DEFENSE MANAGEMENT

Army Needs to Address Resource and Mission Requirements Affecting Its Training and Doctrine Command
Since fiscal year 1995, while TRADOC’s workload has grown as a result of new mission requirements, the number of personnel authorized to meet those requirements has declined. Also since fiscal year 1995, the Command’s operation and maintenance funding increased, but TRADOC allocated these and other operations money to support its highest mission priority—training—while other areas received less emphasis. The table below depicts the number of personnel TRADOC believes are needed to perform its workload (personnel requirements), as well as the number of personnel the Army has authorized for this purpose. Unresolved differences exist between TRADOC and Army Headquarters over TRADOC’s personnel requirements.

Amid the increases in workload and reductions in personnel authorizations, TRADOC has met its training mission, but with difficulty. Moreover, the Command has workload backlogs in other mission areas, such as developing training materials and Army doctrine. The effect of these backlogs is illustrated in TRADOC’s monthly status reports, which show that the Command assigned the lowest readiness rating to more than two-thirds of its units during fiscal year 2001 and into 2002 and attributed the low ratings primarily to the lack of personnel. Furthermore, two Army leadership panels concluded that TRADOC’s training and development standards had deteriorated, and mechanisms for evaluating training and leader development programs were lacking.

Several ongoing and planned Army initiatives may affect TRADOC’s ability to perform its mission in the future. These include efforts to reassess TRADOC’s process for determining personnel requirements and ongoing efforts to transfer forces from TRADOC and other noncombatant commands to warfighting forces. At the same time, TRADOC is losing flexibility to shift funds from one mission area to another because the Army established the Installation Management Agency to manage its facilities. TRADOC is developing a reengineering plan that Command officials believe will increase TRADOC’s efficiency and improve its ability to meet mission requirements; however, the costs, benefits, performance measures, and human capital issues associated with the plan are not yet clear.

### What GAO Found

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### TRADOC Personnel Trends, Fiscal Years 1995-2001

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<td>percent of requirements</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>71%</td>
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</tbody>
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Source: TRADOC.

*Numbers adjusted for the addition and subsequent elimination of two TRADOC subcommands.
Figures

Figure 1: Major TRADOC Installations 6
Figure 2: TRADOC Fiscal Year 2001 Funding by Appropriation 9
Figure 3: TRADOC Fiscal Year 2001 O&M Funding by Mission Area 10
Figure 4: TRADOC Personnel Requirement Trends for Selected Mission Areas, Fiscal Years 1995-2001 13
Figure 5: Selected Mission Area Personnel Authorizations as a Percentage of Personnel Requirements, Fiscal Years 1995-2001 14
Figure 6: TRADOC O&M Funding Trends for Selected Mission Areas for Fiscal Years 1995-2001 16
Figure 7: TRADOC O&M Funding Percentages by Mission Area for Fiscal Years 1995-2001 17
Figure 8: Army Training Workload, Fiscal Years 1991-2003 19
Figure 9: Army Field Manual Status (as of January 2002) 22
Figure 10: Average Readiness Ratings for 30 TRADOC Reporting Units, for the Period January 2001 – February 2002 25
Figure 11: Army Civilian Personnel Authorization Trends for Selected Commands, Fiscal Years 1991-2001 47
Figure 12: Army Military Personnel Authorization Trends for Selected Commands, Fiscal Years 1991-2001 48

Abbreviations

AMC  Army Materiel Command
DOD  Department of Defense
FORSCOM  Army Forces Command
IMA  Installation Management Agency
O&M  Operations and Maintenance
OMB  Office of Management and Budget
POI  Programs of Instruction
TRADOC  Training and Doctrine Command

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February 10, 2003

The Honorable Joel Heffley
Chairman
The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Readiness
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

The Army has begun to transform itself from a Cold War-oriented force into a more rapidly deployable and responsive force better able to meet the diverse challenges of the future. The far-reaching organizational and operational changes that the Army plans will affect virtually every element of the Army. The Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has been designated the lead command for this transformation and, as the architect of the Army’s future, TRADOC has a key role in the transformation process. TRADOC is responsible for ensuring that the Army remains a modern and capable fighting force by developing warfighting concepts and doctrine and by providing recruiting, training, and associated support for military personnel. Like the Department of Defense (DOD) and other Army commands, TRADOC incurred significant decreases in its resources—particularly its personnel resources—during the 1990s as the department took major steps to reshape and reduce the size of its forces. Between fiscal years 1991 and 2001, Army active duty military personnel and civilian personnel were reduced by about 33 percent and 42 percent, respectively. TRADOC incurred similar reductions during this period.

Each year, senior Army officials must decide how to allocate resources among competing priorities and programs within and among the Army’s operational and institutional forces. In recent years, the Army has chosen to give priority to its operational or warfighting units and accept a higher level of risk of mission failure in support organizations such as TRADOC. At the same time, at congressional hearings over the last few years, concerns have been raised about TRADOC’s readiness to perform its mission, particularly within the context of Army transformation. At your request, we reviewed the resources and workload assigned to the Command and its readiness to carry out its mission. Our specific review objectives were to examine (1) the Training and Doctrine Command’s personnel, workload, and budget trends since 1995; (2) the impact of personnel and budget changes on the Command’s ability to perform its
mission and deliver well-trained soldiers to the combat forces; and (3) the actions taken or planned that could have an effect on the Command’s ability to perform its mission.

In conducting this examination, we reviewed documents and interviewed officials at Army Headquarters, the Training and Doctrine Command, and Forces Command. Our analysis of the trends in the Command’s personnel and budgetary resources focused primarily on fiscal years 1995 through 2001. A complete description of our methodology is shown in appendix I.

Results in Brief

Since fiscal year 1995, while TRADOC’s workload has grown due to new mission requirements and its budget has increased in selected areas, its authorized personnel gradually decreased about 13 percent. Specifically, the number of authorized personnel declined during this period from about 63,000 to 55,000. The current authorization represents about 70 percent of the personnel that the Command believes are needed to perform its work (otherwise known as requirements), which have ranged from about 75,000 to 79,000 personnel.\(^1\) The reductions in authorized personnel were caused by a number of DOD and Army decisions. Key among these were reductions mandated by force structure reshaping decisions that began in the early 1990s, such as “Quicksilver,”\(^2\) and other department initiatives that occurred since 1995, such as reductions recommended by the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review.\(^3\) While TRADOC officials believe that the Command’s reported personnel requirements are accurate, unresolved differences exist between TRADOC and Army Headquarters staff over the accuracy of these requirements, particularly as they relate to the use of contractors. Despite personnel reductions, the Command’s primary funding source—operations and maintenance funding—increased about 23 percent (in constant dollars). However, at the Command’s discretion, funding for all of TRADOC’s programs did not increase—funding devoted to training increased about 13 percent, while

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\(^1\) Throughout this report, we refer to personnel requirements and personnel authorizations. Personnel requirements refer to the number of personnel, both civilian and military, deemed necessary by TRADOC to support its workload. Personnel authorizations refer to the number of personnel an organization, in this case TRADOC, is allowed to hire. Personnel authorizations are often less than requirements because of budget constraints.

\(^2\) “Quicksilver” was an Army initiative intended to reduce its force structure and create a more balanced, versatile, lethal, smaller, and ready force.

\(^3\) The Quadrennial Defense Review analyzes military strategy for U.S. forces.
funding devoted to base operations decreased about 20 percent as the Command reallocated limited resources to higher-priority missions. Also, a large portion of the increased funding was directed to hiring contract personnel to support new mission requirements such as Army transformation to a lighter force. Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, contractor support funding increased by about 38 percent, or about $317 million, but this increase did not fully offset the loss of personnel authorizations, according to Command officials.

Amid these reductions in personnel authorizations, TRADOC met its highest mission priority, training, although not without some concerns about quality from other Army organizations. The Command has had more difficulty fully meeting other mission requirements—such as those involving the development of training materials and doctrine—many of which have sizeable workload backlogs. The effect of these workload backlogs is illustrated in TRADOC’s monthly status reports. Our analysis of these status reports showed that the Command assigned the lowest readiness rating to more than two-thirds of its units during fiscal year 2001 and into 2002, and it attributed the low ratings primarily to the lack of personnel. The impact of these conditions has been observed by organizations outside TRADOC. Two Army leadership panels chartered by the Army Chief of Staff—one representing officers and one representing noncommissioned officers—concluded in 2001 and 2002 that TRADOC’s training and development standards had deteriorated and that mechanisms for evaluating training and leadership development programs were lacking. Officials with the Army Forces Command—a primary customer of TRADOC services—have also expressed concern about TRADOC’s reduced capabilities, but the impact cannot be fully quantified due to a lack of Army empirical data and analysis. Although TRADOC does not have a formal process to obtain feedback on the quality and relevance of the products provided to its customers, Forces Command officials indicated that they believe the quality of TRADOC’s individual training programs and doctrine products has declined. For example, they cite the lack of a training strategy to support operational units’ adoption of digital technology, as well as the outdated condition of some doctrine used to guide tactics and procedures in the field. On the other hand, Forces Command officials noted that TRADOC’s support for an element of the Army transformation—the Interim Brigade Combat Teams—had been good. Continuing disconnects between mission requirements and resources could adversely affect TRADOC’s ability to carry out its mission and improve its readiness posture in the future as it continues to address additional transformation requirements, while also training and supporting the current force.
Several ongoing and planned actions may affect the Command’s ability to perform its mission in the future; however, the overall outcome is unclear at this time. In October 2002, a major Army Headquarters initiative, already underway, began shifting budgetary resources and about 10,000 personnel authorizations related to base operations away from the Command to the new Army Installation Management Agency. This reorganization will reduce TRADOC’s mission requirements, but will also eliminate base operations funds that, in the past, were used by the Command as a source of training support; thus, in the future, the Command will have less flexibility to shift funding among its primary missions. Another Army Headquarters initiative is aimed at reassessing the process used to determine personnel requirements for TRADOC and other commands that support warfighting units, but the outcome is uncertain because differences of opinion exist over TRADOC’s requirements and the extent to which its requirements have been offset by contractor support. Also, the Army is conducting commercial activities studies to identify opportunities to use in-house personnel more efficiently and to contract some activities to an outside vendor. Such studies are likely to lead to reduced personnel requirements in the activities studied but would not necessarily free personnel for assignment to other activities or mission areas where shortages exist. In addition, the Army has an initiative underway, known as “Manning the Force,” which is transferring military personnel from the noncombatant forces across the Army to warfighting forces to improve the Army’s combat readiness. This initiative, which continues through fiscal year 2003, is reducing the number of military personnel assigned to TRADOC; however, the Command has not fully quantified the impact of this specific initiative. Finally, TRADOC is developing a reengineering plan that is intended to create a more streamlined and efficient command structure, rely more heavily on technology, and better position the Command to support current and future mission requirements. Command officials believe the plan, once finalized and implemented, will increase TRADOC’s efficiency and improve its ability to meet mission requirements. However, the costs, benefits, performance measures, and human capital issues associated with implementing the plan are not yet clear. Also, the extent to which this effort will lead to organizational consolidations and reductions in personnel requirements remains unclear. These issues could take on more importance as the Army continues its transformation efforts and, if not adequately addressed, could place the Command at increased risk in its role as the Army’s architect of the future.

We are making recommendations for executive action to help the Command address workload backlogs; better measure the quality of its products and services; and ensure that its reengineering plan adequately
addresses efficiency, effectiveness, and human capital issues and is properly resourced to support Army transformation. In commenting on a draft of the report, DOD concurred with the recommendations related to TRADOC’s reengineering process but expressed various concerns about other related recommendations, leaving unclear what overall actions would be taken.

The Army consists of both operational and institutional forces. The institutional forces support such activities as training, supply, and maintenance, and perform a broad range of noncombatant functions that enable operational forces—combat and support units—to deploy and fight in regional and theater wars. TRADOC is part of the Army’s institutional forces. The Command is viewed as the Army’s “architect of the future” because much of what it does is focused on identifying future warfighting requirements and developing organizations, training curriculum, doctrine, and people to fight the battles of tomorrow, as well as those of today.

TRADOC carries out its mission at 26 schools and several training centers located on 15 major installations throughout the continental United States. (See fig. 1.) The Command also has 11 battle laboratories, which support research and development activities associated with weapon systems and combat operations. The schools and battle laboratories specialize in developing and testing warfighting capabilities such as air defense, armor, artillery, aviation, infantry, and transportation. During fiscal year 2001, TRADOC was authorized about 36,500 military personnel and 18,700 civilian personnel.
In general, TRADOC’s overall mission focuses on five primary areas:

- **Combat Development.** Through its combat development mission, TRADOC identifies needed capabilities and requirements for new and existing weapon and battlefield management systems to improve warfighting capabilities and responsiveness. The capabilities and requirements are designed and incorporated into current and new weapon systems to improve the Army’s warfighting capabilities. As part of this effort, TRADOC provides an Armywide focus on research and development activities and conducts analysis and experimentation. The Command’s battle laboratories are heavily involved in the combat development mission.

- **Doctrine Development.** TRADOC develops doctrine to address the complete range of potential tactical and operational missions and operating environments—from infantry operations to aviation—that combat units might encounter. Doctrine establishes the tactics,
techniques, and procedures the combat units might use to carry out their warfighting missions; it is essential for conducting warfare. Much of the Army’s doctrine is found in its field manuals, which number more than 600. Doctrine developers write and update the field manuals, as well as develop organizational structures for combat units.

- **Training and Training Development.** TRADOC’s training and training development mission is directed at developing competent soldiers, capable leaders, and relevant training materials. TRADOC provides soldiers with initial individual entry-level training. The Command also provides advanced individual training, such as learning how to operate a tank. As the training developer, TRADOC develops course material for over 2,000 courses that support individual training. TRADOC also develops training material for unit training, which takes place in the combat units. In addition, through training development, TRADOC certifies staff and faculty associated with its schools, develops a distance-learning curriculum, and promotes continuing education for its military personnel. During fiscal year 2001, TRADOC trained about 323,000 military and civilian personnel at its schools.

- **Accessions/Recruiting.** TRADOC is responsible for recruiting soldiers for the Army. Recruiting activities are conducted throughout the United States, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and at U.S. facilities in Germany and Asia. Recruiting is carried out by a TRADOC subcommand called the Accessions Command, which was established in February 2002. From the beginning of fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2001, accessions activities were carried out by the Army Recruiting Command, the Cadet Command, and the Military Entrance Processing Command. These commands are now components of the Accessions Command.

- **Base Operations.** TRADOC has historically maintained the school buildings, barracks, roads, training ranges, and other structures used to carry out its mission. Base support activities have included facilities maintenance as well as equipment repair. However, in October 2002, base operations support across the Army was consolidated and transitioning to a new Army agency called the Installation Management Agency was begun. Like other Army commands, TRADOC will no longer have direct responsibility for base operations. A large portion of the TRADOC personnel and funding resources associated with base operations is being transferred to the new agency.

TRADOC is also the lead command for Army transformation. This transformation, which was announced in October 1999, is a plan to move the Army’s Cold War organization and equipment to a lighter, more strategically responsive force to fill what the Army sees as a strategic gap in its warfighting capabilities. The transformed force is expected to be capable of responding to a broad range of operations—from peacekeeping
to regional conflicts to major theater wars. To realize the transformation, the Army plans to develop new equipment, revise its operating concepts and doctrine, build unit-level organizations that can quickly adapt to changes in the intensity of a given military operation, and change how it trains its soldiers and leaders. Transformation will touch on all of TRADOC’s mission areas because TRADOC is heavily involved in developing requirements for current and new equipment, revising doctrine, developing new organizations, and training soldiers and leaders. As part of its transformation responsibilities, TRADOC has already played a lead role in developing and fielding the Interim Brigade Combat Teams—commonly referred to as the Stryker brigades—which are being organized and equipped to deploy nearly as quickly as light infantry units but with more lethality and survivability.

Overview of TRADOC Funding

In fiscal year 2001, TRADOC was provided a budget of about $3.2 billion to carry out its mission. This total, however, does not include funding to pay the Command’s military personnel, who are paid from funds that are centrally managed at Army Headquarters. Figure 2 depicts TRADOC’s funding by appropriation.

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4 We focused primarily on TRADOC’s fiscal year 2001 budget because the Command had not yet received its final 2002 budget authorization at the time we conducted a significant portion of our analysis.
The largest segment of the budget was comprised of Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding. It totaled approximately $2.9 billion, or about 91 percent of TRADOC’s total budget. Figure 3 shows how O&M funding was allocated among TRADOC mission areas.
Figure 3: TRADOC Fiscal Year 2001 O&M Funding by Mission Area

Training and base operations were allocated most of the O&M funding. Funding for doctrine development is included in both combat developments and training development.

TRADOC’s O&M funding increased to about $3.5 billion for fiscal year 2002—about $600 million more than fiscal year 2001. A large portion of the increase resulted from additional funding to support the global war on terrorism.

Since at least fiscal year 1995, the number of personnel that TRADOC has been authorized to accomplish its mission has been less than the number of personnel that TRADOC officials believe are required. While personnel requirements remained relatively steady between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, TRADOC’s workload increased and its personnel authorizations decreased as a result of DOD and Army efforts to reshape and constrain the size of the in-house workforce. TRADOC and Army Headquarters officials do not agree on the accuracy of TRADOC’s personnel requirements. As personnel authorizations decreased, TRADOC’s budget increased; however, the increase was not applied uniformly across all of TRADOC’s programs or mission areas. An increasing percentage of the budget was shifted to the Command’s highest-priority mission area—training. In addition, a portion of the budget increase was directed to new mission requirements related to Army transformation. Because TRADOC
did not have the in-house personnel to address the new requirements, the Command increased its use of contractors to satisfy some of the new mission requirements.

TRADOC Personnel Authorizations Are Down Despite Increasing Workload and Associated Personnel Requirements

Since fiscal year 1995, TRADOC’s personnel requirements, as identified by the Command, have remained somewhat steady. Yet, its personnel authorizations and the actual number of personnel on hand have gradually declined by nearly 13 percent—from about 63,000 to 55,000—to where they represent about 71 percent and 65 percent, respectively, of the Command’s personnel requirements. Table 1 details these personnel trends.

### Table 1: TRADOC Personnel Trends, Fiscal Years 1995-2001

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<td>76,650</td>
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<td>57,814</td>
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<td>77%</td>
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<td>95%</td>
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Source: TRADOC.

*Numbers adjusted for the addition and subsequent elimination of personnel requirements and authorizations, and actual personnel that are associated with two TRADOC subcommands: the Recruiting Command and Military Entrance Processing Command. (For additional information, see app. I).

TRADOC also experienced a reduction in actual staffing levels between fiscal years 1995 and 2001. As shown in table 1, the Command was staffed at 77 percent of its requirements in fiscal year 1995 and at only 65 percent of its requirements in fiscal year 2001. The table also shows that the Command has experienced a decline in the number of actual personnel assigned to the Command. According to TRADOC officials, this shortfall in actual personnel provides an even clearer indication that the Command’s full workload cannot be accomplished. The reductions in TRADOC’s personnel authorizations were similar to those of the Army overall, as well as for selected commands. See appendix II for a comparison of TRADOC’s
personnel authorizations with those of other selected major Army commands.

Since fiscal year 1995, TRADOC’s workload has grown due to the addition of several new mission requirements. A number of these are associated with supporting Army transformation requirements that began to emerge after transformation plans were announced in 1999. The Command acquired responsibility for conceptualizing and developing two new aspects of the Army’s fighting forces—the interim and objective forces—while still retaining the responsibilities for supporting, modernizing, and transforming the current force. These new responsibilities include developing weapon systems requirements, combat and training doctrine, and training courses to facilitate the transformation.

In addition, a number of other DOD and Army decisions resulted in TRADOC gaining new mission responsibilities. Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, the Command assumed responsibility for several smaller commands and agencies, including the Army Recruiting Command, the Military Entrance Processing Command, and the Army Management Staff College.\(^5\) Each of these commands and agencies brought new workload requirements with them. However, they also brought most of the personnel authorizations associated with that workload.

The personnel requirements associated with the Command’s major mission areas, as identified by TRADOC, fluctuated only slightly between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, as depicted in figure 4.

\(^5\) TRADOC also assumed responsibility for the Army Civilian Training Education Development Student Detachment, the Army Aeronautical Services Agency, and the Army Nuclear Chemical Agency.
As shown in figure 4, requirements in TRADOC’s training mission area ranged from about 35,000 to 37,000, with slight reductions between fiscal years 1996 and 1999. Likewise, the personnel requirements for the training development, combat development, and base operations mission areas had some minor changes from year to year.

The reductions in personnel authorizations between fiscal years 1995 and 2001 forced TRADOC to set priorities among its mission areas to ensure that it successfully performed its highest-priority function—training. Figure 5 shows TRADOC’s authorization allocations relative to personnel requirements during this period. In comparison to the other mission areas, training was authorized the highest percentage of personnel authorizations.
in each year. Furthermore, training authorization levels remained relatively steady, while those in the base operations mission area were steadily reduced.

Figure 5: Selected Mission Area Personnel Authorizations as a Percentage of Personnel Requirements, Fiscal Years 1995-2001

Several DOD and Army force structure decisions were responsible for a large portion of TRADOC’s personnel authorization reductions. Throughout the 1990s, DOD implemented several force structure reshaping initiatives—including those resulting from the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review—that were aimed at streamlining the military services. Most of these initiatives directed across-the-board cuts in personnel authorizations and often left the military services and their commands to determine how to allocate the reductions. For example, one such initiative—referred to as “Quicksilver”—was implemented between fiscal years 1991 and 1996 to reduce the Army’s force structure to create a balanced, versatile, smaller, more lethal, and more ready force than existed in the late 1980s. As a result, the initiative eliminated 3,134 civilian
positions and 6,224 military positions at TRADOC between fiscal years 1991 and 2001.

TRADOC officials expressed confidence in the accuracy of their reported personnel requirements. They cite the validation of their requirements determination process in 2001 by the Army Manpower Analysis Agency as proof that their process produces valid requirements.\(^6\) Also, representatives of the Manpower Analysis Agency stated that TRADOC’s personnel requirements determination process was based on a sound methodology. However, unresolved differences remain between TRADOC and Army Headquarters officials regarding the accuracy of the Command’s personnel requirements. Representatives of the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans question the methods and assumptions used by TRADOC to link workload and personnel. More specifically, these officials told us they believe that TRADOC does not accurately account for work being done by contract personnel, and thus the difference between the Command’s requirements and authorizations is not as large as it appears. They believe that contractors are filling the gap between requirements and authorizations. However, these officials did not provide any objective analysis to document the extent to which this might be the case. Similarly, TRADOC officials did not have sufficient data to show the extent to which they were relying on contractors.\(^7\) However, according to TRADOC officials, the Command’s personnel requirements determination process appropriately considers work being done by contractors. Although we did not independently validate TRADOC’s personnel requirements processes, our discussions with knowledgeable officials and review of available documentation indicated that their requirements analysis was based on a rigorous multistep process and gave due consideration to the work being performed by contractors. Furthermore, as discussed later in this report, TRADOC frequently cited personnel shortfalls as a cause of low readiness ratings.

\(^6\) The Army Manpower Analysis Agency is assigned responsibility for overseeing and certifying the Army requirements determination processes used by Army commands. The Manpower Analysis Agency reports to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower & Reserve Affairs).

\(^7\) During fiscal year 2002, the Army began collecting information to identify the size of its contractor workforce.
Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, TRADOC’s O&M budget increased $544 million, or about 23 percent (expressed in constant fiscal year 2001 dollars). However, this increase in funding was not uniform across all of TRADOC’s mission areas or budget categories. For example, funding for the base operations mission decreased by around $20 million, or about 2 percent, while training mission funds increased by around $326 million, or about 36 percent. Over time, funding allocated to the recruiting or accessions mission area increased by about $200 million, or almost 100 percent. (See fig. 6.)

Likewise, the increase in funding was not uniform across TRADOC budget categories. For example, between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, funding in the civilian personnel budget category decreased by $60 million, while
contract funding increased by $317 million. The decrease in civilian personnel funding resulted from the loss of personnel authorizations.

During this period, an increasing percentage of the budget was shifted from base operations accounts to the Command’s highest priority mission—training. This is shown in figure 7. This practice generally left TRADOC in a position to conduct only minimal repair and maintenance on its facilities.

The largest increases in TRADOC’s budget were directly related to contracting and added mission responsibilities. Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, the amount of funding spent on contracting increased by 38 percent, or about $317 million (in constant fiscal year 2001 dollars). According to TRADOC budget officials, a large portion of this contract funding was used to support Army transformation initiatives. They noted that in several instances the Army provided funding for transformation-related activities but did not provide the associated personnel
TRADOC did not have available in-house personnel to address the new requirements, which effectively forced the Command to contract for those activities. In fiscal year 2001, the Command received $289 million related to new mission funding. Of that total, $150 million, or 52 percent of new mission funding, was directly associated with Army transformation and was used to acquire contractor support. For example, contractors were used to develop doctrine and training materials for the new Stryker brigades.

Reductions in personnel authorizations, coupled with unchanged personnel requirements, have affected TRADOC’s ability to meet workload requirements in some mission areas. The Command has been able to perform its training mission, but with difficulty. Moreover, backlogs of work exist in the training development, doctrine development, combat development, and base operations mission areas. The Command's inability to address its personnel shortages and workload backlogs are reflected in its monthly readiness reports, which consistently show low readiness levels throughout the Command. At the same time, TRADOC lacks a formal process for obtaining customer feedback information to evaluate the effectiveness of its mission and alert Army leaders to potential problem areas. Two Army leadership panels completing their work in 2001 and 2002 identified concerns about TRADOC’s ability to effectively carry out its mission. Also, anecdotal evidence from U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM)—a major TRADOC customer—indicates that the quality of TRADOC training provided to individuals has declined and confirms that some doctrine is not up to date. Army transformation and other potential future requirements will likely place new demands on TRADOC, making it even more challenging for the Command to perform its mission at its current resource levels.

Over the past several years TRADOC has been able to perform its training mission, but officials noted some concerns about the quality of the training. As shown in figure 8, the number of full-time equivalent students per year—referred to as the training workload—decreased significantly between fiscal years 1991 and 1994, primarily as a result of DOD downsizing. Since approximately 1994 the training workload has remained relatively steady, between 60,000 and 70,000 full-time equivalent students annually. Due to the high priority placed on meeting the training workload, TRADOC ensures that the students arriving at its schools receive timely scheduled training.
However, officials located at both TRADOC Headquarters and the TRADOC schools we visited expressed concern about a decline in quality in some aspects of the training provided by the Command. They believe that the Command does not have enough experienced training instructors to provide the quality of training they would like. They noted that personnel reductions have resulted in the loss of some of the corporate knowledge necessary to develop training courses and doctrine publications and that personnel who were once devoted solely to writing doctrine are now asked to conduct training first and to write doctrine as a secondary responsibility. Furthermore, they told us that the decreasing number of personnel, coupled with increasing class sizes, resulted in more students per instructor and less individual training time.

Workload Backlogs Exist in Some Mission Areas

Workload backlogs are evident in some of TRADOC’s primary mission areas. A training and doctrine development backlog exists throughout the Command. Moreover, the combat development backlog is growing. Finally, declining personnel and budgetary resources have affected the Command’s ability to carry out base operations.
According to TRADOC workload data, a training and doctrine development backlog exists throughout the Command. Army training and doctrine materials must complement one another so that soldiers are trained according to current doctrine. However, as a result of an insufficient number of training development personnel, TRADOC has not been able to maintain the currency of its highest-priority training courses—commonly referred to as programs of instruction (POI)—and associated doctrine. TRADOC officials stated that to compensate for the shortage of doctrine development personnel, the Command has used contractors in some instances to write and revise doctrine publications. Even with the use of contractors, backlogs continue.

TRADOC managers use a database to manage the Command’s highest-priority training and doctrine development workload. TRADOC leadership uses the information contained in this database to make resource and workload allocation decisions. Table 2, which shows data extracted from the database, identifies the Army’s top 13 training and doctrine development priorities as understood by TRADOC. However, these top priorities do not represent the entirety of the Command’s training and doctrine development workload. The work associated with these priorities is expressed in terms of staff-years of work and staff-years available to perform the work. As the table shows, TRADOC’s available personnel cannot complete the workload associated with these top priorities—only 45 percent of the staff-years required for the top priority training and doctrine development work were available, indicating a significant shortfall in personnel available to do this work.
Table 2: TRADOC’s Top 13 Training and Doctrine Development Priorities (as of October 2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority ranking</th>
<th>Workload categories</th>
<th>Staff-years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Contemporary operating environment/force protection</td>
<td>717.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Unit set fielding – 1st Cavalry</td>
<td>108.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Interim B’brigade combat teams (Stryker brigades)</td>
<td>850.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Distance learning courseware</td>
<td>1,911.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Doctrine (field manuals, joint and NATO pubs)</td>
<td>306.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mission training plans</td>
<td>1,403.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Soldier training pubs</td>
<td>17.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>TRADOC transformation</td>
<td>103.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Institutional digital education plan</td>
<td>84.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Interim division</td>
<td>187.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Individual training requirements (POI, etc.)</td>
<td>1,326.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Total army training system courseware</td>
<td>35.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Warrior training support packages</td>
<td>265.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total staff-year requirements</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>7,318.08</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total staff-years available</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>3,294.00</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shortfall in staff-years</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>(4,024.08)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TRADOC.

Most of the Command’s training and doctrine developers are focusing on the top four priorities. TRADOC officials stated that the first and fourth priorities are both being filled at nearly 100 percent of the staff-years required, while attention given to other areas—such as Mission Training Plans and TRADOC Transformation—varies.⁸

Although many of the areas represented in table 2 have a component of doctrine writing, priority number 5 is the area most directly related to TRADOC’s doctrine mission. TRADOC doctrine development officials told us that the Command had enough personnel to complete about 40 percent of its existing doctrine development workload. A large portion of this backlog involves field manuals, which have to be written, reviewed

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⁸ TRADOC does not track actual staff-year data. However, officials were confident that the Contemporary Operating Environment/Force Protection and the Distance Learning Courseware priorities were filled to 100 percent. They identified other areas that have received resources, but could not provide a measure of the level of resourcing for these areas.
periodically, and revised. In total, TRADOC is responsible for more than 600 field manuals and publications, which include joint operations with other military services and U.S. allies.

We calculated that as of January 2002 only about 33 percent of the field manuals in the inventory were up to date. (See fig. 9.) The other 67 percent of the manuals required work, including the development of at least 81 new publications, the review of 129 existing publications, and the revision of 205 outdated publications. Of the 81 new publications, 26 are directly related to the Stryker brigades and Army transformation. Without updated field manuals, the Army’s combat units may not have the benefit of the tactics, techniques, and procedures needed to help them better perform their missions in future conflicts.

Figure 9: Army Field Manual Status (as of January 2002)

Source: TRADOC.

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The Army doctrine development (field manual development) cycle has six phases: (1) assessment, (2) planning, (3) development, (4) production, (5) print and dissemination, and (6) implementation and evaluation. This process may take from 18 to 24 months to complete. The length of time varies depending on whether a field manual is being newly written or revised, the scope and complexity of the material, the extent of the staffing/review required, and the level of approval authority required.
Doctrine writing is one mission area that relies on contractors to satisfy some workload requirements. For example, Fort Benning, which is responsible for supporting the development and fielding of the Stryker brigades, is using contractor personnel to develop doctrine for the new brigades. In this particular situation, Fort Benning officials told us that the contractor used retired military personnel with infantry experience to help write the field manuals. The officials noted that the retired military personnel being used by the contractor had relevant experience needed for writing doctrine; however, they also expressed concern that reduced personnel authorizations may eventually shrink the pool of available retired military personnel with the experience needed to fill the contract positions.

TRADOC is also experiencing growing workload backlogs in its combat developments mission area. The backlogs include tasks required to develop and analyze warfighting concepts and materiel requirements related to force modernization and transformation, among other things. According to TRADOC officials, the Command is responsible for about 46,200 combat development tasks per year. Those same officials noted that the Command’s workload backlog is growing at a rate of about 33 percent per year because the mission area does not have enough personnel to address the large volume of tasks that needs to be completed.

TRADOC’s base operations mission area, which involves activities like logistics and the sustainment, restoration, and modernization of real property, has also been affected by declining resources. TRADOC officials told us that they frequently were able to provide only emergency or minimal real property maintenance at installations between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, due to insufficient personnel and funding. Moreover, during that time, TRADOC shifted O&M funding from base operations accounts to training accounts to ensure that the training mission could be accomplished. This explains, in part, the backlog of reported real property maintenance. For example, for fiscal year 2001, the funding level for the Command’s base operations was set at about 70 percent of its workload requirements, thus TRADOC was able to make more funding available for higher-priority mission areas, such as training.

Various TRADOC officials have also expressed concern about the difficulty of staffing and maintaining training ranges. For example, officials from both TRADOC and FORSCOM noted that the National Training Center, which is used to conduct large-scale collective training exercises, has not been adequately staffed to observe the training and provide feedback to units involved in the exercises. As a result, FORSCOM units
have had to use their own personnel to augment National Training Center personnel, particularly in the area of forward observers; consequently, some FORSCOM combat personnel were not able to participate fully in training exercises.

TRADOC prepares a monthly status report that assesses the readiness of most of its organizational units. These monthly reports are provided to the Army Chief of Staff. Our review of these reports showed that a majority of the Command’s organizations were assigned the lowest readiness rating throughout most of fiscal year 2001 and into fiscal year 2002 and that 17 of TRADOC’s 30 reporting units identified personnel shortages as the primary reason for their lower readiness status. TRADOC’s readiness rating criteria call for a unit to be rated low in the category of personnel if it has less than 70 percent of the personnel it requires. Figure 10 shows how the 30 units included in the reports were rated.

Readiness Reports Show Personnel Shortages and Effects

10 Readiness ratings are based on specific criteria related to personnel levels, equipment on hand, equipment serviceability, and training. The ratings are measures of a unit/component’s ability to perform its mission. A C-1 rating represents the highest readiness position, denoting that the mission can be fully performed. Conversely, a C-4 rating represents the lowest readiness position, denoting that the mission cannot be accomplished.
A few units that did not report problems with personnel shortages had other problems that caused them to report low readiness ratings. For example, one reporting unit that was consistently at a C-4 rating identified the lack of equipment on hand rather than insufficient personnel as the reason for its low readiness ratings.

Unit commanders include written comments that accompany the readiness ratings they provide on monthly readiness reports. The comments highlight the types of problems being experienced and the effect those problems have on the unit’s mission performance. We reviewed the comments for the period covered in figure 10, and the following quote is representative of many of the comments that appeared in the monthly reports:

[The] lack of personnel and funding, especially a very limited officer presence, has put Combat, Doctrine and Training Development at risk resulting in the use of outdated doctrine and training materials....The Operating Force has to compensate by developing what it needs on its own.

According to our analysis, commanders most often reported the shortage of doctrine, training, and combat developers as their top readiness
concern. For example, one comment stated that TRADOC needs funding for 400 permanent civilian training development positions to eliminate the Command’s large training development backlog. Another comment noted that the 70 percent reduction in military and civilian training developers severely degraded the Command’s capability to maintain current force training materials as well as support the evolving future forces’ requirements. Between January 2001 and January 2002, 28 units reported a shortage of developers as a major concern at least once.

Other comments regarding the lack of personnel referred to reductions in the required rank of soldiers that were filling supervisory/training positions, thus assigning training responsibilities to less experienced military personnel. Likewise, commanders noted that personnel reductions had placed civilian personnel in positions for which they were marginally qualified or not qualified at all.

DOD also reports on the readiness of the military services to perform their respective training functions. This readiness assessment is presented to Congress in the department’s quarterly and annual Institutional Training Readiness reports. Although TRADOC has consistently reported a low overall readiness status, the quarterly reports DOD provided to Congress generally showed Army institutional training readiness at the C-1 and C-2 levels. The readiness reports provided to Congress, however, only reflect the training portion of TRADOC’s mission and do not rate the Command’s readiness to carry out training, doctrine, and combat development. For example, the department’s annual Institutional Training Readiness Report for Fiscal Year 2001, issued January 2002, showed TRADOC’s institutional training readiness to be either C-1 or C-2 for six of the seven training categories assessed. The report did note, however, that personnel and funding shortages caused some ratings to drop below C-1, particularly in the flight training area. The report also noted that TRADOC had to put other mission areas—combat, doctrine, and training developments—at risk to meet its primary mission of training. In addition, DOD’s Institutional Training Readiness reports compare the number of students projected to enter the training system and the number that actually receive training. For this reason, the reports do not provide a measure of training quality.

11 The seven categories of institutional training that were assessed were (1) recruiting, (2) one-station unit training, (3) officer acquisition, (4) initial skill training, (5) skill progression training, (6) functional training, and (7) flight training.
TRADOC Lacks Information to Evaluate Its Mission Effectiveness

While TRADOC readiness reports show a significant degradation in readiness—often attributed to resource constraints—the impact on its ability to support operational forces is not well established and is often limited to anecdotal concerns voiced by operational leaders. TRADOC previously collected and evaluated such anecdotal information in the form of feedback from its customers, but it does not currently have the capability to do so. According to TRADOC officials, this capability was eliminated in the early 1990s as part of the Command’s response to reduced personnel authorizations. Nevertheless, collecting feedback from customers is a good management practice. The Government Performance and Results Act as well as prior GAO reports reference the need to obtain and analyze data related to the quality of services provided by and to government organizations. Obtaining feedback from customers is an important aspect of assessing the quality of services. Without a systematic process to collect and evaluate customer feedback information, the ability to plan and prioritize workload based on customers’ needs is hindered.

The Command decided in fiscal year 2002 to reestablish a quality assurance program. According to TRADOC officials, the program’s objectives would be to (1) establish and maintain an organizational structure within TRADOC to ensure the quality and standardization of education/training across components; (2) ensure that all components are trained to the same standard and trained to perform in a contemporary operating environment; (3) ensure that students can perform to training standards; and (4) ensure that education/training meets the needs of the legacy, interim, and objective forces. However, it is unclear how many

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12 The Government and Performance and Results Act requires federal agencies to set strategic goals, measure performance, and report on the degree to which the goals are met. Its intent is to focus agencies more on results, service delivery, and program outcomes (P.L. 103-62, 1993).


14 According to the Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook No. 02-8, Operation Enduring Freedom Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, the contemporary operational environment is the overall operational environment that exists today and in the near future, out to the year 2020. The range of threats during this period extends from smaller, lower-technology opponents using more adaptive, asymmetric methods to larger, modernized forces able to engage deployed U.S. forces in more conventional, symmetrical ways.
resources TRADOC would be able to allocate to this program and whether the program would incorporate a customer feedback component.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army Leadership Panels and FORSCOM Officials</th>
<th>Believe the Quality of TRADOC Products Has Declined</th>
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</table>

Two recent Army training and leader development panels and various FORSCOM officials indicate that the quality of TRADOC’s products—such as well-trained soldiers and adequate field manuals and training materials—has declined. Also, officials at FORSCOM Headquarters and at one of its major installations, Fort Hood, Texas, provided us with anecdotal information about the quality of TRADOC’s products that reinforced the panels’ observations.

During 2001 and 2002, two Army Training and Leader Development Panels—one representing officers and one representing noncommissioned officers—raised issues about the quality of TRADOC’s products. The purpose of these panels, which were chartered by the Army Chief of Staff, was to assess the quality of the Army’s training and leader development programs and identify areas needing improvement. In particular, the panels were to determine the relevancy of existing training and leader development programs to the needs of the future forces. The first panel focused on evaluating training and leader development efforts related to commissioned officers, and the second panel focused on noncommissioned officers.

- The officer panel concluded that (1) TRADOC was not providing the Army with up-to-date training and educational products due to a severe lack of training development resources; (2) TRADOC was not updating or developing training and education products fast enough to support both the current and future forces; (3) many of the foundational publications and products related to standards-based training and leader development were obsolete; and (4) mechanisms for evaluating training and leader development programs were lacking. The panel made the general observation that the Army’s combat forces were evolving at a pace that was not allowing the institutional training base to provide up-to-date training and educational products.

- The noncommissioned officer panel presented similar but more detailed conclusions than the officer panel. The panel noted, among other things, that (1) more than 40 percent of Army military occupational specialties did not have current manuals; (2) the Army training and development standards had deteriorated since the early 1990s; and (3) the Army’s failure to keep its standards up to date since the Gulf War had created a generation of senior noncommissioned officers that do not know and are not executing the principles and processes of Army training doctrine.
FORSCOM’s observations complement the findings of the two Training and Leader Development Panels. FORSCOM officials consistently noted that soldiers graduating from TRADOC schools are not as well trained as they once were because TRADOC no longer has the number of personnel it needs to ensure comprehensive, quality training. Nor did they feel that TRADOC had adequately developed or communicated a strategy for training personnel on digital equipment like the new Army Battle Command System. Moreover, they noted that some of the equipment being used for training was not current, and thus the training being provided on those systems was not properly preparing soldiers to operate the equipment that their operational units were using. For example, they said that armor officers were being trained on older versions of Abrams tanks at TRADOC, while several operational units were already using newer digitized versions. Several armor battalion commanders at Fort Hood said that they had to frequently provide individual training to armor officers coming from TRADOC’s Armor School in order to familiarize the officers with the digital equipment being used in battalion tanks.

Some FORSCOM officials also expressed concerns about the age of Army doctrine publications, several of which are Cold War-era documents. They noted that the lack of current doctrinal publications causes units in FORSCOM to develop battlefield tactics, techniques, and procedures based on doctrinal foundations that do not reflect the current operating environment. FORSCOM officials did note one exception to their general observations about doctrine: they believed TRADOC had provided both timely and quality doctrine development and related support for the new Stryker brigades.

TRADOC Likely to Face Additional Workload Challenges as the Army’s “Architect of the Future”

TRADOC’s ability to meet its future responsibilities will likely be challenged because the Command continues to acquire new mission requirements that will continue to compound its already large workload backlogs. For example, Army transformation requirements will continue to place new demands on TRADOC over the next several years.\(^{15}\) Transformation will bring changes in equipment as the Army modernizes existing equipment and transitions to the interim and objective forces.

This, in turn, will necessitate changes in operating concepts, doctrine, and training.

The Army’s plans, however, do not call for the total elimination of current capabilities. While it is developing the objective force and establishing the interim force, such as the Stryker brigades, the Army plans to sustain, recapitalize (upgrade and rebuild), and modernize many of the systems currently in use. For example, all of the Abrams tanks currently in the Army’s arsenal will eventually be equipped with digital battlefield command systems as part of modernization and transformation efforts and will remain in the arsenal until about 2031. Maintaining and upgrading current capabilities will continue to place demands on TRADOC’s combat, doctrine, and training developments mission areas.

Available budget data indicate that TRADOC could face increased funding challenges as the Army proceeds with its transformation efforts and continues to maintain its current weapon systems. We reported in May 2001 that the modernization and transformation of the current force will require significantly more resources—current systems alone would require substantial investment to sustain and modernize. As we noted in the report, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) said on September 6, 2000, that the Army would require $23 billion to modernize its current forces during fiscal years 2002 to 2007, but projected that it would only have about $15.5 billion for that purpose, a $7.5 billion shortfall. Given this magnitude of budget shortfalls, without additional budgetary resources and improved operating efficiencies, the Army will have to make trade-offs between modernization initiatives and operational demands. Moreover, Army Headquarters has not been persuaded to provide TRADOC with significantly more resources, primarily because it does not have extra resources available. Officials involved in prioritizing Army budgetary resources stated that the Army simply had too many other, higher-priority programs and requirements to satisfy before it could provide TRADOC with additional funding.

Both Army Headquarters and TRADOC have actions or plans in process that could affect TRADOC, but it is unclear how these actions will affect the Command’s resource posture or its ability to perform its mission. Armywide actions include the transfer of responsibility for base operations away from all of its commands to a new Armywide organization, a reassessment of the process used to determine personnel requirements for TRADOC and the other institutional forces, and ongoing commercial activities studies that may cause TRADOC to rely more on contractors to support future operations. The Command is also losing some military personnel to the combat forces as part of the Army’s “Manning the Force” initiative. Finally, TRADOC is in the process of developing a commandwide reengineering plan, which is intended to streamline its organizational structure, make better use of information technology, and be more responsive to the Army’s combat forces. Issues and questions related to these various initiatives remain unresolved or unanswered.

As part of its effort to transform, streamline its headquarters, and improve resource management, the Army announced plans in October 2001 to create a new agency for managing all of its base operations activities. The new agency, called the Installation Management Agency (IMA), was activated in October 2002 and assumed management responsibilities for base operations activities such as force protection, logistics, public works, facilities maintenance, and morale and welfare programs under one management organization. The Army hopes to achieve several goals with IMA, which include improving the efficiency and effectiveness of installation management and allowing mission commanders to focus more on maintaining readiness. The Army expects to transfer about 35,000 personnel authorizations and about $8 billion in funding from various Army commands to IMA during fiscal year 2003.

For fiscal year 2001, TRADOC had about 18,100 personnel requirements and about 10,350 personnel authorizations for base operations. The Army began to transfer personnel authorizations and associated funding from TRADOC to IMA in October 2002. As many as 10,000 personnel may be transferred, although the number had not been finalized. The personnel

IMA is comprised of a headquarters located in the Washington, D.C. area and seven regional offices—four located within the continental United States and one each in Hawaii, Germany, and Korea.
authorizations to be transferred represent most of the authorizations allocated to TRADOC’s base operations mission area.

The loss of the base operations mission will result in TRADOC having less flexibility to shift funding among its primary mission areas. In the past, TRADOC has been able to provide additional funding to its higher-priority mission areas by taking some funds from base operations. For example, in fiscal years 1999, 2000, and 2001, the Command moved $115 million, $98 million, and $145 million, respectively, from investment accounts—which were primarily base operations accounts—to training accounts. As a result, TRADOC was able to complete its primary mission—training—at the expense of some base operations activities, such as the maintenance and rehabilitation of facilities. TRADOC officials told us they will no longer have the flexibility to do this after base operations funding is reallocated to IMA.

Army Reassessing Process for Determining Institutional Force Personnel Requirements

The Army is reassessing the process it uses to determine personnel requirements. Army regulations require that the institutional force’s personnel requirements be based on workload. A sound workload analysis is needed to allocate personnel resources among institutional organizations throughout the Army and to ensure that the highest-priority functions and missions are funded first. Moreover, current law specifies that civilian personnel are to be managed solely on the basis of the workload required to carry out the functions and activities of their respective military department and the funds made available to the department. The law also requires the military department secretaries to report annually on their compliance with the provisions of this law.

However, the Army has had longstanding issues with its institutional force personnel requirements, as documented in previously published GAO and Army Audit Agency reports. Since early 1995, the Army has developed

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18 The investment accounts included funds for (a) infrastructure sustainment, rehabilitation, and modernization; (b) facility reduction; (c) integrated training management; and (d) combat developments.

19 The legislative requirements are set out in 10 U.S.C. Section 129; the annual reports are to be completed by February 1 of each year.

plans and taken steps to improve the processes used to develop personnel requirements for the institutional forces. Nevertheless, we reported in May 2001 that the accuracy of the personnel requirements for the Army’s institutional forces was questionable.\(^{21}\) We recommended that, among other things, the Army use the results of Army Manpower Analysis Agency reviews to improve the personnel requirements of the institutional forces.

While some progress to develop more accurate personnel requirements has been made, the Army is still concerned about two primary problems: (1) the validity of workload estimates and the resulting personnel requirements and (2) the extent to which contractors are satisfying workload requirements. For example, in fiscal year 2002, the Army did not have accurate information about the size and use of the contractor workforce. As a result, the Army was unable to report that it was managing its civilian personnel solely on the basis of the workload required to carry out the functions and activities of the department during fiscal year 2002. A major issue involved the extent to which contractors were meeting workload requirements. Although the Army expends about one-third of its total obligation authority for contractor support, its estimates of the number of contractor personnel supporting the Army ranges from about 125,000 to 600,000.\(^{22}\) Without accurate information about the contractor workforce, the Army was not confident that its civilian personnel requirements were valid. In 2002 the Army began an effort to identify the size of its contractor workforce; this effort is still underway.

In early 2002, concerned about the accuracy of its personnel requirements and the widening gap between personnel requirements and authorizations, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans within Army Headquarters initiated a study of the requirements determination process.


\(^{22}\) The estimate is based on a study sponsored by the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower & Reserve Affairs), which was completed in March 2002. The Assistant Secretary (Manpower & Reserve Affairs) is responsible for Army personnel policies.
The intent of the study was twofold—to arrive at a process that produces valid requirements and to strengthen the role of Army leadership components in the review and approval of the requirements. Among other things, the study team proposed in August 2002 that personnel requirements simply be adjusted downward so that they would equal personnel authorizations. This proposal applied to TRADOC even though its personnel requirements determination process had previously been certified as valid by the Army’s Manpower Analysis Agency. The proposed change in the process was expected to pressure the commands that comprise the institutional force to rejustify their respective personnel requirements and give Army Headquarters more control over the process. However, the commands, as well as some Headquarters offices, opposed the proposal for several reasons. They believed that it did not (a) acknowledge valid requirements processes that were already in place; (b) acknowledge existing workload backlogs in excess of resource levels, which makes areas of risk more visible to senior managers; (c) acknowledge the role the commands play in validating requirements; and (d) comply with legislative requirements to manage personnel requirements solely on the basis of workload. As a result of the commands’ concerns, the proposal has been abandoned. However, the study team continues to seek out other options for strengthening senior Army managers’ control over the process and to identify potential new policy guidance related to the personnel requirements determination process for institutional forces. The follow-on study is not expected to be completed until sometime during fiscal year 2003.

Commercial Activity Studies Likely to Reduce Personnel Requirements and Authorizations

Studies conducted as part of the Army’s commercial activities program will likely lead to some reduction in personnel authorizations at TRADOC. To help meet DOD force reshaping and downsizing goals, the Army established a goal for TRADOC to study about 13,600 positions under Office of Management Budget Circular A-76. One goal of the A-76 studies is to identify commercial functions that could be performed more efficiently, either by a streamlined in-house workforce or a contract with the private sector.

23 The Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans is responsible for conducting the Total Army Analysis, which determines the allocation of personnel resources among the operational and institutional forces. Within Operations and Plans, the Force Management Division has had a long-standing role in determining personnel allocations for the Army’s combat forces. The Force Management Division was the sponsor of this study and believes it needs to be more involved in allocating personnel authorizations to the institutional forces. The Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans also receives TRADOC’s monthly status reports on readiness.
sector. In either case, the required number of personnel authorizations would likely be reduced—either because the in-house workforce would become more efficient and would not require as many staff or because the function would no longer be performed by current federal employees. However, these studies by themselves will not free personnel for assignment to other mission areas where shortages exist.

Most of TRADOC’s commercial activity studies were initiated in fiscal years 1997 and 1999. Because studies generally take from 2 to 4 years to complete, TRADOC did not begin to implement decisions until fiscal year 2001. As of November 2002, decisions on 39 of the 57 studies had been made. Decisions implemented thus far resulted in a majority of the activities under study going to private-sector contractors. Remaining decisions will not be made until sometime in fiscal year 2003. Table 3 shows the status of the studies.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1997</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Studies announced</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total positions to be studied</td>
<td>4,833</td>
<td>3,999</td>
<td>8,832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>4,709</td>
<td>2,043</td>
<td>6,752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>1,956</td>
<td>2,080</td>
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<tr>
<td>Studies completed</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positions retained in-house</td>
<td>935</td>
<td>1,429</td>
<td>2,364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positions to contract</td>
<td>3,898</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>4,321</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TRADOC.

The studies reviewed a number of commercial activities; however, most of the larger studies fell within the base operations mission area and involved the logistics and public works functions. Because TRADOC’s base operations mission was transferred to IMA beginning in October 2002, the Command will not be affected in the future by most of these studies. Of TRADOC’s remaining primary mission areas, training and training support will be most affected by some of the smaller commercial activities studies that are currently underway.

In addition to the above studies that are nearing completion, the Army announced plans in October 2002 to further study all of its functions that do not necessarily require military personnel to perform. If these plans are carried out, Army officials estimate that as many as 150,000 personnel
authorizations Armywide could be eliminated as work shifts to the private sector. To what extent this will affect TRADOC remains to be seen.

Further, although commercial activity studies can reduce TRADOC’s personnel requirements and improve operating efficiencies, they can increase the Command’s budget requirements when their outcome results in military positions being replaced by civilian or contractor personnel. In these instances, the Army plans to reallocate the military positions to other needs. However, the increase in budgetary requirements occurs because the Command must budget for the cost of its civilian personnel and contractors, which are paid from O&M funds. They no longer have the benefit of the military personnel who were paid by Army Headquarters from centrally managed funds. These additional costs are referred to as “military buy-back” costs. In September 2001, TRADOC estimated that its military buy-back costs would be about $44 million, $90 million, and $92 million for fiscal years 2002, 2003, and 2004, respectively.

The Army’s “Manning the Force” initiative was announced in fiscal year 2000 and is intended, in part, to transfer military personnel from the institutional to the operational forces to improve the readiness of combat forces. This initiative will continue at least through fiscal year 2003. Initially, TRADOC expected to lose about 1,400 military personnel to the combat units as a result of the “Manning the Force” initiative. Since a lack of military personnel is already contributing to workload backlogs and low readiness reports, the initiative is not likely to improve TRADOC’s ability to reduce backlogs and improve readiness. Furthermore, the loss of authorized military personnel will not free funds for the Command because, as discussed above, military personnel are not paid from TRADOC’s O&M funds.

However, TRADOC officials were not able to identify the number of military personnel that either have been or will be sent to the combat units as a result of the “Manning the Force” initiative. They explained that several initiatives affecting the number of military personnel assigned to TRADOC, such as “Quicksilver,” were already underway when the “Manning the Force” initiative began.
transformation. They believe that an overhaul is needed because (1) the rapid pace of change related to transformation is stressing the systems and processes associated with combat, doctrine, and training development; (2) the current procedures are too resource-intensive; (3) the weapon systems requirements determination process does not respond to the needs of the combat forces in a timely manner; and (4) the cost of maintaining TRADOC’s current organizational structure cannot be sustained.

In May 2002 the Command received approval from the Army Chief of Staff to develop a reengineering plan. Its draft plan, referred to as the TRADOC Transformation Operational and Organizational Plan, is linked to Armywide plans that provide overall strategic direction—the 2002 Army Modernization Plan and the Army Transformation Campaign Plan. The TRADOC plan is based on two primary goals: (1) streamline the Command’s organization and processes and (2) make better and more extensive use of information technology. The Command’s staff is also in the process of updating policies and regulations to support the reengineering effort.

Although TRADOC’s draft plan has not been finalized, the Command is considering the following organizing concepts to help it achieve its goals:

- **Implement new teaming and partnering arrangements.** TRADOC is considering establishing new teaming and partnering arrangements across organizational boundaries to better focus its resources on key mission areas. Command officials believe that this approach will maximize personnel resources and expertise across the Command to produce better products and eventually result in more effective partnership arrangements. As part of this organizing concept, the role of TRADOC Headquarters will evolve from program management to the integration of functions and organizations within TRADOC.

- **Establish a Combined Arms Command.** TRADOC is considering establishing a subcommand, notionally being referred to as a Combined Arms Command. This command will focus on training and leader development. Most of TRADOC’s educational institutions will be placed under this organization, which will oversee the activities of the schools.

- **Centralize development for training materials, doctrine, and combat systems.** TRADOC is considering centralizing development activities as a by-product of its adoption of a standard schoolhouse model (as discussed in the following point). Responsibility for training development, doctrine development, and combat development for the future force would be shifted from the current 26 schools to six primary
battlefield mission areas associated with future combat operations—maneuver, maneuver support, maneuver sustainment, fires, command and control, and special purpose forces. Development of each of these primary battlefield mission areas would be under the command of a general officer. In addition, each primary battlefield mission area would be supported by a battle laboratory. The six battlefield areas would report to the Combined Arms Center, leaving the individual schools to become more focused on the primary mission of training soldiers. TRADOC believes doing this would help the command become more efficient and effective.

- **Readopt the standard schoolhouse model.** After TRADOC was established in the 1970s, it established school houses/training centers (infantry, armor, artillery, etc.) that followed a standard model in the way they were organized and staffed. As resources became more constrained, the schools were given more flexibility to organize in a manner that suited the commanders’ needs and, theoretically, would make the best use of TRADOC resources. Management became more decentralized. TRADOC is considering a move away from the decentralized management approach and back to a standard schoolhouse model. In addition, the schools would be clustered or organized under the primary battlefield mission areas associated with future combat operations.

- **Refocus battle laboratories and centralize their management.** The command’s 11 battle laboratories are currently aligned with TRADOC’s schools. For example, an armor battle laboratory is part of the armor school at Fort Knox, and the infantry battle laboratory is part of the infantry school at Fort Benning. TRADOC is considering centralizing the management of six laboratories and refocusing them on the six primary battlefield mission areas discussed above. TRADOC believes realigning the laboratories, along with creating new teaming and partnering arrangements, will better focus its resources on broader issues, such as Army transformation.

- **Use distance learning more extensively.** Distance learning is expected to become an integral part of the Command’s training curriculum. Implementation of this concept has been underway for some time at TRADOC. In general, it allows soldiers to complete computer-based training courses or selected modules of a course at their permanent duty location rather than traveling to a TRADOC facility to complete the course. TRADOC expects to develop at least 525 distance learning courses by 2010.

TRADOC officials also believe that better and more extensive use of information technology is just as important as the organizational changes it is considering. These officials state that information technology will be the basic building block of the reengineering effort. TRADOC officials believe the Command has to address mission requirements more quickly
with fewer resources. They also believe improved processes built on the latest technology will allow TRADOC and its customers to share data and develop products—such as doctrine, training materials, and operational requirements documents—in a timely manner.

At the time we completed our review of TRADOC, the Command had not yet developed costs and benefits associated with the reengineering plan, and it was not clear to what extent the reengineering effort would result in organizational realignments or consolidations that might reduce personnel requirements. TRADOC officials told us that an analysis of costs and benefits would take place and be incorporated into an implementation plan after the reengineering concepts and organizing principles were agreed to within the Army. The analysis is to be completed by mid-fiscal year 2003.

We also inquired about development of performance measures to gauge the progress of the reengineering effort and a human capital plan to support the effort. Ideally, a reengineering effort such as the one being undertaken by TRADOC is guided by an overall strategic framework, which sets out the strategic goals to be attained and performance measures to be used to measure and report progress toward reaching the goals. Moreover, the Government Performance and Results Act requires DOD to develop a strategic framework to improve its performance. In addition, it is important for DOD and its components to align their human capital policies with their strategic goals. A human capital plan that supports or is integrated with an overall strategic plan can help align the policies and identify the necessary workforce size and skills mix and where those skills need to be deployed. When the right personnel are on board and provided the training, technology, structure, incentives, and accountability to work effectively, the likelihood of organizational success will be increased.

We found that TRADOC recognized the need for performance measures but had not yet developed them. We also found that the Command has not

developed a human capital plan to support the reengineering effort; however, it has identified the elements needed for a human capital plan, which is to be completed during fiscal year 2003. Thus far, the effort addresses civilian personnel and how the Command can better cope with the civilian personnel reductions it has incurred; it does not address workforce issues associated with military personnel or contractors, which, in a broad sense, are also part of the Command’s human capital. Given the personnel downsizing that TRADOC has experienced and its potentially increasing reliance on contractors to meet its workload, a human capital plan could help the Command thoroughly assess its personnel requirements and integrate them into the reengineering effort.

Although TRADOC’s budget has increased in recent years, the Command has experienced reductions in personnel authorizations that have challenged it to fully meet its workload in most mission areas. TRADOC data indicate that its primary problems relate to personnel shortages, and its readiness reports indicate that more than two-thirds of its units were not ready to perform their missions due primarily to a lack of personnel. Most of the training workload is getting done, but a significant amount of mission work associated with training material, doctrine, and combat developments is not. In addition, TRADOC does not know how well it is accomplishing its mission because it does not have a process in place to obtain systematic feedback from its customers on the quality and relevance of its training and doctrine. Without this type of information, the Army and TRADOC are not in a sound position to fully assess the Command’s mission effectiveness, which could lead to inefficient allocation of resources and ranking of requirement priorities. Army Headquarters officials are aware of some of TRADOC’s difficulties, but, operating within existing resource constraints, officials have had to make difficult choices and allocate resources to higher Army priorities.

However, issues related to TRADOC’s personnel and workload could take on more importance as the Army continues its transformation efforts and, if not adequately addressed, could place the Command at increased risk in its role as the Army’s architect of the future. TRADOC is currently developing a plan to reengineer its mission areas. The extent to which this effort could lead to organizational consolidations and reduced personnel requirements remains to be seen. A broad assessment of TRADOC’s workload requirements and backlogs in conjunction with its reengineering plans would help it set its future direction. Because the Command’s reengineering effort is still evolving, the Army and TRADOC have an opportunity to establish a plan based on a strategic framework for
addressing resource and mission requirements, human capital, reengineering costs, and performance measures.

### Recommendations for Executive Action

To ensure that TRADOC retains sufficient resources to carry out all of its missions in an effective and efficient manner—supporting current forces as well as the transformation effort—we recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower & Reserve Affairs) to work with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, as part of their personnel and force management oversight responsibilities, to examine TRADOC’s workload requirements, the adequacy of TRADOC’s resources, and TRADOC’s mission performance as it finalizes plans for its reengineering efforts. In doing this, action is needed to

- reassess TRADOC’s backlog of current work and future work requirements across all mission areas to ensure that all personnel requirements are identified and validated before further reducing TRADOC’s personnel authorizations;
- develop a human capital plan in conjunction with TRADOC’s reengineering plan that addresses issues associated with the mix and skills of civilian, military, and contractor personnel;
- establish performance measures to gauge progress and identify the costs and benefits associated with the reengineering effort; and
- develop a feedback system so TRADOC is acquiring the best information possible about the quality and relevance of the products and services it provides to its customers.

### Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program Integration) stated that the department agreed with the recommendations related to TRADOC’s reengineering process without elaborating on planned actions, but expressed various concerns about the recommendations related to reassessing TRADOC’s personnel requirements and developing a customer feedback system—leaving unclear what overall actions would be taken. The department’s written comments are reprinted in Appendix III.

DOD interpreted our recommendation to reassess TRADOC’s backlog of current workload and personnel requirements before further reducing TRADOC’s personnel authorizations as a recommendation to fence TRADOC’s current work force, and it cited resource constraints and competing demands as making it impractical to do so. Further, the department’s response expressed concern that our report did not quantify
the resources required to remedy backlogs in training material, doctrine, and combat developments. Our recommendation was not intended to be taken in isolation or to suggest an absolute fencing of TRADOC personnel, but rather to encourage a reassessment of workload and personnel requirements as part of TRADOC’s ongoing reengineering effort. Likewise, our intent was not to quantify the resources required to remedy the backlogs of work in the various areas noted. That effort can best be done by the Army in the context of a number of considerations. From our perspective, the Army and TRADOC have several options if they are to effectively deal with reported shortfalls in personnel related to workload requirements. The options include identifying functions and activities that may no longer be required, identifying opportunities to reduce personnel requirements or reallocate resources through its reengineering efforts, obtaining additional resources, or some combination of these. Given that TRADOC’s reengineering effort is still underway, and we understand that TRADOC’s new commander has recently directed his staff to focus on the potential for reducing workload requirements, it remains unclear what changes in resource requirements will ultimately be necessary. Given the resource constraints identified by TRADOC commanders in their monthly readiness reports, we continue to believe it appropriate that TRADOC reassess its work requirements as part of its reengineering efforts.

Concerning our recommendation for developing a customer feedback system, DOD commented that existing informal feedback mechanisms help evaluate TRADOC’s support to its customers. It indicated they would evaluate our recommendations in terms of the costs, benefits, and likely accuracy of more formal reporting processes. DOD also noted that it would evaluate potential incentives for TRADOC to further improve product relevance and customer responsiveness as part of the TRADOC reengineering process. Separately, DOD expressed concern that our report did not quantify the impact of shortcomings noted in our report on operational force readiness. Our assessment of impact was, aside from information contained in TRADOC’s readiness reports, more qualitative in nature based on the results of internal Army studies and our limited discussions with leaders in the Army’s Forces Command. Given the nature of the concerns identified, we continue to believe that the Army could benefit from a more formal feedback system, one that, if appropriately designed, could be useful to the Army in better determining how well TRADOC supports the operational readiness of the combat forces. Absent such a system, it will be more difficult to fully assess the impact of the shortcomings noted in our report.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and interested congressional committees and members. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have questions concerning this report, please contact me on (202) 512-8412 or holmanb@gao.gov. Other GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are identified in appendix IV.

Barry W. Holman, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

As requested by the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Readiness, we examined the workload, funding levels, and personnel resources at the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Our review was structured to determine if the Command was adequately resourced to carry out its mission. Our specific review objectives were to examine (1) TRADOC’s personnel, budget, and workload trends since 1995; (2) the impact of personnel and budget changes on the Command’s ability to perform its mission and deliver well-trained soldiers to combat forces; and (3) the actions taken or planned that could have an effect on the Command’s ability to perform its mission.

To determine the extent to which TRADOC has experienced budget, personnel, and workload changes over the past several years, we met with Army Headquarters and TRADOC budget, personnel, operations, and training officials. Pertinent budget, personnel, and workload documentation/data were obtained and analyzed to determine the magnitude of the changes. We focused our analyses primarily on documentation from fiscal years 1995 through 2001 because we were able to obtain more complete information for these years. Fiscal year 2002 budget data had not been finalized at the time we completed our analysis. We also examined relevant DOD and Army senior leader guidance, including the Quadrennial Defense Review Report, the Army Transformation Campaign Plan, TRADOC mid-year budget reviews, and TRADOC command plans. We also discussed the allocation of Army personnel among its commands resulting from the Total Army Analysis process. We identified the primary TRADOC mission areas—combat development, doctrine development, training and training development, accessions (more commonly referred to as recruiting), and base operations—and structured our analysis of budget, personnel, and workload data around these mission areas. Our analysis of budget data was limited to budgetary obligations for the fiscal years we reviewed. Our analysis of personnel data compared the differences in required, authorized, and available personnel for fiscal years 1995 through 2001. We also discussed and reviewed available documentation pertinent to the process used by TRADOC to develop and validate its personnel requirements. We held discussions and reviewed documentation with TRADOC, Army Manpower Analysis Agency, and Army Force Management Support Agency representatives. The documentation included mathematical models and studies completed by TRADOC to develop manpower estimating criteria. We also compared the changes in TRADOC’s civilian and military authorizations with those of the total active Army and two of the Army’s largest commands—Army Materiel Command and Forces Command—to put the personnel changes into an
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

overall Army context. We also identified the changes in budgetary resources allocated to TRADOC’s mission areas for fiscal years 1995 through 2001. Because aspects of TRADOC’s accessions mission were added to its responsibilities in fiscal year 1998 and subsequently eliminated from its responsibilities, we excluded the accessions mission when we analyzed the trends in personnel and workload. This included personnel requirements, which averaged about 12,400 for fiscal years 1998 through 2000, and personnel authorizations, which averaged about 11,900 for this 3-year period. The analyses that excluded the accessions mission are noted, where appropriate, in the report.

To determine the effect of personnel and budget changes on the Command’s ability to perform its mission, we met with officials from TRADOC and Forces Command Headquarters and several of their installations. At TRADOC Headquarters we discussed and obtained documentation related to the Command’s ability to measure mission effectiveness. This included reviewing the Command’s monthly readiness reports for the period November 2000 through April 2002 for all of its schools and training facilities; these reports are provided to the Army Chief of Staff each month. We also compared TRADOC’s readiness reports with DOD’s Institutional Training Readiness reports issued during the same period to identify similarities and/or differences between the two; the Institutional Training Readiness reports are provided to Congress annually. At the TRADOC facilities we visited—the armor school, the air defense school, and the infantry school—we discussed the resources available to support the facilities’ workload. We also identified examples of impacts that resulted from resource shortages and obtained information about how the facilities were measuring their mission effectiveness. At Forces Command Headquarters and one of its heavy armor installations, Fort Hood, we discussed the quality of soldiers coming out of TRADOC schools and requested available data that measured the quality of TRADOC products—trained soldiers, doctrine, and training support materials. We also reviewed numerous reports and analyses of agencies and groups that have examined TRADOC—such as RAND Corporation, TRADOC Analysis Center, and the Defense Science Board—to obtain any additional observations and findings not revealed during our review of TRADOC.

To identify Army actions taken or planned that might have an effect on the Command’s ability to perform its mission, we met with Army Headquarters officials and TRADOC officials to discuss past, current, or future initiatives that could affect the resources TRADOC will have available to carry out its mission. During these discussions, we obtained documentation and
testimonial evidence regarding several initiatives. These included the Command’s commercial activities program, the Armywide Transformation of Installation Management initiative, and the Command’s plan to reengineer itself. We analyzed the impact of the commercial activities program, which is being carried out under OMB’s Circular A-76 process, on TRADOC’s budget and personnel since fiscal year 1995. We determined the number of positions announced for competition, the number of positions awarded to contractors, and the number of positions retained by TRADOC’s in-house workforce. We also discussed the scope and implementation schedule for the Army’s Transformation of Installation Management initiative, which is an Armywide program that is moving base operations and support from garrison commanders to a new agency called the Army Installation Management Agency. Finally, we discussed the status of plans to reengineer TRADOC, which involves organizational streamlining and better use of information technology.

We communicated regularly with Department of the Army and TRADOC officials during the analysis process to ensure that our analysis appropriately considered their views, and we conducted work at the following locations:

- Army Headquarters, Pentagon, Arlington, Virginia;
- TRADOC Headquarters, Fort Monroe, Virginia;
- Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky;
- Air Defense School, Fort Bliss, Texas;
- Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia;
- Forces Command Headquarters, Fort McPherson, Georgia;
- 4th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas;
- Army Manpower Analysis Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia; and

We conducted our review from September 2001 through October 2002 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Since the early 1990s, the Army’s civilian and military personnel authorizations have been significantly reduced as DOD reshaped and reduced the size of its institutional and operational forces. Overall, the Army’s authorizations for civilian and active duty military personnel have been reduced by about 41.5 percent and 33.8 percent, respectively, since fiscal year 1991. The following figures show the reductions for the Army and three of its largest commands: TRADOC; the Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), which provides unit training for combat forces; and the Army Materiel Command (AMC), which is responsible for acquiring and supporting weapon systems.

Figure 11: Army Civilian Personnel Authorization Trends for Selected Commands, Fiscal Years 1991-2001

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal year</th>
<th>FY91</th>
<th>FY92</th>
<th>FY93</th>
<th>FY94</th>
<th>FY95</th>
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<th>FY99</th>
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<th>FY01</th>
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<td>TRADOC</td>
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<td>29,039</td>
<td>23,798</td>
<td>23,870</td>
<td>21,736</td>
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<td>19,466</td>
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<td>18,718</td>
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<tr>
<td>FORSCOM</td>
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<td>27,651</td>
<td>30,500</td>
<td>26,493</td>
<td>23,822</td>
<td>20,376</td>
<td>17,537</td>
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<td>19,484</td>
<td>16,009</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMC</td>
<td>91,348</td>
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<td>82,359</td>
<td>70,057</td>
<td>67,358</td>
<td>65,685</td>
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<td>60,973</td>
<td>59,682</td>
<td>54,772</td>
<td>49,787</td>
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<td>369,600</td>
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<td>289,500</td>
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<td>232,500</td>
<td>224,900</td>
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<td>216,400</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Army and TRADOC.

Note: GAO analysis of Army and TRADOC data.

1 The totals do not include members of the Army Reserve and National Guard.
Appendix II: Overview of Armywide Personnel Reductions

Figure 12: Army Military Personnel Authorization Trends for Selected Commands, Fiscal Years 1991-2001

As shown by these figures, all three commands realized significant reductions in civilian personnel. Table 4 summarizes the reductions that occurred from fiscal year 1991 through fiscal year 2001.

Note: GAO analysis of Army and TRADOC data.
### Table 4: Reductions in Army Personnel Authorizations for the Active Army and Selected Commands between Fiscal Years 1991 and 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Civilian personnel</th>
<th>Military personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of reductions</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Army</td>
<td>153,200</td>
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<td>TRADOC</td>
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<td>FORSCOM</td>
<td>10,056</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMC</td>
<td>41,561</td>
<td>-45.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Army.

Note: GAO analysis of Army data.
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

Mr. Barry W. Holman
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
United States General Accounting Office
Washington, DC 20548

Dear Mr. Holman:

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft report, DEFENSE MANAGEMENT: Army Needs to Address Resource and Mission Requirements Affecting Its Training and Doctrine Command, dated December 13, 2002 (GAO Code 350113).

We support the recommendations that suggest improvements to the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) re-engineering process, but take specific issue with the report’s recommendation that no further reduction of TRADOC’s military or civilian personnel occur until this review is completed. We do not believe it appropriate to fence TRADOC’s current work force mix or resourcing based on the data supplied in the draft report alone. Further, resource constraints and competing demands, particularly the global war on terrorism, make it impractical for the Army to fence TRADOC authorization levels until process improvements have been implemented.

We are also concerned that the report does not quantify the resources required to remedy backlogs in training material, doctrine, and combat developments, nor does it quantify the impact of those backlogs on operational force readiness. The report acknowledges that contractors may be mitigating some doctrine-writing workload, but forces Army G-3, rather than TRADOC as claimant for additional resources, to quantify the magnitude of that offset.

In addition, the report cites the absence of processes for systematic customer feedback on the quality and relevance of TRADOC’s products. Although there’s always room for improvement, existing informal feedback mechanisms help evaluate TRADOC’s support to its customers. We plan to evaluate the GAO recommendations in terms of the costs, benefits and likely accuracy of more formal reporting processes. Further, we will evaluate potential incentives for TRADOC to further improve product relevance and customer responsiveness during the TRADOC business process re-engineering effort.

My point of contact is Colonel Sid Evans of the Requirements Directorate, (703) 695-0813, sidney.evans@osd.mil.

Sincerely,

Jeanne B. Fites
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Program Integration)

JAN 13 2003
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

James E. Fuquay, (937) 258-7963

Acknowledgments

In addition to the person named above, James Hatcher, Nancy Lively, Travis Masters, Debra McKinney, Robert Preston, and R.K. Wild made key contributions to this report.
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