the military mission, support forces are additionally burdened with tasks such as building schools, hospitals, and local housing and establishing police and other civil administration services.

Operational and environmental challenges further tax support forces. In Somalia, for example, the area of responsibility for U.S. and coalition forces consisted of approximately 21,000 square miles in the southern half of the country, with U.S. military and coalition forces dispersed over considerable distances throughout the country. As shown in figure 2.1, Mogadishu is more than 200 miles from Kismayo (a key Army location) and about 200 miles from the Marine base in Bardera, which in turn is about 200 miles from Kismayo. Support forces had to frequently move between these locations to deliver food, water, fuel, and other supplies. To the extent possible, decentralized support operations were established at various locations throughout the country to reduce the time spent moving between locations. In some cases, however, this posed even greater stress on support forces because they had to divide already limited support assets. For example, the 10th Mountain Division’s 710th Main Support Battalion divided some of its water teams so that they could provide water purification capabilities at additional locations.
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Figure 2.1: Area of Responsibility for U.S. and Coalition Forces in Somalia

Combat forces also have played a significant role in peace operations. However, because more of these forces are in the active component, a larger number of them have been available for peace operations. Armored combat divisions have had limited involvement.
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The Army’s capacity for providing unique support capabilities exceeds that of any other military service or nation. Yet, most of these support capabilities are in the reserves and, except for volunteers, the Army has been authorized to draw on reserves for peace operations only once—in September 1994 for the operation in Haiti. Without a presidential decision to call up reserve forces, the Army has had to draw upon the smaller number of active forces and reserve volunteers to meet support requirements. In some cases, nearly all the active units for a particular support capability deployed to a peace operation. For example, 75 percent of the petroleum supply companies in the active force structure deployed to Somalia. Similarly, 67 percent of the medium petroleum truck companies and 100 percent of the air terminal movement control teams deployed to Somalia. Table 2.1 provides a list of selected Army capabilities within quartermaster, transportation, engineering, and miscellaneous support units that experienced heavy deployments to Somalia.
Table 2.1: Selected Army Support Units That Experienced Heavy Deployments to Somalia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of unit</th>
<th>Number of active units</th>
<th>Number deployed to Somalia</th>
<th>Percentage of active units deployed to Somalia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General supply companya</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5b</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air terminal movement control</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>detachmentc</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum supply company</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium truck company (petroleum)d</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo transfer company</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light-medium truck company</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire-fighting truck detachment</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water purification ROWPUe</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>detachment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perishable Subsistence Teamf</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aA company generally ranges from about 90 to about 200 personnel.

The additional unit comprised volunteer reserves.

cDetachments are not limited to a certain number; according to Army officials, they range from 2 to 60 personnel.

dWhile there are other medium truck companies for transporting petroleum, these units have particular tactical capabilities.

eROWPU—Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit. This particular detachment is capable of producing drinkable water from any water source, as opposed to a similar detachment that can only produce drinkable water from fresh water sources.

fThis team deployed about 65 people.

Source: Army Command and Control Agency, Department of the Army.

Army’s Cross-Leveling and Multiple Rotation Practices Tax the Already Overextended Support Forces

To prioritize scarce resources, many of the Army’s active support units are assigned fewer people in peacetime than are required to perform their wartime missions. If the Army’s early-deploying support units were needed for war, the Army would supplement the units with people and equipment from other active and reserve units. After the Army restructured its forces in the mid-1980s, we reported that its goal was to authorize combat units, which are the chief means of deterrence, to be staffed at 100 percent of their wartime requirements and support units to be staffed at an average of 90 percent of their wartime requirements.1 In discussions with XVIIth Airborne Corps officials, the most ready and resourced of all the Army

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corps, we were advised that units deploying to Somalia needed 100 percent or more of their authorized people and equipment in order to meet operational requirements. Most units did not have the people, and many did not have the equipment to satisfy this requirement. For example, almost half of the XVIIIth Airborne Corps' First Corps Support Command units were authorized 90 percent or less of their authorized people, and several support units were authorized 80 percent or less of their authorized people. Other corps support commands, such as the Third Corps', which provided initial corps support for operations in Somalia, are resourced at an even lower level than the XVIIIth Airborne Corps.

The Army supplemented the personnel-deficient units deploying to Somalia by borrowing from other units throughout the Army force structure. This practice is known as “cross-leveling.” Cross-leveling has occurred at both the division and corps level. For instance, the 210th Forward Support Battalion, an element of the 10th Mountain Division, took people and equipment from the Division’s 46th Forward Support Battalion and the 710th Main Support Battalion before deploying to Somalia. The 710th Main Support Battalion also supported the 46th Forward Support Battalion’s deployment, thereby creating a domino effect within the 10th Mountain Division. According to the 710th commander, the battalion deployed with fewer than all its people and equipment. Thus, the remaining people were burdened to make do with less.

People from some units rotated more than once to the same peace operation or deployed to consecutive peace operations and/or participated in domestic relief operations because of the high demand for their particular capability. For example, almost all of the people from the XVIIIth Airborne Corps’ 364th Direct Support Supply Company that deployed to Hurricane Andrew also deployed to Somalia within the next year. Other units within the XVIIIth Airborne Corps had similar experiences. According to Army officials, support personnel from other Army units rotated more than once to Somalia. The 10th Mountain Division, which responded to the Hurricane Andrew relief operation and to Operation Provide Hope in Somalia, also deployed to Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti in September 1994 to provide the predominant Army force in support of this peace operation. According to Army officials, approximately 40 percent of the participants in the Haiti operation also participated in the Somalia operation less than 1 year ago.
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Cross-leveling and frequent deployments in turn affect the ability of a unit’s non-deployed elements to meet their operational responsibilities. A combat support group headquarters has considerable responsibility, particularly as part of the XVIIIth Airborne Corps. When the approximately 150 of 180 military personnel from the XVIIIth Airborne Corps’s 507th Combat Support Group Headquarters deployed to Somalia for several months, they left approximately 30 headquarters personnel at Fort Bragg, along with the group’s three battalions, without any additional augmentation. The headquarters was still responsible for (1) supporting the group’s three battalions, (2) supporting the Multinational Force and Observers rotation, (3) conducting logistics operations missions on the installation, and (4) preparing quarterly training briefs to XVIIIth Airborne Corps. In addition, several of the remaining personnel had to participate in two emergency deployment and redeployment exercises and conduct testing and a major briefing for the Army Chief of Staff. In order to cope with the absence of so many headquarter personnel, many operational requirements were decentralized to the battalion level. In some cases, remaining headquarter personnel (1) took on responsibilities typically assigned to more senior personnel, and (2) doubled and tripled workloads throughout the deployment period.

Reserve Forces Contain Key Support Capabilities, but They Have Not Often Been Activated for Peace Operations

Until recently, the President has elected not to activate reserve personnel for use in peace operations. Therefore, only reserve volunteers have participated in most peace operations. This policy has posed particular difficulties because, as shown in table 2.2, many of the support capabilities most heavily relied upon in recent operations reside predominantly in the reserves.

Table 2.2: Percentage of Selected Support Forces in the Reserve Component (as of April 1994)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support capability</th>
<th>Percentage of units in reserve component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quartermaster</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological operations</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil affairs</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Army relied on many reserve volunteers in the Somalia operation. While Army volunteers have been helpful, the volunteers available are not always the ones with the specific capabilities, equipment, and training.
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required for the peace operation. Furthermore, individual volunteers do not meet the Army’s requirement for units, in which a group of individuals are trained and organized to perform a mission as a cohesive entity. For example, when Army planners needed a postal unit for operations in Somalia, they created a unit from available volunteers. This process proved to be time-consuming, taking 1 month to create a 49-person postal unit.

The recent initiative for using reserve volunteers for the peacekeeping operations in the Sinai has been time-consuming due to planning and procedural processes associated with activating approximately 420 reserve personnel. The reserve volunteers will be ready to deploy to the Sinai by January 1995 after completing 3 to 6 months of training. More senior personnel will train longer. While there has been no shortage of volunteers for the current deployment, Army officials are concerned that they will not be able to recruit enough volunteers to continue this on an annual basis. Therefore, the Army is considering the use of volunteers for every third rotation.

Future Operations Could Further Burden Support Capabilities in the Active Component

The Army’s experience in Somalia illustrates the challenges that could lie ahead if the United States chooses to deploy forces to Bosnia or to other peace operations throughout the world. The Army will likely send at least a division-size force to Bosnia if a peace plan is signed. This could have almost three times the impact on the Army as the Somalia operation, which generally required one-third the number of forces designated for Bosnia.

Military police units, in particular, have been kept extremely busy as a result of peace operations. In September 1994, 40 percent of the military police combat support companies stationed in the United States were deployed to Guantanamo Bay supporting the Cuban and Haitian refugee operation. Three other companies were deployed to Suriname, Honduras, and Panama, leaving just 13 companies to patrol nine installations in the United States. According to an Army official, this is a problem because many installations require more than one military police combat support company for patrol duties. Because the increase in military police deployments, mostly due to the refugee crisis, has exceeded the number available in the Army’s force structure, Army infantry units have been used to help meet military police deployment requirements. For example, upon completion of their rotation to Guantanamo Bay, military police companies will return home while rifle companies rotate to Cuba.
According to an Army official, while rifle companies will undergo 2 weeks of training to perform the military police function, the training will not provide them with the full breadth of skills that military police possess.

The Army will continue to face challenges in responding to sizable peace operations if reserve forces are not activated. The need for reserve activation depends on a variety of factors, such as the size of a peace operation and the number of such operations ongoing at one time. For example, Army officials stated that if the United States participates in enforcing a peace agreement in Bosnia, with an Army deployment of approximately 22,000 soldiers, access to the reserve component could be required for the second 6-month rotation because the large support requirement exceeds the number of active forces available in certain support capabilities. According to Army officials, reserve forces would also likely be required if a number of smaller size peace operations were ongoing at one time.

On September 15, 1994, the President authorized the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation to call to active duty about 1,900 Selected Reserve military personnel in the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard to support operational missions in Haiti. The call-up included reservists in specialties such as tactical airlift, aerial port operations, military police, medical support, and civil affairs. These specialties are those that maintain most of their capabilities in the reserve component. In regard to this activation, the Secretary of Defense stated that DOD “... cannot conduct operations involving significant numbers of personnel and amounts of equipment being moved without using the Reserves.”

Peace Operations Stress Certain Air Force Units

Since Operation Desert Storm, the Air Force has responded to numerous, and often simultaneous, peace operations throughout the world on a sustained basis. While these operations have provided valuable experience in joint and coalition operations, they also have taxed the Air Force’s specialized capabilities and the units that are forward deployed in the European theater, where most recent operations involving the Air Force have occurred. The Air Force’s participation in these operations has resulted in extended tours of duty, missed training, increased maintenance on aircraft, and cannibalization of aircraft. There are some reports that the stresses on personnel are affecting morale and families. The Air Force has

Civilian contractors could provide support in specific capabilities, such as petroleum and medium truck companies. Their introduction, however, requires a stabilized operating environment, and this may not be the case in Bosnia. Furthermore, using civilian contractors to provide this support is costly.
used reserve force volunteers to relieve part of the operational burden on these forces.

### Increasing Number of Peace Operations Stress Specialized Forces in the Active Component

The Air Force’s specialized support aircraft provide reconnaissance, surveillance, command and control, and other capabilities that are often not available from other services or nations. This report focuses on four of these specialized aircraft, all of which (except two E-3B/C aircraft) are based in the United States—the EC-130E Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC), for command, control, and communications, and on-scene tactical battle management; the EF-111 Raven, for suppression of enemy air defenses; the E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), for surveillance and command and control; and the F-4G Wild Weasel, for suppression and/or destruction of enemy radars.

The Air Force has relatively few of these specialty aircraft in the active component, and they are being used in an increasing number of peace operations, most of which require a sustained presence. For example, as shown in table 2.3, in June 1994 more than 40 percent of available E-3 AWACS, EC-130E ABCCC, and active component F-4G aircraft were being used in peace operations.

#### Table 2.3: Percentage of Selected Specialized Aircraft Used in Peace Operations (June 1994)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Number available</th>
<th>Number deployed to peace operations</th>
<th>Percent deployed to peace operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EC-130E (ABCCC)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EF-111</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-3 (AWACS)</td>
<td>17b</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-4G</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This column indicates the average number of aircraft available for mission-ready training or deployment to a contingency in June 1994. Excluded are test aircraft and aircraft undergoing depot, phase, or intermediate phase maintenance.

*Four additional aircraft were not available for peace operations during this period because they were assigned to the initial qualification training squadron.

The EC-130E ABCCC, EF-111, and E-3 AWACS are found only in the active component. Only the F-4G aircraft are in both the active and reserve components.
### Increase in Flying Hours Has Stressed Aircraft and Home Stations

Participation in multiple peace operations by a limited number of specialized U.S.-based assets has resulted in increased flying hours for those aircraft involved. This has led to additional wear on the aircraft and more frequent intermediate and phase maintenance. For example, aircraft in the only F-4G squadron in the active component, the 561st fighter squadron, are undergoing major phase maintenance every 4 to 6 months versus every 7 to 8 months 1 year ago. Similarly, EF-111 maintenance officials noted that maintenance teams now must work longer to achieve desired results over a shorter time span than normally required.

In order to support increased peace operation flying hour requirements and maintain the operational effectiveness of forward-deployed forces, the home station has had to share key operational and support personnel with the deployed portion of the squadron. At times, the home station has gone without certain equipment and supplies to ensure that deployed forces can operate effectively. For example, the 7th Air Command and Control Squadron, the only EC-130E ABCCC squadron in the force structure, had to cannibalize home station aircraft and use their parts to support the squadron's forward-deployed aircraft when parts were not available from other sources.

### Aircraft Personnel Are Exceeding Recommended Time on Duty

Due to the extended nature of these operations, participating forces periodically rotate their aircrews, maintenance personnel, and aircraft in order to maintain a continuous ready presence in theater and reduce stress on aircraft and personnel. The Air Combat Command has established 120 days as the recommended maximum number of temporary duty days that Air Combat Command personnel should accrue in a year. However, because of the increasing number of peace operations, personnel associated with specialty aircraft have spent an increased number of days on temporary duty, away from their home bases. In 1994, personnel for the EF-111 and the F-4G approached the Air Combat Command’s recommended maximum number of temporary duty days in a year—120. According to one of their senior commanders, the F-4G’s deployment schedule for 1994 indicates that many individuals will be on temporary duty for about 180 days. According to squadron officials, the increased number of temporary duty days has affected the morale of Air Force personnel participating in peace operations and their families. Some Air Force personnel believe that this increase in temporary duty days is contributing to increased instances of divorce and decisions to leave the Air Force, although no direct link has yet been formally documented.
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Aircraft Personnel Miss Training Necessary to Prepare for High-Threat Combat Environment

Aircrews flying extended hours in peace operations sometimes do not get the opportunity to train to the broad range of skills necessary for maintaining combat efficiency. For example, while deployed in support of Operation Provide Comfort, F-4G aircrews conducted lethal suppression of enemy defenses but were unable to remain proficient in formation take-off and landing events, night intercept operations, and advanced aircraft handling characteristics. In addition, according to squadron officials, aircrews maintained weapons qualifications at minimum proficiency while participating in peace operations. Without this training, aircrews do not meet the technical requirements needed to qualify for participation in a high-threat, combat environment.

On a selected basis, wing commanders can waive certain training requirements for aircrew participating in operations that prevent them from completing all required training. According to senior Air Force officials, the number of waivers granted recently has far exceeded those granted prior to Air Force involvement in these sustained operations. During the January through June 1994 training cycle, 30 of the 71 aircrew personnel of the only F-4G squadron in the active component required a waiver for at least one Graduated Combat Capability event. Similarly, 29 of the 61 aircrew in the only EF-111 squadron required one or more waivers for events to which they could not train. Squadron officials attribute most, if not all, of these waivers to extensive participation in peace operations. The Operations Group Commander, to whom the EF-111 squadron reports, considers the events waived to be critical mission areas. According to the commander, if a large number of aircrew personnel are not flying the required number of sorties required by the Air Combat Command, overall squadron and wing combat capability will suffer.

While there were no waivers received by E-3 AWACS aircrews for the training cycle ending June 30, 1994, squadron officials said that they still have training concerns. The AWACS Operations Group Commander noted that the quality of the training conducted from home station and/or at exercises is significantly greater than that logged on deployed sorties. However, in general, approximately 50 percent of the aircrews’ training requirements were accomplished on deployed sorties. While the training was completed, the commander believes that the aircrews did not receive the quality training they needed. As a means of ensuring quality training in

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4General Graduated Combat Capability events are training events necessary to prepare mission-ready pilots for combat and all possible missions in their respective aircraft. This training is broken into three increments known as Graduated Combat Capability levels A, B, and C. The levels are defined by the number of sorties, specific weapons qualifications, and other sorties and events as determined by the major command.
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the future, an Air Combat Command task force is reviewing Graduated Combat Capability training regulations. In addition, according to Air Force officials, the number of deployed E-3 AWACS aircraft will be reduced so that there will be more available at the home station for training. The reduction will be felt in the drug interdiction program.

European-Based Air Force Assets Carry Heavy Burden in Supporting Peace Operations

Since 1991, the end of Operation Desert Storm, three peace operations requiring substantial and sustained Air Force participation have occurred in the European theater of operations—Operations Provide Comfort, Provide Promise, and Deny Flight. These operations, combined with reductions in the U.S. Air Forces in Europe's (USAFE) force structure—from 8.8 to 2.3 fighter wing equivalents—and corresponding squadron relocations, have resulted in many of the same conditions experienced by specialized U.S.-based assets participating in these operations, such as increased flying hours, high temporary duty rates, and missed training opportunities.

In addition, because recent peace operations have occurred in parts of the European theater where the Air Force has not maintained a permanent presence, a significant number of USAFE personnel have been required to build and maintain infrastructure from which to base forces. Weapons training deployment facilities in Aviano, Italy, and Incirlik, Turkey, had to be expanded greatly in order to accommodate the large numbers of military personnel supporting Operation Deny Flight and Operation Provide Comfort. The Air Force constructed tent cities in these two locations to provide additional housing and other services for deployed personnel.

With the reduction of forward-deployed squadrons in the European theater, considerable portions of some USAFE capabilities have been dedicated to peace operations. For example, USAFE has two F-15E squadrons designed for delivering precision-guided munitions at night in a high-threat environment. For more than a year, about 14 aircraft from both squadrons, which have a combined total of about 48 aircraft, have been participating in Operations Provide Comfort and Deny Flight. The F-15E's night navigational and targeting system and high resolution radar have been valuable in identifying ground targets during these operations. Similarly, USAFE has one A-10 squadron, which provides close air support and forward air control. Twelve of its 21 aircraft have been participating in Operation Deny Flight for more than a year. According to Air Force

\[ A \text{ fighter wing equivalent generally comprises 72 combat aircraft.}\]
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Recent peace operations in the European theater have also placed a heavy demand on USAFE’s C-130 Hercules, which provides intra-theater airlift capabilities. The Air Force has only one active C-130 squadron in the European force structure, and almost the entire squadron—17 of 19 aircraft—has been participating in peace operations in the European theater. Operation Provide Promise’s missions into Bosnia have required the heaviest use of C-130 assets. The squadron’s capabilities were supplemented by reserve aircraft from the United States; nevertheless, the squadron had to curtail training in certain skill areas in order to fly scheduled airlift missions between bases to deliver supplies and participate in Operation Provide Promise.

USAFE, which had primary responsibility for responding to these operations since they have occurred within its area of responsibility, met operational requirements with its own forces as much as possible. This is traditional Air Force practice. Where USAFE did not have the necessary assets (such as the E-3 AWACS) or had shortfalls (such as in C-130s), it sought augmentation from outside Europe. To the extent other USAFE assets could have been augmented with active-duty units from the United States, such as in the case of the F-15E aircraft, some of the adverse impact of participation in these peace operations might have been mitigated. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD noted that the Air Force has recognized these challenges and is addressing them by relying more on active, reserve, and Guard units based in the continental United States, which have deployed to Operations Provide Comfort and Deny Flight to relieve some of the operational burden.

Split Operations Create Logistics and Personnel Challenges for Squadrons Supporting Peace Operations

Deploying to peace operations from bases in Europe or the United States has created planning and logistics challenges for the Air Force because essential unit equipment and personnel have to be shared by the forces at the home base and in the deployed location. These split operations have had a significant impact on home bases, which sometimes have had to make due with a reduced number of maintenance and operational personnel and essential unit equipment to ensure that the deployed forces maintain a high state of readiness. Even if a squadron deploys less than half of its aircraft, the effect on the home base is still significant because key operations and maintenance personnel and equipment must deploy to...
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support the aircraft. According to Air Force officials, split operations challenges exist because Air Force squadrons are still structured to fight in place or deploy as a whole unit rather than in smaller packages as they are doing for peace operations. According to squadron personnel, split operations impede squadron-wide communication processes and long-term squadron planning, and tax senior squadron leaders who often have to perform the jobs of their absent colleagues in addition to their own. According to one squadron commander, it is difficult to plan the future vision for the squadron because the squadron’s senior leaders are geographically separated.

Split operations create other personnel challenges as well. Operations and maintenance personnel rotate between the home station and the peace operation. For example, according to USAFE officials, aircrews from USAFE’s A-10 squadron deploy to Operation Deny Flight for an average of 6 to 9 weeks and remain at the home station for varying periods of 2, 5, or 7 weeks. Maintenance personnel remain deployed for 90 days. While at home station, personnel must train and attend to squadron administrative responsibilities. According to the squadron commander, this allows personnel minimal time for leave and attending to family responsibilities before rotating again to the peace operation.

Aircraft Squadrons Often Have to Forego Necessary Training Because of Peace Operation Demands

Many USAFE squadrons participating in peace operations on a sustained basis have found it difficult to attend major training exercises at the same time they are participating in a peace operation. According to squadron and wing officials we talked with, the squadrons do not have enough people or equipment to support the peace operation, home station requirements, and the training exercise concurrently. Because of their participation in peace operations, both of USAFE’s F-15E squadrons have had to reduce their level of involvement or cancel their participation altogether in training exercises. For example, the squadrons were not able to participate in major tactical air combat exercises, such as Maple Flag, a Canadian exercise similar to Red Flag, which would have provided them with realistic combat training. This type of training is particularly important for these F-15E squadrons since they were established in 1993 and have not had the opportunity to participate in a major tactical air combat exercise.

While USAFE squadrons have not deployed all their forces to peace operations, the forces remaining at the home station often find it difficult to maintain enough aircraft to conduct home station training. For example, beginning with its initial deployment in July 1993, USAFE’s only
A-10 squadron provided 12 of its 21 aircraft on hand to support Operation Deny Flight. Of the remaining nine, two were undergoing phase maintenance inspections at the home station; one was undergoing depot repair; and one was used for spare parts in support of forward-deployed aircraft. Thus, only five of the remaining aircraft were available for pilot training sorties at the home station. Because of the limited number of available aircraft, the remaining aircrews were only able to fly the minimum number of hours needed to maintain mission-ready status. On the occasions when an additional aircraft had to be dedicated to Operation Deny Flight, the squadron did not have enough aircraft available to meet training needs. According to squadron officials, this was also true for USAFE F-15E, F-15C, F-16, and C-130 aircrews.

The Commander of USAFE’s A-10 squadron identified four training events that could not be accomplished at Operation Deny Flight because of various restrictions in the operating theater. These events also were difficult to accomplish at home station because of environmental and other restrictions on low-level flight (below 500 feet), target marking, full scale-weapons delivery, and certain types of approaches. Had the squadron not been participating continuously in Operation Deny Flight, it would have had the opportunity to deploy elsewhere for this training.

As is the case with certain U.S.-based squadrons, aircrews from Europe-based squadrons participating in peace operations have also had to obtain waivers for training requirements they were not able to satisfy during the last training cycle. According to the squadron and wing officials we interviewed at home stations and deployed locations, pilot proficiency in a low-threat environment is at an all-time high due to the nature of the missions over Bosnia and Northern Iraq. However, proficiency in high-threat, low-altitude mission profiles has suffered and will continue to suffer as long as training opportunities and peace operation mission taskings remain at their present levels. As shown in table 2.4, for example, all of the aircrews in USAFE’s two F-15E squadrons obtained waivers for one or more training events they were not able to accomplish during the 6-month training cycle ending June 30, 1994. Aircrews received waivers in areas such as Night Weapons Delivery, Air Combat Maneuvers, Air Combat Tactics, and Basic Fighter Maneuvers.
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Table 2.4: Number of Training Waivers Granted to USAFE Personnel Participating in Peace Operations (as of June 1994)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USAFE platform</th>
<th>Number of 51-series regulation waivers granted</th>
<th>Percentage of air crew receiving waivers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F-15E</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-10</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-15C</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*aThese 51-series regulations are Multi-Command Regulations for major training and include training unique to each airframe. Events within these regulations are waived at the major command level, such as the Air Combat Command.

As mentioned earlier, USAFE’s only C-130 squadron had to curtail training in order to meet its peace operation and normal operational requirements. However, after March 1994, its operational requirements for Operation Provide Promise declined significantly. As a result, C-130 aircrew did not require training waivers for the training cycle ending June 30, 1994. At the height of Operation Provide Promise, squadron aircrew required training waivers for two consecutive periods ending June 30 and December 31, 1993. For these training cycles, 42 and 52 percent of squadron cockpit crew required 102 and 127 training waivers, respectively. Squadron aircrew received training waivers in critical areas such as night vision profiles and assault approaches.

In September 1994, the newly appointed USAFE Commander acknowledged that USAFE units were having difficulty accomplishing their training tasks because they are supporting peace operations. He noted that operations such as Deny Flight and Provide Comfort are competing for combat training time and causing combat skills to atrophy. According to the Commander, fighter pilots need to practice intercepts, bomb dropping, and air-to-air combat, yet they do not typically get this experience during the course of a peace operation. He stressed that USAFE can no longer continue to accept degraded levels of training. As noted earlier in this chapter, the Air Force is now relying more on active, reserve, and Guard units based in the continental United States to relieve some of the operational burden.

Reserves Provide Operational Relief to Certain Forces in the Active Component

Air Force reserve volunteer participation in peace operations has more than doubled since fiscal year 1991. Reserve forces have participated in such major operations as Restore Hope, Provide Comfort, Provide Hope, and Southern Watch, as well as other smaller international peace...
Recent Peace Operations Have Stressed Key Military Capabilities

operations and domestic disaster relief operations. In some cases, reserves have been needed to meet mission requirements that active forces were unable to fulfill. For example, since there is only one F-4G squadron in the active component and it is participating in Operation Provide Comfort and Southern Watch, reserve F-4Gs have had to provide augmentation to Operation Southern Watch. In particular, the 190th Air National Guard Fighter Squadron deployed to Southwest Asia in support of Operation Southern Watch in December 1993, within a year of returning from another Southern Watch deployment. According to squadron officials, the 190th Fighter Squadron was deployed 12 out of 18 months during this time period.

In other cases, reserve volunteers have provided operational relief to active forces. For example, from November 15, 1993, to January 15, 1994, and again during the summer of 1994, reserve A-10 personnel and aircraft from the United States relieved USAFE’s A-10 squadron so that its personnel could attend scheduled training at Nellis Air Force Base. Operational relief for other USAFE aircraft was provided by F-16, KC-135, C-141, and C-5 reserve aircraft from the United States. In addition to providing this operational relief, reserve forces still have had to meet most of their individual and unit training; attend exercises; and satisfy other operational responsibilities for local, state, and federal agencies, such as providing assistance in weather reconnaissance, disaster relief, aeromedical evacuations, and counternarcotics.

The majority of C-130s are in the reserves. Given Operation Provide Promise’s extensive C-130 requirements and USAFE’s relatively small number of C-130s, reserve aircraft and personnel were looked to for meeting mission requirements. Initially, reserve aircraft and personnel augmented USAFE’s only C-130 squadron. However, in January 1994, because an increasing number of U.S.-based aircraft and personnel were needed, the Air Force formed another squadron, known as the Delta squadron. This squadron consisted of reserve and active C-130 aircraft and personnel that operated out of Germany. Aircrew and maintenance personnel rotated every 2 to 3 weeks. The reserve deployments allowed the active component C-130 squadron in Europe to reduce its flying hours and subsequently increase its mission capable rates. As of May 1994, volunteer Air Force reservists flew approximately 62 percent of the airlift sorties in support of Operation Provide Promise. However, while reservists generally are willing to participate in these operations, Air Force Reserve and National Guard officials noted that this level of reserve participation in peace operations is affecting the willingness of reserves to
volunteer for exercises. As of May 1994, however, the need for reservists to support Provide Promise dropped as operational demands diminished.

**Naval Forces Have Not Been as Taxed by Peace Operations as Other Services, but Operational Stress Is Increasing**

Certain Navy and Marine Corps units have experienced increased operating tempo and reduced time to prepare for deployments due to their participation in peace operations. The ability to obtain necessary training while participating in these operations is also becoming an increasing concern. However, peace operations have provided the naval services with unique experiences in joint and coalition operations that in many cases may be more valuable than training exercises.

**Naval Services Experience High Operating Tempo in Providing Forces for Peace Operations**

The Navy and Marine Corps in peacetime are inherently crisis- and contingency-oriented forces and have conducted peace operations in littoral areas since their creation. Navy and Marine Corps force structure is designed so that the naval services can maintain a forward presence and rapidly respond to crises, as well as the war-fighting requirements of MRCs. The peacetime role of forward-deployed carrier battle groups and amphibious task forces covers the spectrum of military involvement—from single-ship port visits, maritime interdiction and blockades, humanitarian relief missions, and emergency evacuation of U.S. nationals, to major amphibious operations.

According to naval officials, in attempting to meet both the requirements of peace operations and normal peacetime presence commitments, naval forces have exceeded established operating tempo standards for forward-deployed forces in the Central Command, European Command, and Pacific Command areas of operation. The officials indicated that this was due in part to participation in peace operations involving Bosnia, Iraq, and Somalia and in part to the reduction in force structure and forward-deployed forces available to respond to the same or greater number of operational commitments. While the Navy and Marine Corps have tried not to extend deployments beyond 6 months, the operating tempo has increased during deployments. This is reflected, for example, by an increased number of steaming days incurred by Navy aircraft carriers operating in the Mediterranean and adjoining seas in 1993 versus 1989 (the year before Operation Desert Shield).
Chapter 2
Recent Peace Operations Have Stressed Key Military Capabilities

Participation in Peace Operations Affects Training of Naval Forces

Sustained commitments to particular peace operations, such as Operations Sharp Guard and Deny Flight in Europe and Operation Southern Watch in Southwest Asia, require a sustained presence of surface ships and an aircraft carrier in the Adriatic Sea and Arabian Gulf. This often reduces U.S. naval participation in certain exercises and training. For example, in written responses to our questions the Navy stated that several exercises have been canceled in the European and Central Commands’ areas of operation, severely limiting training in anti-submarine warfare, amphibious operations, and command and control. These capabilities would be needed in a major regional conflict. Table 2.5 compares Sixth Fleet aircraft carrier deployments in 1989 and 1993 and shows a decrease in the number of days devoted to training exercises and an increase in the number of days devoted to all other operations.6

Table 2.5: Comparison of Calendar Year 1989 and 1993 Sixth Fleet Aircraft Carrier Operations and Exercise Days

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Days in theater</th>
<th>Days in port</th>
<th>Days for operations</th>
<th>Days for exercises</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6Days steaming comprises days in operations and days in exercises.

Postponed or canceled training has not always had a negative effect on naval forces, however. Naval officials stress that peace operations provide unique opportunities for realistic joint and coalition experience and in many cases may be better than exercises. For example, naval forces may receive better training by participating in a multilateral peace operation involving maritime and air interdiction, such as Operations Sharp Guard and Deny Flight in Europe, than by participating in a scheduled exercise with one or two other nations. Similarly, Marine support forces in Somalia obtained valuable experience building infrastructure and providing other logistical support to U.S. and coalition forces.

If naval forces are pulled out of training required before a major deployment, they have to compress their training period and then work longer hours to catch up when they return to port. Some of the ships that have participated in the Haiti operation were taken out of single-ship basic training, such as damage control drills. The Navy considers interrupting this training less damaging to overall mission effectiveness than taking ships out of intermediate or advanced training that requires operating with...
Recent Peace Operations Have Stressed Key Military Capabilities

more than one unit. Much of the basic training can be done at sea, even while a ship is participating in an operation. As more ships were dedicated to support Cuban migrant interdiction, however, training opportunities decreased because more of a ship's crew was involved in migrant sighting, recovery, screening, care, and feeding. When the ships return to port, therefore, they have to perform in-port maintenance, training, and many administrative and operational inspections simultaneously to remain on schedule for their next major 6-month deployment. This has resulted in crewmen working longer hours and has left less time for them to spend with their families prior to a major deployment.

Naval officials also told us that peace operations are resulting in reduced intermediate training, such as that at instrumented ranges for missile and gun shoots. U.S. European Command officials noted that naval aviators participating in these operations are experiencing many of the same challenges as the Air Force in terms of training and operational tempo.

Participation in sustained peace operations and a reduction in forward-deployed forces has also contributed to reduced U.S. naval presence in certain geographic areas where U.S. forces had been able to visit on past deployments. Among the results has been a reduced level of participation in bilateral exercises and training with countries that may not be participating in peace operations and fewer port visits and military-to-military exchanges. Quantifying the effects of this reduction in presence is difficult since the political and diplomatic factors at issue are somewhat intangible. Naval officials have noted, however, that some nations dedicate considerable resources preparing for the opportunity to participate in an exercise with the U.S. Navy. When exercises are canceled, countries do not get the experience operating with technologically superior U.S. systems and therefore may not be capable of doing so in the future should the need arise.

Table 2.5 also shows the decrease in the number of days aircraft carriers spent in port during Sixth Fleet Mediterranean deployments in 1989 and 1993. The reduced number of days in port has affected the Navy's ability to conduct intermediate maintenance on its ships and equipment. According to U.S. Navy officials in Europe, there has been a 20-percent reduction in the Navy's ability to conduct intermediate maintenance in this theater, which requires time in port. They are concerned that continued delays in conducting intermediate maintenance may degrade equipment readiness and service life, particularly since peace operations tend to expose
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equipment to more wear and tear than would be expected during normal peacetime operations.

According to the Navy, its participation in peace operations has not, thus far, had a harmful impact on its ability to perform other more traditional missions. Thus, naval units have been able to meet a variety of demands by moving within or across command boundaries—such as between the European and Central Commands—in response to emerging crises. The Navy has generally been able to maintain its policy mandating that deployments not exceed 6 months and that the period between deployments be twice as long as the last deployment. The Navy had to break this policy in some cases, however, so that ships could be made available to support Somalia operations. While in 1993 there were 5 of these cases, through September 1994 the Navy had 15 cases in which it had to break this policy. According to the Navy, the 1994 cases were due chiefly to operational requirements regarding Somalia, Haiti, Cuba, and counter-drug missions. The Marine Corps faces similar challenges. For example, a Marine Expeditionary Unit that returned on June 23, 1994, from a 6-month deployment, including 3 months off the coast of Somalia, was sent back to sea in less than 3 weeks to support U.S. operations off the coast of Haiti.

According to service officials, the Navy and Marine Corps have not found it necessary to rely upon volunteer reserve forces in peace operations to the same degree as the Army and Air Force. Naval forces are structured for daily peacetime forward presence operations that require a complete range of combat forces and capabilities be readily available for immediate response. As a result, the majority of these forces and capabilities are in the active component. The function of the Navy and Marine Corps reserve is to augment the active component forces. Nevertheless, there are certain capabilities that reside exclusively, or nearly so, in the Naval Reserve and are essential to many peace operations. These capabilities include units and individuals involved in cargo handling, Navy air logistics, medical fleet hospitals, and mobil construction battalions. Recent Navy support to peace operations has included the Naval Reserve in search and rescue and maritime patrol support for Operations Deny Flight and Sharp Guard, as well as construction support for operations in Somalia. According to naval officials, reliance on these limited, yet important, combat support and combat service support capabilities may increase as the Navy’s commitment to future peace operations continues to expand.
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Short Duration of Marine Corps Participation in Somalia Operation Had Limited Impact

Marine Corps forces, chiefly from the First Marine Expeditionary Force, supported operations in Somalia from December 1992 through early May 1993. Later, other Marine forces provided offshore support. While Marine Corps forces have participated in a variety of peace operations, their participation in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia represented their largest peace operation commitment. Early in the operation, the Marine Corps provided the predominant number of forces, including initial entry and sustainment forces. At its peak in January 1993, there were over 11,000 U.S. Marine forces in Somalia. However, by February 1993, the U.S. Army gradually assumed the majority of the support responsibilities for U.S. and coalition forces, and the Marine Corps began to redeploy.

The deployment of Marine forces to Somalia resulted in certain support units’ devoting a significant percentage of their capability to the operation, leaving minimal support available at the home base for use in other operations. For example, approximately 95 percent of the 1st Marine Division’s Combat Engineer Battalion and half of the Division’s Headquarters Battalion deployed to Somalia. The absence of the Headquarters Battalion required a secondary planning staff, the 11th Marines, to handle division operations until the main battalion returned. While the 11th Marines, which functions normally as an artillery unit, could have handled a contingency similar in size and scope to the riots in Los Angeles or the Northridge Earthquake, it did not have the capacity to orchestrate a response to a MRC, according to Marine officials. Had another conflict occurred while these forces were in Somalia, the Marines would have to have looked to one of the other two Marine Expeditionary Forces to respond. However, since the Marine Corps’ major ground participation was limited to several months and other forces were available for crisis response elsewhere, the operation had a limited impact.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

DOD generally agrees that recent peace operations have stressed key military capabilities and states that it is already examining various means to reduce lengthy deployments in support of peace operations and operations other than war. DOD further states that high temporary duty rates and heavy use of specialized aircraft are force management issues that have been addressed by better use of worldwide assets, heavier involvement of the reserves, and the purchase of additional and replacement aircraft. We describe DOD efforts to address the stress peace operations have placed on key military capabilities at several points in the report and modified the report based on DOD’s comments and further discussion with DOD officials.
DOD disagrees with our characterization of the demand peace operations have placed on specialized Air Force aircraft. It believes that we have painted an inaccurate and misleading picture about the degree to which such Air Force capabilities are devoted to peace operations. Our report clearly states that the aircraft we cite (see table 2.3) were the average number of aircraft available for mission ready training or deployment to a contingency in June 1994 and that the number excluded test aircraft and/or aircraft undergoing depot, phase, or intermediate phase maintenance. We recognize that the Air Force has more aircraft in its inventory than those available at any one time. However, we believe that in evaluating how peace operations affect military capabilities the appropriate focus is the number of aircraft available for use at any one time.
Chapter 3

Participation in Peace Operations May Delay Services’ Response to Major Regional Conflicts

As a result of the bottom-up review, DOD concluded that military forces needed for peace operations will come from the same pool of forces identified for use in the event of one or more MRCs. Some of the Army and Air Force forces used in recent peace operations, including certain Army support units such as port and terminal services units and petroleum handling units that exist in small numbers in the active Army and specialized Air Force aircraft, such as the E-3 AWACS, are also needed in the early stages of a MRC. Disengaging these forces from a peace operation and redeploying them to the MRC quickly may be difficult. Also difficult would be obtaining sufficient airlift to redeploy the forces, retraining forces to restore their war-fighting skills, and reconstituting equipment. These difficulties are significant because in the event of a short-warning attack, forces are needed to deploy and enter battle as quickly as possible to halt the invasion and minimize U.S. casualties.

Bottom-Up Review Envisions Peace Operations as Secondary Mission

In 1993, the Secretary of Defense conducted the bottom-up review, a reassessment of U.S. defense requirements. This review, completed in October 1993, examined the nation’s defense strategy, force structure, modernization, infrastructure, foundations, and resources needed for the post-Cold War era. The Secretary’s report on the bottom-up review outlined the new dangers facing the U.S. interests, chief among them being regional aggression. To deal with regional aggression and other regional dangers, DOD’s strategy is to (1) defeat aggressors in MRCs; (2) maintain overseas presence to deter conflicts and provide regional stability; and (3) conduct smaller scale intervention operations, such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. To deal with the threat of regional aggression, DOD concluded that it is prudent for the United States to maintain sufficient military power to fight and win two MRCs that occur nearly simultaneously. According to the report on the bottom-up review, while deterring and defeating major regional aggression will be the most demanding requirement of the new defense strategy, U.S. military forces are more likely to be involved in operations short of declared or intense warfare. The forces responding to these other operations will be provided largely by the same collection of general purpose forces needed for MRCs and overseas presence.

DOD’s report on the bottom-up review states that if a MRC occurs, DOD will deploy a substantial portion of its forces stationed in the United States and draw on forces assigned to overseas presence missions. Unless needed for the conflict, other forces that are engaged in smaller scale operations like peacekeeping will remain so engaged. If a second conflict breaks out, the
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bottom-up review envisioned that DOD would need to deploy another block of forces, requiring a further reallocation of overseas presence forces, any forces still engaged in smaller scale operations, and most of the remaining U.S.-based forces. In determining force requirements for the two-conflict strategy, DOD assumed that forces already engaged in peace operations could rapidly redeploy to a regional conflict.

Congress Directs Review of Bottom-Up Review

In the Fiscal Year 1995 Defense Authorization Act, Congress expressed concern about the bottom-up review and the defense budget. Regarding peace operations, Congress found that U.S. forces are involved in a number of peace operations, there was a possibility of even larger future involvement, and many of the forces participating in peace operations would be required early on in the event of one or more MRCs. Consequently, Congress directed that DOD review the assumptions and conclusions of the President’s budget, the bottom-up review, and the Future Years Defense Program. The review is to consider the various other-than-war or nontraditional operations in which U.S. forces are or may be participating and directs among other things that the report describe in detail the force structure required to fight and win two MRCs nearly simultaneously in light of other ongoing or potential operations. Congress also stated that the President should be willing to increase defense spending if needed to meet new or existing threats.

Key Force Capabilities Relied on for Both Peace Operations and MRCs

We found that certain Army support forces as well as specialized Air Force aircraft and Marine Corps prepositioned equipment and stocks that would be needed early in a first MRC have been engaged in peace operations.

Army Support Forces Designated for Early Use in a MRC Are Used in Peace Operations

The Army identified 5-1/3 active combat divisions and associated support forces that are needed in the early stages of a MRC. An additional 3-1/3 active combat divisions and associated support forces—follow-on forces—would either be deployed later in a MRC or could provide part of the response for a second MRC.

The support units that accompany active combat forces are organized into seven packages. The first three packages, called Contingency Force Pool (CFP) 1-3, support the first 5-1/3 divisions. While the fourth package, CFP 4, does not support the first 5-1/3 divisions directly, it rounds out the theater.
support that would be required for these early deploying forces. The follow-on 3-1/3 divisions are supported principally by CFP 5-7.

Army planners try to avoid using forces designated for early deployment to a MRC for contingencies such as peace operations. Although planners have been able to minimize the use of these forces in peace operations, they have had to use a large portion of some of the Army’s CFP 1-3 support forces in large-scale and/or multiple peace operations because there is a limited number of such forces in the active component.

In the Somalia operation, 50 percent of the active support forces used were from CFP 1-3 units. Specifically, 92 percent of quartermaster forces, 69 percent of engineering support forces, 64 percent of miscellaneous support forces, and 65 percent of transportation forces deployed to Somalia were CFP 1-3 units. As shown in table 3.1, certain support capabilities within those areas had an even higher percentage of CFP 1-3 units.
### Table 3.1: Selected Active Support Units Within CFP 1-3 That Deployed to Somalia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of unit</th>
<th>Active CFP 1-3 units</th>
<th>Active CFP 1-3 units deployed to Somalia</th>
<th>Percentage of active CFP 1-3 capability deployed to Somalia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General supply company(^a)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air terminal movement control detachment(^b)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium truck company (petroleum)(^c)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo transfer company</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water purification ROWPU(^d) detachment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perishable subsistence team(^e)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum supply company</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light-medium truck company</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting truck detachment</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) A company generally ranges from about 90 to about 200 personnel.

\(^b\) A detachment is not limited to a certain number; according to Army officials, it ranges from 2 to 60 personnel.

\(^c\) While there are other medium truck companies for transporting petroleum, these units have particular tactical capabilities.

\(^d\) ROWPU—Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit. This particular detachment is capable of producing drinkable water from any water source, as opposed to a similar detachment that can only produce drinkable water from fresh water sources.

\(^e\) This team deployed about 65 people.

Source: Army Command and Control Agency, Department of the Army.

Similarly, should a peace plan be signed and U.S. military forces deploy to Bosnia to support the implementation of this plan, the Army likely would need to draw on support forces, including CFP units, to meet support requirements. For example, approximately 64 percent of the total number of forces planned to deploy are support forces, and approximately 14 percent of those forces will likely come from CFP 1-3 units.

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**Air Force Will Need Specialized Aircraft for MRCs That Are Also Used in Peace Operations**

The Air Force anticipates needing almost all its specialized and unique capability aircraft, such as the EF-111, F-4Gs, E-3 AWACS, EC-130 ABCCC, and F-15E in the early days of a MRC. The Air Force’s experience in Operation Desert Storm documents the early demand for these aircraft.
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Participation in Peace Operations May Delay Services’ Response to Major Regional Conflicts

For example, approximately 63 percent of the F-4G aircraft were deployed in support of Operation Desert Storm at the beginning of the hostilities. According to the bottom-up review, some of these aircraft are so important to a MRC’s success and are of such limited number in the active force structure that they are tasked to both MRCs, even in the case of nearly simultaneous MRCs. Recent peace operations have required varying numbers of the Air Force’s specialized and unique capability aircraft on a fairly continuous basis. For June 1994, we calculated that approximately 46 percent of these aircraft were involved in Operations Provide Comfort, Provide Promise, Deny Flight, and Southern Watch.

According to DOD officials, participation in the enforcement of no fly zones and other operations that require the forward deployment of U.S. forces can also enhance the ability of the U.S. military to respond quickly to regional contingencies. These officials said that this was the case in Operation Vigilant Warrior in October 1994, where having U.S. aircraft already operating from Saudi Arabia greatly facilitated the initial coalition response to Iraq’s threatened aggression against Kuwait.

Naval Services Use Forward-Deployed Forces for Peace Operations and MRCs

U.S. naval forces are structured to respond to regional contingencies with their forward-deployed carrier battle groups and amphibious-ready groups, which rotate on a regular basis between home ports and regional theaters. The Navy and the Marine Corps respond to many types of operations, from MRCs to peace operations, with the same forward-deployed forces. Generally, this has not been a problem because of the flexibility and rotational nature of naval forces. However, to respond to recent peace operations in the Caribbean Sea, the Navy has had to use its non-deployed forces, which were training and conducting maintenance in preparation for their upcoming scheduled 6-month deployments.

Army and Marine Corps Use Prepositioned Equipment and Stocks for Peace Operations

The Marine Corps and the Army have prepositioned equipment and stocks afloat for use in the event of a MRC. The Marine Corps has relied on prepositioned equipment and supplies stored on their Maritime Prepositioned Ships for a quick contingency response capability. Equipment and supplies that the Marines used in Somalia came from 4 of the 13 Maritime Prepositioned Ships that are organized into three squadrons positioned throughout the world. Each squadron is designed to provide enough ground combat and combat support equipment and supplies to sustain about 17,300 Marines for 30 days. The equipment and
supplies aboard these ships are also needed to support other conflicts in which U.S. Marine forces are involved. To the extent these ships have been off-loaded to support a peace operation, their equipment and supplies are unavailable to respond to a MRC.

Similarly, the Army has prepositioned equipment afloat to facilitate the rapid deployment of a heavy Army brigade. Ships from the Army’s Prepositioning Afloat Program, which contains 12 ships with combat and support equipment and supplies, were recently positioned for use in supporting the Rwanda humanitarian operation. Five of these ships, containing support equipment and supplies, were positioned off the coast of Africa to support this operation if necessary. The need to unload these ships’ equipment and supplies never arose. In early October 1994, all 12 of these ships were sent to Southwest Asia to support U.S. forces responding to Iraqi troop movements. Had the five ships positioned off the African Coast been unloaded to support the Rwanda operation, their supplies and equipment likely would not have been available for use in Southwest Asia.

Disengagement From Peace Operations and Redeployment to MRCs Would Be Difficult

U.S. military forces would encounter numerous challenges if they needed to redeploy on short notice from one or more sizable peace operations to a MRC. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements stated in June 1994 that the United States would “liquidate” its commitments to peace operations in the event of two simultaneous regional conflicts. Discussions with service officials and review of data concerning the types and number of forces committed to peace operations indicate that disengagement from one or more sizable peace operations and redeployment of forces to a MRC on short notice could be difficult.

Obtaining sufficient airlift would be one of the primary challenges encountered in redeploying forces from one or more peace operations to a MRC. In order to redeploy ground personnel and equipment from the peace operations, the already limited number of airlift assets flying from the United States to the MRC would have to divert to the peace operation, in some cases pick up personnel and equipment, and take them to the MRC. The Air Force has not yet fully studied the implication of such a redeployment and hence could not quantify the impact of this delay on the Air Force’s ability to meet MRC deployment requirements. Air Force officials did say that it would make a difficult situation even worse. According to Air Force officials, the Air Force’s tactical forces would also encounter an airlift problem in moving from a peace operation to a MRC. While aircraft and aircrews could easily fly from one operation to another,
the maintenance and logistics support needed to keep the aircraft flying—supplies, equipment, and personnel—would have to wait for available airlift.

Another challenge that would be encountered is that certain Army contingency support forces (such as port handlers, air and sea movement control personnel, and petroleum handlers) needed in the early days of a MRC, would still be needed within the peace operation theater to facilitate the disengagement and redeployment. As a result of our analysis comparing the support capabilities needed in the first 30 days of a MRC with the contingency support capabilities deployed to Somalia, we found that in some cases 100 percent of some of these active component support forces were used in the Somalia peace operation. Had a MRC arisen during this time, immediate access to reserve component forces would have been necessary. According to DOD officials, the Army has recognized this as a challenge and is currently examining this issue as part of the Total Army Analysis 2003, which it expects to complete in mid-1995.1

According to Navy officials, the response of Navy ships to a MRC would depend more on their overall distance to the crisis location than on the operations they were currently conducting. With some peace operations, however, Navy ships may not be directed to disengage quickly and move to a MRC. A senior Navy official noted, for example, that it took approximately 7 months to resolve a crisis in Liberia in 1990-91 and until that time the amphibious ready group was not directed to participate in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

Each service faces challenges with reconstituting its forces in terms of training, equipment, and supplies in order to deploy directly to a MRC. Army officials have expressed some concern that participating in peace operations may degrade combat unit readiness for combat operations because of the inability to practice certain individual and collective wartime skills. In Somalia, for example, while the combat forces received extensive experience in military operations conducted in an urban environment, they were not able to practice collective training skills. According to 10th Mountain Division officials, in some cases it took approximately 3 to 6 months to bring these skills back to a level acceptable for combat operations once they returned from Somalia. Army officials also noted that while peace operations offered the opportunity to practice and enhance logistic skills, logistics training provided in Somalia

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1This analysis is a computer-assisted study involving the simulation of combat to generate nondivisional support requirements, based on war-fighting scenarios DOD developed.
Participation in Peace Operations May Delay Services' Response to Major Regional Conflicts

did not substitute completely for the training that would result from a prepared training exercise, such as those at the National Training Center. In the latter, the support forces would work with combat forces as they would in high-intensity combat operations. Marine Corps ground forces had similar experiences in Somalia.

According to Air Force officials, peace operations tend to degrade the overall combat readiness of Air Force flight crews that participate in these operations on a sustained basis because they often restrict night and low-level flight operations and do not provide experience in other combat skills such as night intercept maneuvers. Similarly, naval aviators find that they lose proficiency in some combat skills, such as air combat maneuvering, through prolonged participation in peace operations. As with the Air Force, naval aviators who participate in these operations on a sustained basis are not as able to get to combat ranges where they can practice their full breadth of combat capabilities.

The reconstitution of equipment used in peace operations may also hinder a timely disengagement and redeployment to a MRC. The extensive use of certain equipment, combined with the harsh environmental effects encountered in certain peace operations, has required extensive maintenance before the equipment can be used again. For example, upon their return from Somalia, the 10th Mountain Division's AH-60 helicopters had to enter depot level maintenance as a result of the harsh desert environment and the extensive use of these helicopters in Somalia.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

DOD disagrees with our conclusion that participation in peace operations could impede the timely response of U.S. forces to MRCs. It agrees that there are only a small number of certain active support units that are likely to be needed to conduct both peace operations and MRCs. However, it believes that our resultant conclusions reflect a lack of understanding of how U.S. forces would respond to a MRC. Our conclusions in this regard focus on certain critical capabilities that exist in limited numbers, specifically certain Army support units and certain Air Force aircraft. We reached our conclusions through analysis of how these capabilities have been used in peace operations and past conflicts and their planned use in future conflicts. We agree that most combat forces would be readily available to respond to a MRC.

In its comments DOD states that, on the basis of the recent response of U.S. forces to the possibility of Iraqi aggression against Kuwait while U.S.
forces were engaged in Haiti, it does not see any evidence that significant support unit shortfalls exist. It further states that the participation of certain Air Force aircraft in peace operations in that part of the world facilitated the response to Iraqi movements. Since these events occurred after we had completed our audit work, we were not in a position to analyze them.
Participation in large-scale and/or multiple peace operations could impede the ability of U.S. forces to rapidly respond to MRCs because of several factors. First, certain critical support forces needed in the early days of a major regional conflict would also be needed to facilitate a redeployment from the peace operation. Second, airlift assets would have to be diverted to pick up personnel and equipment from the peace operation. Finally, some of the forces would need training, supplies, and equipment before deploying to another major operation.

Forces with capabilities that exist in limited numbers in the active Army and would be needed in the early stages of a MRC have been used repeatedly in peace operations. Similar-type units that are not engaged in peace operations may not be able to respond quickly or effectively to MRCs because they are assigned fewer people than authorized and they may have loaned some people to the units engaged in the peace operations, which exacerbates an already difficult situation.

Specialized aircraft that exist in limited numbers in the active force structure and their crews are also being used more frequently in peace operations. The Air Force anticipates needing almost all its specialized aircraft in the early days of a MRC.

Some forces in each service are missing training and exercises that affect their overall combat readiness and their ability to redeploy directly to a MRC. Numerous waivers have been issued for aircrews that have not been able to complete required training due to the demands of peace operations. Naval forces involved in peace operations are spending almost all their time at sea conducting operations and so have been unable to participate in some exercises and training.

Peace operations are also likely to have a long-term impact on the people who participate in them although it is difficult to quantify that impact. In 1994 personnel for specialized aircraft have approached the Air Force’s recommended maximum number of temporary duty days away from home station in a year—120. In the case of the F-4Gs, squadron personnel are likely to exceed the recommended maximum by 50 percent. There are reports that increased temporary duty days for Air Force personnel are affecting their morale and their families and that it is contributing to increased instances of divorce and decisions to leave the Air Force. Naval personnel, unable to perform as much maintenance, training, and operational inspections while at sea, are working longer hours in port and have less time for their families prior to a major deployment.
A June 1994 Defense Science Board Report on Readiness notes that the amount of time individuals are away from home has been affected by, among other things, the rapid force drawdown and a higher level of contingency operations. This has increased deployment frequency and placed new strains on personnel. The report further notes that family separation has always been a major, if not the number one, retention variable.

**Options for Easing the Strain of Peace Operations**

There are options available to allow DOD to meet the demands of participation in numerous and/or sizable sustained peace operations on military forces while maintaining the capability to rapidly respond to MRCS. These options have their own advantages and disadvantages and will require choices on the use of the nation’s resources. Although no one option addresses all the problems we have identified, a combination of these options could substantially ease the problems. While there are costs associated with some of these options, we have not examined their magnitude and how DOD might fund them. DOD is currently examining a range of such options.

**Change the Mix of Army Combat and Support Forces**

One option involves increasing the availability of support forces for peace operations by maintaining fewer combat and more support forces on active duty. At present, the Army has placed many support functions in the reserve component. For example, many units that open and operate ports overseas are in the reserve component. This capability was placed in the reserve component during the Cold War, and DOD expected that when forces were needed in wartime it would be able to quickly access and deploy these reserve forces. However, many of these forces that are in the active component have been required in peace operations because the Army has not been authorized to involuntarily access reserve units in most peace operations. While the Army maintains limited numbers of certain types of support capability on active duty, it maintains substantial combat capability in the active component. More support forces could be made available for peace operations if the Army maintained fewer combat forces and redirected those resources to maintaining more support forces. According to Army officials, this is one of the issues that is being examined as part of the Total Army Analysis, which should be completed by mid-1995.

Alternatively, DOD may be able to increase the number of combat and combat service support forces without decreasing the number of combat
forces by making more use of civilian employees. We recently reported that the services use thousands of military personnel in support functions, such as personnel management and data processing, that are typically performed by civilian personnel and do not require skills gained from military experience.\(^1\) We further reported that replacing these military personnel with civilian employees would reduce peacetime personnel costs and could release military members for use in more combat-specific duties.

### Make Greater Use of the Reserves

Making greater use of the reserves would ease the burden on Army active support forces and Air Force airlift and combat forces. Authority to call up the reserves rests with the President. There are three provisions of Title 10 of the U.S. Code that provide access to large numbers of reservists, one of which is section 673b—Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up (PSRC). This section provides access to 200,000 members in the Selected Reserve for up to 270 days and would only require the President to notify Congress that he was making the call-up.

DOD policy guidance regarding the use of reserves for peace operations requires that maximum consideration be given to the use of volunteers before involuntary activation is ordered. The President called up approximately 1,900 reservists to support the September 1994 military intervention in Haiti. Prior to that call-up, PSRC had been invoked only once (for the Gulf War) since its 1976 enactment. The reserves were not activated for the operations in Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1989, or Somalia in 1992. According to senior Army officials, a request went from the Army to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for involuntary access to reserves for Somalia. The request ultimately was never presented to the President. An April 1994 DOD report on accessibility of reserve forces notes that using PSRC authority would raise sensitive domestic and foreign policy concerns that require time to resolve before the President could be expected to decide on when large numbers of reservists should be ordered to active duty.

Prior to the Haiti intervention, DOD had stated in its April 1994 report on accessibility of reserve forces that the decision to not invoke PSRC in Grenada, Panama, and Somalia supported the perception that PSRC has evolved into a de facto mobilization authority.

As DOD’s report on the reserves notes, gaining involuntary access to reserve personnel for any mission is a sensitive matter. A reserve call-up has the potential to disrupt the lives of reservists, their families, and their employers or customers. According to DOD, the assumption of many reservists is that reservists would be called up for service only when vital interests of the United States are threatened. This is based on Cold War experiences and certain post-Cold War contingencies such as Desert Storm. U.S. Army Reserve Command officials advised us of their concern that involuntary use of the reserves for peace operations would be disruptive to reservists’ lives and ultimately could affect the willingness of Americans to join the reserves.

The Office of Reserve Affairs, within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, is examining the limits and impediments to volunteerism and how to expand their use. That office has identified several impediments, including statutory requirements involving the lack of some benefits for reservists on duty for less than 31 days, the lack of employer support, and the lack of funds to pay the costs of reservists on active duty, which currently is not included in the annual defense budget, that must be eliminated if DOD is to rely on expanded use of volunteers. DOD reports that it is addressing a wide range of proposals for mitigating these and other impediments.

Make Greater Use of Contractors

DOD could also use contractors to augment support forces. The Army is already making greater use of contract personnel to provide many of the support services typically provided by its combat service support personnel. In Somalia, for example, the Army used the logistics civil augmentation program, which uses a civilian contractor to provide construction services and general logistic support. This reduced the Army support requirement. The Army has also tasked this contractor with developing a worldwide logistics civil augmentation plan and a specific plan for a potential future deployment to Bosnia. The Bosnia plan describes the military support the contractor personnel can provide and the types of military units it can replace.

Use of the contractor entails additional costs that, in Somalia, were paid first from the Marine Corps’ and then the Army’s operations and maintenance budget. In addition, Army officials said that in Somalia, the contractor needed to use Army equipment to perform its tasks, which required taking equipment from Army units.
Use Worldwide Military Assets

The use of worldwide military assets could ease the strain on military forces. Peace operations had a number of negative impacts on USAFE because USAFE followed its traditional practice of meeting operational requirements with its own forces as much as possible. While USAFE’s two F-15E squadrons and one A-10 squadron were heavily engaged in supporting peace operations, there were several active-duty F-15E and active-duty A-10 squadrons based in the United States that might have been able to ease the strain if they could have taken turns rotating aircraft and personnel to those operations. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD noted that the Air Force has recognized these challenges and is addressing them by relying more on active, reserve, and Guard units based in the continental United States, which have deployed to Operations Provide Comfort and Deny Flight to relieve some of the operational burden.

Change Forward Presence Goals

At present, one of the Navy’s principal missions is to maintain forward presence around the world. Forward presence is also a key component of national military strategy as described in the report on the bottom-up review. However, the extent of forward presence necessary is a matter of judgement for the Navy and the Joint Staff.

DOD could change the required level of forward presence to relieve the strain on naval forces. This would require a significant military and diplomatic policy decision. It could also result in reduced crisis response capability and less opportunity to participate in multilateral exercises.

Accept the Status Quo

The alternative to using defense resources differently is to accept the status quo and so continue to treat peace operations as a secondary mission. The risk of accepting the status quo is that it would continue the strain on the military as a result of its participation in peace operations and could adversely affect the military’s ability to respond to a MRC if one should occur while military forces were engaged in a sizable peace operation or several smaller ones.

Whether the risk is acceptable in part depends on the frequency with which the United States engages in sizable peace operations and the duration of these operations. Each operation is different in terms of size, operating environment, and duration. For example, the operation in Somalia required large numbers of ground forces in an austere environment for over a year, while the Rwanda operation required smaller
numbers of ground and airlift forces for several months. Estimates for a potential Bosnia deployment call for even larger numbers of ground forces in an austere environment for about 2 years. Other operations, such as enforcement of the no-fly zones over Iraq and Bosnia, have required aviation assets for an extended period but few ground forces.

Whether the risk is acceptable also depends on the extent to which the services can mitigate the risks. For example, the services might be able to use civilian contractor logistics support, or use some of the other options we have identified. Ultimately, however, if policymakers believe that the likelihood of U.S. involvement in large scale, extended duration operations is low, the risk may be much more acceptable than if they believe that the likelihood is high.

**Recommendation**

Concerned about the bottom-up review and the defense budget, Congress directed DOD to review the assumptions and conclusions of the President’s budget, the bottom-up review, and the Future Years Defense Program. DOD is to review peace operations and report in detail on the force structure required to fight and win two MRCS nearly simultaneously while responding to other ongoing or potential operations. Consequently, we are not making recommendations regarding reassessing the impact of participation in peace operations in this report.

We recently reported on the bottom-up review’s assumptions concerning the broader force structure issues, including the redeployment of forces from other operations to MRCS, the availability of strategic mobility, and the deployability of reserve combat forces.²

On another matter, however, we believe that because of the Army’s significantly reduced size the staffing of support forces at 10 to 20 percent below their authorized levels needs to be reassessed. Consequently, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army, as part of the Total Army Analysis 2003, to reexamine whether high priority support units that would deploy early in a crisis should still be staffed at less than 100 percent of their authorized strength.

**Agency Comments and Our Evaluation**

DOD states that it is addressing the matter we raise in our recommendation as part of Total Army Analysis 2003. If the Army fully assesses the issue of

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staffing high priority support units as part of the Total Army Analysis 2003, we believe that the intent of our recommendation would be met.
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the end of this appendix.

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Mr. Henry L. Hinton, Jr.
Assistant Comptroller General
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Dear Mr. Hinton:

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the General Accounting Office (GAO) draft report, "PEACE OPERATIONS: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Ability to Respond to Regional Conflicts," dated December 2, 1994 (GAO Code 701017), OSD Case 9823. The Department partially concurs with the report findings. The Department takes exception, however, both to the GAO's overall conclusion that participation in peace operations could impede the timely response of U.S. forces to major regional conflicts (MRCs) and to a number of specific findings in the report. With respect to the recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the Army to reexamine the manning level of certain support forces, as the DoD detailed comments point out, such a review is already underway.

In May of 1994, President Clinton signed a decision directive that, among other things, describes why selective U.S. participation in multilateral peace operations is necessary to protect and advance U.S. national security interests. As a global power, the United States uses its military forces to protect its interests and advance its foreign policy objectives around the world. Although the Cold War is over, the post-Cold War security environment still presents a variety of threats to America's interests. Most prominent among those threats are: attempts by regional powers hostile to U.S. interests to dominate their respective regions through aggression or intimidation; internal conflicts among ethnic, national, religious or tribal groups that threaten innocent lives and undermine regional stability and international order; threats to democracy and reform; and efforts by potential adversaries to acquire or use weapons of mass destruction.

In this new security environment, it is likely the United States will face virtually limitless calls for American involvement in containing such threats. However, the United States does not have limitless resources and cannot nor should not respond to every crisis or conflict. Therefore, one of the principal challenges we face as a nation in this new era is to decide when and how to employ military forces in pursuit of national objectives.
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There are three basic categories of cases in which the U.S. may use its armed forces. The first involves America's vital interests—that is, the defense of U.S. territory, citizens, allies and economic well-being. We will do whatever it takes to defend these interests, including, when necessary, the unilateral and decisive use of military power. This was demonstrated clearly during the Persian Gulf War and, more recently, in OPERATION VIGILANT WARRIOR, the rapid response to aggressive moves by Iraq towards Kuwait in October 1994.

The second category includes cases in which important, but not vital, U.S. interests are threatened. That is, the interests at stake do not affect national survival or well-being, but do affect American security and the character of the world in which we live. In such cases, military forces should only be used if they advance U.S. interests, they are likely to be able to accomplish their objectives, the costs and risks of their employment are commensurate with the interests at stake, and other means have been tried and have failed to achieve national objectives. Such uses of force should also be limited, reflecting the relative saliency of the interests at stake. Haiti and Bosnia are the most recent examples in this category.

The third category of cases involves primarily humanitarian interests. Here, our decisions on whether or not to intervene focus on the use of military forces rather than the use of force. Generally, the military is not the best tool to address humanitarian concerns. But under certain conditions, the use of our armed forces may be appropriate: when a humanitarian catastrophe dwarfs the ability of civilian relief agencies to respond; when the need for relief is urgent and only the military has the ability to jump-start the longer-term response to the disaster; when the response requires resources unique to the military; and when the risk to American troops is minimal—as was the case recently in Rwanda.

Through the United Nations (UN), appropriate regional organizations, or ad hoc coalitions, nations can act to prevent, contain, or resolve conflicts through what is broadly termed peace operations—military operations conducted under the authority of either Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The scope of those operations ranges from traditional peacekeeping to large-scale peace enforcement operations involving the potential for combat.

To summarize the position of the Administration and the Department of Defense, the United States will always retain the capability to intervene unilaterally when the nation’s interests are threatened. However, as it has in the past, our nation will continue to participate in multinational peace operations, when they serve national interests as a cost-effective tool for preserving or restoring peace and stability in key regions. The Administration and the DoD continue to believe that these types of operations often offer the best way to prevent, contain or resolve conflicts that could otherwise become far more costly and deadly. In such cases, the United States invokes the authority and support of the international community and benefits from sharing the military and financial burden with others. While U.S. forces are participating in multilateral peace operations more frequently than they did during
the Cold War, they continue to maintain the capability to deploy, fight, and achieve
decisive victory against any potential adversary—even in the unlikely event of two
nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRCs).

As described in detail in the enclosed comments, several of the GAO findings
are either inaccurate or misleading. For example, while the GAO report correctly
notes that the active component forces maintain only a small number of certain
support units that are likely to be needed to conduct both peace operations and MRCs,
the GAO conclusions reflect a lack of understanding about how U.S. forces would
respond to an MRC. Based upon the DoD analysis and recent experience in using
these support units during both OPERATION VIGILANT WARRIOR in the Persian
Gulf and OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti, the Department does not see
any evidence that significant support unit shortfalls exist.

However, the Department will continue to review force structure requirements
(both active and reserve component) to determine the best force mix to support our
defense strategy. As part of that ongoing review, the Army is examining its currently
projected force structure and potential enhancements through the Total Army
Analysis - 2003 (TAA-03), which is projected for completion in mid-1995. This
analysis will identify warfighting support requirements and allocate available force
structure in the most efficient manner to execute the defense strategy. Until the
TAA-03 is complete, it is premature to draw any conclusions regarding shortfalls in
the Army support structure. If shortfalls are identified during the course of that
analysis, the DoD will take whatever steps are necessary to ensure they are corrected--
to include the creation of additional force structure for support forces if that is
required.

In those areas where the GAO recommends follow-up analysis, the Department
came to similar conclusions over a year ago, and such assessments are already well
underway. To date, those studies have confirmed the judgments of the senior
civilian and military leadership within the DoD that current and programmed forces
will be able to execute successfully the national security strategy.

The detailed DoD comments on the report's findings and recommendation are
provided in the enclosure. Additional technical comments were provided separately
to the GAO staff. The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the
draft report.

Edward L. Warner, III

Enclosure
As Stated
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GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED DECEMBER 2, 1994
(GAO CODE 701017) OSD CASE 9823

"PEACE OPERATIONS: HEAVY USE OF KEY CAPABILITIES MAY AFFECT
ABILITY TO RESPOND TO REGIONAL CONFLICTS"

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS
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FINDINGS

- FINDING A: Demand Has Increased for U.S. Military Responses
  to Peace Operations. The GAO reported that recent changes in
  the international security environment are redefining the role of the U.S.
  military. The GAO observed that as the number, size, and scope of
  peace and humanitarian relief operations have increased in the past
  several years, the nature and extent of U.S. participation has changed
  markedly. The GAO noted that while U.S. military forces have
  participated in peace operations for many years, notably as part of
  the Multinational Force of Observers on the Sinai Peninsula, the size
  of the U.S. military contingent has traditionally been limited.
  However, the GAO pointed out that recently the U.S. has used more
  military forces, of an increasingly varied nature, in peace operations
  in places such as Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and Northern and Southern
  Iraq. The GAO concluded that those operations have often occurred,
  and will likely continue to occur, in austere environments with little
  or no infrastructure from which to base and sustain an operation--an
  important consideration given the extended duration of those
  operations. The GAO noted that the U.S. military forces have also
  been used to respond to natural disasters, such as Hurricane Andrew
  and the 1993 Midwest floods.

  The GAO concluded that peace operations tend to be sustained rather
  than short-term operations and, therefore, have required extended
  force commitments from the U.S. Military Services. The GAO observed
  that the U.S. military forces continue to maintain a 12-year
  commitment to the Multi-national Force of Observers on the Sinai
  Peninsula, a 3-year commitment to OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT in
  northern Iraq, and were committed to OPERATION RESTORE HOPE in Somalia
  for almost 2 years. The GAO also observed that numerous units
  provided forces during those operations and were rotated to ensure a
  ready presence. For example, the GAO noted that during OPERATION
  RESTORE HOPE, the Army rotated forces to and from Somalia
  approximately every 4 months. Further, the GAO noted that the Air
  Force tends to rotate its aircrew more frequently. For instance, the
  GAO reported that during operations PROVIDE COMFORT, PROVIDE PROMISE,
  DENY FLIGHT, and SOUTHERN WATCH, the Air Force rotated forces every 3
  months. The GAO concluded that for every unit deployed, there are two
  like units in the United States supporting its rotation--one
  recovering from the rotation and another preparing for the next
  rotation.

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The GAO also found that continuing force drawdown has compounded challenges for the U.S. military in responding to extended peace operations. The GAO observed that all four Services have experienced reductions in personnel and equipment that have forced military planners to reevaluate how the Services will respond to peace operations and major regional conflicts. For example, the GAO noted that, with the reduction in the number of overseas bases and forward deployed forces in Europe, the Army and Air Force have returned part of their Cold War-era European force structure to the U.S. and do not plan to realign the remainder. The GAO concluded that the remaining forces, which once could have responded to peace operations from forward locations, now may have to be augmented by forces located in the Continental United States (CONUS). (pp. 2-3, p. 14, p. 17/GAO Draft Report)

**DOD RESPONSE:** Partially concur. The Department agrees that the post-cold war security environment is placing different demands on U.S. forces. However, the GAO overly broad definition of what constitutes a "peace operation" incorrectly implies that it is peace operations alone that are creating those new demands. In recent years, there have been a proliferation of terms used to describe military operations other than war that are unplanned or not budgeted for in advance by the DoD. Peace operations are only one type of contingency operation for which U.S. forces are prepared to respond.

During 1994, such contingency operations ranged from VIGILANT WARRIOR, the rapid response that successfully deterred aggressive moves by Iraq in the Gulf, to PROVIDE COMFORT, which since shortly after the conclusion of the Gulf War in 1991 has provided security and humanitarian assistance to the Kurdish population of northern Iraq. Peace operations--the term used to describe peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions--are but a small percentage of the 70 different contingency operations undertaken by three different Administrations during the past decade to advance U.S. national interests and foreign policy goals. The range of such contingency operations includes peace operations, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, non-combatant evacuation, maritime escort, counterterrorism, deterrence of aggression, intervention, sanctions enforcement, no-fly zone enforcement, and migrant rescue/support. The United States military has a long history of participating in this broad range of contingency operations--both before and during the Cold War. Those missions are, in fact, a traditional role of the military and should not all be considered a subgroup of peace operations.

- **FINDING B: Recent Peace Operations Have Stressed Key Military Capabilities.** The GAO found that peace operations have heavily stressed certain key military capabilities, particularly Army support forces, such as quartermaster and transportation units and Air Force specialized aircraft, while having less impact on other forces, such as Army armored combat divisions and general purpose Air Force combat aircraft outside Europe. In the Army, the GAO observed that a large percentage of certain support forces in the active component have been used, because most of the support capabilities are in the reserves, and have not been activated for use in peace operations. The GAO also observed that the impact on the support forces has been
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Further exacerbated by (1) the practice of borrowing people from one unit to supplement another that lacks sufficient personnel to deploy, and (2) through rotation of some personnel to the same operation more than once or to consecutive operations, because of the demand on their particular capability. The GAO also found that active Army support forces are often used to establish an infrastructure in an austere environment and provide the basic necessities, such as food, water, toilet, and showers, to U.S. military forces and, in many cases, to coalition forces and the local population. The GAO asserted that, if "nation building" is part of the military mission, support requirements increase even further as the military builds schools, hospitals, local housing, and establishes police and other civil administration services.

The GAO also observed that, in the Air Force, peace operations have placed considerable stress on the limited number of forces providing specialized capabilities and on forward-deployed units in the European theater. The GAO also found that the increased flying hours necessary to support those operations have had an impact on aircraft and crews, including: (1) extended temporary duty in excess of established goals; (2) increased aircraft maintenance; (3) cannibalization of home station aircraft; and, (4) missed training. The GAO noted that peace operations have not been as disruptive to the Navy and Marine Corps. However, the GAO indicated that forward deployed naval forces have experienced increased operating tempo and, in some cases, reduced time between deployments, which has limited some training. The GAO concluded that participation in those operations has provided unique experience in joint and coalition exercises. (pp. 4-5, pp. 21-28/GAO Draft Report)

**DOD Response:** Partially concur. As recognized by the GAO, the DoD is already examining various means to reduce lengthy deployments in support of peace operations and operations other than war. Specifically, the Army routinely addresses mission duration and rotation issues as part of normal mission analysis. Similarly, the Air Force has already taken a number of steps which have significantly reduced the stress placed upon certain units by their participation in contingency operations. High temporary duty (TDY) rates and heavy use of specialized aircraft are force management issues that have been addressed by better use of worldwide assets, heavier involvement of the Reserve Components, and the purchase of additional and replacement aircraft. The DoD, however, does not agree with the GAO conclusions regarding the extent that peace operations may have stressed military capabilities. By focusing on a set of specialized aircraft and listing the number of aircraft "available" as compared to the number deployed to "peace operations" (as defined by the GAO and listed in Table 2.3) the GAO analysis incorrectly describes the degree to which such Air Force capabilities are dedicated to peace operations and how that would affect the DoD ability to respond to a major regional conflict (NRC).

For example, the GAO cited that 17 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft were "available" in June 1994, when, in fact, the worldwide total of U.S. AWACS is 30, excluding NATO AWACS. While, as was the case in June 1994, some number of the total AWACS inventory is usually "down" for maintenance, many of those aircraft could be reactivated and deployed quickly if the situation required. Furthermore,
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a majority of the AWACS the GAO identified in Table 2.3 as being committed to peace operations in June 1994 were participating in OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH. Thus, those aircraft would have been in a forward location and able to serve as command and control aircraft for our initial airpower response, should an MRC have arisen in that region. In this particular situation, our forward deployed aviation capabilities enhances DoD's ability to respond rapidly to an MRC--contrary to the conclusions of the GAO.

Similarly, Table 2.3 indicates that 74 percent of the F-4Gs that were available in June 1994 were deployed to a peace operation. However, it should be recognized that the F-4G aircraft is being retired and being replaced by a significantly larger number of F-16s which can perform the same mission, thus reducing the burden. It should also be recognized that one reason the number of aircraft deployed to a "peace operation" is so high is because of peace-time rotation practices that are designed to reduce the stress on any one unit.

- FINDING C: The Army Cross-Leveling and Multiple Rotation Practices Tax the Already Overextended Support Forces. The GAO observed that, to save money, many of the Army active support units are assigned fewer people than required to perform their missions. The GAO observed that, if needed for war, the early-deploying units would be brought up to required strength by taking people and equipment from other active and reserve units. The GAO noted that, since the Army restructured its forces in the mid-1980s, its goal has been to authorize combat units, which are the chief means of deterrence, to be staffed at 100 percent of their wartime requirements and support units to be staffed at an average of 90 percent of their wartime requirements.

The GAO also observed that XVIIth Airborne Corps units deploying to Somalia needed 100 percent or more of their authorized personnel and equipment in order to meet operational requirements. However, the GAO found that most units did not have the people or equipment to satisfy that requirement. For example, the GAO noted that almost half of the XVIIth Airborne Corps' First Corps Support Command units had 90 percent or less of their authorized personnel, and several support units had 80 percent or less of their authorized people. The GAO also found that other corps support commands, such as the Third Corps, which provided initial corps support for operations in Somalia, are resourced at an even lower level than the XVIIth Airborne Corps.

The GAO asserted that the Army supplemented the personnel-deficient units deploying to Somalia by borrowing from other units throughout the Army force structure—a process known as cross-leveling. The GAO noted that cross-leveling has occurred at both the division and corps level. In addition, the GAO observed that people from some units rotated more than once to the same peace operation or deployed to consecutive peace operations, because of the demand on their particular capability. The GAO concluded that the combination of cross-leveling and frequent deployments are having an adverse impact on installation support. For example, the GAO noted that approximately 150 of 180 military personnel from the XVIIth Airborne Corps 507th Combat Support Group (CSG) Headquarters deployed to Somalia for several months, leaving approximately 30 headquarters personnel at
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Fort Bragg along with the group's three battalions and no additional augmentation. The GAO asserted that, in order to cope with the absence of so many headquarters personnel, many operational requirements were decentralized to the battalion level. The GAO also asserted that the remaining headquarters personnel assumed roles far above their designated ranks and doubled and tripled work loads throughout the deployment period. The GAO concluded that, given the decrease in the size of the Army, the practice of cross-leveling needs to be reassessed. (pp. 5-6, pp. 24-30/GAO Draft Report)

**DoD RESPONSE:** Partially concur. Based upon the Authorized Level of Organization (ALO) and the Personnel Priority Groups (PPG), some active Army units—combat, combat support, and combat service support—are assigned fewer people than required to perform their wartime and other contingency missions. Those guidelines are exhaustively developed after considering the Joint Strategic Planning System and the Total Army Analysis. Generally, combat units on any installation are manned to their full ALO level. As a result, some combat support and combat service support units are manned at slightly lower level. Further, early deploying units are frequently manned at a higher level than comparatively late deployers. Such prioritization must occur even within high priority units such as the XVIII Airborne Corps. Additionally, certain low-density specialties are manned, by the conscious decision of the Army leadership, at lower levels than are required in an effort to preclude sub-optimization of these highly skilled personnel during peacetime. Since few peace operations are short notice crises, cross-leveling is an appropriate means to manage scarce personnel resources.

Force size and structure must ensure that wartime requirements are met. However, U.S. military forces must also be prepared to participate in the full range of contingency operations at a level commensurate with national interests. While it is true that installation manning may suffer as a result of a particular deployment, it would be unwise to establish "installation support" as a criteria for building active force structure. In the event of a theater war of long duration, it is expected that reserve personnel, or personnel currently retired from the armed forces, would be called to duty to ensure the effective and efficient management of CONUS based military installations. Thus, while cross-leveling and operational deployments may have an impact on installation manning for a short duration, that does not warrant a change in force structure.

As discussed, in the DoD response to the GAO recommendation, the Army is already reassessing how to best structure its forces to meet the requirements as specified in the Bottom-Up Review (BDR) through its Total Army Analysis 2003 (TAA-03). Furthermore, the DoD recognizes that better use of both reserve forces and civilian contractors are ways to increase the number of support units available for contingency operations. The DoD has a number of ongoing initiatives in this area.

- **FINDING D:** Reserve forces contain key support capabilities, but they have not often been activated for peace operations. The GAO found that, until recently, the President has elected not to activate reserve personnel for use in peace operations; therefore.

See comment 4.
only reserve volunteers have participated in most peace operations. The GAO determined that this policy has posed particular difficulties, because the support capabilities most heavily relied upon in recent operations reside predominantly in the reserves.

The GAO observed that the Army relied on many reserve volunteers in the Somalia operation. However, the GAO asserted that the Army is not well suited for using volunteer reserve forces, because the jobs typically require their presence for longer periods of time than is practical when reservists have other full-time civilian jobs. For example, the GAO noted that Army volunteers in Somalia were needed for 3 to 6 months. The GAO also indicated that when reservists were able to volunteer, they generally stayed for the full rotation period. The GAO also determined that, while Army volunteers have been helpful, the volunteers available are not always the ones with the specific capabilities, equipment, and training required for the peace operation. The GAO further observed that the use of individual volunteers does not meet the Army's requirement for units, in which a group of individuals are trained and organized to perform a mission as a cohesive entity.

The GAO concluded that the recent initiative for using reserve volunteers for the peacekeeping operations in the Sinai has been time consuming due to planning and procedural processes associated with activating approximately 300 reserve personnel. The GAO observed that the reserve volunteers will be ready to deploy to the Sinai by January 1995 after completing three to six months of training depending on the rank of personnel involved. The GAO pointed out that, while there has been no shortage of volunteers for the current deployment, Army officials are concerned that they will not be able to recruit enough volunteers to continue this practice on an annual basis. Therefore, the GAO found that the Army is currently planning to use volunteers every third rotation. (pp. 30-32/GAO Draft Report)

**DOD RESPONSE:** Partially concur. The Army is well aware of the difficulties associated with using reserves for operational requirements. The Secretary of the Army, in conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), is currently examining ways to more easily gain access to reserve units for small scale operations and has proposed legislation for this purpose. While there is a limit on the amount of volunteerism that can be expected from reserve personnel, that remains a viable means of ensuring that the armed forces can meet their sustained commitment. Further, the GAO report is somewhat contradictory by stating first that "the Army is not well suited for using volunteer reserve forces because the jobs they perform typically require their presence for longer periods of time than is practical when reservists have other full-time civilian jobs." The report continued by stating that "Army volunteers were needed for three to six months" and that "when reservists were able to volunteer, they generally stayed for the full rotation period." Therefore, as the report correctly indicated, the Army was able to find reservists to volunteer for the required duration. The draft report also noted the limited value of Army volunteers since they are usually individuals and not trained as a cohesive unit. Although the DOD acknowledges those points, it should be recognized that results of the deployment demonstrates that Army reservists who volunteered to participate in the operation in Somalia, and other contingency
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operations, have performed their duties admirably and have greatly contributed to the success of their units' mission.

○ **FINDING E: Future Operations Could Further Burden Support Capabilities in the Active Component.** The GAO concluded that the Army's experience in Somalia illustrates the challenges that lie ahead if the U.S. chooses to deploy forces to Bosnia or to other peace operations throughout the world. The GAO indicated that, while the Army provided approximately a brigade size force to Somalia, it would likely provide a division size force to Bosnia—roughly three times the Army force in Somalia. The GAO asserted that, if the U.S. participated in that operation with an Army deployment of approximately 22,000 soldiers, access to the reserve component would be required for the second 6-month rotation, because the large support requirement exceeds the number of active forces available in certain support capabilities. The GAO concluded that the Army will continue to face challenges in responding to peace operations if reserve forces are not activated. However, the GAO indicated that the need for reserve activation depends on a variety of factors, such as the size and number of peace operations ongoing at one time. (p. 6, pp. 32-33/GAO Draft Report)

**DOD RESPONSE:** Concur. The DoD acknowledges that the deployment of 22,000 soldiers to Bosnia, if a peace plan were to be signed, could require augmentation from the reserve component. However, the need for augmentation depends upon a number of factors, including: the specific mission, anticipated duration, support infrastructure available, as well as the size and number of other military operations ongoing at the time of the deployment.

○ **FINDING F: Peace Operations Stress Certain Air Force Units.** The GAO reported that the Air Force has contributed to recent peace operations by providing airlift, delivering humanitarian relief, and participating in various "no fly zone" air operations. The GAO found that those types of operations have placed considerable stress on specialized capabilities which only exist in small numbers, such as command and control, surveillance, reconnaissance, and radar jamming aircraft, and on forward deployed units in the European theater, where most recent operations have occurred. The GAO also found that peace operations are having an effect on the units—i.e., (1) an increase in flying hours has resulted in additional aircraft and home station stress, (2) aircraft personnel are exceeding the recommended time on duty, and (3) aircraft personnel have missed the training necessary to prepare for high-threat combat environment.

The GAO also found that many of the units have experienced increased operational and personnel tempo, because of sustained deployments, and have had fewer opportunities for training in the broad spectrum of warfare requirements, such as night intercept operations and advanced aircraft handling characteristics. For example, the GAO observed that 48 percent of EF-11 Aircres and 42 percent of active component F-4G aircres received waivers for training requirements they were not able to complete during the January-June 1994 training cycle—primarily due to their extensive participation in peace operations. The GAO also
asserted that deploying part, but not all, of a unit has created planning and logistics challenges for the Air Force. The GAO pointed out that essential unit personnel have to be shared by the forces at the home base and in the deployed operational location, because the squadrons are structured to fight in place or deploy as a whole unit rather than in smaller packages as they are doing for peace operations. (pp. 6-7, pp. 34-39/GAO Draft Report)

**DOD Response:** Partially concur. The GAO used an overly broad definition of peace operations that not only included peace operations, but also included humanitarian assistance (OPERATION PROVIDE PROMISE), conventional deterrence (OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH), and counter-drug operations. In essence, the GAO reviewed the effect of all contingent operations during the month of June 1994 on a few select units. The DOD recognizes that, at that point in time, those units the GAO visited were stressed. However, the Air Force has already taken actions to relieve that stress by relying on worldwide aviation resources to reduce the operations of those units. Further, the GAO did not consider the availability of similar capabilities that reside in the Navy and Marine Corps that would also be immediately available in the case of an MRC. While the DOD agrees that deployed units miss some training exercises—and some squadrons are not able to accomplish certain training events which are considered indicators of aircrew proficiency when deployed to peace operations—it should be recognized that those aircrews are gaining valuable practical experience in other skills that will enhance their ability to successfully respond to an MRC. Finally, it is important to recognize that the limited impact on training has not affected the preparedness of the units discussed to conduct their wartime missions.

- **Finding G:** European-Based Air Force Assets Carry Heavy Burden in Supporting Peace Operations. The GAO concluded that the traditional practice of meeting operational requirements with a command's own resources as much as possible, combined with the drawdown of forces in Europe, have put increased strain on the remaining in-theater assets in supporting peace operations on a sustained basis and maintaining combat skills. The GAO observed that, since the end of OPERATION DESERT STORM in 1991, three peace operations have occurred in the European theater of operations -- Operations Provide Comfort, Provide Promise, and Deny Flight. The GAO asserted that those operations, combined with the reduction in the U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) force structure—from 8.8 to 2.3 fighter wing equivalents—and corresponding squadron reallocations, has resulted in increased flying hours, high temporary duty rates, and missed training opportunities.

In addition, because recent peace operations have occurred in parts of the European theater where the Air Force has not maintained a permanent presence, the GAO found that a significant number of USAFE personnel have been required to build and maintain infrastructure from which to base forces and manage day-to-day operations. For example, the GAO observed that Air Force had to expand weapons training deployment facilities in Aviano, Italy, and Incirlik, Turkey, and construct "tent cities" in support of OPERATION DENY FLIGHT and PROVIDE COMFORT to accommodate the deployed personnel. The GAO also
observed that, with the reduction of forward deployed squadrons in the European theater, considerable portions of some USAFE capabilities have been dedicated to peace operations. For example, the GAO explained that the USAFE has two F-15E squadrons designed for delivering precision-guided munitions at night in a high-threat environment. The GAO indicated that for more than a year, about fourteen aircraft from both squadrons, which have a combined total of about forty-eight aircraft, have been participating in OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT and DENY FLIGHT.

The GAO concluded that, because of their participation in those operations, the squadrons have had to forego major training exercises that would have provided them with the most realistic combat training available. The GAO indicated this training is particularly important for those squadrons, because they were established in 1993 and have not had the opportunity to participate in a major tactical air combat exercise. (p. 7, pp. 46-47/GAO Draft Report)

**DD2 RESPONSE:** Concur. Although European-based Air Force units have been heavily tasked for some operations, this situation has been corrected. As the GAO report correctly recognized, CONUS-based Guard, Reserve and Active units and other worldwide assets have deployed to Turkey and Bosnia to relieve the burden on European-based forces.

- **FINDING H: Naval Forces Have Not Been as Taxed by Peace Operations as Other Services, But Operational Stress Is Increasing.** The GAO concluded that peace operations have not been as disruptive to the Navy and Marine Corps as to the other Services, because they are normally forward deployed throughout the world. However, the GAO noted that certain Navy and Marine Corps units have experienced increased operating tempo and decreased time between deployment due to their participation in sustained operations and the reduced force structure available to respond to those operations and to other forward deployment requirements. For example, the GAO observed that a Marine Expeditionary Unit, which returned on June 23, 1994, from a 6-month deployment off the coast of Somalia, was sent back to sea in less than 3 weeks to support U.S. operations off the coast of Haiti. The GAO also observed that increased operational tempo has resulted in reduced U.S. naval participation in certain training and exercises, less time for intermediate maintenance and repair, and reduced U.S. naval presence in certain geographic areas. (pp. 7-6, pp. 46-53/GAO Draft Report)

**DD2 RESPONSE:** Concur. While the DoD agrees that naval forces operating in support of a peace operation may reduce naval presence elsewhere, it should be understood that the decision to deploy naval forces in support of specific peace operations is made only after a thorough analysis of how such a deployment would advance U.S. interests—giving full consideration to the potential costs associated with the deployment.

- **FINDING I: Participation in Peace Operations May Delay the Services' Response to Major Regional Conflicts.** The GAO reported that, according to the Bottom-Up Review (BUR), military...
forces needed for peace operations will come from the same pool of forces identified for use in the event of one or more major regional conflicts (MRCs). The GAO concluded that (1) Army support forces designated for early use in an MRC are being used in peace operations; (2) the Air Force will need specialized aircraft for MRCs that are also used in peace operations; (3) Naval Services are using non-deployed forces for peace operations; and (4) the Army and Marine Corps are using prepositioned equipment and stocks for peace operations. The GAO found that key Army support units and specialized Air Force aircraft used in recent peace operations have been identified as being needed in the early stages of an MRC; yet, the GAO concluded that it may be difficult to disengage those forces from the peace operation and redeploy them to the MRC quickly. The GAO asserted that is significant, because in the event of a short-warning attack, forces are needed to deploy rapidly to the theater and enter the battle as quickly as possible as a means to halt the invasion.

The GAO observed that, during the Somalia operation, the Army used a large percentage of its support forces needed in the early stages of an MRC, such as forces for opening ports and airfields. The GAO pointed out that in certain cases, nearly 100 percent of the contingency support forces for particular capabilities had deployed to Somalia and were unavailable for deployment elsewhere. For example, the GAO noted that the Army used all its contingency support forces attached to general supply, air terminal movement control, medium truck, cargo transfer, and water purification units. The GAO also observed that the Air Force is in a similar situation. The GAO found that many of the Air Force special capability units have been participating in peace operations on a fairly continuous basis; yet, the GAO noted that the DoD plans to use some of those units in both MRCs. The GAO also indicated that, while the aircraft and aircrews could easily move to another location, the supplies, equipment, and personnel associated with the support of the aircraft would have to wait for available airlift.

The GAO also found that, more recently, the Navy has had to use its non-deployed forces, which are training and conducting maintenance in preparation for their upcoming 6-month deployments, to respond to peace operations in the Caribbean Sea. In addition, the GAO found that both the Army and Marine Corps have used prepositioned equipment and stocks for peace operations which are needed to respond to an MRC. (p. 8, pp. 54-60/GAO Draft Report)

**DOD RESPONSE:** Nonconcurs. The DoD acknowledges that disengagement from one or more sizable peace operations and redeployment of forces to an MRC on short notice could pose operational challenges. However, the DoD does not agree that it would delay Service response. Military operations by their very nature are complex. While having forces deployed to one operation may cause additional challenges, that situation would not impede a quick response should an MRC arise. To argue that significant percentages of types of support units were involved in Somalia does not necessarily represent the existence of a shortfall in capabilities. Substitute units or capabilities are available in almost all cases, to include the use of Host Nation Support, civilian contractors and other resources. Recent contingency operations conducted by the U.S. military verify the correctness of the force posture. For example, during the conduct of the peace
operation in Haiti, over 20,000 personnel from both active and reserve components were employed. Concurrent with that operation, the U.S. military began to execute an MRC-like deployment of forces in support of OPERATION VIGILANT WARRIOR to deter potential Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. That operation was not impeded in any way by the U.S. involvement in Haiti.

It is also important to recognize that while there may be some stress on support forces, the availability of combat units will not be a problem, because the types of combat forces that are typically committed to peace operations—light infantry, Marines and Special Forces—are not the same as those that are likely to be required during the initial stages of a major regional conflict. Further, if those forces are needed for a major regional conflict, they will be needed in limited numbers or for a short duration. That means that the U.S. would have time, even in the unlikely event of two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts, to withdraw troops from the peace operation, and train them for the theater of operations, as necessary, before redeploying them.

**Army Support Forces:** The Army is continuing to address its force structure requirements and potential adjustments in considerable detail through its Total Army Analysis - 2003 (TAA-03), projected for completion by mid-1995. While the results of an earlier Army analysis (TAA-01) identified support shortfalls in certain combat support and combat service support units, that analysis was based on a 12 active division “Base Force.” Those relatively small force shortfalls, however, were not considered to pose any significant risk to U.S. operations. As the active Army force structure is reduced to 10 divisions, plans call for aggregate active and reserve end-strength to decrease by only 13,000, as compared to the Base Force. That will give the Army the flexibility to provide more support units in areas of need. The Army is currently addressing its force structure requirements (both active and reserve component) and potential enhancements to the BUR force through its TAA-03, projected for completion by mid-1995. Until the TAA-03 is complete, it is premature to draw any conclusions regarding shortfalls in the Army support structure. However, if shortfalls are identified during the course of that analysis, necessary steps will be taken to ensure they are corrected—to include the creation of additional force structure for support forces, if that is required.

**Air Force Units:** The GAO focused on the availability of certain specialized aircraft and concluded that Air Force participation in peace operations and other contingency operations will impede its rapid response to an MRC. However, all available historical data demonstrates that the Air Force is capable of rapidly moving and employing forces around the world, regardless of its operational involvement in another theater. For instance, the GAO reported that 9 of the 17 E-3 (AWACS) that were "available" in June 1994, were participating in peace operations. The DOD does not agree. As the GAO chart indicates (Table 2.3), 2 were participating in counter-drug operations. Moreover, 5 of the AWACS were participating in OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH in southern Iraq and would have provided the initial response to an MRC in that theater by providing roughly half of the total number of AWACS needed to fight a theater level war in that region. That was verified during the recent deployment of U.S. forces.

See comment 8.

See comment 9.

See comment 10.
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...to OPERATION VIGILANT WARRIOR, where many of those critical units were quickly moved from Haiti to Kuwait. Similarly, the GAO overstated the impact of moving Air Force maintenance and logistics units from a peace operation to an MRC. The DoD acknowledges that moving these units would be a planning consideration that could pose a logistical challenge. However, there is no empirical data to support the GAO contention that it would be a problem that would impede the U.S. response to a MRC. In fact, based on our own historical experiences and after-action analyses, the Air Force has the demonstrated capabilities to rapidly move from one theater to another. For instance, Air Force assets that are currently deployed in support of OPERATION RESTORE DEMOCRACY in Haiti were able to respond to OPERATION VIGILANT WARRIOR when Iraq threatened Kuwait in 1990.

Naval Forces: The DoD does not agree that naval forces may not be able to disengage quickly and move to an MRC because of the distance between operations. Naval forces are able to transit long distances in a relatively short amount of time. For instance, in December of 1992, the USS RANGER and USS TRIPOLI traveled 2000 miles during a 5-day period of time to participate in the Somalia UNITAF Operation. The total amount of time needed to move ships from one operation to another is constrained more by operational requirements than on the distance between operations. The GAO noted that it took approximately 7 months to resolve a crisis in Liberia in 1990/1991—thus delaying the amphibious ready group's (ARG) departure to participate in OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. However, those forces could have been moved sooner had they been needed in the Persian Gulf. The amount of time taken to move those naval forces was not a result of difficulty associated with disengaging from a peace operation but was, instead, an operational decision—made U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)—that was made based upon where the ARG was most needed at a given point in time. Furthermore, when needed by the CINC to participate in OPERATION DESERT STORM, the ARG was quickly able to disengage and participate in a theater level conflict.

o FINDING I: Disengagement from Peace Operations and Redeployment to MRCs Would Be Difficult. The GAO concluded that the disengagement and redeployment from a sizable peace operation to one or more MRCs would not be easy. First, the GAO asserted that critical logistics support forces would be needed to facilitate a redeployment from the peace operation in the early days of a major regional conflict. Second, the GAO asserted that airlift and sealift assets needed to deploy people and equipment to a major regional conflict theater would have to be diverted to the peace operation theater to pick up personnel and equipment. Finally, the GAO asserted that many of the combat and support forces, which had participated in the peace operation, would not be ready to deploy directly to another major operation without additional training, equipment, and supplies.

The GAO found that the U.S. military forces would encounter numerous challenges if they needed to redeploy on short notice from one or more sizable peace operations to an MRC. The GAO asserted that obtaining sufficient airlift would be one of the primary challenges. The GAO noted that the Air Force has not yet fully studied the implication of such a redeployment and could not quantify the impact. The GAO also...
asserted that critical Army contingency support forces (such as port handlers, air and sea movement control personnel, and petroleum handlers) needed in the early days of an MRC, would still be needed within the peace operation theater to facilitate the disengagement and redeployment. According to Navy officials, the GAO indicated that the response of Navy ships to an MRC would depend more on their overall distance to the crisis location than on the operations they were currently conducting—e.g., it took approximately 7 months to break loose the amphibious ready groups from an operation in Liberia in 1990/1991 during the height of Desert Shield/Desert Storm. (p. 9, pp. 61-63/GAO Draft Report)

**DOD RESPONSE:** Nonconcurs. As discussed in the DoD response to Finding I, the DoD acknowledges that disengagement from one or more sizable peace operations and redeployment of forces to an MRC on short notice could pose operational challenges. However, the DoD does not agree that those challenges would make prevent it from being able to respond rapidly to an MRC. The DoD analyses indicate that many of the units needed for an MRC are not the same as those that would be required during the initial stages of an MRC. Moreover, even if it is necessary to disengage some low density units from a peace operation, the DoD has the capability to rapidly move those capabilities from one theater to another. From historical experience, the DoD is convinced that it has sufficient flexibility through the use of active and reserve units, host nation support, and civilian contractors to adequately respond to such contingencies, should they arise.

**FINDING K: Options for Easing the Strain of Peace Operations.** The GAO concluded that there are options available for reducing the impact of continued participation in numerous and/or sizable sustained peace operations on military forces while maintaining the capability to rapidly respond to MRCs. The GAO acknowledged that those options have their own impacts and will require choices on the use of the nation's resources. The GAO also noted that, while there are costs associated with some of the options, the GAO has not examined their magnitude or how the DoD might fund them. For example, the GAO noted that one option involves increasing the availability of support forces for peace operations by maintaining fewer combat and more support forces on active duty. The GAO pointed out that the Army maintains limited numbers of certain types of support capability on active duty and substantial active combat capability. The GAO added that, while changing the mix of active combat and support forces would make more support forces available for peace operations, it would decrease available active combat forces for regional conflicts. The GAO observed that senior Army officials have characterized the planned level of combat forces as the minimum force required to meet a two MRC strategy. The GAO indicated that, alternatively, the DoD may be able to increase the number of combat and combat service support forces without decreasing the number of combat forces by making more use of civilian employees.

The GAO also concluded that another option involves greater use of the reserves as opposed to changing the force mix. The GAO asserted that using the reserves would also ease the impact on Army support forces as well as on Air Force airlift and combat forces. The GAO pointed
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out that the President called up approximately 1,900 reservists to support the September 1994 military intervention in Haiti. The GAO indicated that prior to that call-up, the President's Selected Reserve Call-up Authority had been invoked only once since its 1976 enactment—for the Gulf War—and had not been invoked for the operations in Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1989, and Somalia in 1992. However, the GAO acknowledged that involuntary use of the reserves for peace operations would be disruptive to reservists' lives and could affect the willingness of Americans to join the reserves.

In addition, the GAO concluded that other options include making greater use of contractors to augment support forces, using worldwide Air Force assets, rather than regional assets to support peace operations, and changing forward presence and deployment goals to relieve the strain on naval forces. The GAO asserted that, although no one option addresses all the problems identified, a combination of the options could substantially ease the problems. (pp. 9-10, pp. 65-70/GAO Draft Report)

**DOD RESPONSE:** Partially concur. The DoD acknowledges there are options for easing the strain of peace operations on certain units. However, the feasibility, cost and impact of each option must also be considered. As recognized by the GAO, the DoD is continuing to reassess force structure requirements and is examining all available options.

- **FINDING 1:** Accept the Status Quo. The GAO also concluded that the alternative to using defense resources differently is to accept the status quo and continue to treat peace operations as a secondary mission. However, the GAO asserted that the risk of accepting the status quo is that it would continue the strain on the military as a result of its participation in peace operations, and could adversely affect the military's ability to respond to an MRC if one should occur while military forces were engaged in a sizable peace operation or several smaller ones. The GAO indicated that whether the risk is acceptable in part depends on how often the United States engages in sizable peace operations and their duration. The GAO also indicated that it depends on whether the Services can mitigate the risks, such as through the introduction of training simulators for forces deployed on peace operations, as has been done in Macedonia, through greater use of civilian contractor logistics support. The GAO acknowledged that each operation is different in terms of size, operating environment, and duration. However, the GAO concluded that, ultimately, if policy makers believe that the likelihood of U.S. involvement in large scale, extended duration operations is low, the risk may be much more acceptable than if they believe the likelihood is high. (pp. 70-71/GAO Draft Report)

**DOD RESPONSE:** Partially concur. The DoD agrees that the force structure must be adapted to the realities of the post-Cold War security environment. In fact, the Bottom-Up Review was a major step in that direction. The DoD continues to analyze requirements to meet the dangers to U.S. national security, and will make whatever adjustments are necessary. However, the DoD does not agree that the current force structure could adversely affect the military's ability
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now on pp. 8-9 and 55.

See comment 15.

The DoD recognizes that rapidly moving forces from one operation to another may pose operational challenges. The Department is confident that our force structure and commanders are flexible enough to find prudent ways to overcome such obstacles. During the recent deployment of forces to Kuwait during OPERATION VIGILANT WARRIOR, some of those critical units which the GAO stated would delay response to an MRC were quickly moved from Haiti to Kuwait. In fact, contrary to the conclusions drawn by the GAO, the operational deployment to Haiti actually facilitated a timely response to a MRC-like operation being conducted in a completely different theater of operations.

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RECOMMENDATION

- **RECOMMENDATION:** The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to reexamine whether high priority support units that would deploy early in a crisis should still be manned at 10 to 20 percent below their authorized strength. (p. 11, p. 75/GAO Draft Report)

**DOD RESPONSE:** Partially concur. As discussed in the DoD response to E, I, and L, the Army is currently performing the Total Army Analysis 2003 (TAA 2003), to assess the force structure needs of the Army and to ensure that the Army is capable of meeting the requirements specified in the Bottom-Up Review. Accordingly, no Secretary of Defense direction is necessary. The Manning level of high priority support units is one of the many issues that is being examined as part of the Army analysis. The DoD expects the TAA 2003 to be complete in mid-1995. Should shortfalls be identified during the course of the Army analysis, the DoD will take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that those shortfalls are addressed—to include the creation of additional force structure for support forces, if that is required.
The following are GAO’s specific comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) letter dated February 7, 1995.

**GAO Comments**

1. We make one recommendation in our report, regarding the need to reexamine whether high priority support units that would deploy early in a crisis should be manned at less than 100 percent of their authorized strength. DOD’s response to that recommendation appears on the last page of its written comments.

2. We agree that in recent years there has been a proliferation of terms used to describe military operations other than war. We also agree that the United States has participated in disaster relief and humanitarian relief operations for many years and have revised our report to reflect this fact. Regarding our revised definition of peace operations, we are using the same definition used in the DOD Inspector General’s September 1994 report entitled Specialized Military Training for Peace Operations. The peace operations identified in table 1.1 of our report are included in the Secretary of Defense’s January 1994 Annual Report to the President and Congress except for Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, which was authorized after the date of the Secretary’s report.

3. DOD disagrees with our conclusions regarding the extent that peace operations may have stressed military capabilities. DOD specifically focuses its comments on our discussion of how peace operations have stressed specialized aircraft, noting that there were other aircraft in addition to the aircraft we enumerate as available. Our report states that the aircraft cited in table 2.3 were the average number of aircraft available for mission ready training or deployment to a contingency in June 1994 and that the number excluded test aircraft and/or aircraft undergoing depot, phase, or intermediate phase maintenance. The aircraft we list were the ones available for immediate use. We have revised our report to state that forward deployment of U.S. forces, including aircraft, can enhance the ability to respond to regional conflicts.

4. Our discussion focuses on support forces that participated in peace and domestic relief operations, not installation support. We have revised our report to clarify the impact of cross-leveling and frequent deployments on the ability of a unit’s non-deployed elements to meet their operational responsibilities.

5. We have clarified our discussion of the Army’s use of reserve volunteers.
6. As discussed in comment 2, the Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report characterizes the operations identified by DOD in this comment as U.S. forces acting in support of U.N. peace operations. We have revised our report to exclude the E-3 AWACS aircraft used in the drug interdiction program from our count of such aircraft used in peace operations. While we agree that participating in peace operations provides aircrews valuable practical experience, as we discuss in chapter 2, aircrews flying extended hours in these operations sometimes do not get the opportunity to train to the broad range of skills necessary for maintaining combat efficiency.

7. DOD does not believe that the use of significant percentages of types of support units in Somalia represents the existence of a shortfall in capabilities. DOD states that substitute units or capabilities are available in almost all cases and that recent contingency operations, specifically the initial deployment of U.S. forces to deter potential Iraqi aggression against Kuwait while U.S. forces were involved in Haiti, verify the correctness of U.S. force posture. Our report discusses the use of a large proportion of certain types of support forces in Somalia that are designated for early deployment to a MRC because there is a limited number of such forces in the active component. As DOD points out, there are options available for some support missions, such as the use of contractors. However, these options may not be immediately available. We discuss several alternatives that would allow DOD to meet the demands of peace operations while maintaining the capability to rapidly respond to MRCs. Until DOD takes steps to ease the strain on active duty forces it will have to initially rely on active duty units to rapidly respond to a MRC.

8. Our discussion focuses on the early availability of certain Army support forces, Air Force specialized aircraft, and Army and Marine Corps afloat prepositioned equipment. We agree that infantry units engaged in peace operations are likely to have adequate time to redeploy to a MRC.

9. The changes in end strength have decreased the Army’s flexibility to provide more support units in areas of need. The 13,000 person decrement represents a net decrease in end strength for the active component and the U.S. Army Reserve—those components that provide most of the Army’s support units—and an increase in the Army National Guard’s end strength. Within its increased end strength, the National Guard is retaining more combat positions than it retained under the base force. Because of the decreases in end strength in the active and U.S. Army reserve components and the fact that the increased National Guard end strength is being used
to retain combat positions, the Army has less flexibility for providing more support units within its end strength.

10. We state that aircraft and aircrews could easily fly from one operation to another and have revised the report to state that forward deployment of U.S. forces, including aircraft, can enhance the ability to respond to regional conflicts. Regarding redeploying maintenance and logistics units from a peace operation to a MRC, we state that the Air Force has not yet fully studied the airlift implications of redeploying forces from a peace operation to a MRC and hence could not quantify the impact of this delay on the Air Force’s ability to meet MRC deployment requirements. We agree that redeploying forces from one operation to another may not necessarily increase lift requirements. However, until DOD examines the lift requirements for such redeployments, we believe that the specific impact is unknown.

11. We have revised the report to reflect this information.

12. As discussed in chapter 3, our analysis comparing the support capabilities needed in the first 30 days of a MRC with the contingency support capabilities deployed to Somalia indicated that in some cases 100 percent of some of these active component support forces were used in Somalia.

13. We agree that feasibility, cost, and, impact of each option must be considered. Chapter 4 discusses some of the difficulties that could be associated with these options and recognizes that there are costs associated with them.

14. We are not making a blanket statement about the adequacy of current force structure to respond to a MRC while U.S. military forces are engaged in a sizable peace operation or several smaller ones. Our report identifies certain limited capabilities that could affect a timely response to a MRC and states that peace operations have had less impact on other forces, such as Army armored combat divisions and general purpose combat aircraft outside Europe. As DOD notes, U.S. forces quickly responded to the possibility of Iraqi aggression against Kuwait while U.S. forces were engaged in Haiti. Since these events occurred after we had completed our audit work, we were not in a position to analyze them.

15. DOD partially agrees with our recommendation, but it states that it is addressing the matter we raise as part of Total Army Analysis 2003. We
Appendix I
Comments From the Department of Defense

believe that if this action is completed, it would meet the intent of our recommendation and we have revised our recommendation to reflect this.
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