April 30, 2010

Congressional Committees

Subject: Quadrennial Defense Review: 2010 Report Addressed Many but Not All Required Items

The Department of Defense (DOD) is facing the complex challenge of simultaneously supporting continuing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and preparing its military forces to meet emerging threats of the new security environment. Congress appropriated $626 billion for DOD’s fiscal year 2010 budget and to support current operations. As we have emphasized in previous reports, the federal government is facing serious long-term fiscal challenges, and DOD may confront increased competition over the next decade for federal discretionary funds.\(^1\) The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the fourth since 1997 and the second since the start of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, articulates DOD’s strategic plan to rebalance capabilities in order to prevail in current operations and develop capabilities to meet future threats. The QDR acknowledged that the country faces fiscal challenges and that DOD must make difficult trade-offs where warranted. Also, the QDR results are intended to guide the services in making resource allocation decisions when developing future budgets.

DOD is required by law to conduct a comprehensive examination of the national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies of the United States, every 4 years, with a view toward determining and expressing the nation’s defense strategy and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years.\(^2\) In addition to the 14 reporting requirements specified in the 1999 legislation that established the standing requirement for the QDR in the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007,\(^3\) Congress added 2 new reporting elements to be included in subsequent QDRs, including the requirement to report on the specific capabilities needed to achieve the strategic and warfighting objectives. The department submitted its report on the fourth

---


quadrennial review to Congress on February 1, 2010. According to DOD officials, DOD separately provided supplemental information in a classified format to the four congressional defense committees.  

Section 1051 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires GAO to report to the congressional defense committees and the Secretary of Defense not later than 90 days after QDR report was released on the degree to which the QDR report addressed the 17 specific reporting items required by law. This letter and enclosure I provide our assessment of the degree to which DOD addressed each of these items in its 2010 report on the QDR and the supplemental information provided to the defense committees. The legislation also requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to the congressional defense committees that directly addresses those items that GAO assessed as not directly addressed by the QDR no later than 30 days after the submission of GAO’s report. The legislation that establishes the requirements for the QDR review and report is reprinted in enclosure II.

**DOD’s Approach to the 2010 QDR**

DOD used the 2008 National Defense Strategy as the starting point for the 2010 QDR review. The strategy described an environment shaped by globalization, violent extremist movements, rogue and unstable states, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. For its 2010 QDR analyses, DOD examined forces needed for three different sets of scenarios, each consisting of multiple concurrent operations, chosen to reflect the complexity and range of events that may occur in multiple theaters in overlapping timeframes in the mid-term (5 to 7 years in the future). The range of potential operations included homeland defense, defense support to civil authorities responding to a catastrophic event in the United States, a major stabilization operation, deterring and defeating regional aggressors, and a medium-sized counterinsurgency mission.

According to the QDR report, DOD used the results of its analyses to make decisions on how to size and shape the force and to inform its choices on resourcing priorities. For example, according to DOD officials, the proposed fiscal year 2011 defense budget focuses investments toward the priorities outlined in the QDR report, such as rebalancing the force.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy had the lead role in conducting the 2010 QDR. To conduct the QDR analyses, DOD established four issue teams, each co-chaired by representatives from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation division of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Staff. Issue teams included: (1) irregular warfare, (2) high-end asymmetric threats, (3) global posture, and (4) homeland defense and support to civil authorities. A

---

4 The four defense committees are the House Committee on Armed Services, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Defense of the House Committee on Appropriations, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Senate Committee on Appropriations. The supplemental information contained some classified information, and is therefore not publicly available.

5 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84 § 1051 (2009). Although the law refers to the “2009 QDR”, the QDR report was issued in February 2010, and we refer to it in this report as the “2010 QDR”.

Page 2 GAO-10-575R Quadrennial Defense Review
fifth team integrated the work of the four issue teams. According to DOD officials, each team was comprised of relevant stakeholders and subject matter experts from across the department. The results of the teams’ analyses, including proposed solutions to identified gaps and shortfalls, were reviewed and vetted within the department by representatives from across DOD, including representatives from the military services, combatant commands, Joint Staff, and key offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, such as the Office of the Comptroller and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. The Secretary of Defense chaired a committee of senior leaders to provide guidance and make final decisions. As part of the process, DOD officials said that they coordinated the analyses and communicated the results with other ongoing reviews, such as the Nuclear Posture Review and the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements 2016 study. DOD officials also engaged in discussions with other federal agencies, including the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security, as well as the intelligence community. In addition, DOD held outreach discussions with allied and other countries and had representatives of some allied countries participate in issue team discussions.

**Scope and Methodology**

For our assessment of the extent to which the 2010 QDR report addressed the required reporting items, we reviewed the QDR report and classified supplemental information provided to congressional defense committees to assess whether each item was addressed, addressed in part, or not directly addressed in the QDR report and supplemental information. Specifically, we independently reviewed and compared the QDR report and supplemental information with the legislative requirements and assessed whether each item was addressed, addressed in part, or not directly addressed. The final assessment reflected our consensus based on the individual assessments. We considered an item addressed if all parts of the item were explicitly included in either the QDR report or the supplemental information. We considered the item addressed in part if one or more parts were included, but not all parts were explicitly addressed. We considered an item not directly addressed if neither the QDR report nor the supplementary information explicitly addressed any part of the required item. In addition, we interviewed DOD officials involved in the QDR analysis to discuss their interpretation of the legislative requirements and the review’s analytic approach and findings. We did not evaluate DOD’s process and methodology or validate the results of the QDR analyses. We conducted this performance audit from February 2010 to April 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. Additional information regarding our scope and methodology appears in enclosure III.

---

6 According to DOD officials, DOD had also initially established a team to improve efficiency and cost-effectiveness in business processes, but this team was dissolved because other DOD offices were doing comparable work, the results of which, according to DOD officials, were incorporated in the QDR report. There were also additional cross-cutting teams which met as needed to support the work of the four issue teams, such as a cyber issues team.
GAO’s Assessment of the Extent to Which the 2010 QDR Report and Supplemental Information Addressed Required Reporting Items

Our analysis showed that of the 17 required reporting items, DOD addressed 6, partially addressed 7, and did not directly address 4. The items not directly addressed included items addressing the anticipated roles and missions of the reserve component, the advisability of revisions to the Unified Command Plan, the extent to which resources must be shifted among two or more theaters, and the appropriate ratio of combat to support forces. According to DOD officials, these items were not directly addressed for a variety of reasons such as changes in the operational environment, the difficulty of briefly summarizing a large volume of data generated through the QDR analyses, or departmental plans to report on some items separately. Table 1 below shows the items required to be included in the QDR report and our assessment of each item.
Table 1: GAO Assessment of Required Items in DOD’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Required Items and Comments</th>
<th>Our Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>(1)</strong> The results of the review, including a comprehensive discussion of the national defense strategy of the United States, the strategic planning guidance, and the force structure best suited to implement that strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk.</td>
<td>Addressed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Comments:** The QDR report included a discussion of the national defense strategy, including four objectives: prevail in today’s wars; prevent and deter conflict; prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies; and preserve and enhance the all-volunteer force. The QDR report also discussed six cross-cutting missions that that are required to achieve these objectives. The report included strategic planning guidance by identifying capability enhancements and included a force structure list covering the major combat elements of each military service that is intended to implement the defense strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk.

| **(2)** The assumed or defined national security interests of the United States that inform the national defense strategy defined in the review. | Addressed |

**Comments:** The QDR report described U.S. interests as linked to the international system and listed national security interests as security, prosperity, broad respect for universal values, and an international order that promotes cooperative action. The report also asserted that advancing these interests is best accomplished by integrating all elements of national power including strong regional allies and partners.

| **(3)** The threats to the assumed or defined national security interests of the United States that were examined for the purposes of the review and the scenarios developed in the examination of those threats. | Addressed |

**Comments:** The QDR report outlined current and near-term threats confronting the United States and explained the scenarios DOD used in the QDR analyses. The report emphasized that the U.S. is currently at war and discussed the need for DOD to remain cognizant of global issues such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Unlike past reviews that called for U.S forces to be able to fight and win two major regional conflicts, the 2010 QDR report asserted that U.S. forces must be capable of conducting a wide range of operations, including homeland defense and deterrence as well as defeating regional aggressors. The scenarios analyzed included a combination of types of operations reflecting a wide range of operations in multiple theaters in overlapping timeframes.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Required Items and Comments</th>
<th>Our Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>(4) The assumptions used in review, including assumptions relating to</strong>—(a) the status of readiness of United States forces; (b) the cooperation of allies, mission-sharing and additional benefits to and burdens on United States forces resulting from coalition operations; (c) warning times; (d) levels of engagement in operations other than war and smaller-scale contingencies and withdrawal from such operations and contingencies; and (e) the intensity, duration, and military and political end-states of conflicts and smaller-scale contingencies.</td>
<td><strong>Addressed in Part</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Comments:** The QDR report and the supplemental information provided to the congressional defense committees discussed the assumptions underlying the QDR analyses in general terms but did not specifically include all the assumptions as required.

- Assumptions regarding readiness were not directly addressed in terms of readiness levels as reported in DOD’s readiness reporting systems. DOD officials told us they used rotation rates in the scenario analyses as a proxy for readiness, but the assumed rotation rates were not fully reported.

- Although assumptions regarding the details of allied cooperation were included in the scenarios, only a general discussion of allied participation was reported which did not include details such as the types of forces or capabilities that allies may provide.

- Examples of assumptions relating to warning times were included in the supplemental information but not all the warning time assumptions of all the scenarios were reported.

- The scenarios analyzed included U.S. forces participating in a wide range of activities short of war, although the QDR report did not use the terms “operations other than war” and “smaller-scale contingencies.”

- The supplemental information included a general discussion of phases of a variety of types of operations but did not discuss assumptions regarding end-states.

| **(5) The effect on the force structure and on readiness for high-intensity combat of preparations for and participation in operations other than war and smaller-scale contingencies.** | **Addressed in Part** |

**Comments:** The QDR report and supplemental information discussed the need for forces to be capable of engaging in combat operations as well as a wide range of smaller operations, but these documents did not specifically explain the effects of these smaller operations on the force structure or readiness for high-intensity combat. For example, these documents did not discuss whether involvement in smaller types of operations may result in lowered readiness for high-intensity operations as measured by DOD’s readiness reporting systems.

According to DOD officials, analysis of the effects of participation in small-scale contingencies on combat readiness and force structure were accounted for in the QDR scenario analyses. As the scenarios began, some forces were rotated back to the United States for retraining to be ready for the high-intensity operations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Required Items and Comments</th>
<th>Our Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(6) The manpower and sustainment policies required under the national defense strategy to support engagement in conflicts lasting longer than 120 days.</td>
<td>Addressed in Part</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Comments:** The QDR report discussed various manpower policies, such as objectives for rotation rates, in detail, but discussed sustainment activities in very general terms. The manpower policies discussed include a wide variety of issues such as improving wounded warrior care and revising bonus policies to retain personnel. Regarding sustainment, DOD officials explained that the department interpreted the requirement to mean an assessment of DOD’s ability to continue operations by sustaining a rotation of forces into and out of ongoing operations, which was included in the scenario analyses. However, for purposes other than the QDR report, DOD also defines sustainment as providing logistical support—food, fuel, spare parts—to maintain operations. According to DOD officials, the QDR analyses did not include a detailed analysis of re-supplying forward deployed forces.

(7) The anticipated roles and missions of the reserve components in the national defense strategy and the strength, capabilities, and equipment necessary to assure that the reserve components can capably discharge those roles and missions.

**Comments:** Neither the QDR report nor the supplemental information discussed the roles and missions of the reserve components. The QDR report stated that the proper mix and roles of active and reserve components is a key force management issue. The report also stated that DOD will conduct a comprehensive review of the future roles of the reserve components which, according to DOD officials, may be completed in early 2011.

(8) The appropriate ratio of combat forces to support forces (commonly referred to as the ‘tooth-to-tail’ ratio) under the national defense strategy, including, in particular, the appropriate number and size of headquarters units and Defense Agencies for that purpose.

**Comments:** The QDR report did not include a specific ratio of combat forces to support forces and did not identify the appropriate number or size of headquarters units or defense agencies. The supplemental information noted that DOD’s forces should be as lean as possible, and that the distinction between combat and support forces has become blurred in the current operational environment.

(9) The specific capabilities, including general number and type of specific military platforms, needed to achieve the strategic and warfighting objectives identified in the review.

**Comments:** The QDR report listed the organizations and platform types that encompass the major combat elements of each of the services, and discussed the capabilities that the department assessed as needed to accomplish each of the six missions of the defense strategy. The QDR report noted that it did not list all the support forces but did discuss some support capabilities the department would like to expand such as increased availability of rotary wing assets. Finally, the supplementary information provided to the defense committees described the analysis and issues for various elements of the force structure including fighters, bombers, and the Navy battle force.

(10) The strategic and tactical air-lift, sea-lift, and ground transportation capabilities required to support the national defense strategy.

**Comments:** The QDR report listed selected mobility resources and noted that the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016, which was issued in February 2010, contained more detailed information on the number of air-lift, sea-lift, and ground transportation platforms required to support the strategy.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Required Items and Comments</th>
<th>Our Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>(11)</strong> The forward presence, pre-positioning, and other anticipatory deployments necessary under the national defense strategy for conflict deterrence and adequate military response to anticipated conflicts.</td>
<td>Addressed in Part</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comments:</strong> The QDR report discussed forward presence and anticipatory deployments in general terms and did not discuss what quantities, types, and locations of pre-positioned equipment were needed under the defense strategy. The QDR report stated that U.S. presence is to support operations, deter threats, and reassure allies and partners. However, according to DOD officials, the department is continuing to study how presence might be changed to better support the defense strategy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(12)</strong> The extent to which resources must be shifted among two or more theaters under the national defense strategy in the event of conflict in such theaters.</td>
<td>Not Directly Addressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comments:</strong> Neither the QDR report nor the supplementary information characterized the extent to which resources must be shifted among two or more theaters. The supplementary information acknowledged that moving forces from one theater to another is an option for managing shortfalls in capabilities. However, neither the QDR report nor the supplementary information quantified how many or what kind of resources might need to be shifted or which theaters might need to receive resources from another.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(13)</strong> The advisability of revisions to the Unified Command Plan as a result of the national defense strategy.</td>
<td>Not Directly Addressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comments:</strong> The QDR report did not discuss the advisability of revisions to the Unified Command Plan. However, DOD is required by law to update this plan not less than every 2 years. According to DOD officials, the next update, scheduled to be issued in the fall 2010, will incorporate QDR results.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(14)</strong> The effect on force structure of the use by the armed forces of technologies anticipated to be available for the ensuing 20 years.</td>
<td>Addressed in Part</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comments:</strong> The QDR report discussed a number of new technologies anticipated to be available such as expanding the capacity of attack submarines for long-range strike and capabilities for defending cyber networks. However, the QDR report did not specify the effects of technology on force structure in terms of the numbers and types of units and platforms.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(15)</strong> The national defense mission of the Coast Guard.</td>
<td>Addressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comments:</strong> The supplemental information provided to the defense committees cited several Coast Guard national defense missions such as domestic and expeditionary port operations and port defense, and coastal sea control operations. In addition, the supplemental information cited a May 2008 memorandum of agreement between DOD and the Department of Homeland Security on the use of the Coast Guard that further describes these missions. For example, port operations and defense are designed to ensure that port areas are free of threats and safe for navigation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Required Items and Comments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Comments</th>
<th>Our Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(16) The homeland defense and support to civil authority missions of the active and reserve components, including the organization and capabilities required for the active and reserve components to discharge each such mission.</td>
<td>the QDR report included a general discussion of this item and discussed initiatives for enhancing capabilities, but the QDR report did not clearly identify the active and reserve component missions for homeland defense and support to civil authorities or specify the organization and capabilities of the active and reserve components required to discharge those missions.</td>
<td>Addressed in Part</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(17) Any other matter the Secretary considers appropriate.</td>
<td>The supplemental information referred to three issues in the QDR report as addressing this item:</td>
<td>Addressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• taking care of U.S. servicemembers and their families;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• institutional reform; and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• global defense posture and deterrence.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Enclosure I includes our detailed evaluation of each of the above required reporting items.

### Concluding Observations

The 2010 QDR report presented the results of DOD’s review and, together with the supplemental information, addressed many of the reporting items that are required by law. The reasons for not directly addressing four of the required items are varied and include: reporting on items separately; the changing operational environment; or difficulty in succinctly characterizing voluminous data resulting from the scenario analyses. In previous reports we have examined the strengths and weaknesses of the previous QDRs and made recommendations for strengthening analytic approaches, especially in determining the force structure best suited to execute the defense strategy. We reported that the previous QDR did not adequately assess different options for organizing and sizing DOD’s forces to provide needed capabilities and that DOD did not fully apply its risk management framework because DOD had not developed assessment tools to measure risk. In addition, in our 2007 report we noted that some defense analysts suggested that eliminating some reporting requirements—such as those that may no longer be relevant due to changes in the security environment or those that are addressed in other reports—could enable DOD to focus its quadrennial review and reporting on broad strategic issues. For example, DOD officials noted that calculating a single preferred ratio of combat to support forces would be difficult given the blurring between combat and support activities in the new security environment where support activities are increasingly forward deployed and subject to enemy attack, and technology has enabled remote participation in combat activities, such as through remotely piloted vehicles. In our 2007 report we suggested that Congress consider revisions to the QDR

---

legislation, including eliminating some detail on reporting elements that could be addressed in different reports or may no longer be relevant due to changes in the security environment. We continue to believe that these options could help clarify Congress’s expectations for the report and encourage DOD to focus on high priority matters.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD recognized that the department did not directly address four items in the QDR report. DOD stated that a review of the QDR legislative requirements is merited in light of the changed security environment and that eliminating or revising some of the reporting items could help to ensure that the next QDR focuses on the issues of greatest saliency. DOD’s comments included a discussion of why each of the four items was not addressed—either work is on-going or DOD believes the item is no longer relevant in the current security environment. The department’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in enclosure IV. In addition, DOD officials provided technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate.

We are sending copies of the report to the congressional defense committees. This report is also available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Should you or your staffs have any questions, please contact me at (404) 679-1816 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report were Margaret G. Morgan, Assistant Director; Brenda M. Waterfield, Analyst-in-Charge; Simon J. Hirschfeld; Erika A. Prochaska; Rachel E. Dunsmoor, Ophelia Robinson, Terry Richardson, K. Nicole Harms, and Erik S. Wilkins-McKee.

John H. Pendleton
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

Enclosures–4
List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
The Honorable John McCain
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman
The Honorable Thad Cochran
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

The Honorable Ike Skelton
Chairman
The Honorable Howard P. McKeon
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

The Honorable Norman D. Dicks
Chairman
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Reporting Requirement

According to 10 U.S.C. § 118 (d)(1), the QDR report shall include the results of the review, including a comprehensive discussion of the national defense strategy of the United States, the strategic planning guidance, and the force structure best suited to implement that strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk.

Our Assessment: Addressed

Based on our assessment, we found that this item was addressed.

Detailed Assessment of This Item

We found that this item was addressed because the QDR report and supplemental information explained the defense strategy, discussed strategic planning guidance, and identified major elements of force structure required to implement the strategy at a low-to-moderate risk level. The report identified four objectives of the defense strategy: prevail in today’s wars; prevent and deter conflict; prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies; and preserve and enhance the all-volunteer force. To achieve these objectives, the report identified six key missions: defend the United States and support civil authorities; achieve success in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations; build the security capacity of partner states; deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments; prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction; and operate effectively in cyberspace. Department of Defense (DOD) officials explained that the objectives and missions collectively constitute the defense strategy.

The QDR report offered strategic planning guidance by identifying capability enhancements needed to address shortfalls that, officials believe, will enable the department to implement the defense strategy. The guidance was based on the findings from DOD’s analyses of three scenarios that it used to identify the force structure and capabilities needed in the mid-term to conduct the six missions and achieve each of the four defense objectives. The QDR analyses identified some capability gaps and shortfalls in current forces, which were discussed in the QDR report. For example, some of the enhancements needed to conduct the counterinsurgency mission include increasing the availability of rotary-wing assets, expanding aircraft systems for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and improving capabilities to counter improvised explosive devices. DOD expects the services to use this guidance in making resource allocation decisions as they plan for the size and capabilities of their respective forces. The QDR report also included more general strategic planning guidance such as identifying broad areas for development of future capabilities—for example, long-range strike—and directing needed studies, such as the study of reserve component roles and missions.

The QDR report included a force structure list of the major combat elements of each service. DOD officials told us that they chose to identify only major force elements because a comprehensive force list would be too lengthy. In the supplemental information provided to the defense committees, DOD stated that the force structure reflected in the fiscal years 2011-2015 Future Years Defense Program is intended to execute the defense strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk, predicated on the assumption that the United States will reduce its forces in Iraq and make progress toward accomplishing its missions in Afghanistan, and will therefore be able to return to a sustainable rotation rate and “reset” readiness to conduct the full range of missions.
According to 10 U.S.C. § 118 (d)(2), the QDR shall include the assumed or defined national security interests of the United States that inform the national defense strategy defined in the review.

Our Assessment: Addressed

Based on our assessment, we found that this item was addressed.

Reporting Item: Assumed or Defined National Security Interests

We found that this item was addressed because the QDR report included statements on the assumed main national security interests that inform the strategy. The report described America’s main national security interests as inextricably linked to the integrity and resilience of the international system and lists as chief national security interests security, prosperity, broad respect for universal values, and an international order that promotes cooperative action. The QDR report asserted that advancing these interests is best accomplished by integrating all elements of national power, including diplomacy, economic development, cooperation and engagement, and strong allies and partners. The QDR report discussed the interests the United States has in common with allies and partners, such as NATO countries. It also discusses the importance of building relationships in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere. For example, the report discussed interests the United States shares with Russia such as countering proliferation and confronting terrorism, and with Korea and Japan in building alliances and restructuring allied security roles and capabilities.
Reporting Requirement

According to 10 U.S.C. § 118 (d)(3), the QDR report shall include the threats to the assumed or defined national security interests of the United States that were examined for the purposes of the review and the scenarios developed in the examination of those threats.

Our Assessment: Addressed

Based on our assessment, we found that this item was addressed.

Detailed Assessment of This Item

We found that this item was addressed because the QDR report outlined current and near-term threats confronting the United States and explained the scenarios the Department of Defense (DOD) used in the QDR analyses.

The report described a time of complexity and uncertainty in the security environment and challenges faced by the United States in pursuing the national goals of promoting stability in key regions, providing assistance to nations in need, and promoting the common good. The report emphasized that the United States is currently at war, with ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and continuing assistance to Pakistan to counter threats from violent extremists. The report discussed the need for DOD to remain cognizant of global geopolitical changes, such as the rise of China and India, operational threats due to the increased power of nonstate actors with access to advanced technology, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The report also noted that powerful trends, such as rising demand for resources and cultural and demographic tensions, could spark or exacerbate future conflict. Finally, the report discussed continuing and future threats such as terrorist threats, the further development and spread of weapons for anti-access strategies, antiship cruise missiles, development of capabilities to disrupt or destroy satellites, and threats to cyberspace that may disrupt military networks.

Unlike past reviews that called for the armed forces to be able to fight and win two major regional conflicts in overlapping timeframes, the 2010 QDR report asserted that the armed forces must be capable of conducting a wide range of operations, including homeland defense, deterrence and preparedness missions, as well as defeating regional aggressors. To assess the force structure and capabilities needed to meet many types of demands, the 2010 QDR examined three scenario combinations designed to reflect current and projected security environment. Each scenario included a different combination of types of operations ranging from engaging in major stabilization operations, deterring and defeating two regional aggressors, conducting counterinsurgency, maintaining a long-duration deterrence operation, and extending support to civil authorities. The QDR report explained that the scenarios reflected the expectation that U.S. forces need to be capable of conducting a wide range of operations in multiple theaters in overlapping timeframes. The classified supplemental information DOD provided to the defense committees contained more details of the QDR scenarios than are provided in the unclassified report. The report noted that the force structure presented reflects the demands of ongoing operations, and that the appropriate size and mix of forces could change as demands evolve.
Reporting Requirement

According to 10 U.S.C. § 118 (d)(4), the QDR report shall include the assumptions used in the review, including assumptions relating to: (A) the status of readiness of United States forces; (B) the cooperation of allies, mission-sharing and additional benefits to and burdens on the United States forces resulting from coalition operations; (C) warning times; (D) levels of engagement in operations other than war and smaller-scale contingencies and withdrawal from such operations and contingencies; and (E) the intensity, duration, and military and political end-states of conflicts and smaller-scale contingencies.

Our Assessment: Addressed in Part

Based on our assessment, we found that this item was addressed in part.

Detailed Assessment of This Item

We found that this item was addressed in part because the QDR report and supplemental information provided to congressional defense committees discussed the assumptions underlying the QDR analysis in general terms but did not specifically include all assumptions required.

- Neither the QDR report nor the supplemental information directly addressed the assumptions relating to readiness in terms of DOD’s readiness reporting systems. Instead, DOD used rotation rates in the scenario analyses as a proxy for readiness, according to DOD officials. Since forces involved in on-going operations may not be immediately available or ready for a major event, the forces were assumed to rotate back to the United States for retraining before being made available for a major event in the scenarios. However, the rotation rates used as a proxy for readiness were also not fully reported in the report or supplemental information.

- While the supplemental information included some discussion of the assumptions relating to allied contributions, it did not set out the assumptions relating to the specific types of forces or capabilities allies may provide in each scenario, although these details were used in the QDR scenario analyses. The supplemental information noted that DOD continues to work with allies to better understand their capacity to contribute to coalition operations.

- The supplemental information included some examples of assumptions relating to warning times but did not include all warning times for all the scenarios. DOD officials explained that warning times were included as assumptions in each of the scenarios analyzed.

- The terms “operations other than war” and “smaller-scale contingencies” were not used in the QDR report, and DOD officials told us that these terms are generally no longer used by the department. However, the QDR report stated that U.S. forces must be capable of conducting a wide range of operations from homeland defense to deterrence, and the supplemental information stated that U.S. forces must be prepared to engage in a wide range of activities short of war. DOD officials told us that they assumed ongoing involvement in these activities in the analysis of three scenarios.

- Regarding assumptions as to the intensity, duration, and end states of conflicts, the supplemental information noted that DOD assessed the force against a wide range of scenarios and its analysis reflected various phases of operations, ranging from deterrence to warfighting to stabilization. However, the assumed military and political end states of conflicts were not defined.

In discussing these assumptions, DOD officials agreed with our assessment and stated that the scenario analyses yielded voluminous, classified data. The officials explained that they used their judgment on how much information was appropriate and prudent to report.
Reporting Requirement

According to 10 U.S.C. § 118 (d)(5), the QDR report shall include the effect on the force structure and on readiness for high-intensity combat of preparations for and participation in operations other than war and smaller-scale contingencies.

Our Assessment: Addressed in Part

Based on our assessment, we found that this item was addressed in part.

Detailed Assessment of This Item

We found that this item was addressed in part because although the QDR report and supplemental information provided to congressional defense committees presented a force structure designed to meet a range of threats and discussed the need for forces to be capable of engaging in combat operations as well as smaller-scale operations, these documents did not specifically explain the effects of smaller-scale operations on the force structure or on readiness for high-intensity combat.

The terms “operations other than war” and “smaller-scale contingencies” were not used in the QDR report, and Department of Defense (DOD) officials told us that these terms are generally no longer used by the department. DOD officials told us that the QDR’s scenario analyses assumed that U.S. forces will almost always be engaged in smaller-scale missions, such as deterrence operations or humanitarian relief missions—now called foundational activities. The analyses also assumed that over time, forces could be redirected to meet more pressing operational needs.

Neither the QDR report nor the supplemental information specified the effects on force structure and readiness for high-intensity combat of forces involved in foundational activities. For example, although the supplemental information stated that the biggest influence on the size of the force is long-duration stability and deterrence operations, the report did not provide details such as whether involvement in these types of operations results in the need for more brigades, or more aircraft squadrons, or more ships. Further, these documents did not discuss whether involvement in foundational activities may result in lowered readiness for high-intensity combat operations (as measured by DOD’s readiness reporting systems) for some portion of the force structure.

According to DOD officials, the effects of forces’ participation in foundational activities were accounted for in the QDR scenario analyses and the forces listed in the QDR report reflect the results of the scenario analyses which included involvement in foundational activities. For example, as each scenario began, some forces were not immediately available for the high-intensity operation but continued to be engaged in ongoing foundational activities. Before rotating to the high-intensity operation, these forces were rotated back to the United States for retraining to prepare for the high-intensity operation. DOD officials agreed that the effects on readiness are not explicitly reported because they viewed readiness as a force management issue and the QDR analyses focused on force capabilities and structure.
Reporting Item: Manpower and Sustainment Policies

Detailed Assessment of this Item

We found that this item was addressed in part because although the QDR report discussed several manpower policies, it did not include a discussion of sustainment policies required under the national defense strategy. The manpower policies that the QDR report discussed include a wide variety of issues such as wounded warrior care, managing deployment tempo, recruiting and retention, supporting families, developing future military leaders, and developing the total defense workforce. For example, in its discussion of recruiting and retention, the QDR report described the Department of Defense’s (DOD) efforts to revise bonus policies to retain personnel. Also, the QDR report discussed goals for wounded warrior care such as improving health benefits and creating new policies for mental health care. The report discussed sustainment in general terms, such as the need to reset equipment, increase the number and quality of key “enablers” such as logisticians and communications support assets, and continue to prioritize the effective delivery of logistical support. However, the report did not include a discussion of sustainment policies.

DOD officials explained that the department interpreted the reporting requirement for sustainment as an assessment of DOD’s ability to continue operations by sustaining a rotation of forces into and out of ongoing operations. This force movement was modeled in the QDR scenario analyses by using different rotation rates for active and reserve forces. By rotating forces, the model accounted for the need to rest and retrain personnel and the continuous movement of forces into an area to sustain operations. However, DOD also defines sustainment as providing logistics—delivering materiel such as ammunition, spare parts, and fuel to military forces—to maintain operations. According to DOD officials, the QDR analyses did not include a detailed analysis of supplying forces with food, fuel, and spare parts. Also, DOD officials said that the QDR analyses did not include a detailed assessment of contractor-provided support yet the Joint Staff concluded earlier this year that the joint force relies on contract support across all capability areas.

Related GAO Findings: Reliance on Contractor-Provided Support

We reported in 2006 that, since the 1990s, DOD has increasingly relied on contractors to meet many of its logistical support needs during combat operations. We also reported in March 2010 that few of the combatant commanders’ operation plans include information on contractor support and the information that is included provides little insight into the extent to which DOD will need to rely on contractors to support contingency operations.

1 GAO-07-145.
2 GAO-10-472.
Reporting Item: Roles, Missions, Strength, Capabilities, and Equipment of the Reserve Components

Detailed Assessment of This Item

We found that this item was not directly addressed because neither the QDR report nor the supplemental information provided to the defense committees discussed the roles and missions of the reserve components in the national defense strategy or outlined the strength, capabilities, and equipment necessary to discharge those roles and missions.

The QDR report explained that the defense strategy requires the reserves to serve in an operational capacity and necessitates the continued use of some high-demand skills in the reserve components. However, some statements in the report implied that the roles and missions of the reserve components might need to change. For example, the report stated that ensuring the proper mix and roles of active and reserve components is a key force management issue. Further, given the current operational tempo, Department of Defense (DOD) officials acknowledged that the department cannot meet its goal of demobilizing all reserve forces for 5 years for every 1 year mobilized. Finally, although the defense strategy requires the National Guard and the reserves to be integrated with the active component, the report did not explain how the reserve components' capabilities and equipment should complement those of the active components to achieve this integration. The force structure listed in the QDR report included some reserve units, but the list cited only examples of major force elements. The report also noted that existing National Guard forces will be used to build a homeland response force in each of the 10 Federal Emergency Management Agency regions.

DOD officials agreed that this item is not directly addressed even though some reserve forces are included in the force structure listed in the report. DOD officials agreed this is an important issue considering that heavy use of reserve forces over the last several years can have long-term consequences. The QDR report stated that over the coming year, DOD will conduct a comprehensive review of the future role of the reserve components, including an examination of the balance between active and reserve forces. DOD officials told us that the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs is responsible for conducting this study and expects it will be completed in early 2011.

Related GAO Findings: Reserves’ Missions Changing but Some Units Have Difficulty Meeting Readiness Goals

GAO reported in 2009 that the Army is changing the organization and missions of some of its reserve units to provide more operational forces, but faces challenges in achieving sustainable mobilization rates and readiness goals.\(^3\) In 2007, we found that planning for the National Guard's response to potential large-scale catastrophic events was not complete.\(^4\) These findings underscore the importance of DOD studying the roles and missions of the reserve components.

---

\(^3\) GAO-09-898.
\(^4\) GAO-07-60.
Reporting Requirement

According to 10 U.S.C. § 118 (d)(8), the QDR report shall include the appropriate ratio of combat forces to support forces (commonly referred to as the “tooth-to-tail” ratio) under the national defense strategy, including, in particular, the appropriate number and size of headquarters units and Defense Agencies for that purpose.

Our Assessment: Not Directly Addressed

Based on our assessment, we found that this item was not directly addressed.

Reporting Item: Ratio of Combat Forces to Support Forces

Detailed Assessment of This Item

We found that this item was not directly addressed because neither the QDR report nor the supplemental information provided to the defense committees identified a ratio of combat forces to support forces under the national defense strategy and neither identified the appropriate number or size of headquarters units or defense agencies for that purpose.

In the supplemental information provided to the defense committees, the Department of Defense (DOD) noted that the ratio of combat forces to support forces and enablers should be as lean as possible and that current operational environments blur the distinctions between combat and support forces. For example, support may need to be forward-deployed with forces engaged in combat operations. The supplemental information explained that current enemy tactics, new technologies, and the increased lethality of weapons make the differences between combat and support forces less relevant. DOD also reported that some aspects of the current operating environment, such as working with other U.S. agencies and allies, increase support requirements such as command and control. DOD noted in the supplemental information that it has established new headquarters units, such as U.S. Africa Command, and DOD officials said that although this command is considered support, it is important for achieving the strategy's objective to prevent and deter conflict.

DOD officials agreed that this item is not directly addressed and explained that since the current operational environment blurs the distinction between combat and support, such a ratio would not provide a meaningful measure of efficient use of resources. Also, DOD officials said that in contrast to previous defense strategies that focused on two major wars, counterinsurgency, stability, or counterterrorism operations depend on strengthening key non-combat capabilities.

Related GAO Findings: Ratio of Combat to Support Difficult to Measure

In our report on the last QDR, we identified options Congress could consider for improving future QDRs which included eliminating some reporting items, such as the ratio of combat forces to support forces. We reported that given rapidly changing technologies, differentiating between combat and support troops has become increasingly irrelevant and difficult to measure.⁵

⁵ GAO-07-709.
Reporting Requirement

According to 10 U.S.C. § 118 (d)(9), the QDR report shall include the specific capabilities, including the general number and type of specific military platforms, needed to achieve the strategic and warfighting objectives identified in the review.

Our Assessment: Addressed

Based on our assessment, we found that this item was addressed.

Detailed Assessment of This Item

We found that this item was addressed because the QDR report listed capabilities, including the general number and type of specific military platforms, needed to achieve the strategic and warfighting objectives identified in the review.

The QDR report listed the organizations and platform types that encompass the major combat elements of each military service and discussed the capabilities that the Department of Defense (DOD) assessed as needed to accomplish each of the six missions of the defense strategy. The report noted that it did not list all the support forces—called enabler forces—that play crucial roles in supporting operations in complex environments, but did discuss some of the enabler capabilities the department wants to expand, such as increased availability of rotary wing assets and expanded aircraft systems for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Also, the QDR report discussed other needed capabilities that are not explained in terms of platforms. For example, the need to develop a joint air-sea battle concept and expand future long-range strike capabilities were discussed in general terms. The QDR report made reference to other reports, such as the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 and the Nuclear Posture Review Report, which contain more information about platforms needed to achieve objectives. Finally, the supplementary information that DOD provided to the defense committees described the analysis and issues for various elements of the force structure, including fighter force structure, bomber force structure, the Navy battle force, and airlift and aerial refueling force structure.

—

Reporting Requirement

According to 10 U.S.C. § 118 (d)(10), the QDR report shall include the strategic and tactical air-lift, sea-lift, and ground transportation capabilities required to support the national defense strategy.

Our Assessment: Addressed In Part

Based on our assessment, we found that this item was addressed in part.

Detailed Assessment of This Item

We found that this item was addressed in part because the QDR report contained a limited discussion of mobility capabilities, noting that the capacity of mobility resources was validated in the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016, issued shortly after the QDR report. However, neither the QDR report nor the supplementary information provided to congressional defense committees contained detailed results of the mobility study, such as the number of strategic and tactical air-lift, sea-lift, and ground transportation platforms required to support the national defense strategy.

The QDR report referred to the mobility study report which contained detailed information on the numbers of platforms for air-lift, sea-lift, and ground transportation required to conduct a range of missions. In conducting the mobility study, DOD analyzed three scenarios to determine mobility requirements, gaps, and overlaps in capabilities in the 2016 timeframe. Although the mobility scenarios were different from the QDR scenarios in some details, officials told us that the mobility scenarios were more demanding and, as a result, the requirements derived in the mobility analysis would be adequate to meet the demands of the QDR scenarios. Although the QDR report acknowledged that support capabilities are important, the report only listed selected sea-lift and air-lift platforms, such as cargo ships and refueling wings, but did not discuss ground transportation capabilities. According to DOD officials, DOD did not report more detail on mobility requirements because the details were contained in the other report which was also provided to the defense committees and, at the time the QDR report was issued, the results of the mobility study had not been fully vetted within the department.

Related GAO Findings: Civil Reserve Air Fleet Passenger Capacity Has Declined

The mobility report noted that projected Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) capacity is significant and exceeds the requirements of the scenarios studied. We reported in 2009 that DOD depends on CRAF charter passenger aircraft to move more than 90 percent of its peacetime requirements, as well as all contingency surges. However, CRAF passenger capacity has declined 55 percent since 2003. This underscores the importance of DOD carefully studying the requirements for and risks to its mobility capabilities.

---

7 Department of Defense, Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016, (February 2010).
8 GAO-09-625.
Reporting Requirement

According to 10 U.S.C. § 118 (d)(11), the QDR report shall include the forward presence, pre-positioning, and other anticipatory deployments necessary under the national defense strategy for conflict deterrence and adequate military response to anticipated conflicts.

Our Assessment: Addressed in Part

Based on our assessment, we found that this item was addressed in part.

Detailed Assessment of This Item

We found that this item was addressed in part because the QDR report and supplemental information provided to congressional defense committees discussed forward presence and anticipatory deployments in general terms but did not provide detail as to their necessity under the national defense strategy for conflict deterrence and adequate military response to anticipated conflicts. In addition, details of pre-positioning needed under the defense strategy were not discussed.

The QDR report discussed forward presence in Europe, the Pacific, the Greater Middle East, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere in varying degrees of detail. In Europe, for example, the report noted that the U.S. will retain four brigade combat teams and an Army Corps headquarters, but the discussion of forces to be positioned in Asia and Africa was less specific. For example, the QDR report stated that U.S. defense posture calibrates the U.S. presence in each region to best support ongoing and future operations, deter potential threats, and reassure allies and partners. According to DOD officials, the QDR scenario analyses included forward presence of U.S. forces, and the department is continuing to study how presence might be changed to better support the defense strategy.

Neither the QDR report nor the supplemental information discussed pre-positioning—placing materiel and equipment at strategic locations to enable DOD to field combat ready forces quickly—in detail, such as specifying how much of what equipment is needed at which locations to support the defense strategy. However, the QDR report stated that reset and pre-positioned stock replacement are two crucial issues for maintaining readiness.

The QDR report discussed anticipatory deployments briefly, stating that DOD is examining options for deploying selected forces in regions facing new challenges. For example, selectively homeporting additional naval forces forward could strengthen deterrence and expand maritime security cooperation with partner navies. However, the report did not provide details of what ships might be deployed at which locations.

Related GAO Findings: Some Pre-positioned Equipment Depleted

We reported in 2009 that assessing risk to operations based on shortfalls in pre-positioned equipment would provide DOD better information to assess how pre-positioning could support current and future operations. We also testified in 2008 that ongoing operations have depleted some pre-positioned equipment and it is not clear when it will be replenished. These findings underscore the importance of assessing pre-positioning requirements in support of the defense strategy.

---

9 GAO-10-172R.
10 GAO-08-669T.
Reporting Requirement

According to 10 U.S.C. § 118 (d)(12), the QDR report shall include the extent to which resources must be shifted among two or more theaters under the national defense strategy in the event of conflict in such theaters.

Our Assessment: Not Directly Addressed

Based on our assessment, we found that this item was not directly addressed.

Detailed Assessment of This Item

We found that this item was not directly addressed because neither the QDR report nor the supplementary information provided to the defense committees contained a discussion of the extent to which resources must be shifted among two or more theaters under the national defense strategy in the event of conflict in such theaters.

The supplementary information provided to the defense committees acknowledged that moving forces from one theater to another is an option for managing shortfalls in key capabilities. In addition, Department of Defense (DOD) officials told us that in analyzing the forces needed in each of the scenarios, DOD's analyses included what types of forces would need to be shifted between theaters. However, DOD officials agreed that neither the QDR report nor the supplementary information discussed the extent to which resources must be shifted, such as the quantities or kinds of resources that might need to be shifted, how frequently such adjustments may need to occur, or which theaters' resources have priority for shifting resources. According to DOD officials, DOD did not report information on the extent to which resources must be shifted among theaters because the data were voluminous, classified, and would have been difficult to succinctly characterize in the proper context.

Related GAO Findings: Shifting Resources Item Related to Two-Major-Theater-War Planning Construct

In our report on the last QDR, we identified options Congress could consider for improving the usefulness of future QDRs, including eliminating some reporting items such as the extent to which resources must be shifted among two or more theaters under the national defense strategy in the event of conflict in such theaters. We reported that this element was related to the old two-major-theater-war planning construct, and that it may be more useful for DOD’s force structure assessments to be tied to requirements for a broad range of potential threats.\(^{11}\)

\(^{11}\) GAO-07-709.
Reporting Element: Advisability of Revisions to the Unified Command Plan

Detailed Assessment of This Item

We found that this item was not directly addressed because neither the QDR report nor the supplementary information provided to the defense committees provided an assessment of the advisability of revisions to the Unified Command Plan as a result of the national defense strategy.

The Unified Command Plan establishes the missions, responsibilities, and geographic areas of responsibilities for commanders of combatant commands. The Unified Command Plan is required by law to be updated not less than every 2 years. The supplemental information noted that the Department of Defense (DOD) is currently updating the Unified Command Plan. According to DOD officials, the updated Unified Command Plan, which is expected to be issued in the fall of 2010, will capture the direction and strategic themes outlined in the 2010 QDR report. DOD officials agreed, however, that neither the QDR report nor the supplementary information provided to the defense committees provided an assessment of the advisability of revisions to the Unified Command Plan because the plan is regularly updated in a separate process.

Related GAO Findings: Updates to Unified Command Plan Required Under Separate Legislation

GAO reported in 2007 that some items that are required to be included in the QDR report are addressed by other laws as well. The requirement to report changes to the Unified Command Plan is one example. We also reported that DOD had a process for assessing the Unified Command Plan and that legislation requires that the President notify Congress not more than 60 days after either establishing a new combatant command or significantly revising the missions, responsibilities, or force structure of an existing command.

---

13 GAO-07-709.
Reporting Item: The Effect on Force Structure of Technologies Anticipated to be Available

Detailed Assessment of This Item

We found that this item was addressed in part because the QDR report discussed a number of new technologies anticipated to be available for use by the armed forces and listed major elements of the force structure, but the effects on force structure of the new technologies were not specified.

According to the QDR report, the capabilities, flexibility, and robustness of U.S. forces will be improved by fielding more and better enabling systems, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), electronic attack, communications networks, and enhanced cyber defenses. The QDR report cited capabilities to be developed with anticipated technologies to conduct the six key mission areas, including expanding the capacity of attack submarines for long-range strike, conducting field experiments with prototype versions of naval unmanned combat aerial systems for ISR, and developing the latest technologies to enable U.S. forces to operate in cyberspace. The QDR report also noted that DOD will explore technologies that have the potential to detect, track, and identify threats to the United States. For example, DOD is working with the Department of Homeland Security and the Defense Intelligence Agency to explore new technologies to assist in the detection of tunnels. The QDR report listed major elements of the force structure DOD determined was needed over the next 5 years in accordance with the defense strategy. However, the effect of these new technologies on force structure in terms of the numbers and types of units and platforms was not specified. DOD noted in the supplemental information that most of its quantitative analyses focused on the mid term (5-7 years in the future). DOD officials agreed that the effects on force structure were not fully reported and explained that it would be premature to attempt firm conclusions about changes in force structure that might result from the incorporation of new technologies over the long term (through 2030). The QDR report cautioned that requirements for new systems are too often set at the far limit of current technological boundaries, which often results in disappointing performance and cost and schedule overruns.

Related GAO Findings: Technology and System Acquisition

Management of DOD’s major weapon system acquisitions has been on GAO’s high-risk list since 1990. GAO has stated that in the absence of product knowledge at critical junctures, managers rely heavily on assumptions about technology and design maturity, which are too optimistic. This exposes programs to significant and unnecessary technology and design risk and, ultimately, cost growth and schedule delays. GAO also reported in 2006 that DOD needs to strengthen its processes for transitioning new technologies to ensure that technologies are ready when needed. These findings underscore the importance of balancing improvements with program risk and cost.

---

14 GAO-08-619.
15 GAO-06-883.
Reporting Requirement

According to 10 U.S.C. § 118 (d)(15), the QDR report shall include the national defense mission of the Coast Guard.

Our Assessment: Addressed

Based on our assessment, we found that this item was addressed.

Detailed Assessment of This Item

We found that this item was addressed because the supplemental information provided to the defense committees described the national defense missions of the Coast Guard.

The supplemental information stated that the national defense missions of the Coast Guard include: maritime interception operations; domestic and expeditionary port operations, security and defense; military environmental response operations; coastal sea control operations; combating terrorism; and rotary wing intercept. The supplemental information also cited other documents, including the statutory basis for the Coast Guard’s defense role and two memorandums of agreement between the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security on the use of the Coast Guard in support of national defense. The November 2004 memorandum of agreement detailed the peacetime and wartime joint command and control structure for the Navy and Coast Guard. The 2008 memorandum of agreement described some of the missions listed above. For example, maritime intercept operations may include stopping, boarding, searching, diverting, or redirecting vessel traffic. Coast Guard port operations, security, and defense are designed to ensure that port and harbor areas are maintained free of hostile threats and safety deficiencies in order to safeguard freedom of navigation for vessels.
**Reporting Requirement**

According to 10 U.S.C. § 118 (d)(16), the QDR report shall include the homeland defense and support to civil authority missions of the active and reserve components, including the organization and capabilities required for the active and reserve components to discharge each such mission.

**Our Assessment: Addressed in Part**

Based on our assessment, we found that this item was addressed in part.

**Reporting Item: The Homeland Defense and Support to Civil Authority Missions of the Active and Reserve Components**

**Detailed Assessment of This Item**

We found that this item was addressed in part because the QDR report included a general discussion of homeland security and support to civil authorities. However, the QDR report did not clearly identify the active and reserve component missions for homeland defense and support to civil authorities or specify the organization and capabilities of the active and reserve components required to discharge those missions.

Defending the United States and supporting civil authorities at home was one of the six key mission areas outlined in the QDR report as part of the defense strategy. Through the QDR analyses, the Department of Defense (DOD) identified four areas requiring increased capabilities. For example, it identified the need to field faster, more flexible consequence management response forces. To meet this need, the QDR report described a planned initiative to use existing National Guard forces to build a response force in each of the 10 Federal Emergency Management Agency regions. The QDR report also discussed other initiatives intended to enhance capabilities for domain awareness, accelerate the development of capabilities to detect radiological and nuclear material and weapons at a distance, and enhance domestic abilities to counter improvised explosive devices. However, the report and supplemental information did not outline the full range of missions required of active and reserve forces and did not identify the full range of organization and capabilities to discharge those missions.

According to DOD officials, forces for homeland defense and support to civil authorities were included in its scenario analyses. However, DOD officials said that the QDR report did not fully report the missions of the active and reserve components for homeland defense and support to civil authorities or identify the active and reserve component forces needed for each of these missions.

**Related GAO Findings: Civil Support Missions and Capabilities**

In March 2010, we reported that DOD has many strategy, policy, and guidance documents on homeland defense and support to civil authorities, but that DOD has not fully or clearly defined roles and responsibilities for these missions. For example, DOD has not addressed the breadth of civil support missions that it must be prepared to support. In another March 2010 report, we found that although DOD has identified some capability gaps for civil support missions, the precise scope of these shortfalls has not been determined because of a lack of interagency agreement on the extent of the capabilities that DOD is expected to provide. These findings underscore the importance of fully identifying and clearly assigning civil support missions.

---

16 GAO-10-364.
17 GAO-10-386.
Reporting Item: Matters the Secretary Considers Appropriate

Detailed Assessment of This Item

We found that this item was addressed because the supplemental information provided to the congressional defense committees listed three matters that the Secretary considered appropriate: taking care of U.S. service members and their families; institutional reform; and global defense posture and deterrence.

**Taking care of U.S. service members and their families.** The QDR report stated that multiple long deployments are taking a significant toll on soldiers and their families and, as a result, one of the defense strategy objectives is to preserve and enhance the all-volunteer force. The QDR report discussed initiatives the Department of Defense (DOD) is undertaking in six areas: wounded warrior care, managing deployment tempo, recruiting and retention, supporting families, developing future military leaders and developing the total defense workforce.

**Institutional reform.** The QDR report listed four areas where the department believes reform is important: security assistance, defense acquisition, the defense industrial base, and energy security and climate change. Regarding security assistance, the QDR report stated that building security capacity of partners and allies is critical and that enabling our partners to respond to security challenges may reduce risk to U.S. forces. Regarding defense acquisition, the QDR report discussed acquisition system problems, such as overly optimistic cost estimates and a decline in the acquisition workforce. The report also discussed efforts to address these problems such as increasing the numbers and skills of the acquisition workforce and strengthening cost analysis capabilities.

**Global defense posture and deterrence.** The QDR report described three elements as key to U.S. defense posture: forward-stationed and rotationally deployed forces, capabilities, and equipment; a supporting overseas network of infrastructure and facilities; and a series of treaty, access, transit, and status-protection agreements and arrangements with allies and key partners. Also, see our assessment of the required reporting item on forward presence on page 22.
10 U.S.C. § 118 Quadrennial Defense Review

(a) **Review required.**—The Secretary of Defense shall every four years, during a year following a year evenly divisible by four, conduct a comprehensive examination (to be known as a “quadrennial defense review”) of the national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies of the United States with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years. Each such quadrennial defense review shall be conducted in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(b) **Conduct of review.**—Each quadrennial defense review shall be conducted so as—

1. to delineate a national defense strategy consistent with the most recent National Security Strategy prescribed by the President pursuant to section 108 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404a);

2. to define sufficient force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program of the United States associated with that national defense strategy that would be required to execute successfully the full range of missions called for in that national defense strategy;

3. to identify (A) the budget plan that would be required to provide sufficient resources to execute successfully the full range of missions called for in that national defense strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk, and (B) any additional resources (beyond those programmed in the current future-years defense program) required to achieve such a level of risk; and

4. to make recommendations that are not constrained to comply with the budget submitted to Congress by the President pursuant to section 1105 of title 31.

(c) **Assessment of risk.**—The assessment of risk for the purposes of subsection (b) shall be undertaken by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That assessment shall define the nature and magnitude of the political, strategic, and military risks associated with executing the missions called for under the national defense strategy.

(d) **Submission of QDR to Congressional committees.**—The Secretary shall submit a report on each quadrennial defense review to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The report shall be submitted in the year following the year in which the review is conducted, but not later than the date on which the President submits the budget for the next fiscal year to Congress under section 1105(a) of title 31. The report shall include the following:

1. The results of the review, including a comprehensive discussion of the national defense strategy of the United States, the strategic planning guidance, and the force structure best suited to implement that strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk.
Enclosure II: QDR Legislative Requirements

(2) The assumed or defined national security interests of the United States that inform the national defense strategy defined in the review.

(3) The threats to the assumed or defined national security interests of the United States that were examined for the purposes of the review and the scenarios developed in the examination of those threats.

(4) The assumptions used in the review, including assumptions relating to--

(A) the status of readiness of United States forces;

(B) the cooperation of allies, mission-sharing and additional benefits to and burdens on United States forces resulting from coalition operations;

(C) warning times;

(D) levels of engagement in operations other than war and smaller-scale contingencies and withdrawal from such operations and contingencies; and

(E) the intensity, duration, and military and political end-states of conflicts and smaller-scale contingencies.

(5) The effect on the force structure and on readiness for high-intensity combat of preparations for and participation in operations other than war and smaller-scale contingencies.

(6) The manpower and sustainment policies required under the national defense strategy to support engagement in conflicts lasting longer than 120 days.

(7) The anticipated roles and missions of the reserve components in the national defense strategy and the strength, capabilities, and equipment necessary to assure that the reserve components can capably discharge those roles and missions.

(8) The appropriate ratio of combat forces to support forces (commonly referred to as the ‘tooth-to-tail’ ratio) under the national defense strategy, including, in particular, the appropriate number and size of headquarters units and Defense Agencies for that purpose.

(9) The specific capabilities, including the general number and type of specific military platforms, needed to achieve the strategic and warfighting objectives identified in the review.

(10) The strategic and tactical air-lift, sea-lift, and ground transportation capabilities required to support the national defense strategy.

(11) The forward presence, pre-positioning, and other anticipatory deployments
Enclosure II: QDR Legislative Requirements

necessary under the national defense strategy for conflict deterrence and adequate military response to anticipated conflicts.

(12) The extent to which resources must be shifted among two or more theaters under the national defense strategy in the event of conflict in such theaters.

(13) The advisability of revisions to the Unified Command Plan as a result of the national defense strategy.

(14) The effect on force structure of the use by the armed forces of technologies anticipated to be available for the ensuing 20 years.

(15) The national defense mission of the Coast Guard.

(16) The homeland defense and support to civil authority missions of the active and reserve components, including the organization and capabilities required for the active and reserve components to discharge each such mission.

(17) Any other matter the Secretary considers appropriate.

(e) CJCS review.--(1) Upon the completion of each review under subsection (a), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense the Chairman's assessment of the review, including the Chairman's assessment of risk and a description of the capabilities needed to address such risk.

(2) The Chairman's assessment shall be submitted to the Secretary in time for the inclusion of the assessment in the report. The Secretary shall include the Chairman's assessment, together with the Secretary's comments, in the report in its entirety.

(f) Independent panel assessment.--(1) Not later than six months before the date on which the report on a Quadrennial Defense Review is to be submitted under subsection (d), the Secretary of Defense shall establish a panel to conduct an assessment of the quadrennial defense review.

(2) Not later than three months after the date on which the report on a quadrennial defense review is submitted under subsection (d) to the congressional committees named in that subsection, the panel appointed under paragraph (1) shall submit to those committees an assessment of the review, including the recommendations of the review, the stated and implied assumptions incorporated in the review, and the vulnerabilities of the strategy and force structure underlying the review. The assessment of the panel shall include analyses of the trends, asymmetries, and concepts of operations that characterize the military balance with potential adversaries, focusing on the strategic approaches of possible opposing forces.

(g) Consideration of effect of climate change on department facilities, capabilities, and missions.--(1) The first national security strategy and national defense strategy prepared after January 28, 2008, shall include guidance for military
Enclosure II: QDR Legislative Requirements

planners--

(A) to assess the risks of projected climate change to current and future missions of the armed forces;

(B) to update defense plans based on these assessments, including working with allies and partners to incorporate climate mitigation strategies, capacity building, and relevant research and development; and

(C) to develop the capabilities needed to reduce future impacts.

(2) The first quadrennial defense review prepared after January 28, 2008, shall also examine the capabilities of the armed forces to respond to the consequences of climate change, in particular, preparedness for natural disasters from extreme weather events and other missions the armed forces may be asked to support inside the United States and overseas.

(3) For planning purposes to comply with the requirements of this subsection, the Secretary of Defense shall use--

(A) the mid-range projections of the fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change;

(B) subsequent mid-range consensus climate projections if more recent information is available when the next national security strategy, national defense strategy, or quadrennial defense review, as the case may be, is conducted; and

(C) findings of appropriate and available estimations or studies of the anticipated strategic, social, political, and economic effects of global climate change and the implications of such effects on the national security of the United States.

(4) In this subsection, the term “national security strategy” means the annual national security strategy report of the President under section 108 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404a).

(h) Relationship to budget.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect section 1105(a) of title 31.

(i) Interagency overseas basing report.--(1) Not later than 90 days after submitting a report on a quadrennial defense review under subsection (d), the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report detailing how the results of the assessment conducted as part of such review will impact--

(A) the status of overseas base closure and realignment actions undertaken as part of a global defense posture realignment strategy; and

(B) the status of development and execution of comprehensive master plans for
Enclosure II: QDR Legislative Requirements

overseas military main operating bases, forward operating sites, and cooperative security locations of the global defense posture of the United States.

(2) A report under paragraph (1) shall include any recommendations for additional closures or realignments of military installations outside of the United States and any comments resulting from an interagency review of these plans that includes the Department of State and other relevant Federal departments and agencies.
Enclosure III: Scope and Methodology

To assess the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) reported on the items required by 10 U.S.C. § 118 (d), we evaluated the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report published by DOD in February 2010 as well as the supplementary information provided to the congressional defense committees in February 2010. For the purposes of determining the extent to which DOD addressed each of the items required by law, we considered both the QDR report and the supplementary information since the supplementary information was provided to the defense committees.

We determined that the extent to which DOD addressed each item required by subsection (d) would be rated as either “addressed,” “addressed in part,” or “not directly addressed.” These categories were defined as follows:

- **Addressed**: A required QDR item is addressed when the QDR report or supplementary information explicitly address all parts of the item.
- **Addressed in part**: A required QDR item is addressed in part when the QDR report or supplementary information addresses at least one or more parts of the required item, but not all parts of the item are explicitly addressed. Also, an item is considered addressed in part if the QDR or supplementary information states that the item is addressed in another document and specifically refers to the document, and we are able to verify that the requirement is addressed in that referenced document. Studies and reports that were not completed and issued at the time of our review were not considered to have fulfilled the requirement to any extent.
- **Not directly addressed**: A required QDR item is not directly addressed when the QDR report and supplementary information do not explicitly address any part of the required item.

Specifically, three GAO analysts independently reviewed and compared the QDR report and supplemental information with the legislative requirements, assessed whether each item was addressed, addressed in part, or not directly addressed, and recorded their assessment and the basis for the assessment on a data collection instrument. The final assessment reflected the analysts’ consensus based on the individual assessments. We considered an item addressed if all parts of the item were explicitly included in either the QDR report or the supplementary information. We considered the item addressed in part if one or more parts were included, but not all parts were explicitly addressed. We considered an item not directly addressed if neither the QDR report nor the supplementary information explicitly addressed any part of the required item.

Information DOD developed as part of the QDR analyses but did not reported in either the QDR report or supplemental material provided to the defense committees was not factored into our assessment of whether the item was addressed. In addition, we interviewed DOD officials involved in the QDR analysis to discuss their interpretation of the legislative requirements and the review’s analytic approach and findings. We did not evaluate DOD’s process, or methodology, or validate the results of the QDR analyses.

To obtain DOD’s perspective on how the department believed it had addressed the legislative requirements, we reviewed documentation related to DOD’s analyses and interviewed DOD officials who were involved in the review, including officials in the
Enclosure III: Scope and Methodology

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation division of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Staff Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate. To provide context, our assessment also reflected our review of relevant DOD documents and issues raised in recent GAO reports that specifically relate to some of the required reporting items.

We conducted our work from February 2010 to April 2010, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Mr. John H. Pendleton  
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management  
U.S. Government Accountability Office  
441 G Street, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20548  

Dear Mr. Pendleton:


The United States faces a complex and challenging security landscape in which the pace of change continues to accelerate. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) strove, successfully in our view, to take account of this complexity in setting a course for the future evolution of our armed forces. We support GAO’s assessment that a review of the legislative requirements for the QDR is merited in light of changes to the security environment that have occurred since the legislation was established in 1999. By eliminating or revising some of the reporting elements, the legislation could help to ensure that the next QDR focuses on the issues of greatest saliency to the development of a sound defense program.

The Department recognizes the draft report’s assessment that we did not directly address four requested items in the Quadrennial Defense Review and appreciates the opportunity to explain further.

Sincerely,

James N. Miller

Attachment – Reply to GAO assessment
Enclosure IV: Comments from the Department of Defense

GAO DRAFT REPORT – DATED APRIL 8, 2010
GAO CODE 351441 / GAO-10-575R

“QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW: 2010 Report Addresses Many But Not All Required Items”

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE FOUR ITEMS OF LEGISLATION ASSESSED AS “NOT DIRECTLY” ADDRESSED

Reporting Item - Roles, Missions, Strength, Capabilities and Equipment of the Reserve Components: GAO found that this item was not directly addressed because neither the QDR report nor the supplemental information provided to the defense committees discussed the roles and missions of the reserve components in the national defense strategy or outlined the strength, capabilities, and equipment necessary to discharge those roles and missions.

DoD Response: As noted on page 54 of the report, the QDR specifically acknowledged the need to review the future roles of the Reserve Component, including an examination of the balance between active and reserve forces. It is essential that DoD integrate the National Guard and Reserves into the broader All-Volunteer Force in order to meet the challenges of a dynamic security environment. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD (P&R)) is undertaking this review, which should be completed in early 2011.

Reporting Item – Ratio of Combat Forces to Support Forces: GAO found that this item was not directly addressed because neither the QDR report nor the supplemental information provided to the defense committees identified a ratio of combat forces to support forces under the national defense strategy and neither identified the appropriate number or size of headquarters units or defense agencies for that purpose.

DoD Response: The traditional “tooth to tail” paradigm is no longer a useful or relevant metric to apply to U.S. military forces. In today’s complex security environment the distinction between “combat” forces and “support” elements is blurring. Today UAV pilots located in the United States are flying reconnaissance and strike missions in the Afghanistan; logistic convoys are on constant guard against improvised explosive devises; and combat enablers, such as helicopters, intelligence fusion centers, secure communications and mobile logistics, are critical to the effectiveness of the front line troops. As the distinction between tooth and tail becomes less relevant, it is no longer a meaningful measure of efficient use of resources. The key endeavor is to ensure that U.S. forces have the capabilities and capacity they need to accomplish their missions, irrespective of whether those capabilities are regarded as “combat” or “support” assets. This was the focus of the QDR.
Reporting Item – The Extent to Which Resources Must Be Shifted: GAO found that this item was not directly addressed because neither the QDR report nor the supplementary information provided to the defense committees contained a discussion of the extent to which resources must be shifted among two or more theaters under the national defense strategy in the event of conflict in such theaters.

DoD Response: The legislation’s provision for reporting on which resources might have to be shifted from one contingency to another was more applicable to an era when force planning could be adequately based on a small number of scenarios. The QDR, however, was premised on a recognition that in a complex security environment, U.S. forces must be capable of conducting a wide range of mission (see, for example, pages 17 and 42-43 of the QDR Report.) For this reason, assessments of U.S. forces conducted by the QDR examined many scenarios and tested future forces against multiple combinations of scenarios.

Analysis supported the conclusion that U.S. forces can perform the missions called for by the defense strategy and the QDR. However, because of the multi-faceted nature of those missions it was impractical to report in detail which force elements might have to be shifted between contingencies.

Reporting Item – Advisability of Revisions to the Unified Command Plan: GAO found that this item was not directly addressed because neither the QDR report nor the supplementary information provided to the defense committees provided an assessment of the advisability of revisions to the Unified Command Plan as a result of the national defense strategy.

DoD Response: Title 10 U.S.C., Section 161, requires the Chairman to review “the missions, responsibilities, and force structure of each combatant command” and recommend to the President, through the Secretary of Defense, any changes to such missions, responsibilities, and force structures as may be necessary.” The Unified Command Plan (UCP) 2010 review, which is now ongoing, will account for the national defense strategy and other elements of the Quadrennial Defense Review. A revised UCP will be issued in the fall of 2010.
Related GAO Products


Related GAO Products

| **GAO’s Mission** | The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. |
| **Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony** | The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday afternoon, GAO posts on its Web site newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products, go to www.gao.gov and select “E-mail Updates.” |
| **Order by Phone** | The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s Web site, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm. Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or TDD (202) 512-2537. Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information. |
| **To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs** | Contact: Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 |
| **Congressional Relations** | Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov, (202) 512-4400 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 Washington, DC 20548 |
| **Public Affairs** | Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 Washington, DC 20548 |